VENTURA VS VENTURA

GR NO. L-26306, APRIL 27, 1988

FACTS:
Appellants in this case are Maria Ventura, who is the illegitimate daughter of the
deceased Gregorio Ventura, while Miguel and Juana Cardona are his son and surviving
spouse who are also brother and mother of Maria Ventura.

Appellees are Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura, who are the deceased’s legitimate
children with his former wife (the late Paulina Simplicio). The deceased in his will
denied the paternity of the appellees.

In 1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not
include the appellees in the petition. Appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate
child, was named and appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his will and the
administratrix of his estate.

Gregorio Ventura died on September 1955. Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and
thereafter submitted an inventory of the estate.

Said account of administration was opposed by appellees assailing the veracity of the
report as not reflecting the true income and expenses of the estate. Maria Ventura filed a
motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts of administration or to have their
approval without the opposition of the appellees on the ground that the question of
paternity is still pending final determination before the Supreme Court and that should
they be adjudged the adulterous children of the testator, they are not entitled to inherit nor
to oppose the approval of the accounts of administration.

In 1965, the court a quo removed Maria Ventura as executrix and admiistratrix of the
estate and in her place Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are hereby appointed on the
ground that executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the funds of the estate, was
inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with the orders of the Court in the
matter of presenting up-to-date statement of accounts and neglected to pay the real estate
taxes of the estate.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE/S: whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified.

RULING:

The issue has become moot and academic in view of the decision of this Court in related
cases.

Aside from the instant special proceedings, there are two other civil cases involving the
estate of the deceased Gregorio Ventura.

In a Civil Case, Gregoria and Mercedes Ventura claimed that they are the legitimate
children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife Paulina Simpliciano, who died in 1943, and
asked that one-half of the properties described in the complaint be declared as the share
of their mother in the conjugal partnership, with them as the only forced heirs of their
mother Paulina.

The lower court already rendered its judgment in 1959 declaring Mercedes Ventura and
Gergoria Ventura to be the legitimate daughters of Paulina Simpliciano and Gregorio
Ventura; declaring that as such legitimate daughters of Paulina Simpliciano they are
entitled to 1/2 of the properties described. The Supreme Court, on appeal by Maria
Ventura, declared that appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate
children of the deceased Gregorio Ventura and his wife, Paulina Simpliciano, and as such
are entitled to the annulment of the institution of heirs made in the probated will of said
deceased became final and executory upon the finality of the order, approving the
partition directed in the decision in question. That order of approval is an appealable one,
and inasmuch as no appeal has been taken from the same, it is beyond dispute that the
decision in controversy has already become final and executory in all respects. Hence, the
case at bar has become moot and academic.

Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious," and as a result,
intestacy follows, thereby rendering the previous appointment of Maria Ventura as
executrix moot and academic.

This would now necessitate the appointment of another administrator under Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which states that If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;"

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana
Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel
Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the
statute of distribution to the decedent's property.

It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more
preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class the
strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between
next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.'"

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late
Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are
entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria
and Miguel Ventura.

BLAS VS SANTOS
GR NO. L-14070, MARCH 29, 1961

FACTS:
Simeon Blas contracted a firrst marriage with Marta Cruz sometime before 1898. They
had three children, only one of whom, Eulalia, left children, namely:

a. Maria Gervacio Blas, one of the plaintiffs,

b. Marta Gervacio Blas, one of the defendants, and
c. Lazaro Gervacio Blas (who deid in 1953 who is survived by 3 legitimate children
who are plaintiffs)

Marta Cruz died in 1898, and the following year, Simeon Blas contracted a second
marriage with Maxima Santos. At the time of this second marriage, no liquidation of the
properties acquired by Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz was made. Three of the properties
left are shponds located in Obando, Bulacan. Maxima Santos does not appear to have
apportioned properties to her marriage with Simeon Blas.

Simeon Blas died in 1937 while Maxima died in 1956. Rosalina Santos became
administratrix of her estate, Later on, plaintiffs learned that Maxima did not fulfill her
promise fulfill her promise as it was learned thtat Maxima only disposed not even one-
tenth of the properties she acquired from Simeon Blas.

This action was instituted by plaintiffs against the administratrix of the estate of Maxima
Santos, to secure a judicial declaration that one-half of the properties left by said Maxima
Santos Vda. de Blas had been promised by the deceased Maxima Santos to be delivered
upon her death and in her will to the plaintiffs.

The alleged promise of the deceased Maxima Santos is contained in a document executed
by Maxima Santos introduced in court as Exhibit “A”.

Defendant, who is the administratrix of the estate of the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de
Blas admits the allegations of the complaint as to her capacity as administratrix; the death
of Simeon Blas on January 3, 1937; the fact that Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz begot three
children, only one of whom, namely, Eulalia Blas, left legitimate descendants; that
Simeon Blas contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos on June 28, 1898.

She denies, for lack of suffcient information and belief, knowledge of the first marriage
of Simeon Blas to Marta Cruz, the averment that Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz acquired
properties situated in Obando, Bulacan, that said properties were utilized as capital, etc.
As special defenses, she alleges that the properties of the spouses Blas and Santos had
been settled and liquidated in the project of partition of the estate of said Simeon Blas;
that pursuant to the project of partition, plaintiffs and some defendants had already
received the respective properties adjudicated to them; that the plaintiffs and the
defendants Marta Gervacio and Jose Chivi are estopped from impugning the validity of
the project of partition of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and from questioning
the ownership in the properties conveyed in the project of partition to Maxima Santos as
her own exclusive property; that the testament executed by Maxima Santos is valid, the
plaintiffs having no right to recover any portion of Maxima Santos' estate now under
administration by the court.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the heirs should receive properties based on the promise of Maxima.

RULING:
Yes. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death.

Although it is not a will (it lacks the formality) or donation, it is still enforceable because
said promise was actually executed to avoid litigation (partition of Simeon Blas’ estate)
hence, it is a compromise.

The principal basis for the plaintiffs' action in the case at bar is the document Exhibit
"A". It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for
the reason that the conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated; that it
was prepared at the same time as the will of Simeon Blas on December 26, 1936, at the
instance of the latter himself. It is also not disputed that the document was signed by
Maxima Santos and one copy thereof, which was presented in court as Exhibit "A", was
kept by plaintiffs' witness Andres Pascual.

Exhibit "A", therefore, appears to be the compromise defined in Article 1809 of the Civil
Code of Spain, in force at the time of the execution of Exhibit "A", which provides as
follows:

"Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in interest, by giving, promising,

or retaining something avoids the provocation of a suit or terminates one which has
already been instituted."

A document signed by the testator's wife, promising that she would respect and obey all
the dispositions in the latter's will, and that she would hold one-half of her share in the
conjugal assets in trust for the heirs and legatees of her husband in his will, with the
obligation of conveying the same to such of his heirs or legatees as she might choose in
her last will and testament, is a compromise and at the same time a contract with
sufficient cause or consideration.

The action to enforce the wife's promise to convey in her testament, upon her death, one-
half of the conjugal properties she would receive as her share in the conjugal properties,
did not arise until and after her death when it was found that she did not comply with her
promise. (Article 1969, old Civil Code).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-
appellee, administratrix of the estate of Maxima Santos, is ordered to convey and deliver
one-half of the properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal
properties in said Civil Case to the heirs and the legatees of her husband Simeon Blas.

TINGA VDA DE CABALU VS SPS TABU

GR NO. 188417, SEPTEMBER 24, 2012

FACTS:
The property subject of the controversy which was a portion of a property registered in
the name of the late Faustina Maslum (Faustina).

Faustina died without any children. She left a holographic will, assigning and distributing
her property to her nephews and nieces. The said holographic will, however, was not
probated. One of the heirs was the father of Domingo Laxamana (Domingo), Benjamin
Laxamana, who died in 1960. In 1975, Domingo allegedly executed a Deed of Sale of
Undivided Parcel of Land disposing of his 9,000 square meter share of the land to
Laureano Cabalu.

On August 1, 1994, to give effect to the holographic will, the forced and legitimate heirs
of Faustina executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Succession with Partition which imparted
9,000 square meters of the land to Domingo. Thereafter, on December 14, 1995,
Domingo sold 4,500 square meters of the 9,000 square meters to his nephew, Eleazar
Tabamo.

On August 4, 1996, Domingo passed away.

On October 8, 1996, two months after his death, Domingo purportedly executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent Renato Tabu (Tabu). Subsequently, Tabu and his
wife, Dolores Laxamana (respondent spouses), subdivided the said lot into two

Petitioners claimed that they were the lawful owners of the subject property because it
was sold to their father, Laureano Cabalu, by Domingo, through a Deed of Absolute Sale,
dated March 5, 1975. Hence, being the rightful owners by way of succession, they could
not be ejected from the subject property.

Respondent spouses countered that the deed of sale from which the petitioners anchored
their right over the 9,000 square meter property was null and void because in 1975,
Domingo was not yet the owner of the property, as the same was still registered in the
name of Faustina. Domingo became the owner of the property only on August 1, 1994,
by virtue of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Succession with Partition executed by the forced
heirs of Faustina. In addition, they averred that Domingo was of unsound mind having
been confined in a mental institution for a time.
The RTC dismissed the complaint as it found the 1975 Deed of Absolute Sale, null and
void for lack of capacity to sell on the part of Domingo. Likewise, the Deed of Absolute
Sale, dated October 8, 1996, covering the remaining 4,500 square meters of the subject
property was declared ineffective having been executed by Domingo two months after his
death.

The CA sustained the RTC’s declaration of nullity of sale on the ground that the deed of
sale was simulated but reversed the decision of the RTC in canceling the TCT in the
name of Domingo and in ordering the restoration of the TCT, registered in the name of
Faustina, to its former validity, Domingo being an undisputed heir of Faustina. It also
found that Domingo was of sound mind at the time when the 1975 sale.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land covering the 9,000
square meter property executed by Domingo in favor of Laureano Cabalu on March 5,
1975, is valid;

2. Whether the Deed of Sale, dated October 8, 1996, covering the 4,500 square meter
portion of the 9,000 square meter property, executed by Domingo in favor of Renato
Tabu, is null and void.

RULING:
1. No. It is not valid.

The defense of the legal presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the facts proven
and already established in the records of the case. The RTC and later the CA had already
ruled that the sale, dated March 5, 1975, had the earmarks of a simulated deed.

Furthermore, the sale cannot be deemed valid because at that time, Domingo was not yet
the owner of the property. There is no dispute that the original and registered owner of
the subject property from which the subject 9,000 square meter lot came from, was
Faustina. In her will, the name of Benjamin, father of Domingo, appeared as one of the
heirs. Thus, even if Benjamin died sometime in 1960, Domingo in 1975 could not yet
validly dispose of the whole or even a portion thereof for the reason that he was not the
sole heir of Benjamin, as his mother only died sometime in 1980.

Besides, under Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "No contract may be entered into upon
future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law."

The law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been
opened; (2) the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor
has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in
nature.

n this case, at the time the deed was executed, Faustina's will was not yet probated; the
object of the contract, the 9,000 square meter property, still formed part of the inheritance
of his father from the estate of Faustina; and Domingo had a mere inchoate hereditary
right therein.

2. Yes, it is null and void.

Domingo became the owner of the said property only on August 1, 1994, the time of
execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Succession with Partition by the heirs of Faustina,
when the 9,000 square meter lot was adjudicated to him.

The document itself, the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996, readily shows
that it was executed on August 4, 1996 more than two months after the death of
Domingo. Contracting parties must be juristic entities at the time of the consummation of
the contract.

To form a valid and legal agreement, it is necessary that there be a party capable of
contracting and a party capable of being contracted with. Hence, if any one party to a
supposed contract was already dead at the time of its execution, such contract is
undoubtedly simulated and false and, therefore, null and void by reason of its having
been made after the death of the party who appears as one of the contracting parties
therein. The death of a person terminates contractual capacity.

The contract being null and void, the sale to Renato Tabu produced no legal effects and
transmitted no rights whatsoever.