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Canon 18 – A lawyer shall reserve his client with competence and diligence
SANCHEZ v. ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS, A.C. No. 10543 (16 March 2016)
FACTS:
 Sanchez has charged Atty. Aguilos with misconduct for the latter’s refusal to
return the amount of Php 70,000, which she had paid for his professional
services despite not having performed the contemplated professional
services.
 Sanchez avers that she sought the legal services of the respondent to
represent her in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband.
However, she subsequently withdrew the case from him, and requested the
refund of the amount paid. Atty. Aguilos refuses to do so as he has already
started working on the case.
 A letter was sent through Atty. Martinez to demand the return of payment less
the amount corresponded to the legal services performed. Atty. Aguilos did
not heed to the demand letter.
 Thus, Sanchez brought an administrative complaint for his constant refusal to
return the amount paid.
 IBP declared that the respondent’s insistence that he could have brought a
petition for legal separation based on the psychological incapacity of the
complainant’s husband was sanctionable because he himself was not
conversant with the grounds for legal separation; also, recommended that
Atty. Aguilos be suspended for 6 months.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent should be held administratively liable for misconduct
RULING: YES. SC fines Php 10,000 for misrepresenting his professional competence,
reprimands him for use of offensive language towards his fellow attorney, and orders
to return the Php 70,000 within 30 days from notice.
RATIO:
 Atty. Aguilos misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the
complainant. He did not know the distinction between the grounds for legal
separation and for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have been
basic and expected of him as a lawyer accepting a professional engagement
of either causes of action. As such, he failed to live up to the standards of
attorneys.
 Canon 18 (Rule 18.01-18.03) was violated.
o Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
DONGA-AS v. ATTY. ROSE BEATRIX CRUZ-ANGELES AND WYLIE M. PALER,
A.C. No. 11113 (9 August 2016)
FACTS:
 Petitioner engaged in the legal services of respondents for the annulment of
his marriage with his wife, Mutya. Respondents informed petitioner that it will
cost him Php 300,000 (Php 100k – payable immediately ; Php 100k – after
final hearing)
 From then, respondent constantly followed up but the petitioners could not
present any petition and offered excuses for the delay, such as not having
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been able to communicate to the judge who they insinuated to favorable
resolve the petition.
 Later, respondent’s asked for additional Php 250,000 in order to continue
working on the case. However, no progress took place.
 Petitioner received a message from respondent informing him that NSO bore
no record of his marriage. Upon checking, petitioner learned that such is not
true as it was only said to cover up the delay in the filing of petition.
 Frustrated, petitioner decided to terminate the engagement and demanded for
refund. Respondents refured to return and in fact sent two more additional
billings. Thus, petitioner filed Complaint-Affidavit before IBP.
 IBP recommended the penalty of 4 months suspension but exonerated Atty.
Grandea from any liability. It later increased the recommended penalty to 2
years.
ISSUE: W/N Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler should be held administratively liable for
violating CPR.
RULING: YES. SC found respondents guilty of violating Rule 1.01. Canon 1, Canon 7,
Canon 11, Rule 18.03, Canon 18 and Rule 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of CPR. Each
are suspended for 3 years, and ordered to return the legal fees received.
RATIO:
 Even after 5 months, respondents failed to file appropriate pleading and could
not show a finished draft of such. This shows violation of Canon 18, which is
neglect of legal matter entrusted to them by their client.
 Once a lawyer takes us the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the
latter with competence, and to attent to such client’s cause with diligence, care
and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by
his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable.
Rule 18.01 – Shall not undertake legal service if unqualified
De Juan vs. Atty. Oscar Baria III
A.C. No. 5817
May 27, 2004
Facts:
 Respondent Atty. Baria III, after passing the bar in 1999, was employed as a
broadcaster in DWANs radio program offering free legal services to the poor.
Wherein, according to him, he gave free legal services to indigent clients one
of whom was complainant
 According to petitioner, she asked the assistance of Banahaw Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC), which assigned respondent to handle her labor case.
Respondent represented complainant on a contingency fee agreement.
 Petitioner claims that she was illegally terminated from her work as packer (on
probation status for six months) in Triple AAA’s Pacing Department.
 Emma claims that she was terminated without notice nor explanation so she
filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
 Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
against the company for illegal dismissal, non-payment of premium pay for
holiday, rest day, and 13th month pay.
 The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Emma but upon appeal of
Triple AAA, NLRC reversed the decision.
 Complainant blamed respondent for the reversal. She said that she came to
know of the reversal of the Labor Arbiters decision when she called
respondent in October 2001. When she asked the respondent what they
should do, respondent answered, “Paano iyan ihaehhindi ako marunong
gumawa ng Motion for Reconsideration.”
 According to respondent, petitioner lied to him about her employment and that
after he told her of their possibility of losing the case, she never contacted him
again.
 Respondent also said that he received calls from the staff of Raffy Tulfo, a
radio commentator. In one of these calls, his wife talked to one of Tulfos
employees and she was told that complainant told Tulfo that the respondent
received money from Triple AAA Antique. As a result Tulfo lambasted him on
his radio program.
 When respondents secretary confronted the husband regarding the Tulfo
incident, complainants husband retorted, Sabihin mo sa kanya mag ingat siya
at baka may mangyari sa kanya. Shortly thereafter, respondent began
receiving death threats over the phone and also noticed armed men casing
his office. He reported these calls and presence of suspicious armed men to
the police.
Issue: whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant
disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainant a motion for reconsideration from
the decision of the NLRC.
Held: FINED in the amount of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of this
or similar offense will be dealt with more severely
 The records reveal that indeed the respondent did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the NLRC such that the said decision eventually had
become final and executory.
 His excuse that he did not know how to file a motion for reconsideration is
lame and unacceptable.
 It was incumbent upon counsel to diligently return to his books and re-
familiarize himself with the procedural rules for a motion for reconsideration
Doctrines:
 One a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity
to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
 Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is,
until the case becomes final and executory.
 A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services
without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances.
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 A lawyer is expected to be familiar with these rudiments of law and procedure
and anyone who acquires his service is entitled to not just competent service
but also whole-hearted devotion to his clients cause.
 It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and
he should exert his best efforts to protect within the bounds of law the interest
of his client.
Rollon vs. Atty. Camilo Naraval, supra.
Rule 18.02 – Shall adequately prepare
Rule 18.03 – Shall be liable for neglect of legal matters
Fabie vs. Atty. Leonardo M. Real
A.C. 10572
September 20, 2016
Facts:
 Patrick Fabie, petitioner, claims that a parcel of land was donated to him by
his sister, Jaynie, to support his intended application for immigration.
 This plan to immigrate did not push through hence he engaged the services
of respondent, Atty. Leonardo M. Real, to facilitate the return of ownership of
the said property to Jaynie.
 According to the complainant, he gave respondent the necessary documents
for the transfer of ownership as well as the amount of 40, 000 to answer for
the expenses to be incurred plus the professional fees. This was evidenced
by an acknowledgement receipt.
 However, more than a year passed, none has been accomplished.
 Complainant sought for the return of items received by the respondent
 Respondent only returned TCT No. R-1971 but not the sum of 40 thousand
and other documents.
 As demand letters for the return of money were left unheeded, complainant
was constrained to file against respondent with the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP.
 Respondent admitted hat received the items in the receipt but on a different
date for a different purpose, which according to him was for the settling of the
estate of complainant’s father, Esteban Fabie, however the heirs had a
change of heart and took back the documents and the money on November
28 2010.
Issue: Whether or not respondent committed a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
Held: YES. SUSPENDED for 6 months, ordered to return the 40 thousand pesos +
interest of 12% per annum from the time he received the amount
 RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence
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 Respondent failed to competently and diligently discharge his duty when he
was unable to cause the transfer of ownership property form complainant
Jaynie.
 Despite doing nothing, he even obstinately refused to return the 30 thousand
he received as attorney’s fees.
 His inability to properly discharge his duty to his client makes him answerable
not just to him but also to the court, the legal profession, and to the general
public.
 IBP Board o Governors recommends that respondent be suspended from the
practice f law for a period of 2 years
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Barbuco v. Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran, A.C. No. 5092 (11 August 2004)
RECIT-READY: Lucila through her son Benito engaged the services of Atty. Beltran for
the filing of an appeal before the CA from the decision of RTC Cavite in a civil case
where Lucila is the defendant. Atty. Beltran filed the Appellant’s Brief 43 days late,
which caused the dismissal of the MR. In his defense, Atty. Beltran averred that he met
a vehicular accident and suffered head injuries which caused him to forget his
deadlines. SC held that such is no excuse since he is a member of a law firm composed
of not just one lawyer and he could have asked his partners to file the brief or a Motion
for Extension on his behalf. His failure to file brief within the reglementary period
certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence.
DOCTRINE: Every member of the Bar should always bear in mind that every case that
a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless
of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer’s fidelity to the
cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be
expected of him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect the interest of his
client within the bounds of the law. The CPR dictates that a lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence and he should not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him.
FACTS:
 Lucila S. Barbuco filed a complaint against Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran for
malpractice of law, negligence and dishonesty.
 Complainant, through her son, Benito B. Sy, engaged the services of
respondent for the purpose of filing an appeal before the CA from the decision
of the RTC of Cavite in a civil case where complainant is the defendant. She
gave the total sum of P3,500.00 for payment of the docket fees.
 Complainant’s appeal was dismissed by the CA for failure to file Appellant’s
Brief, pursuant to Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Complainant found out only on June 4, 1999, when her son went to the CA to
verify the status of the case.
 Beltran averred:
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o That the docket fees were paid on time and that on September 22,
1998, he filed the Appellant’s Brief with the CA. However, the appeal
was dismissed;
o That on October 19, 1998, respondent filed a MR, on the ground that
he received the notice to file brief on June 25, 1998; however, on
June 26, 1998, he met a vehicular accident which physically
incapacitated him for several days; and that as a result of the
accident, he suffered head injuries which caused him to lose track of
deadlines for the filing of pleadings;
o That on March 9, 1999, the MR was denied on the ground that the
brief for defendant-appellant was filed 43 days late.
 IBP Commission on Bar Discipline: Beltran be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of 5 years.
 IBP Board of Governors: affirmed the recommendation but modified the
recommended period to 6 months only.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Beltran violated Rule 18.03 of the CPR.
HELD: YES. Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran is SUSPENDED for a period of 6 MONTHS.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
 Rule 18.03 of the CPR for Lawyers states: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
 An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and
with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief within the reglementary period
certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of 43 days
resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.
 The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular accident and suffered
physical injuries cannot serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on time
considering that he was a member of a law firm (Beltran, Beltran and Beltran
Law Office) composed of not just one lawyer.
o Respondent could have asked any of his partners in the law office to
file the Appellant’s Brief for him or, at least, to file a Motion for
Extension of Time to file the said pleading.
 In B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, SC ruled that the confusion in the
office of the law firm following the death of one of its partners is not a valid
justification for failing to file the brief. We further ruled in the said case that
upon receipt of the notice to file the brief, the law firm should have re-assigned
the case to another associate.
Roberto P. Nonato v. Atty. Eutiguio M. Fudolin, Jr., A.C. No 10138 (16 June
2015)
RECIT-READY: Roberto’s father, Restituto, owned a real property which became the
subject of ejectment proceedings against Anselmo. Initially, Restituto was represented
by Atty. Garcia but during the pre-trial stage, the latter was replaced by Atty. Fudolin,
Jr.. For failure to submit the parties’ position papers, the case was dismissed. Atty
Fudolin, Jr. filed two MRs to no avail. Restituto died and was succeeded by his heirs.
Roberto and his father were never informed of the dismissal of the case nor the
 Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
subsequent MRs filed by the respondent. Atty. Fudolin, Jr. apologized and asserted
that he suffered from undetected stroke and other illnesses. The SC ruled that the same
is unsatisfactory and merely an afterthought. His failure to file the position paper, and
to inform his client of the status of the case, not only constituted inexcusable
negligence; but it also amounted to evasion of duty.
DOCTRINE: A lawyer is bound to protect his client’s interests to the best of his ability
and with utmost diligence. He should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent, and
efficient manner; and provide the quality of service at least equal to that which he,
himself, would expect from a competent lawyer in a similar situation. By consenting to
be his client’s counsel, a lawyer impliedly represents that he will exercise ordinary
diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by his profession, and
his client may reasonably expect him to perform his obligations diligently. The failure to
meet these standards warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
FACTS:
 Roberto’s father, the late Restituto Nonato, was the registered owner of a real
property at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. The property became the subject of
ejectment proceedings filed by Restituto against Anselmo Tubongbanua,
before the MTC of Hinigaran. When the complaint was filed, Restituto was
represented by Atty. Felino Garcia. However, at the pre-trial stage, Atty.
Garcia was replaced by Atty. Fudolin.
 Although Restituto paid the respondent his acceptance fees, no formal
retainer agreement was executed and no receipts were issued for the
acceptance fees paid.
 Roberto asserted that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings
before the MTC, the respondent failed to fully inform his father Restituto of the
status and developments in the case.
 MTC ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers. Since
neither party complied with the court’s directive, the MTC dismissed the
complaint as well as the counterclaim.
 The respondent filed a MR and justified his failure to file the position paper by
arguing that he misplaced the case records, adding that he was also burdened
with numerous other cases. The MTC denied the motion as well as the second
MR. He also filed a supplemental motion, but the court denied both motions.
 Restituto died and all his properties passed on to his heirs, the complainant
among them.
 Roberto alleges:
o that he and his father Restituto did not know of the ejectment suit’s
dismissal as the respondent had failed to furnish them a copy of the
MTC’s dismissal order;
o that the respondent did not inform them about the filing of the MR or
of its denial by the MTC;
 Because of the patent negligence, Roberto informed the respondent that his
failure to file the position paper could be a ground for his disbarment and,
without the respondent’s intervention, entered into an oral extrajudicial
compromise with the daughter of defendant Anselmo.
 Respondent wrote the complainant and apologized for his repeated failure to
communicate with him. The respondent asserted:
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o that he failed to file the position paper due to his poor health and that
he had suffered a stroke and had become partially blind, which
caused the delay in the preparation of the pleadings in the ejectment
case;
o that he focused on his health for self-preservation, and underwent
vascular laboratory examinations; thus, he failed to communicate
with the late Restituto and the complainant;
o that he never revealed the gravity of his illness to his clients or to the
court out of fear that his disclosure would affect his private practice;
o that because the dismissal was purely based on a technical ground,
he maintained that his failure to file the position paper did not amount
to the abandonment of his client’s case;
 IBP’s Report and Recommendation: Recommended the respondent’s
suspension for one (1) month from the practice of law.
 IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation. The complainant moved to reconsider the resolution but
was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent could be held administratively liable for
negligence in the performance of duty.
HELD: YES. Atty. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. is SUSPENDED for a period of 2 years and
WARNED that the commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with
more severely.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
 Respondent has been remiss in the performance of his duties as Restituto’s
counsel.
 His failure to file the position paper, and to inform his client of the status of the
case, not only constituted inexcusable negligence; but it also amounted
to evasion of duty.
 All these acts violate the Code of Professional Responsibility warranting the
court’s imposition of disciplinary action.
 Respondent’s excuse — that he had an undetected stroke and was suffering
from other illnesses — unsatisfactory and merely an afterthought.
 His medical condition cannot serve as a valid reason to excuse the omission
to file the necessary court pleadings. The respondent could have requested
an extension of time to file the required position paper, or at the very least,
informed his client of his medical condition; all these, the respondent failed to
do.
 Respondent’s subsequent filing of successive pleadings significantly weakens
his health-based excuse. His efforts not only contradict his explanation that
his physical predicament forced him to focus on his illnesses; they also
indicate that his illnesses were not at all incapacitating.
 Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
Dominic Paul D. Lazareto v. Atty. Dennis N. Acorda,
A.C. No. 9603
(16 June 2015)
FACTS:
1. Respondent was a member of the law office Jaromay Baylon Acorda Landrito
& Associates
2. In January 2004, Lazareto and his family engaged the services of the
respondent to handle the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Lazareto’s
father who died intestate
3. They agreed to set the deadline for the filing of the extrajudicial settlement
action on May 26, 2004, to enable the family to avail of a P100,000.00
deduction in estate taxes.
4. They also agreed that titles to a parcel of conjugal land (Lots B & E) at Tomas
Mapua St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, left by the deceased, be transferred to
Lazareto’s mother, Cleotilde D. Lazareto.
5. Lazareto gave the respondent the original duplicate copies of the TCT of the
two lots, together with cash representing the respondent’s acceptance fee
(P50,000.00), and initial deposit to answer for extrajudicial transactions which
include transfer taxes and cost of publication (P70,000.00) for a total of
P120,000.00.
6. Lazareto had followed up the developments with the respondent by phone,
but he could not be contacted until he received a fax message from him asking
for an additional P88,000.00, which Lazareto gave in installments
7. Lazareto had not heard from the respondent all this time, although the lawyer
sent a certain Manny Pacheco (Pacheco), allegedly the liaison officer of the
law firm, to get the second installment of P20,000.00.
8. Lazareto gave additional funds to respondent for property taxes and issuance
of new titles, for additional transfer expenses, and for additional property
taxes.
9. Lazareto and his family entered into negotiations to sell one of the lots with a
certain Mrs. Nel Manzano.
10. They asked the respondent to prepare the deed of sale for the transaction;
however, he failed to attend to it.
11. The family made several follow-ups to no avail
12. Respondent admitted he had lost the TCTs
13. Lazareto requested the respondent to execute an affidavit of loss so that the
family could secure a duplicate copy of the TCT. The respondent did send a
copy of the affidavit of loss, but it was unsigned.
14. Respondent alleged that upon his engagement as counsel by Lazareto’s
family, he advised them that he could not determine the exact date of
completion or termination of his assigned task, considering that he did not
have full control over the processing of documents by the concerned
agencies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent was negligent in carrying out the task entrusted to him by
Lazareto and his family
RULING:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2012-196, dated June 9,
2012, of the IBP Board of Governors is SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Dennis N.
Acorda is ORDERED suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years from and
after notice of this Decision. We also WARN him that the commission of the same or
similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.
RATIO:
YES, RESPONDENT WAS NEGLIGENT
1. While the respondent might have manifested, in good faith, his intention to
complete the task referred to him at the earliest possible time, the results
proved otherwise.
2. He did not complete the legal matter referred to him by Lazareto, especially
their agreement that titles to Lots B and E were to be transferred to Lazareto’s
mother Clotilde.
3. Only the TCT of Lot B was delivered to the Lazareto family in late December
2005. The transfer of Lot E to Clotilde was put on hold because of the
respondent’s negligence in the custody of the TCT of Lot E, compelling the
family to work on the extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased
Lazareto on their own.
4. The respondent’s claim that all the proceedings for the extrajudicial settlement
of the estate of Lazareto’s father had been completed was necessarily
relevant to Lazareto’s contention that the lawyer had been seriously remiss in
the fulfillment of his contractual obligation to his family.
5. The filing of the falsified documents by the respondent or by someone acting
upon his instructions was clearly a dishonest attempt to mitigate the adverse
effect of his inaction or negligence on the legal matter entrusted to him.
6. Further, the ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoins every lawyer to act
with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play, and nobility in the course
of his practice of law.
7. Any member of the legal fraternity should do nothing that would lessen in any
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the
legal profession.
 Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
RULE 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
Ruiz v. Santos,
G.R. No. 166386 (27 January 2009)
FACTS:
1. Dominga, Apolonia, Florencio, Cornelia, Tomasa and Olimpio, all surnamed
Ruiz (petitioners), were the original owners of seven parcels of land
2. Cirila delos Santos (respondent) is a duly licensed real estate broker.
3. Respondent referred in writing the subject property to Odessa Antiporda
(Antiporda), a realtor and a fellow estate broker, who had earlier informed
respondent that she had a prospective buyer interested to buy a land with an
area of about 15 to 20 hectares to be used as a retirement village.
4. Antiporda in turn referred the subject property to one Alfred Tantiansu
(Tantiansu)
5. Olimpio then gave respondent a written authority to sell the same.
6. Tantiansu showed interest in the properties and asked for the lowering of price
7. Respondent asked Olimpio for the renewal of her authority, to sell to which
the former obliged. In the authority to sell, it was specified that she would still
be paid her commission even after the said authority expired, provided she
registered in writing her prospective buyer with whom she negotiated during
the period of authority.
8. Subsequently, respondent notified petitioners in writing that Tantiansu was her
buyer.
9. A meeting was held between Olimpio and Tantiansu only, without respondent.
10. Olimpio asked respondent to lower her commission from 5% to 2.5%;
otherwise, the sale would not push through. But respondent, through a letter
sent to Olimpio, answered that she was amenable to a commission of 4%.
11. Respondent later learned that the properties were sold to different
corporations at P60.00 per square meter, as indicated in the deeds of sale.
12. Upon her verification of the articles of incorporation of the corporation-buyers
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, she found out that the
corporations were owned by Tantiansu. Respondent then demanded the
payment of her broker's commission, but was unheeded.
13. Respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for collection of sum of money and
damages against all petitioners, alleging that it was through her effort as a real
estate broker that she was able to bring about the consummation of the sale
of the subject property, to petitioners' immense gain and benefits; that despite
the sale and her repeated demands, petitioners refused to pay her broker's
fee.
ETHICS FACTS (THE OTHER FACTS ARE NOT SUPER RELEVANT AS IN NOT
SURE IF MA’AM WILL EVEN ASK. SHE MIGHT ASK LANG WHAT THE COUNSEL
DID/FAILED TO DO)
1. RTC dismissed the case because of non-payment of docket fees
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2. Petitioners filed a petition for relief from the RTC Order that did not giving due
course to their notice of appeal on the grounds of mistake and excusable
negligence committed by their counsel.
3. They contend that their counsel mistakenly erred when he relied in good faith
on the affirmation made by the trial court's clerk of court that the appeal fees
would be accepted even after the period for the filing of the notice of appeal;
that counsel also mistakenly relied on jurisprudence that technical rules of
procedure would be relaxed provided that the same were substantially
complied with; that counsel's negligence should not be binding on them; that
they have good and substantial defenses which would result in the dismissal
of the complaint or a reduction of the monetary awards set forth in the
decision.
ISSUE (ethics issue):
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the case for counsel’s failure to pay docket
fees on time
RULING:
Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in denying petitioners'
petition for relief, since they were not prevented from filing their notice of appeal and
payment of docket fees by mistake or excusable negligence that would have deprived
them of their day in court. Such relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode
of procedure for that matter; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to
reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost, because of either inexcusable
negligence or counsels mistake in procedure.
RATIO:
NO, RTC DID NOT ERR IN DOING SO.
1. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and
prudence could not have guarded against.
2. Petitioners' counsel filed a notice of appeal within the reglementary period for
filing the same without, however, paying the appellate docket fees. Counsel
very well knew that under the Rules of Court, the full amount of appellate
docket and other lawful fees must be paid within the same period that the
notice of appeal was filed, as he even allegedly communicated to the clerk of
court his request for additional time in order to consolidate the confirmation of
petitioners' desire to appeal.
3. The failure of counsel to pay the appellate docket fees on time constitutes
negligence. Despite receiving an overseas call on October 15, 2003, i.e., the
last day to file the appeal, from petitioner Cornelia, who then lived in Japan
and expressed in behalf of the other petitioners their desire to appeal the RTC
decision, he paid the fees only on October 24, 2003.
4. The counsel of petitioners should not have relied on the alleged assurance by
the clerk of court of the acceptance of the late payment of docket fees.
 Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
5. As an officer of the court, he should know that the affirmation of the clerk of
court could not prevail over the specific requirement of the rules.
6. The rules of procedure are meant to be followed and not to be subjected to
the whims and convenience of the parties and their counsels or by mere
opinions of the clerk of court.
7. While, exceptionally, the client may be excused from the failure of counsel,
the factual circumstances in the present case do not give us sufficient reason
to suspend the rules of the most mandatory character. Petitioners themselves
may not be said to be entirely faultless.
8. It is the duty of the client to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly
posted about the case.
Rule 18.04 – shall keep client informed
Vda. de Robosa v. Attys. Juan B. Mendoza and Eusebio P. Navarro, Jr., A.C. No.
6056
9 September 2015
FACTS
 February 20, 1993 - upon the behest of Atty. Mendoza, Felicisima signed a
Contract for Service prepared by Atty. Mendoza (relative).
o The said contract stipulated that in the event of a favorable CENRO
or LMB resolution, Felicisima shall convey to Atty. Mendoza one-fifth
(1/5) of the lands subject of the application or one-fifth (1/5) of the
proceeds should the same property be sold.
 The CENRO and the LMB proceedings resulted in the dismissal of Felicisima and
her siblings’ application for Lot No. 2489 and the partial grant of their application
for Lot No. 3771.
 Subsequently, Felicisima and her siblings sold the land to Greenfield Corporation
(Greenfield) and received the amount of P2,000,000.00 as down payment.
 October 15, 1998 – Atty. Mendoza, joined by his wife Filomena, filed in the RTC
claiming that except for the amount of P40,000.00, complainants refused to pay
his attorney’s fees equivalent to 1/5 of the proceeds of the sale of the land as
stipulated in the Contract for Service.
 In their Answer with Counterclaim, Felicisima and her siblings denied the
“existence and authenticity of the Contract of Service.”
 RTC ruled in favor of Atty.
o Since no opposition was filed by Felicisima, RTC granted the said
motion and issued a writ of execution, which resulted in the levy and
eventual transfer of Felicisima’s properties in favor of Atty. Mendoza
as the highest bidder in the execution sale.
 Felicisima filed a complaint-affidavit for disbarment against:
o Atty. Mendoza for allegedly deceiving her into signing the Contract
for Service by taking advantage of her illiteracy,
o Atty. Navarro for dereliction of duty in handling her case before the
CA causing her properties to be levied and sold at public auction.
 She alleges that Atty. Mendoza made her sign a document at her house without
the presence of her siblings. Said document (Contract for Service) was written in
English, which she does not understand.
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 She claims that Atty. Mendoza told her the document would shield her from her
siblings’ possible future claims on the property because she alone is entitled to the
property, as her siblings did not help her in processing the application for original
registration. She discovered only during the trial that Atty. Mendoza anchors his
claim over Vs of proceeds from the sale of the land awarded by the CENRO and
LMB on the same document she had signed.
 As to Atty. Navarro, Felicisima claims that her case before the CA was neglected
despite repeated follow-ups on her part. She also points out that Atty. Navarro
abandoned her case before the RTC when the latter failed to file an opposition to
Atty. Mendoza’s motion for execution pending appeal, which resulted in the loss of
her properties.
 Atty. Navarro pleads for mercy and compassion if he had somehow committed
some lapses considering that this is the first time he was charged administratively
in his almost 39 years of law practice and that he is too willing to take complainant’s
cause if not for such apparent miscommunication between a lawyer and his client.
 IBP ruled:
o Atty. Mendoza guilty of taking advantage of Felicisima’s ignorance
just to have the Contract for Service signed. Atty. Mendoza violated
Canon 17 as well as Rule 20.04
o Atty. Navarro, the Investigating Commissioner held that his
participation in politics affected his law practice and caused him to
forget about Felicisima’s case. Atty. Navarro’s acts showed lack of
diligence in violation of Canon 18 of the CPR and his Lawyer’s Oath.
 IBP CBD recommended that both be suspensed for two (2) years from the
practice of law.
 IBP BOG modified suspension from two (2) years to six (6) months.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Navarro violated Rule 18.04 (YES)
RULING
 Dismissal of case against Attorney Mendoza
 Suspension for Attorney Navarro
RATIO
 For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
 Court finds no ground to support Felicisima’s claim that she did not enter into
any written agreement with the plaintiff, Juan Mendoza, for the latter to render
legal services and the corresponding compensation therefor as set forth in the
Contract of Service. However, the Court finds that the amounts received by
the plaintiff Juan Mendoza from defendant Felicisima Mendoza during the
course of his legal services for the twenty hearings in the amount of P1,300.00
per hearing or a total of P26,000.00 should also be deducted from his claim of
P1,384,000.00 leaving an unpaid balance of PI,258,000.00 due plaintiff Juan
Mendoza for legal services rendered the defendants.
Atty. Navarro ‘s Gross Negligence
 The facts on record clearly established his failure to live up to the standards
of diligence and competence of the legal profession.
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 Atty. Navarro agreed to represent Felicisima and her siblings in Civil Case No.
T-1080 and as their counsel he filed the Answer with Counterclaim.
 He likewise attended the hearings of the case until the RTC rendered an
adverse judgment. However, after filing the Notice of Appeal, nothing was
heard of again from him.
o He did not file any opposition when Atty. Mendoza moved for
execution pending appeal, which resulted in the sale of Felicisima’s
properties at public auction and eventual eviction of Felicisima and
her children from the said premises.
o He failed to file an appellant’s brief despite receipt of the order from
the CA directing him to do so within the period specified therein, and
to file a motion for reconsideration when the appeal was dismissed
due to non-filing of such brief. His motion for extension of time to
submit an appellant’s brief was filed 93 days late and was thus
denied by the CA.
o He filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance bearing the conformity
of his clients, which was granted. It is evident from the foregoing that
Atty. Navarro failed to inform Felicisima of the status of the case so
that the latter was surprised upon being served the eviction order of
the court and eventual dismissal by the CA of their appeal.
 Despite the receipt of the order to file appellant’s brief from the CA, he did not
inform Felicisima about it nor did he inquire from the latter whether they
already secured the services of a new counsel.
 Atty. Navarro’s failure to communicate vital information to his client violated
Rule 18.04
 ATTY. NAVARRO IS GUILTY OF RULE 18.03 AND 18.04 AND IS
SUSPENDED FOR SIX MONTHS.
Canon 19 – A lawyer shall represent client with zeal within the bounds of the law
PATROCNIA H. SALABAO VS. ATTY. ANDRES C. VILLARUEL
AC No. 8084
August 24, 2015
FACTS
 In 1995. Salabao filed a case against Elmer Lumberio for his deceitful and
fraudulent conduct of taking her precious real property in Taguig.
 Respondent was the counsel for Lumberio.
 Complainant stated that:
o RTC Pasig issued it resolution in her favor in 2002.
o In order to delay the case, respondent appealed the case. CA ruled
in her favor. Respondent again filed an appeal before the SC.
Lumberio lost and the case became final and executory.
o Undeterred, he once again tried to defer the execution of the RTC
decision by bringing to the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment.
When rebuffed, he again appealed to SC.
o Respondent still filed a Petition for Certiorari, which was however
dismissed.
 Respondent denied the accusations and clarified that the several pleadings
he had filed had centered on the legality of the court’s decision ordering the
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cancellation of the title of Lumberio in such ordinary proeceeding for
cancellation of the title.
 The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent relentlessly filed
petitions and appeals in order to exhaust all possible remedies to obtain relief
for his client, which he considered as tantamount to “abusive and a spiteful
effort to delay the execution of Judgment”
o He recommended that respondent be suspended for four months
 IBP BOG adopted and approved the suspension.
ISSUE: WON respondent violated Canon 19 (YES)
RULING
 Respondent is hereby suspended for 18 months
RATIO
 While it is true that lawyers owe entire devotion to the cause of their clients, it
cannot be emphasized enough that their first and primary duty is not to the
client but to the administration of justice.
 Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the
administration of justice, any act of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts, or
impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies
disciplinary action against him.
 In this case, the judgment in favor complainant had become final and executor
by July 27, 2005. Respondent however proceeded to file no less than 12
motions and cases in various courts subsequent to the Entry of Judgment.
 From the filed cases and motions, it is clear that respondent’s intention was to
delay the execution of the final judgment.
Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten
to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any
case or proceeding.
Belo v. Atty. Roberto “Argee” C. Guevarra, supra.
FERDINAND MARTIN O. PENA vs. ATTY. LOLITO APARICIO, A.C. No. 7298 (25
June 2007)
SUMMARY: Aparicio appeared as legal counsel for Grace C. Hufana in an illegal
dismissal case before NLRC against complainant Fernando Martin Pena. After Pena
rejected the claim of Hufana for separation pay as baseless, Aparicio sent Pena a letter
reiterating his client's claim for separation pay and threatened complainant that should
Pena fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim higher
damages and file multiple charges. The SC ruled that Aparicio violated Rule 19.01 for
threatening Pena to pay the amounts claimed by them, otherwise would file multiple
charges against the company.
FACTS:
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 Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio appeared as legal counsel for Grace C. Hufana in an
illegal dismissal case before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) against Pena.
 Pena, as President of MOF Company, Inc. (Subic), received a notice from the
Conciliation and Mediation Center of the NLRC for a mediation/conciliation
conference.
o Atty. Aparicio, on behalf of his client, submitted a claim for separation
pay arising from her alleged illegal dismissal.
 Complainant rejected the claim as being baseless.
 Complainant thereafter sent notices to Hufana for the latter to explain her
absences and to return to work.
 In reply to this return to work notice, Atty. Aparicio wrote a letter to complainant
reiterating his client’s claim for separation pay which also contained threats to
the company:
o If the amount claimed is not paid within the time given, they will file
multiple charges against the company such as tax evasion,
falsification of documents.
 Pena filed this complaint with IBP,
o Atty. Aparicio’s counterclaim is for damages and disbarment of Atty.
Jocson, complainant’s counsel alleged to play an important role in
imputing malicious and fabricated charges against him.
 IBP: Dismiss the case
ISSUES: W/N Atty. Aparicio violated Rule 19.01 of the CPR
HELD: YES, he is REPRIMANDED.
RATIO:
 Rule 19.01: A lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or
baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed
to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own
cases against the lawyer’s client.
 Through Atty. Aparicio’s letter, he threatened complainant that should the
latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and
claim bigger amounts including moral damages and file multiple charges.
o These are not just violation of Canon 19, but are also BLACKMAIL.
 Blackmail: extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or
exposure or opposition in the public prints…obtaining of value from a person
as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or
disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice.
 Respondent’s threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to
secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his client’s demands.
o The letter even contains an implied promise to “keep silent” about
the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date
indicated.
Que v. Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr., supra.
Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the
course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall
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promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall
terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Peña v. Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio, supra.
VALERIANA DALISAY vs. ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., A.C. No. 5655 (22
April 2005)
 SUMMARY: This is a complaint filed against Atty. Mauricio, Jr. for demanding
and receiving exorbitant attorney’s fee but did not take any action on Dalisay’s
case. After demanding 56,000 from Dalisay, Atty. Mauricio did nothing to
former’s case. He contends that the legal advice and opinions given by him
gives him the right to demand for attorney’s fee. The SC ruled that though they
are legal services, collecting 56,000 as attorney’s fee is exhorbitant.
FACTS:
 Dalisay engaged the services of Atty. Mauricio in a civil case where she is the
defendant.
 After consulting, she handed him all the pertinent documents and the
acceptance fee of 48,000 and filing fee of 8,000 as demanded by Atty.
Mauricio.
o She paid the filing fee even if she knew that the civil case was already
filed with the court.
o Initially, the acceptance fee was 25,000 but demanded additional
amount.
 Notwithstanding her payments, Atty. Mauricio never rendered any legal
services for Dalisay’s civil case. Thus she decided to terminate their atty-client
relationship and demanded the return of her money and the documents.
o Atty. Mauricio refused.
 Atty. Mauricio’s comment:
o Dalisay is not covered by the free legal services rendered by his
office (pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of Mauricio)
o Filing fee demanded is for another case to be filed by Atty. Mauricio
o Dalisay did no heed to his advice to bring her son-in-law to his office
for a conference regarding the civil case.
o He rendered legal services to Dalisay by way of legal advice and
opinions on all her problems
 IBP: Complaint against Atty. Mauricio should be dismissed, but he must return
the amount to Dalisay
ISSUES: W/N Atty. Mauricio violated the CPR
HELD: YES, he is SUSPENDED for 6 months and ordered to return the money to
Dalisay within 10 days from notice
RATIO:
 When Mauricio accepted 56,000 from Dalisay, Mauricio agreed to take up the
latter’s case and thus an attorney-client relationship was established.
 There is nothing in the records to show that respondent entered his
appearance as counsel of record for the subject civil case.
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 There was also no evidence nor any pleading submitted to show that a case
was filed to justify payment of 8,000.
 When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due
diligence in protecting his rights.
 A lawyer is entitled to collect fees for services but such must be reasonable.
 Since Atty. Mauricio did not take any step to assist Dalisay in her case,
charging 56,000 is improper.
 While giving legal advice and opinion is legal service, 56,000 is exorbitant.
Rule 19.03
Shall not allow client to dictate procedure
Olvida v. Atty. Arnel C. Gonzales,
A.C. No. 5732 (16 June 2015)
FACTS:
 Early November 2000, he engaged the services of the respondent in the filing
and handling of a case for Termination of Tenancy Relationship (case) against
tenant Alfonso Lumanta (Lumanta) who was no longer religiously paying the
rentals for a 54,000-sq.m. coconut farm in Tibungco, Davao City, owned by
his wife and under his administration. Lumanta had left the leased property
unattended and in a sorry state.
 December 5, 2000, the complainant paid the respondent his acceptance fee
of P15,000.00 and P700.00 as advance appearance fee.
 The case was filed on January 22, 2001. the parties failed to come to an
agreement, prompting the Board to require the parties to submit their position
papers within 40 days from the date of the hearing.
 March 22, 2001, the complainant provided the respondent all pieces of
documentary evidence, including his own affidavit, for the preparation of the
position paper, as follows: (1 photocopy of the leasehold agreement; (2) the
complainant's affidavit; (3) affidavit of Emma Comanda in support of the case
against Lumanta; (4) affidavit of Danilo Vistal for the same purpose as
Comanda's affidavit; (5) certification of Municipal Agrarian Office that the
complainant and Lumanta failed to reach a settlement regarding the tenancy
dispute; (6) result of ocular inspection of disputed property; and minutes of
conciliation meeting between the parties conducted by the Barangay Lupon
over the dispute.
 the complainant repeatedly called the respondent's office for information about
the position paper. He did this until April 25, 2001, the last day of its
submission, but failed to contact the respondent. Thus, he was compelled to
go to the respondent's office; but again, he failed to see the respondent whose
secretary could not provide him any information about the status of the case.
 After fruitlessly going back and forth the respondent's office, the complainant
finally contacted the respondent's secretary, Marivic Romero, about the
position paper.
o Romero told him that the position paper had already been filed.
o When he asked for a copy, Romero replied that there was none as
it was the respondent himself who prepared the position paper on his
computer.
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o Due to his commitments as Regional Legal Assistant for the
Federation of Free Workers, the complainant momentarily neglected
to follow up the matter with the respondent, until he received on
December 13, 2001 - nine months after the expiration of the period
for the filing of the position paper.
 A copy of the decision of Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Norberto P.
Sinsona dismissing the case for lack of merit. When he read the text of the
decision, he discovered that the respondent did not file the position paper in
the case.
 The complainant terminated the respondent's services. As there was an
urgent need to file a motion. for reconsideration, the complainant engaged the
services of another lawyer to handle the case.
 Over a period of several years, the respondent filed several motions for
extension of time to file his comment allegedly due, among others, to changes
in his office address, and to his alleged preoccupation in attending to his wife
who was afflicted with brain tumor. Despite Court notices for him to show
cause for his failure to comment, the respondent failed to comply with the
Court's directive. His inaction came to a head when the Court fined
him P2,000.00 for non-compliance with the show cause Resolution of January
19, 2009.
 Respondent's dismissal of the complaint, contending that the complainant's
accusations were merely products of his fertile imagination and scheming
mind.
 pressed charges against him not because he failed to file a position paper -
under DARAB rules, the filing of a position paper can be dispensed with - but
because he lost the case.
 the complainant lost the case because there was a difference of opinion
between them; the complainant wanted to impose upon him his own view and
opinion and would dictate to him what he wanted to be done in the course of
the proceedings, while refusing all his advice on how to pursue the case.
 IBP recommended respondent's SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a
period of four (4) months.
o He negligent in discharging his duties as a lawyer in the handling of
complainant's case against his former tenant Lumanta. He faulted
respondent, as the complainant did, for his failure to file a position
paper in the case. He disagreed with the respondent's assertion that
the Position Paper is unimportant and that his client had failed to
submit the necessary papers or documents to support his cause of
action.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gonzalez violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: Atty. Amel C. Gonzales is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) years.
He grossly violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides: A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE
SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
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The deadline for the filling of the position paper had come and gone, but the
complainant was still trying to get information from the respondent and from his office
on the matter. Inexplicably, at so late a period for the filing of the position paper and
without even asking for extension to file the pleading, the respondent remained
unavailable until the complainant's receipt of a copy of the DARAB decision dismissing
the case for lack of merit due to the respondent's failure to file a position paper.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that "A LAWYER
SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Accordingly,
Rule 18.02 mandates that " a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
The respondent's boldness in saying that his failure to file the position paper in the
tenancy case was due to the complainant's fault. He lost sight of the fact that he was
engaged by the complainant to plead his case in the tenancy dispute in the way he
(respondent) believed the case should be handled, not in any other way. Under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer "shall not allow his client to dictate the
procedure in handling the case. "Thus, we cannot accept his lame excuse that the
complainant failed to provide him with the documents he needed in the preparation of
the position paper and that he and the complainant had a difference of opinion on how
the case should be handled. Notably, even the Investigator recognized that the
complainant submitted documents to the respondent; whatever was lacking could not
be submitted as the complainant could not even contact the respondent despite
repeated attempts.
In short, the respondent should have acted as a lawyer in the case, not as a mere agent
waiting for the complainant's instructions. He should not have wasted several months
doing nothing about the position paper he knew had to be filed as required by the
DARAB Adjudicator. He should not have lied to the complainant making him believe
that he was doing his work as his lawyer and that he had already filed the position
paper. He should not have made himself scarce and kept the complainant in the dark
on the status of the case. Before the time for filing lapsed, he should have been candid
enough to tell the complainant that he could not file the required position paper and that
it was time for him to engage another lawyer. This is the honorable thing to do under
the circumstances, for a lawyer worthy of his license.
Canon 20
A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Rule 138, sec. 24, 32
RULES OF COURT
Compensation of attorney's; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject
matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion
of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may
disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional
knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
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Masmud v. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 183385 (13 February 2009)
FACTS:
 July 9, 2003, Evangelina Masmud’s (Evangelina) husband, the late Alexander
J. Masmud (Alexander), filed a complaint against First Victory Shipping
Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A. for non-payment of permanent disability
benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees. Alexander engaged the services of Atty.
Rolando B. Go, Jr. (Atty. Go) as his counsel.
 Alexander agreed to pay attorney’s fees on a contingent basis, as follows:
twenty percent (20%) of total monetary claims as settled or paid and an
additional ten percent (10%) in case of appeal. They also agreed that any
award of attorney’s fees shall pertain to respondent’s law firm as
compensation.
 The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision granting the monetary claims of
Alexander. (attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total
monetary award). [Alexander’s] claim for payment of medical expenses is
dismissed for lack of basis.
 Alexander’s employer filed an appeal, during its pendency Alexander died.
After explaining the terms of the lawyer’s fees to Evangelina, Atty. Go caused
her substitution as complainant. Although, NLRC rendered dismissing the
appeal and later became final and executory.
o LA directed the NLRC Cashier to release the amount
of P3,454,079.20 to Evangelina. She paid Atty. Go the of
P680,000.00.
 Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce the attorney’s lien
alleging that Evangelina reneged on their contingent fee agreement.
Evangelina paid only the amount of P680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of the
award as attorney’s fees, thus, leaving a balance of 10%, plus the award
pertaining to the counsel as attorney’s fees.
 In response, Evangelina manifested that Atty. Go’s claim for attorney’s fees of
40% of the total monetary award was null and void based on Article 111 of the
Labor Code.
 The NLRC Cashier is directed to pay movant-counsel the amount
of P677,589.96 which is currently deposited therein to partially satisfy the lien.
 The Attorney’s fees of respondent Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. is declared fully
compensated by the amount of P1,347,950.11 that he has already received.
 Evangelina filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether Atty Go can claim of forty percent (40%) of the monetary award in a
labor case as attorney’s fees.
RULING: The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract between Atty.
Go and Evangelina’s husband. The CA committed no error of law when it awarded the
attorney’s fees of Atty. Go and allowed him to receive an equivalent of 39% of the
monetary award.
There are two concepts of attorney's fees.
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 Ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid
to a lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered to the latter.
 Extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as
indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party
The court applies the ordinary concept of attorney’s fees, or the compensation that Atty.
Go is entitled to receive for representing Evangelina, in substitution of her husband,
before the labor tribunals and before the court. Evangelina maintains that Article 111 of
the Labor Code is the law that should govern Atty. Go’s compensation as her counsel
and assiduously opposes their agreed retainer contract.
ART. 111. Attorney's fees. — (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable
party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the
wages recovered.
Contrary to Evangelina’s proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the
extraordinary concept of attorney’s fees. It regulates the amount recoverable as
attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing
party. It may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by
his client for the legal services he rendered.
Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court should be observed in determining Atty.
Go’s compensation. The retainer contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides
for a contingent fee. The contract shall control in the determination of the amount to be
paid, unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. Attorney's fees
are unconscionable if they affront one's sense of justice, decency or reasonableness.
Code of Professional Responsibility are also to be considered in assessing the proper
amount of compensation that a lawyer should receive.
CANON 20 — A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01. — A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered
case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
Chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from
the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and scrutiny of the court in order
that clients may be protected from unjust charges. The amount of contingent fees
agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his
legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is
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allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the
suit fail.
Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he should receive
adequate compensation for his efforts. Even as we agree with the reduction of the
award of attorney's fees by the CA, the fact that a lawyer plays a vital role in the
administration of justice emphasizes the need to secure to him his honorarium lawfully
earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession.
A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud
on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the part of his counsel. The
duty of the court is not alone to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner,
but also to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital consisting of his brains
and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of
time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any
attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation. It would
be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client, he himself
would not get his due.
Orocio v. Angulan et al., G.R. No. 179892-93 (30 January 2009)
FACTS:
 Sept. 26, 1978 – NAPOCOR Board, pursuant to specific power and duty to fix
the compensation, allowance and benefits of the NAPOCOR employees
under section 6(c) of RA 6395, passed RESOLUTION NO. 78-119 approving
the grant of a monthly welfare allowance (up to 10% of the employees’ basic
pay to all NAPOCOR employees)
 NAPOCOR Welfare Plan Committee (later renamed as NAPOCOR Welfare
Fund Board of Trustees) issued and promulgated a charter
o For the termination/ amendment of the plan
o Payment of members in case of the termination of the plan, balance
to the credit of each member
 NAPOCOR Board subsequently passed Resolution No. 82-172 fixing a
NAPOCOR employees contribution to the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund in a sum
equivalent to 5% of his basic pay
 2001 - Congress passed Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA), which directed the restructuring
of the power industry, including the reorganization of the NAPOCOR
 NAPOCOR Board passed Resolution No. 2003-43 on 26 March 2003
abolishing the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund Department and other departments,
and dissolving the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund upon the effectivity of EPIRA
 some of the employees in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund Department and in
other departments (who were also members of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund)
resigned, retired or separated from service
 liquidation and dissolution processfor the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund
commenced
 NAPOCOR approved Resolution No. 2004-001 authorizing the release of
P184 million (40% of the liquidated assets) for distribution to the members
who resigned, retired, or separated upon the effectivity of the EPIRA
Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
o Pursuant to this resolution, respondent, as ex-officio chairman of
NAPOCOR-WFBT, issued a memorandum to implement the release
of the P184M
 Mrs. Perla A. Segovia (Segovia), former Vice-President of Human Resources
and Administration and former Ex-Officio Chairman of the NAPOCOR-WFBT,
in behalf of the 559 non-EPIRA separated members and in her own personal
capacity, wrote a letter to Mr. Murga (then NAPOCOR President), demanding
equal shares in the remaining assets of NAPOCOR Welfare Fund and access
to its information and records
 There being no response, Segovia, with the former president of NAPOCOR
(Baysic), in their personal capacity and on behalf of the 599 separated
members filed a petition for mandamus, accounting and liquidation with a
prayer for the issuance of a TRO and injunction against NAPOCOR
 The parties executed a compromise agreement which both EPIRA and the
separated members are entitled to earning differentials
 The compromise agreement was later on approved by the RTC
 Petitioner filed a motion for approval of charging (Attorneys) Lien  granted
by the RTC and decreed that he is entitled to collect the amount so demanded
 Petitioner then filed a motion for execution to collect the sum but respondents
contended that the amount due to the separated members under the
compromise agreement was a mere estimate, thus, cannot be validly claimed
by the petitioner
 RTC issued an order in favor of petitioner
 CA annulled and set aside the RTC order and held that the P17 M sought to
be collected by the petitioner was excessive based on:
(1) the corrected earnings differential in the amount
of P119,196,000.00 due the non-EPIRA separated members
was a mere estimate and was hypothetical. Thus, petitioner
was unjustified in using said amount as basis for his 15%
attorneys fees;
(2) there was hardly any work by petitioner since (a) the
compromise agreement was reached without trial or hearing on
the merits; (b) there was no issue regarding the release and
distribution of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund to the non-EPIRA
separated members as the enactment of EPIRA, not the efforts
of petitioner, made such distribution possible; (c) there was no
issue on how much each non-EPIRA separated members
would receive because the amount of their respective
contribution was duly recorded by the respondents; (d)
respondents have already distributed the corrected earnings
differential to some non-EPIRA separated members, and have
given petitioner his corresponding partial attorneys fees
amounting to P3,512,007.32; (e) most of the non-EPIRA
separated members have not yet received their share under the
compromise agreement but petitioner, who was merely their
agent, was already given partial payment as attorneys fees; (f)
the amount of P17,794,572.70 represents only less than one
fourth partial release of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund which
means that the equivalent of three-fourths more would be
demanded [by petitioner] in the future; and
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(3) the money claim of the non-EPIRA separated members was
settled through a compromise agreement and not won by
petitioner in a trial on the merits.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s claim of 15% contingency/success fee is unconscionable and
unreasonable despite the undisputed fact that said fees is among the terms and
conditions of the approved compromise agreement and court order
HELD: CA’s decision is overturned. Atty. Orocio should be paid of the earning
differential due his client (non-EPIRA separated members) because it was clearly
stipulated in the legal retainer agreement signed with Atty. Orocio. However, it is
modified and decreased to 10% (P 8M)
RATIO:
 As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the basis of the Court of Appeals in
granting the writ was petitioners alleged violation or invasion of respondents
right, as petitioners clients, to pay only a reasonable amount of attorneys fees
to, and only for services actually rendered by, petitioner  CA is clearly
mistaken
 It should be made clear that petitioner is the counsel for the non-EPIRA
separated members in the latters quest to claim their shares in the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund
 Petitioner was never hired or employed by respondents as their counsel in the
cases at bar. Respondents themselves do not claim or allege that they are
clients of petitioner. In fact, petitioner is representing the non-EPIRA
separated members, the opposing party to the respondents in the present
cases
 Further, the amount of attorneys fees being claimed by petitioner is
chargeable to the P119,196,000.00 corrected earnings differential of his
clients, the non-EPIRA separated members. Respondents have actually
partially distributed such amount to some non-EPIRA separated members
pursuant to the Compromise Agreement
 the non-EPIRA separated members are the lawful owners/beneficiaries of the
amount from which petitioner’s attorneys fees had been and shall be taken 
if anyone would be injured by petitioners claim for attorneys fees, it would be
his clients, the non-EPIRA separated members, and not respondents
 The Compromise Agreement was submitted to the RTC for approval through
the joint motion of the non-EPIRA separated members and respondents, and
the RTC had rendered a final and executory decision approving the same. By
virtue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals cannot alter or change the terms of
the Compromise Agreement by prohibiting petitioner from collecting his
stipulated amount of attorneys fees
 An attorneys fee, in its ordinary concept, refers to the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer for the legal services he has rendered to
a client
 The client and his lawyer may enter into a written contract whereby the latter
would be paid attorneys fees only if the suit or litigation ends favorably to the
client. This is called a contingency fee contract
Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
o The amount of attorneys fees in this contract may be on a percentage
basis, and a much higher compensation is allowed in consideration
of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails
 the non-EPIRA separated members and petitioner voluntarily entered
into a contingency fee contract whereby petitioner did not receive any
acceptance fee or appearance/meeting fee. The non-EPIRA separated
members expressly agreed to pay petitioner contingency or success
fees of fifteen percent (15%) of whatever amount/value of assets (liquid
and/or non-liquid) recovered; and authorized petitioners law firm to
receive and/or collect its contingency/success fee without further
demand
 Contingent fee contracts are permitted in this jurisdiction because they
redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer especially in cases
where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to
pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract
for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of litigation and oftentimes,
the contingent fee arrangement is the only means by which the poor clients
can have their rights upheld
 A stipulation on a lawyers compensation in a written contract for professional
services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may
be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount to be unreasonable
or unconscionable
 If the stipulated amount for attorneys fees is excessive, the contract may be
disregarded even if the client expressed their conformity thereto
 Attorneys fees are unconscionable if they affront ones sense of justice,
decency or reasonableness, or if they are so disproportionate to the value of
the services rendered
 courts are empowered to reduce the attorneys fee or fix a reasonable amount
thereof taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances and the
established parameters
 The principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may be a
basis for determining the reasonable amount of attorneys fees
 Quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the
equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying
for it. It is applicable even if there was a formal written contract for attorney’s
fees as long as the agreed fee was found by the court to be unconscionable
 It appears that the non-EPIRA separated members chose petitioner as their
counsel because the latter, as former member of the NAPOCOR-WFBT for
two terms or four years, is familiar and knowledgeable on the operation of the
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. Yet, according to the contingency fee contract
agreement between petitioner and the non-EPIRA separated members,
petitioner received no acceptance fee and appearance/meeting fee when he
took on the non-EPIRA separated members case. Petitioners attorney’s fees
were absolutely dependent on the success of non-EPIRA separated members
claim on the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. Despite these circumstances,
petitioner worked diligently in advocating the claims of the non-EPIRA
separated members against respondents
 Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court
to be unconscionable or unreasonable
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 our Labor Code explicitly limits attorney’s fees to a maximum of 10% of the
recovered amount
o the 15% attorneys fees of petitioner should be reduced to 10%. As
such, petitioner is entitled to collect only, as attorneys fees, an
amount equivalent to 10% of
the P119,196,000.00 or P11,919,600.00.
Quirante v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73886 (31 January 1989)
FACTS:
 Dr. Indalecio Casasola (father of respondents) had a contract with a building
contractor named Norman GUERRERO
 The Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN, for short)
acted as bondsman for GUERRERO
 Guerrero’s failure to perform his part of the contract within the period specified
prompted Dr. Casasola to sue both Guerrero and PHILAMGEN for damages
 PHILAMGEN filed a cross-claim against Guerrero for indemnification
 RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners by rescinding the contract and ordered
Guerrero and PHILAMGEN to pay damages
o RTC issued a writ of execution
 Petition to quash the writ of execution to comel the RTC to give due course to
the appeal was dismissed
 Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and several children as survivors
 In the meantime, herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for
the confirmation of his attorney's fees alleging that there was an oral
agreement between him and Dr. Casasola with regard to the amount of
attorney’s fees, confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda de Casasola,
and the 2 daughters of the deceased
 Petitioner avers that pursuant to said agreement, the attorney's fees would be
computed as follows:
o In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's
fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00.
o In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the
P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of
Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.
 IAC decision:
o there is still pending in the Supreme Court a petition which may or
may not ultimately result in the granting to the Isasola (sic) family of
the total amount of damages given by the respondent Judge. Hence
the award of damages confirmed in the two assailed Orders may
be premature
o assuming that the grant of damages to the family is eventually
ratified, the alleged confirmation of attorney's fees will not and should
not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto
ISSUE: WON Atty. Quirante may be awarded the amount of the contingency/ attorney’s
fee that he and the deceased agreed upon while the case is still pending and WON it
would be binding upon the heirs of the deceased
HELD: the decision of the respondent court is affirmed
 Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
RATIO:
 General Rule: counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the
very action in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a
separate action
o If the first alternative is chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim,
even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law for
the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover
attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of
counsel have been rendered
 What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however,
different from attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for under Article
2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not
of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who
may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution
o petitioner's claims are based on an alleged contract for professional
services, with them as the creditors and the private respondents as
the debtors
 we agree with the respondent court that the confirmation of attorney's fees is
premature
 the petition for review on certiorari filed by PHILAMGEN in this Court (G.R.
No. 64834) "may or may not ultimately result in the granting to the Casasola
(sic) family of the total amount of damages" awarded by the trial court because
of the subsequent developments of the pending case
 Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise
has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and
the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added
validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as
an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due
to the client
 an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been
decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue
over attorney's fee only arises when something has been recovered from
which the fee is to be paid
 the supposed contract alleged by petitioners as the basis for their fees
provides that the recovery of the amounts claimed is subject to certain
contingencies
 We, therefore, take exception to and reject that portion of the decision of the
respondent court which holds that the alleged confirmation to attorney's fees
should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto, since it is also
premised on the eventual grant of damages to the Casasola family, hence the
same objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding may be pre-emptive
of factual and evidentiary matters that may be presented for consideration by
the trial court
Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
(a) the time spent and the extent of the service rendered or required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
BATCH 7 BLOCK GG02
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the
IBP chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with the consent of the client, be entitled
to a division of fees in proportion to the work performed and responsibility assumed.
Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the client,
accept any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or
other compensation whatsoever related to his professional employment from anyone
other than the client.
Sison, Jr. v. Atty. Manuel N. Camacho
AC No. 10910
January 19, 2016
FACTS:
Complainant Atty. Antero M. Sison, Jr. (Atty. Sison), president of MDAHI, charged Atty.
Camacho with violations of the CPR. He accused Atty. Camacho of violating Rule 1.01,
for dishonestly entering into a compromise agreement without authorization, and Rule
16.01 for failure to render an accounting of funds with were supposed to be paid as
additional docket fees.
Atty. Sison alleged that Atty. Camacho was the counsel of MDAHI in an insurance claim
against Paramount Life & General Insurance Corp. The initial insurance claim of MDHAI
was Php 14, 863,777.00.
According to Atty. Sison, Atty. Camacho met with Atty. Dimaano, Corp. Sec. of MDHAI,
and proposed to increase their claim to Php 64,412,534.18, by taking into account the
interests imposed. Upon such proposal, he clarified that MDHAI will have to pay
additional docked fees in the amount of Php 1,288,260.00. MDAHI agreed and Atty.
Dimaano gave the money to Atty. Camacho, who promised to issue a receipt for the
said amount but never did.
However, Atty. Sison later on discovered that the RTC had already rendered a decision
in favor of MDAHI granting its insurance claim plus interests in the amount of Php
65,000,000.00.
On August 11,2011, Atty. Camacho sent a letter to MDAHI recommending a settlement
with Paramount Insurance in the amount of Php 15,000,000.00. This was refused by
MDAHI. However, despite the refusal, and without the written conformity of MDAHI,
Atty. Camacho filed the Satisfaction of Judgment with the RTC, stating that the parties
had entered into a settlement agreement.
 Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
When Atty. Sison met with Atty. Camacho to clarify the events which have previously
occurred, he asked Atty. Camacho whether he paid the amount of Php 1,288,260.00
as additional docket fees. In his reply, Atty. Camacho said that he gave the payment to
the clerk of court as the payment period had already lapsed. Thus, Atty. Sison filed a
complaint against Atty. Camacho.
In his answer, Atty. Camacho denied all the allegations against him. He claimed that
he had the authority to enter into the compromise agreement and that the docket fees
given to him formed part of his attorney’s fees. He further claimed that the judgment
debt was paid and accepted by MDAHI without any objection, evidenced by a receipt.
The RTC issued an order in favor of Atty. Camacho. According to the RTC, only Php
300,000.00 was paid to Atty. Camacho as attorney’s fees. Based on the foregoing, Atty.
Camacho asserted that he amount of Php 1,288,260.00 which he received formed part
of his Attorney’s fees.
The IBP-CBD submitted its report and recommendation finding Atty. Camacho to have
violated the provisions of Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of the CPR, and recommending the
imposition of the penalty of 1-year suspension from the practice of law. The Board of
Governors of the IBP adopted the said report and recommendation.
Upon motion for reconsideration of Atty. Camacho, the Board partially granted the
motion and the suspension imposed was lowered to only 6 months from the practice of
law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Camacho was in violation of Rule 20.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
HELD: YES
While Atty. Camacho was found guilty for violations of Rules 1.01 and 16.01 of the
CPR, he was also found guilty of entering into a compromise agreement without the
authority of his client.
Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and
integrity in all their dealings. Members of the Bar took their oath to conduct themselves
according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to their clients and to delay no man for money or malice. These mandates
apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients considering the highly fiduciary
nature of their relationship.
In line with the fiduciary duty of the Members of the Bar, Section 23, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court specifies a stringent requirement with respect to compromise
agreements, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - Attorneys have authority to
bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their
client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but
the full amount in cash.
BATCH 7 BLOCK GG02
In this case, the RTC awarded MDAHI Php 65,000,000.00. When Paramount Insurance
offered a compromise agreement in the amount of Php 15,000,000.00, it was clear that
this offer was not accepted by MDAHI. Despite the lack of written authority, Atty.
Camacho agreed to a lower judgment award on behalf of his client.
In entering into a compromise agreement without the written authority of hiss client,
Atty. Camacho violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR which states that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful cunduct. Members of the Bar must
always conduct themselves in a way that promotes public confidence in the integrity of
the legal profession.
Atty. Camacho was also charged with violation of Rule 16.01 of the CPR, which
provides that a lawyer should account for all the money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
Atty. Camacho indeed violated Rule 16.01 of the CPR. When Atty. Camacho personally
requested MDAHI for additional docket fees, the latter obediently granted the amount
of P1,288,260.00 to the former. Certainly, it was understood that such amount was
necessary for the payment of supposed additional docket fees. Yet, when Atty. Sison
confronted Atty. Camacho regarding the said amount, the latter replied that he simply
gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had lapsed. Whether the said amount
was pocketed by him or improperly given to the clerk of court as a form of bribery, it
was unmistakably clear that Atty. Camacho did not apply the amount given to him by
his client for its intended legal purpose.
Moreso, Atty. Camacho failed to issue a receipt to MDAHI from the moment he received
the amount. Pursuant to Rule 16.01, a lawyer must be aware that he is accountable for
the money entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring
accountability is by issuing and keeping receipts.
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office
as an attorney, for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the CPR. The practice of law is a profession, a form of
public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who
possess good moral character.
In this case, Atty. Camacho entered into a compromise agreement without the
conformity of his client which is evidently against the provisions of the CPR and the law.
Moreover, he deliberately failed to account for the money he received from his client,
which was supposed to be paid as additional docket fees. He even had the gall to
impute that the money was illicitly given to an officer of the court. The palpable
indiscretions of Atty. Camacho shall not be countenanced by the Court for these
constitute as a blatant and deliberate desecration of the fiduciary duty that a lawyer
owes to his client.
The Court finds that Atty. Camacho's acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of
the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his
duties as a member of the Bar. His actions erode rather than enhance the public
perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations, as
 Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
well as the damage and prejudice they caused to his client, Atty. Camacho deserves
the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For reasons above-stated, he
is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately.
Furthermore, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is ORDERED to return to Marsman-Drysdale
Agribusiness Holdings Inc. the money intended to pay for additional docket fees which
he received from the latter in the amount of P1,288,260.00 within ninety (90) days from
the finality of this decision.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, sec. 20:
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to
be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under
the law.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such
means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead
the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve
the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action
or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the
defenseless or oppressed;
(j) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means,
regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present
every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived
of life or liberty, but by due process of law.
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Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or
fraud.
Ramos v. Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo,
A.C. No. 6210
December 9, 2004
FACTS:
The case is about a complaint for the suspension of Atty. Patricio Ngaseo for violation
of the CPR and Art. 1491 of the Civil Code by demanding from his client, Federico
Ramos, the delivery of 1000 sq. meters of land which is litigated property as payment
for his appearance fees.
In 1998, complainant Ramos went to Atty. Ngaseo in his Makati Office to engage his
services as counsel in a case involving a 2-hectare piece of land in San Carlos,
Pangasinan. Atty. Ngaseso agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of Php
20,000.00, appearance fee of Php 1,000.00 per hearing and the cost of meals,
transportation and other incidental expenses. Ramos, however, alleges that he did not
promise to pay Atty. Ngaseo 1,000 sq. meters of land as appearance fees.
On September 16, 1999, complainant went to the respondents office to inquire about
the status of the case. Respondent informed him that the decision was adverse to them
because a congressman exerted pressure upon the trial judge. Respondent however
assured him that they could still appeal the adverse judgment and asked for the
additional amount of P3,850.00 and another P2,000.00 on September 26, 2000 as
allowance for research made.
Although an appeal was filed, complainant however charges the respondent of
purposely failing to submit a copy of the summons and copy of the assailed decision.
Subsequently, complainant learned that the respondent filed the notice of appeal 3 days
after the lapse of the reglementary period.
complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent asking for the delivery of
the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land which he allegedly promised as payment for respondents
appearance fee. In the same letter, respondent also threatened to file a case in court if
the complainant would not confer with him and settle the matter within 30 days.
Atty. Ngaseo alleged that in 1997, Ramos went to his Makati office, accompanied by
other people to engage his services in connection with a 2-hecrare parel of land situated
in San Carlos, Pangasinan which his family lost 7 years prior due to an execution sale.
It was held that Ramos tried to look for a lawyer who would take their case, but could
not find anyone willing. However, Atty. Ngaseo agreed to handle the case for an
acceptance fee of Php 60,000.00 plus an appearance feeof Php 3,000.00 per hearing.
6 months later, Ramos went back to the office of Atty. Ngaseo to discuss legal fees.
According to Atty. Ngaseo, Ramos was willing to pay an acceptance fee of Php
40,000.00 – Php 20,000.00 to be paid upon the engagement of his service, and the
remind Php 20,000.00 to be paid after a treasure hunt in Nueva Viscaya. Moreso,
Ramos offered to pay, on top of the apperance fees, 1,000 sq. meter of land from the
subject land if they win, and from another land if they lose.
 Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
Complainant, again, asked Atty. Ngaseo to continue handing the case with an offer to
double the 1,000 sq. meter piece of land promised and the remaining balance of Php
20,000.00 as acceptance fee.
The CA then rendered a favorable decision ordering the return of the disputed 2-hectare
land to the complainant. This decision became final and executory. From that moment,
Ramos failed to contact Atty. Ngaseo, which compelled Atty. Ngaseo to send him a
demand letter for what was promised.
Due to this demand letter, Ramos filed a complaint against Atty. Ngaseo with the IBP
for violation of the CPR. The IBP Commissioner found Atty. Ngaseo guilty of grave
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in violation of the CPR and
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. The
recommendation was approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. However,
they lowered the penalty to only 6 month suspension from the practice of law.
In the appeal of Atty. Ngaseo, he argues that he did not violate Art. 1491 of the Civil
Code because when he demanded the delivery of the 1,000 sq. meter of land which
was offered and promise to him in lieu of the appearance fees. Respondend further
condetns that he can collect the unpaid appearance fee even without a written contract.
He claims that his acceptance and appearance fees are resonable because a Makati
based legal practitioner would not handle a case for an acceptance fee of only Php
20,000.00 and Php 1,000.00 per court appearance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Ngaseo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and Art.
1491 of the Civil Code
HELD: YES. Guilty for violation of Rule 20.04 of Canon 20 of the CPR
Under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by
purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the
litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession.
In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the
respondent only made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused
to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the
transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of
Article 1491. Even assuming that such demand for delivery is unethical, respondents
act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491.
We note that the report of the IBP Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors does not clearly specify which acts of the respondent constitute gross
misconduct or what provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility have been
violated. We find the recommended penalty of suspension for 6 months too harsh and
not proportionate to the offense committed by the respondent. The power to disbar or
suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and
member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty. All
considered, a reprimand is deemed sufficient and reasonable.
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is
found guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the legal profession in violation of
Rule 20.04 of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more
severely.
Canon 21 – A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after
the attorney-client relation is terminated.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, sec. 20, par.(e).
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve
the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 24, par.(b).
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following
cases:
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of,
or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer,
concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;
REVISED PENAL CODE, art. 209.
Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. — Revelation of secrets. — In
addition to the proper administrative action, the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed
upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor ( procurador judicial) who, by any malicious breach
of professional duty or of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client,
or reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his professional capacity.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador
judicial) who, having undertaken the defense of a client or having received confidential
information from said client in a case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party
in the same case, without the consent of his first client.
Hilado v. David, et al.,
G.R. No. L-961
September 21, 1949
FACTS:
On April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against Selim Jacob
Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during the Japanese
occupation by Mrs. Hilado's now deceased husband. Hilado was represented by Atty.
Delgado Dizon, while Assad was represented by Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and
Balonkita.
On January 1946, Atty. Vicente Francisco took the place of Atty. Ohnick as counsel for
 Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
Assad.
Four months later, Atty. Dixon filed a motion seeking to disqualify Atty. Francisco from
participating from the case. According to Atty. Dixon, he found out that on June 1945,
Hilado approached Atty. Francisco to ask for legal opinion regarding her case, and Atty.
Francisco sent Hilado a letter with his legal opinion.
Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification from the case. he argued
that no material information was relayed to him by Hilado. He claimed that that upon
hearing Hilado’s story, he told Hilado that her case would not win in court. However,
Hilado later on returned with a copy of the complaint prepared by Atty. Dixon. During
which time, he was not around, but an associate of the firm, Atty. Agrava was present
and attended to Hilado. Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal letter where it was stated
that Hilado had no cause of action to file the case. According to Atty. Agrava, the letter
was to explain why the firm cannot take Hilado’s case.
Atty. Francisco then pointed out that he was not paid for his advice, that no confidential
information was given since all that Hilado brought was a copy of the complaint filed in
court. They claim that if any, Hilado already waived her right to disqualify Atty. Francisco
from the proceedings since he was already representing Assad in court for the previous
months.
Judge ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified from participating in the case
HELD: YES
The Court held that there was already an attorney-client relationship between Hilado
and Atty. Francisco. Thus, Atty. Francisco cannot participate in the proceedings as
counsel of Assad, without the consent of Hilado.
It is an accepted rule that to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary
that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged. It does not matter
whether the attorney did not undertake the case under which the consultation was
about. If a person consults with an attorney in his professional capacity, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquires such consultation, then the professional
employment must be considered established.
An attorney is employed — that is, he in engaged in his professional capacity as a
lawyer or counselor — when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his
case, or when hie is giving advice thereon, just as truly when he is drawing his client’s
pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.
It does not matter if the information relayed is confidential or not. So long as the
attorney-client relationship is established, the lawyer is proscribed from taking other
representations against the client.
With regard to the fact that it took Hilado 4 months to file for the disqualification of Atty.
Francisco, the Court held that the length of time is not a waiver of her right. The right of
a client to have a lawyer be disqualified, based on previous attorney-client relationship,
BATCH 7 BLOCK GG02
as counsel against her does not prescribe. Professional confidence once reposed can
never be divested by expiration of professional employment.
Canon 21 – A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after
the attorney-client relation is terminated.
Bun Siong Yao v. Atty. Leonardo A. Aurelio, A.C. No. 7023 (30 March 2006)
RECIT READY: Atty. Aurelio was the brother-in-law of Mrs. Yao (Bun Siong Yao’s wife).
Mrs. Yao and Atty. Aurelio had a disagreement. Aurelio demanded the return of his
investments in the two (2) companies where majority share was held by Bun Siong
Yao. Bun Siong Yao refused. Aurelio filed these suits to retaliate. Bun Siong Yao
challenged these suits, saying that he is abusing the attorney-client relationship by
filing suits against the company in which he is retained as counsel, by using
information (for the suits) he obtained in his capacity as counsel AND as Bun Siong
Yao’s personal lawyer, under the guise of a “concerned stockholder”.
DOCTRINE: The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to
disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client,
unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets
of a client arises at the inception of their relationship and continues until termnination
of that relationship.
FACTS:
1. Atty. Aurelio was Bun Siong Yao’s lawyer since 1987. He was also a stockholder
and the retained counsel of (a) Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation; and (b) Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation, in which Bun Siong Yao was a majority stockholder.
2. Bun Siong Yao purchased several parcels of land using his personal funds, but
were registered in the name of the two corporations upon the advice of Aurelio.
3. Aurelio, who was also the brother in-law of Bun Siong Yao’s wife, had in 1999 a
disagreement with Bun Siong Yao’s wife, and thereafter, Aurelio demanded the
return of his investment in the corporations.
a. Aurelio --- BROTHER IN LAW --- Mrs. Yao ❤Bun Siong Yao
4. When Bun Siong Yao refused to pay, Aurelio filed eight charges for estafa and
falsification of commercial documents against Bun Siong Yao and his wife and
the other officers of the corporation.
5. Aurelio also filed a complaint against Bun Siong Yao for alleged non-compliance
with the reportorial requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City and another
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon City for alleged
violation of Section 75 of the Corporation Code. Healso filed a similar complaint
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.
6. Bun Siong Yao alleged that the series of suits filed against him and his wife is
a form of harassment and constitutes an abuse of the confidential
information which respondent obtained by virtue of his employment as counsel.
7. Bun Siong Yao argued that Aurelio is guilty of representing conflicting interests
when he filed several suits not only against Bun Siong Yao and the other
officers of the corporation, but also against the two corporations of which
he is both a stockholder and retained counsel.
8. Aurelio claimed that:
 Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
a. He handled several labor cases in behalf of Solar Textile Finishing
Corporation;
b. The funds used to purchase several parcels of land were not the
personal funds of Bun Siong Yao but pertain to Solar Farms &
Livelihood Corporation;
c. Since 1999 he was no longer the counsel for complainant or Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation;
d. He never used any confidential information in pursuing the criminal cases
he filed but only used those information which he obtained by virtue of his
being a stockholder.
9. The IBP recommended that Aurelio be suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months because he:
a. Is guilty of forum shopping;
b. Is remiss in his duty as counsel and incorporator of the two corporations
for failure (of the corporations) to comply with the SEC and BIR reportorial
requirements; and
c. Represented conflicting interests by filing cases against his clients
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Aurelio, in the present case, represented conflicting
interests
RULING: YES. Atty. Leonardo A. Aurelio was ordered SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS
RATIO:
 The professional relationship between the complainant and the respondent is more
extensive than his claim that he only handled isolated labor cases for Bun Siong
Yao’s corporations. Aside from being the brother-in-law of Mrs. Yao, it appears
that even before the inception of the companies, Aurelio was already
providing legal services to the complainant.
o He was the legal counsel who filed incorporation papers and was the
personal lawyer of Yao predating the incorporation of the two companies.
 The parties’ relationship was not just professional, but they are also related by
affinity. The disagreement between Mrs. Yao and Atty. Aurelio affected their
professional relationship. Bun Siong Yao’s refusal to disclose certain financial
records prompted Atty. Aurelio to retaliate by filing several suits.
 It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney and his client
is a fiduciary one. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed on him. The protection given to the client is perpetual
and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by
the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any
other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
 Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[8]
Lawyers cannot be allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of exacting
vengeance or as a tool for instigating hostility against any person, most especially
against a client or former client.
Genato v. Atty. Essex L. Silapan, A.C. No. 4078 (14 July 2003)
BATCH 7 BLOCK GG02
RECIT-READY: Genato and Silapan had a very tumultuous relationship involving
debts, loans, defaults, bouncing checks, with a side of libel. Genato was a businessman
and Silapan was a lawyer looking for a place to rent out for his law office. Silapan ended
up renting a portion of the building of Genato, and Genato made Silapan handle some
of his cases. Silapan borrowed money for a car, and issued postdated checks for
payment of the loan. For this loan, a real estate mortgage was also constituted.
Eventually, Silapan defaulted in payment. When Genato attempted to encash the
postdated checks, these were dishonored. Genato proceeded with foreclosure.
Silapan, in his Answer (to the foreclosure proceeding) claimed that Genato was
a fraudulent “loan shark” and also wanted Silapan to bribe judges in several
cases.
DOCTRINE: The attorney-client relationship is one of confidence and trust, surviving
even the death of the client. However, the privilege against disclosure of
confidential communications or information is limited only to communications
which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a
lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or
perpetration of a fraud.
FACTS:
1. Genato alleged that in July 1992, Silapan asked if he could rent a small office
space in Genato’s building in Quezon City for his law practice. Genato acceded
and introduced Silapan to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay, Genato’s retained lawyer, who
accommodated Silapan in the building and made him handle some of Genato’s
cases. Hence, the start of the legal relationship between Genato and Silapan.
2. The conflict between the parties started when Atty. Silapan borrowed two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from Genato, which he intended to use as
downpayment for the purchase of a new car.
3. In return, Silapan issued to Genato a postdated check in the amount of
P176,528.00 to answer for the six (6) months interest on the loan. He likewise
mortgaged to Genato his house and lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its
title, claiming that it was the subject of reconstitution proceedings before the
Quezon City Register of Deeds.
4. With the money borrowed from Genato, Silapan purchased a new car. However,
the document of sale of the car was issued in Genato’s name and financed through
City Trust Company.
5. In January 1993, Silapan introduced to Genato a certain Emmanuel Romero.
Romero likewise wanted to borrow money from complainant. Genato lent Romero
the money and, from this transaction, Silapan earned commission in the amount
of P52,289.90. Genato used the commission to pay Silapan’s arrears with the car
financing firm.
6. Subsequently, Silapan failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing
firm sent demand letters to Genato. Genato tried to encash respondents postdated
check with the drawee bank but it was dishonored as Silapan’s account therein
was already closed.
7. Silapan failed to heed Genato’s repeated demands for payment. Genato then filed
a criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a
civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
 Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
8. In the foreclosure case, Silapan alleged in his Answer that Genato was “a
businessman who is engaged in the real estate business, trading and buy and sell
of deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals and has
many cases pending in court”.
9. Genato denied Silapan’s charges and claimed that Silapan’s allegation is libelous
and not privileged, as it was irrelevant to the foreclosure case. Another part in the
Answer alleged that Genato wanted Silapan, his former counsel in that case, to
offer bribe money to the members of the review committee of the Department of
Justice where a petition for review of the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor
was pending at the time, x x x or, [if the petition for review is denied], to offer bribe
money to the prosecutor assigned at the above-mentioned Court, and even to the
presiding Judge, for his eventual acquittal,
10. Silapan argued that he is not guilty of breaking his confidential lawyer-client
relationship with complainant as he made the disclosure in defense of his honor
and reputation.
11. Silapan also denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission from Romero’s
loan which he allegedly helped facilitate. He alleged that the amount was paid to
him by Romero as attorneys fees, the latter being his client. He used this amount
to pay his arrears with the car financing firm xxx Respondent also alleged that he
filed a perjury case against complainant who, in turn, filed a complaint for libel
against him.
12. The IBP recommended a suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
ISSUE: Whether or not SIlapan was justified in disclosing information regarding his
clientto “defend his honor and reputation” (alternatively: whether respondent committed
a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to complainant illegal practices and
disclosing complainants alleged intention to bribe government officials in connection
with a pending case)
RULING: NO. However, the SC reduced his penalty. Atty. Essex L. Silapan was
ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) months
RATIO:
 Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on him.
 The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose
communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the
latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client
arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is
perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected
by the partys ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other
change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
 It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of
confidential communications or information is limited only to
communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a
lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in
contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud.
 If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainants alleged
intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the communication is
BATCH 7 BLOCK GG02
not covered by the privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer professionally.
It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he may commit
a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does
not attach, there being no professional employment in the strict sense.
 However, the disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were
not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it
against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of
litigation therein and respondents professional competence and legal advice were
not being attacked in said case. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His
relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good
faith and fairness.
ROSARIO JUNIO VS. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GRUPO
A.C. No. 5020 | 2001-December-18
DOCTRINE
Respondent's liability is NOT for misappropriation or embezzlement but for violation of
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which forbids lawyers from
borrowing money from their clients unless the latter's interests are protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice.
FACTS
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Grupo for malpractice and gross
misconduct.
COMPLAINANT’S AVERMENTS:
 Sometime in 1995, engaged the services of respondent for the redemption of a
parcel of land registered in the name of her parents.
 Entrusted to respondent the amount of P25,000.00 in cash to be used in the
redemption.
 Respondent received the amount as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt.
 Respondent did NOT redeem the property.
 The right of redemption was lost and the property was forfeited.
 Demanded the return of the money.
 Respondent continuously refused to refund the money entrusted to him, despite
repeated demands made by the complainant and without justifiable cause.
RESPONDENT:
 Admitted receiving the amount.
 However, alleged that the subject land could really not be redeemed anymore.
 And so, he requested the complainant that he avail the money to help defray his
children's educational expenses.
 It was really a personal request, a private matter between respondent and
complainant.
 The family of the complainant and respondent were very close and intimate with
each other.
 Complainant, as well as her two sisters, served respondent's family as household
 Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
helpers for many years.
 That is why, when complainant requested assistance regarding the problem of the
mortgaged property, respondent had no second-thoughts.
 Respondent did not ask for any fee.
 His services were purely gratuitous.
 His acts were on his own and by his own.
 It was more than pro bono; it was not even for charity.
 It was simply an act of a friend for a friend.
 It was just lamentably unfortunate that his efforts failed.
 Strictly speaking, NO ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP exists between them.
 Everything was sort of personal.
 Accepts his fault, because there were occasions when complainant's sisters
came to ask for the payment, and he could not produce the money.
 It does not mean that respondent will not pay, or that he is that morally depraved
as to willfully and deliberately renege in his obligation.
COMPLAINANT filed a reply
 Denying that respondent informed her of his failure to redeem the property; and
 Denying that respondent requested her to instead lend the money to him.
ISSUE
Whether the transaction was a loan or misappropriation of client’s money.
RULING: LOAN
RATIO
Granting the respondent the benefit of the doubt, we assume that there was a loan
in the amount of P25,000.00. This is confirmed by the execution of a promissory
note.
Moreover, the demand letter mentions of "reimbursement of the sum received" and
interest giving the impression that the funds previously intended to be used for the
repurchase of a certain property was converted into a loan.
ISSUE
Whether respondent violated the CPR.
RULING: YES
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice
This rule is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence
over the client.
This rule is especially significant in the instant case where the respondent enjoys an
immense ascendancy over the complainant.
(Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility).
 The duty and obligation to repay the loan remains unshaken.
 Five (5) years had already passed.
 But he has not demonstrated any volition to settle his obligation.
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In this case, respondent's liability is compounded by the fact that not only did he not
give any security for the payment of the amount loaned to him but that he has also
refused to pay the said amount.
A lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
To constitute professional employment, it is NOT essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is NOT necessary
that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which
the consultation was had.
If a person consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits
or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be
regarded as established.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Guilty of violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
orders him suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month.
Rule 21.01
A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except;
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or
associates or by judicial action.
Rule 21.02
A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a
third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents
thereto.
WILLIAM S. UY VERSUS ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES
A.C. No. 5280 | 2004-March-30
DOCTRINE
The relationship between complainant and respondent stemmed from a personal
transaction or dealings between them rather than the practice of law by
respondent.
Complainant failed to prove any of the circumstances enumerated above that would
warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein respondent.
FACTS
COMPLAINANT’S AVERMENTS:
 He engaged the services of respondent to prepare and file a petition for the
issuance of a new certificate of title.
 After confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and
 Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him
a petition to be filed.
 Respondent demanded a certain amount from him other than what they had
previously agreed upon.
 Respondent turned against him just because he refused to grant respondent's
request for additional compensation.
 Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out that,
respondent filed a letter-complaint against him for "Falsification of Public
Documents."
 With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer
and grossly disregarded his duty to preserve the secrets of his client.
 The complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer
certificate of title subject matter of the petition:
William S. Uy acquired by purchase a parcel of land from FERMIN C.
GONZALES; xxx
That instead of registering said Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of
Title for the purpose of transferring the same in his name, William S. Uy
executed a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer in favor of his children, to
make it appear that his said children are of legal age, when in fact and in
truth, they are minors, to qualify them as farmers/beneficiaries, thus
placing the said property within the coverage of the Land Reform
Program;
Some of these Falsified documents are without the signature of affiant, Fermin
C. Gonzales;
Fermin C. Gonzales was already dead;
William S. Uy with deceit and evident intent to defraud undersigned, still
accepted the amount of P340,000.00, from Atty. Fermin L.
Gonzales...knowing fully well that at that time the said TCT cannot be
redeemed anymore because the same was already transferred in the
name of his children;
William S. Uy refuse to deliver to him a TCT.
RESPONDENT’S AVERMENTS
 Offered to redeem from complainant a 4.9 hectare-property which the latter
acquired by purchase from his (respondent's) son, the late Fermin C. Gonzales,
Jr.
 Paid complainant P340,000.00.
 Demanded the delivery of TCT No. T-33122 as well as the execution of the Deed
of Redemption.
 Upon request, gave complainant additional time to locate said title.
 Instead, complainant gave him photocopies of TCT No. T-33122 and TCT No. T-
5165.
 Complainant explained that he had already transferred TCT No.T-5165 to his
children, and that TCT No. T-5165 was misplaced and cannot be located despite
efforts to locate it.
 Respondent offered his assistance pro bono to prepare a petition for lost title.
Complainant agreed.
 Respondent submitted to complainant a draft of the petition for the lost title ready
for signing and notarization.
 Complainant asked him to wait where he waited for almost two hours until he found
BATCH 7 BLOCK GG02
out that complainant had already left without leaving any instructions nor funds for
the filing of the petition.
 Complainant's conduct infuriated him which prompted him to give a handwritten
letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the petition and that complainant
should get another lawyer to file the petition.
 The lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant was terminated when
he gave the handwritten letter to complainant.
 There was no longer any professional relationship between the two of them when
he filed the letter-complaint;
 The facts and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were
culled from public documents procured from the Office of the Register of
Deeds.
A letter from Atty. Augusto M. Macam stated that his client, William S. Uy, had lost
interest in pursuing the complaint he filed against Atty. Gonzales and requesting
that the case against Atty. Gonzales be dismissed.
ISSUE
Whether Atty. Gonzales violated the confidentiality of lawyer-client relationship.
RULING: NO
While it is true that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer
of the court, complainant failed to prove any of the circumstances enumerated
above that would warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein respondent.
The relationship between complainant and respondent stemmed from a personal
transaction or dealings between them rather than the practice of law by
respondent.
RATIO
Respondent dealt with complainant only because he redeemed a property which
complainant had earlier purchased from his (complainant's) son. It is not refuted
that respondent paid complainant P340,000.00.
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily
permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a
business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining
professional advice or assistance.
It is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney on any
previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged
for, neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the
case about which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance
of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession.
Said rule cannot apply to the present case.
 Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of
title of the land he has redeemed from complainant.
 Respondent's immediate objective was to secure the title of the property that
complainant had earlier bought from his son.
 There was NO ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
 The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to
 Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
their personal transaction.
 The alleged "secrets" of complainant were not specified by him in his affidavit-
complaint.
 Facts alleged by respondent were not obtained by respondent in his
professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned
by his deceased son.,
Respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21.
Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that:
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer
to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or
disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.
Rule 21.03 – Shall not give information to outside agency
Rule 21.04 - Disclosure to partners and associates
Rule 21.05 – Shall adopt measures to prevent disclosure
Rule 21.06 – Shall avoid indiscreet conversation
Rule 21.07 - Shall not reveal consultation; exception
Canon 22 - A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances.
Rule 22.01 – Causes for withdrawal
Intestate Estate of Luis Domingo v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-28078 (29
April 1971)
Doctrine: "The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless
clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be
more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that
'the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay' and expressly admonishes
that 'for a willful violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary
action.' "
FACTS:
BATCH 7 BLOCK GG02
 August 7, 1961: CFI of Pangasinan rendered judgment approving the money
claim of respondent Pedro A. Aquino against the petitioner’s estate by
ordering the then special administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria, "to pay
from the available funds of the estate the sum of P20,000.00 with 12% interest
per annum from June 10, 1954 to Pedro A. Aquino."
 January 20, 1967: Both parties appealed from the said judgment to the Court
of Appeals
 CA: the claim of Atty. Pedro A. Aquino is hereby approved and allowed, and
the administratrix is ordered to pay, from the available funds of the estate
 March 9, 1967: Petitoner filed with the appellate court an "Appearance with
Motions for Substitution and to be served with a copy of the Judgment,"
o stating inter alia, that the former special administratrix, Asuncion
Domingo Sta. Maria had long resigned
o with the permission of the intestate court, that the other co-special
administrator, Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. (who had caused the
prosecution of the appeal) was removed for having squandered cash
funds of the estate
o and that as a consequence, Mrs. Consuelo Domingo de Lopez was
appointed judicial administratrix and has since been administering
the estate alone;
o that Mrs. Lopez as judicial administratrix wished to file a motion for
reconsideration of the appellate court's judgment and that the clerk
of court be directed to serve copy of said judgment on her counsel
instead of on Atty. Unson as the former special administrator's
counsel "for purposes of starting of time to move for re-hearing or
reconsideration;"
o and praying that as present judicial administratrix, she be substituted
in lieu of the former joint administrators and that her counsel be
served with copy of the appellate court's decision.
 April 27, 1967: the appellate court denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration per its resolution
 September 23, 1967: no further move was made by petitioner thereafter until
almost five months later when on, after respondent had filed in the intestate
court a motion for execution of the judgment, as affirmed in his favor by the
appellate court, it filed the present petition.
 November 7, 1967:The Court, upon urgent supplemental petition of petitioner,
further issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement, through
sale of the estate's properties, of the appellate court's judgment.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Unson continues to be the counsel of the estate of Luis Domingo
RULING: YES. “WHEREFORE, the petition is ordered dismissed and petitioner's
counsel shall pay treble costs. The writ of preliminary injunction issued of November 7,
1967 is hereby dissolved and upon promulgation of this decision, respondent may
proceed immediately with the enforcement and execution by the intestate court of the
appellate court's judgment of January 20, 1967, in his favor. This decision shall be
noted in the personal record of the counsel for petitioner and of their associate attorney,
Teodoro P. Regino, who signed and verified the petition.”
RATIO:
Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
 The records at bar amply show that Atty. Jose A. Unson was the counsel on
record of the petitioner estate in the appellate court and never filed any
withdrawal as such counsel.
 Even after the removal on May 21, 1963 of Luis Domingo, Jr. as administrator
of the estate, Atty. Unson filed in the appellate court his memorandum dated
August 17, 1963, for the estate as appellant.
 While it may be true that Atty. Unson ceased as counsel for the estate and for
the former administrator sometime on November 8, 1966, when the intestate
court granted his motion dated November 2, 1966, to withdraw as counsel by
virtue of his appointment to and assumption on February 8, 1966 of the public
office of Assistant Administrator of the Sugar Quota Administration, this was
true only insofar as the case in the intestate court was concerned.
 He continued on record in the appellate court as counsel for the estate as
appellant therein and did not file therein any withdrawal as counsel and neither
did the petitioner inform said court of any change of counsel or of party-
administrator, as required by Rule 138, section 26 of the Rules of Court.
 More so, no appearance of any new counsel for the estate was ever filed with
the appellate court.
 Notice and copy of the appellate court's decision of January 20, 1967, were
therefore duly served by registered mail on the estate's counsel of record at
his address of record at 307 Trinity Building, San Luis, Ermita Manila in
accordance with Rule 13, section 8 of the Rules of Court.
 And in accordance with said Rule, service by registered mail of the appellate
court's decision upon the petitioner's counsel of record was deemed
completed and effected upon the addressee's failure to claim his mail on the
fifth day after the first notice of the postmaster.
 One vital factor that the present administratrix, Mrs. Lopez, has obviously
failed to appreciate, wittingly or otherwise, is that the party in the Subject case
was the intestate estate of the deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. and that Atty.
Unson represented the estate as counsel in the said case.
 The fact that his services were engaged by Luis Domingo, Jr. in his (Luis')
official capacity as administrator, did not make him the personal counsel of
Luis.
 Thus, nothwithstanding Luis' removal as administrator, Atty. Unson continued
to represent the estate as counsel in the appellate court.
 He continued to be authorized to represent the estate as its counsel, until the
new administrator should terminate his services, which she never did.
 The representations made by the present administrator and her counsel in the
petition at bar — filed almost five months after the appellate court's denial of
her belated motion for substitution and to be served with copy of its decision
— to the effect that the appellate court had granted respondent "new and
further relief" in its decision by the award of compound interest on the sum
due respondent are deplorable.
 The petition, alleging and praying that the appellate court's decision of January
20, 1967, be declared null and void for having been rendered and entered in
excess of or without jurisdiction or that this Court send for the records from
the appellate court "for purposes of review and thereafter render its own
decision reversing the judgment [of the appellate court]" notwithstanding its
long having become final and executory, is utterly untenable and without legal
justification.
BATCH 7 BLOCK GG02
 Petitioner's counsel are reminded of this Court's admonition that "the
cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging
of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided.
 There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of
Court which provides that 'the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay' and expressly admonishes that 'for a willful violation of
this rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.' "
Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Atty. Juan C. Dealca, A.C. No.
4215 (21 May 2001)
DOCTRINE: Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall
withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances, although he may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails
to pay the fees for the services.
Rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients
concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent
imposition, injustice or fraud.
FACTS:
 Complaint Felicisimo M. Montano charged Atty. Juan Dealca with misconduct
and prays that he be "sternly dealt with administratively."
 November 14, 1992: the complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S.
Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a case
pending before the Court of Appeals
 The parties agreed upon attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00 fifty
percent (50%) of which was payable upon acceptance of the case and the
remaining balance upon the termination of the case.
 Accordingly, complainant paid respondent the amount of P7,500.00
representing 50% of the attorney's fee.
 Thereafter, even before respondent counsel had prepared the appellant's brief
and contrary to their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after
the termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment
from complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4,000.00.
 Prior to the filing of the appellant's brief, respondent counsel again demanded
payment of the remaining balance of P3,500.00.
 When complainant was unable to do so, respondent lawyer withdrew his
appearance as complainant's counsel without his prior knowledge and/or
conformity.
 Returning the case folder to the complainant, respondent counsel attached a
Note dated February 28, 1993,2 stating: “Pepe and Del Montano, for breaking
your promise, since you do not want to fulfill your end of the bargain, here's
your reward. Henceforth, you lawyer for yourselves. Here are your papers.
Johnny”
Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos
 Complainant claimed that such conduct by respondent counsel exceeded the
ethical standards of the law profession and prays that the latter be sternly dealt
with administratively.
 Complainant later on filed motions praying for the imposition of the maximum
penalty of disbarment.
 IBP: "three (3) months suspension from the practice of law for having been
found guilty of misconduct, which eroded the public confidence regarding his
duty as a lawyer."
 Respondent counsel sought reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution
of the IBP, alleging that the latter misapprehended the facts and that, in any
case, he did not deserve the penalty imposed.
 The true facts, according to him, are the following:
o Complainant is being represented by Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in his
case on appeal;
o Due to the ailment of Atty. Gerona's daughter, he could not prepare
and submit complainant's appellant's brief on time;
o Complainant went to the respondent to do just that, i.e., prepare and
submit his appellant's brief on time at the agreed fee of P15,000.00,
50% down and 50% upon its completion;
o Working overtime, respondent was able to finish the appellant's brief
ahead of its deadline, so he advised the complainant about its
completion with the request that the remaining balance of P7,500.00
be paid.
o Complainant paid P4,000.00 only, promising to pay the P3,500.00
"tomorrow" or on "later particular date."
o Please take note that, at this juncture, there was already a breach of
the agreement on complainant's part.
o When that "tomorrow" or on a "later particular date" came,
respondent, thru a messenger, requested the complainant to pay the
P3,500.00 as promised but word was sent that he will again pay
"tomorrow" or on a "later date."
o This promise-non-payment cycle went on repeatedly until the last
day of the filing of the brief. Please take note again that it was not the
respondent but the complainant who sets the date when he will pay,
yet he fails to pay as promised;
o Even without being paid completely, respondent, of his own free will
and accord, filed complainant's brief on time;
o After the brief was filed, respondent tried to collect from the
complainant the remaining balance of P3,500.00, but the latter made
himself scare. As the records would show, such P3,500.00 remains
unpaid until now
o Sensing that something was amiss, respondent sent the February
28, 1993 note and case folder to the complainant, hoping that the
latter would see personally the former about it to settle the matter
between them;
o However, instead of seeing the respondent, complainant filed this
case;
o Respondent was constrained to file his withdrawal with the Court of
Appeals because of this case to avoid further misunderstanding
since he was the one who signed the appellant's brief although Atty.
BATCH 7 BLOCK GG02
Gerona was his counsel of record. Such withdrawal was accordingly
granted by the appellate court;
 Respondent counsel further averred that complainant's refusal to pay the
agreed lawyer's fees, measly as it was, was deliberate and in bad faith; hence,
his withdrawal as counsel was "just, ethical and proper."
 Respondent counsel concluded that not only was the penalty of suspension
harsh for his act of merely trying to collect payment for his services rendered,
but it indirectly would punish his family since he was the sole breadwinner with
children in school and his wife terminally ill with cancer.
 IBP: denied Atty. Dealca's motion for reconsideration
 Complainant asked the IBP to reconsider the foregoing resolution but the
motion was denied.
ISSUE: W/N Atty Dealca violated Canon 22 of the CPR
RULING: YES. “WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Juan S.
Dealca is REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt
with more severely.”
RATIO:
 Going into the merits, we affirm the findings made by the IBP that complainant
engaged the services of respondent lawyer only for the preparation and
submission of the appellant's brief and the attorney's fees was payable upon
the completion and submission of the appellant's brief and not upon the
termination of the case.
 There is sufficient evidence which indicates complainant's willingness to pay
the attorney's fees.
 AS agreed upon, complainant paid half of the fees in the amount of P7,500.00
upon acceptance of the case. And while the remaining balance was not yet
due as it was agreed to be paid only upon the completion and submission of
the brief, complainant nonetheless delivered to respondent lawyer P4,000.00
as the latter demanded.
 This, notwithstanding, Atty. Dealca withdrew his appearance simply because
of complainant's failure to pay the remaining balance of P3,500.00 which does
not appear to be deliberate.
 The situation was aggravated by respondent counsel's note to complainant
withdrawing as counsel which was couched in impolite and insulting language.
 Atty. Dealca's conduct is unbecoming of a member of the legal profession.
 Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall
withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances.
 Although he may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay
the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the present case, Atty.
Dealca's withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to
pay him the attorney's fees.
 In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation.
 Respondent's contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member of the
bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00.
Calanog • Chua • Espiritu • Gaon • Gervacio • Liao • Lumapas • Maravilla • Monfort • Ongtenco • Ramos • Tabalingcos BATCH 7 BLOCK GG02
 Rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with
clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to
prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
 Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant, respondent lawyer
failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code.
 The Court, however, does not agree with complainant's contention that the
maximum penalty of disbarment should be imposed on respondent lawyer.
 The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.
 Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will
disbarment be imposed as a penalty.
 It should never be decreed where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, would accomplish the end desired.
 In the present case, reprimand is deemed sufficient.