LEGAL PROFESSION GROUP MEMBERS:

Pamela Altubar
John Paul Antiquiera
Matz Capilla
James Harvey Dinoy
Dave John Domingo
Justin Denise Feranco
Jun Dee Guibingcan
Megan Herrera
Enrico Carlo Lopez
Nuriel Ameen Muhammad
Marco Paolo Renacia
Mary Ruth Kristine Risma
Jose Rodolf Teves

[G.R. No. 111478. March 13, 1997]

GEORGE F. SALONGA and SOLID INTERTAIN CORPORATION, Petitioner,

v.

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JULIO R. LOGARTA, and PAUL GENEVE

ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

This is a case concerning the Annulment of Judgment. Petitioners had alleged that the
ruling of the CA be annulled on two ground; Firstly, of fraud on the part of the petitioner’s
previous counsel and; Secondly, that the petitioner was deprived of his basic constitutional right
to due process.
 Well-settled is the doctrine that “A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a)
that the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law; or (b) that it has
been obtained by fraud.”1

To summarize, and to answer the issues of the case, the SC had stated doctrines and
jurisprudence that would support their decision. On the issue of the alleged fraud of the on the
part of the petitioner’s previous counsel, the SC said that “in order for fraud to serve as a basis
for the annulment of a judgment, it must be extrinsic or collateral in character, otherwise there
would be no end to litigations. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party
which is committed outside the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent."2 The SC notes that the previously acts of the previous counsel of the petitioner were
in no way shown or alleged to have been caused by private respondents. On the issue of the
denial of due process, SC has answered the issue by applying the doctrine that “the essence of
due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one
may have in support of one's defense. 'To be heard' does not mean only verbal arguments in
court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process."3

In this case, the main principle which could be derived concerning the legal profession is
that the “the negligence of counsel binds the client.”4 This is based on the rule that any act
performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act
of his client.5 Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel may result in the
rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them.6

Cayetano vs. Monsod, GR No. 100113, September 3, 1991

This case revolves on the petitioner’s opposition on the appointment of respondent as

Chairman of the Commission on Elections. He contended that the respondent has not met the
qualifications for the position for failing to meet the requirement of engaging in the practice of
law for at least ten years. He supplants that although the respondent is a member of the
Philippine Bar, the latter is an inactive member and did not practice his lawyering profession but
worked as an economist, manager and other corporate functions. It is clear from the petitioner’s

1
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 673, July 21, 1993; citing Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA
577, September 13, 1991.
2
Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 224.
3
Mutuc v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 43, 49, September 26, 1990; citing Tajonera v.Lamaroza, 110
SCRA 438, December 19, 1981, Richards v. Asoy, 152 SCRA 45, July 9, 1987, and Juanita Yap Say v. IAC, 159,
SCRA 325, March 28, 1988.
4
B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 28, 39, February 7, 1992; citing Manila
Electric Co. v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 200, July 4, 1990.
5
Agpalo, Ruben A., Legal Ethics, p. 278, (1989); citing Cruz v. Jugo, 66 Phil. 102, (1938), Montes v. CFI
of Tayabas, 48 Phil. 640, (1926), U.S. v. Umali, 15 Phil. 33 (1910), Isaac v. Mendoza, 89 Phil. 279, (1951), and
Vivero v. Santos, 98 Phil. 500, (1956)
6
Supra, pp. 278-279; citing Malipol v. Tan, 55 SCRA 202, January 21, 1974.
contention that his belief of what the law profession is narrowed down to lawyering, litigation,
and legislation. However, the scope of the practice of law is broader than what is bounded by the
walls of the court. It encompasses all other professions in connection with the law.

To reiterate the court’s ruling, the practice of law involves rendition of services requiring
the knowledge and application of legal principles and techniques to serve the interest of another.
It is not limited to appearing in court and assisting in the conduct of litigation. It includes all
advice to clients and all actions taken in matters connected with the law. It means any activity, in
or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal principles, knowledge, training and
experiences. The work experiences of respondent as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and lawyer-legislator more than satisfy
the constitutional requirements of practice of law for at least ten years.

G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996

TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C.
CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN and EDUARDO U.
ESCUETA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents. G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

It is confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No.
33 grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the
identity of his client, giving him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners
in the ACCRA law firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has
been assumed by private respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the identity of
their principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the
confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship. The uberrimei
fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for
negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including confidentiality,
loyalty, competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect
their rights to make decisions have been zealously sustained. In our jurisdiction, this privilege
takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August
7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to
reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of
professional employment." Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-
client privilege, as currently worded provides: Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in
the following cases: xxx xxx xxx An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer,
or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
states: Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every
peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection
with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval. This duty is
explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a
lawyer's fidelity to client: The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the
door to a whole spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited
information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely
dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn
requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information.
It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the
privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.

In re: Cunanan, 94, phil. 534

In Cunanan, controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concerns as R .A. No.
972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers Act of 1953." Under the rules if court of court
governing admission to the Bar, in order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 percent in all subjects,
without falling bellow 50 percent in any subject. The R.A. No. 972 was Questioned to its
constitutionality because it infringed the Authority of the Judiciary who will be admitted to
practiced law. Reasons for its constitutionality: There was a manifest encroachment on the
constitutional responsibility of the supreme court. It is in effect a judgment revoking the
resolution of the court, and only the supreme court may revise or alter them, in attempting to do
so R.A. no.972 violated the constitution. That congress exceeded its power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to the bar. Article 2 of RA no.972 is nor embraced in the title
of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions
of art. 1 the entire law is void. It is under the authority of the court. The portion of article 1 of
RA no. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of article 2 of the said law are
unconstitutional and therefore void and without force and effect. The part of article 1 that refers
to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953-1955) is valid and shall continue
in force.

Armovit v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 16

Conflict between the dispositive portion of a Decision and opinion of the court: When there is a
conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of a Decision and the opinion of the court
contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An order of
execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the Decision.This rule rests on the
theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement
ordering nothing. The exception to this rule is when the conclusion from the body of the decision
clearly shows that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, in this case, the body of the
decision will prevail. Applying this ruling to the case at bar, it is clear that the statement in the
body of our 1991 Decision (that "we do not find Atty. Armovit’s claim for ‘twenty percent of all
recoveries’ to be unreasonable") is not an order which can be the subject of execution. Neither
can we ascertain from the body of the Decision an inevitable conclusion clearly showing a
mistake in the dispositive portion. Mere pronouncements in the bodies of Decisions made by the
courts can not be the subject of execution; such random states can easily be taken out of context
and are susceptible to different interpretations. Hence, statements from bodies of Decisions
should be presented in a clear and definite order.

Zaldivar Vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989

A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others. In fact, Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules
of Court penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. The duties of a
lawyer are also provided for in Section 20, Rules of Court. Section 20, paragraph (b) in particular
states that an attorney is bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice
and judicial officers. Gonzalez stated that “the statements in the newspapers were true; that he
was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court,
to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error.” One may be entitled to the
constitutional guarantee of free speech. However, such right is not absolute and is susceptible of
any limitation. It would be too much to insist that all times and under all circumstances it should
remain unrestrained. In the case at bar, presented were criteria for permissible limitation on
freedom of speech and of the press. One is the "clear and present danger" doctrine. The
balancing-of-interests test, another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and
of the press, "requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of
interests observable in a given situation or type of situation.” As an officer of the court, one owes
duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and
the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic, and must uphold the
dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is
the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

January 9, 1973 I

In this Resolution of the Supreme Court, we saw the principle of esprit de corps among
the members of the Bar of the Philippines. It was evident that the members of the Bar wanted to
have a Unified Bar or the Integrated Bar in order to “raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively”, as the Court said. We learned that, in order to fully perform the duties in the
legal profession, in administration of justice, a certain level of standards should be upheld among
the members in the profession. The integration of the Bar has indeed fostered and catered to the
needs of the legal profession in order for it to survive the ever changing times and be able to
keep its integral principles intact.

In the case at bar, the lawyers argued that how much should the amount for the fee that
they have rendered service to. The one who rendered much greater services should have the
higher fee compared to others. It should be on how much work they have rendered. Atty.
Fransisco had to make wide and extensive research in the field of writing, medicine and
chimistry not to mention the interviewing of prospective witnesses. We cannot deny the
extensive amount of work a lawyer has to do, but we also believe that one's wealth should not be
a leverage in the administration of justice. And integrity and compassion should go hand in hand
in the legal profession.

In Re Testate Estate of Doña Gabina Raquel, Vicente J. Francisco v.Aurea Matias G.R. No.
L-16349, January 31, 1964]

In the case at bar, the lawyers argued that how much should the amount for the fee that
they have rendered service to. The one who rendered much greater services should have the
higher fee compared to others. It should be on how much work they have rendered. Atty.
Fransisco had to make wide and extensive research in the field of writing, medicine and
chimistry not to mention the interviewing of prospective witnesse
Francisco vs. Matias
10 SCRA 89

Let me start by through a case brief, Atty. Francisco’s services were engaged to secure the
probate of the will of Gabina Raquel. Upon the allowance of the will rested the Aurea Matias right
to the bulk of an estate, worth more than 1 million pesos. The importance of this subject matter,
appellee's services were engaged to secure the probate of the will of Gabina Raquel. Upon the
allowance of the will rested the appellants right to the bulk of an estate, worth more than one
million pesos. Had the will been disallowed, appellant and the other legatees named in the will
would have received nothing. Had the will been disallowed, Aurea Matias and the other legatees
named in the will would have received nothing. Attempting to minimize the importance to the
estate of legal services in securing approval of the will, Aurea Matias points out that will or no
will, the estate remains.

Held, Taking into account all the variables of proceeding in the light of our several
pronouncements on matter of contingent lawyer’s fees we feel that the modify the appealed
resolution and awarding instead of 25% to 12% the market value of the estate, should be given to
Atty. Francisco as counsel fees for it would accomplish substantial justice.