GROUP REPORTS

PHILOSOHY OF LAW

Instruction:

1. Prepare a brief but comprehensive oral report.

2. Be creative.
3. Research and analyze carefully the topics assigned.
4. Read the assigned cases in their entirety. Digest and discuss them in relation to your
assigned topic. You can also research on additional cases or jurisprudence.
5. Submit a term paper at the end of the semester summarizing your report (10 to 20 pages,
Times New Roman, size 12).
6. Be ready to answer the questions of your classmates and the professor.

Group 1 (Adan& Agulto) October 18, 2019

A. Ends and Effects of Law (Human Rights)

1. Human rights
2. Historical Development
3. Concept of Humanity
4. Human Rights Instruments
5. What are the basic human rights
6. Commission on Human Rights (CHR) limit discussion on the functions and powers

 Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human

rights violations involving civil and political rights;
 Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
 Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and
provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under-
privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
 Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
 Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to
enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
 Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and
to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their
families;
 

 Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty
obligations on human rights;
 Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority;
 Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
 Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
 Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

a. Carino vs CHR, GR No. 96682, December 2, 1991

FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to

protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances.
The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their classes,
converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies,
etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to
work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-
work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were
administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to
sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee
was consequently formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating

Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott
the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal
from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy
and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the
issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers’ to due process of law.
The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the
respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on
Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful
mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers,
allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown
to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over
the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the
return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and
held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they
should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges;” there had been violation of their civil and political
rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.”

ISSUE:

* Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

HELD:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such

power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another
court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take
over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of

adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that
the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Power to Investigate

The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the

power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on
complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules
of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite
for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity
from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the
truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office,
or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its
findings.

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense,
these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

“Investigate” vs. “Adjudicate”

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or

delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to
search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an
official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to
find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the
notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts
inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the
inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up

step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search
into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to
inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as
"(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or
otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain
matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge,

arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary
defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a
court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon
as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant
judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of
a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the

power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the
merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case
No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even
if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings
against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS,
their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More
particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the
question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by
the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law;
(b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions,
and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to
their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education,
constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances
complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by
each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be
imposed for said acts or omissions.

Who has Power to Adjudicate?

These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education,
being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the
Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.

Manner of Appeal

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the
Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately
based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves
are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process;
and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed
"human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters
which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for
reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the
event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service
Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
b. EPZA vs CHR 208 SCRA 125
c. Facts:
d. Valles, Aedia and Ordonez filed with CHR a joint complaint against
EPZA for allegedly violating their human rights when EPZA Project
Engineer Damondamon along with 215 the PNP Company tried to level
the area occupied by complainants.The same parcel of land was
reserved and allocated for purpose of development into Cavite Export
Processing Zone which was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation
and was later sold to EPZA.CHR issued an order of injunction for EPZA
and company to desist from committing further acts of demolition,
terrorism and harassment until further order. 2 weeks later the group
started bulldozing the area and CHR reiterated its order of injunction,
including the Secretary of Public Works and Highways to desist
fromdoing work on the area. EPZA filed a motion to life the order with
CHR for lack of authority and said motion wasdismissed.EPZA filed the
case at bar for certiorari and prohibition alleging that CHR acted in
excess of
its jurisdiction in issuing a restraining order and injunctive writ; that the p
rivate respondents have no clear and positive right to be protected by
an injunction; and that CHR abused its discretion in entertaining the
complaint. EPZA’s petition was granted and a TRO was issued ordering
CHR to cease and desist from enforcing/implementing the injunction
orders. CHR commented that its function is not limited to mere
investigation (Art. 13, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution).
 e.
f. Issue:
g. WON CHR has the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining
order against supposed violatorsof human rights, to compel them
to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of.
h.
i. Held:
j.
k. The SC held that CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial
body. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication,
and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even aquasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining there from the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. The constitutional provision
directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated
or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue are straining order or writ of injunction for, if that
were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned
in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including
a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the
proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not
being a court of justice, the CHR itself hasno jurisdiction to issue the
writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge
of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court .A writ of
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a
pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights
and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose. EPZA’s
petition is granted.
7. Are the basic human rights respected in the Philippines?
8. Cases: Summarize and Focus on the issue of human rights
a. Primicias vs Fugoso, GR. No. L-1800, January 27, 1948
Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the
refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to
hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of
grievances to the government. The reason alleged by
the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is,
"that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing
upon previous utterances and upon the fact that
passions, specially on the part of the losing groups,
remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be
delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence
of the people in their government, and in the duly
constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of
the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving
emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local
government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927
prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public
 place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the
peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a
body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or
disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful
assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of
Public Place.
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said
section provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of
Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant
permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or
procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila;
(2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the
view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of
the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and
proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the
second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the
Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system
of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any
officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national
emergency.

The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot

alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to
fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must
be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to
be prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in
some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its
suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the
state.

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880

AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR
RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE
GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of
1985."
Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To
this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without
prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the
law.
Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:
(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade,
procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public
place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an
opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or
influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or
petitioning the government for redress of grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and
assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances:
Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2
of this Act shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other
concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a
labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and
regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road,
street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open
space of public ownership where the people are allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the
military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a
public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of
the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of
loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes.
Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit
shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public
assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the
public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established
by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of
the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the
campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which
shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution.
Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as
provided for by law are not covered by this Act.

b. Stonehill vs Diokno 20 SCRA 383

FACTS:
In violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code, 42 warrants were issued
against petitioners or the corporation where they are officers to search the
persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of their books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers) which are the subject of the offense.
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending
final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued alleging the search warrants to be void since (1) they do not
describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3)
the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned
petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers
and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law
ISSUE: W/N the seizure is valid

HELD: YES. warrants for the search of 3 residences null and void;
searches and seizures made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
injunction issued
the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority
of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations, and
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be.
question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only
by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a
seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy
of whose homes had not been disturbed
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
2 points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional
mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and
- not met
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized. - not met
without reference to any determinate provision of said
laws
the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners
herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would
be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at
the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers.
People vs Musa 217 SCRA 597
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in
selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM
leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian
informer guided Ani to Musa’s house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able
to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.
 The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he
successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the
NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his
position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and
asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the
P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two
newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He
raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved
in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but
did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga
and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a ‘cellophane colored white and stripe
hanging at the corner of the kitchen.’ They asked Musa about its contents but failed
to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa
was then placed under arrest.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is
unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.

Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be
admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include
the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the ‘plain view’
of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence. The ‘plain view’ doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the
seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent
from the ‘plain view’ of the object.

In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain view’ of the police. They
arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for
other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside
the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the ‘plain view’ of said object.

Therefore, the ‘plain view’ does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and
cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the
Constitution.
c. Zulueta vs CA, 253 SCRA 699
Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to
return documents and papers taken by her from private
respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and
consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private

respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver
and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers
were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in
question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held:
(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question
are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication
and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify

any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets
of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication

between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without
the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing
is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with
the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.

a. The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

d. People vs Adan GR No. 116437, March 3, 1997
Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused
of the crime of rape with homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of
Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means
of violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Marianne Guevarra y Reyes
against her will and without her consent; and the above-named accused in
order to suppress evidence against him and delay (sic) the identity of the
victim, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill the said Marianne Guevarra y Reyes, attack, assault and hit said victim
with concrete hollow blocks in her face and in different parts of her body,
thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly caused her death.
Contrary to Law.1
The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M.,
in Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty
years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing,
left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She
was to prepare for her final examinations on February 21, 1994. Marianne
wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two
bags containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more than
P2,000.00 in cash.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her
inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's
grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure
as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody
was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought
her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant dragged the
unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there
until dark. Night came and appellant pulled Marianne, who was still
unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one
side by a six-foot high concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot.
Appellant stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped
the girl's body over the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl
moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan
and hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to
the other side of the fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot
and abandoned it.2
At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of
Marianne was discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her
brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty
with a sanitary napkin.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died
of "traumatic injuries" sustained as follows:
1. Abrasions:
1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally oblique from
right to left.
2. Abrasions/contusions:
2.1 temple, right.
2.2 cheek, right.
2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.
2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.
2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular, approximate 3 inches
in width, from right MCL to left AAL.
2.7 elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.
3. Hematoma:
3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.
3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.
3.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
4. Lacerated wounds:
4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.
4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline lower jaw, 4 inches.
5. Fractures:
5.1 maxillary bone, right.
5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and 2nd
incisors.
6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes, right.
7. External genitalia
7.1 minimal blood present.
7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia, introitus and
exposed vaginal wall.
8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity
showed negative for spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February
22, 1994, by Dr. Wilfredo S. de Vera).
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions
due to Traumatic Injuries, Face.3
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor
Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look
for the criminal. Searching the place where Marianne's body was found, the
policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what
appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a pair of
shoes which were identified as Marianne's.4
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found
bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the
occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother
of appellant's wife, that accused-appellant also lived there but that he, his
wife and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several
articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with
some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt.
The clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and
allegedly belonged to appellant.5
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in
Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a
police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house.
They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police
headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any
knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him
with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in
the pigpen, appellant relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and
Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He also
said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne.6
Immediately, the police took appellant to his house. Larin and Dizon, who
were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by the police.
Appellant went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a
flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which were
later identified as belonging to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were
taken of appellant and the two other suspects holding the bags.7
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police
headquarters. The following day, February 25, a physical examination was
conducted on the suspects by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Orpha
Patawaran.8 Appellant was found to sustain:
HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back: with
abrasions (scratches at the back). Extremities: freshly-healed wound along
index finger 1.5 cm. in size Lt.9
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at
the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor
Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the
mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a request that they talk
privately. The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and
there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell
you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the
door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the
confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since
no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and
videotaped. 10 In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of
the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt.
He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the
place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and
Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings
against them. 11 He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the
pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. 12 After his
confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to
help
 him. 13 His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the
media nationwide. 14
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days,
February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters came.
Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the
mayor and reenacted the crime. 15
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He
testified that in the afternoon of February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's
house in Barangay Tangos attending the birthday party of his nephew. He,
his wife and son went home after 5:00 P.M. His wife cooked dinner while
he watched their one-year old son. They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and woke up
the next day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to Manila to collect some
debts while he and his son went to his parents' house where he helped his
father cement the floor of the house. His wife joined them in the afternoon
and they stayed there until February 24, 1994 when he was picked up by
the police. 16
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at Bagong Nayon, Baliuag.
In one of the rooms, the policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and
kicked him repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that he raped and
killed Marianne. When he refused, they pushed his head into a toilet bowl
and injected something into his buttocks. Weakened, appellant confessed
to the crime. Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house where he saw
two of his neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the police to go
to the old toilet at the back of the house and get two bags from under the
flower pot. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told. 17
In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and
sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court
also ordered appellant to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as
moral damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias
"Bobby is found guilty by proof beyond a scintilla of doubt of the crime
charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized in
accordance with R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par. 8,
classifying this offense as one of the heinous crimes and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the family of Marianne
Guevarra the amount of P50,000. 00 for the death of Marianne Guevarra
and P71,000.00 as actual burial and incidental expenses and P100,000.00
as moral damages. After automatic review of this case and the decision
becomes final and executory, the sentence be carried out.
SO ORDERED. 18
This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22
of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant contends that:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS BASIS
OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE
INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR ON THE ALLEGED
ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION;
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE
WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND TO SUPPORT IT;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF
CONVICTION WHEN THE EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY SHOWS THAT
THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED. 19
The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of
the three policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and
four news reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral
confessions. It was also based on photographs and video footages of
appellant's confessions and reenactments of the commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the
policemen, the mayor and the news reporters because they were made
during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section 12,
paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) . . .
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) . . .
Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of
such
rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel. 20 Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. 21 The exclusionary rule is
premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures
where the potentiality for compulsion physical and psychological, is
forcefully apparent. 22 The incommunicado character of custodial
interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of
what really transpired. 23
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to
"[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense." An
investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the
police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the
suspect in connection with an alleged offense. 24 As intended by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police
authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal
police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our
government." 25
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a
general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already
a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house.
This is clear from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief
investigator of the crime, viz:
COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who
did this act?
WITNESS: First, the place where Marianne was last found is at the
backyard of the house of the accused. Second, there were blood stains at
the pigpen, and third, when we asked Romano Calma who were his other
companions in the house, he said that, it was Pablito Andan who cannot be
found at that time and whose whereabouts were unknown, sir.
Q: So you had a possible suspect?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You went looking for Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then, what else did you do?
A: We tried to find out where we can find him and from information we
learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos in Baliuag. We went there,
found him there and investigated him and in fact during the investigation he
admitted that he was the culprit. 26
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to
the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his
constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. 27 His
confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags
recovered from appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of the
investigating team testified:
Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these bags
marked as Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them, where did
he point these bags?
A: At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags beneath
the canal of the toilet.
Q: In other words, you were given the information where these two (2) bags
were located?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located what
did you do?
A: We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we would
know where the two (2) bags were hidden, sir.
Q: And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused pointed
to the place where the bags were located?
A: After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal, he
really showed where the bags were hidden underneath the canal, sir. 28
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to
the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. 29
The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day,
Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and
requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and appellant
confessed that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness.
Mayor Trinidad testified, viz:
Mayor Trinidad: . . . . During the investigation when there were already
many people from the media, Andan whispered something to me and
requested that he be able to talk to me alone, so what I did was that, I
brought him inside the office of the chief of police.
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of the
Chief of Police, mayor?
A: While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin
mo ako,! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." So
when he was telling this to me, I told him to wait a while, then I opened the
door to allow the media to hear what he was going to say and I asked him
again whether he was the one who did it, he admitted it, sir. This was even
covered by a television camera. 30
xxx xxx xxx
Q: During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell you
something and then you responded by bringing him inside the office of the
Chief of Police and you stated that he admitted that he killed Marianne . . .
Court: He said to you the following words . . .
Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin mo
ako! Ako ang pumatay kay Marianne," was that the only admission that he
told you?
A: The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were alone
and the second one was before the media people, sir.
Q: What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the Chief of
Police?
A: These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from
making further admissions because I wanted the media people to hear
what he was going to say, sir. 31
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that
appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that
a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution.
However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to
any interrogation by the latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not question
appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It
was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the
mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was
going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a
confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled
confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. 34 Thus, it has
been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do
not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by
the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally
admitted having committed the crime. 35 What the Constitution bars is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights
under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion
by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 36 Hence, we hold
that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial
court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The
confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by
the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised
interview are deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence. 37
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye"
on Channel 7, interviewed appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview
was recorded on video and showed that appellant made his confession
willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other
relatives. 38 Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9
also interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified that:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to reach the
place where the body of Marianne was found, where did you start your
interview, in what particular place?
Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview inside the
police station of Baliuag and I identified myself to the accused as I have
mentioned earlier, sir. At first, I asked him whether he was the one who
raped and killed the victim and I also learned from him that the victim was
his cousin.
Q: And what was the response of Pablito Andan?
A: His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was
responsible for raping and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked him
whether his admission was voluntary or that there was a threat, intimidation
or violence that was committed on his person because I knew that there
were five other suspects in this case and he said that he was admitting it
voluntarily to the policemen. I asked him whether he was under the
influence of drugs but he said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.
Q: You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present, was
the uncle beside him at the time that you asked the question?
A: The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name I
cannot recall anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I don't know if it is
the place of the crime scene or in the place where Marianne Guevarra
resides but . . . All throughout the scene inside the office of the Station
Commander, there was no air of any force or any threatening nature of
investigation that was being done on the suspect, that is why, I was able to
talk to him freely and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me that he was
the one who raped and killed, so we went to the next stage of
accompanying me to the scene of the crime where the reenactment and
everything that transpired during the killing of Marianne Guevarra.
Q: Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission from
the accused Pablito Andan that you were going to interview him?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of the
Baliuag PNP, you also went to the scene of the crime?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who accompanied you?
A: I was accompanied by some Baliuag policemen including Mayor
Trinidad and some of the relatives of the accused.
Q: At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of Guevarra was
recovered.
Q: How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present, more or
less?
A: There were many, sir, because there were many wailing, weeping and
crying at that time when he was already taken in the patrol jeep of the
Baliuag police, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in Concepcion,
Baliuag, Bulacan, what transpired?
A: I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the crime
was committed by the accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old
house where I tried to accompany the accused and asked him to narrate to
me and show me how he carried out the rape and killing of Marianne
Guevarra, sir.
Q: Did he voluntarily comply?
A: Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.
Q: It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the PNP
Baliuag up to the scene of the crime, all the stages were videotaped by
you?
A: Yes, sir. 39
Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered
the proceedings for three successive days. 40 His testimony is as follows:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?
A: We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their own
investigation so that we can have a direct interview with the suspect.
Q: Were there people?
A: The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the
deputy chief of police, several of the policemen, the group of Inday Badiday
and several other persons. I asked the suspect after the mayor presented
the suspect to us and after the suspect admitted that he was the one who
killed Marianne. I reiterated the question to the suspect. Are you aware that
this offense which is murder with . . . rape with murder is a capital offense?
And you could be sentenced to death of this? And he said, Yes. So do you
really admit that you were the one who did it and he repeated it, I mean,
say the affirmative answer.
Q: And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a while
ago?
A: Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to take
some pictures of the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and several others,
I heard the group of Inday Badiday asking the same questions from the
suspect and the suspect answered the same.
Q: Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned?
A: The same group of people who were there, sir.
Q: You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused
answered you affirmatively, what was the answer, please be definite?
Court: Use the vernacular.
A: I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw ba talaga
and gumawa ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay Marianne? Ang sagot nya,
"Oo." Alam mo ba itong kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol, inaamin mo
pa ba na ikaw and gumawa sa pagpatay at pag-rape kay Marianne?" Sagot
pa rin siya ng "Oo."
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you ask him, why did you kill Marianne?
A: I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because a devil
gripped his mind and because of that according to him, your Honor, were
the pornographic magazines, pornographic tabloids which he, according to
him, reads almost everyday before the crime.
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell the
court and the public what was the physical condition of accused Pablito
Andan?
A: As I observed him that time, there was no sign on his body that he was
really down physically and I think he was in good condition.
Court: So he was not happy about the incident?
A: He even admitted it, your Honor.
Court: He was happy?
A: He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.
Court: Was he crying?
A: As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there was
no tear that fell on his face.
Court: Was he feeling remorseful?
A: As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx 41
Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on
February 26, 1994. 42 He also testified that:
Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan give you
the permission that you asked from him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present?
A: The first person that I saw there was Mayor Trinidad, policemen from
Baliuag, the chief investigator, SPO4 Bugay, and since Katipunan, the chief
of police was suspended, it was the deputy who was there, sir.
Q: Were they the only persons who were present when you interviewed the
accused?
A: There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with people.
There were people from the PNP and people from Baliuag, sir.
Q: How about the other representatives from the media?
A: Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there were
people from the radio and from TV Channel 9.
Q: How about Channel 7?
A: They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.
Q: You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his wife
also present?
A: Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she was
really the wife but they were hugging each other and she was crying and
from the questions that I asked from the people there they told me that she
is the wife, sir.
Q: How about the other members of the family of the accused, were they
around?
A: I do not know the others, sir. but there were many people there, sir.
Q: Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview. May
we know what question did you ask and the answer.
A: My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was "Yes."
Q: What was the next question?
A: I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the victim
aboard a tricycle. He called her up. She entered the house and he boxed
her on the stomach.
Q: What was the next question that you asked him?
A: He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why he killed
the victim was because he was afraid that the incident might be discovered,
sir.
Q: Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a news
item on that?
A: Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.
Q: Were there other questions propounded by you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: "Ano iyon?"
A: He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence, sir.
Q: Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of Marianne to the other side
of the fence?
A: I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q: But can you produce the news item based on that interview?
A: I have a xerox copy here, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 43
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from
any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted
as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. 44 They were not acting
under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check
appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant
them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. 45 In fact, they
asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on
separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he
repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in
the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his
confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other
relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant
by the news reporters.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not
covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill
of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. 46 It governs the relationship between the
individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to
the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual
exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken
away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect. 47
Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these
limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted
interference by any department of government and its agencies. 48
In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the
medical evidence against him. Dr. Alberto Bondoc, a Medical Specialist
with the Provincial Health Office, conducted the first autopsy and found no
spermatozoa and no recent physical injuries in the hymen. 49 Allegedly,
 the
minimal blood found in her vagina could have been caused by her
menstruation. 50
We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994
by Dr. Dominic L. Aguda, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation. His findings affirmed the absence of spermatozoa but
revealed that the victim's hymen had lacerations, thus:
Hymen — contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted blood at 6
and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the
clock. 51
Dr. Aguda testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may have
been caused by an object forcibly inserted into the vagina when the victim
was still alive, indicating the possibility of penetration. 52 His testimony is as
follows:
Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this 3 o'clock
and 6 o'clock position corresponding to the walls of the clock. . . . .
Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.
Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the edges of the
lacerations, I found blood clot, that is why I put it into writing as fresh.
Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did on the
cadaver was merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the body was
autopsied first before you did you re-autopsy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the vagina could
have been sustained on account of the dilation of the previous autopsy?
A: Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the autopsy on the
victim which was already dead, no amount of injury or no amount of
lacerated wounds could produce blood because there is no more
circulation, the circulation had already stopped. So, I presumed that when
the doctor examined the victim with the use of forceps or retractor, vaginal
retractor, then I assumed that the victim was already dead. So it is
impossible that the lacerated wounds on the hymen were caused by those
instruments because the victim was already dead and usually in a dead
person we do not produce any bleeding.
Q: What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the lacerations with
clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the
clock could have been inflicted or could have been sustained while the
victim was alive?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of the lacerated
wounds, now will you kindly go over the sketch you have just drawn and
indicate the edges of the lacerated wounds where you found the clotted
blood?
A: This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the lacerated wound
at 6 o'clock. I found the blood clot at this stage. The clotted blood are found
on the edges of the lacerated wounds, sir.
Q: What could have caused those lacerations?
A: Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly inserted into
that small opening of the hymen causing lacerations on the edges of the
hymen, sir.
Q: If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those lacerations?
A: It is possible, sir. 53
We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the
vagina does not negate the commission of rape 54 nor does the lack of
complete penetration or rupture of the hymen. 55 What is essential is that
there be penetration of the female organ no matter how slight. 56 Dr. Aguda
testified that the fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations found in the
victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh and could not have been
caused by any injury in the first autopsy.
Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by
appellant are supported by other evidence, real and testimonial, obtained
from an investigation of the witnesses and the crime scene, viz:
(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along the subdivision road
near appellant's house; 57
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother
were not in their house; 58
(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's
house, a meter away from the wall. Bloodstains were also found on the
grass nearby and at the pigpen at the back of appellant's house; 59
(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had
been dragged over a flat rough surface. 60 This supports the thesis that she
was thrown over the fence and dragged to where her body was found;
(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry
hamper in his house;
(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were
found positive for the presence of blood type "B," the probable blood type
of the victim. 61 Marianne 's exact blood type was not determined but her
parents had type "A" and type "AB." 62 The victim's pants had bloodstains
which were found to be type "O," appellant's blood type; 63
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to
explain; 64
(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the
incident and were later found at his parents' house in Barangay Tangos,
Baliuag, Bulacan; 65
In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other
circumstantial evidence justify the conviction of appellant.
Appellant 's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence.
His alibi cannot even stand the test of physical improbability at the time of
the commission of the crime. Barangay Tangos is only a few kilometers
away from Concepcion Subdivision and can be traversed in less than half
an hour. 66
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,
Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-
appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659
amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to the
penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to
impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify
the heirs of the victim, Marianne Guevarra, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.
a. In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659
amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality
of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise
of the pardoning power.
e. People vs Mahinay, GR No. 122485 February 1, 1999
Facts

Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his tasks was
to take care of Isip’s house which was under construction adjacent to the latter’s
residence. The victim was a 12-year old girl who used to frequent the residence of
Isip.

On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was reported missing by her mother.
The following morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger jeepney and disappeared.

The victim’s body was found, lifeless, at around 7:30 am that same day. She was
found in the septic tank wearing her blouse and no underwear. The autopsy showed
that the victim was raped and was strangled to death.

Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen found a pair of dirty white short pants,
a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by the victim’s mother to
belong to her daughter. Also, they found a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified
as that of the appellant. Also found in the yard, three armslength away from the septic
tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers
positively identified by Isip as appellant’s belongings.

The appellant was soon arrested and executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he
narrated how the crime was committed. The trial ensued and the lower court
convicted him of the crime of Rape and was sentenced to death.

The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

Issues

WON the appellant’s extra-judicial confession was validly taken and in accordance
with his rights under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights; and

WON the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling

The conviction of the appellant is affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi
The Court ruled that the appellant’s extrajudicial confession was taken within the
ambit of the law as evinced by the records and testimony of the lawyer who assisted,
warned and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and
custodial rights.

As to the second issue, the appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented
by the prosecution is insufficient to warrant a conviction of his guilt. However, the
Court ruled otherwise.

The Court recalled the Rule on Evidence and settled jurisprudence. Absence of direct
proof does not absolve the appellant because conviction may be had with the
concurrence of the following requisites as stated in the Rules of Court:
there is more than one circumstance;
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Court recalled the ruling in People v. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141, all circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and
with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
And also in People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 citing People v. Abitona, 240 SCRA
335, that facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass
even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.
The Court agreed with the trial court’s decision in giving credence to several
circumstantial evidence, which is more than enough to prove appellant’s guilt beyond
the shadow of reasonable doubt.
The Court also updated the Miranda rights with the developments in law that provided
the rights of suspects under custodial investigation in detail.

A person under custodial investigation should be informed:

In a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and
he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a language known to and understood
by said person;
That he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be
used as evidence against him;
That he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an
independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
That if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be
provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his
behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or
one acting in his behalf;
That no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the
presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
That, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most
expedient means – telephone, radio, letter or messenger – with his lawyer
(either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any
medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his
immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be
the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
That he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the
same;
That the waiver must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel,
otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his
waiver and chooses to speak;
 That he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he
does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such
indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet
commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
That his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any
of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process,
regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered
some statements;
11. That any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of
any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence.

g. Ayer Production vs Judge Capulong, 160 SCRA 861

Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Petitioner Ayer
Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer Productions), 1 envisioned, sometime in 1987, the for commercial viewing and
for Philippine and international release, the histolic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de
los Santos Avenue). Petitioners discussed this Project with local movie producer Lope V. Juban who
suggested th they consult with the appropriate government agencies and also with General Fidel V.
Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles in the events proposed to be filmed.
The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was
endorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification Board as wel
as the other government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos also
signified his approval of the intended film production.
In a letter dated 16 December 1987, petitioner Hal McElroy informed
private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture
enclosing a synopsis of it, the full text of which is set out below:
The Four Day Revolution is a six hour mini-series about People Power—a
unique event in modern history that-made possible the Peaceful revolution
in the Philippines in 1986.
Faced with the task of dramatising these rerkble events, screenwriter David
Williamson and history Prof Al McCoy have chosen a "docu-drama" style
and created [four] fictitious characters to trace the revolution from the death
of Senator Aquino, to the Feb revolution and the fleeing of Marcos from the
country.
These character stories have been woven through the real events to help
our huge international audience understand this ordinary period inFilipino
history.
First, there's Tony O'Neil, an American television journalist working for
major network. Tony reflects the average American attitude to the
Phihppinence —once a colony, now the home of crucially important military
bases. Although Tony is aware of the corruption and of Marcos'
megalomania, for him, there appears to be no alternative to Marcos except
the Communists.
Next, Angie Fox a fiery Australian photo-journalist. A 'new girl in town,' she
is quickly caught up in the events as it becomes dear that the time has
come for a change. Through Angle and her relationship with one of the
Reform Army Movement Colonels (a fictitious character), we follow the
developing discontent in the armed forces. Their dislike for General Ver,
their strong loyalty to Defense Minister Enrile, and ultimately their defection
from Marcos.
The fourth fictitious character is Ben Balano, a middle-aged editor of a
Manila newspaper who despises the Marcos regime and is a supporter an
promoter of Cory Aquino. Ben has two daughters, Cehea left wing lawyer
who is a secret member of the New People's Army, and Eva--a -P.R. girl,
politically moderate and very much in love with Tony. Ultimately, she must
choose between her love and the revolution.
Through the interviews and experiences of these central characters, we
show the complex nature of Filipino society, and thintertwining series of
events and characters that triggered these remarkable changes. Through
them also, we meet all of the principal characters and experience directly
dramatic recreation of the revolution. The story incorporates actual
documentary footage filmed during the period which we hope will capture
the unique atmosphere and forces that combined to overthrow President
Marcos.
David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright with some 14 hugely
successful plays to his credit(Don's Party,' 'The Club,' Travelling North) and
11 feature films (The Year of Living Dangerously,' Gallipoli,' 'Phar Lap').
Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian
with a deep understanding of the Philippines, who has worked on the
research for this project for some 18 months. Together with Davi
Wilhamgon they have developed a script we believe accurately depicts the
complex issues and events that occurred during th period .
The six hour series is a McElroy and McElroy co-production with Home Box
Office in American, the Australian Broadcast Corporation in Australia and
Zenith Productions in the United Kingdom
The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enact. ment of the
events that made possible the EDSA revolution; it is designed to be viewed
in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style,
creating four (4) fictional characters interwoven with real events, and
utilizing actual documentary footage as background.
On 21 December 1987, private respondent Enrile replied that "[he] would
not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or
exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any
cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or
commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in the
production, airing, showing, distribution or exhibition of said or similar film,
no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should not be
made to [him] or any member of his family, much less to any matter purely
personal to them.
It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of private
respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners
proceeded to film the projected motion picture.
On 23 February 1988, private respondent filed a Complaint with application
for Temporary Restraining Order and Wilt of Pretion with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-151 in Branch 134 thereof,
seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day
Revolution". The complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-
series without private respondent's consent and over his objection,
constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy. On 24 February
1988, the trial court issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set
for hearing the application for preliminary injunction.
On 9 March 1988, Hal McElroy flied a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to
the Petition for Preliminary Injunction contending that the mini-series fim
would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his family
and that a preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their
right of free expression. Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own
Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of action as the mini-series had
not yet been completed.
In an Order 2 dated 16 March 1988, respondent court issued a writ of
Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners, the dispositive portion of
which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, ordering
defendants, and all persons and entities employed or under contract with
them, including actors, actresses and members of the production staff and
crew as well as all persons and entities acting on defendants' behalf, to
cease and desist from producing and filming the mini-series entitled 'The
Four Day Revolution" and from making any reference whatsoever to
plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of
plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears rent substantial or marked
resemblance or similarity to, or is otherwise Identifiable with, plaintiff in the
production and any similar film or photoplay, until further orders from this
Court, upon plaintiff's filing of a bond in the amount of P 2,000,000.00, to
answer for whatever damages defendants may suffer by reason of the
injunction if the Court should finally decide that plaintiff was not entitled
thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
On 22 March 1988, petitioner Ayer Productions came to this Court by a
Petition for certiorari dated 21 March 1988 with an urgent prayer for
Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, which petition was docketed as
G.R. No. L-82380.
A day later, or on 23 March 1988, petitiioner Hal McElroy also filed
separate Petition for certiorari with Urgent Prayer for a Restraining Order or
Preliminary Injunction, dated 22 March 1988, docketed as G.R. No. L-
82398.
By a Resolution dated 24 March 1988, the petitions were consolidated and
private respondent was required to file a consolidated Answer. Further, in
the same Resolution, the Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order
partially enjoining the implementation of the respondent Judge's Order of
16 March 1988 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued therein, and
allowing the petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions of
the projected mini-series which do not make any reference to private
respondent or his family or to any fictitious character based on or
respondent.
Private respondent seasonably filed his Consolidated Answer on 6 April
1988 invoking in the main a right of privacy.
I
The constitutional and legal issues raised by the present Petitions are
sharply drawn. Petitioners' claim that in producing and "The Four Day
Revolution," they are exercising their freedom of speech and of expression
protected under our Constitution. Private respondent, upon the other hand,
asserts a right of privacy and claims that the production and filming of the
projected mini-series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy
which he is entitled to enjoy.
Considering first petitioners' claim to freedom of speech and of expression
the Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to
film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in
theaters or to diffuse them through television. In our day and age, motion
pictures are a univesally utilized vehicle of communication and medium Of
expression. Along with the press, radio and television, motion pictures
constitute a principal medium of mass communication for information,
education and entertainment. In Gonzales v. Katigbak, 3 former Chief
Justice Fernando, speaking for the Court, explained:
1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication
of Ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effect on the
perception by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as
well as the pre cultural traits is considerable. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn
v. Wilson (343 US 495 [19421) is the Importance of motion pictures as an
organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to
entertain as well as to inform' (Ibid, 501). There is no clear dividing line
between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a
distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free
expression. ...4
This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to
foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore the circumstance
that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected
to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of
speech and of expression. In our community as in many other countries,
media facilities are owned either by the government or the private sector
but the private sector-owned media facilities commonly require to be
sustained by being devoted in whole or in pailt to revenue producing
activities. Indeed, commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities
available in our country and hence to exclude commercially owned and
operated media from the exerciseof constitutionally protected om of
speech and of expression can only result in the drastic contraction of
such constitutional liberties in our country.
The counter-balancing of private respondent is to a right of privacy. It
was demonstrated sometime ago by the then Dean Irene R. Cortes
that our law, constitutional and statutory, does include a right of
privacy. 5 It is left to case law, however, to mark out the precise scope
and content of this right in differing types of particular situations. The
right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," 6 like the right of free
expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a
person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that
person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited
from him or to be published about him constitute of apublic character.
7 Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked resist
publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. 8 The
interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to
be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of
the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the
realm of legitimate public concern. 9
Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 10 on which private respondent relies
heavily, recognized a right to privacy in a context which included a claim to
freedom of speech and of expression. Lagunzad involved a suit fortion
picture producer as licensee and the widow and family of the late Moises
Padilla as licensors. This agreement gave the licensee the right to produce
a motion Picture Portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty
candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros
Occidental during the November 1951 elections and for whose murder,
Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and
his men were tried and convicted. 11 In the judgment of the lower court
enforcing the licensing agreement against the licensee who had produced
the motion picture and exhibited it but refused to pay the stipulated
royalties, the Court, through Justice Melencio-Herrera, said:
Neither do we agree with petitioner's subon that the Licensing Agreement
is null and void for lack of, or for having an illegal cause or consideration,
while it is true that petitioner bad pled the rights to the book entitled "The
Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent
and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said
deceased's life and in that of his mother and the member of his family. As
held in Schuyler v. Curtis, ([1895],147 NY 434,42 NE 31 LRA 286.49 Am St
Rep 671), 'a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deperson to
protect his memory, but the privilege wts for the benefit of the living, to
protect their feelings and to preventa violation of their own rights in the
character and memory of the deceased.'
Petitioners averment that private respondent did not have any property
right over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is
neither well taken. Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically
destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's
privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or
novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a he or she may
be (Garner v. Triangle Publications, DCNY 97 F. Supp., SU 549 [1951]). In
the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a
true-to-life Story Of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little
romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture
and brutality. 12
In Lagunzad, the Court had need, as we have in the instant case, to deal
with contraposed claims to freedom of speech and of expression and to
privacy. Lagunzad the licensee in effect claimed, in the name of freedom of
speech and expression, a right to produce a motion picture biography at
least partly "fictionalized" of Moises Padilla without the consent of and
without paying pre-agreed royalties to the widow and family of Padilla. In
rejecting the licensee's claim, the Court said:
Lastly, neither do we find merit in petitioners contention that the Licensing
Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of
the press, in that, as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to
express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior
restraint.The right freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred
position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA
191 [1963]). It is not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
xxx xxx xxx
The prevailing doctine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech
and the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio,
television and the movies, is the "balancing of interest test" (Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed. p. 79). The principle
"requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in given situation or type of situation"
(Separation Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899).
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted
by respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner.
taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the
particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations
assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity
of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of
freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters
of essentially private concern." 13
Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger
test" be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a
different conclusion must here be reached: The production and filming by
petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution"
does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful
intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy."
1. It may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the instant case
is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent Judge upon the
exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. The respondent Judge
has restrained petitioners from filming and producing the entire proposed
motion picture. It is important to note that in Lagunzad, there was no prior
restrain of any kind imposed upon the movie producer who in fact
completed and exhibited the film biography of Moises Padilla. Because of
the speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates. 14
The invalidity of a measure of prior restraint doesnot, of course, mean that
no subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a person claiming to
exercise such constitutional freedoms. The respondent Judge should have
stayed his hand, instead of issuing an ex-parte Temporary Restraining
Order one day after filing of a complaint by the private respondent and
issuing a Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the projected
motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any
audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew
what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other
words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy
that private respondent could lawfully assert.
2. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-
bloody change of government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue in February 1986, and the trian of events which led up to that
denouement. Clearly, such subject matter is one of public interest and
concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners' argue, of international interest. The
subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of this countryand
as such, must be regarded as having passed into the public domain and as
an appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any
form of mass media. The subject mater, as set out in the synopsis
provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the
individual life and certainly not to the private life of private
respondent Ponce Enrile. Unlike in Lagunzad, which concerned the
life story of Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his
immediate family, what we have here is not a film biography, more or
less fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day
Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man
Juan Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer
to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the
constituent events of the change of government in February 1986.
3. The extent of the instrusion upon the life of private respondent Juan
Ponce Enrile that would be entailed by the production and exhibition of
"The Four Day Revolution" would, therefore, be limited in character. The
extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis of the
proposed film, may be generally described as such intrusion as is
reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful historical account. Private
respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict in "The
Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private respondent or
that of any member of his family.
4. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of
public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private
respondent was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a
"public figure:"
A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments,
fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives
the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character,
has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity.
Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved
some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of
an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other
entertainment. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public
officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary
soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Grand
Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a
position where public attention is focused upon him as a person.
Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their
tight to privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less indiscrimately, in
the decisions" that they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so
could not complaint when they received it; that their personalities and their
affairs has already public, and could no longer be regarded as their own
private business; and that the press had a privilege, under the Constitution,
to inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of
public interest. On one or another of these grounds, and sometimes all, it
was held that there was no liability when they were given additional
publicity, as to matters legitimately within the scope of the public interest
they had aroused.
The privilege of giving publicity to news, and other matters of public
interest, was held to arise out of the desire and the right of the public to
know what is going on in the world, and the freedom of the press and other
agencies of information to tell it. "News" includes all events and items of
information which are out of the ordinary hum-drum routine, and which
have 'that indefinable quality of information which arouses public attention.'
To a very great extent the press, with its experience or instinct as to what
its readers will want, has succeeded in making its own definination of news,
as a glance at any morning newspaper will sufficiently indicate. It includes
homicide and othe crimes, arrests and police raides, suicides, marriages
and divorces, accidents, a death from the use of narcotics, a woman with a
rare disease, the birth of a child to a twelve year old girl, the reappearance
of one supposed to have been murdered years ago, and undoubtedly many
other similar matters of genuine, if more or less deplorable, popular appeal.
The privilege of enlightening the public was not, however, limited, to the
dissemination of news in the scene of current events. It extended also to
information or education, or even entertainment and amusement, by books,
articles, pictures, films and broadcasts concerning interesting phases of
human activity in general, as well as the reproduction of the public scene in
newsreels and travelogues. In determining where to draw the line, the
courts were invited to exercise a species of censorship over what the public
may be permitted to read; and they were understandably liberal in allowing
the benefit of the doubt. 15
Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because, inter alia, of his
participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of the change of
government in February 1986. Because his participation therein was major
in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make
reference to the role played by private respondent would be grossly
unhistorical. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower
than that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the
seclusion of simple private citizenship. he continues to be a "public figure."
After a successful political campaign during which his participation in the
EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the press, radio
and television, he sits in a very public place, the Senate of the Philippines.
5. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between
the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of
privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed
motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of
events. There must, in other words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of
truth in depicting the participation of private respondent in the EDSA
Revolution. 16 There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of
the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or
embarrassing personal facts. 17 The proposed motion picture should not
enter into what Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad referred to as
"matters of essentially private concern." 18 To the extent that "The Four
Day Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation of private
respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and
reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion
into private respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and
actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even without a license from
private respondent.
II
In a Manifestation dated 30 March 1988, petitioner Hal McElroy informed
this Court that a Temporary Restraining Order dated 25 March 1988, was
issued by Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 88-413, entitled "Gregorio B. Honasan vs.
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd., McElroy Film Productions, Hal McElroy, Lope
Juban and PMP Motion for Pictures Production" enjoining him and his
production company from further filimg any scene of the projected mini-
series film. Petitioner alleged that Honasan's complaint was a "scissors and
paste" pleading, cut out straight grom the complaint of private respondent
Ponce Enrile in Civil Case No. 88-151. Petitioner Ayer Productions, in a
separate Manifestation dated 4 April 1988, brought to the attention of the
Court the same information given by petitoner Hal McElroy, reiterating that
the complaint of Gregorio B. Honasan was substantially identical to that
filed by private respondent herein and stating that in refusing to join
Honasan in Civil Case No. 88-151, counsel for private respondent, with
whom counsel for Gregorio Honasan are apparently associated,
deliberately engaged in "forum shopping."
Private respondent filed a Counter-Manifestation on 13 April 1988 stating
that the "slight similarity" between private respondent's complaint and that
on Honasan in the construction of their legal basis of the right to privacy as
a component of the cause of action is understandable considering that
court pleadings are public records; that private respondent's cause of
action for invasion of privacy is separate and distinct from that of
Honasan's although they arose from the same tortious act of petitioners'
that the rule on permissive joinder of parties is not mandatory and that, the
cited cases on "forum shopping" were not in point because the parties here
and those in Civil Case No. 88-413 are not identical.
For reasons that by now have become clear, it is not necessary for the
Court to deal with the question of whether or not the lawyers of private
respondent Ponce Enrile have engaged in "forum shopping." It is, however,
important to dispose to the complaint filed by former Colonel Honasan who,
having refused to subject himself to the legal processes of the Republic
and having become once again in fugitive from justice, must be deemed to
have forfeited any right the might have had to protect his privacy through
court processes.
WHEREFORE,
a) the Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE, and the Order
dated 16 March 1988 of respondent trial court granting a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is hereby SET ASIDE. The limited Temporary Restraining Order
granted by this Court on 24 March 1988 is hereby MODIFIED by enjoining
unqualifiedly the implementation of respondent Judge's Order of 16 March
1988 and made PERMANENT, and
b) Treating the Manifestations of petitioners dated 30 March 1988 and 4
April 1988 as separate Petitions for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction or Restraining Order, the Court, in the exercise of its plenary and
supervisory jurisdiction, hereby REQUIRES Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147, forthwith to DISMISS Civil
Case No. 88-413 and accordingly to SET ASIDE and DISSOLVE his
Temporary Restraining Order dated 25 March 1988 and any Preliminary
Injunction that may have been issued by him.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Group 2 (Ala & Agcaoili) October 18, 2019

B. Ends and Effects of Law (Equality) October 18, 2019

1. Concept of Equality
2. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution
3. Is there absolute equality?
4. Common Humanity
5. Moral Capacities
6. Equality in Unequal Circumstances
7. Requisites for valid classification-i. Substantial Distinction, ii. Germane to the purpose of
the law, iii. Not limited to existing conditions, and iv. Equally applicable to the same
members of the same class
9. Cases: Summarize and focus on the issue of Equality
a. Villavicencio vs Lukban G.R. No. L-14639, March 25, 1919

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL.,

petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at
night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or
to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation
to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that
the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that
these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and
stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted
by the respondents.
ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.

a. HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above

the law. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the
prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law
expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law
punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation,
who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the
prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same
rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Thei
rchoice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may
make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize
anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of
the human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by
being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to
collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being
transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely
punished
b. Ichong vs Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957

ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its
purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a
stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.
• a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
• aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to
continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance
with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical
persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of
term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for
violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and
measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and
industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in
the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional
for the ff: reasons:
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them
of their liberty and property without due process
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens
the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the
legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among
residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.

The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are
treated alike.

The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.

Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien
of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislature’s target in
the enactment of the Act.

The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien
and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty
and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living.
The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on
him/her in times of crisis or emergency.

While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs
of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.

The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the
people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious
designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the
nation’s economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.

c. Himagan vs People, 237 SCRA 538

FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He
was charged for the murder of and attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA
6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law
provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty
imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall
immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such
case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety
(90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension
averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension
should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive
suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a
violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by
the Constitution.

HELD: No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from
the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the
application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen
carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or
intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense
is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses
against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to
silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The
imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975
does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.

Group 3 (Batongbakal & Blando)

C. Ends and Effects of Law (Equality) October 18, 2019

1. Equal Access Before the Law

2. Positive Discrimination
3. Section 11, Article III of the Constitution
4. Equal Protection for Men
5. Section 5 Par. 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution
6. RA 9710 (Focus only on the provisions on equal access)
7. RA 10524 (Focus only on the provisions on equal access)
8. RA 7277 (Focus only on the provisions on equal access)
9. RA 10911 Focus only on the provisions on equal access)
10. SOGIE Equality Bill
11. Cases: a. Laurel vs Misa, G.R. No. L-200, March 28, 1946
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; VALIDITY OF SECTION 19 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO.
682; CLASS LEGISLATION; UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS;
RETROACTIVE EFFECT. — Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, suspending
the provision so of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code in so far as political
detainees were concerned, for six months from their formal delivery by the
Commander in Chief of United States Army in the Philippines to the Commonwealth
Government, is not discriminatory in nature, unlawful delegation of legislative
powers, retroactive in operation.

Per PERFECTO, J., dissenting: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

2. WARRANT OF ARREST. — One of the essential requisites of depriving a person of

his liberty, when he is accused of an offense, is the existence of a warrant of arrest
issued in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, if the due process
clause of the same must be complied with.

3. SPECIFIC OFFENSE. — One of the fundamental rights of an accused is to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. That right is
violated when accused is detained for "active collaboration with the Japanese during
the Japanese regime," there being no such offense described in any law applicable
to petitioner.

4. SEVERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VIOLATED. — Upon the facts of the case,

several constitutional rights of petitioner appeared to have been violated, such as
the right to meet the witnesses face to face, to have witnesses in his behalf
compelled to appear, to have speedy and public trial, to have equal protection of
the laws, to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

5. SECTION 19 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 682. — Section 19 of Commonwealth

Act No. 682, providing for the suspension of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
and as said suspension is interpreted and applied in actual practice, is violative of
the due process of law constitutional guaranty.

6. AUTHORIZES TRAMPLING PERSONAL FAVOR. — Section 19 of Commonwealth

Act No. 682, as interpreted, in fact, authorizes public officers and employees to
deprive and continue depriving the political prisoners concerned of their personal
liberty, without due or any legal process of law.
7. DISCRIMINATION. — No one can, with candor and fairness, deny the
discriminatory character of the provision. If all discriminations are abhorrent under
any regime of law and justice, it is imperatively more so in a democracy.

8. DICTATORSHIP. — Granting the Special Prosecutors’ Office full discretion as to

how long within the six-month maximum article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
must continue suspended, turns said office into a dictatorship which may dispense
its favors and disfavors to individual prisoners under no other test than its
convenience and whims.

9. THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL COURT FOR SPECIAL PURPOSES. — The creation

of a special court to try cases arising years before its creation is a blunder identical
in nature and viciousness to the former practice of shuffling judges of first instance,
the judicial rigodon resorted to before to suit certain purposes of the government
and which was stopped by Judge Borromeo’s courageous defense of the
independence of the judiciary, in a leading case before the Supreme Court which
made history.

10. SEGREGATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. — We are not ready to

support petitioner’s contention that the whole Commonwealth Act No. 682 should
be declared null and void because of unconstitutional provisions contained therein,
considering that said provisions may be segregated and the remaining portions of
the text may stand on their own feet.

11. A WRONG PRINCIPLE. — The creation of the People’s Court should not per set a
precedent that will sanction a wrong principle. Generally speaking, the creation of
temporary tribunals to administer justice in specifically pre-determined existing
cases is contrary to the nature and character of judicial functions.

12. WHAT JUDGES ARE SUPPOSED TO DECIDE. — Judges are not supposed to
decide on what may appear right or wrong in the evanescent moment when the
voice of passion grows louder in the market of human activities. They must not
make decisions in the spur of news that wake screaming headlines and arouse the
uncontrollable emotions of political leaders or of the populace. They must decide
between right and wrong by the criterion of universal conscience, by the judgment,
not only of the fleeting instance of evolving history, but the unending caravans of
generations to come.

13. PERMANENT INSTITUTIONS. — In order that judges could render judgments of

lasting value which would embody the wisdom of the ages and the moral sense of
all time, it is necessary that they should preside over tribunals which must be
looked upon as permanent institutions of justice, not temporary makeshifts, more
appropriate to serve ephemeral purposes than to be the inviolable temples of an
eternal goddess.

14. INTELLECTUAL OVERHAULING. — The facts of current experience, showed the

imperative need of a wholesale intellectual overhauling as part of the work of post-
war rehabilitation in all orders of our national life.

15. MANY ELEMENTAL TENETS AND IDEALS NEED BE RESTATED. — The worries
and psychological shocks caused by the Japanese initial victories and brutal
oppressions concomitant with their occupation of our country, had the effect of
warping the mentality and the sense of moral values of not a negligible number of
persons, and many elemental ideas and tenets must be restated, if not
rediscovered. Among them is our concept on human freedom.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.:

Anastacio Laurel demands his release from Bilibid Prison, mainly asserting that
Commonwealth Act No. 682, creating People’s Court, specially section 19, under
which he is detained as a political prisoner, is unconstitutional and void. The
Solicitor General, meeting the issue, sustains the validity of the whole law.

According to the pleadings, Petitioner, a Filipino citizen, was arrested in Camarines

Sur in May, 1945, by the United States Army, and was interned, under a
commitment order "for his active collaboration with the Japanese during the
Japanese occupation," but in September, 1945, he was turned over to the
Commonwealth Government, and since then has been under the custody of the
respondent Director of Prisons.

The legality of the petitioner’s arrest and detention by the military authorities of the
United States is now beyond question. 1 His present incarceration, which is merely
a continuation of his previous apprehension, has lasted "more than six hours"
counted from his delivery to the respondent; but section 19 of Commonwealth Act
No. 682 provides in part as follows: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"Upon delivery by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United

States in the Philippines of the persons detained by him as political prisoners, to the
Commonwealth Government, the Office of the Special Prosecutors shall receive all
records, documents, exhibits and such other things as the Government of the
United States may have turned over in connection with and/or affecting said
political prisoners, examine the aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc., and
take, as speedily as possible, such action as may be proper: Provided, however, . .
. And, provided, further, That, in the interest of public security, the provisions of
article one hundred twenty-five of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be
deemed, as they are hereby, suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political prisoners
are concerned, until the filing of the corresponding information with the People’s
Court, but the period of suspension shall not be more than six (6) months from the
formal delivery of said political prisoners by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the United States in the Philippines to the Commonwealth Government."
In view of this provision, and the statement of the Solicitor General that even on
the date the petition was presented his office had, ready for filing, an information
charging herein petitioner with treason, we fail to see how petitioner’s release may
now be decreed.

However, he contends that the aforesaid section violates our Constitution, because
it is (a)discriminatory in nature; (b) unlawful delegation of legislative powers; and
(c) retroactive in operation.

(a) It is first argued that the suspension is not general in application, it being made
operative only to "the political prisoners concerned," that other citizens are not
denied the six-hour limitation in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, that such
discrimination is unexcusable and amounts to denial of the equal protection of the
laws.

It is accepted doctrine in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does
not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon
which different rules shall operate—so long as the classification is not unreasonable.
2 Instances of valid classification are numerous. The point to be determined then is
whether the differentiation in the case of the political prisoner is unreasonable or
arbitrary.

One of the proclamations issued by General MacArthur upon his arrival in Leyte
(December 29, 1944) referred to those Filipino citizens who voluntarily given aid,
comfort and sustenance to the Japanese. It announced his purpose to hold them in
restraint for the duration of the war, "whereafter they shall be turned over to the
Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases." When active
hostilities with Japan terminated, General MacArthur ordered the delivery to the
Commonwealth of all the prisoners in theretofore taken under his said
proclamation. There were 6,000 in round numbers. The problem was momentous
and urgent. Criminal informantions against all were , or a majority, or even a
substantial number of them could not be properly filed in the six-hour period. They
could not obviously be turned loose, considering the conditions of peace and order,
and the safety of the prisoners themselves. So the President, by virtue of his
emergency powers, promulgated Executive Order No. 65 suspending article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, for not more than thirty days, with regard to said
detainees or internees, having found such suspension necessary "to enable the
Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to adopt temporary measures in
relation with their custody and the investigation, prosecution and disposal of their
respective cases." The Order added that it shall be in force and effect until the
Congress shall provide otherwise. Congress later approved Commonwealth Act No.
682, establishing the People’s Court and the Office of Special Prosecutors for the
prosecution and trial of crimes against national security committed during the
second World War. It found the thirty-day period too short compared with the
facilities available to the prosecution, and set the limit at six months.

Considering the circumstances, we are not prepared to hold the extension of the
period for the political detainees was unreasonable. The Legislature chose to give
the prosecutor’s office sufficient time to investigate and to file the proper charge—
or discharge those who m it may find innocent. If time had not been granted, the
prosecutor would perhaps have been forced to indict all the detainees
indiscriminately: reserving, of course, its right subsequently to request the
liberation of those it may think not guilty. But such wholesale indictment was
obviously neither practical nor desirable. We will allow that there be some dispute
as to the wisdom or adequacy of the extension. Yet the point is primarily for the
Legislature to decide. The only issue is the power to promulgate special rules for
the custody and investigation of active collaborationists, and so long as reasons
exist in support of the legislative action courts should be careful not to deny it.

In this connection, it must be stated there can be no really be no substantial

ground to assail the six-month extension, in view of the provisions authorizing the
release under bail. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was intended to prevent
any abuse of resulting from confining a person without informing him of his offense
and without permitting him to go on bail. Commonwealth Act. No. 682 gives no
occasion to such abuse. The political prisoners know, or ought to know, they are
being kept for crimes against national security. And they are generally permitted to
furnish bail bonds.

(b) There is hardly any merit to the argument that as "the duration of the
suspension of article 125 is placed in the hands of the Special Prosecutor’s Office,"
the section constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative powers; for as explained
by the Solicitor-General, the result—some informations filed before, afterwards—is
merely the consequence of the fact that six thousand informations could not be
filed simultaneously, and that some one had to be first or some one else,
necessarily the last." The law, in, effect, permitted the Solicitor General to file the
informations within six months. And statutes permitting officers to perform their
duties within certain periods of time may not surely be declared invalid delegations
of legislative power.

(c) Nor is the position correct that section 19 is retroactive in its operation. It refers
to detention after its passage-not before. Incidentally, there is no constitutional
objection to retroactive statutes where they relate, to remedies or procedure. 3

The argument is advanced that when he was arrested, (May, 1945), article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code was in force, and petitioner could have asked for release
after six hours and, therefore, Commonwealth Act No. 682 that takes away that
right is ex post facto, retroactive and fundamentally objectionable. The premises
are incorrect. In May, 1945, he could not have asked for release after six hours. In
other words, he would not have been discharged from custody. (Raquiza v.
Bradford, supra.) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was in force, it is true; but
not as to him. The laws of the Commonwealth were revived in Camarines Sur by
operation of General MacArthur’s proclamation of October 23, 1944, upon its
liberation from enemy control; but subject to his reservation to hold active
collaborationists in restraint "for duration of the war." So, persons apprehended
under that directive, for treasonable collaboration, could not necessarily invoke the
benefits of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Undoubtedly the Legislature could validly repeal section 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. Had it done so, herein petitioner would have no ground to protest on
constitutional principles, as he could claim no vested right to the continued
enforcement of said section. 4 Therefore, a fortiori he may not complain, if, instead
of repealing section, our lawmaking body merely suspended its operation for a
definite period of time. Should he counter that such repeal or suspension must be
general to be valid, he will be referred to the preceding considerations regarding
classification and the equal protection of the laws.

Wherefore, we perceive no irreconcilable conflict between the Constitution and the

challenged portions of section 19 of Commonwealth Act. No. 682.

The other features of the People’s Court Act which are the subject of denunciation
by petitioner do not , in our opinion, require specific elucidation at this time,
because he has not as yet been held into that court, and the issues appear to have
important or necessary connection with his current deprivation of liberty. 5

The petition for the writ of habeas corpus will be denied. With costs.

Moran, C.J., Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

OZAETA, J., with whom concurs PARAS, J., concurring in the result: c hanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw li bra ry

I concur with the majority in upholding the constitutionality of section 19 of the

People’s Court Act. In the view I held in the Raquiza case the detention of the
petitioner by the military authorities was illegal for lack of due process. But the
same thing cannot be said as to his present detention by the respondent Director of
Prisons, especially now that an information for treason has been filed against him.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting: c hanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw li bra ry

On or about May 6, 1945, petitioner was arrested by the C.I.C., United States
Army, Camarines Sur. On September 6, 1945 he was turned over to the
Commonwealth Government by the United States Army and since that date he
remained in prison under the personal custody of the respondent Director of
Prisons, and now he comes before us complaining that his arrest and detention are
illegal and in violation of many of his constitutional rights, in that:" (a) He was
arrested and detained without a warrant of arrest. (See Constitution , Article III,
section 3) (b) No information or charge has been lodged against him, informing him
of the nature and cause of his arrest. (See Constitution, Article III, section 17.) (c)
He was not given an opportunity to confront the witnesses who caused his arrest
and detention. (See Constitution, Article III, section 17.) (d) He was not accorded
the benefit of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in behalf.
(See Constitution, Article III, section 17.) (e) He was and is being denied the right
to a prompt, speedy and public trial. (See Constitution, Article III, section 17.) (f)
His arrest and detention was and is without due process of law. (See Constitution,
Article III, section 15.) (g) He was not accorded the equal protection of the laws.
(See Constitution, Article III, section 1.) (h) He was subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment. (See Constitution, Article III, section 19.) (i) He was committed to
prison and detained by the respondent under a bill of attainder. (See Constitution,
Article III, section 11.)."

Petitioner also maintains that the People’s Court Act No. 682, under which the
respondent herein purports to act, violates not only the spirit but also the letter of
the fundamental law in many ways, in that:" (a) It constitutes an assault upon the
independence of the judiciary. (See Tydings-McDuffie Law, section 2, par. [a]) (b)
It deprives the accused of certain rights already acquired at the time of its passage,
and therefore is ex-post facto in nature. (See Constitution, Article III, section 11.)
(c) It partakes of the nature of a bill of attainder. (See Constitution, Article III,
section 11.) (d) It denies the equal protection of the laws. (See Constitution, Article
III, section 1.) (e) It provides for cruel and unusual punishment. (See Constitution,
Article III, section 19.) (f) It deprives the citizen of his day in court. (See
Constitution, Article III, section 21.) (g) It constitutes an unlawful delegation of
legislative and executive functions. (See Tydings-McDuffie Law, section 2, par[a].)
(h) It covers more than one subject matter. (See Constitution, Article VI, section
12, par. 1.) (i) It authorizes the charging of multifarious crimes in one complaint or
information thereby making it impossible to be informed of the real nature of and
cause of the accusation against the accused. (See Constitution, Article III, section
17.) (j) It denies the constitutional right of a person to bail before conviction. (See
Constitution, Article III, section 16.)"

Consequently, petitioner prays that Commonwealth Act No. 682 be declared

unconstitutional and null and void, that his detention, irrespective of the validity of
the said act, be declared illegal and in violation of many of his constitutional rights,
and that an order be issued for his complete and absolute release.

Respondent answered that, pursuant to the authority of the proclamation issued by

the Commander in Chief of the American Armed Forces, Southwest Pacific Area,
General Douglas MacArthur, Dated December 29, 1944, petitioner was arrested and
thereafter detained on May 10, 1945, under security commitment order, issued by
the commanding officer of the 904th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment,
United States Army, upon the charge of "active collaboration with the Japanese
during the Japanese occupation" ; that his subsequent detention as a political
prisoner, upon the transfer of his person to the Commonwealth Government by the
United States Army, pursuant to the terms of the proclamation issued by General
Douglas MacArthur on December 29, 1944, Executive Order No. 65, issued by
President of the Philippines on September 3, 1945, and pursuant to the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 682, approved on September 25, 1945, was a mere
logical sequence of his previous commitment and hence equally valid and legal.

Respondent alleges also that petitioner has not as yet availed of the benefits of
section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which confers upon political prisoners the
privilege of securing their release on bail upon proper application therefor with the
People’s Court; that Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not trench upon, nor
contravene any of the provisions of the Constitution; that it is not ex post facto in
nature in that it suspends, in the interest of national security, the provision of
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code for a period of not more than six months,
which is fully justified by the practical necessities of the situation, considering the
circumstance that there are more than 6,000 political prisoners charged with the
grave crime of treason and other offenses against national security; that said law
does not materially impair the substantial rights of the accused to have the
question of his guilt determined according to the substantive law existing at the
time of the commission of the offense, that it is not a bill of attainder, since it does
not inflict punishment without a judicial trial; that it neither deprives the citizen of
his day in court, nor it provides for cruel and unusual punishment; that it applies
equally and uniformly to all persons similarly situated; that it complies with the
constitutional requirement that the accused must be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him; that instead of suppressing or denying the constitutional
right of an accused to bail before conviction, said act recognizes and concedes to all
accused in section 19 the right to bail, except those charged with capital offenses
when evidence of guilt is strong; that the information against the petitioner,
charging him with treason upon ten counts was ready for filing in People’s Court
even on the date the petition in this proceeding was presented; and that in due
deference to this Supreme Court, the filing of said information has been held in
abeyance pending the final disposition of this habeas corpus proceeding.

For purposes of this discussion, the discrepancy between petitioner and respondent
as to the correct date when petitioner was arrested, May 6 or May 10, cannot affect
the merits of the case.

Without a lawful warrant of arrest. — Whether the arrest took place on May 6,
1945, as alleged by petitioner or on May 10, as alleged by respondent, there is
absolutely no question that petitioner was arrested without any lawful warrant of
arrest.
Section 1:3 of Article III of the Constitution provides that "no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." This provision considered in connection with the provision of section 1:1 of
Article III of the Constitution and section 1:15 of the same article that no person
shall be deprived of liberty or be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law, implies necessarily that one of the essential requisites for depriving
a person of his liberty, when he is accused of an offense, is the existence of a
warrant of arrest issued in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

We are of opinion that the arrest of petitioner was executed in flagrant violation of
the above-mentioned constitutional provisions.

No information as to any charge. — The Constitution provides that one of the

fundamental rights of an accused is "to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him." (Section 1:17, Article III of the Constitution.)

This constitutional guarantee appears equally to have been violated in petitioner’s

case.

Respondent’s allegation that petitioner is detained because of his active

collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese Occupation does not inform
petitioner of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, it appearing that
there is no such offense described in any law applicable to petitioner as "active
collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese regime." cra law virt ua1aw lib ra ry

Meeting witnesses face to face. — Petitioner complains that he was not given an
opportunity to confront his witnesses who caused his arrest and detention.

The complainant is equally well-taken. There is nothing in the record to show that
before, during , or at any time after his arrest, petitioner has ever been accorded
the opportunity of meeting the witnesses "face to face" as provided in section 1:17
of Article III of the Constitution.

Attendance of witnesses in his behalf. — Petitioner complains he was not accorded

of the benefit of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his
behalf as provided in section 1:17 of Article III of the Constitution. This allegation
has not been disputed.

We have, therefore, here another flagrant violation of a constitutional right of

petitioner.

Speedy and public trial. — Petitioner invokes also his constitutional right to "have a
speedy and public trial" as provided in section 1:17 of Article III of the Constitution.

There is absolutely no question that this constitutional right of petitioner has been
equally violated.

Equal protection of the laws. — Petitioner complains that he was not accorded equal
protection of the laws as provided in section 1:1 of Article III of the Constitution.

Petitioner’s allegation is equally well-founded, there being no question as to the fact

that he was and he is being deprived of several of his fundamental rights under the
Constitution without any legal process.

Cruel and unusual punishment. — Petitioner complains that he was subjected to

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of section 1:19 of Article III of the
Constitution.

There is no question that petitioner is being deprived of his liberty without any
information or complaint charging him of any specified offense under the laws of
the land.
So it appears that he is being, in effect, subjected to the punishment of deprivation
of liberty for almost one year, without any definite information as to when it will
end. This means that he is being subjected to punishment, not only because he is
not authorized by any law of the land, but because it is meted out to petitioner for
no specific offense at all. The violation of section 1: 19 of Article III of the
Constitution is indispensable.

Petitioner complains that those responsible for his detention appear to have never
heard of such trifles as those contained in the Bill of Rights and even if they did,
they contend that the Constitution was never meant for the "untouchables" known
in the contemporary Philippine history as "collaborators," and that no one can
imagine a more glaring case for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus than that of
the petitioner, it appearing that the circumstances of his arrest are self-
demonstrative of the most scandalous violation of the Bill of Rights ever
perpetrated under the American flag.

Petitioner, as has been shown, appears well supported in his complaint.

Now, as one of the questions raised in this case, let us determine the validity of
that portion of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, an act creating the
People’s Court, which provides as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com. ph

". . . And, provided, further, That , in the interest of public security, the provisions
of article one hundred twenty-five of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be
deemed, as they are hereby, suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political prisoners
are concerned, until the filing of the corresponding information with the People’s
Court, but the period of suspension shall not be more than six (6) months from the
formal delivery of said political prisoners by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the United States in the Philippines to the Commonwealth Government."
libra ry
c ralaw virtua1aw

The provision of the Revised Penal Code which has been virtually suspended by this
law is: jgc: chan robles .com.p h

"Art. 125. Delay in the Delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. — The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed
upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal
ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within
the period of six hours." (As amended by Act No. 3940.)

The pertinent provisions of our fundamental law which limit the powers of the
legislative branch of our government in the enactment of our laws are as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com. ph

"ART. III. -BILL OF RIGHTS.

"SECTION 1. (1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

x x x

"(15) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law.

x x x

"(17) In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent

until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf."
"Development of the Doctrine of Due Process of Law.

"Though the words ’due process of law’ have not a long history, the doctrine implied
by them has history in Anglo-American law which extends for more than seven
hundred years—back, indeed, to the signing of the Magna Charta. And yet,
notwithstanding this long period during which countless opportunities have
presented themselves for its application and judicial definition, the doctrine has not
yet received a statement in such a form that its specific applications can, in all
cases, be determined. This failure has been due, not to any lack of judicial effort or
acumen, but to the very nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental
principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than
general statement. The result is, that the meaning of the phrase has to be sought
in the history of its specific applications, and, as the variety of these possible
applications is infinite, it will probably never be possible to say that the full content
of that meaning has been determined. In Twining v. New Jersey (211 U.S., 78), we
find the court saying: ’Few phrases in the law are so elusive of exact apprehension
as this. This court has always declined to give a comprehensive definition of it, and
has preferred that its full meaning should be gradually ascertained by the process
of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise.’ So
also in Davidson v. New Orleans (96 U.S., 97), the court said: ’to define what it is
for a state to deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, in terms which would cover every exercise of power thus forbidden to the
state, and exclude those which are not, no more useful construction could be
furnished by this or any other court to any part of the fundamental law.’ And, later
in the same opinion: ’There is wisdom in the ascertaining of the intent and
application of such an important phrase in the Federal Constitution by the gradual
process of judicial inclusion and exclusion as the cases presented for decision shall
require, with the reasoning on which such discussions may be founded.’

"In Holden v. Hardy (169 U.S., 366) the court said: ’This court has never attempted
to define with precision the words "due process of law," It is sufficient to say that
there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of
free government no member of the Union may disregard.’

"It would appear, then, that a complete knowledge of the meaning of the doctrine
of due process of law in American constitutional jurisprudence can be obtained only
by a study of every case in which its application has been sought. . . ." cralaw vi rt ua1aw lib ra ry

"Per legem Terrae.

"The historical antecedents of the phrase ’due process of law’ may be clearly traced
back to the expression per legem terrae as it occurs in the Charter wrung by the
Barrons from King John. The 39th chapter of that document provides that ’no
freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any
way destroyed; nor shall we go upon him or send upon him, but by lawful judgment
of his peers or by the law of the land’ (per legem terrae). In the later re-issues and
reaffirmations of this charter by Henry III, in 1216, 1217 and 1225, this provision
was repeated, with however, in the issues of 1217 and 1255, the addition of the
words after disseized, ’of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs,’ (de libero
tenemento suo vel libertatibus, vel liberis consuetudinibus suis).

"The words of Magna Charta, per legem terrae, probably had at this time the
technical meaning that no civil or criminal plea should be decided against a freeman
until he had been given the opportunity to furnish the customary ’proof’ which the
law, as it then stood, recognized and permitted him to offer. This proof might be by
battle, or ordeal, or by compurgation. Whatever form it might assume it was
technically known as the law (lex), that is, as a test according to which the
defendant’s claim was to be upheld or denied. (McKechnie, Magna Charta, 102,
441, 442: Thayer, Evidence, 200; Bigelow, History of Procedure, 155. Thayer and
Bigelow are cited by McKechnie.)

"In the various petitions of the Parliament in the Fourteenth Century against the
arbitrary acts of the King’s Council, the guaranty of the law of the land was
appealed to, and these petitions, when assented to by the King, became, of course,
statutes of the realm. Thus, in 1331, in Stat. 5 Edw. III, C. 9, it was declared that
’no man from henceforth shall be attacked by any accusation, nor forejudged of life
or limb, nor his lands, tenements, goods nor chattels seized into the King’s hands
against the form of the Great Charter and the law of the land.’ So again, in 1351, in
Stat. 25, Edw. III, C. 4, it was declared that ’from henceforth none shall be taken
by petition or by suggestion made to our lord the King or his Council, unless it be
by presentment or indictment of his good and lawful people of the same
neighborhood, where such deeds be done, in due manner or by process made by
writ original at the common law, nor that none be ousted of his franchises, nor of
his household, unless he be fully brought in to answer and forejudged of the same
by the courts of the law,’ Still again, in 1355, in Stat. 28, Edw. III, C. 3, there was
substantially similar provision, and there, for what would appear to be the first
time, we have the modern phrase employed.’No man,’ it was declared, ’of what
state or condition soever he be , shall be put out of his lands, or tenements, nor
taken, nor imprisoned, nor indicted, nor put to death, without he be brought in to
answer by due process of law.’ (Par due proces de lei.) (Cf. McGehee, Due Process
of Law, Chap. I.)

"It is thus apparent that in these petitions and statutes of Edward III, the phrases
’due process of law’ and ’the law of the land’ had come to be synonymous, both
indicating, as the substance of the petitions shows, that the guaranty insisted upon
was that persons should not be imprisoned except upon due indictment, or without
an opportunity on their parts to testify the legality of their arrest and detention, and
that their property should not be taken except in proceedings conducted in due
form in which fair opportunity was offered to the one claiming ownership or right to
possession to appear and show cause, if any, why the seizure should not be made.

"The Petition of Right of 1628, approved by Charles I, recited various arbitrary acts
complained of, and appealed to ’the laws and franchises of the realm.’ Coke, in the
his Second Institute, defined the phrase per legem terrae as meaning ’the common
law, statute law or custom of England,’ and then declared: ’For the true sense and
exposition of these words , see the Statute 37, Edw. III, C. 8, where the words’ by
the law of the land’ are rendered ’without due process of law’, for there it is said,
though it be contained in the Great Charter, that no man be taken, imprisoned or
put out of his freehold without due process of law; that is by indictment or
presentment of good and lawful men where such deeds be done or by writ original
of the common law.

"It was in this sense as employed in the statutes of Edward III and by Coke, and as
relating solely to matters of procedure, that the phrase due process of law was
introduced into American law." (3 Willoughby on the Constitution of the United
States, 2d ed., sections 1113,1114, pp. 1685, 1688,)

"English and American Use of the Phrase ’Due Process of Law’ Contrasted.

"Coming now to American practice we find that the exact phrase ’due process of
law’ was not employed in any of the eleven State constitutions adopted prior to the
Federal Constitution, but that it early found expression in substance, if not in very
words, in those instruments. The very words do, however, appear in the
Declaration of Rights of the State of New York, adopted in 1777, and in one of the
amendments proposed by that State to the Federal Constitution as drafted by the
Constitution of the United States in, adopted in 1791. That amendment provides,
inter alia, that ’nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.’ The Federal imposition of the requirement upon the
States did not come until 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.

"It is a very remarkable fact that not until our written Constitution was more than
half a century old did the phrase receive an interpretation and application which
approximates that which it has today, and not, indeed, until a hundred years had
passed away was resort had to it as the usual device of those disapproving of the
acts of their legislatures. This, however, is no doubt in a measure explainable by
the fact that not until the increased complexity of social and industrial life had led,
upon the one hand, to the use by the State and Federal Governments of
administrative process more or less summary in character and, upon the other
hand, to marked increase in the regulative control of law over private acts and use
of public property, did there appear the necessity for the appeal to this limitation by
those who conceived themselves injured by the exercise of such administrative
powers or by the enforcement of these legislative regulations.

"In two most important respects the application in America of the requirement of
due process of law has differed from that which it had received in England prior to
1776, and which indeed, it still receives in that country. These are: (1) that, in the
United States, it operates as a limitation upon the legislative as well as upon the
executive branch of the government, and (2) that it relates to substantive as well
as procedural rights. This second application is, however, one which, as we shall
see, was not at first developed.

"Before the requirement could be recognized as one imposed upon the legislature
there had to be first established the doctrine that the courts, when called upon to
apply the enactments of the lawmaking branch of the government of which they
themselves constitute the judiciary, may declare the invalidity of the enactments,
which, in their judgment, conflict with the provision of the written Constitution. This
doctrine, as is well known, was not accepted without protest, but may be said to
have received final and decisive sanction as the fundamental principle of American
constitutional jurisprudence in the great opinion of Marshall, rendered in 1803, in
the case of Marbury v. Madison (1 Cr., 137).

"That, as contrasted with English practice, the requirement of due process of law
was a limitation upon the legislative power, so far, at least, as to render void an
enactment authorizing a taking of life, liberty or property by an arbitrary or
otherwise defective procedure, seems early to have been held, the argument being
founded upon the obvious fact that, as contrasted with English constitutional
documents, American written instruments of government and their accompanying
Bills of Rights have for their primary aim the delimitation of the powers of all
departments of government,—of the legislative as well as the executive or judicial."
(3 Willoughby, 2d ed., section 1115, pp. 1689, 1690.)

"The possibility, under a popular form of government, of oppression in the form of

laws enacted by their own representatives, does not appear to have been keenly
felt by the people. So far, however, as it was apprehended , the early view seems
to have been that the restraints of natural law would be operative, according to the
doctrine that the law-making branch of every government is inherently without the
power arbitrarily and oppressively to invade the sphere of private rights of a
persons and property. This natural law doctrine, though it can never be said to have
a gained a definite establishment, even for a time, nevertheless received frequent
obiter assertion, and its influence was for a long time seen in discussions of our
higher courts. Thus, for example, in 1875, in Loan Association v. Topeka the court
said: ’It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free government
beyond the control of the state,—a government which recognized no such rights,
which held the lives, the liberty and the property of its citizens subject at all times
to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most democratic
depository of power is, after all, but a despotism . . . The theory of our
governments, state and municipal, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power
anywhere. The executive, the legislative and the judicial branches of these
governments are all of limited and defined powers. There are limitations on such
power which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments—implied
reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could not exist,
and which are respected by all governments entitled to the name. No court, for
instance, would hesitate to declare void a statute which enacted that A and B who
were husband and wife to each other should be so no longer, but that A should
thereafter be the husband of C, and B the wife of D, or should enact that the
homestead now owned by A should henceforth be the property of B.’" 3 Willoughby,
United States Constitutional Law, section 1116, pp. 1692, 1693.)

"There are certain general principles, well settled, however, which narrow the field
of discussion, and may serve as helps to correct conclusions. These principles grow
out of the proposition universally accepted by American Courts on the authority of
Coke, that the words ’due process of law’ are equivalent in meaning to the words
’law of the land,’ contained in the chapter of Magna Charta which provides that ’no
freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or exiled, or any
wise destroyed; nor shall we go upon him, nor send upon him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.’"

"In Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. it was said: ’It is sufficient to say that by due
process of law is meant one which, following the forms of law, is appropriate to the
case and just as to the parties to be affected. It must be pursued in the ordinary
mode of prescribed by law, it must be adapted to the end to be attained, and
whenever it is necessary for the protection of the parties, it must give them the
opportunity to be heard respecting the justness of the judgment sought. The
clause, therefore, means that there can be no proceeding against life, liberty or
property which may result in deprivation of either, without the observance of those
general rules established in our system of jurisprudence for the security of private
rights.’

"‘By the law of the land,’ said Webster in a much quoted paragraph, ’is most clearly
intended the general law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen
shall hold his life, liberty and property and immunities under the protection of
general rules which govern society. Everything which may pass under the form of
an enactment is not law of the land.’" (3 Willoughby, 2d ed., pp. 1708, 1709.) .

"The fact that the requirement as to due process includes, to a very considerable
extent at least, the guarantee of equal protection of the laws, is especially shown in
the opinion if the court in Smyth v. Ames where it is said: ’The equal protection of
the laws, which by the Fourteenth Amendment no state can deny to the individual,
forbids legislation, in whatever form it may be enacted, by which the property of an
individual is, without compensation, wrested from him for the benefit of another, or
of the public.’

"The possible distinction between the two prohibitions we find touched upon by
Chief Justice Taft in his opinion in Truax v. Corrigan. He there said: ’It may be that
they (the two prohibitions) overlap, that a violation of one may involve at times the
violation of the other, but the spheres of the protection they offer are not
coterminous. . . . The due process clause . . . of course tends to secure equality of
law in the sense that it makes a required minimum of protection of everyone’s right
of life, liberty and property, which the Congress or the legislature may not withhold.
Our whole system of law is predicated on the general fundamental principle of
equality of application of the law. . . . But the framers and adopters of this
(Fourteenth) Amendment were not content to depend on a mere minimum secured
by the due process clause, or upon the spirit of equality which might not be insisted
on by local public opinion. They therefore embodied that spirit in a specific
guaranty. The guaranty was aimed at undue favor and individual or class privilege,
on the one hand, and at hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality, on
the other. It sought an equality of treatment of all persons, even though all enjoyed
the protection of due process.’ Thus, in the instant case, the Chief Justice pointed
out that the State statute under examination which prohibited interference by
injunctions in disputes between employers and employees concerning terms and
conditions of employment resulted in the recognition of our set of actions against
ordinary tort feasors and another set against tort feasors in labor disputes. The
contention that no one has a vested right to injunctive relief, he said, did not meet
the objection that the granting of equitable relief to one man or set of men, and
denying it to others under like circumstances and in the same jurisdiction was a
denial of the equal protection of the laws.

"In Hayes v. Missouri the court said of the Fourteenth Amendment that it ’does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the objects to which it is directed or by
the territory within which it is to operate. It merely requires that all persons subject
to such legislation shall be treated alike , under like circumstances and conditions
both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.’ Having quoted this
statement, Chief Justice Taft in Truax v. Corrigan added: ’Indeed, protection is not
protection unless it does so. Immunity granted to a class, however limited, having
the effect to deprive another class, however limited, of a personal or property right,
is just as clearly a denial of equal protection of laws to the latter class as if the
immunity were in favor of, or the deprivation of right permitted worked against, a
larger class.’
"From what has been said it is clear that, in many cases, laws which have been held
invalid as denying due process of law might also have been so held denying equal
protection of the laws, or vice versa, and that, in fact, in not a few cases, the courts
have referred to both prohibitions leaving it uncertain which prohibition was
deemed the most pertinent and potent in the premises.

"One of the best general statements of the scope and intent of the provision for the
equal protection of the laws is that given by Justice Field in his opinion in Barbier v.
Connolly, in which, speaking for the court, he said: chan rob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

The Fourteenth Amendment in declaring that no State "shall deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor to deny any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," undoubtedly intended, not only
that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty or arbitrary spoliation of
property but the equal protection and security should be given to all under like
circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights; that all persons
should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness and acquire and enjoy
property; that they should have like access to the courts of the country for the
protection of their persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, and
the enforcement of contracts; that no impediment should be interposed to the
pursuits by anyone except as applied to the same pursuits by others under like
circumstances; that no greater burdens calling and condition, and that in the
administration of criminal justice no different or higher punishment should be
imposed upon one that such as is prescribed to all for like offenses.’" (3 Willoughby
2d ed., pp. 1928, 1930.)

"The legislature may suspend the operation of the general laws of the State, but
when it does so the suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual
cases or for particular localities. Privileges may be granted to particular individuals
when by so doing the rights of others are not interfered with; disabilities may be
removed; the legislature as parens patriae, when not forbidden, may grant
authority to the guardians or trustees of incompetent persons to exercise a
statutory control over their estates for assistance, comfort or support, or for the
discharge of legal or equitable liens upon their property; but everyone has a right
to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a special statute which,
without his consent, singles his case out as one to be regulated by a different law
from that which is applied in all similar cases, would not be legitimate legislation,
but would be an arbitrary mandate as is not within the province of free
governments. Those make the laws ’are to govern by promulgated, established
laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for
the favorite at court and the countryman at plough.’ This is a maxim in
constitutional law, and by it we may test the authority and binding force of
legislative enactments." (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 558, 559.)

"Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of

the law; and if special privileges are granted, or special burdens or restrictions
imposed in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart
as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government.

"The State, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no

arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious and
discriminations against persons or classes are still more so; and, as a rule of
construction, it is to be presumed they were probably not contemplated or
designed. (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 562, 563.)

"It is usual for state constitutions and statutes to provide for the accused a speedy
and public trial. By speedy trial is meant one that can be had as soon after
indictment as the prosecution can with reasonable diligence prepare for, regard
being had to the terms of court; a trial conducted according to fixed rules,
regulations, and proceedings of law, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays. The term ’speedy’ as thus used, being a word of indeterminate meaning,
permits legislative definition to some extent; and authorities uniformly hold that
such statutes are enacted for the purpose of enforcing the constitutional right, and
that they constitute a legislative construction or definition of the constitutional
provision, and must be construed fairly to the accomplishment of that end. Any act
of the legislature which infringes the constitutional provision is necessarily
nugatory." (16 C.J., pp. 439, 440.)

"‘The purpose of the statute (1) is to prevent continued incarceration without

opportunity to the accused, within reasonable time, to meet the proofs upon which
the charge is based.’ (State v. Miller, 72 Wash., 154, 159, 163; 129 P., 1140.) (2)
’The constitutional privilege of a speedy trial was intended to prevent an arbitrary,
indefinite imprisonment, without any opportunity to the accused to face his
accusers in a public trial. It was never intended as furnishing a technical means for
escaping trial.’ (State v. Miller, supra.) (3) ’The sole object of all laws from first to
last, was to ensure a speedy trial to the accused, and to guard against a protracted
imprisonment or harrassment by a criminal prosecution, an object but little if any
less interesting to the public than to him." (Com. v. Adcock, 8 Grat. [49 Va. ], 661,
680.) (Quote Denham v. Robinson, 72 W. Va., 243, 255; 77 S.E., 970; 45 L.R.A.,
N. S., 1123; Ann. Cas. 1915D,997.) (See also Ex parte Santee(2 Va. Cas. [4 Va. ],
363, 365) (where the court said: That whilst it has an eye to the solemn duty of
protecting the public against the wrongs of those who are regardless of their
obligations to society, and to the delays which the Commonwealth may unavoidably
encounter in prosecuting breaches of these obligations, it is studious to shield the
accused from the consequences of the laches of those to whom the duty of
conducting the prosecution may have been assigned. The public has rights as well
as the accused, and one of the first of these is, that of redressing, or punishing
their wrongs. It would not seem reasonable that this right, so necessary for the
preservation of society, should be forfeited without its default).

"This provision of our constitutions must receive a reasonable interpretation. It

cannot be held to mean that in all the possible vicissitudes of human affairs, a
person who is accused of a crime shall have a speedy and public trial in due form of
law, because there may be times when the civil administration will be suspended by
the force of uncontrollable circumstances. This constitutional provision was adopted
upon general considerations growing out of the experience of past times, and was
intended to prevent the government from oppressing the citizen by holding criminal
prosecutions suspended over him for an indefinite time; and it was also intended to
prevent delays in the customary administration of justice, by imposing upon the
judicial tribunals an obligation to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of
criminal accusations.’ (Ex parte Turman, 26 Tex., 708, 710; 84 Am. D., 598.) ." (16
C.J., 440, footnote.)

"In any criminal case, the person accused may not be deprived of life, liberty,
property except by due process of law, even though he is guilty. The law by which
the question of due process is determined is the law of the jurisdiction where the
offense was committed and the trial is had.

"Due process of law in a criminal case requires a law creating or defining the
offense, a court of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and
opportunity to defend, trial before an impartial judge or judge and jury according to
established criminal procedure, and a right to be discharged unless found guilty. . .
.

"While the freedom of the state and federal governments to control and regulate
the procedure of their courts for the prosecution of criminal offenses is limited by
the requirement of the process of the law, and the procedure must not work a
denial of fundamental rights of accused included within the conception of due
process, no particular form or method of procedure in criminal cases is required by
the guaranty of due process so long as accused has due and sufficient notice of the
charge or accusation and an adequate opportunity to be heard in defense." (16 C.
J. S., pp. 1171-1173.) .

"An emergency existing does not increase constitutional power or diminish,

constitutional restrictions; hence while emergency legislation may temporarily limit
available remedies, it does not contemplate the permanent denial of due process."
(16 C. J. S. P. 1157.) .
"Although a law is fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied
and administered with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as to make unjust and
illegal discrimination, it is within the prohibition of the Federal Constitution." (Chy
Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S., 275; 23 Law. ed., 550.)

"The action of a state through its officers charged with the administration of the law
fair in appearance may be of such character as to constitute a denial of the equal
protection of the laws." (Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 145;
55 Law. ed., 191.)

"The clause ’due process of law’ means that there can be no proceeding against life,
liberty or property which may result in the deprivation of either, without the
observance of those general rules established in our system of jurisprudence for the
security of private rights." (Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U.S., 51; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep., 20; 47
Law. ed., 70.)

"CRIMINAL ACCUSATIONS.

"Perhaps the most important of the protections to personal liberty consist in the
mode of trial which is secured to every person accused of crime. At common law,
accusations of felony were made in the form of an indictment by a grand jury; and
this process is still retained in many States, while others have substituted in its
stead an information filed by the prosecuting officer of the State or country. The
mode of investigating the facts, however, is the same in all; and this is through a
trial by jury, surrounded by certain safeguards which are well understood part of
the system, and which the government cannot dispense with.

"First, we may mention that the humanity of our law always presumes an accused
party innocent until he is proved guilty. This is a presumption which attends all the
proceedings against him, from their initiation until they result in a verdict, which
either finds the party guilty or converts the presumption of innocence into an
adjudged fact.

"If there were any mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable
certainty, insure the attendance of the accused to answer the accusation, it would
not be justifiable to inflict upon him that indignity, when the effect is to subject
him, in a greater or less degree, to the punishment of a guilty person, while as yet
it is not determined that he has committed any crime. If the punishment on
conviction cannot exceed in severity the forfeiture of a large sum of money, then it
is reasonable to suppose that such a sum of money, or an agreement by
responsible parties to pay it to the government in case the accused should fail to
appear, would be sufficient security for his attendance; and therefore, at the
common law, it was customary to take security of this character in all cases of
misdemeanor; one or more friends of the accused undertaking for his appearance
for trial, aggreeing that a certain sum of money should be levied of their goods and
chattels, lands and tenements, if he made default. . . . The presumption of
innocence is an absolute protection against conviction and punishment, except
either, first on confession in an open court; or, second, on proof which places the
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Formerly, if a prisoner arraigned for felony stood
mute wilfully, and refused to plead, a terrible mode was resorted to for the purpose
of compelling him to do so, and this might even end in his death; but a more
merciful proceeding is now substituted; the court entering the plea of not guilty for
a party who, for any reason, fails to plead for himself.

"Again, it is required that the trial be speedy: and here also the injunction is
addressed to the sense of justice and sound judgment of the court. In this country,
where officers are specially appointed or elected to represent the people in these
prosecutions, their position gives them an immense power for oppression: and it is
so feared they do not always sufficiently appreciate the responsibility, and wield the
power with due regard to the legal rights and privileges of the accused. When a
person charged with crime is willing to proceed at once to trial, no delay on the part
of the prosecution is reasonable, except only that which is necessary for proper
preparation and to secure the attendance of witnesses. Very much, however, must
be left to the judgment of the prosecuting officer in these cases; and the court
would not compel the government to proceed to trial at the first term after
indictment found or information filed, if the officer who represents it should state,
under the responsibility of his official oath, that he was not and could not be ready
at that time. But further delay would not generally be allowed without a more
specific showing of the causes which prevent the State proceeding to trial, including
the names of the witnesses, the steps taken to procure them, and the facts
expected to be proved by them, in order that the court might judge of the
reasonableness of the application, and that the prisoner, might, if he saw fit to take
the course, secure an immediate trial by admitting that the witnesses, if present,
would testify to the facts which the prosecution have claimed could be proven by
them." (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 436-441.)

"Section 19 of our Bill of Rights provides that ’no citizen of this state shall be
deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities , or in any manner
disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.’

"‘Law of the land’ is interpreted to mean general public law, operating equally upon
every member of the community." (Re Jilz, 3 Mo. App., 246.) .

"No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws;" "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, property without
due process of law.." . . U.S. Constitution, section 1, article 14.

"Due process of law under the 14th amendment and the equal protection of the law
are secured if the law operates on all alike and does not subject the individual to
the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. (Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S.,
382; 38 Law. ed., 487; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep., 570; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S., 535;
28 Law. ed., 232; 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 111, 292.) .

"Do laws operate equally upon the citizens of the Commonwealth of Texas which
will imprison under like verdicts one man for a month and another for six months?
Manifestly not.

"Section 3 of the Bill of Rights to the State Constitution provides: ’All freemen,
when they form a social compact, have equal rights.’

"A law which makes different punishments follow the same identical criminal acts in
the different political subdivisions of Texas violates both our state and Federal
Constitutions. It fails to accord equal rights and equal protection of the law, and a
conviction under it is not in due course of the ’law of the land.’ Re Jilz (3 Mo. App.,
246); Re H. F. Millon (16 Idaho, 737; 22 L. R. A. [N. S. ], 1123;102 Pac., 374), and
Jackson v. State (55 Tex. Crim. Rep., 557; 117 S. W., 818), are cited in support of
our view in their reasoning.

"We think the principles announced in the case of Ex parte Jones (106 Tex. Crim.
Rep., 185; 290 S. W., 177), apply in some degree to the instant case. It was there
held that article 793, Code Crim. Proc., superseded and controlled an ordinance of
the city of Dallas which allowed only 50 cents per day to be credited upon the fine
of a convict for labor performed. Provisions similar to those quoted in our state
constitution have been a part of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence since there was a
wrung from the unwilling hands of King John at Runnymede in 1215 the Magna
Charta, which itself provides that a freeman shall not be passed upon or
condemned but ’by the lawful judgment of his peers and the law of the land.’ ’Law
of the land’ has the same legal meaning as ’due process of law,’ and one of its
accepted meanings is that quoted above. Re Jilz, 3 Mo. App., 243; 3 Words &
Phrases, pp. 2227-2232." (Ex Parte Sizemore, 59 A.L.R., Annotated, pp. 430, 432.)

"And in Re Jilz ([1877], 3 Mo. App., 2430),an act of the legislature of Missouri,
which, by limiting the power of a court established in a certain country to assess
punishments, varied the penalties for crimes committed therein from those fixed by
the general law for the whole state, was held to be unconstitutional in so far as it
had that effect, the court saying: ’A law which should prescribe death as the
punishment of murder in one country, and imprisonment as the penalty for the
same crime in other parts of the state, would be void, because not operating
equally upon all inhabitants of the state. The general law applicable to the state
prescribes, as the punishment for the offense for which the petitioner was
convicted, imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or fine not
exceeding $500, or both such fine and imprisonment. . . . A law prescribing a
different punishment from this in St. Louis county is clearly unconstitutional. It
follows that so much of the act referred to, establishing the court of criminal
correction, as limits the punishment for the misdemeanor in St. Louis county to
imprisonment for six month’s is void.’

"So, in State v. Buchardt (Mo.) supra, where the same legislative act was in
question, the court says: ’Under our Constitution, it is not permissible to punish the
same offense or violation of some public or general law by one species of
punishment in one locality, and by a different or more heavy punishment in other
localities in the state. A law inflicting such different penalties for the perpetration of
any given crime cannot bear the test of judicial examination.’

"And in State v. Gregori ([1928],—Mo—, 2 S. W. [2d], 747), an act of the

legislature which made children seventeen years of age in counties of 50,000
population or more subject to the juvenile court act, while in counties of less than
50,000 population children seventeen years of age were not subject to the juvenile
court act, but were subject to full criminal responsibility, was held unconstitutional
as denying equal protection of the laws; the court stating that it was the general
doctrine that the law relative to those who might be charged with and convicted of
crime, as well as to the punishment to be inflicted therefor, should operate equally
upon every citizen or inhabitant of the state.

"And, in State v. Fowler ([1927], 193 N. C., 290; 136 S.E., 709), an act of the
North Carolina legislature, applicable to five counties of the state only, which
imposed as punishment for a specified offense a fine only, while a statute applicable
to the whole state imposed a fine or imprisonment, was held to be unconstitutional
under both the Federal and State Constitutions as a denial of the equal protection
of the laws. The court says: ’But the statute under consideration cannot be
sustained on the ground that it was enacted in the exercise of the police power. The
question is whether it shall supersede "the law of the land" — the general public law
which was designed to operate without exception or partiality throughout the state.
It is needful to remember that indictment was drafted under the general law, and
that the decisive question is whether offenders in the five counties referred to may
lawfully be exempted from the punishment prescribed by the general law; whether
they shall be subject only to a fine when the offenders in ninety-five other counties
may be punished by imprisonment. In our judgment this part of section 2 is neither
equal protection of the laws nor the protection of equal laws. . . . It is the grant of a
special exemption from punishment or an exclusive or separate privilege which is
forbidden by the cited provision. . . . The principle of uniformity in the operation of
a general law extends to the punishment, and denounces as arbitrary and
unreasonable the imposition in one county of any kind of punishment which is
different from that which is prescribed under the general law to all who may be
guilty of the same offense. It follows that the provision limiting the punishment for
the first offense to a fine must be regarded as an arbitrary class distinction which
cannot be sustained because forbidden by the fundamental law, and the judgment
which was pronounced by authority of the general law must be upheld."
(Annotation, 59 A. L. R., Annotated, p. 434.)

"Bills of attainder were prohibited to be passed, either by the Congress or by the

legislatures of the several States. Attainder, in a strict sense, means an extinction
of civil and political rights and capacities; and at the common law it followed, as of
course, on conviction and sentence for the different classes of felony.

"A bill of attainder was legislative conviction for alleged crime, with judgment of
death. Such convictions have not been uncommon under other governments, and
then power to pass these bills has been exercised by the Parliament of England at
some periods in its history, under the most oppressive and unjustifiable
circumstances, greatly aggravated by an arbitrary course of procedure, which had
few of the incidents of a judicial investigation into alleged crime. For some time
before the American Revolution, however, no one had attempted to defend it as a
legitimate exercise of power; and if it would be unjustifiable anywhere, there were
many reasons why it would be specially obnoxious under a free government, and
why consequently its provision, under the existing circumstances of our country,
would be a matter of more than ordinary importance. Every one must concede that
a legislative body, from its numbers and organization, and from the very intimate
dependence of its members upon the people, which renders them liable to be
peculiarly susceptible to popular clamor, it not properly constituted to try with
coolness, caution, and impartiality a criminal charge, especially in those cases in
which the popular feeling is strongly excited—the very class of cases most likely to
be prosecuted by this mode. And although it would be conceded that, if such bills
were allowable, they should be properly be presented only for offenses against the
general laws of the land, and be proceeded with on the same full opportunity for
investigation and defense which is afforded in the courts of the common law, yet it
was remembered that in practice they were often resorted to because an obnoxious
person was not subject to punishment under the general law, or because, in
proceeding against him by this mode, some rule of the common law requiring a
particular species of degree of evidence might be evaded, and a conviction secured
on proofs that a jury would not be suffered to accept as overcoming the
presumption of innocence. Whether the accused should necessarily be served with
process; what degree or species of evidence should be required; whether the rules
of law should be followed, either in determining what constituted the crime, or in
dealing with the accused after conviction—were all questions which would
necessarily address themselves to the legislative discretion and sense of justice;
and the very qualities which are essential in a court to protect individuals on trial
before them against popular clamor, or the hate of those in powers, were precisely
those which were likely to prove weak or wanting in legislative body at such a time.
And what could be more obnoxious in a free government than the exercise of such
a power by a popular body, controlled by a mere majority, fresh from the contests
of exciting elections, and quite too apt, under the most favorable circumstances, to
suspect the motives of the adversaries, and to resort to measures of doubtful
propriety to secure party ends?

"Nor were legislative punishments of this severe character the only ones known to
parliamentary history; there were others of a milder form, which were only less
obnoxious in that the consequences were less terrible. These legislative convictions
were imposed punishments less than that of death were called bills of pains and
penalties, as distinguished from bills of attainder; but the constitutional provisions
we have referred to were undoubtedly aimed at any and every species of legislative
punishment for criminal or supposed criminal offenses; and the term ’bill of
attainder’ is used in a generic sense, which would include bills of pains and
penalties also.

"The thoughtful reader will not fail to discover, in the acts of the American States
during the Revolutionary period, sufficient reason for this constitutional provision,
even if the still more monitory history of English attainders had not been so freshly
remembered. Some of these acts provided for the forfeiture of the estates, within
the Commonwealth, of those British subjects who had withdrawn from the
jurisdiction because not satisfied that grievances existed sufficiently serious to
justify the last resort of an oppressed people, or because of other reasons not
satisfactory to the existing authorities; and the only investigation provided for was
an inquiry into the desertion. Others mentioned particular persons by name,
adjudged them guilty of adhering to the enemies of the State, and proceeded to
inflict punishment upon them so far as the presence of property within the
Commonwealth would enable the government to do so. These were the resorts of a
time of extreme peril, and if possible to justify them in a period of revolution, when
everything was staked on success, and when the public safety would not permit too
much weight to scruples concerning the private rights of those who were not aiding
a popular cause, the power to repeat such acts under any conceivable
circumstances in which the country could be placed again was felt to be too
dangerous to be left in the legislative hands. So far as proceedings had been
completed under those acts before the treaty of 1783, by the actual transfer of
property, they remained valid and effectual afterwards; but so far as they were
then incomplete, they were put an end to by that treaty.
"The conviction of the propriety of this constitutional provision has been so
universal, that it has never been questioned, either in legislative bodies or
elsewhere. Nevertheless, cases have recently arisen, growing out of the attempt to
break up and destroy the government of the United States has adjudged certain
action of Congress to be in violation of this provision and consequently void. The
action referred to was designed to exclude from practice in the United States courts
all persons who had taken up arms against the government during the recent
rebellion, or who had voluntarily given aid and encouragement to its enemies; and
the mode adopted to effect the exclusion was to require of all persons, before they
should be admitted to the bar or allowed to practice, an oath negating any such
disloyal action. This decision was not at first universally accepted as sound; and the
Supreme Courts of West Virginia and of the District of Columbia declined to follow
it, insisting that permission to practise in the courts is not a right but a privilege,
and that the withholding it for any reason of State policy or personal unfitness could
not be regarded as the infliction of criminal punishment.

"The Supreme Court of the United States has also, upon the same reasoning, held a
clause in the Constitution of Missouri, which among other things, excluded all
priests and clergymen from practising or teaching unless they should first take a
similar oath of loyalty, to be void, overruling in so doing a decision of the Supreme
Court of that State." (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 368-372.)

The legal problem confronting us is characterized by the fact that we have to avoid
the misleading effect resulting from the difference between the text and the letter
of the law and their grammatical sense and effect on one side, and as it is
interpreted and applied in actual practice.

Apparently, there is nothing so harmless as the provision of section 19 of Act No.

682, suspending for a period of not more than six months the provision of article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code punishes the public officer or employee who
"shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person
to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours."cra law virt ua1aw li brary

Said article has nothing to show that it bears constitutional sanction. It is only a
part of the penal laws which are within the full jurisdiction of the legislative power
to enact or not to enact. The Philippine Legislature which enacted the Revised Penal
Code could have failed to do so without, by that very fact, violating any provision of
the Constitution. The succeeding legislative bodies—the unicameral National
Assembly and the Congress—may, without question, repeal or suspend article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, as any other article of the same, or even the whole
code.

Therefore, as an abstract proposition, as a matter of legal technicality, we believe

that there is absolutely no ground for disputing the power of the legislative body to
suspend or even repeal article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. But the provision is
vitiated:
chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

(1) By the fact that it is class legislation, excluding the political prisoners concerned
from the same benefits and protection afforded all other persons by article 125.

(2) By the fact that it is interpreted and applied, not only in the negative sense as a
deterrent against public officials or employees bent on encroaching and trampling
upon the personal freedom of any person, but as a positive authority to said officers
and employees to deprive and continue depriving the political prisoners concerned
of their personal liberty, without due or any legal process of law provided the
deprivation of liberty did not exceed six months, but without reckoning the previous
many months of illegal detention they had already suffered before their formal
transfer to Commonwealth Government.

For these two radical and incurable defects, section 19 of Act No. 682 runs counter
to the Constitution when it prohibits that no person shall be deprived of liberty
without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws. (Article III, section 1 [1], Constitution of the Philippines.)

No one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the
provision. If all discriminations are abhorrent under any regime of law and justice,
imperatively more in a democracy such as ours , tribunals must be recreant to their
duties if they fail to deny validity to such odious legal measure, conceived, adopted,
and unhappily enacted by the legislative power in one of its blundering moods in
utter defiance of the fundamental law of the land.

Petitioner points out that in the provision there is an unconstitutional delegation of

legislative powers, because the power to suspend the provision of article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code within the maximum period of six months, in fact, is transferred
to the Special Prosecutors’ Office, which may shorten or lengthen said suspension
by filing the corresponding criminal information at any time it may deem
convenient.

The Special Prosecutor’s Office may not suspend altogether article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code by filing immediately the information. It may suspend it for 10
days, by filing the information within that time. It may suspend it for one month,
two months, or three months, by filing the information within the desired time. It
may suspend it for a maximum period of six months just by mere inaction, by not
filing any information at all. The result is, in fact, to place in the hands of the
Special Prosecutors’ Office the power to suspend article 125 for any length of time
within the maximum period of six months. And what is worst is that the suspension
that the Special Prosecutor’s Office may decree is individualized, and not of general
effect to all the political prisoners concerned, thus making the Special Prosecutors’
Office a kind of dictatorship which may dispense its favors and disfavors to
individual prisoners under no other test than its convenience and whims.

Evidently, petitioner’s complaint is well-taken, giving additional ground for the

nullity of the provision in question, the legislative power having been reserved by
the Constitution exclusively to Congress.

Lastly, the provision in question appears to legalize the many months of illegal
detention already endured by the political prisoners concerned. The legislative
power can not legalize illegal detention, much more if that illegal detention has
been perpetrated in utter violation of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.

Petitioner assails the Validity of the whole Act. No. 682, aside from what has been
already said about section 19 thereof, upon the following grounds: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

(1) Because it is an ex post facto law, violating section 1(11), Article III, of the
Constitution, petitioner having been deprived of his acquired right to be freed,
under penalty of his detainers, within six hours after his detention under article 125
of the Revised Penal Code.

(2) Because section 2 set up a legal trap by which a person, Accused in the
information of an offense, may be convicted and sentenced for a different one, thus
violating his constitutional right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him." (Section 1 [17], Article III, Constitution of the Philippines.)

(3) Because it creates a special court to try cases arising years before its creation,
transferring a jurisdictional belonging to courts of first instance to the People’s
Court, a blunder identical in nature and viciousness to the former practice of
shuffling judges of first instance, the judicial rigodon resorted to before to suit
certain purposes of the government and which was stopped by Judge Borromeo’s
courageous defense of the independence of the judiciary, in a leading case before
the Supreme Court which made history.

(4) Because the creation of the People’s Court is a judicial gerrymandering.

(5) Because the name "People’s Court" suggests a political entity, a popular
dispenser of political justice, in contrast with the stable, impartial, cultured nature
of a judiciary, detached from momentary interests and influences.

(6) Because the self-extinguishing character of the People’s Court makes it an

agency for special mission, more an agency of the legislature than that of the
administration of justice.

(7) Because it disqualifies members of the judiciary who served under the Japanese
regime.

We cannot but recognize that strength of the objections, specially objections of (1),
(2) and (7).But we are not ready to support petitioner’s contention that the whole
act should be declared null and void, considering that the unconstitutional
provisions thereof may be segregated and the remaining portions of the text may
stand on their own feet.

Objection (1) adds only one another ground to show the unconstitutionality of the
provision of section 19, suspending article 125 of the Revised Penal Code; and
objection (2) only affects the corresponding provision of section 2 of the act.
Objection (7), upon which we already expressed our opinion in the case of De la
Rama v. Misa (42 Off. Gaz., 1544), only affects the provision concerning the
disqualification of certain justices of the Supreme Court.

Regarding objections (3), (4), (5), and (6), although they are meritorious, we
believe that they are offset by the collegiate character of the newly created court.
We are inclined to believe that the main purpose in creating the People’s Court was
precisely to afford those who will be charged and tried before it a special safeguard,
in the fact that more than one judge will have to hear and try a case, to
counterbalance the prevailing prejudice in the community against the persons who
are accused for having collaborated with the enemy. For this reason, we are of
opinion that the act of creating the People’s Court must not be invalidated.

But it is our hope that its creation will not set a precedent that will sanction a wrong
principle. Generally speaking, the creation of temporary tribunals to administer
justice in specially pre-determined existing cases is contrary to the nature and
character of judicial functions and the purposes of the administration of justice,
which must be characterized by the independence of judicial officers, independence
that cannot be secured without guaranteeing the stability of tenure of office.

Judges are not supposed to decide on what may appear right or wrong in the
evanescent moment when the voice of passion grows louder in the market of
human activities. They must not make decisions in the spur of the news that make
screaming headlines and arouse the uncontrollable emotions of political leaders or
of the populace. They must decide between right and wrong by the criterion of
universal conscience, by judgment, not only of the fleeting instance of evolving
history, but the unending caravans of generations to come.

The inherent justice of their decisions must continue being sensed as the treasured
human heritage long long after they had rendered their inescapable tribute to
death, like aroma which continues enriching and sweetening the air long after the
flowers have been crushed in the chemist’s retorts to give way to their perfumed
essence, like the beauty of the temples and palaces of Palmyra which continues
charming our memory millenniums after they have become just dusty ruins, like
the heavenly melodies which continue lingering in our ears long after we have
heard those musical gems, such as the masterpieces of Bach and the symphonies
of Beethoven, like light emitted by stars which ceased to exist centuries ago still
traveling in the immensity of space to attract our admiration and arouse dreams of
immortality.

In order that judges could render judgments of lasting value which would embody
the wisdom of the ages and the moral sense of all time, it is necessary that they
should preside over tribunals which must be looked upon as permanent institutions
of justice, not temporary makeshifts, more appropriate to serve ephemeral
purposes than to be the inviolable temples of an eternal goddess. And the judge
themselves, to acquire the olympic serenity, the awesome and noble austerity, the
heretic aloofness, the majestic equanimity proper of their great mission, there
being none greater that can be entrusted to a person as the image of God, must
feel, by the permanency, stability, and security of their tenure of office, that they
owe an undivided loyalty, not to any transient idols or to any momentary masters,
no matter how powerful they are, but to the inseparable twin divinities of truth and
justice.

Judge Robert N. Wilkin said that the special function of a judicial officer is to
determine what is right and what is wrong, not only for the clamorous present, but
for silent generations to come. From him we quote these illuminating paragraphs: jgc:c han robles. com.ph

"The guiding force in social evolution is not to be found in the arbitrary will of
groups , nor in a common purpose. It is to be found in the law of our nature, that
imminent or inherent law founded on the characteristics of human kind.’A law
instilled and not imposed,’ as Cicero said, ’a law in which we are fashioned, not
instructed.’ It is not created by proclamation or legislative fiat. It is discovered by
patient research and spiritual insight.

"The true judge must have something of the vision of prophet. He must be able to
see the trends of his time extended, so that principles which he announces may be
adjusted to conditions yet to come. The observation of Graham Wallas that a great
judge needs a touch of the qualities that make a poet has been quoted with
approval by Professor Chafee, Justice Cardozo, and others. Poets, as has been
stated, bear the same relation to society as the antennae of an insect to its body;
they are ’feelers’ of the body politic. Their sensibilities are more acute, more
advanced than those of their contemporaries, and what they feel and express today
their fellows will feel and understand tomorrow. Poets, prophets, judges—they are
God’s elect; we cannot elect them.

"The great judge cannot be a child of his age. If his judgments are to be great they
must be timeless, or at least timed to the future. The spirit of the law should enable
him to transcend the spirit of his times and he should be able to speak sub specie
aeternitatis. What a desecration of the office to choose its incumbent by any system
which forces him to temporize!.

"Judges in early times were priests, or more accurately stated, the priests
performed the functions of judges. There is still much about the judicial office that
is priestly. This has ever seemed quite natural to those who took seriously their first
legal learning from Blackstone, who stated at the outset that all human laws
depend upon the divine law. While for a time that teaching seemed out of fashion,
the more recent trend is to acknowledge again our subjection to a law of nature, a
law divine. Be that as it may, it will not be disputed that a proper performance of
judicial duties requires a devotion to quite similar to the consecration of priest.
Judges, like the clergy, should be kept unspotted from the world. Any personal
interest, selfish concern, or party consciousness, corrupts not only the judge but
the judicial function. Any want of honest detachment in the judge undermines
public faith in judicial administration. As has frequently been stated, it is quite as
important to the public that judges should be free from the appearance of evil as
that they should be free from actual evil. The prevalent disrespect for law is
prompted not so much by corruption in the courts, as by that system of choosing
judges which makes every judge suspect.

"The taking of judicial office should be much like the taking of holy orders—one
should not do so who is unwilling to suffer a kind of civil death. The only way in
which one can be worthy of the office is by submerging self in the performance of
the duties of the office. A judge should be only the voice of the law. As Cicero said,
’While the law is a voiceless magistrate, the magistrate is law made vocal.’ It is
arrogant presumption for a judge to pose as anything more, and gross indiscretion
for him to assert his own voice. The only way in which he can avoid violation of the
injunction, ’Judge not, that they be not judged,’ is by pronouncing , not his personal
will, but the judgment of the law. How otherwise could a judge impose a death
sentence and live in peace? If the judgment is his own, the blood of the condemned
is upon him. If the judgment is at the behest of popular clamor he has given
sanction to lynching. But if his judgment is the pronouncement of the law, the
judicial function is fulfilled and his conscience clear. The judicial robe should be
submerge personality and make its bearer, like a priest in vestment, an impersonal
part of divine function." (The Judicial Function and the Need of Professional Section
of Judges by Robert N. Wilkin, Journal of the American Judicature Society, Vol. 29,
No. 4, Dec., 1945.)

The facts of current experience showed the imperative need of intellectual

overhauling as part of the work of post-war rehabilitation of in all orders of our
national life. Many elemental tenets and ideals need be restated, if not
rediscovered. The worries and psychological shocks caused by the Japanese initial
victories and brutal oppressions concomitant with their occupation of our country,
had the effect of warping the mentality and sense of moral values of not a
negligible number of persons. There are men whose intellectual outlook and views
of freedom and fundamental human rights, tethered by defective development of
ideology, are not only outmoded, but absolutely incompatible with the trends of
progress, whose brains appear not to be completely freed from the embryonic
amnion and are in need of allantoic nutrition, who would rather wield the bludgeon
of jungle arbitrariness and make a coffle of serfs of free people, than abide by the
constitutional precepts and the noble doctrines of the UNO Charter, whose juridical
ideas, rather than in forum of modern democracy, have their proper place among
the fossils of apteryx, megatheria and dinosaurs’ museum and, notwithstanding,
are being haled in apparently responsible sectors of the press as heroes of
progressiveness. Such nonsense and intellectual travesty are inconceivable except
in a topsyturvy world which has adopted the thyrsus as the choicest emblem of
human happiness, where the frenzied mental processes have been inverted as if in
the Corinthian order, the frieze, cornice, and architrave are placed at the foot of the
column and above it the stylobate.

Among the basic concepts that must be included in the wholesale intellectual
overhauling which we need to undergo, if we have to follow the mental, social,
legal, and moral thread which was cut at the impact of the disastrous invasion of
our soil, is the one we have on personal liberty, upon which traditional democratic
principles we had been accepting and following before the enemy occupation, as
part of the nature of our social and political institutions, appear to have been
forgotten, the present case being one of a series of instances evidencing it, as can
be seen in our opinions in Raquiza v. Bradford (75 Phil., 50);Reyes v. Crisologo (75
Phil., 225); Duran v. Abad Santos (75 Phil., 410); Herras Teehankee v. Rovira (75
Phil., 634); Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons p. 756, post; Tañada v. Quirino
(42 Off. Gaz., 394), the pronouncements in which we are reiterating here.

The moral hiatus in our national life is over, and in this hour of resumption of
democratic processes, there is an imperative need, as one of the cornerstones of
our national structure, to redefine and reaffirmed our pre-war concept of human
freedom.

1. The petitioner is entitled to be immediately set free, and we vote for

restoring him to his personal freedom of which he was deprived without any
legal process.

b. Garcia vs Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in
the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore,
a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a
statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in
fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does
not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in
no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of
a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard
is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis
supplied)
a. Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find
that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall
hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.