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DEDE LALA SALLESALLE UNIVERSITYUNIVERSITY COLLEGECOLLEGE OFOF LAWLAW

LasallianLasallian CommissionCommission onon BarBar OperationsOperations 20182018

onon BarBar OperationsOperations 20182018 CIVILCIVIL LAWLAW JusticeJustice DelDel CasCastillotillo

CIVILCIVIL LAWLAW

JusticeJustice DelDel CasCastillotillo DigestsDigests

ChelChel SySy

LCBOLCBO ChairpersonChairperson

NicoNico GarciaGarcia

LCBOLCBO ViceVice ChairChair forfor InternalsInternals

StephSteph GriarGriar

LCBOLCBO ViceVice ChairChair forfor ExternalsExternals

PatPat CostalesCostales

LCBOLCBO ExecutiveExecutive SecretarySecretary

CesCes NagaNaga

LCBOLCBO ExecutiveExecutive TreasurerTreasurer

TetTet ValezaValeza

AcademicAcademic AffairsAffairs ChairpersonChairperson

JanineJanine TutanesTutanes RodRod ZantuaZantua

AcademicAcademic AffairsAffairs DeputyDeputy ChairpersonsChairpersons

JanineJanine Sta.Sta. AnaAna

CivilCivil LawLaw ChairpersonChairperson

AbbyAbby MartinezMartinez

CivilCivil LawLaw DeputyDeputy ChairpersonChairperson

AliceAlice DeDe LaLa CruzCruz

PersonsPersons andand FamilyFamily RelationsRelations SubjectSubject HeadHead

KhristelKhristel CalantocCalantoc

ObligationsObligations andand ContractsContracts SubjectSubject HeadHead

LeighLeigh DomingoDomingo

SalesSales SubjectSubject HeadHead

FranciscoFrancisco BanguisBanguis

AgencyAgency TrustTrust andand ParntershipParntership SubjectSubject HeadHead

JanloJanlo FevidalFevidal

PropertyProperty SubjectSubject HeadHead

NathNath TolentinoTolentino

CreditCredit TransactionsTransactions SubjectSubject HeadHead

NatashaNatasha FloresFlores

LandLand TitlesTitles andand DeedsDeeds SubjectSubject HeadHead

CarissaCarissa BonifacioBonifacio

WillsWills andand SuccessionSuccession SubjectSubject HeadHead

JonasJonas ManaoManao

TortsTorts andand DamagesDamages SubjectSubject HeadHead

SubjectSubject HeadHead JonasJonas ManaoManao TortsTorts andand DamagesDamages SubjectSubject HeadHead

ChelChel SySy

LCBOLCBO ChairpersonChairperson

NicoNico GarciaGarcia

LCBOLCBO ViceVice ChairChair forfor InternalsInternals

StephSteph GriarGriar

LCBOLCBO ViceVice ChairChair forfor ExternalsExternals

PatPat CostalesCostales

LCBOLCBO ExecutiveExecutive SecretarySecretary

CesCes NagaNaga

LCBOLCBO ExecutiveExecutive TreasurerTreasurer

TetTet ValezaValeza

AcademicAcademic AffairsAffairs ChairpersonChairperson

JanineJanine TutanesTutanes RodRod ZantuaZantua

AcademicAcademic AffairsAffairs DeputyDeputy ChairpersonsChairpersons

JanineJanine Sta.Sta. AnaAna

CivilCivil LawLaw ChairpersonChairperson

AbbyAbby MartinezMartinez

CivilCivil LawLaw DeputyDeputy ChairpersonChairperson

AliceAlice DeDe LaLa CruzCruz

PersonsPersons andand FamilyFamily RelationsRelations SubjectSubject HeadHead

KhristelKhristel CalantocCalantoc

ObligationsObligations andand ContractsContracts SubjectSubject HeadHead

LeighLeigh DomingoDomingo

SalesSales SubjectSubject HeadHead

FranciscoFrancisco BanguisBanguis

AgencyAgency TrustTrust andand ParntershipParntership SubjectSubject HeadHead

JanloJanlo FevidalFevidal

PropertyProperty SubjectSubject HeadHead

NathNath TolentinoTolentino

CreditCredit TransactionsTransactions SubjectSubject HeadHead

NatashaNatasha FloresFlores

LandLand TitlesTitles andand DeedsDeeds SubjectSubject HeadHead

CarissaCarissa BonifacioBonifacio

WillsWills andand SuccessionSuccession SubjectSubject HeadHead

JonasJonas ManaoManao

TortsTorts andand DamagesDamages SubjectSubject HeadHead

SubjectSubject HeadHead JonasJonas ManaoManao TortsTorts andand DamagesDamages SubjectSubject HeadHead

CCiivviill LLaaww

CCiivviill LLaaww JJuussttiiccee DDeell CCaassttiilllloo DDiiggeessttss PERSONSPERSONS ANDAND FAMILYFAMILY
CCiivviill LLaaww JJuussttiiccee DDeell CCaassttiilllloo DDiiggeessttss PERSONSPERSONS ANDAND FAMILYFAMILY

JJuussttiiccee DDeell CCaassttiilllloo DDiiggeessttss

PERSONSPERSONS ANDAND FAMILYFAMILY RELATIONSRELATIONS

HINGHING v.v. CHOACHUYCHOACHUY

G.R.G.R. No.No. 179736|26179736|26 JuneJune 20132013 PersonsPersons andand PersonalityPersonality

DOCTRINE:DOCTRINE: AnAn individual'sindividual's rightright toto privacyprivacy underunder ArticleArticle 2626 (1(1)) ofof thethe CivilCivil CodeCode shouldshould notnot bebe confinedconfined toto hishis househouse oror residenceresidence asas itit maymay extendextend toto placesplaces wherewhere hehe hashas thethe rightright toto excludeexclude thethe publicpublic oror denydeny themthem access.access.

FACTS:FACTS:

RespondeRespondentsnts filedfiled aa casecase againstagainst petitionerpetitioner forfor constructingconstructing aa fencefence withoutwithout aa validvalid permit.permit. InIn orderorder toto getget evidenceevidence toto supportsupport thethe case,case, responrespondentsdents illegallyillegally set-upset-up andand installedinstalled onon thethe buildingbuilding ofof AldoAldo GoodyearGoodyear ServitecServitec twotwo videovideo surveilsurveillancelance camerascameras facingfacing petitioners'petitioners' property;property; respondenrespondents,ts, throughthrough theirtheir employeesemployees andand withoutwithout thethe coconsentnsent ofof petitioners,petitioners, alsoalso tooktook picturespictures ofof petitioners'petitioners' on-goingon-going construction;construction; andand thatthat thethe actactss ofof respondentsrespondents violateviolate petitioners'petitioners' rightright toto privacy.privacy. Thus,Thus, petitionerspetitioners prayedprayed thatthat respondentsrespondents bebe orderedordered toto removeremove thethe videovideo surveillancesurveillance camerascameras andand enjoinedenjoined fromfrom conductingconducting illegalillegal surveillance.surveillance.

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ISSUE:ISSUE: WhetherWhether oror notnot therethere isis aa violationviolation ofof petitioners’petitioners’ rightright toto privacyprivacy

HELD:HELD: Yes,Yes, petitionerspetitioners havehave aa "reasonable"reasonable expectationexpectation ofof pprivacy"rivacy" inin theirtheir property,property, whetherwhether theythey useuse itit asas aa businessbusiness officeoffice oror asas aa residenceresidence andand thatthat thethe insinstallationtallation ofof videovideo surveillancesurveillance camerascameras directlydirectly fafacingcing petitioners'petitioners' propertyproperty oror coveringcovering aa significantsignificant porportiontion thereof,thereof, withoutwithout theirtheir consent,consent, isis aa clearclear violationviolation ofof theirtheir rightright toto privacy.privacy. AnAn individual'sindividual's rightright toto privacyprivacy underunder ArticleArticle 2626 (1)(1) ofof thethe CivilCivil CodeCode shouldshould notnot bebe confinedconfined toto hishis househouse oror residenceresidence asas itit maymay extendextend toto placesplaces wherewhere hhee hashas thethe rightright toto excludeexclude thethe publicpublic oror denydeny themthem access.access. TheThe phrasephrase "prying"prying intointo thethe privacyprivacy ofof another'sanother's residence,"residence," therefore,therefore, coverscovers places,places, locations,locations, oror eveneven situationssituations whichwhich anan individualindividual conconsiderssiders asas private.private. AndAnd asas longlong asas hishis rightright isis recognizedrecognized byby society,society, otherother individualsindividuals maymay notnot infinfringeringe onon hishis rightright toto privacy.privacy. TheThe CA,CA, thereforetherefore,, errederred inin limitinglimiting thethe applicationapplication ofof ArticleArticle 2626 (1)(1) ofof thethe CivilCivil CodeCode onlyonly toto residences.residences. •• TheThe reasonablenessreasonableness ofof aa person'sperson's expectationexpectation ofof privprivacyacy dependsdepends onon aa two-parttwo-part test:test: (1)(1) whether,whether, byby hishis conduct,conduct, thethe individualindividual hashas exhibitedexhibited anan expectaexpectationtion ofof privacy;privacy; andand (2)(2) thisthis expectationexpectation isis oneone thatthat societysociety recognizesrecognizes asas reasonable.reasonable.

••

JULIANO-LLAVEJULIANO-LLAVE v.v. REPUREPUBLICBLIC

G.R.G.R. No.No. 169766169766 |30|30 MarchMarch 20112011 MarriageMarriage

DOCTRINE:DOCTRINE: TheThe lawlaw inin effecteffect atat thethe timetime ofof marriagemarriage shallshall bebe appliedapplied inin determiningdetermining thethe validityvalidity ofof marriage.marriage.

FACTS:FACTS:

••

SenatorSenator TamanoTamano marriedmarried petitionerpetitioner EstrellitaEstrellita JulianoJuliano--LlaveLlave (“Estrellita”)(“Estrellita”) twice:twice:

oo

oo

TheThe firstfirst marriagemarriage waswas performedperformed underunder thethe IslamicIslamic lawslaws andand traditiontradition iinn 1993;1993; andand

TheThe secondsecond marriagemarriage waswas performedperformed underunder aa civilcivil cereceremonymony alsoalso inin 1993.1993.

InIn theirtheir marriagemarriage contracts,contracts, TamanoTamano indicatedindicated hishis ccivilivil statusstatus asas “divorced”.“divorced”.

ZoraydaZorayda TamanoTamano (“Zorayda”)(“Zorayda”) filedfiled aa complaintcomplaint forfor dedeclarationclaration ofof nullitynullity ofof marriagemarriage ofof TamanoTamano andand EstrellitaEstrellita forfor beingbeing bigamousbigamous withwith thethe followingfollowing allegations:allegations:

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests o At the time of Tamano’s marriage with Estrellita in
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests o At the time of Tamano’s marriage with Estrellita in

Justice Del Castillo Digests

o

At the time of Tamano’s marriage with Estrellita in 1993, his marriage with Zorayda in 1958 remained subsisting.

o

Tamano did not and could not have divorced Zorayda by invoking the Code of Muslim Personal Laws on the ground that his marriage with Zorayda was never deemed legally and factually contracted under Muslim law.

Estrellita, on the other hand, alleged that:

o

The Muslim law automatically applies to Tamano’s marriage with Zorayda without need of registering their consent since they are both Muslims; and that

o

Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing because under the law, only the husband or wife can file a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tamano and Estrellita’s marriage was bigamous

HELD: Yes, since the marriage of Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, the applicable law that shall govern marriages of a Muslim and non-Muslim is the Civil Code of 1950 and not the Muslim Law of 1977.

Under the Civil Code, only one marriage can exist at any given time and divorce is not recognized

except during the effectivity of R.A. 394 (An Act Authorizing for a Period of Twenty Years Divorce Among Moslems Residing in Non-Christian Provinces), however, this was not availed of by the

parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not Zorayda and Adib have legal standing to file the complaint

HELD: Yes. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a complaint for nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, and which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the contracting parties.

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10 SC does not apply, Adib as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother has filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.

KALAW v. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 166357 | 19 September 2011 Marriage

DOCTRINE:

It is the plaintiff that has the burden of proving the existence of facts that would establish psychological incapacity.

Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, the same does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

FACTS:

Petitioner is married to respondent. Years later, he filed a petition to declare their marriage void under article 36 of the Family Code.

In support of his allegations, Kalaw presented a psychologist and a Catholic canon law expert who testified that such acts complained of reflected a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).

Petitioner also alleges the sexual infidelity of respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kalaw has sufficiently proved that Fernandez suffers from psychological incapacity

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests HELD: No, the burden of proving psychological incapacity is on
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests HELD: No, the burden of proving psychological incapacity is on

Justice Del Castillo Digests

HELD: No, the burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff who must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious or psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state.

The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.

The testimonies of the supposed expert witnesses that he relied upon were mere conclusions premised on the alleged acts or behavior of Fernandez, which had not been sufficiently proven.

As to the allegation that Fernandez committed adultery, the SC ruled that although sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, the same does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

MATUDAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 203284 | 14 November 2016 Marriage

DOCTRINE: Psychological Incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.

FACTS:

Nicolas filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against his wife, Marilyn, on grounds of psychologically incapacity.

He alleged that Marilyn failed to fulfill her obligations as a wife and mother, and provide them necessary emotional and financial care, and support even after leaving for word abroad

Doctor found that Marilyn has a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Antisocial Traits, but this was only fed solely based on Nicolas’ allegations. They also failed to identify the root cause and provide it existed at the inception of their marriage

ISSUE: Whether or not Marilyn is psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code

HELD: No, psychological Incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.

The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. DAVID

G.R. No. 169548| 15 March 2010 Property Relations of the Spouses

DOCTRINE: Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void.

FACTS:

Spouses Manuel and Martha David, acquired a lot, which was registered in the name of Martha. The spouses separated de facto, and no longer communicated with each other.

Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan Corp.

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and

Justice Del Castillo Digests

Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Reconveyance against Titan. Manuel alleged that the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge and consent, and therefore void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Sale is void by reason of the absence of Manuel’s consent.

HELD: Yes, the property is part of the spouses’ conjugal partnership, even if it is registered only to Martha’s name.

Absence any proof that it is not part of the conjugal property, it must be deemed to be part of it. Since the property is part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan required the consent of both spouses and in the absence of the other spouse’s consent, the Deed of Sale is void.

FRANCISCO LIM v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK

G.R. No. 183918 | 15 January 2014 Property Relations of the Spouses

DOCTRINE: The presumption in Article 160 that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership” applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.

FACTS:

Francisco Lim executed an Irrevocable SPA in favor of his brother, Franco Lim, authorizing latter to mortgage his share in the property, which they co-owned.

Franco, and their mother from the Bank a loan and to secure the loan, Francisco and Franco executed in favor of the Bank a REM over the property. But, when the loan was not paid, the Bank foreclosed the mortgaged property.

Francisco filed before the RTC a complaint against the Bank, Franco, and Victoria.

Francisco alleged that he did not authorize Franco to mortgage the subject property and same should be avoided because the mortgage contract was executed without the consent of his wife.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of signiture of Francisco’s wife is a ground to invalidate the contract.

HELD: No, the presumption that a property registered to one spouse is part of the conjugal property applies only to properties acquired during marriage the marriage.

In this case, the property was acquired before the marriage so the presumption does not apply and the signiture of the wife is not required.

PERLA v. BARING

G.R. No. 172471 | 12 November 2012 Paternity and Filiation

DOCTRINE:

A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.

To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental

Justice Del Castillo Digests

child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity.

FACTS:

Respondent Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy filed a Complaint for support against Antonio.

They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and Antonio lived together as commonlaw spouses for two years. As a result of said cohabitation, Randy was born.

As evidence respondents presented a birth certificate, which was not signed by Antonio.

In his testimony, Randy alleges that he was treated by Antonio as his son and would kiss and hug him. When Randy asked him for support, Antonio promised that he would support him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence is sufficient to establish filiation

HELD: No, a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.

To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity.

RODOLFO S. AGUILAR v. EDNA G. SIASAT

G.R. No. 200169 | 28 January 2015 Paternity and Filiation

DOCTRINE: The filiation of illegitimate children can be established by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document and signed by the parent concerned.

FACTS:

Rodolfo Aguilar claimed that he is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses who died intestate.

Rodolfo, to prove filiation, presented several documents and one of which is his father’s, Alfredo Aguilar’s, SSS Form E-1. This is a public document subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo during his employment with BMMC, which bears his signature and thumb marks and indicates that Rodolfo, born on 5 March 1945, is his son and dependent.

Rodolfo argued that he cannot present his Certificate of Live Birth because all the records of the Local Civil Registry covering the period of 1945-1946 were destroyed.

ISSUE: Whether or not SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement in the establishment of legitimate filiation

HELD: Yes. The filiation of illegitimate children is, like legitimate children, under Art. 172 of the Family Code, established by

(1)

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

SSS Form E-1, a public document, acknowledged and notarized before a notary public executed by Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing Rodolfo as his son, satisfies the requirement of proof of filiation.

Such due recognition in any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition but it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

CCiivviill LLaaww

CCiivviill LLaaww JJuussttiiccee DDeell CCaassttiilllloo DDiiggeessttss
CCiivviill LLaaww JJuussttiiccee DDeell CCaassttiilllloo DDiiggeessttss

JJuussttiiccee DDeell CCaassttiilllloo DDiiggeessttss

REPUBLICREPUBLIC OFOF THETHE PHILIPPINESPHILIPPINES v.v. SARENOGONSARENOGON

G.R.G.R. No.No. 199194199194 || 1010 FebruaryFebruary 20162016 AbsenceAbsence

DOCTRINE:DOCTRINE: UnderUnder Art.Art. 4141 ofof thethe FamilyFamily Code,Code, “well“well --founded”founded” beliefbelief mustmust bebe establishedestablished byby honesthonest -to--to- goodnessgoodness effortsefforts toto ascertainascertain whetherwhether thethe absentabsent spspouseouse isis stillstill alivealive oror isis alreadyalready dead.dead.

FACTS:FACTS:

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JoseJose filefiledd aa PetitionPetition forfor declarationdeclaration ofof presumptivepresumptive deathdeath ofof hishis wife.wife. NoNo oneone opposedopposed thethe petitionpetition soso trialtrial ensued.ensued. JoseJose testifiedtestified thatthat NetchieNetchie waswas employedemployed asas aa domesticdomestic helperhelper inin HongHong Kong.Kong. TheyThey diddid notnot communicatecommunicate forfor 33 months,months, andand hehe couldcould notnot contactcontact herher relatives.relatives. HeHe filedfiled thethe petitionpetition beforebefore thethe RTCRTC soso hehe couldcould concontracttract anotheranother marriagemarriage underunder Art.Art. 4141 ofof thethe FamilyFamily Code,Code, whichwhich waswas granted.granted.

marriagemarriage underunder Art.Art. 4141 ofof thethe FamilyFamily Code,Code, whichwhich waswas granted.granted.
marriagemarriage underunder Art.Art. 4141 ofof thethe FamilyFamily Code,Code, whichwhich waswas granted.granted.
marriagemarriage underunder Art.Art. 4141 ofof thethe FamilyFamily Code,Code, whichwhich waswas granted.granted.

•• TheThe RepublicRepublic claimsclaims thatthat Jose’sJose’s allegedalleged effortsefforts inin locatinglocating NetcNetchiehie diddid notnot engenderengender oror generategenerate aa

ItIt maintainsmaintains thatthat eveneven asas JoseJose exertedexerted effortsefforts

well-foundedwell-founded beliefbelief thatthat thethe latterlatter isis probablyprobably deaddead

toto locatelocate Netchie,Netchie, JoseJose inexplicablyinexplicably failedfailed toto enlienlistst thethe assistanceassistance ofof thethe relevantrelevant governmentgovernment

agenciesagencies suchsuch asas thethe PNP,PNP, NBI,NBI, andand POEA.POEA.

ISSUE:ISSUE: WhetherWhether oror notnot thethe effoeffortsrts ofof JoseJose inin locatinglocating hishis missingmissing wifewife supportsupport aa “well“well --foundedfounded belief”belief” thatthat NetchieNetchie isis probablyprobably deaddead

HELD:HELD: No,No, inin aa petitionpetition forfor aa declarationdeclaration ofof presumptivepresumptive ddeatheath underunder ArticleArticle 4141 ofof thethe FamilyFamily Code,Code, thethe claimclaim mustmust bebe basedbased onon aa “well“well --foundedfounded belief”belief” tthathat thethe spousespouse isis dead.dead. Jose’sJose’s efforteffort isis clearlyclearly insufficientinsufficient asas hehe diddid notnot eveneven soughtsought thethe helphelp ofof appropriateappropriate governmengovernmentt authoritiesauthorities inin findingfinding thethe whereaboutswhereabouts ofof hishis missingmissing wife.wife.

PROPERTYPROPERTY

PUDADERAPUDADERA v.v. MAGALLANESMAGALLANES

G.R.G.R. No.No. 170073170073 || 1818 OctoberOctober 20102010 OwnershipOwnership

DOCTRINE:DOCTRINE:

InIn casecase ofof aa doubledouble salesale ofof immovables,immovables, ownershipownership sshallhall belongbelong toto "(1)"(1) thethe firstfirst registrantregistrant inin goodgood fafaith;ith; (2)(2) then,then, thethe firstfirst possessorpossessor inin goodgood faith;faith; andand (3)(3) fifinally,nally, thethe buyerbuyer whowho inin goodgood faithfaith presentspresents thethe oldestoldest titletitle

FACTS:FACTS:

LazaroLazaro waswas thethe ownerowner ofof aa parcelparcel ofof land,land, LotLot 11-E,11-E, coveredcovered byby TCT.TCT. LazaroLazaro soldsold aa 400400 sq.sq. m.m. portionportion ofof LotLot 11-E11-E toto MagaMagallanesllanes underunder aa ContractContract ToTo SaleSale UponUpon fullfull paymentpayment ofof thethe monthlymonthly installments,installments, LazaLazaroro executedexecuted aa "Deed"Deed ofof DefiniteDefinite Sale"Sale" inin favorfavor ofof Magallanes.Magallanes. oo Thereafter,Thereafter, MagallanesMagallanes hadhad thethe lotlot fencedfenced andand hadhad aa nipanipa huthut constructedconstructed thereon.thereon. TheThe otherother portionsportions ofof LotLot 11-E11-E were,were, likewise,likewise, soldsold byby LazaroLazaro toto severalseveral buyersbuyers LazaroLazaro executedexecuted aa "Partition"Partition Agreement"Agreement" inin favorfavor ofof MagallanesMagallanes andand thethe aforesaidaforesaid buyersbuyers delineatingdelineating thethe portionsportions toto bebe ownedowned byby eacheach buyer.buyer. oo UnderUnder thisthis agreement,agreement, MagallanesMagallanes andand MarioMario GonzalesGonzales werewere assignedassigned anan 800800 sq.sq. m.m. portionportion ofof LotLot 11-E,11-E, withwith eacheach owningowning 400400 sq.sq. m.m. ththereof,ereof, denominateddenominated asas LotLot No.No. 11-E-811-E-8

owning 400 400 sq. sq. m. m. th th ereof, ereof, denominated denominated as as Lot
owning 400 400 sq. sq. m. m. th th ereof, ereof, denominated denominated as as Lot
owning 400 400 sq. sq. m. m. th th ereof, ereof, denominated denominated as as Lot
owning 400 400 sq. sq. m. m. th th ereof, ereof, denominated denominated as as Lot

CCiivviill LLaaww

CCiivviill LLaaww JJuussttiiccee DDeell CCaassttiilllloo DDiiggeessttss • • • • • • • •
CCiivviill LLaaww JJuussttiiccee DDeell CCaassttiilllloo DDiiggeessttss • • • • • • • •

JJuussttiiccee DDeell CCaassttiilllloo DDiiggeessttss

inin aa SubdivisionSubdivision PlanPlan whichwhich waswas approvedapproved byby thethe DirectorDirector ofof Lands.Lands. LazaroLazaro refusedrefused toto turnturn overover thethe mothermother titletitle toto thethe aaforesaidforesaid buyers,buyers, thus,thus, preventingpreventing themthem fromfrom titlingtitling inin theirtheir namesnames thethe subdividedsubdivided portionsportions thereof.thereof. Magallanes,Magallanes, alongalong withwith thethe otherother buyers,buyers, filedfiled anan adadverseverse claimclaim withwith thethe RegisterRegister ofof Deeds.Deeds. MagallanesMagallanes andand GonzalesGonzales filedfiled aa motionmotion toto surrendersurrender title.title. LazaroLazaro soldsold LotLot 11-E-8,11-E-8, i.e.,i.e., thethe lotlot previouslypreviously assignedassigned toto MagallanesMagallanes andand MarioMario GoGonzalesnzales underunder thethe aforesaidaforesaid "Partition"Partition Agreement,"Agreement," toto SpousesSpouses Natividad.Natividad. AA newnew titletitle waswas issuedissued inin thethe namename ofof SpousesSpouses NativNatividad.idad. MagallanesMagallanes filingfiling aa complaintcomplaint forfor specificspecific performance,performance, injunctioninjunction andand ddamagesamages againstagainst SpousesSpouses Natividad.Natividad. TheThe civilcivil casecase filedfiled byby MagallanesMagallanes waswas laterlater dismisdismissedsed byby thethe trialtrial courtcourt forfor lacklack ofof jurisdictionjurisdiction SpousesSpouses NatividadNatividad soldsold thethe subjectsubject lotlot toto PudaderaPudadera MagallanesMagallanes causedcaused thethe constructionconstruction ofof twotwo houseshouses ofof ststrongrong materialsmaterials onon thethe subjectsubject lot.lot. PudaderaPudadera filedfiled anan actionaction forfor forcibleforcible entryentry againstagainst Magallanes.Magallanes.

filed filed an an action action for for forcible forcible entry entry against against Magallanes. Magallanes.
filed filed an an action action for for forcible forcible entry entry against against Magallanes. Magallanes.
filed filed an an action action for for forcible forcible entry entry against against Magallanes. Magallanes.

oo

filed filed an an action action for for forcible forcible entry entry against against Magallanes. Magallanes.
filed filed an an action action for for forcible forcible entry entry against against Magallanes. Magallanes.
filed filed an an action action for for forcible forcible entry entry against against Magallanes. Magallanes.
filed filed an an action action for for forcible forcible entry entry against against Magallanes. Magallanes.
filed filed an an action action for for forcible forcible entry entry against against Magallanes. Magallanes.

ISSUE:ISSUE: WhetherWhether oror notnot PudaderaPudadera hashas aa betterbetter rightright toto thethe lolott

HELD:HELD: No,No, followingfollowing ArtArt 15441544 NCC,NCC, inin casecase ofof aa doubledouble salesale ofof immovables,immovables, ownershownershipip shallshall belongbelong to:to:

(1)(1)

TheThe firstfirst registrantregistrant inin goodgood faithfaith

(2)(2)

TheThe firstfirst possessorpossessor inin goodgood faithfaith

(3)(3)

TheThe buyerbuyer whowho inin goodgood faithfaith presentspresents thethe oldestoldest titltitlee

TheThe lawlaw requiresrequires thatthat thethe secondsecond buyerbuyer mustmust havehave acquiredacquired andand registeredregistered thethe immovableimmovable propepropertyrty inin goodgood faith.faith. InIn orderorder forfor thethe secondsecond buyerbuyer toto displacedisplace thethe firstfirst buyer,buyer, thethe folfollowinglowing mustmust bebe shown:shown:

"(1)"(1) thethe secondsecond buyerbuyer mustmust showshow thatthat hehe actedacted inin goodgood faithfaith (( i.e.i.e.,, inin ignoranceignorance ofof thethe firstfirst salesale andand ofof thethe firstfirst buyer’sbuyer’s rights)rights) fromfrom thethe timetime ofof acquisitionacquisition untiluntil titletitle isis transferredtransferred toto himhim byby registrationregistration oror failingfailing registration,registration, byby deliverydelivery ofof possession;possession; andand (2)(2) thethe secondsecond buyerbuyer mustmust showshow continuingcontinuing goodgood faithfaith andand innocenceinnocence oror lacklack ofof knowledgeknowledge ofof ththee firstfirst salesale untiluntil hishis contractcontract ripensripens intointo fullfull ownershipownership throughthrough priorprior registrationregistration asas providedprovided byby law.law.

InIn thethe casecase atat bar,bar, bothboth thethe trialtrial courtcourt andand CACA foundfound thatthat petitionerspetitioners werewere notnot buybuyersers andand registrantsregistrants inin goodgood faithfaith owingowing toto thethe factfact tt hathat MagallanesMagallanes constructedconstructed aa fencefence andand smallsmall huthut onon tthehe subjectsubject lotlot andand hashas beenbeen inin actualactual physicalphysical possessiopossessionn sincesince 1979.1979. Hence,Hence, petitionepetitionersrs werewere awareaware oror shouldshould havehave beenbeen awareaware ofof Magallanes’Magallanes’ priorprior physicalphysical possessionpossession andand claimclaim ofof ownershipownership overover thethe subjectsubject lotlot whenwhen theythey visitedvisited thethe lotlot onon severalseveral occasionsoccasions priorprior toto thethe salesale thereof.thereof.

COMMUNITIESCOMMUNITIES CAGAYANCAGAYAN v.v. NANOLNANOL

G.R.G.R. No.No. 176791176791 || 1414 NovemberNovember 20122012 OwnershipOwnership

DOCTRINE:DOCTRINE: InIn casecase ofof aa builderbuilder inin goodgood faith,faith, thethe sellerseller (the(the ownerowner ofof thethe land)land) hashas twotwo optiooptionsns underunder ArticleArticle 448:448:

HeHe maymay appropriateappropriate thethe improvemeimprovementsnts forfor himselfhimself afterafter reimbursreimbursinging thethe buyerbuyer (the(the builderbuilder

(1)(1)

inin goodgood faith)faith) thethe necessarynecessary andand useful;useful; oror (2)(2) HeHe maymay sellsell thethe landland toto thethe buyer,buyer, unlessunless itsits valuevalue iiss considerablyconsiderably moremore thanthan thatthat ofof thethe improvemeimprovements,nts, inin whichwhich case,case, thethe buyerbuyer shallshall paypay reasonablereasonable rent.rent.

FACTS:FACTS:

••

RespondentspousesRespondentspouses ArsenioArsenio andand AngelesAngeles NanolNanol enteredentered intointo aa ContractContract toto SellSell withwith petitionerpetitioner CommuCommunitiesnities Cagayan,Cagayan, Inc.,Inc., wherebywhereby thethe latterlatter agreedagreed toto sellsell toto rrespondeespondentspousentspousess aa househouse andand Lots.Lots.

99

CCiivviill LLaaww

CCiivviill LLaaww JJuussttiiccee DDeell CCaassttiilllloo DDiiggeessttss •• •• •• •• RR
CCiivviill LLaaww JJuussttiiccee DDeell CCaassttiilllloo DDiiggeessttss •• •• •• •• RR

JJuussttiiccee DDeell CCaassttiilllloo DDiiggeessttss

••

••

••

••

RRespondenespondent-spousest-spouses availedavailed ofof petitioner’spetitioner’s in-housein-house financing1financing166 thus,thus, undertakingundertaking toto paypay thethe loanloan overover fourfour yearsyears RespondeRespondentnt ArsenioArsenio demolisheddemolished thethe originaloriginal househouse andand cc onstructedonstructed aa threestorythreestory househouse allegedlyallegedly valuedvalued atat P3.5P3.5 million,million, moremore oror less.less. RespondeRespondentsnts defaulteddefaulted whichwhich promptedprompted petitionerpetitioner toto filefile aa casecase forfor unlawfulunlawful detainer.detainer. RespondentRespondent spouses’spouses’ demandsdemands forfor thethe reimbursementreimbursement ooff thethe improvementsimprovements mademade whichwhich petitionepetitione rr deniesdenies allegingalleging thatthat thethe respondentsrespondents werewere buildersbuilders iinn badbad faith.faith.

rr deniesdenies allegingalleging thatthat thethe respondentsrespondents werewere buildersbuilders iinn badbad faith.faith.
rr deniesdenies allegingalleging thatthat thethe respondentsrespondents werewere buildersbuilders iinn badbad faith.faith.
rr deniesdenies allegingalleging thatthat thethe respondentsrespondents werewere buildersbuilders iinn badbad faith.faith.

ISSUE:ISSUE: WhetherWhether oror notnot respondentsrespondents isis entitledentitled toto reimbursemreimbursementent ofof thethe improvementsimprovements mademade

HELD:HELD: Yes,Yes, thethe presumptionpresumption remainremainss thatthat thethe respondentsrespondents areare buildersbuilders inin goodgood faith.faith. ArticleArticle 448448 ofof thethe CivilCivil CodeCode appliesapplies whenwhen thethe buildbuilderer believesbelieves thatthat hehe isis thethe ownerowner ofof thethe landland oror thatthat byby somesome titletitle hehe hashas thethe rightright toto buildbuild thereonthereon,, oror that,that, atat least,least, hehe hashas aa claimclaim ofof titletitle theretthereto.o. TheThe sellerseller (the(the ownerowner ofof thethe land)land) hashas ttwowo optionsoptions underunder ArticleArticle 448:448:

••

••

(1)(1)

inin goodgood faith)faith) thethe necessarynecessary andand usefuluseful expenses;expenses; oror (2)(2) HeHe maymay sellsell thethe landland toto thethe buyer,buyer, unlessunless itsits valuevalue iiss considerablyconsiderably moremore thanthan thatthat ofof thethe improvemeimprovements,nts, inin whichwhich case,case, thethe buyerbuyer shallshall paypay reasonablereasonable rent.rent.

HeHe maymay appropriateappropriate thethe improvemeimprovementsnts forfor himselfhimself afterafter reimbursreimbursinging thethe buyerbuyer (the(the builderbuilder

GUYAMINGUYAMIN v.v. FLORESFLORES

G.R.G.R. No.No. 202189202189 || AprilApril 25,25, 20172017 OwnershipOwnership

DOCTRINE:DOCTRINE: OccupantsOccupants byby meremere tolerancetolerance mustmust vacatevacate uponupon thethe demdemandand ofof thethe registeredregistered owner.owner.

FACTS:FACTS:

FloresFlores isis thethe registeredregistered ownerowner ofof aa parcelparcel ofof landland occupiedoccupied byby Guyamin.Guyamin. GuyaminGuyamin occupiedoccupied thethe propertyproperty byby meremere tolerancetolerance andand lliberalityiberality ofof Flores.Flores. •• DespiteDespite demand,demand, GuyamGuyaminin refusedrefused toto vacatevacate thethe property.property. ThisThis promptedprompted FloresFlores toto filefile aa complaintcomplaint forfor recoveryrecovery ofof possessionpossession forfor saidsaid property.property.

••

••

ISSUE:ISSUE: WhetherWhether oror notnot GuyaminGuyamin shouldshould vacatevacate thethe propertyproperty

HELD:HELD: Yes,Yes, asas occupantsoccupants byby meremere tolerancetolerance ofof thethe owner,owner, GGuyaminuyamin hashas nono rightright toto thethe propertyproperty whatsoever,whatsoever, andand hishis presencepresence isis merelymerely toleratedtolerated andand underunder thethe ggoodood gracesgraces ofof thethe owners.owners. GayuminGayumin isis boundbound byby anan impliedimplied promisepromise toto vacatevacate thethe premisespremises uponupon demanddemand

CHUNGCHUNG JR.JR. VV MANDRAGONMANDRAGON

G.R.G.R. No.No. 179754179754 || 2121 NovemberNovember 20122012 OwnershipOwnership

DOCTRINE:DOCTRINE:

InIn aa casecase forfor quietingquieting ofof title,title, thethe plaintiffplaintiff mustmust showshow thatthat hehe hashas aa legallegal oror atat leastleast anan equitableequitable titletitle overover thethe realreal propertyproperty inin dispute,dispute, andand thatthat somesome dedeeded oror proceedingproceeding becloudsbeclouds itsits validityvalidity oror efficacy.efficacy.

FACTS:FACTS:

••

PetitionersPetitioners andand respondentsrespondents areare childrenchildren ofof RafaelRafael fromfrom hishis firstfirst andand secondsecond wifewife respectively.respectively. TheThe subjectsubject landland inin thisthis casecase waswas ownedowned byby thethe secondsecond wifewife ofof Rafael,Rafael, asas reflectedreflected inin thethe TCT.TCT.

waswas ownedowned byby thethe secondsecond wifewife ofof Rafael,Rafael, asas reflectedreflected inin thethe TCT.TCT.

1010

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • One of the respondents sold the subject land to
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • One of the respondents sold the subject land to

Justice Del Castillo Digests

One of the respondents sold the subject land to third persons.

By reason thereof, petitioner filed a case for quieting of title raising as issue the authority of respondent to dispose the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner possess the required title to file a case for quieting of title.

HELD: No, the property is clearly owned by the second wife of Rafael and hence they have no equitable title over the property.

In a case for quieting of title are fairly simple, the plaintiff need to prove only two things, namely:

(1) The plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and

(2)

That the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title

must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Stated differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a l egal or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.

REPUBLIC v. AFP RSBS

G.R. No. 180463 | 16 January 2013 Ownership

DOCTRINE: The failure of a party to avail of the proper remedy to acquire or perfect one’s title to land cannot justify a resort to other remedies which are otherwise improper and do not provide for the full opportunity to prove his title, but instead require him to concede it before availment.

FACTS:

Lots X, Y-1, and Y-2 were reserved for recreation and health purposes by virtue of Proclamation No. 168 but it was later on amended to remove Lots Y-1 and Y-2 lots from reservation and declared them open for disposition to qualified applicants.

The heirs of Kusop (Kusop) applied for issuances of individual miscellaneous sales patents over the whole of Lot X which was approved.

The titles were issued in the names of Kusop but were simultaneously conveyed to AFP-RSBS.

The Republic instituted a complaint for reversion, cancellation and annulment of the AFP-RSBS titles on the thesis that they were issued over a public park which is classified as inalienable and non-disposable public land.

Kusop argued that they acquired vested interests over Lot X before Proc. 168 having occupied the same for more than 30 years.

ISSUE: Whether or not the “vested rights” of the heirs of Kusop over Lot X can prevail against government ownership of public land under the Regalian doctrine

HELD: No. Respondents-intervenors did not question Proc. 2273, precisely because they were the beneficiaries thereof; nor did they object to the retention of Lot X as part of the park reserve. Instead, in 1997, they applied for, and were granted, sales patents over Lot X.

Evidently, the sales patents over Lot X are null and void, for at the time the sales patents were applied for and granted, the land had lost its alienable and disposable character. It was set aside and was being utilized for a public purpose, that is, as a recreational park.

Kusop no longer had any right to Lot X not by acquisitive prescription, and certainly not by sales patent. In fact, their act of applying for the issuance of miscellaneous sales patents operates

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests as an express acknowledgment that the State, and not respondents-intervenors,
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests as an express acknowledgment that the State, and not respondents-intervenors,

Justice Del Castillo Digests

as an express acknowledgment that the State, and not respondents-intervenors, is the owner of Lot

X.

It is erroneous to suppose that respondents-intervenors possessed title to Lot X when they applied for miscellaneous sales patents, for the premise of such grant or privilege is precisely that the State is the owner of the land, and that the applicant acknowledges this and surrenders to State

ownership.

MANANQUIL v. MOICO

G.R. No. 180076 | 21 November 2012 Quieting of Title to or Interest in and Removal or Prevention of Cloud over Title or Interest in Real Property

DOCTRINE: In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, it is essential that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the subject-matter of the action.

FACTS:

Lots 18 & 19 formed part of the land previously expropriated by the NHA.

Lot 18 was awarded to Spouses Mananquil under a Conditional Contract to Sell while Lot 19 was sold to Prescilla.

When the spouses died, the Mananquil heirs (brothers and sisters of the husband Mananquil) executed an extrajudicial settlement and adjudicated ownership over Lots 18 & 19 in favor of Dianita. They took possession and leased them out to third parties.

Eulegio and two others (claiming to be the surviving heirs of the spouses) executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Moico.

Moico evicted the Mananquil tenants and demolished the structure they built on Lots 18 & 19.

The Mananquils instituted a civil case for quieting of title

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mananquils had legal or equitable title over the lots for their action to prosper

HELD: No, petitioners failed to show their qualifications or right to succeed the husband in his rights under the NHA program/project.

They failed to present any title, award, grant, document or certification from the NHA or proper government agency which would show that the spouses Mananquil have become the registered owners/beneficiaries/awardees of Lots 18 and 19, or that petitioners are qualified successors or beneficiaries taking over Iluminardo's rights after his death.

An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no r ights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. But for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:

(1) The plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action;

The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

(2)

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests GIL MACALINO, JR., et. al. v. ARTEMIO PIS-AN G.R. No.
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests GIL MACALINO, JR., et. al. v. ARTEMIO PIS-AN G.R. No.

Justice Del Castillo Digests

GIL MACALINO, JR., et. al. v. ARTEMIO PIS-AN

G.R. No. 204056 | 1 June 2016 Quieting of Title to or Interest in and Removal or Prevention of Cloud over T itle or Interest in Real Property

DOCTRINE: In cases of quieting of title, it is essential that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title or interest in the subject property.

FACTS:

Emeterio Jumento was the owner of the half portion of Lot 3154 consisting of 469 square meters and his children, the other half in equal shares.

Emeterio inherited his children’s portion when they died, thus becoming the owner of the whole lot. Subsequently, Emeterio passed away.

Meanwhile, the City of Dumaguete built a barangay road which cut acr oss the said lot, dividing it into three portions.

Artemio, a grandson-in-law of Emeterio and one of the latter’s heirs, had the lot surveyed, divided into three (Lot 3154 A, B, and C)

Artemio and his co-heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Absolute Sale adjudicating among themselves Lot 3154. The document did not identify which portion of the three was being sold to the Silleros, who simply bought 207-sqm of Lot 3154. They then put up a house and sold it to Gil Macalino.

Macalino had the lot surveyed and discovered that the portion occupied by him was only 140sqm, not 207sqm. He, along with his children, filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages to RTC

Artemio argues that the lot fenced by the Silleros was exactly the portion that they sold to Gil, the latter not having execerised the diligence required of a buyer.

o The deed of sale from the Silleros, particularly state that they were selling a 207-sqm portion “known as Sub-lot 3154-A” and that due to this phrase, the sale was for a lump sum, presuming that Gil only intended to buy Lot 3154 -A (and not the other lots)

ISSUE: Whether or not Gil is entitled to Lot 3154-C for the remainder of the 207sqm portion he bought?

HELD: No, in order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, it is essential that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property that is the subject matter of the action.

Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership.

Since what the Silleros bought from Artemio was Lot 3154-A, which was only 140-sqm, it logically follows that what they sold to Macalino was the same and exact property. As such, no confusion exists as to the extent of what the Spouses Silleros owned. Thus, what Macalino bought from the Silleros was Lot 3154-A only, and in the absence of a legal or equitable title, or interest, in favor of Macalino there is no cloud to be prevented or removed.

MODESTO PALALI v. JULIET AWISAN

G.R. No. 158385 | 12 February 2010

Quieting of Title to or Interest in and Removal or Prevention of Cloud over T itle or Interest in Real Property

DOCTRINE: One claiming to be in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of a land in the concept of an owner must be able to prove his claim through substantial evidence.

FACTS:

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Respondent filed an action to quiet title over a
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Respondent filed an action to quiet title over a

Justice Del Castillo Digests

Respondent filed an action to quiet title over a portion of a 6 hectare property against the petitioner, claiming that petitioner is encroaching upon the said 6 hectare property which she owns. Respondent prays that she be declared the rightful owner of the encroached property, using as basis the following:

o

She inherited the property from her father who had declared the same in his taxes.

o

Additionally, she also claims that her father introduced sev eral improvements over the lot proving his continued possession over the subject property.

Petitioner, on the other hand, claims a superior right over the property. Petitioner stated that he and his ancestors and predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession over the subject property in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. They introduced several improvements over the lot, and planted vegetation therein, which was backed by testimonies from neighbors.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has a better right over the subject property

HELD: Yes, the petitioner was able to substantiate his claim of open, continuous, notorious, exclusive possession over the subject property in the concept of an owner through him and his predecessors-in- interest.

First, respondent’s presentation of tax declarations cannot overcome the evidence presented by the petitioner who adequately proved his open, continuous possession over the property supported by the testimonies of long-time residents/neighbors.

Second, the ocular inspection of the trial court found that the improvements mentioned by respondent were not found on the subject property, while those mentioned by petitioner were present. Thus, the petitioner has a better right to the property.

OLEGARIO v. MARI

G.R. No. 147951 | 14 December 2009

Possession

DOCTRINE: Possession, to constitute the foundation of acquisitive prescription, must be possession under a claim of title or must be adverse.

FACTS:

As early as 1916 Juan Mari (father of respondent) declared his ownership over a parcel of land in Nancasalan, Mangatarem for tax purposes. He took possession by delineating the limits with a bamboo fence, planted fruit bearing trees and bamboos and constructed a 2 story house.

After a survey was made, and a tax declaration specified the property as residential land with an area of 897 sqm. By virtue of a deed of sale it was transferred to respondent, Pedro Mari (Mari).

Wenceslao Olegario (husband of Magdalena Fernandez and father of petitioner Arsenio Olegario) filed a new tax declaration, for a 50 sqm parcel of land in the same property.

In May 14, 1961, Wenceslao executed a "Deed of Quit-Claim of Unregistered Property in favor of Arsenio Olegario. Transferring the 50 sqm property to him. Wenceslao then disputed Mari’s claim over the land.

Mari filed with DENR regional office in Pangasinan a pr otest against petitioners because of their encroachment into the disputed property. The office decided in favor of respondent and found that he is the owner.

Arsenio caused an amendment of his tax declaration of the 50 sqm property, increasing the area of the lot to 341-sqm.

After discovering the amendments of Arsenio, respondent filed a complaint with RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan for Recovery of Possession and Annulment of Tax Declaration.

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests o Mari alleged that Juan Mari, and subsequently his successor,
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests o Mari alleged that Juan Mari, and subsequently his successor,

Justice Del Castillo Digests

o Mari alleged that Juan Mari, and subsequently his successor, was deprived by the Olegarios of the possession of portions of subject realty which Mari owned.

Olegario asserts that they have been in possession of the disputed lots since 1948 or for more than 30 yrs already. Hence they acquired ownership by vi rtue of prescription.

Mari asserts that petitioner can only claim ownership over 50 sqm and not 341 sqm.

ISSUE: Whether the Olegarios have acquired the property through claim of title/adverse possession?

HELD: No, the ownership of Juan Mari (respondent’s father) clearly shows that he was in the possession of the lot in the concept of owner, publicly and peacefully since 1916 when he declared the lot for tax purposes, planted trees and bamboos, constructed a 2 story house and bamboo fence. Compared to petitioner when they entered the disputed lot much later, in 1965.

According to Article 538 of the Civil Code, respondent is the preferred possessor since 1916. Despite the Olegarios occupying the lots for 25 years, they cannot acquire ownership because there was no evidence the disputed lots were transferred to them by their predecessors.

Hence, the Olegarios cannot acquire the lots by ordinary p rescription of 10 yrs. and ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. The Olegarios were only tolerated by the owner and no matter how long they were tolerated it cannot start the prescriptive period. Material possession of land is not adverse possession and it’s insufficient to vest title.

DELA CRUZ v. CAPCO

G.R. No. 176055 | 17 March 2014 Possession

DOCTRINE: The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real property possession de facto and not possession de jure.

FACTS:

Sps. Dela Cruz filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Sps. Capco, alleging that Teodora, mother of petitioner Amelia Dela Cruz, acquired a parcel of land by virtue of a land registration case. The said property was eventually registered in her name.

Teodora, out of neighborliness and blood relationship, tolerated the Sps. Capco’s occupat ion thereof. Eventually, the title to the property was conveyed to Sps. Dela Cruz.

Intending to construct a house and utilize the space for b alut and salted egg business, they asked Sps. Capco to vacate the property.

As Sps. Capco refused, the matter was brought to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation but to no avail. Hence this complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sps. Dela Cruz has a better right to possess such property

HELD: Yes, the only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real property possession de facto and not possession de jure but where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property.”

Here, both parties anchor their right to possess based on ownership, i.e., the spouses Dela Cruz by their own ownership while the spouses Capco by the ownership of Rufino as one of the heirs of the alleged true owner of the property. Thus, the MTC and the RTC co rrectly passed upon the issue of ownership in this case to determine the issue of possession. However, it must be emphasized that “[t]he adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involvi ng title to the property.”

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Sps. Dela Cruz was able to prove that they
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Sps. Dela Cruz was able to prove that they

Justice Del Castillo Digests

Sps. Dela Cruz was able to prove that they are owners of the lot. Their allegation that the subject property was adjudicated to Teodora and was later conveyed in their favor was supported by:

(1)

A copy of the Decision of the land r egistration case;

(2)

Title of the land issued to Teodora

(3) The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Teodora wherein the latter’s heir agreed to convey the said property to Amelia. On the other hand, aside from Sps Capco’s bare allegation that respondent Rufino is an heir of the true owners thereof, presented nothing to support their claim.

All told, the Court agrees with the MeTC’s conclusion, as affirmed by the RTC, that the spouses Dela Cruz are better entitled to the material possession of the subject property. As its present owners, they have a right to the possession of the property which is one of the attributes of ownership.

REPUBLIC v. CORTEZ

G.R. No. 201405. | 24 August 2015 Possession

DOCTRINE: Possession, no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect if the property cannot be lawfully possessed in the first place.

FACTS:

Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr., a missionary, established an orphanage and school in Punta Verde, Palaui Island, Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares of land located in the western portion of Palaui Island where with the help of Aetas and other people under his care, cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in order to support his charitable, humanitarian and missionary works.

May 22, 1967: Pres. Marcos issued Proc. No. 201 which reserved 2,000 hectares of the southern half portion of the Palaui Island for the use of the Philippine Navy, subject, to private r ights if there be any.

Aug. 16, 1994: Pres. Ramos issued Proc. No. 447 declaring Palaui Island and the surrounding waters as marine reserve, subject to any private rights. The entire Palaui Island consisting of an aggregate area of 7,415.48 hectares was accordingly reserved as a marine protected area.

Jun. 13, 2000: Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction against Rogelio C. Bi n as ̃ in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval Command in Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. According to Rev. Cortez, some members of the Philippine Navy, upon orders of Bi n as, ̃ disturbed his peaceful and lawful possession of the said 50hectare portion of Palaui Island when they commanded him and his men, through the use of force and intimidation, to vacate the area.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rev. Cortez is entitled to possess the land

HELD: No, only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of possession and thus, property of the public dominion, common things and things specifically prohibited by law cannot be appropriated and hence, cannot be possessed.

The Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim, is not part of the public domain and therefore can be the proper object of possession.

To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be established. In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and disposable when
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and disposable when

Justice Del Castillo Digests

of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same.

Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code. Possession, even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect since the property cannot be lawfully possessed in the first place.

SIY v. TOMLIN

G.R. No. 205998 | 24 April 2017 Possession

DOCTRINE: In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered.

FACTS:

Siy filed a complaint for recovery of possession with prayer for replevin agai nst Ong. Siy alleged that he owns a Range Rover which he purchased from Lopez. Siy admitted that he did not register the sale in his favor, and that the vehicle remained in the name of Lopez.

Siy entrusted the vehicle to Ong under an arrangement that the latter would sell the vehicle for him.

Siy stated that Ong failed to remit the proceeds of the purported sale nor return the vehicle.

Among the evidence presented by Siy were: a manager’s check and cash voucher as proof of payment, and the affidavit of Lopez attesting to the sale.

Tomlin, on the other hand, claimed to be the lawful and registered owner of the vehicle. Tomlin presented the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration. Tomlin argued that he is the true owner of the subject vehicle. He said that Ong sold to vehicle to Chua, and that the same vehicle was later on sold to him by the latter.

ISSUE: Whether or not Siy is entitled to possession of the car

HELD: No, in a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either t he owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered. From Siy’s own account, he appointed Ong as his agent to sell the vehicle.

Since Ong was able to sell the vehicle, Siy ceased to be the owner thereof. Considering that he was no longer the owner or rightful possessor of the subject vehicle at the time he filed the case, he is not entitled to possession over the property.

REGALADO v. DE LA PENA

G.R. No. 202448 | 13 December 2017 Possession

DOCTRINE: In an action to recover possession of property, the assessed value of the subject property is jurisdictional.

FACTS:

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and Jaime (all
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and Jaime (all

Justice Del Castillo Digests

Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and Jaime (all surnamed De La Pena) are the registered owners of two parcels of land with a total area of 44 hectares.

Regalado, without knowledge and consent of the De La Penas, entered, took possession of, and planted sugar cane on the subject properties without paying rent.

They filed a complaint for recovery of possession of the property with the RTC against Regalado.

Regalado moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the assessed values of the subject properties were not alleged.

ISSUE: Whether or not an allegation as to the assessed value of the property is necessary for an action to recover possession of property

HELD: Yes, in this case, the RTC took cognizance of the complaint only on the presumption that the assessed values of the properties exceed Php 20,000.

However, jurisdiction is conferred by law, it cannot be presumed nor implied. In the absence of any allegation as to the assessed value of the subject properties, it cannot be determined which court has exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint.

MeTC, MTC, or MCTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value does not exceed Php 20,000 (or Php 50,000 in Metro Manila). If it exceeds such value, RTC has jurisdiction.

DE GUZMAN v. FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 191710 | 14 January 2015 Easements

DOCTRINE: The need of the dominant estate is the one which governs the determination of the width of the easement of right of way. The grant of the easement should not be excessive that would be prejudicial to the dominant estate.

FACTS:

The Petitioners Demetria de Guzman, Lolita de Guzman, Esther Milan, Banaag de Guzman, Amor Apolo, Herminio de Guzman, Leonor Vivencio, Norma de Guzman, and Josefina Hernandez (petitioners) were co-owners of a parcel of land (15,063 sqm) in Cainta, Rizal.

Said land was then subdivided among them and individual titles were issued to them.

The property was enclosed and surrounded by other properties belonging to various owners. One of the owners is the respondent Filinvest, which has a potential direct access to Marcos highway.

The petitioners then filed a complaint for easement of right of way against t he respondent.

The respondent answered that the petitioners have an access to Sumulong Highway through another adjoining property. And they also alleged that Su mulong Highway is nearer than Marcos Highway from the petitioners’ property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 10-meters of right of way grant is proper for the petitioners

HELD: No, what governs the width of the easement is the needs of the dominant estate.

Under Art. 651 of the Civil Code, the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate an d may accordingly be changed from time to time.

According to Senator Tolentino, it is the needs of the dominant tenement which determines the width of the passage

In this case, the grant of the RTC of 10 meters width of the easement was surely not proper since if that was the case, the indemnity that the petitioners would be giving is around P38M. That amount

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests would be iniquitous since the need of the petitioner was
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests would be iniquitous since the need of the petitioner was

Justice Del Castillo Digests

would be iniquitous since the need of the petitioner was just an adequate vehicular access to the highway.

The right of way of 3 meters would already suffice to meet the needs of the petitioners. Therefore the indemnification must be computed using the 3-meter right of way and not the excessive 10- meter one.

ANDRES. v. STA. LUCIA DEV’T CO.

G.R. No. 201405. | 24 August 2015 Easements

DOCTRINE: An easement of rightofway may be demanded by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same.

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of RightofWay against Sta. Lucia Dev’t Co. Before RTC, alleging that they are coowners and possessors for more than 50 years of 3 parcels of unregistered agricultural land in Rizal with a total area of more or less 10,500 sqm.

A few years back, however, Sta. Lucia Dev’t Co. acquired the lands surrounding the subject property and developed the same into a residential subdivision known as the Binangonan Metropolis East, and built a concrete perimeter fence around it such that petitioners were denied access from subject property to the nearest public road and vice versa.

They thus prayed for a rightofway within Binangonan Metropolis East in order for them to have access to Col. Guido Street, a public road. This is considering that their possession became adverse when their predecessor-in-interest with regard to the land allegedly formally registered his claim of ownership with the DENR.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of rightofway from respondent

HELD: No, the petition has no merit. Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of rightofway may be demanded by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same.

Contrary to petitioners' allegations, there is no showing that there was a claim of ownership over the subject property by their predecessor-in-interest. His letter to the DENR is actually just a request for the issuance of certain documents and nothing more.

NAGA CENTRUM, INC. v. ORZALES

G.R. No. 203576 | 14 September 2016 Easements

DOCTRINE: The owner of a landlocked property has a right to demand a right-of-way through neighboring estates provided that it is least prejudicial to the servient estate and shortest to the highway

FACTS:

Sps. Orzales owns a house and lot situated in Valentin Street, Sabang Naga City

Their property was surrounded by different property owners and eventually lost passageway to public highway

To access the public road, they can only pass through Rizal Street, which is in Naga Centrum’s property, on a limited time from 9:00am to 2:00pm dail

Burdened by it, Sps. Orzales demands for a right-of-way from Naga Centrum but the later declined

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Naga Centum intentionally blocked the passageway and landlocked Sps.
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Naga Centum intentionally blocked the passageway and landlocked Sps.

Justice Del Castillo Digests

Naga Centum intentionally blocked the passageway and landlocked Sps. Orzales’

ISSUE: Whether or not Sps. Orzales has the right to demand right-of-way

HELD: Yes, to be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites should be met:

(1)

The estate is surrounded by other immovable and is without adequate outlet to public highway

(2)

Payment of proper indemnity

(3)

Isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner’s acts

(4)

Right-of-way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate

All the four requisites were present in this case which justifies Sps. Orzales demand for right of way. Also with the interest of justice as enshrined under Art. 19 and 26 of the Civil Code, Naga Centrum should have exercised its right with justice and respect to i ts neighbors

HIPOLITO, JR. v. CINCO

G.R. No. 174143 | 28 November 2011 Nuisance

DOCTRINE: The mere fact that the building is considered as a nuisance under the Civil Code does not deprive the Building Official the authority to order its condemnation and demolition.

FACTS:

Edeltrudis Hipolity y Marciano (Edeltrudis) entered into a lease agreement with Francisco Villena (Villena) over a parcel of land located at San Andres Bukind, Manila for 20 years. Edeltrudis was obliged to build an apartment-style building adjacent to the existing house in the property.

After 13 years, the heir of Edeltrudis, Spouses Ricardo Hipolito, Jr. and Liza Hipolito (Sps. Hipolito), and the heirs of Villena were informed that the property was acquired by Atty. Carlos D. Cinco (Cinco) via a deed of sale.

Cinco then filed with the OBO a verified request for structural inspection of the structures in the lot. The Office of the Building Official eventually declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous, and recommended their demolition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Building Official could order the condemnation and demolition of the buildings even though the building falls under the concept of a nuisance under the Civil Code

HELD: Yes, the Building Official has authority.The fact that the buildings in question could also constitute nuisances under the Civil Code does not preclude the Building Official form issuing the assailed Demolition Order.

As provided by P.D. No. 1096, the authority of the Building Official to order the repair, vacation or demolition, as the case may be, is without prejudice t o further action that may be undertaken under the relevant provisions of the Civil Code.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. JUMAMOY

G.R. No. 168164 | 3 August 2011 Prescription

DOCTRINE: The 10-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust applies when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property.

Civil Law

FACTS:

Civil Law FACTS: Justice Del Castillo Digests • In an earlier case for reconveyance, the RTC
Civil Law FACTS: Justice Del Castillo Digests • In an earlier case for reconveyance, the RTC

Justice Del Castillo Digests

In an earlier case for reconveyance, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the exclusion of 2.5 hectares of property from the coverage of an OCT registered in the na me of Pace. It was established that the said lot was owned by the predecessor of Jumamoy, hence, should be reconveyed in favor respondent Jumamoy.

However, the RTC decision could not be annotated on the OCT of Pace.

o It was found that the OCT had already been cancelled by reason of an unpaid mortgage executed by Pace with the PNB, and t hat TCT had already been issued in favor of PNB.

Jumamoy filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Mortgage, Foreclosure Sale, Reconveyance and Damages against PNB and Pace. He argued that:

o

Pace could not validly mortgage the entire Lot to PNB as a portion thereof consisting of 2.5 hectares belongs to him; and

o

PNB is not an innocent mortgagee or purchaser for value since it had been notified that the said lot was subject to litigation.

The PNB, on the other hand, contends that Jumamoy’s action for reconveyance had already prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jumamoy’s action for reconveyance had prescribed

HELD: No, an action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in 10 years as it is an obligation created by law, to be counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

This rule, however, applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property.

In this case, it has been established that Jumamoy is in actual possession of the property, hence, the action for reconveyance is imprescriptible.

If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

ANDRES. v. STA. LUCIA DEVT CO.

G.R. No. 201405. | 24 August 2015 Prescription

DOCTRINE: If the mode of acquisition is prescription, it must first be shown that the land has already been converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period.

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of RightofWay against Sta. Lucia Dev’t Co. Before RTC, alleging that they are coowners and possessors for more than 50 years of 3 parcels of unregistered agricultural land in Rizal with a total area of more or less 10,500 sqm.

A few years back, however, Sta. Lucia Dev’t Co. Acquired the lands surrounding the subject property and developed the same into a residential subdivision known as the Binangonan Metropolis East, and built a concrete perimeter fence around it such that petitioners were denied access from subject property to the nearest public road and vice versa.

Petitioners assert that they have already become owners of the subject property through extraordinary acquisitive prescription since they have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession thereof for more than 50 yrs.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests HELD: No, the petition has no merit. Even if timely
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests HELD: No, the petition has no merit. Even if timely

Justice Del Castillo Digests

HELD: No, the petition has no merit. Even if timely raised, such argument of petitioners, as well as with respect to extraordinary acquisitive prescription, fails.

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.

However, only lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth, or removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership, may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.

And if the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, it must first be shown that the land has already been converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period.

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

METROBANK v. ROSALES

G.R. No. 183204| 13 January 2014 Sources of Obligations

DOCTRINE: Obligations arise from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts.

FACTS:

Respondent Rosales is the owner of China Golden Bridge Travel Services, while respondent Yo Yuk To is the mother of Rosales. They opened a Joint Peso Account with Metrobank.

Rosales accompanied her client Fang, a Taiwanese national, to open a savings account with Metrobank. Since Fang could only speak Mandarin, Rosales acted as the former’s interpreter.

Later, respondents opened a Joint Dollar Account with Metrobank.

Metrobank issued a “Hold Out” order against respondents’ accounts and filed before the Office of the Prosecutor a criminal case for estafa.

o Metrobank accused respondents as the ones responsible for the unauthorized and fraudulent withdrawal of 75,000 USD from Fang’s dollar account.

Respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Breach of Obligation and Contract against Metrobank, alleging that they attempted several times to withdraw their deposits but were una ble to because their accounts were placed under “Hold Out” status without any explanation.

Metrobank claims that it did not breach its contract with respondents because it has a valid reason for issuing the “Hold Out” order.

o It anchors its right to withhold respondents’ deposits on the Application and Agreement for Deposit Account, which reads “the Bank is hereby authorized to withhold as security for any and all obligations with the Bank, all monies xxx of the Depositor xxx for so much as will be sufficient to pay any or all obligations incurred by the latter.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Metrobank is guilty of breach of contract despite the “Hold Out” clause

HELD: Yes, the “Hold Out” clause applies only if there is a valid and existing obligation ari sing from any of the sources of obligations enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code, to wit: law, contracts, quasi- contracts, delict and quasi-delict.

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • In this case, petitioner failed to show that respondents
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • In this case, petitioner failed to show that respondents

Justice Del Castillo Digests

In this case, petitioner failed to show that respondents had an obligation to it under any of the aforementioned sources of obligations, thus, the “Hold Out” clause cannot apply.

Although a criminal case was filed against respondent, this is not enough reason for Metrobank to issue a “Hold Out” order as the case was still pending and no final judgment of conviction has been rendered against them. In fact, at the time the “Hold Out” order was issued, the criminal complaint had not yet been filed.

MANLAR RICE MILL, INC. v. DEYTO

G.R. No. 191189 | 29 January 2014 Kinds of Obligations

DOCTRINE: There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires.

FACTS:

Respondent Ang entered into a rice supply contract with Petitioner Manlar Rice Mill Inc. (Manlar) where the former purchased rice from the latter. This transaction was covered by nine (9) postdated checks issued by Ang from her personal bank/checking account.

Upon presentment, all nine (9) checks were dishonored.

Manlar made oral and written demands upon respondents Deyto and Ang, which went unheeded.

Manlar filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Deyto and Ang before the RTC seeking to hold respondents solidarily liable on the rice supply contract.

Deyto filed her Answer claiming that she did not contract with Malar or any of its representatives regarding the purchase and delivery of rice. She further argued that Manlar’s claim has no factual and legal basis, and that Manlar’s impleading her is simply a desperate str ategy or attempt to recover its losses from her, considering that Janet Ang can no longer be located.

ISSUE: Whether or not Deyto can be held solidarily liable with Ang for what the latter owes to Manlar

HELD: No, well-entrenched is the rule that solidary obligations cannot be lightly inferred. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires.

A contract affects only the parties to it, and cannot be enforced by or against a person who is not a party thereto. In the present case, the preponderance of evidence indicates that it was Janet Ang alone who entered into the rice supply agreement with Manlar. Whenever Manlar made rice deliveries, Deyto was not around. Also, it was Ang alone who issued the subject checks and delivered them to Manlar.

GOLDLOOP v. GSIS

G.R. No. 171076 | 1 August 2012 Kinds of Obligations

DOCTRINE: Parties may validly stipulate the unilateral rescission of a contract.

FACTS:

GSIS and Goldloop executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby Goldloop, at its own expense and account, would renovate the facade of the Philcomcen Building as well as construct a condominium building on a portion of the said land.

The MOA provided for a unilateral rescission in case of failure to perform the contract.

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • The projects, however, were not completed because the Mayor
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • The projects, however, were not completed because the Mayor

Justice Del Castillo Digests

The projects, however, were

not completed because the Mayor did not act on Goldloop’s

application for building permits.

By reason thereof, GSIS rescinded the contract.

Goldloop asserted that the rescission was without basis and clearly made in bad faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rescission was valid

HELD: Yes, parties may validly stipulate the unilateral r escission of a contract. Such is the case here since the parties conferred upon GSIS the right to unilaterally rescind the MOA.

In this case, both Goldloop and GSIS failed to comply with their reciprocal obligations.

o

Goldloop’s obligation failed to construct and develop the condominium building.

o

GSIS failed to deliver to Goldloop the property free from all liens and encumbrances.

In view of the rescissory action taken by GSIS pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code, mutual restitution is required. Goldloop should return to GSIS the possession and control of the property subject of their agreements while GSIS should reimburse Goldloop whatever amount it had received from the latter by reason of the MOA.

CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION v. ASEA BROWN BOVERI

G.R. No. 171660 | 17 October 2011 Kinds of Obligations

DOCTRINE: The penalty clause takes the place of indemnity for damages a nd the payment of interests in case of non-compliance with the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.

FACTS:

Petitioner Continental Cement Corporation (CCC) obtained the services of respondents Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) and BCC Brown Boveri to repair its kiln drive motor.

Due to the repeated failure of ABB to repair the kiln drive motor, CCC file a complaint for sum of money and damages. It claimed that due to the consequence of the failure to comply with their contractual obligation, ABB must pay the production and opportunity losses, labor cost and rental of crane, penalties, cost of money interest, and attorney’s fees.

ABB, however, claimed that under Clause 7 of the General Conditions attached to CCC’s letter of offer issued to the former, the liability of ABB should not extend to consequential damages either direct or indirect.

ISSUE: Whether or not ABB is liable for payment of penalties

HELD: Yes, CCC is entitled to penalties since under Art. 1226 of the Civil Code, the penalty clause takes the place of indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance with the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.

In this case, since there is no stipulation to the contrary, the penalty shall cover all other damages claimed by CCC (i.e. production loss, labor cost, and rental of crane).

SPOUSES BONROSTRO v. SPOUSES LUNA

G.R. No. 172346 | 24 July 2013 Kinds of Obligations and Extinguishment of Obligations

DOCTRINE: Tender of payment takes effect only if accompanied by actual payment or followed by consignation.

Civil Law

FACTS:

Civil Law FACTS: Justice Del Castillo Digests • In 1992, respondent Constancia Luna, as buyer, entered
Civil Law FACTS: Justice Del Castillo Digests • In 1992, respondent Constancia Luna, as buyer, entered

Justice Del Castillo Digests

In 1992, respondent Constancia Luna, as buyer, entered into a Contract to Sell with Bliss Development Corporation involving a house and lot in Diliman, Quezon City.

A year after, Constancia this time as the seller, entered into another Contract to Sell with petitioner Lourdes Bonrostro concerning the same property to be paid in installments.

The Spouses Bonrostro took possession of the property immediately after the execution of the contract. However, Lourdes failed to pay the stipulated subsequent amortization payments.

The Spouses Luna filed before the RTC a Complaint for Rescission of Contract and Damages against the Spouses Bonrostro praying for the rescission of the contract, delivery of possession of the subject property, and payment by the Spouses Bonrostro of their unpaid obligation.

The RTC ruled that the delay could not be considered a substantial breach considering that the Spouses Bonrostro were ready and willing to pay as evidenced by a letter they sent to the Spouses Luna, hence, rescission is not proper. It further ordered the Spouses Bonrostro to pay the Spouses Luna the balance plus interest.

The Spouses Bonrostro now questions the order with regard to the payment of interest, alleging that they should not be assessed any interest subsequent to the date of the letter as this constitutes a valid tender of payment.

ISSUE: Whether or not nonpayment of the purchase price in a Contract to Sell constitutes a substantial breach warranting a rescission

HELD: No, in a contract to sell, payment of the price is a positive suspension condition, the failure of which is not a breach of contract warranting rescission under Article 1911 of the Civil Code but rather just an event that prevents the supposed seller from being bound to convey title to the supposed buyer.

Article 1911 cannot be applied to sales of real property on installment since these are governed by the Maceda Law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lourdes’ letter to Atty. Carbon a mounts to tender of payment

HELD: No, the Spouses Bonrostro erroneously assumed that the letter amounts to tender of payment of the remaining balance which would suspend the accrual of interest. Their claimed tender of payment did not produce any effect because it was not accompanied by actual payment or followed by consignation.

To have the effect of payment and the consequent extinguishment of the obligation to pay, the law requires the companion acts of tender of payment and consignation.

Tender of payment is the manifestation by the debtor of a desire to comply with or pay an obligation. If refused without just cause, the tender of payment will discharge the debtor of the obligation to pay but only after a valid consignation of the sum due shall have b een made with the proper court.

Consignation is the deposit of the proper amount with a judicial authority in accordance with rules prescribed by law, after the tender of payment has been refused or because of circumstances which render direct payment to the creditor impossible or inadvisable.

LAO v. SPECIAL PLANS, INC.

G.R. No. 164791| 29 June 2010 Extinguishment of Obligations

DOCTRINE: Compensation takes place only if both obligations are liquidated and demandable.

FACTS:

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Petitioners Lao, Manansala and Jim, entered into a Contract
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Petitioners Lao, Manansala and Jim, entered into a Contract

Justice Del Castillo Digests

Petitioners Lao, Manansala and Jim, entered into a Contract of Lease with Special Plans, Inc. (SPI) over the latter’s building.

SPI sent a Demand Letter to the petitioners asking for full payment of rentals in arrears.

Receiving no payment, SPI filed a complaint for sum of money.

Petitioners, in their Answer with Counterclaim, admitted their nonpayment of rentals but alleged that SPI did not deliver the leased premises in a condition fit for petitioners’ intended use and thus, they incurred expenses for repairs done on the property.

o Petitioners claim that the amount spent for repairs should be judicially compensated

against the said unpaid rentals.

ISSUE: Whether or not compensation is proper

HELD: No, compensation can take place only when both debts are liquidated and demandable.

The Civil Code provides that compensation shall take place when the following requisites are present:

(1)

Each one of the obligors be bound principally and that he be at the same time a principal

(2)

creditor of the other; Both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the

(3)

same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated; The two debts are due:

(4)

The debts are liquidated and demandable;

(5) Over neither of them be any retention or controversy, commenced by third parties and communicated in due time to the debtor.

A claim is considered liquidated when the amount and time of payment is fixed.

In this case, petitioners failed to properly discharge their burden to show that the debts are

liquidated and demandable.

support their allegation that there were actual expenses made for the alleged repairs. Consequently, legal compensation is inapplicable.

They did not present any convincing evidence or proof which could

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK v. ENRIQUEZ

G.R. Nos. 168646 and 168666 | 12 January 2011 Extinguishment of Obligations

DOCTRINE: The dation in payment extinguishes the obligation to the extent of the value of the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties or as may be proved, unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, or by their silence, consider the thing as equivalent to the obligation, in which case the obligation is totally extinguished.

FACTS:

Delta Development Management Services, Inc. (Delta) is owned by Ricardo De Leon (De Leon), who in turn owns Lot 4 of Delta Homes I.

Delta obtained a P4 million loan from petitioner Luzon Development Bank (LDB) which is secured by a Real Estate Mortgage including Lot 4.

Delta then executed a Contract to Sell with respondent Enriquez over the house and lot in Lot 4. The Contract provides that a final Deed of Sale will only be issued upon full payment of the consideration.

Delta then defaulted on its loan obligation. LDB, instead of foreclosing the REM, agreed to a dation in payment wherein Delta would assign real estate properties to LDB in payment of the total obligation. One of the properties included was Lot 4.

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests ISSUE: Whether or not the d a c i o
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests ISSUE: Whether or not the d a c i o

Justice Del Castillo Digests

ISSUE: Whether or not the dacion en pago extinguished the loan obligation

HELD: Yes, the dacion en pago extinguished the loan obligation notwithstanding the existence of the Contract to Sell over Lot 4 in favor of Enriquez.

As a rule, the dation in payment extinguishes the obligation to the extent of the value of the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties or as may be proved, unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, or by their silence, consider the thing as equivalent to the obligation, in which case the obligation is totally extinguished.

It is the intention of the parties in the dation in payment which determines whether the property subject of the dation will be considered as the full equivalent of the debt and will therefore serve as full satisfaction of the said debt.

In this case, the Dacion stated that the assigned properties served as full payment of Delta ’s total obligation to LDB without any reservation or condition. Since LDB already accepted the said properties as equivalent to the loaned amount and as full satisfaction of Delta’s debt, it cannot now complain that some of the assigned properties are covered by existing Contracts to Sell.

MONTEMAYOR v. MILLORA

G.R. No. 168251 | 27 July 2011 Extinguishment of Obligations

DOCTRINE: A debt is considered liquidated, not only when it is expressed in definite figures which do not require verification, but also when the determination of the exact amount depends only on a simple arithmetical operation.

FACTS:

Respondent Atty. Millora obtained a P400,000 loan from petitioner Montemayor with a stipulated monthly interest of 2%.

Atty. Millora was only able to pay P100,000 of the loan, hence, a complaint for sum of money was filed by Montemayor.

Atty. Millora answered with a counterclaim for payment of the legal service he rendered in favor of Montemayor.

The trial court found merit in both the collection of money and the counterclaim, ruling that:

o

Atty. Millora is liable to Montemayor in the amount of P300,000.

o

Montemayor is liable to Atty. Millora for attorney’s fees “which is equivalent to the amount of Atty. Milllora’s monetary liability.”

o

Both the amounts being equivalent, the trial court ordered for its offsetting.

Montemayor now questions the validity of the “offsetting” of the monetary claims awarded. He points out that offsetting cannot be made because the judgment of the RTC failed to specify the amount of attorney’s fees, and that for offsetting to apply, the two debts must be liquidated or ascertainable.

ISSUE: Whether or not both claims could be validly offset despite the RTC not specifying numerically the amount to be paid for the counterclaim

HELD: Yes, a debt is considered liquidated, not only when it is expressed in definite figures which do not require verification, but also when the determination of the exact amount depends only on a simple arithmetical operation.

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • For legal compensation to take place, the requirements set
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • For legal compensation to take place, the requirements set

Justice Del Castillo Digests

For legal compensation to take place, the requirements set forth in Arts. 1278 and 1279 of the Civil Code must be present. It must be established that both parties have monetary obligations to each other, that both obligations are already due, that they be liquated and demandable, and that no third parties must be involved.

In the instant case, both obligations are liquidated. Millora has the obligation to pay his debt in the amount of P300,000 with interest counted from the filing of the complaint. Montemayor, on the other hand, has the obligation to pay attorney’s fees which the RTC had already determined to be equivalent to whatever amount recoverable from Millora.

CACAYORIN v. AFPMBAI

G.R. No. 171298 | 15 April 2013 Extinguishment of Obligations

DOCTRINE: Article 1256 of the Civil Code authorizes consignation alone, without need of prior tender of payment, when the creditor is unknown or when two or more persons claim the same right to collect.

FACTS:

Petitioner Cacayorin filed an application with respondent AFPMBAI to purchase a piece of property which the latter owned, through a loan facility.

Cacayorin and the Rural Bank executed a Loan and Mortgage Agreement.

The Rural Bank issued a letter of guaranty informing AFPMBAI that the proceeds of the approved loan will be released to them after AFPMBAI transfers the title of the property to Cacayorin. AFPMBAI complied.

The Rural Bank was closed and was placed under receivership by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). AFPMBAI, on the other hand, made oral and written demands for petitioners to pay the loan/consideration for the property.

Petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC for consignation of loan payment against AFPMBAI and PDIC alleging that as a result of Rural Bank’s closure and PDIC’s claim that their loan papers could not be located, they were left in a quandary as to where they should tender full payment of the loan.

AFPMBAI filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that:

o

The complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the HLURB and not the RTC since Cacayorin filed the case in his capacity as a buyer of a subdivision lot;

o

Since no prior valid tender of payment was made by Cacayorin, the consignation case was fatally defective and susceptible to dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of prior tender of payment is fatal to the consignation case

HELD: No, Article 1256 of the Civil Code authorizes consignation alone, without need of prior tender of payment, when the creditor is unknown or when two or more persons claim the same right to collect.

As can be seen from the records, two entities may possibly be the creditors of the loan: (1) the Rural Bank (through PDIC), which is the apparent creditor under the earlier Loan and Mortgage Agreement; and (2) AFPMBAI, which is currently in possession of the loan documents and the certificate of title, and the one making demands upon petitioners to pay.

Whatever transpired between PDIC and AFPMBAI in respect of Cacayorin’s loan account, if any, such that AFPMBAI came into possession of the loan documents and the TCT, it appears that Cacayorin was not informed nor made privy thereto. As such, the consignation case must proceed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests HELD: Yes, consignation is necessarily judicial, as the Civil Code
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests HELD: Yes, consignation is necessarily judicial, as the Civil Code

Justice Del Castillo Digests

HELD: Yes, consignation is necessarily judicial, as the Civil Code itself pro vides that consignation shall be made by depositing the thing or things due at the disposal of judicial authority. While tender of payment can be made in venues other than courts, consignation must be made only before the courts.

While it may be true that petitioners' claim relates to the terms and conditions of the sale of AFPMBAI's subdivision lot, this is overshadowed by the fact that since the complaint pleads a case for consignation, the HLURB is without jurisdiction to try it, as such case may only be tried by the regular courts.

ROSETE v. BRIONES

G.R. No. 176121 | 22 September 2014 Extinguishment of Obligations

DOCTRINE: Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor.

FACTS:

The NHA awarded a lot to petitioner Teodorico Rosete.

Respondents Jose and Remedios Rosete, Neorimse and Felicitas Corpuz, and Felix and Marietta Briones objected, claiming that the award of the entire lot of Teodorico was erroneous.

The property was eventually awarded to Teodorico, who subsequently made full payment of the value of the subject lot and likewise paid the real property taxes thereon.

However, the NHA later withdrew its decision and subsequently cancelled the award made in favor of Teodorico. The subject property was then subdivided among both petitioner and respondents.

The NHA informed Teodorico that his payments shall be adjusted accordingly, but that his excess payments will not be refunded; instead, they will be applied to his co- awardees’ amortizations and his co-awardees shall in turn pay him.

Teodorico now demands that his co-awardees be required to reimburse his property tax payments as failure to do so would result to unjust enrichment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rosete is entitled to reimbursement

HELD: No, the SC cannot order respondents to refund Rosete’s overpayments since the specific amount of overpayment is not fixed or determinable from the record. Also, the Court is not a trier of facts, hence, it cannot receive evidence on the matter.

Had Rosete proven the actual overpaid amounts, the Court could have ordered the reimbursement pursuant to Article 1236 of the Civil Code which states , “Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor.”

Rosete may however recover from NHA the actual recipient of the overpayment applying the principle of solution indebiti.

PSHS-CAGAYAN v. PIRRA CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES

G.R. No. 204423 | 14 September 2016 Extinguishment of Obligations

DOCTRINE: if the obligation is substantially performed in good faith, the obligor, may recover as if it had strictly and completely fulfilled its obligation, less damages suffered by the obligee.

Civil Law

FACTS:

Civil Law FACTS: Justice Del Castillo Digests • PIRRA Construction Enterprise (PIRRA) entered into construction
Civil Law FACTS: Justice Del Castillo Digests • PIRRA Construction Enterprise (PIRRA) entered into construction

Justice Del Castillo Digests

PIRRA Construction Enterprise (PIRRA) entered into construction contracts with the Philippine Science High School-Cagayan Valley Campus (PSHS) for the construction of an academic buildings, dormitories and a school canteen (Project A and Project C).

Project A

o PIRRA requested for its payment and sent a letter to PSHS requesting for substantial acceptance and completion of the Project, as the accomplishment for Project A was already 94.09%. PSHS replied without any objection, and merely stated that payment could not be made because of certain defects found on the Project pursuant to a COA report.

Project C

o

PIRRA requested the suspension of the construction of the canteen because of certain difficulties, which PSHS granted. Another request for suspension was made because of affected footings, columns, and time beams. The request was left unheeded.

o

PSHS found out that PIRRA suspended work on Project C without its approval, hence, it informed PIRRA that it was terminating the Project C contract because of the latter’s delay, default, and abandonment.

PIRRA demanded from PSHS payment for the constructions made on Project A and C.

ISSUE: Whether or not PIRRA can validly demand for the construction payment of Project A

HELD: Yes, it is provided under Article 1234 of the Civil Code that if the obligation is substantially performed in good faith, the obligor, may recover as if it had strictly and completely fulfilled its obligation, less damages suffered by the obligee.

In this case, PSHS acknowledged the substantial compliance of PIRRA on Project A. In fact, PSHS initially expressed its willingness to pay only to put it on hold because of a COA report which found the existence of defects and undelivered items. Such report , however, cannot affect PSHS’ obligation to pay because the payment was due on the performed items that were completed or were otherwise already performed, save for the d efects.

ISSUE: Whether or not PIRRA is entitled to payment despite the non-completion of Project C

HELD: Yes. Although PIRRA was guilty of delay, suspension of work without any approval from PSHS, and abandonment of the project, PSHS should still pay PIRRA for the value of the work done as it was found there had already been a 25.5% accomplishment on Project C. To deny payment thereof would result in unjust enrichment of PSHS at the expense of PIRRA.

SPOUSES CASTRO v. TAN

G.R. No. 168940 | 24 November 2009 Essential Requisites of a Contract

DOCTRINE: The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

FACTS:

Respondent Tan entered into an agreement with petitioners spouses Castro denominated as

Kasulatan ng Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay (Kasulatan) to secure a P30,000 loan.

o Under the Kasulatan, Tan undertook to pay the mortgage debt within six (6) months or until August 17, 1994, with an interest rate of 60% per annum, compounded monthly.

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Tan failed to pay the same upon maturity, hence,
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Tan failed to pay the same upon maturity, hence,

Justice Del Castillo Digests

Tan failed to pay the same upon maturity, hence, petitioners caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and emerged as t he only bidder in the auction sale that ensued.

The period of redemption expired without Tan having redeemed the property; thus, title over th e same was consolidated in favor of the Spouses Castro.

Tan, in filing a complaint against respondents, alleges that the interest rate on the principal amount of the loan is unconscionable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 60% interest rate is iniquitious and unconscionable

HELD: Yes, Article 1306 of the Civil Code allows the contracting parties to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

While parties to a loan agreement have wide latitude to stipulate on any interest rate in view of Central Bank Circular No. 905, which suspended the Usury Law ceiling on interest, it is worth stressing that interest rates whenever unconscionable may still be declared illegal.

In this case, the 60% interest rate per annum, even if knowingly and voluntarily assumed, is considered iniquitous and unconscionable. Being a void stipulation, the same is deemed inexistent from the beginning. Accordingly, the legal interest of 12% per annum must be imposed in lieu of the excessive interest rate stipulated in the agreement.

HEIRS OF MARIO PACRES v. HEIRS OF CECILIA YGOÑA

G.R. No. 174719 | 5 May 2010 Essential Requisites of a Contract

DOCTRINE: Only parties to a contract can maintain an action to enforce the obligations arising under said contract.

FACTS:

Pastor Pacres originally owned Lot 9 in Cebu which he left intestate to his heirs Margarita, Simplicia, Rodrigo, Francisco, Mario (petitioners’ predecessor -in-interest) and Veñarada (petitioner). On this lot stood the co-owned Pacres ancestral home.

Four of the Pacres siblings (Rodrigo, Francisco, Simplicia and Margarita) sold their shares in the ancestral home and its lot to Ramirez, who at that time, was leasing the ground floor thereof.

With the sale, Ramirez’s possession as lessee turned into a co -ownership with petitioners Mario and Veñarada, who did not sell their shares in the ancestral home.

Rodrigo, Francisco, Simplicia and Margarita sold their remaining shares in Lot 9 to Ygoña.

The Republic of the Philippines expropriated the front portion of Lot 9 for the expansion of the Cebu south road.

Veñaranda and Mario prayed that the expropriation payments be made to them, and consequently, they filed a complaint for specific performance against Ygoa and Ramirez.

o Petitioners alleged that an agreement was entered into by Ygoa and Ramirez with their siblings-vendees. Such agreement allegedly provided that Ygoa and Ramirez shall partition the property, and that they shall survey and title the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may demand compliance of the alleged oral agreements for the partition and additional obligations of surveying and titling

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests HELD: No, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests HELD: No, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts

Justice Del Castillo Digests

HELD: No, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs (subject to exceptions not applicable here). Thus, only a party to the contract can maintain an action to enforce the obligations arising under said contract.

Petitioners, not being parties to the contracts of sale between Ygoña and the petitioners’ siblings, cannot demand compliance from respondents for the partition and additional obligations of surveying and titling.

Petitioners cannot invoke the second paragraph of Article 1311 of the Civil Code which provides that if a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment. This refers to stipulations pour autrui or stipulation for the benefit of third parties. In the present case, the written contracts of sale contain no such stipulation in favor of the petitioners.

TOLEDO v. HYDEN

G.R. No. 172139 | 8 December 2010 Essential Requisites of a Contract

DOCTRINE: A threat to enforce ones claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Toledo obtained several loans from respondent Hyden.

Toledo had an unpaid balance, thus Jocelyn with two of her subordinates as witnesses signed a document entitled Acknowledgment of Debt.

Toledo issued five (5) checks to Hyden representing renewal payment of her five (5) previous loans.

Later, Toledo asked Hyden for the recall of one of the checks in the amount of P30,000.00 and replaced the same with six (6) checks.

After honoring three of these checks, Jocelyn ordered the stop payment on the remaining checks and filed a complaint against Hyden for Declaration of Nullity and Payment, Annulment, Sum of Money, Injunction and Damages.

o Toledo averred that Hyden forced, threatened and intimidated her into signing the Acknowledgment of Debt and at the same time forced her to issue the seven (7) postdated checks.

ISSUE: Whether or not document Acknowledgment of Debt is valid

HELD: Yes, Toledo failed to prove her claim that she was made to sign the Acknowledgment of Debt and draw the seven (7) postdated checks through force, threat and intimidation.

Even if Toledo was able to prove the existence of such threats, the same is not considered as threat that would vitiate consent. Article 1335 of the Civil Code provides that “a threat to enforce one’s claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent.

As can be seen from the records of the case, Toledo in fact signed the document in her office and in the presence of two witnesses. Furthermore, after the execution of the said document, Toledo honored the first three checks before filing the present complaint. If indeed she was forced as she claims to be, she would never have made good on the first three checks.

SWIFT FOODS, INC. v. SPOUSES MATEO

G.R. No. 170486 | 12 September 2011 Essential Requisites of a Contract

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests DOCTRINE: A contract is the law between the parties and
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests DOCTRINE: A contract is the law between the parties and

Justice Del Castillo Digests

DOCTRINE: A contract is the law between the parties and those who are guilty of negligence in the performance of their obligations are liable for damages.

FACTS:

The respondent spouses Mateo entered into a Warehousing Agreement with Buhain, Swift Food’s Sales Supervisor, regarding the lease of the former’s warehouse for the storage of Swift’s feeds products.

Swift began delivering feeds to the spouses’ warehouse. To properly document the movement of the stocks, Swift through its sales personnel, Enfestan, gave the spouses two kinds of warehouse documents that would be presented before every release of stocks: (1) the Daily Warehouse Stock Report (DWSR), and the (2) Warehouse Issue Slip (WIS).

o According to the Agreement, the WIS should contain the signature of the sales personnel as proof that the latter received the released stocks.

A few months later, Swift informed the spouses that it was terminating the contract due to violation of the Warehousing Agreement. It explained that such violations were made when stocks were released to unauthorized persons and which caused them a cash shortage of around P2 Million.

The spouses denied violating the terms of the Agreement and explained that they merely followed the instructions of Buhain and Enfestan to release the stocks directly to customers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses committed a breach o f the warehousing agreement

HELD: Yes, records show that there has been a clear breach of the terms of the Warehouse Agreement and as such, they shall be held accountable for all the stocks released by them without proper authority.

The Warehouse Agreement expressly provided that the spouses should only release stocks to Swift’s sales personnel upon presentation of the properly signed documents. However, records reveal that, contrary to this provision, the spouses released stocks without the necessary clearance.

The spouses likewise failed to exercise ordinary diligence in inquiring with the head office whether the instructions of Buhain or Enfestan were proper or authorized. Their reliance on the word of Swift’s sales personnel, contrary to the written contract, is a clear act of negligence.

MOVERTRADE CORP. v. COA and DPWH

G.R. No. 204835 | 22 September 2015 Essential Requisites of a Contract

DOCTRINE: It is a basic principle in law that contracts have the force of law between the parties and should be complied with in good faith.

FACTS:

Petitioner Movertrade and the Commission on Audit (COA) with the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) entered into a contract for dredging in Pampanga Bay.

Project Supervisor, Director Soriquez, issued two letters reminding Movertrade that side dumping is not allowed and that dredge spoils should be pumped in the provided spoil sites.

Engineer Bustos of DPWH issued another letter reiterating the prohibition of side dumping and the availability of the spoil sites.

Despite these letters, Movertrade continued to side dump.

In the final phase of completion, the president of Movertrade issued a letter asking for payment for the work rendered, and provided and explanation as to why it side dumped.

Director Soriquez denied the request for payment for the reason that the side dumping done was not authorized.

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • DPWH still paid Movertrade, however, the amount of P7,354,897.10
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • DPWH still paid Movertrade, however, the amount of P7,354,897.10

Justice Del Castillo Digests

DPWH still paid Movertrade, however, the amount of P7,354,897.10 representing the cubic meters of the dredging work rendered remained unpaid.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to payment

HELD: No, contracts have the force of law between the parties and should be complied with in good faith.

A breach occurs where the contractor inexcusably fails to perform substantially in accordance with the terms of the contract.

In this case, the contract specifically provides the manner of disposing dredge spoils. As such, Movertrade cannot unilaterally change the manner of disposal without first amending the contract or obtaining the express consent or approval of DPWH. To do otherwise would result to a breach of the contract.

Without a doubt, Movertrade's failure to dump the dredge spoils at the designated spoil sites constitutes a breach. Thus, petitioner is not entitled to its money claim for the 165,576.27 cubic meters dredging work as it was done in contravention of paragraph 11 of the Contract Agreement.

MANZANILLA v. WATERFIELDS

G.R. No. 177484 | 18 July 2014 Interpretation of Contracts

DOCTRINE: Even without proper admission, the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties reveal their intention to amend the Original Contract of Lease.

FACTS:

The Spouses Manzanilla entered into a Contract of Lease over its property with Waterfields.

The parties later amended the contract with r egard to the commencement of the lease, which they reckoned on the date of the execution of the amendment, and the undertaking of the spouses to register the agreements. All other terms and conditions in the original contract remained in full force and effect.

Waterfields failed to pay the monthly rental fee and instead sent a letter seeking to amend the Amended Contract of Lease. In the letter, Waterfields promised to pay the rentals by way of check, and promising to give an advance rental. It likewise stipulated that the rental deposit shall be used exclusively for the payment of unpaid utilities and other incidental expenses.

Waterfield still failed to pay, hence, the spouses filed a Complaint for Ejectment.

In its Answer, Waterfields claimed that it did not fail or refuse to pay the monthly rentals but was just utilizing the rental deposit (which was equivalent to one year rentals) as rental payment in accordance with the provisions of the original Contract of Lease.

The spouses, in turn, argued that the rental deposit cannot be applied as payment for the monthly rentals pursuant to the Amended Contract of Lease and the Letter-Amendment.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid amendment to the Contract of Lease

HELD: Yes, the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties reveal their intention to amend the original Contract of Lease.

Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that, “I n order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.”

The intention of Waterfields in coming up with the letter was to r epress its violation of the contract since at that time, it was already in default in the payment of rent. The spouses, in fact, agreed to the provisions of the letter, believing that it would receive payment of the advance rental. Waterfields likewise benefited from the letter since it was not ejected from the premises.

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Since the Letter-Amendment is valid, Waterfields is considered to
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • Since the Letter-Amendment is valid, Waterfields is considered to

Justice Del Castillo Digests

Since the Letter-Amendment is valid, Waterfields is considered to have defaulted in the payment of rentals.

SONLEY v. ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK

G.R. No. 205623 | 10 August 2016 Rescissible Contracts

DOCTRINE: The party aggrieved by the breach of a compromise agreement may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand as if there had never been any compromise agreement, and without bringing an action for rescission thereof.

FACTS:

Petitioner Sonley agreed to purchase a real property from r espondent Anchor Savings Bank.

o Pursuant to the Agreement, the parties entered into a Contract to Sell whereby petitioner agreed to pay a downpayment and the remaining balance will be payable on monthly installments.

Sonley defaulted in her obligation, hence, Anchor Savings Bank rescinded the contract.

Sonley filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Rescission of Contract.

The parties agreed to an amicable settlement and entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby Sonley would be given the right to repurchase the subject property, and which the latter exercised in 2010.

Anchor filed a Manifestation and Motion for Execution claiming that Sonley had not been paying the agreed monthly installments. It prayed that a writ of execution be issued in its favor ordering that the Contract to Sell be rescinded.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Compromise Agreement can be rescinded?

HELD: Yes, the language of Article 2041 of the Civil Code denotes that the party aggrieved by the breach of a compromise agreement may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need not seek a judicial declaration of rescission, for he may regard the compromise agreement already rescinded.

Under Article 2041 of the Civil Code, “if one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.”

The parties’ Compromise Agreement provides that the defendant shall have a right to rescind this

Compromise Agreement as provided under the Contract to Sell”. The Contract to Sell likewise provides that the SELLER shall be entitled, as a matter of right, to rescind this Contract upon the failure of the BUYER to pay on due date any monthly installment.”

Sonley’s failure to abide by the agreement should result in execution, cancellation and rescission of the Compromise Agreement and Contract to Sell, and her eviction from the property.

CAMPOS v. PASTRANA

G.R. No. 175994| 8 December 2009 Void and Inexistent Contracts

DOCTRINE: Contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are inexistent and void from the beginning.

FACTS:

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • This case arose from the refusal of Carlito, the
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests • This case arose from the refusal of Carlito, the

Justice Del Castillo Digests

This case arose from the refusal of Carlito, the father of herein petitioners, to surrender the possession of a fishpond he leased from respondents’ mother, Salvacion, despite the expiration of the Contract of Lease.

Respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages (Possession Case) against Carlito, in which the RTC issued a Writ of Execution which was returned unsatisfied.

When respondents were about to levy certain properties registered in the name of Carlito to satisfy the judgment in the Possession Case, they discovered that Carlito already transferred the same to their children, herein petitioners, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Respondents filed a complaint seeking to declare as null the Deeds of Sale and TCTs issued pursuant thereto (Nullity of Sale Case), and alleged that the said contracts of sale were simulated for the sole purpose of evading the levy in satisfaction of the money judgment that might be rendered in the Possession Case.

Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that the lots were acquired in good faith and for value because the properties were sold to them before they had any notice of the claims or interests of other persons thereover.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deeds of Absolute Sale were s imulated

HELD: Yes, the Deeds of Absolute Sale are simulated and were executed for the purpose of putting the lots in question beyond the reach of creditors, hence, void.

Based on the records, there were clear badges of simulation that renders the whole transaction void and without force and effect, pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code.

o

The Deeds of Absolute Sale were antedated a nd were executed when the Possession case was already pending.

o

There was a wide disparity in the alleged consideration specified in the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the actual zonal valuation of the subject properties.

o

The spouses continue to be in actual possession of the properties and their children, who are the alleged transferees of the property, have not in fact exercised complete dominion over the same. Neither have the spouses been paying rent for the use of the properties which they allegedly sold to their children.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for the declaration of the inexistence of the Deeds of Absolute Sale alrea dy prescribed

HELD: No, pursuant to Article 1410 of the Civil Code, an action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract is imprescriptible.

ISSUE: Whether or not an action for rescission is proper

HELD: No, an action to rescind is founded upon and presupposes the existence of a contract. A contract which is null and void is no contract at all and hence, could not be the subject of rescission.

SALES

TUAZON v. DEL ROSARIO-SUAREZ

G.R. No. 168325 | 8 December 2010 Nature and Form of Contract

DOCTRINE:

An option contract is a contract by which the owner of property agrees with another person that he shall have the right to buy his property at a fixed price within a certain time.

Civil Law

FACTS:

Civil Law FACTS: Justice Del Castillo Digests • Roberto and Lourdes executed a Contract of Lease
Civil Law FACTS: Justice Del Castillo Digests • Roberto and Lourdes executed a Contract of Lease

Justice Del Castillo Digests

Roberto and Lourdes executed a Contract of Lease over a parcel of land for a period of three years.

During the effectivity of the lease, Lourdes offered to sell to Roberto the subject parcel of land. She pegged the price at P37,541,000.00 and gave him t wo years to decide on the said offer.

More than four months after the expiration of the Contract of Lease, Lourdes sold subject parcel of land to her only child, her son-in-law, and her two grandsons.

The new owners notified Roberto to vacate the premises but Roberto refused.

Roberto claims that Lourdes violated his right to buy subject property under the principle of right of first refusal by not giving him notice and the opportunity to buy the property under the same terms and conditions or specifically based on the much lower price paid by the De Leons.

ISSUE: Whether or not Roberto had the right of first refusal

HELD: No, what is involved here is an option contract. An option contract is entirely different and distinct from a right of first refusal in that in the former, the option granted to the offeree is for a fixed period and at a determined price; Lacking these two essential requisites, what is involved is only a right of first refusal.

Letter of Lourdes embodies an option contract as it grants Roberto a fixed period of only two years to buy the subject property at a price certain of P37,541,000.00.

It being an option contract, the unilateral promise to buy or sell is a mere offer, which is not converted into a contract except at the moment it is accepted. Before the promise is accepted, the promissor may withdraw it at any time. Even if the promise was accepted, private respondent was not bound thereby in the absence of a distinct consideration.

In this case, it is undisputed that Roberto did not accept the terms stated in the letter of Lourdes. There is therefore no contract that was perfected between them. Roberto, thus, does not have any right to demand that the property be sold to him at the price for which it was sold to the De Leons neither does he have the right to demand that said sale to the De Leons be annulled.

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK v. ENRIQUEZ

G.R. Nos. 168646 and 168666 | 12 January 2011 Nature and Form of Contract

DOCTRINE: Contract to Sell does not transfer ownership until there is full payment of the consideration.

FACTS:

Delta Development Management Services, Inc. (Delta) is owned by Ricardo De Leon (De Leon) who owns Lot 4 of Delta Homes I.

Delta obtained a P 4 million loan from Luzon Development Bank (LDB) which is secured by a Real Estate Mortgage including Lot 4.

Delta then executed a Contract to Sell with Angeles Catherine Enriquez (Enriquez) over the house and lot in Lot 4. The Contract provides that a final deed of sale will only be issued upon full payment of the consideration.

Delta then defaulted on its loan obligation. LDB, however, agreed to a dation in payment wherein Delta would give real estate properties to LDB in payment of the total obligation. One of the properties included was Lot 4.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Contract to Sell transferred ownership to Enriquez

HELD: No, the Contract to Sell did not transfer ownership over Lot 4 to Enriquez because a contract to sell is one where the prospective seller reserves the transfer of title to the prospective buyer until the happening

Civil Law

Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests of an event, such as full payment of the purchase
Civil Law Justice Del Castillo Digests of an event, such as full payment of the purchase

Justice Del Castillo Digests

of an event, such as full payment of the purchase price. It does not, by itself, transfer ownership to the buyer.

In the instant case, there is nothing in the provisions of the contract entered into by DELTA and Enriquez that would exempt it from the general definition of a contract to sell. The terms thereof provide for the reservation of DELTAs ownership until full payment of the purchase price; such that DELTA even reserved the right to unilaterally void the contract should Enriquez fail to pay three successive monthly amortizations.

DUARTE v. DURAN

G.R. No. 173038 | 14 September 2011 Nature and Form of Contracts

DOCTRINE: A contract of sale is perfected the moment the parties agree upon the object of the sale, the price, and the terms of payment. Once perfected, the parties are bound by it whether the contract is verbal or in writing because no form is required.

FACTS:

Respondent Duran offered to sell a laptop computer to petitioner Duarte through the help of a common friend, Dy. Since Duarte was undecided, Duran left the laptop with the former for two days and later, Duarte expressed her willingness to buy the laptop on installment.

Duarte made partial payments through two installments, and which was evidenced by a handwritten receipt signed by Duarte.