6 Supena v. de La Rosa

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 267 11/2/19, 1:21 AM
*
RTJ-93–1031. January 28, 1997.
RODRIGO B. SUPENA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROSALIO

G. DE LA ROSA, respondent.
Judges; Mortgages; Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage;

Sales; Ignorance of the Law; Any judge, worthy of the robe he dons,
or any lawyer, for that matter, worth his salt, ought to know that
different laws apply to different kinds of sales under our
jurisdiction.·Any judge, worthy of the robe he dons, or any lawyer,
for that matter, worth his salt, ought to know that different laws
apply to different kinds of sales under our jurisdiction. We have
three different types of sales, namely: an ordinary execution sale, a
judicial foreclosure sale, and an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. An
oridinary execution sale is governed by the pertinent provisions of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on Execution, Satisfaction and Effect
of Judgments. Rule 68 of the Rules, captioned Foreclosure of
Mortgage, governs judicial foreclosure sales. On the other hand, Act
No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118, otherwise known as „An Act
to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in
or Annexed to
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Supena vs. De la Rosa
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016e27f30e26ac81b49c003600fb002c009e/p/AUB047/?username=Guest Page 1 of 18
Real Estate Mortgages,‰ applies in cases of extrajudicial foreclosure

sales of real estate mortgages.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Venue; Act No. 3135; If the main
concern of respondent judge in holding in abeyance the auction sale
in Manila was to determine whether or not venue of the execution
sale was improperly laid, he would have easily been enlightened by
referring to the correct law, definitely not the Rules of Court, but Act
No. 3135.·The case at bench involves an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale of a real estate mortgage executed by mortgagor PQL in favor
of mortgagee BAID. If the main concern of respondent judge in
holding in abeyance the auction sale in Manila scheduled on May
26, 1993 was to determine whether or not venue of the execution
sale was improperly laid, he would have easily been enlightened by
referring to the correct law, definitely not the Rules of Court, which
is Act No. 3135, as amended, particularly Sections 1 and 2, viz:
„SECTION 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted
in or attached to any real estate mortgage hereafter made as
security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other
obligation, the provisions of the following sections shall govern as to
the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be effected,
whether or not provision for the same is made in the power. SEC. 2.
Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the
property sold is situated\ and in case the place within said province
in which the sale is to be made is the subject of stipulation, such sale
shall be made in said place or in the municipal building of the
municipality in which the property or part thereof is situated‰ Here,
the real property subject of the sale is situated in Felix Huertas
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Thus, by express provision of Section 2,
the sale cannot be made outside of Manila.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ignorance of the Law;
The failure of a judge to recognize that it is not the general
provisions of the Rules of Court on Venue of Actions but Act No. 3135
which is the law in point dealing particularly on extrajudicial
foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages is an utter display of
ignorance of the law to which he swore to maintain professional
competence.·Again, in this regard, we reiterate that the law in
point here is Act No. 3135, as amended, which is a special law,
dealing particularly on extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate
mortgages, and not the general provisions of the Rules of Court on
Venue of Actions. In fact, even Section 5, Rule 4, is quite explicit in
stating that: „When rule not applicable.·This rule shall not apply
in those cases where a
VOL. 267, JANUARY 28, 1997 3
specific rule or law provides otherwise.‰ The failure of respondent to

recognize this is an utter display of ignorance of the law to which he
swore to maintain professional competence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; Words and
Phrases; The determinative or operative fact which converts a claim
into an „action or suit‰ is the filing of the same with a „court of
justice‰·filed elsewhere, as with some other body or office not a
court of justice, the claim may not be categorized under either term.
·Furthermore, provisions quoted by respondent under Rule 4
pertains to the venue of actions, which an extrajudicial foreclosure
is not. Section 1, Rule 2 defines an action in this wise: „Action
means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party
prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong.‰ Hagans v. Wislizenus does not
depart from this definition when it states that "[A]n action is a
formal demand of oneÊs legal rights in a court of justice in the
manner prescribed by the court or by the law. x x x.‰ It is clear that
the determinative or operative fact which converts a claim into an
„action or suit‰ is the filing of the same with a „court of justice.‰
Filed elsewhere, as with some other body or office not a court of
justice, the claim may not be categorized under either term.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and
Practice; Unlike an action, an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage is initiated by filing a petition not with any court of justice
but with the office of the sheriff.·Unlike an action, an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage is initiated by filing a petition
not with any court of justice but with the office of the sheriff of the
province where the sale is to be made. By no stretch of the
imagination can the office of the sheriff come under the category of
a court of justice. And as aptly observed by the complainant, if ever
the executive judge comes into the picture, it is only because he
exercises administrative supervision over the sheriff. But this
administrative supervision, however, does not change the fact that

extrajudicial foreclosures are not judicial proceedings, actions or
suits.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In interpreting
stipulations, inquiry must be made as to whether or not the
agreement is restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in
the place agreed upon or merely permissive in that the parties may
file their suits not only in the place agreed upon but also in the
places fixed by the rules.·Written stipulations as to venue are
either man-
datory or permissive. In interpreting stipulations, inquiry must be

made as to whether or not the agreement is restrictive in the sense
that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon or merely
permissive in that the parties may file their suits not only in the
place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by the rules,
Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law; It has been said that when
the law transgressed is elementary, the failure to know or observe it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law; There will be a great faith in
the administration of justice if there be a belief on the part of the
parties that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of an
apparent deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.·It has been
said that when the law transgressed is elementary, the failure to
know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. In this
case, a mere reference by respondent judge to Act No. 3135, as
opposed to Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, as well as the Deed
of the Real Estate Mortgage itself, would dictate that there is no
justification whatsoever for him to hold in abeyance the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale scheduled on May 26, 1993 in front of
the City Hall of Manila. A judge owes it to the public and to the
legal profession to know the very law he is supposed to apply to a
given controversy as mandated by the Code of Judicial Conduct. He
is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
the statutes and procedural rules. There will be great faith in the
administration of justice if there be a belief on the part of the

parties that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of
an apparent deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.
Unfortunately, respondent judge, instead of inspiring faith and
confidence in the administration of justice, committed a rank
disservice to its cause when he issued the May 25, 1993 Order
based on the inapplicable provisions of the Rules of Court
Same; Foreclosure of Mortgage; Actions; Injunction; The matter
of determining the truthfulness of the mortgagorÊs allegation that an
amount previously paid to the mortgagee was not duly credited nor
deducted from the accounts of the mortgagor should be the subject of
a proper court action for the purpose of seeking a temporary
restraining order with prayer for a possible injunction to stop the
scheduled extrajudicial foreclosure sale, not a mere ex-parte Motion
to Hold Auction Sale in Abeyance.·As to the second averment of
respondent judge, that he issued the May 25, 1993 Order so as to
determine the truthfulness of the mortgagorÊs allegation that the
P500,000.00 previously paid to the mortgagee BAID was not duly
credited nor
VOL. 267, JANUARY 28, 1997 5
deducted from the accounts of the mortgagor, suffice it to state that

the same, by no means, provide any justification for the highly
questionable actuation of respondent judge in issuing the subject
Order. This matter, respondent judge ought to have known, should
have been the subject of a proper court action for the purpose of
seeking a temporary restraining order with prayer for a possible
injunction to stop the scheduled extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
Definitely, a mere ex-parte Motion to Hold Auction Sale in Abeyance
is not the proper remedy, and this recourse by PQL evinces a clear
attempt on its part to shortcut the entire process. Unfortunately,
respondent judge fell prey to this scheme, wittingly or unwittingly.
Instead of providing some legal justification for his irregular
conduct in issuing the questioned Order, this flimsy argument
advanced by the respondent judge all the more has convinced this
Court of his culpability.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross

Ignorance of the Law.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Caesar M. Ortega for complainant.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
In his verified complaint dated June 16, 1993, Mr. Rodrigo

B. Supena, President of Mortgagee BPI Agricultural
Development Bank (BAID, for short), charges respondent
Judge Rosalio G. de la Rosa with gross ignorance of the law
for issuing an unlawful Order, dated May 25, 1993, in
Foreclosure Case No. 93–822, entitled, „BPI Agricultural
Development Bank v. PQL Realty Incorporated.‰ The Order
in effect held in abeyance the public auction sale set on
May 26, 1993, per Notice of Extrajudicial Sale of one (1)
parcel of land, together with the building and all the
improvements existing thereon, described and covered by
TCT No. 112644 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, on the
basis of a mere Ex-Parte Motion to Hold Auction Sale in
Abeyance filed by Mortgagor, PQL Realty Incorporated
(PQL, for short).
The antecedent facts are as follows:

On April 1, 1993, mortgagee BAID decided to1

extrajudicially foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage
executed by mortgagor PQL in the formerÊs favor.
Accordingly, BAID petitioned the Ex-Officio Sheriff of
Manila to take the necessary steps for the foreclosure of the
mortgaged property and its sale to the highest bidder.
On April 21, 1993, Jesusa P. Maningas, the Clerk of
Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Manila, issued a Notice of
Extrajudicial Sale, scheduling the public auction sale on
May 26 1993 at 10:00 oÊclock a.m. in front of the City Hall
Building, Manila. Said notice was subsequently published

in the PeopleÊs Journal Tonight on May 4,11 and 19, 1993.
However, on May 25, 1993, or one day before the
scheduled sale, the Hon. Rosalio G. de la Rosa, in his
capacity as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, issued an Order holding in abeyance the scheduled
public auction sale, on the basis of a mere ex-parte motion
filed by PQL, a copy of which was received by mortgagee-
complainant only on May 31, 1993. Complainant avers
that, said order is, for all practical intents and purposes, a
restraining order for an indefinite period, issued without
the proper case being filed and without the benefit of notice
and hearing, or even an injunction bond from which the
mortgagee may seek compensation and restitution for the
damages it may suffer by reason of the improper
cancellation of the auction sale.
The only ground relied upon by the ex-parte Motion,
„that the parties have agreed to hold the foreclosure
proceedings in Makati and not in Manila,‰ is patently
without merit, according to the complainant, as the venue
of foreclosure proceedings is fixed by law and cannot be
subject of stipulation. In sum, complainant submits that
the actuations of respondent judge in granting the ex-parte
motion of mortgagor were without basis and highly
suspicious.
Respondent, in his comment, maintains that he held in
abeyance the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of the
property
_______________
1Annex „A" Rollo, pp. 7–10.
VOL. 267, JANUARY 28, 1997 7

mortgaged supposed to be held on May 26, 1993 and

instead scheduled the same for hearing on June 16, 1993
(which however did not transpire), to determine two issues:
first, whether the venue in Foreclosure Proceeding No. 93–
822 was improperly laid in light of the stipulation in the

„Loan Agreement‰ duly entered into by both parties and
acknowledged before a Notary Public which provides:
„14) VENUE OF ACTIONS·Any action or suit brought under this

Agreement or any other documents related hereto shall be
instituted in the proper Courts of Makati, Metro Manila, Republic
2
of the Philippines."
and, secondly, in order to determine the veracity of the

mortgagorÊs allegation that the Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) paid to BPI Agri-Bank last January,
1993 does not reflect and does not appear to have been
credited or deducted from the accounts of mortgagor. It
was, allegedly, under the principle of fair play, equity and
substantial justice which
3
compelled him to issue the Order
dated May 25, 1993.
We find the respondent judge culpable as charged.
Any judge, worthy of the robe he dons, or any lawyer, for
that matter, worth his salt, ought to know that different
laws apply to different kinds of sales under our jurisdiction.
We have three different types of sales, namely: an ordinary
execution sale, a judicial foreclosure sale, and an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. An ordinary execution sale is
governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court on Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of
Judgments. Rule 68 of the Rules, captioned Foreclosure of
Mortgage, governs judicial foreclosure sales. On the other
hand, Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, otherwise
known as „An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under
Special Powers Inserted
_______________
2 Rollo, p. 63.
3 Comment, pp. 2–3; Rollo, pp. 23–24.

in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages,‰ applies in cases 4

of extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages.
The case at bench involves an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale of a real estate mortgage executed by mortgagor PQL
in fovor of mortgagee BAID. If the main concern of
respondent judge in holding in abeyance the auction sale in
Manila scheduled on May 26, 1993 was to determine
whether or not venue of the execution sale was improperly
laid, he would have easily been enlightened by referring to
the correct law, definitely not the Rules of Court, which is
Act No. 3135, as amended, particularly Sections 1 and 2,
viz:
„SECTION 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted

in or attached to any real estate mortgage hereafter made as
security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other
obligation, the provisions of the following sections shall govern as to
the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be effected,
whether or not provision for the same is made in the power.
SEC. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province
in which the property sold is situated; and in case the place within
said province in which the sale is to be made is the subject of
stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the
municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part
thereof is situated.‰
Here, the real property subject of the sale

5
is situated in
Felix Huertas Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Thus, by express
provision of Section 2, the sale cannot be made outside of
Manila. Moreover, were the intention of the parties be
considered with respect to venue in case the properties
mortgaged be extrajudicially foreclosed, they even
unequivocably stipulated in the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage itself under paragraph 15 that:
„x x x xxx xxx
It is hereby agreed that in case of foreclosure of this mortgage
under Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, the auction sale, in case of
_______________
4 See Fiestan v. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 751, 756 [1990].

5 Annex „B"; Rollo, p. 11.
VOL. 267, JANUARY 28, 1997 9

properties situated in the province, shall be held at the capital

6
thereof."
Respondent judge, therefore, had no valid reason to

entertain any doubt as to the propriety of the venue of the
auction sale in Manila. The law as well as the intention of
the parties cannot be more emphatic in this regard.
Respondent judge, however, refers to the venue
stipulation in the Loan Agreement signed by the parties to
the effect that, „Any action or suit brought under this
Agreement or any other documents related hereto 7
shall be
instituted in the proper courts of Makati x x x." And under
the pertinent provisions of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on
Venue of Actions, which provide:
„Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance·(a) Real actions.·Actions

affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property shall
be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any
part thereof lies.
Sec. 3. Venue by agreement.·By written agreement of the parties
the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one
province to another.‰
venue of the auction sale should have been laid in Makati

as mutually agreed upon by the parties.
Again, in this regard, we reiterate that the law in point
here is Act No. 3135, as amended, which is a special law,
dealing particularly on extrajudicial foreclosure sales of
real estate mortgages, and not the general provisions of the
Rules of Court on Venue of Actions. In fact, even Section 5,
Rule 4, is quite explicit in stating that:
„When rule not applicable.·This ule shall not apply in those cases
where a specific rule or law provides otherwise.‰
_______________
6 Annex „A"; Rollo, p. 8.

7 Supra.
10

The failure of respondent to recognize this is an utter

display of ignorance of the law to which 8
he swore to
maintain professional competence. Furthermore,
provisions quoted by respondent under Rule 4 pertains to
the venue of actions, which an extrajudicial foreclosure is
not. Section 1, Rule 2 defines an action in this wise:
„Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one

party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.‰
9
Hagans v. Wislizenus does not depart from this definition
when it states that "[A]n action is a formal demand of oneÊs
legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed
by the court or by the law. x x x.‰ It is clear that the
determinative or operative fact which converts a claim into
an „action or suit‰ is the filing of the same with a „court of
justice.‰ Filed elsewhere, as with some other body or office
not a court of justice,
10
the claim may not be categorized
under either term. Unlike an action, an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage is initiated by filing a
petition not11
with any court of justice but with the office of
the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.
By no stretch of the imagination can the office of the sheriff
come under the category of a court of justice. And as aptly
observed by the complainant, if ever the executive judge
comes into the picture, it is only because he exercises
administrative supervision over the sheriff. But this
administrative supervision, however, does not change the
fact that extrajudicial foreclosures are not judicial
proceedings, actions or suits.
Granting arguendo that an extrajudicial foreclosure sale
can be classified as an „action or suit‰ (which it is not) and
_______________
8 Rule 3.01, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct.

9 42 Phil. 880, 882 [1920], citing People v. County Judge, 13 How. Pr.
[N.Y.], 398.
10 Lopez v. Filipinas Compañia de Seguros, 16 SCRA 855, 859 [1966].
11 See Section 4, Act 3135, as amended.
11
VOL. 267, JANUARY 28, 1997 11

that the venue stipulation in the Loan Agreement would

gain relevance, respondent judge still committed a grievous
error in holding the auction sale in abeyance due to
improper laying of venue. We again quote the subject
stipulation for easy reference, to wit:
„14) VENUE OF ACTIONS·Any action or suit brought under this

Agreement or any other documents related hereto shall be
instituted in the proper Courts of Makati, Metro Manila, Republic
of the Philippines.‰
Written stipulations as to venue are either mandatory or

permissive. In interpreting stipulations, inquiry must be
made as to whether or not the agreement is restrictive in
the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed
upon or merely permissive in that the parties may file their
suits not only in the place
12
agreed upon but also in the
places fixed by the rules. 13
In Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, the stipulation on
venue there involved read:
„The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila.‰
The Court, in ruling that venue had been properly laid in

the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan (the place of
defendantÊs residence), said:
„x x x. An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, The parties

agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila,Ê does not preclude
the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The
plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued in

Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that
Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent therefrom.
We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and defendant bound
themselves to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in
question only or exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not
change or transfer venue. It simply is permissive. The parties solely
_______________
12 Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law, Vol. I, 1994 ed., p. 317.

13 30 SCRA 187, 190 [1969].
12

agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may

resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts
specifically mentioned in Section 2 (b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non
14
praesumitur."
15
In Lamis Ents. v. Lagamon, the promissory note sued on
had the following stipulation:
„In case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of

Davao City.‰
The collection suit was instituted in the then Court of First

Instance of Tagum, Davao, where the defendant resides,
and not in Davao City as stipulated. We rejected the
defense of improper venue and, citing the case of Polytrade,
therein held:
„x x x. Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the
venue, suffice it to say that a stipulation as to venue does not
preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant
under Section 2 (b), Rule 4, Rules of Court, in the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement which would
indicate that the place named is the only venue agreed upon by the
parties. The stipulation did not deprive Maningo of his right to
pursue remedy in the court specifically mentioned in Section 2 (b) of
16
Rule 4, Rules of Court, Renuntiatio non praesumitur. x x x."
17
In Western Minolco v. Court of Appeals, the clause on
venue read:
„The parties stipulate that the venue of the actions referred to in

Section 1–2.01 [Article XII of the Agreement] shall be in the City of
Manila.‰
The initial action was commenced in the then Court of

First Instance of Baguio and Benguet instead of Manila.
This Court
_______________
14 Ibid., at 191.
15 108 SCRA 740, 743 [1981].
16 Ibid., at 753–754.
17 167 SCRA 592, 594 [1988].
13
VOL. 267, JANUARY 28, 1997 13

took the occasion to reiterate once more the Polytrade

doctrine:
„x x x. In any event, it is not entirely amiss to restate the doctrine

that stipulations in a contract, which specify a definite place for the
institution of an action arising in connection therewith, do not, as a
rule, supersede the general rules on the matter set out in Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, but should be construed merely as an agreement
on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
18
place.
It is true that there have been early decisions of the

Supreme Court inconsistent with the Polytrade
19
line of
cases, notably Bautista 20v. de Borja, and Hoechst
Philippines, Inc. v. Torres. However, Lamis Enterprises
and Western Minolco
_______________
18 Ibid., at 598.
19 18 SCRA 474, 477 [1966]. Here, the venue stipulation read:
"[I]n case of any litigation, arising [t]herefrom or in connection [t]herewith, the

venue of the action shall be in the City of Manila.‰
The Court read the above stipulation as an agreement to definitely fix

the venue of actions arising out of the written contracts sued upon, in the
proper courts of the City of Manila and granted dismissal of the
complaint. The Court did not seek to analyze the stipulation; not finding
any clause reserving to the parties the right of election, the Court
surmised that the agreement was one requiring venue to be laid in one
place only, to the exclusion of other competent tribunals.
20 83 SCRA 297, 299 [191 In this case, the venue clause provided:
"[I]n case of any litigation arising out of this agreement, the venue of any
action shall be in the competent courts of the Province of Rizal.‰
The Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Barredo, followed the case of
Bautista v. de Borja (supra) and interpreted the venue clause as an agreement
requiring venue to be laid in only one place, i.e., the Province of Rizal, and
sustained the trial courtÊs dismissal of the action for improper venue. The
Court said that
14

21
followed by Moles v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
Hongkong22 and Shanghai Banking Corporation 23
v.
Sherman, Nasser v. Court of Appeals, and 24
Surigao
Century Sawmill Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals settled the
matter by treading the path blazed by Polytrade Hence, the
inevitable conclusion to be
drawn, which respondent judge should have appreciated
and followed, is that Bautista and Hoechst Philippines
have been rendered obsolete by the Polytrade line of cases.
Needless to say, the more recent jurisprudence shall be
deemed modificatory of the old ones. Restating the settled
rule, therefore, as belabored by 25this Court in Philippine
Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, venue stipulations in a
contract, while considered valid and enforceable, do not as
a rule supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court. In the absence of qualifying or

restrictive words, they should be considered merely as an
agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to
the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather
permissive.
Notwithstanding the above fundamental considerations,
respondent judge still issued the May 25, 1993 Order
stopping indefinitely the foreclosure sale scheduled the
following day on May 26, 1993. Clearly, he can be held
accountable for ignorance of the foregoing jurisprudential
developments on the applicable rules governing venue
stipulations.
It has been said that when the law transgressed is
elementary, the failure to know or observe it constitutes
gross igno-
_______________
„No further stipulations are necessary to elicit the thought that both
parties agreed that any action by either of them would be filed only in
the competent courts of Rizal province exclusively.‰ (83 SCRA at 301).
21 169 SCRA 777, 785 [1989].
22 176 SCRA 331, 337 [1989].
23 191 SCRA 783, 792 [1990].
24 218 SCRA 619, 623 [1993].
25 230 SCRA 413, 420 [1994].
15
VOL. 267, JANUARY 28, 1997 15

26
rance of the law. In this case, a mere reference by
respondent judge to Act No. 3135, as opposed to Rule 4 of
the Revised Rules of Court, as well as the Deed of the Real
Estate Mortgage itself, would dictate that there is no
justification whatsoever for him to hold in abeyance the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale scheduled on May 26, 1993 in
front of the City Hall of Manila. A judge owes it to the
public and to the legal profession to know the very law he
is supposed to apply to a given27 controversy as mandated by
the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory

28
acquaintance with the statutes
and procedural rules. There will be great faith in the
administration of justice if there be a belief on the part of
the parties that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be
accused of29an apparent deficiency in their grasp of legal
principles. Unfortunately, respondent judge, instead of
inspiring faith and confidence in the administration of
justice, committed a rank disservice to its cause when he
issued the May 25, 1993 Order based on the inapplicable
provisions of the Rules of Court.
As to the second averment of respondent judge, that he
issued the May 25, 1993 Order so as to determine the
truthfulness of the mortgagorÊs allegation that the
P500,000.00 previously paid to the mortgagee BAID was
not duly credited nor deducted from the accounts of the
mortgagor, suffice it to state that the same, by no means,
provide any justification for the highly questionable
actuation of respondent judge in issuing the subject Order.
This matter, respondent judge ought
_______________
26 See Agcaoili N, Ramos, 229 SCRA 705, 110 [1994], citing Santos v.
Judge Isidro, 200 SCRA 597 [1991].
27 Canon 3, Rule 3.01·A judge in accordance with his sworn duties
should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it.
Canon 3, Rule 3.02·In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to
ascertain the fact and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests,
public opinion or fear of criticism.
28 De los Santos-Reyes v. Montesa, Jr., 247 SCRA 85, 96 [1995].
29 Mamolo, Sr. v. Narisma, 252 SCRA 613, 618–619 [1996].
16

to have known, should have been the subject of a proper

court action for the purpose of seeking a temporary
restraining order with prayer for a possible injunction to
stop the schedled extrajudicial foreclosure sale. definitely, a
mere ex-parte Motion to Hold Auction Sale in Abeyance is
not the proper remedy, and this recourse by PQL evinces a

clear attempt on its part to shortcut the entire process.
Unfortunately, respondent judge fell prey to this scheme,
wittingly or unwittingly Instead of providing some legal
justification for his irregular conduct in issuing the
questioned Order, this flimsy argument advanced by the
respondent judge all the more has convinced this Court of
his culpability.
WHEREFORE, the Court, resolving to hold respondent
Judge Rosalio G. de la Rosa administratively liable for
gross ignorance of the law, imposes on him a FINE of
P2,000.00, the same to be deducted from whatever
retirement benefits he may be entitled to receive from the
government. SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Padilla (Chairman), J., No part, former director and
counsel for BAID.
Respondent meted a P2,000 fine for gross ignorance of

the law.
Note.·A judge disregarding the rules and settled

jurisprudence shows gross ignorance. (San Manuel Wood
Products, Inc. vs. Tupas, 249 SCRA 466 [1995])
··o0o··
17
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

6 Supena v. de La Rosa

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

6 Supena v. de La Rosa

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 267 11/2/19, 1:21 AM

RODRIGO B. SUPENA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROSALIO

Judges; Mortgages; Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage;

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Supena vs. De la Rosa

Real Estate Mortgages,‰ applies in cases of extrajudicial foreclosure

in those cases where a

VOL. 267, JANUARY 28, 1997 3

Supena vs. De la Rosa

specific rule or law provides otherwise.‰ The failure of respondent to

administrative supervision, however, does not change the fact that

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Supena vs. De la Rosa

datory or permissive. In interpreting stipulations, inquiry must be

administration of justice if there be a belief on the part of the

VOL. 267, JANUARY 28, 1997 5

Supena vs. De la Rosa

deducted from the accounts of the mortgagor, suffice it to state that

Court of his culpability.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

In his verified complaint dated June 16, 1993, Mr. Rodrigo

6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On April 1, 1993, mortgagee BAID decided to1

Building, Manila. Said notice was subsequently published

1Annex „A" Rollo, pp. 7–10.

VOL. 267, JANUARY 28, 1997 7

mortgaged supposed to be held on May 26, 1993 and

822 was improperly laid in light of the stipulation in the

„14) VENUE OF ACTIONS·Any action or suit brought under this

and, secondly, in order to determine the veracity of the

8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages,‰ applies in cases 4

„SECTION 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted

Here, the real property subject of the sale

4 See Fiestan v. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 751, 756 [1990].

VOL. 267, JANUARY 28, 1997 9

properties situated in the province, shall be held at the capital

Respondent judge, therefore, had no valid reason to

„Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance·(a) Real actions.·Actions

venue of the auction sale should have been laid in Makati

6 Annex „A"; Rollo, p. 8.

10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The failure of respondent to recognize this is an utter

„Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one

8 Rule 3.01, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct.

VOL. 267, JANUARY 28, 1997 11

that the venue stipulation in the Loan Agreement would

„14) VENUE OF ACTIONS·Any action or suit brought under this

Written stipulations as to venue are either mandatory or

„The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila.‰

The Court, in ruling that venue had been properly laid in

„x x x. An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, The parties

plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued in

12 Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law, Vol. I, 1994 ed., p. 317.

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may

„In case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of

The collection suit was instituted in the then Court of First

„The parties stipulate that the venue of the actions referred to in

The initial action was commenced in the then Court of

VOL. 267, JANUARY 28, 1997 13

took the occasion to reiterate once more the Polytrade