FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 123298. November 27, 2003.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , appellee, vs . FRANCISCO L. CALPITO

alias "Francis," appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

For the death of Florentina Villas that was allegedly committed on the occasion of a
robbery, Francisco L. Calpito was charged of Robbery with Homicide. However, based on
the evidence presented, the trial court convicted him of the crime of murder and the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed upon him. Hence, this appeal.
The Court ruled that although the assailed decision did not discuss which
circumstance quali ed the killing to murder, a perusal of the facts of the case readily
revealed that the abuse of superior strength attended the crime. In a recent case, it was
held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and
defenseless woman constitutes an abuse of the aggressor's superior strength. The
circumstance must apply with more reason in the present case, where the abuse of
superior strength is evident from the notorious disparity between the relative strength of
the victim, a 74-year old unarmed woman, and the assailant, a young man armed with a
knife.
However, it was also held that the claim of minority by an appellant will be upheld
even without any proof to corroborate his testimony, especially so when coupled by the
fact that the prosecution failed to present contradictory evidence thereto. In this case, the
prosecution only questioned the submitted birth certi cate, but did not adduce any
evidence to disprove appellant's claim of minority when he committed the crime.
Accordingly, the mitigating circumstance of minority should, as a matter of fairness, be
appreciated in favor of appellant, especially in light of the compassionate liberality this
Court has granted to minors involved in serious crimes.
Consequently, the decision of the court a quo was a rmed with modi cation as to
the penalty imposed and award of damages.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; ABUSE OF

SUPERIOR STRENGTH; EVIDENT FROM THE NOTORIOUS DISPARITY BETWEEN THE
RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE UNARMED OLD WOMAN VICTIM AND THE YOUNG
ASSAILANT ARMED WITH A KNIFE. — Although the assailed decision did not discuss
which of these quali ed the killing to murder, a perusal of the facts of the case readily
reveals that abuse of superior strength attended the crime. In several cases, this Court has
ruled that this circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is
considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
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 aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor
which the latter selected or took advantage of in the commission of the crime. In a recent
case, it was held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed
and defenseless woman constitutes an abuse of the aggressor's superior strength. The
circumstance must apply with more reason in the present case, where the abuse of
superior strength is evident from the notorious disparity between the relative strength of
the victim, a 74-year-old unarmed woman, and the assailant, a young man armed with a
knife.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TREACHERY; CANNOT BE APPRECIATED WHERE THE
PROSECUTION ONLY PROVED THE EVENTS AFTER THE ATTACK HAPPENED. — With
respect to treachery, this Court holds that it cannot be considered in the present case. This
circumstance cannot be appreciated where the prosecution only proved the events after
the attack happened, but not the manner the attack commenced or how the act which
resulted in the victim's death unfolded. It must be noted that in this case, the prosecution's
lone witness only accounted for what transpired after the stabbing, as he did not see the
actual attack on the victim.
3. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; MINORITY; WILL BE UPHELD EVEN
WITHOUT PROOF TO CORROBORATE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED, ESPECIALLY WHEN
THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT ANY CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE. — At the
outset, it must be borne in mind that in assessing the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being
more bene cial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this
circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age. . . . This
Court has held that the claim of minority by an appellant will be upheld even without any
proof to corroborate his testimony, especially so when coupled by the fact that the
prosecution failed to present contradictory evidence thereto. In this case, the prosecution
only questioned the submitted birth certi cate, but did not adduce any evidence to
disprove appellant's claim of minority when he committed the crime. Accordingly, the
mitigating circumstance of minority should, as a matter of fairness, be appreciated in favor
of appellant, especially in light of the compassionate liberality this Court has granted to
minors involved in serious crimes.
4. ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY PLEA OF GUILTY; APPRECIATED WHEN ENTERED
BEFORE THE PROSECUTION PRESENTED ITS EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR. — This Court
agrees with appellant's claim that he should be credited with the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary plea of guilty to the offense charged. The requisites of this circumstance are:
(1) that the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) that the confession of guilt
was made in open court, that is, before the competent court that is to try the case; and (3)
that the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution. In this case, upon re-arraignment, appellant, in the presence of his counsel,
and in open court, voluntarily pleaded guilty to the crime charged before the prosecution
presented its evidence. This mitigating circumstance should therefore be considered in
computing the proper penalty.
5. ID.; MURDER; CIVIL LIABILITY; P25,000 AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, P25,000
AS TEMPERATE DAMAGES AND P50,000 AS CIVIL INDEMNITY AWARDED IN CASE AT
BAR. — On the matter of appellant's civil liability, this Court nds it appropriate to impose
additional damages in line with prevailing jurisprudence: exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000 and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000. The civil indemnity
in the amount of P50,000 is sustained.
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 6. ID.; ID.; PROPER PENALTY. — Lastly, modi cations on the imposable penalty
are in order. As the crime was committed prior to the amendment of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code by Republic Act 7659, the appropriate penalty for Murder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. In view of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed in its proper period, pursuant
to Article 68 (2) of the Code, which is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal
medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being an ordinary mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty and no aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty
should be taken from the minimum period of the imposable penalty, which is prision mayor
in its maximum period, while the minimum should be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, which is anywhere within the range of prision correctional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period.

DECISION

AZCUNA , J : p

On appeal is the decision dated July 5, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban
City 1 in Criminal Case No. 91-01-59 nding appellant Francisco Calpito alias "Francis"
guilty of the crime of Murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000. 2
Appellant was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide under an
information which reads, as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of November, 1990, in the City of Tacloban,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a deadly weapon, with intent [to] gain did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of violence and intimidation on the
person of FLORENTINA VILLAS rob, take and carry away a shoulder bag
containing cash in the amount of P15,000 and jewelries amounting to P30,000
belonging to Florentina Villas; that on the occasion of said robbery and by reason
thereof and for the purpose of enabling him to take/rob and carry away the
above-mentioned bag, taking advantage of superior strength with treachery and
with intent to kill, said accused did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack and stab with the said weapon Florentina Villas and Israel
Montilla in icting wounds on Florentina Villas which caused her death and [a]
wound on Israel Montilla which necessitated medical attendance on him for a
period of 5-7 days and [which] incapacitated him from performing his usual work
for the same length of time.

Contrary to law. 3

Initially, appellant entered a plea of not guilty and waived pre-trial. 4 Upon appellant's
motion, a reinvestigation of the case was conducted. 5 However, the prosecution resolved
to maintain the original information. 6 On January 15, 1993, appellant was re-arraigned, and
after being appraised of the consequences of the nature of his offense, he changed his
plea to one of guilty. 7 The court a quo thereafter received the prosecution's evidence to
prove the nature and extent of appellant's culpability as to the crime charged. 8
The prosecution presented its sole witness in the person of Israel Montilla, the
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 grandson of the victim Florentina Villas. In his testimony, 9 he narrated that at around 2:00
a.m. of November 21, 1990, he was sleeping in the sala of the victim's residence when he
was awakened by the victim's shout for help. He then rushed to the victim's bedroom
which was just 2½ meters away from the sofa on which he slept. By the doorway, he met
appellant who was holding a fan knife in his right hand and the victim's shoulder bag in his
left. He grappled with appellant, who suddenly stabbed him on his left upper arm. While
Montilla searched for something with which he could defend himself, appellant rushed out
of the house through the kitchen door, the lock of which the latter had destroyed. Montilla
looked inside the bedroom and saw his grandmother on the bed lying in a pool of blood,
with stab wounds all over her body.

Montilla further declared that no other person was inside the bedroom when the
incident happened. He was able to recognize appellant because of the uorescent light. He
testi ed that he could not be mistaken regarding the assailant's identity, since he had long
known appellant, who resided near the victim's house. He also stated that appellant, in his
haste, left a ashlight and a cap which had the latter's name written on its inside portion.
He added that he had known appellant to be a drug user, and that at the time of the
incident, the latter appeared to be under the influence of drugs.
The Medico-legal Reports 1 0 submitted by Dr. Benjamin Ver disclosed that the victim
suffered a total of 4 stab wounds and 7 incise wounds on different parts of her body.
These wounds caused the victim's death, at the age of 74.
The court a quo, nding the charge of Robbery with Homicide unsubstantiated by
evidence, convicted appellant of the crime of Murder. Appellant was thus sentenced, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the plea of guilty of accused Francisco Calpito
alias "Francis" to the crime charged in the information and considering the
evidence adduced by the prosecution which su ciently established the absolute
culpability and degree of participation of the herein accused in the killing of the
deceased, accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt not of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, but of Murder, the prosecution having failed to
prove with su cient amplitude the existence of Robbery, [and] the Court hereby
sentences accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify the
heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000, and to pay the costs. 1 1

Appellant, thereafter, filed a Motion for Reconsideration 1 2 arguing that the trial court
erred in convicting him of Murder instead of Homicide, and in failing to apply the mitigating
circumstance of minority.
Acting on the motion, the court a quo ordered the reception of evidence to prove
appellant's minority. Appellant presented the testimony 1 3 of Paquito Ato, Civil Registrar of
Butuan City who allegedly issued the former's birth certi cate, the original of which was
submitted as evidence. On this birth certi cate, it was stated that appellant was born on
May 31, 1974, thus indicating that he was only 16 on November 20, 1990 when the crime
happened. Ato con rmed the authenticity of the aforesaid document, and its late
registration, as indicated thereon. He further declared that it was applied for by appellant's
mother, who supplied to him all the details on appellant's birth. He, however, admitted that
he was unable to verify the information given, as the hospital where appellant was born no
longer existed, and as the named attending physician no longer resided in Butuan City.
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 In its Order dated September 15, 1995, the court a quo denied the motion and
a rmed appellant's conviction for Murder. It further found the submitted birth certi cate
dubious and self-serving. 1 4
Hence, the instant appeal. Appellant questions his conviction on two grounds:
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE.

II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY INTERPOSED BY THE DEFENSE. 1 5

Appellant disputes the court a quo's nding of the attendance of qualifying

circumstances in the commission of the crime. The information alleged the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength. Although the assailed decision
did not discuss which of these quali ed the killing to murder, a perusal of the facts of the
case readily reveals that abuse of superior strength attended the crime. In several cases,
this Court has ruled that this circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the
parties. It is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for
the aggressor which the latter selected or took advantage of in the commission of the
crime. 1 6 In a recent case, it was held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon
upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes an abuse of the aggressor's
superior strength. 1 7 The circumstance must apply with more reason in the present case,
where the abuse of superior strength is evident from the notorious disparity between the
relative strength of the victim, a 74-year-old unarmed woman, and the assailant, a young
man armed with a knife.
With respect to treachery, this Court holds that it cannot be considered in the
present case. This circumstance cannot be appreciated where the prosecution only proved
the events after the attack happened, but not the manner the attack commenced or how
the act which resulted in the victim's death unfolded. 1 8 It must be noted that in this case,
the prosecution's lone witness only accounted for what transpired after the stabbing, as he
did not see the actual attack on the victim.
Given the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the court a quo
therefore correctly convicted appellant for Murder.
This Court, however, disagrees with the trial court in its conclusion on the mitigating
circumstance of minority. In its order, 1 9 the court a quo found appellant's birth certi cate
doubtful because there appeared a slight discrepancy between the name stated thereon
and the name being used by appellant. It also took into consideration the fact that the
document was belatedly registered by appellant's mother, who appeared to have supplied
the necessary information so that her son may avail of the aforesaid mitigating
circumstance.
At the outset, it must be borne in mind that in assessing the attendance of the
mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused,
it being more bene cial to the latter. 2 0 In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated
this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age. 2 1
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 This Court emphasizes that while the submitted birth certi cate is not entirely
satisfactory, a careful review of the records reveals other evidence of appellant's minority.
In the December 19, 1994 hearing, upon being asked by the trial court, appellant declared
that he was 20 years old, 2 2 consequently indicating that on November 21 1990, he must
have been only 16 years old. Also, as appearing in appellant's sworn statement executed
on November 21, 1991, 2 3 he declared that he was 18 years old, hence evincing that he
must have been only 17 at the time of the incident. Notwithstanding the discrepancy, both
declarations nonetheless show that he was below 18 when he committed the crime. This
Court has held that the claim of minority by an appellant will be upheld even without any
proof to corroborate his testimony, especially so when coupled by the fact that the
prosecution failed to present contradictory evidence thereto. 2 4 In this case, the
prosecution only questioned the submitted birth certi cate, but did not adduce any
evidence to disprove appellant's claim of minority when he committed the crime.
Accordingly, the mitigating circumstance of minority should, as a matter of fairness, be
appreciated in favor of appellant, especially in light of the compassionate liberality this
Court has granted to minors involved in serious crimes. 2 5
Furthermore, this Court agrees with appellant's claim that he should be credited with
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty to the offense charged. The
requisites of this circumstance are: (1) that the offender spontaneously confessed his
guilt; (2) that the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before the competent
court that is to try the case; and (3) that the confession of guilt was made prior to the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution. 2 6 In this case, upon re-arraignment,
appellant, in the presence of his counsel, and in open court, voluntarily pleaded guilty to the
crime charged before the prosecution presented its evidence. 2 7 This mitigating
circumstance should therefore be considered in computing the proper penalty.
On the matter of appellant's civil liability, this Court nds it appropriate to impose
additional damages in line with prevailing jurisprudence: exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000 2 8 and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000. 2 9 The civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000 is sustained.
Lastly, modi cations on the imposable penalty are in order. As the crime was
committed prior to the amendment of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code by Republic
Act 7659, the appropriate penalty for Murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death. 3 0 In view of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty next
lower in degree shall be imposed in its proper period, pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the
Code, which is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. 3 1 Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being an ordinary mitigating circumstance of plea of
guilty and no aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty should be taken from the
minimum period of the imposable penalty, which is prision mayor in its maximum period,
while the minimum should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is
anywhere within the range of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo nding appellant Francisco L. Calpito
alias "Francis" guilty of Murder is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATIONS that he is
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 10 years of prision mayor medium as
MINIMUM, to 12 years of prision mayor maximum as MAXIMUM and that, in addition to
the civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000, he is further ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim P25,000 as exemplary damages and P25,000 as temperate damages. Costs de
officio. IESAac

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 SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago and Carpio, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Branch 9.
2. Rollo, p. 40.
3. Records, pp. 1–2.
4. Certificate of Arraignment, Records, p. 59; Order, Records, p. 60.

5. Records, p. 73.
6. Id., at 77–79.
7. Id., at 101.
8. Id., at 105.
9. TSN, February 23, 1994, pp. 1–12.
10. Records, p. 7.
11. Rollo, p. 11.
12. Records, pp. 121–123.
13. TSN, December 19, 1994, pp. 2–8.

14. Records, p. 134.

15. Rollo, p. 30.
16. People v. Bongadillo, 234 SCRA 233 (1994).
17. People v. Appegu, 379 SCRA 703 (2002).
18. People v. Baniega, 377 SCRA 170 (2002); People v. Bulan, 374 SCRA 618 (2002).
19. Records, supra, note 14.
20. People v. Regalario, 220 SCRA 368 (1993) citing US v. Bergantino, 3 Phil 118 (1903).
21. People v. Barreta, 343 SCRA 199 (2000); People v. Regalario, supra, note 20, citing
People v. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535 (1991).
22. TSN, December 19, 1994, p. 8.
23. Records, pp. 70–71.
24. People v. Monteron, 378 SCRA 340 (2002) citing People v. Chua, 339 SCRA 426 (2000).
25. People v. Regalario, supra, note 20.
26. People v. Crisostomo, 160 SCRA 47 (1988).
27. See note 7.
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 28. People v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 137782, April 1, 2003; People v. Alcodia, G.R. No. 134121,
March 6, 2003.
29. People v. delos Santos, G.R. No. 135919, May 9, 2003.
30. People v. Alfon, G.R. No. 126028, March 14, 2003.
31. People v. Paredes, 264 SCRA 578 (1996).

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