An Exemplar-Retrieval Model of Short-Term Memory Search: Linking Categorization and Probe Recognition

CHAPTER TWO
An Exemplar-Retrieval Model of
Short-term Memory Search:
Linking Categorization and
Probe Recognition
Robert M. Nosofsky
Indiana University Bloomington, Bloomington, IN, United States
E-mail: nosofsky@indiana.edu
Contents
1. Introduction and Background 48
1.1 Introduction 48
1.2 Background 49
2. The “Core” Version of the Formal Model 50
3. Short-term Probe Recognition in a Continuous-Dimension Similarity Space 54
4. Short-term Probe Recognition of Discrete Stimuli 58
5. A Power Law of Memory Strength 62
6. Bridging Short-term and Long-term Probe Recognition and Incorporating the Role 64
of Previous Memory Sets
6.1 Review of Empirical Findings 64
6.2 The Extended EBRW Model: Conceptual Description 67
6.3 The Extended EBRW Model: Formal Description 71
6.4 Modeling Application 74
7. Evidence for a Joint Role of Categorization and Familiarity Processes 76
8. Summary and Conclusions 80
Acknowledgments 82
References 82
Abstract
Exemplar-retrieval models such as the exemplar-based random walk (EBRW) model
have provided good accounts of response time (RT) and choice-probability data in a
wide variety of categorization paradigms. In this chapter, I review recent work showing
that the model also accounts accurately for RT and choice-probability data in a wide
variety of probe-recognition, short-term, memory-search paradigms. According to
the model, observers store items from study lists as individual exemplars in memory.
When a test probe is presented, it causes the exemplars to be retrieved. The exemplars
that are most readily retrieved are those that are highly similar to the test probe and
Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Volume 65
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ISSN 0079-7421
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48 Robert M. Nosofsky
that have the greatest memory strengths. The retrieved exemplars drive a familiarity-
based evidence-accumulation process that determines the speed and accuracy of
oldenew recognition decisions. The model accounts for effects of memory-set size,
old-new status of test probe, and study-test lag; effects of the detailed similarity
structure of the memory set; and the role of the history of previously experienced mem-
ory sets on performance. Applications of the model reveal a quantitative law of how
memory strength varies with the retention interval. In addition, the model provides a
unified account of how probe recognition operates in cases involving short and
long study lists. Furthermore it provides an account of the classic distinction between
controlled versus automatic processing depending on the types of memory-search
practice in which observers engage. In short the model brings together and extends
prior research and theory on categorization, attention and automaticity, short- and
long-term memory, and evidence-accumulation models of choice RT to move the field
closer to a unified account of diverse forms of memory search.
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction
A fundamental issue in cognitive science concerns the mental repre-
sentations and processes that underlie memory search and retrieval. A major
approach to investigating the nature of memory search is to measure both
accuracies and response times (RTs) in tasks of probe recognition. In such
tasks, observers are presented with a list of to-be-remembered items (the
“memory set”) followed by a test probe. The task is judge, as rapidly as
possible while minimizing errors, whether the test probe is “old” (a member
of the memory set) or “new.”
In this chapter, I provide a review of recent and ongoing work in which I
have applied an extension of an exemplar-retrieval model of categorization
(Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997) to account for probe-recognition memory
search (Nosofsky, Cox, Cao, & Shiffrin, 2014; Nosofsky, Little, Donkin,
& Fific, 2011). As I will describe, the model builds upon and extends classic
theories in the domains of categorization and memory and ties them
together with evidence-accumulation models of decision making. I will
argue that the model provides a coherent account of a highly diverse set
of memory-search results, moving the field in the direction of a unified
account of categorization and probe recognition.
To anticipate, I will provide evidence showing that the model accounts
for the following: (1) classic effects of memory-set size, oldenew status of
the probe, and study-test lag on recognition RTs and accuracies; (2) effects
Memory Search 49
of the detailed similarity structure of the list of to-be-remembered items; and

(3) the role of the history of previous memory sets on judgments involving
the present set. Furthermore applications of the model will reveal an
intriguing quantitative “law” of how memory strength varies with the
recency with which study items were presented. The model will also allow
for a unified account of how probe recognition operates in cases involving
both short and long lists. In addition the model will provide accounts of the
basis for the classic distinction between “controlled” versus “automatic”
processing depending on the types of memory-search practice in which
observers engage (eg, Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
1.2 Background
In the seminal “memory-scanning” paradigm introduced by Sternberg
(1966, 1969), observers maintain short lists of items in memory and are
then presented with a test probe. The observers’ task is to classify the probe
as “old” or “new” as rapidly as possible while minimizing errors. Under
Sternberg’s conditions of testing, the result was that mean RTs for both
old and new probes were linearly increasing functions of the size of the
memory set. Furthermore the RT functions for the old and new probes
were parallel to one another. These results led Sternberg to formulate his
classic serial-exhaustive model of memory search. Since that time, a wide
variety of other information-processing models have also been developed
to account for performance in the task (for reviews and analysis, see
Reed, 1973 and Townsend & Ashby, 1983).
One modern formal model of short-term probe recognition is the exem-
plar-based random walk (EBRW) model (Nosofsky et al., 2011). According
to this model, short-term probe recognition is governed by the same
principles of global familiarity and exemplar-based similarity that are theo-
rized to underlie long-term recognition and forms of categorization (Clark
& Gronlund, 1996; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Hintzman, 1988; Kahana &
Sekuler, 2002; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Murdock, 1985; Nosofsky, 1986,
1991; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997). The model
assumes that each item of a memory set is stored as an individual exemplar
in memory. When a test probe is presented, it causes the individual exem-
plars to be retrieved. The exemplars that are most readily retrieved are those
that are highly similar to the test probe and that have the greatest memory
strengths. The retrieved exemplars drive a familiarity-based evidence-
accumulation process that determines the speed and the accuracy of olde
new recognition decisions.
I start this chapter by providing a formal statement of a core version of

the model. The core version adopts the simplifying assumption that the
observer’s performance depends only on the current memory set being
tested, without influence from previous sets. Later in the chapter, I present
an extended version of the model in which I attempt to capture how the
observer’s experience with previous memory sets influences performance
on the current set.
2. THE “CORE” VERSION OF THE FORMAL MODEL

A schematic illustration of the workings of the EBRW model as applied
to probe recognition is presented in Fig. 1. The model assumes that each item
of a study list is stored as a unique exemplar in memory. The exemplars are
represented as points in a multidimensional psychological space. In the
baseline model, the distance between exemplars i and j is given by,
" #1
X
K r r
dij ¼ wk xik xjk ; (1)
k¼1
Figure 1 Schematic illustration of the workings of the exemplar-based random walk

model as applied to the probe-recognition paradigm. (A) Old exemplars (O) are
activated in proportion to their memory strength (which is a function solely of lag)
and their similarity to the test probe. (B) The old exemplars (O) and criterion elements
(C) race to be retrieved with rates that depend on their activations. In an extended
model, long-term memory traces (LTM) are also retrieved. (C) The retrieved exemplars,
criterion elements, and LTM traces drive a random walk process for making oldenew
recognition decisions. Each time that an old exemplar is retrieved, the random walk
steps toward the OLD threshold; each time that a criterion element is retrieved, the
random walk steps toward the NEW threshold; the retrieval of LTM traces can move
the random walk in both directions (see text for details).
Memory Search 51
where xik is the value of exemplar i on psychological dimension k; K is the

number of dimensions thatP define the space; r defines the distance metric of
the space; and wk (0 < wk, wk ¼ 1) is the weight given to dimension k in
computing distance. In situations involving the recognition of holistic or
integral-dimension stimuli (Garner, 1974), which will be the main focus of
the present work, r is set equal to 2, which yields the familiar Euclidean
distance metric. The dimension weights, wk, are free parameters that reflect
the degree of “attention” that subjects give to each dimension in making
their recognition judgments. In situations in which some dimensions are
more relevant than others in allowing subjects to discriminate between old
versus new items, the attentioneweight parameters may play a significant
role (eg, Nosofsky, 1991). In the experimental situations considered in the
present work, however, all dimensions tend to be relevant and the attention
weights will turn out to play a minor role.
The similarity of test item i to exemplar j is an exponentially decreasing
function of their psychological distance (Shepard, 1987),

sij ¼ exp cj dij ; (2)
where cj is the sensitivity associated with exemplar j. The sensitivity governs
the rate at which similarity declines with distance in the space. When
sensitivity is high, the similarity gradient is steep, so even objects that are
close together in the space may be highly discriminable. By contrast, when
sensitivity is low, the similarity gradient is shallow, and objects are hard to
discriminate. In most previous tests of the EBRW model, a single global
level of sensitivity was assumed that applied to all exemplar traces stored in
long-term memory. In application to the present short-term recognition
paradigms, however, allowance is made for forms of exemplar-specific
sensitivity. For example, in situations involving high-similarity stimuli, an
observer’s ability to discriminate between test item i and exemplar-trace j
will almost certainly depend on the recency with which exemplar j was
presented: Discrimination is presumably much easier if an exemplar was just
presented, rather than if it was presented earlier on the study list (due to
factors such as interference and decay).
Each exemplar j from the memory set is stored in memory with
memory strength mj. As is the case for the sensitivities, the memory strengths
are exemplar specific (with the detailed assumptions stated later). Almost
certainly, for example, exemplars presented more recently will have greater
strengths.
When applied to oldenew recognition, the EBRW model presumes
that abstract elements termed criterion elements are part of the cognitive
processing system. The strength of the criterion elements, which we

hypothesize is at least partially under the control of the observer, helps
guide the decision about whether to respond “old” or “new.” In particular,
as will be explained below, the strength setting of the criterion elements
influences the direction and rate of drift of the EBRW process. Other
well-known sequential-sampling models include analogous criterion-
related parameters for generating drift rates, although the conceptual
underpinnings of the models are different from those in the EBRW model
(eg, Ratcliff, 1985, pp. 215e216; Ratcliff, Van Zandt, & McKoon, 1999,
p. 289).
Presentation of a test item causes the old exemplars and the criterion
elements to be activated. The degree of activation for exemplar j, given
presentation of test item i, is given by
aij ¼ mj sij : (3)
Thus the exemplars that are most strongly activated are those with high
memory strengths and that are highly similar to test item i. The degree of
activation of the criterion elements (C) is independent of the test item
that is presented. Instead criterion-element activation functions as a fixed
standard against which exemplar-based activation can be evaluated. As dis-
cussed later in this chapter, however, criterion-element activation may be
influenced by factors such as the size and structure of the memory set,
because observers may adjust their criterion settings when such factors are
varied.
Upon presentation of the test item, the activated stored exemplars and
criterion elements race to be retrieved (Logan, 1988). The greater the degree
of activation, the faster the rate at which the individual races take place. On
each step, the exemplar (or criterion element) that wins the race is retrieved.
Whereas in Logan’s (1988) model, the response is based on only the first
retrieved exemplar, in the EBRW model the retrieved exemplars drive a
random-walk process. First, there is a random-walk counter with initial
setting zero. The observer establishes response thresholds, Rold and Rnew,
that determine the amount of evidence needed for making each decision.
On each step of the process, if an old exemplar is retrieved, then the
random-walk counter is incremented by unit value toward the Rold
threshold; whereas if a criterion element is retrieved, the counter is decre-
mented by unit value toward the Rnew threshold. If either threshold is
reached, then the appropriate recognition response is made. Otherwise a
new race is initiated, another exemplar or criterion element is retrieved
Memory Search 53
(possibly the same one as on the previous step) and the process continues.
The recognition decision time is determined by the total number of steps
required to complete the random walk. It should be noted that the concept
of a “criterion” appears in two different locations in the model. First, as
explained above, the strength setting of the criterion elements influences
the direction and rate of drift of the random walk. Second, the magnitude
of the Rold and Rnew thresholds determine how much evidence is needed
before an old or a new response is made. Again other well-known sequen-
tial-sampling models include analogous criterion-related parameters at these
same two locations (for extensive discussion, see, eg, Ratcliff, 1985).
Given the detailed assumptions in the EBRW model regarding the race
process (see Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997, p. 268), it turns out that, on each
step of the random walk, the probability (p) that the counter is incremented
toward the Rold threshold is given by
pi ¼ Ai =ðAi þ CÞ; (4)
where Ai is the summed activation of all of the old exemplars (given pre-
sentation of item i), and C is the summed activation of the criterion
elements. (The probability that the random walk steps toward the Rnew
threshold is given by qi ¼ 1pi.) In general, therefore, test items that match
recently presented exemplars (with high memory strengths) will cause high
exemplar-based activations, leading the random walk to march quickly to
the Rold threshold and resulting in fast OLD RTs. By contrast, test items that
are highly dissimilar to the memory-set items will not activate the stored
exemplars, so only criterion elements will be retrieved. In this case, the
random walk will march quickly to the Rnew threshold, leading to fast NEW
RTs. Through experience in the task, the observer is presumed to learn an
appropriate setting of criterion-element activation (C) such that summed
activation (Ai) tends to exceed C when the test probe is old, but tends to be
less than C when the test probe is new. In this way, the random walk will
tend to drift to the appropriate response thresholds for old versus new lists. In
most applications, for simplicity, I assume the criterion-element activation is
linearly related to memory set size. (Because summed activation of exem-
plars, Ai, tends to increase with memory-set size, the observer needs to adopt
a stricter criterion as memory-set size increases.)
Given these processing assumptions and the computed values of pi (Eq.
(4)), it is then straightforward to derive analytic predictions of recognition
choice probabilities and mean RTs for any given test probe and memory
set. The relevant equations are summarized by Nosofsky and Palmeri
(1997, pp. 269e270, 291e292). Simulation methods are used when the
model is applied to predict fine-grained RT distribution data.
In sum having outlined the general form of the model, I now review spe-
cific applications of the model to predicting RTs and accuracies in different
variants of the short-term probe-recognition paradigm.
3. SHORT-TERM PROBE RECOGNITION IN A

CONTINUOUS-DIMENSION SIMILARITY SPACE
In Nosofsky et al.’s (2011) initial experiment for testing the model,
the stimuli were a set of 27 Munsell colors that varied along the dimensions
of hue, brightness, and saturation. Similarity-scaling procedures were used
to derive a precise multidimensional-scaling (MDS) solution for the colors
(Shepard, 1980). The MDS solution provides the xik coordinate values for
the exemplars (Eq. (1)) and is used in combination with the EBRW model
to predict the results from the probe-recognition experiment (cf.
Nosofsky, 1992).
The design of the experiment involved a broad sampling of different list
structures to provide a comprehensive test of the model. There were 360
lists in total. The size of the memory set on each trial was one, two, three,
or four items, with an equal number of lists at each set size. For each set size,
half the test probes were old and half were new. In the case of old probes,
the matching item from the memory set occupied each serial position
equally often. To create the lists, items were randomly sampled from the
full set of stimuli, subject to the constraints described above. Thus a highly
diverse set of lists was constructed, varying not only in set size, old/new
status of the probe, and serial position of old probes, but also in the simi-
larity structure of the lists.
Because the goal was to predict performance at the individual-subject
level, three subjects were each tested for approximately 20 1-h sessions,
with each of the 360 lists presented once per session. As it turned out,
each subject showed extremely similar patterns of performance, and the
fits of the EBRW model yielded similar parameter estimates for the three
subjects. Therefore, for simplicity, and to reduce noise in the data, I report
the results from the analysis of the averaged subject data.
In the top panels of Fig. 2, I report summary results from the experiment.
The top-right panel reports the observed correct mean RTs plotted as a
function of (1) set size, (2) whether the probe was old or new (ie, a lure),
and (3) the lag with which old probes appeared in the memory set. (Lag is
Memory Search 55
Figure 2 Summary data from the short-term memory experiment of Nosofsky et al.
(2011). (Top) Observed error rates and mean response times (RTs). (Bottom) Predictions
from the exemplar-based random walk model. Reprinted from Nosofsky, R.M., Little, D.R.,
Donkin, C., & Fific, M. (2011). Short-term memory scanning viewed as exemplar-based
categorization. Psychological Review, 188, 288. Copyright 2011 by APA. Reprinted with
permission.
counted backward from the end of the list.) For old probes, there was a big
effect of lag: In general, the more recently a probe appeared on the study list,
the shorter was the mean RT. Indeed once one takes lag into account, there
is little remaining effect of set size on the RTs for the old probes. That is, as
can be seen, the different set size functions are nearly overlapping (cf.
McElree & Dosher, 1989; Monsell, 1978). The main exception is a persis-
tent primacy effect, in which the mean RT for the item at the longest lag
for each set size is “pulled down.” (The item at the longest lag occupies
the first serial position of the list.) By contrast, for the lures, there is a big
effect of set size, with longer mean RTs as set size increases. The mean
proportions of errors for the different types of lists, shown in the top-left
panel of Fig. 2, mirror the mean RT data just described.
The goal of the EBRW modeling, however, was not simply to account
for these summary trends. Instead, the goal was to predict the choice prob-
abilities and mean RTs observed for each of the individual lists. Because
there were 360 unique lists in the experiment, this goal entailed simulta-
neously predicting 360 choice probabilities and 360 mean RTs. The results
of that model-fitting goal are shown in the top and bottom panels of Fig. 3.
The top panel plots, for each individual list, the observed probability that the
subjects judged the probe to be “old” against the predicted probability from
the model. The bottom panel does the same for the mean RTs. Although
there are a few outliers in the plots, overall the model achieves a good fit
to both data sets, accounting for 96.5% of the variance in the choice prob-
abilities and for 83.4% of the variance in the mean RTs.
The summary-trend predictions that result from these global fits are
shown in the bottom panels of Fig. 2. It is evident from inspection that
the EBRW does a good job of capturing these summary results. For the
old probes, it predicts the big effect of lag on the mean RTs and the nearly
overlapping set-size functions. Likewise it predicts with good quantitative
accuracy the big effect of set size on the lure RTs. The error-proportion
data (left panels of Fig. 2) are generally also well predicted.
The explanation of these results in terms of the EBRW model is straight-
forward. According to the best-fitting parameters from the model (see
Nosofsky et al., 2011), more recently presented exemplars had greater mem-
ory strengths and sensitivities than did less recently presented exemplars.
From a psychological perspective, this pattern seems highly plausible. For
example, presumably, the more recently an exemplar was presented, the
greater should be its strength in memory. Thus if an old test probe matches
the recently presented exemplar, it will give rise to greater overall activation,
leading to shorter mean old RTs. In the case of a lure, as set size increases, the
overall summed activation yielded by the lure will also tend to increase. This
pattern arises both because a greater number of exemplars will contribute to
the sum, and because the greater the set size, the higher is the probability that
it at least one exemplar from the memory set will be highly similar to the
lure. As summed activation yielded by the lures increases, the probability
that the random walk takes correct steps toward the Rnew threshold decreases,
and so mean RTs for the lures get longer.
Beyond accounting well for these summary trends, inspection of the
detailed scatterplots in Fig. 3 reveals that the model accounts for fine-grained
changes in choice probabilities and mean RTs depending on the fine-
grained similarity structure of the lists. For example, consider the choice-
probability plot (Fig. 3, top panel) and the Lure-Size-4 items (open
diamonds). Whereas performance for those items is summarized by a single
point on the summary-trend figure (Fig. 2), the full scatterplot reveals
Memory Search 57
Figure 3 Scatterplots of observed and exemplar-based random walkepredicted choice

probabilities and mean response times (RTs) associated with individual lists from the
short-term memory experiment of Nosofsky et al. (2011). Reprinted from Nosofsky,
R.M., Little, D.R., Donkin, C., & Fific, M. (2011). Short-term memory scanning viewed as
exemplar-based categorization. Psychological Review, 188, 286e287. Copyright 2011 by
APA. Reprinted with permission.
extreme variability in results across different tokens of the Lure-Size-4 lists.

In some cases the false-alarm rates associated with these lists are very low, in
other cases moderate, and in still other cases the false-alarm rates exceed the
hit rates associated with old lists. The EBRW captures well this variability in
false-alarm rates. In some cases, the lure might not be similar to any of the
memory-set items, resulting in a low false-alarm rate; whereas in other cases
the lure might be highly similar to some of the memory-set items, resulting
in a high false-alarm rate.
4. SHORT-TERM PROBE RECOGNITION OF DISCRETE

STIMULI
The application in the previous section involved short-term probe
recognition in a continuous-dimension similarity space. A natural question,
however, is how the EBRW model might fare in a more standard version of
the paradigm, in which discrete alphanumeric characters are used. To the
extent that things work out in a simple, natural fashion, the applications
of the EBRW model to the standard paradigm should be essentially the
same as in the just-presented application, except they would involve a highly
simplified model of similarity. That is, instead of incorporating detailed
assumptions about similarity relations in a continuous multidimensional
space, we apply a simplified version of the EBRW that is appropriate for
highly discriminable, discrete stimuli.
Specifically, in the simplified model, I assume that the similarity be-
tween an item and itself is equal to one; whereas the similarity between
two distinct items is equal to a free parameter s (0 < s < 1). Presumably
the best-fitting value of s will be small, because the discrete alphanumeric
characters used in the standard paradigm are not highly confusable with
one another. Note that the simplified model makes no use of the dimen-
sional attentioneweight parameters or the lag-dependent sensitivity param-
eters. All other aspects of the model were the same, so we estimated the
lag-dependent memory strengths, random walk thresholds, and criterion-
element parameters.
Here I illustrate an application of the simplified EBRW model to a well-
known data set collected by Monsell (1978; Experiment 1, immediate con-
dition). In brief, Monsell (1978) tested eight subjects for an extended period
in the probe-recognition paradigm, using visually presented consonants as
stimuli. The design was basically the same as the one described in the
previous section of this chapter, except that the similarity structure of the lists
Memory Search 59
was not varied. A key aspect of Monsell’s procedure was that individual
stimulus presentations were fairly rapid, and the test probe was presented
either immediately or with brief delay. Critically the purpose of this proce-
dure was to discourage subjects from rehearsing the individual consonants of
the memory set. If rehearsal takes place, then the psychological recency of
the individual memory-set items is unknown, because it will vary depending
on each subject’s rehearsal strategy. By discouraging rehearsal, the psycho-
logical recency of each memory set item should be a systematic function
of its lag. (Another important aspect of Monsell’s design, which I consider
later in this review, is that he varied whether or not lures were presented
on recent lists. The present applications are to data that are collapsed across
this variable.)
The mean RTs and error rates observed by Monsell (1978) in the imme-
diate condition are reproduced in the top panel of Fig. 4. (The results
obtained in the brief-delay condition showed a similar pattern.) Inspection
of Monsell’s RT data reveals a pattern that is very similar to the one we
observed in the previous section after averaging across the individual tokens
of the main types of lists (ie, compare to the observed-RT panel of Fig. 2). In
particular, the mean old RTs vary systematically as a function of lag, with
shorter RTs associated with more recently presented probes. Once lag is
taken into account, there is little if any remaining influence of memory-
set size on old-item RTs. For new items, however, there is a big effect of
memory-set size on mean RT, with longer RTs associated with larger set
sizes. Because of the nonconfusable nature of the consonant stimuli, error
rates are very low; however, what errors there are tend to mirror the
RTs. Another perspective on the observed data is provided in Fig. 5, which
plots mean RTs for old and new items as a function of memory-set size, with
the old RTs averaged across the differing lags. This plot shows roughly linear
increases in mean RTs as a function of memory-set size, with the positive
and negative functions being roughly parallel to one another. (The main
exception to that overall pattern is the fast mean RT associated with positive
probes to 1-item lists.) This overall pattern shown in Fig. 5 is, of course,
extremely commonly observed in the probe-recognition memory-scanning
paradigm.
Nosofsky et al. (2011) fitted the EBRW model to the Fig. 4 data by using
a weighted least-squares criterion (see the original article for details). The
predicted mean RTs and error probabilities from the model are shown
graphically in the bottom panel of Fig. 4. Comparison of the top and bottom
panels of the figure reveals that the EBRW model does an excellent job of
Figure 4 Observed (top panel) and exemplar-based random walkepredicted data

(bottom panel) for Monsell (1978, Experiment 1). Mean response times (RTs) and error
rates plotted as a function of lag, memory-set size, and type of probe. Observed data
are estimates from Monsell’s (1978) Figs. 3 and 4. Reprinted from Nosofsky, R.M., Little,
D.R., Donkin, C., & Fific, M. (2011). Short-term memory scanning viewed as exemplar-based
categorization. Psychological Review, 188, 290. Copyright 2011 by APA. Reprinted with
permission.
capturing the performance patterns in Monsell’s (1978) study. Mean RTs for
old patterns get systematically longer with increasing lag, and there is little
further effect of memory-set size once lag is taken into account. Mean
RTs for lures are predicted correctly to get longer with increases in mem-
ory-set size. (The model is also in the right ballpark for the error proportions,
although in most conditions the errors are near floor.) Fig. 5 shows the
EBRW model’s predictions of mean RTs for both old and new probes as
Memory Search 61
Figure 5 Observed and exemplar-based random walkepredicted set size functions,

averaged across different lags, for Monsell (1978, Experiment 1). Observed data are
based on estimates from Monsell’s (1978) Figs. 3 and 4. Reprinted from Nosofsky,
R.M., Little, D.R., Donkin, C., & Fific, M. (2011). Short-term memory scanning viewed as
exemplar-based categorization. Psychological Review, 188, 291. Copyright 2011 by APA.
Reprinted with permission.
a function of memory-set size (averaged across differing lags), and the model
captures the data from this perspective as well. Beyond accounting for the
major qualitative trends in performance, the EBRW model provides an
excellent quantitative fit to the complete set of data.
The best-fitting parameters from the model (see Nosofsky et al., 2011)
were highly systematic and easy to interpret. As expected, the memory-
strength parameters decreased systematically with lag, reproducing the
pattern seen in the fits to the data from the previous section. The best-fitting
value of the similarityemismatch parameter (s ¼ 0.050) reflected the low
confusability of the consonant stimuli from Monsell’s experiment. The con-
ceptual explanation of the model’s predictions is essentially the same as
already provided in the previous section.
In sum, without embellishment, the EBRW model appears to provide a
natural account of the major patterns of performance in the standard version
of the probe-recognition paradigm in which discrete alphanumeric charac-
ters are used, at least in cases in which the procedure discourages rehearsal
and where item recency exerts a major impact. In addition, I should note
that although the present chapter focuses on predictions and results at the
level of mean RTs, the exemplar model has also been shown to provide suc-
cessful quantitative accounts of probe-recognition performance at the level
of complete RT distributions. Examples of such applications are provided by
Nosofsky et al. (2011), Donkin and Nosofsky (2012b), and Nosofsky, Cao,
Cox, and Shiffrin (2014).
5. A POWER LAW OF MEMORY STRENGTH

Applications of the EBRW model to the probe-recognition paradigm
have led to the discovery of an interesting regularity involving memory
strength. As described in the previous sections, in the initial tests of the
model, separate memory strength parameters were estimated corresponding
to each individual lag on the study list. It turns out, however, that the esti-
mated memory strengths follow almost a perfect power function of this lag.
The power-function relation has been observed in both studies reviewed
in the previous sections, but is brought out in most convincing fashion in an
experiment reported by Donkin and Nosofsky (2012a). In this experiment,
participants studied 12-item lists consisting of either letters or words,
followed by a test probe. Separate RT-distribution data for hits and misses
for positive probes were collected at each study lag. (RT-distribution data
for false alarms and correct rejections for negative probes were collected as
well.) In line with the results reported in the previous sections, mean RTs
and error probabilities increased in regular fashion with increases in study
lag (for detailed plots, see Donkin & Nosofsky, 2012a, Figs. 1e3). The
EBRW model provided an excellent quantitative account of the complete
sets of detailed RT-distribution and choice-probability data. (More pre-
cisely, in fitting the RT-distribution data, Donkin and Nosofsky (2012a)
adopted the linear-ballistic accumulator approach of Brown and Heathcote
(2008) rather than a random-walk framework. The main conclusions did
not depend on the particular type of evidence-accumulation model that
was assumed.)
The discovery that resulted from the application of the model is illus-
trated graphically in Fig. 6. The figure plots, for each of four individual par-
ticipants who were tested, the estimated memory-strength parameters
against lag. As shown in the figure, the magnitudes of the memory strengths
are extremely well captured by a simple power function. Indeed, a special
case of the model that imposed a power-function relation on the memory
strengths provided a more parsimonious fit to the data than did the full
version of the model that allowed all individual memory-strength parame-
ters to vary freely (for detailed analyses, see Donkin & Nosofsky, 2012a).
Furthermore a variety of alternative quantitative functions, including
Memory Search 63
1.0 1.0
Participant 1 Participant 3
0.8 0.8
0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4
0.2 0.2
0.0 0.0
Memory Strength
1 3 5 7 9 1 3 5 7 9
1.0 1.0
Participant 2 Participant 4
0.8 0.8
0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4
0.2 0.2
0.0 0.0
1 3 5 7 9 1 3 5 7 9
Lag Lag
Figure 6 Model-based results from the probe-recognition experiment of Donkin and
Nosofsky (2012a). Estimated memory strengths (open circles) are plotted as a function
of lag, along with the best-fitting power functions. Reprinted from Donkin, C., & Nosofsky,
R.M., (2012). A Power-law model of psychological memory strength in short- and long-term
recognition. Psychological Science, 23, 625e634. Copyright 2012 by Sage. Reprinted with
permission.
exponential, hyperbolic, linear, and logarithmic functions, failed to provide

an adequate account of the data.
Interestingly, other researchers have previously reported that a variety of
empirical forgetting curves are well described as power functions (eg,
Anderson & Schooler, 1991; Wickelgren, 1974; Wixted & Ebbesen,
1991). For example, Wixted and Ebbesen (1991) reported that diverse mea-
sures of forgetting, including proportion correct of free recall of word lists,
recognition judgments of faces, and savings in relearning lists of nonsense
syllables, were well described as power functions of the retention interval.
Wixted (2004) considered a variety of possible reasons for the emergence
of these empirical power-function relations and concluded that the best
explanation was that the strength of the memory traces themselves may
exhibit power-function decay. The model-based results from Donkin and

Nosofsky (2012a) lend support to Wixted’s suggestion and now motivate
the new research goal of unpacking the detailed psychological and neuro-
logical mechanisms that give rise to this discovered power law of memory
strength.
6. BRIDGING SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM PROBE

RECOGNITION AND INCORPORATING THE ROLE OF
PREVIOUS MEMORY SETS
6.1 Review of Empirical Findings
The hypotheses that global familiarity and exemplar-based similarity
govern long-term recognition and categorization have been central ones
in the field of cognitive psychology for decades (eg, Gillund & Shiffrin,
1984; Hintzman, 1986, 1988; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986).
The idea that those very same principles may underlie short-term probe
recognition is less-widely held; however, as just reviewed in the previous
sections of this chapter, evidence in favor of that hypothesis has been
mounting in recent years (eg, Donkin & Nosofsky, 2012a, 2012b; Nosofsky
et al., 2011; see also Kahana & Sekuler, 2002). More rigorous support for the
idea would arise, however, if one could show that an exemplar-familiarity
model accounted parsimoniously for probe recognition involving both short
and long lists within the same experimental paradigm. Nosofsky, Cox, et al.
(2014) pursued that aim by further testing the EBRW model in a memory-
search paradigm in which memory-set size took on values 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16
across trials.
This aim of bridging short-term and long-term probe recognition with
the EBRW model was a timely one, given intriguing results reported
recently by Wolfe (2012). Following some of the early hybrid memory
and visual search paradigms of Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and Shiffrin
and Schneider (1977), Wolfe conducted experiments in which observers
maintained lists of items in memory, and then searched through visual arrays
to locate whether a member of the memory set was present. Extending
Shiffrin and Schneider’s investigations, however, Wolfe tested not only
memory sets that included a small number of items, but ones that contained
8 or 16 items (and, in an extended paradigm, 100 items). Under his condi-
tions of testing, he found that mean RTs were extremely well described as a
logarithmic function of memory-set size. In a related earlier investigation,
Burrows and Okada (1975) examined memory search performance in cases
Memory Search 65
involving memory sets composed of 2 through 20 items. Mean RT was well

described as either a logarithmic or bilinear function of memory-set size.
One of Nosofsky, Cox, et al.’s (2014) goals was to explore the hypothesis
that the principles of exemplar-based retrieval and global familiarity formal-
ized within the EBRW model might provide an account of the curvilinear
relation between mean RT and set size observed in probe-recognition
paradigms that include longer list lengths.
A second major goal of Nosofsky, Cox, et al.’s (2014) study was to inves-
tigate from a model-based perspective how relations between targets and
foils across trials influence the process of probe recognition. Thus we exam-
ined how relations between previously experienced memory sets and
current sets impact performance. As I briefly review below, this issue is a
classic one in the cognitive psychology of memory and attention, with
some of the most famous results in the field aimed at understanding the issue
(Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). As will be seen, the
current modeling involving the EBRW model sheds new light on how the
history of experience with previous memory sets impacts performance on
current sets.
Nosofsky, Cox, et al. (2014) tested subjects in three conditions.
Following the language from Shiffrin and Schneider (1977), in the “var-
ied-mapping” (VM) condition, items that served as positive probes (old
targets) on some trials might serve as negative probes (foils) on other trials,
and vice versa. In the “consistent-mapping” (CM) condition, one set of
items always served as positive probes, and a second set always served as
negative probes. Finally in an “all-new” (AN) condition, on each trial, a
completely new set of items formed the memory set (see also Banks &
Atkinson, 1974). The VM condition places the greatest demands on the
current list context by forcing the observer to discriminate whether a given
item occurred on the current list rather than previous ones. The AN condi-
tion requires the observer to remember the current list, but requires less-
contextual discrimination than VM because no target or foil had been
presented on earlier lists. The CM condition allows (but does not require)
the observer to rely solely on long-term memory and to ignore the
current-list context.
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) demon-
strated dramatic differences in patterns of performance across VM and CM
conditions in their hybrid memory-visual search paradigms. VM conditions
showed the usual pattern that performance depended on memory-set size,
and this pattern remained as practice continued. However, in CM
conditions performance tended to become invariant with set size as practice

continued. As reviewed below, Nosofsky, Cox, et al. (2014) observed
similar patterns in their study (with AN performance intermediate between
CM and VM).
The contrasting patterns of performance across VM and CM conditions
in visual/memory search is among the most fundamental empirical results
reported in the field of cognitive psychology, and provides valuable infor-
mation concerning how different forms of practice and experience influence
controlled versus automatic human information processing. Yet, although
Shiffrin and Schneider provided a conceptual theoretical account of the per-
formance patterns in their VM and CM conditions, they did not develop a
formal quantitative model. Nosofsky, Cox, et al.’s (2014) aim was to begin
to make headway toward developing a unified formal-modeling account of
memory-search performance across VM, CM, and AN conditions. As will
be developed below, a successful model would bring together prior research
and theory on attention and automatism, visual and memory search, short-
and long-term memory retrieval, and categorization.
In the experiment reported by Nosofsky, Cox, et al. (2014), there were
50 subjects in each of the VM, CM, and AN conditions. The stimuli were
2400 unique object images used in the long-term memory study of Brady,
Konkle, Alvarez, and Oliva (2008). In the AN condition, a new set of stimuli
was randomly sampled from the complete set of 2400 images on each indi-
vidual trial. No stimulus was used more than once in the experiment (unless
it was an old test probe for the current list). In both the VM and CM con-
ditions, for each individual subject, a set of 32 stimuli was randomly sampled
from the 2400 images and served as that subject’s stimulus set for the entire
experiment. In the VM condition, on each trial, the memory set was
randomly sampled from those 32 stimuli. If the test probe was a foil, it
was randomly sampled from the remaining members of the 32-stimulus
set. In the CM condition, for each individual subject, 16 stimuli were
randomly sampled that served as the positive set, and the remaining 16 stim-
uli served as the negative set. On each trial, the memory set was randomly
sampled from the positive set. If the test probe was a foil, it was randomly
sampled from the negative set.
The memory-set sizes were 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16. The size of the memory
set was chosen randomly on each individual trial. The status of the test
probe (old or new) was chosen randomly on each individual trial. If the
test probe was old, its serial position on the study list was chosen randomly
on each trial. Each subject participated for 5 blocks of 25 trials each. Further
Memory Search 67
details regarding the procedure are provided by Nosofsky, Cox, et al.

(2014).
The mean correct RTs are displayed as a function of conditions (VM,
AN, CM), set size, and probe type (old vs new) in Fig. 7 (top panel). [For
ease of presentation and viewing, the figure does not display mean RTs
for new probes at set size 1. Evidence reported by Nosofsky, Cox, et al.
(2014) suggested strongly that there was a significant proportion of trials
in this condition in which observers did not realize that the test probe had
been presented (they believed it was simply the second member of the
memory set).] The mean proportions of errors are displayed as a function
of these variables in Fig. 8 (top panel). Mirroring the results from Wolfe
(2012) and Burrows and Okada (1975), the mean RTs in the VM and
AN conditions get substantially longer as set size increases and the increase
is curvilinear in form. That is, the lengthening in RTs occurs at a decreasing
rate as set size increases. This pattern is roughly the same for the old and new
probes. The lengthening in RTs is much smaller in the CM condition and
may be limited to the old probes. Unlike Wolfe’s and Burrows and Okada’s
data, there are substantial proportions of errors in most of the conditions
(Fig. 8). The overall pattern of error data is similar to the mean RTs, the
main exception being a pronounced increase in errors for new items in
the VM condition at set size 16.
In addition, across all set sizes and for both old and new probes, mean
RTs are longer and error rates are higher in the VM condition than in
the AN condition. Clearly mean RTs are much shorter and error rates are
much lower in the CM condition than in the other two conditions.
As was the case for the memory-search experiments reported in the
earlier sections, we also analyzed the data for the old probes as a joint func-
tion of set size and lag. The functions showed the same form as reported
earlier in this chapter, suggesting that nearly all the effects of set size on
old-item performance was due to the differential lags with which old items
were tested.
6.2 The Extended EBRW Model: Conceptual Description

To account for the role of the history of previous lists on memory-search
performance of current lists, we extend the EBRW in straightforward
fashion. The key idea is that exemplars from previous lists are not “erased”
from memory with the presentation of each current list. Instead all exem-
plars from previous trials of the experiment are stored, albeit with decreased
memory strengths and sensitivities due to having been presented in the
Observed
1000 Varied-Old
Varied-New
950 Allnew-Old
Allnew-New
900 Consist-Old
Mean Correct RT (ms)
Consist-New
850
800
750
700
650
600
550
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Set Size
Predicted
1000 Varied-Old
Varied-New
950 Allnew-Old
Allnew-New
900 Consist-Old
Mean Correct RT (ms)
Consist-New
850
800
750
700
650
600
550
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Set Size
Figure 7 Mean correct response times (RTs) for old probes and new probes plotted as a
function of set size in the varied mapping (VM), all-new (AN), and consistent-mapping
(CM) conditions. Top panel ¼ observed, bottom panel ¼ predicted. Adapted from
Nosofsky, R.M., Cox, G.E., Cao, R., & Shiffrin, R.M. (2014). An exemplar-familiarity model
predicts short-term and long-term probe recognition across diverse forms of memory
search. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40, 1528.
Copyright 2014 by APA. Adapted with permission.
Memory Search 69
Observed
Varied-Old
Varied-New
0.3 Allnew-Old
Allnew-New
Consist-Old
0.25
Consist-New
0.2
P(Error)
0.15
0.1
0.05
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Set Size
Predicted
Varied-Old
Varied-New
0.3 Allnew-Old
Allnew-New
Consist-Old
0.25
Consist-New
0.2
P(Error)
0.15
0.1
0.05
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Set Size
Figure 8 Mean error proportions for old probes and new probes plotted as a function
of set size in the varied-mapping, all-new, and consistent-mapping conditions. Top
panel ¼ observed, bottom panel ¼ predicted. Adapted from Nosofsky, R.M., Cox, G.E.,
Cao, R., & Shiffrin, R.M. (2014). An exemplar-familiarity model predicts short-term and long-
term probe recognition across diverse forms of memory search. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40, 1529. Copyright 2014 by APA.
Adapted with permission.
distant past. In recent years, the precise assumptions I have made concerning
the nature of these previous-list traces have been evolving (and will likely
continue to evolve as new experiments are conducted). Here I present a
fairly general version of the extended model to date, which is being devel-
oped in collaboration with Rui Cao and Richard Shiffrin (Nosofsky, Cao, &
Shiffrin, in preparation).
The basic idea in the extended model is that when a test probe is pre-
sented, it causes the retrieval of not only the old exemplars on the current
list, but also exemplars from previous lists in the experiment. These
“long-term memory” (LTM) exemplars enter the evidence-accumulation
process of the random walk in the same manner as the current-list exemplars.
The probability with which an LTM exemplar is retrieved depends jointly
on its memory strength, its similarity to the test probe, and the extent to
which any “context” elements associated with the LTM exemplar match
or mismatch the current list context (cf. Howard & Kahana, 2002;
Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981).
An important open question, however, concerns that extent to which
the “old” and “new” labels that are associated with the LTM exemplars
are themselves stored with those exemplars. In the case of what I will
term a “familiarity-only” version of the model, the response labels are not
part of the exemplar traces. Instead if an LTM exemplar is retrieved, it always
causes the random walk to take a step toward the old threshold.
An alternative version of the extended model, which I will term a
“labeling” model, assumes that the “old” and “new” labels associated with
the test probes on previous trials are stored along with the exemplars them-
selves. So, for example, if test probe T was “old” on a given trial, then a rep-
resentation of T-old would be stored in memory; whereas if T was a new test
probe on that trial, then a representation of T-new would be stored in mem-
ory. In making an oldenew decision for the current list, if an LTM exemplar
is retrieved that has an “old” label, then the random walk takes a step in the
direction of the old threshold. Crucially, however, if the LTM exemplar that
is retrieved has a “new” label, then the random walk steps toward the new
response threshold. Note that this “labeling” version of the model is basically
a type of exemplar-based categorization model (as originally formalized by
Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997), with the categories being “old” versus “new.”
The most straightforward assumption is that the labeling/categorization
strategy does indeed apply in the CM version of the task. Indeed, one of
the key hypotheses advanced by Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) is that a
major component in the development of “automatic” processing in CM
Memory Search 71
memory-search tasks involves the use of categorization (for more extended

discussion and debate, see, eg, Cheng, 1985; Logan & Stadler, 1991;
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1985). Note that under CM conditions, there is one
fixed set of items (the “positive” category) that always receives an “old”
response and a second fixed set of items (the “negative” category) that always
receives a “new” response. In principle, the observer does not need to pay
any attention to the current memory set to perform the task: If the test probe
belongs to the positive category then the observer can respond “old,” and
likewise for the negative category. It seems plausible that, following suffi-
cient practice, the observer can develop these long-term categories and
use them effectively for performing CM search.
In the case of VM and AN search, however, the situation is not as clear
cut. Because assignment of previously presented exemplars to old and new
responses is not diagnostic in VM and AN memory search, it seems that the
best strategy would be to try to ignore the previous trials and focus solely on
the current list. However, the recording of previous exemplars (along,
perhaps, with their response labels) may simply be an automatic component
of the memory system (eg, Logan, 1988), so that previous exemplars (and
their associated response labels) may enter into the evidence-accumulation
process in VM and AN search as well.
6.3 The Extended EBRW Model: Formal Description

Given the conceptual development provided above, the formal extension of
the EBRW model to accounting for the role of previous list history is as fol-
lows. First, the “core” mechanisms in the model (formalized in Eqs. (1)e(4))
continue to operate in all conditions. That is, presentation of the test probe
leads to the probabilistic retrieval of the exemplars and criterion elements
associated with the current list, and the retrieval of these exemplars and
criterion elements drives the random-walk process in the same manner as
already described. As explained earlier in this section, however, the LTM
exemplars may also be retrieved during the memory-search process and
will contribute to the direction and rate of drift of the random walk. We
presume that by directing different “context cues” toward the retrieval
process (eg, Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981), the observer can potentially
give differential weight to the information from the current list and from
LTM in the memory-search process. Let wList(k) (0 wList(k) 1) denote
the weight that the observer gives to the current list in each main mem-
ory-search condition k (k ¼ AN, VM, CM); and let wLTM(k) ¼ 1dwList(k)
denote the weight that the observer gives to the LTM exemplar traces.
Furthermore let Old-O(k) denote the activation of all old LTM exemplars
given presentation of an old (O) test probe in condition k; Old-N(k) denote
the activation of all old LTM exemplars given a new (N) test probe; and
analogously for New-O(k) and New-N(k). Then for an old test probe, the
probability that each individual random-walk step moves toward the
ROLD response threshold is given by,
pold ¼ ½ðwList $ Ai þ wLTM $Old OÞ=½ðwList $Ai þ wLTM $Old OÞ
þ ðwList $C þ wLTM $New OÞ: (5)
For example, the random walk steps toward the ROLD threshold anytime
an old exemplar from the current memory set is retrieved (measured by
wList$Ai), or anytime an old exemplar from LTM is retrieved (measured by
wLTM$Old-O). Conversely the random walk steps toward the Rnew
threshold anytime that a criterion element is retrieved (measured by
wList$C), or anytime an exemplar from LTM is retrieved that is associated
with the NEW category. (Note that the probability that the random-walk
moves toward the Rnew threshold on any given step is simply qold ¼ 1pold.)
Analogously, for new test probes, the probability that each individual
random-walk step is toward the ROLD response threshold is given by
pnew ¼ ½ðwList $ Ai þ wLTM $Old NÞ=½ðwList $Ai þ wLTM $Old NÞ
þ ðwList $C þ wLTM $New NÞ;
(6a)
whereas the probability that the random walk steps toward the Rnew
threshold is simply
qnew ¼ 1 pnew
¼ ½ðwList $C þ wLTM $New NÞ=½ðwList $Ai þ wLTM $Old NÞ
þ ðwList $C þ wLTM $New NÞ:
(6b)
[It should be emphasized that, in this notation, the probability of taking
steps toward the Rold and Rnew thresholds is denoted by p and q, respectively;
whereas the type of test probe (old vs new) is denoted by the subscript on p
and q.] Thus Eq. (6b) formalizes the idea that, for new test probes, the
random walk correctly steps toward the NEW threshold anytime that a cri-
terion element is retrieved or anytime that an LTM exemplar is retrieved
that is associated with the NEW category label.
Memory Search 73
Different versions of the model arise depending on the parameter settings

given to the LTM exemplars. For example, setting the New-O and New-N
parameters equal to zero yields a pure “familiarity”-based model, in which
retrieval of exemplars from LTM always moves the random walk
toward the OLD threshold. Indeed, Nosofsky, Cox, et al. (2014) found
that a version of such a pure familiarity-based model yielded excellent
accounts of the complete sets of AN, VM, and CM data that I reviewed
earlier in this section. However, in subsequent work, Nosofsky, Cao,
et al. (2014) conducted additional experiments (reviewed in the next section
of this chapter) that pointed clearly to the inadequacy of the familiarity-only
model. Thus to provide a coherent conceptual account of all the data, I now
report fits of a version of the extended model that presumes that the LTM
exemplars that are retrieved can drive the random walk toward either the
OLD or NEW thresholds, ie, a “familiarity plus categorization” model.
As discussed previously, the key condition in which the categorization
strategy is expected to operate is the CM condition. For simplicity, I pre-
sume in the CM condition that the Old-N and New-O parameters are equal
to zero (ie, that members of the positive and negative sets do not retrieve
each other); however, both the Old-O and New-N parameters take on
nonzero values, implementing the categorization process described above.
By contrast, in the AN and VM conditions, all of these LTM parameters
are allowed to take on nonzero values. For example, in the VM condition,
both old and new test probes will presumably lead to the retrieval of old
exemplars from previous lists, because both old and new test probes were
mapped to the old response label on these previous trials. The same might
occur in the AN condition, because old and new test probes on current lists
might be similar to old exemplars from previous lists. A key idea, however, is
that the magnitude of the Old-O and Old-N parameters should be lower in
the AN condition than in the VM condition, because the test probes in the
AN condition are not exact matches to any old exemplars from previous lists
in that condition. It is an open question whether the New-O and New-N
parameters take on positive values in the AN and VM conditions.
As listed in Table 1, the free parameters in the modeling included the
following: the similarity mismatch parameter s; values of b and a for
describing the power-function relation between memory strength and
lag j: mj ¼ a þ jb; values of u and v for describing how criterion-element
activation varied with memory-set size N: C ¼ u þ v$N; the response
thresholds Rold and Rnew; and a residual-time parameter (t0) and random-
walk time-scaling constant (k). In addition, the extended model estimated
Table 1 Best-fitting parameters from the extended version of the exemplar-based

random walk model to the probe recognition data.
Parameter AN VM CM
s 0.036 0.053 0.007

a 1.527 e 0.001
b 2.736 e 0.355
u 0.599 e 0.798
v 0.065 e 0.005
Rold 3.949 e 1.828
Rnew 3.723 e 6.494
t0 0.268 e e
k 0.052 e e
wlist 0.972 e 0.714
Old-O 8.123 11.916 2.288
Old-N (8.123) (11.916) (0.000)
New-O 4.740 15.295 (0.000)
New-N (4.730) (15.295) 4.213
Note. Cells without entries had parameter values constrained to be equal to parameter values from
conditions listed to their left. Parameter values in brackets were held fixed a priori. AN, All-New; VM,
Varied Mapping; CM, Consistent Mapping; s, similarity, a, memory-strength asymptote; b, memory-
strength decay rate; u, criterion-activation intercept; v, criterion-activation slope; Rold, old response
threshold; Rnew, new response threshold; t0, residual time (s); k, timescale parameter (s); wlist, weight
given to current list; Old-O, Old-N, New-O, New-N, long-term memory activations.
Data from Nosofsky, R.M., Cox, G.E., Cao, R., & Shiffrin, R.M. (2014). An exemplar-familiarity
model predicts short-term and long-term probe recognition across diverse forms of memory search.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40(6), 1524.
the listeweight parameter wList and the LTM activation parameters Old-O,
Old-N, New-O, and New-N. Based on various model-fitting explorations,
and to achieve greater parsimony and interpretability of the parameter
estimates, I introduced a variety of parameter constraints. In particular, the
residual-time (t0) and scaling (k) parameters were held fixed across all three
conditions; the parameters b, a, u, v, Rold, Rnew, and wList were held fixed
across conditions AN and VM; and the Old-O and Old-N parameters as
well as the New-O and New-N parameters were set equal to one another
in conditions AN and VM. The latter constraints arise because in the VM
and AN conditions, old and new test probes should yield equal matches
to old test probes (and new test probes) from previous lists.
6.4 Modeling Application

I fitted the model to the data by using a weight-least-squares criterion (see
Nosofsky, Cox, et al., 2014; for details). The resulting predictions are illus-
trated along with the observed data in the bottom panels of Figs. 7 and 8,
with the best-fitting parameters reported in Table 1.
Memory Search 75
In brief, the model captures the major trends in performance extremely

well: the curvilinear increase in mean RTs as a function of set size that is
observed for old and new probes in both the VM and AN conditions
(Fig. 7); the increase in error proportions for old and new probes that is
observed as a function of set size in these conditions (Fig. 8); the finding
that mean RTs are longer and error proportions are greater in the VM con-
dition than in the AN condition; and the finding that RTs are much shorter
in the CM condition than in the other conditions, and that error rates are
lower, particularly for the new probes (Figs. 7 and 8). Although not illus-
trated here, the model also captured the joint lag by set-size functions
observed for the mean RTs and error rates across all three conditions.
The intuitions about the bases for these predictions are as follows. First, as
explained previously, because stimuli with shorter lags have greater memory
strengths, the summed activation (Ai) is greatest for old test probes with short
lags, resulting in short mean RTs and low error rates for these stimuli, and
also causing the dependence of old-probe-item RT upon memory-set
size because longer lists tend to include stimuli with greater lags. Further-
more, across a broad range of parameter settings, as lag increases, the old-
item step-probabilities in the random walk decrease toward 0.5, first rapidly
and then more gradually. This property lies at the core of the model’s
predictions that old-item mean RTs and error probabilities increase in curvi-
linear fashion with increases in lag and set size, at least for the range of
different set sizes tested in the present paradigm. Turning to new probes, first
note that summed activation increases as set size increases. As a result the
probability that the random walk takes correct steps toward the Rnew
threshold decreases, so mean RTs for the new probes get longer. Again,
the changes in magnitude of these new-item step probabilities tend to be
curvilinear with set size, a core property of the model.
There are two key parameter changes that allow the model to account
for the differences in performance across the VM, AN, and CM conditions
(see Table 1). The first involves the differences among the LTM-related
parameters across these conditions. Because of the consistent mappings,
old test probes retrieve only old exemplars and new test probes retrieve
only new exemplars in the CM condition. Thus the random walk marches
very efficiently toward the correct response thresholds in this condition. By
contrast, in the VM and AN conditions, retrieval of exemplars from previous
lists leads to haphazard directions of movement in the random walk, because
the items from previous lists have been mapped in inconsistent fashion to the
old and new responses. In addition, as expected, the magnitude of the LTM
parameters (Old-O, Old-N, New-O, and New-N) is lower in the AN condi-

tion than in the VM condition, because exemplars never repeated in the
former condition. Thus the LTM-retrieval process introduces less noise
into the random walk in the AN condition than in the VM condition.
A second key change across conditions is the change in the value of the
similarity parameter s. As reported in Table 1, the psychological similarity
between distinct objects is greatest in the VM condition, intermediate in
the AN condition, and near zero in the CM condition. Nosofsky, Cox,
et al. (2014) provided conceptual explanations for why between-exemplar
similarity might be expected to change in this manner across the conditions.
Here, I discuss only how the value of the similarity parameter affects the
predictions. First, because psychological similarity is near zero in the CM
condition, summed activation (Ai) for new probes is near zero, regardless
of set size. Thus the random walk marches in the same efficient fashion
toward the Rnew response threshold regardless of set size, resulting in the
nearly flat mean RT function. For old probes, however, lag continues to
play a role in the activation function, and memory strength of the old probes
decreases with increasing lag. Thus even in the CM condition, mean RTs
for old probes get somewhat longer, on average, with increasing lag. In addi-
tion, the slow-down and increased errors in the VM condition compared to
the AN condition arise because of the greater similarity among items in the
VM condition. As s increases, the random-walk step probabilities for both
old and new probes tend toward 0.5, resulting in a noisier and slower
random-walk process.
7. EVIDENCE FOR A JOINT ROLE OF CATEGORIZATION

AND FAMILIARITY PROCESSES
In the previous section, I illustrated an application of the extended exem-
plar-retrieval model to account for memory-search performance across AN,
VM and CM conditions. As explained in that section, although the “categori-
zation” component of the model was included in the applications for purposes
of conceptual coherence, Nosofsky, Cox, et al. (2014) found that a familiarity-
only version of the model could fit those data equally well. The present sec-
tion reviews recent evidence for a distinct role of categorization processes in
CM memory search. To reiterate, by “categorization,” I mean that observers
have learned associations between exemplars and response labels for both the
old and new categories.
Memory Search 77
Nosofsky, Cao, et al. (2014) attempted to decouple the predictions from

a familiarity-only model and a familiarity-plus-categorization model of
memory search. Besides testing both VM and CM performance of highly
practiced subjects, the key manipulation was to include trials in which the
test probe on the current list was just tested on the previous list. The use
of recent negative probes is a well-known manipulation in VM memory-
search tasks (eg, Monsell, 1978) and has been used in modern work to
help assess the nature of forgetting from short-term memory (eg, Berman,
Jonides, & Lewis, 2009; McKeown, Holt, Delvenne, Smith, & Griffiths,
2014); however, to my knowledge, this type of manipulation has not
been used previously in CM memory search.
As argued previously, because targets and distractors switch roles across
trials in VM search, there are no long-term “old” versus “new” categories
to learn in that paradigm. Thus, presumably, participants in VM will rely
primarily on familiarity as a basis for making oldenew decisions. Repeating
a test probe from the previous list should increase its familiarity. Thus the
prediction is that there should be enhanced performance for repeated
“old” test probes, but degraded performance for repeated “new” test probes,
which should have longer correct-rejection RTs and higher error rates. This
pattern of results involving repeated test probes is indeed commonly
observed in VM memory search (eg, Monsell, 1978).
The crucial question concerns performance for repeated probes in the
CM condition. If only “familiarity” operates, then the qualitative pattern
of effects for CM should be the same as for VM, for the reasons outlined
above. By contrast, if a categorization process intervenes, the expectation
is that performance may be enhanced for both repeated “old” and “new”
probes. In particular, if a new probe is tested on trial n1, then the
observer’s memory of its assignment to the “new” category should be
enhanced (the value of NEW-N in Eq. (6b) would increase). If that probe
is then repeated on trial n, it could result in a shorter “new” RT and a lower
error rate than for nonrepeated new probes.
In Nosofsky, Cao, et al.’s (2014) study, four highly practiced observers
were tested in both VM and CM memory-search tasks over multiple
sessions. On each trial, memory-set size was 2, 4, 6, 8, or 16. In both the
VM and CM conditions, with probability 0.20, the test probe from trial
n-1 was repeated on trial n. The stimuli and procedures for creating the
VM and CM conditions were the same as used in Nosofsky, Cox, et al.
(2014) and as described in the previous section.
Although Nosofsky, Cao, et al. (2014) modeled the data separately for
each individual subject, all subjects showed the same qualitative patterns
of results. Therefore, in reviewing the summary trends here, I report the
data averaged across the four subjects.
The mean correct RTs are plotted as a function of condition (VM
vs CM), memory-set size, probe type (old vs new), and repeat status of
the probe in Fig. 9. The mean proportions of errors are plotted as a function
of these variables in Fig. 10.
First, note that the results from the standard (no-repeat) conditions are
similar to those I reported in the previous section (Figs. 7 and 8). In the stan-
dard VM condition (solid triangles), mean RTs for both the old and new
probes get longer with increases in memory-set size, and this lengthening
is curvilinear in form. The error proportions in the standard VM condition
show the same pattern. In the standard CM condition (solid squares), the
mean RTs and error proportions for the new probes are a flat function of
memory-set size, whereas the mean RTs and error proportions for the
old probes lengthen curvilinearly with increases in set size. The old-item
set-size functions in the CM condition are not as steep as in the VM
condition.
NEW OLD
900 900
CM-repeat
CM-no repeat
800 800 VM-repeat
VM-no repeat
700 700
Mean RT
600 600
500 500
400 400
300 300
0 5 10 15 0 5 10 15
Set Size Set Size
Figure 9 Mean correct response times (ms) for old and new test probes plotted as a
function of condition (VM vs CM), repeat manipulation, and set size. VM, varied map-
ping, CM, consistent mapping. Reprinted from Nosofsky, R.M., Cao, R., Cox, G.E., &
Shiffrin, R.M. (2014). Familiarity and categorization processes in memory search. Cognitive
Psychology, 75, 102. Copyright 2014 by Elsevier. Reprinted with permission.
Memory Search 79
NEW OLD
1 1
CM-repeat
0.9 0.9 CM-no repeat
VM-repeat
0.8 0.8 VM-no repeat
0.7 0.7
Probability Error
0.6 0.6
0.5 0.5
0.4 0.4
0.3 0.3
0.2 0.2
0.1 0.1
0 0
0 5 10 15 0 5 10 15
Set Size Set Size
Figure 10 Mean probability of error plotted as a function of condition (VM vs CM), olde
new status of probe, set size, and repeat manipulation. VM, varied mapping, CM, consis-
tent mapping. Reprinted from Nosofsky, R.M., Cao, R., Cox, G.E., & Shiffrin, R.M. (2014).
Familiarity and categorization processes in memory search. Cognitive Psychology, 75,
103. Copyright 2014 by Elsevier. Reprinted with permission.
The data from the VM-repeat condition are symbolized by X’s. Perhaps
the most dramatic results are that, for the new probes, compared to the
standard VM condition (solid triangles), there is a major lengthening in
mean RTs and a major increase in error rates in the VM-repeat condition
(cf. Monsell, 1978). The mean RTs for the new probes in the VM-repeat
condition are not monotonic with set size, but this pattern varied consider-
ably across the different subjects and the irregular plot probably reflects noise
due to the smaller sample sizes in the VM-repeat condition. Note that the
error proportions for the new probes in the VM-repeat condition do
increase in highly regular fashion as set size increases. Regarding the old
probes, there is little change in mean RTs and a slight decrease in error rates
(except at set-size 16) when the probe repeats from the previous trial.
The data from the CM-repeat condition are symbolized by open circles.
Whereas there was a dramatic slowdown for repeat-new probes in the VM
condition, there was no change in RT for the repeat-new probes in the CM
condition (and error rates remain essentially at zero). In addition, mean RTs
got shorter for old probes in the CM-repeat condition and error rates got
even lower than in the CM no-repeat condition.
These qualitative patterns of results are consonant with the predictions

from a familiarity-only model in the VM condition but challenge the
predictions from a familiarity-only model in the CM condition. The famil-
iarity-only models naturally predicts that when a new probe repeats from the
previous trial, there will be a major lengthening in correct mean RTs and an
increase in error rates in the VM condition: When the new probe repeats
from the previous trial, its familiarity is increased, making it more difficult
for the observer to correctly reject the new probe. When an old probe
repeats from the previous trial, its already-high familiarity is further
enhanced, leading the model to predict slight speedups in processing and
reductions in error rates compared to the standard no-repeat condition.
The problem for the familiarity-only model arises mainly for new probes
in the CM condition. Whereas repeating the new probe in the VM condi-
tion led to dramatic lengthening in correct RT and to increases in error rate,
there was no such interference in the CM condition. Because any boost in
familiarity in the VM condition should be paralleled by a similar boost in
familiarity in the CM condition, the differing qualitative patterns of results
across the VM and CM conditions challenge the familiarity-only model.
Instead, the results support the idea that CM search is also mediated by
longer term categorization processes: When a probe is repeated from the
previous list, the observer’s memory for the membership of that item in
either the new or old category is enhanced, and the observer can use this
category-membership information as a basis for making his or her olde
new recognition judgments. Nosofsky, Cao, et al. (2014) corroborated these
lines of argument by showing that the familiarity-plus categorization version
of the extended exemplar model provided good quantitative fits to the com-
plete sets of RT distribution and error data of the individual subjects,
whereas the familiarity-only version of the model failed to do so.
8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Exemplar-retrieval models were advanced in early research as vehicles
for understanding the relation between categorization and oldenew recog-
nition performance (eg, Hintzman, 1988; Nosofsky, 1988, 1991).
Furthermore more recent work has illustrated successful applications of
such models to predicting the time course of categorization and oldenew
recognition decision making and to predicting categorization and olde
new recognition RTs (eg, Lamberts, 2000; Lamberts, Brockdorff, & Heit,
2003; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; Nosofsky & Stanton, 2005, 2006).
Memory Search 81
However, a major gap in research is that the RT predictions of exemplar-

similarity models such as the EBRW model have not been examined in
the variants of the classic short-term probe-recognition paradigm, perhaps
the most venerable of all recognition-RT tasks. A primary aim of my recent
work has been to fill that gap and to conduct a systematic investigation of the
performance of the EBRW model in that paradigm. The purpose of this
chapter was to provide a review of these recent investigations.
In my view, the reported tests of the model have been largely successful,
and the model appears to account in natural fashion for a wide array of results
involving short-term memory search. The successful applications include
natural accounts of (1) mean RTs and choice probabilities associated with
individual lists in continuous-dimension, similarity-based versions of the
paradigm; (2) mean RTs as a function of memory-set size, serial position,
and probe type in the standard version of the paradigm that uses discrete
alphanumeric characters; and (3) the detailed shapes of RT distributions
observed in short-term probe-recognition tasks. Moreover quantitative
applications of the model to detailed RT-distribution data have revealed
an intriguing lawful relation between latent “memory-strength” parameters
in the model and the recency with which individual exemplars of the mem-
ory set are presented, corroborating past proposals that memory declines as a
power function of the retention interval.
The recent work reviewed in this chapter also shows that the proposed
exemplar-retrieval model accounts successfully for data from probe-
recognition paradigms involving both short and long lists by incorporating
a form of short-term memory loss. In particular, the model predicts the find-
ings that performance drops sharply with lag and that the lag functions for
different list lengths lie atop each other. An emergent prediction from the
model is that it accounts naturally for the curvilinear increase in RTs and
error rates observed in memory-search experiments that span a wide range
of memory-set sizes (eg, Burrows & Okada, 1975; Wolfe, 2012). The
research goes even further by exploring the effects of varied, AN, and consis-
tent stimuluseresponse mappings across trials. These manipulations were
shown to have dramatic effects upon memory-search performance, in
ways analogous to those shown in studies of attention and visual search
(eg, Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
Furthermore the model seems to be a viable candidate for accounting for
the effect of these mapping manipulations on memory search. In short,
the present modeling has brought together and extended prior research
and theory on categorization, attention and automaticity, short- and
long-term memory, and evidence-accumulation models of choice RT to

move the field closer to achieving a unified account of diverse forms of
memory search.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by Grant FA9550-14-1-0357 from the Air Force Office of
Scientific Research to Robert Nosofsky.
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CHAPTER TWO

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

of the detailed similarity structure of the list of to-be-remembered items; and

I start this chapter by providing a formal statement of a core version of

2. THE “CORE” VERSION OF THE FORMAL MODEL

Figure 1 Schematic illustration of the workings of the exemplar-based random walk

where xik is the value of exemplar i on psychological dimension k; K is the

processing system. The strength of the criterion elements, which we

3. SHORT-TERM PROBE RECOGNITION IN A

Figure 3 Scatterplots of observed and exemplar-based random walkepredicted choice

extreme variability in results across different tokens of the Lure-Size-4 lists.

4. SHORT-TERM PROBE RECOGNITION OF DISCRETE

Figure 4 Observed (top panel) and exemplar-based random walkepredicted data

Figure 5 Observed and exemplar-based random walkepredicted set size functions,

5. A POWER LAW OF MEMORY STRENGTH

exponential, hyperbolic, linear, and logarithmic functions, failed to provide

exhibit power-function decay. The model-based results from Donkin and

6. BRIDGING SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM PROBE

involving memory sets composed of 2 through 20 items. Mean RT was well

conditions performance tended to become invariant with set size as practice

details regarding the procedure are provided by Nosofsky, Cox, et al.

6.2 The Extended EBRW Model: Conceptual Description

memory-search tasks involves the use of categorization (for more extended

6.3 The Extended EBRW Model: Formal Description

Different versions of the model arise depending on the parameter settings

Table 1 Best-ﬁtting parameters from the extended version of the exemplar-based

s 0.036 0.053 0.007

6.4 Modeling Application

In brief, the model captures the major trends in performance extremely

parameters (Old-O, Old-N, New-O, and New-N) is lower in the AN condi-

7. EVIDENCE FOR A JOINT ROLE OF CATEGORIZATION

Nosofsky, Cao, et al. (2014) attempted to decouple the predictions from

These qualitative patterns of results are consonant with the predictions

8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

However, a major gap in research is that the RT predictions of exemplar-

long-term memory, and evidence-accumulation models of choice RT to

Logan, G. D., & Stadler, M. A. (1991). Mechanisms of performance improvement in consis-

Schneider, W., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1985). Categorization (restructuring) and automatization:

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