UST 1-I CIVIL LAW REVIEWER institution whose nature, consequences, and

incidents are governed by law and not subject

FAMLAW CASE DIGESTS to stipulation.‖ It is an institution of public
order or policy, governed by
rules established by law which cannot be
made inoperative by the stipulation of the
EDWIN A. ACEBEDO v. EDDIE P.
parties.
ARQUERO
Although every office in the government
399 SCRA 10 (2003)
service is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and
Position in the judiciary requires greater
uprightness from an individual than in the
moral righteousness and uprightness.
judiciary. That is why the Court has firmly
laid down exacting standards of morality
Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. and decency expected of those in the service
Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal of the judiciary.
Trial Court (MTC) of Brooke’s Point,
Palawan for immorality, alleging that his
Their conduct, not to mention behavior, is
wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former
circumscribed with the heavy burden of
stenographer of the MTC Brooke’s Point, and
responsibility, characterized by, among other
Arquero unlawfully and scandalously
things, propriety and decorum so as
cohabited as husband and wife.
to earn and keep the public’s respect and
confidence in the judicial service. It must
Arquero claimed that Acebedo himself had be free from any whiff of impropriety, not
been cohabitating with another woman.
only with respect to their duties in the judicial
Based on Arquero’s testimony, he justified branch but also to their behavior outside the
his having a relationship with Irader solely on court as private individuals
the written document purportedly a
―Kasunduan‖ or agreement entered into by
Arquero’s act of having illicit relations with
Acebedo and Irader, consenting to and giving
Irader is, within the purview of Section 46 (5)
freedom to either of them to seek any partner
of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive
and to live with him or her.
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful
ISSUE: and immoral conduct.
Whether or not Arquero should be held guilty
Espinosa v.Atty. Omana, A.C. No. 9081,
of immorality
October 12, 2011
HELD:
FACTS: On 17 November 1997, Rodolfo
Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought
Arquero’s justification fails. Being an
Omana’s legal advice on whether they could
employee of the judiciary, Arquero ought to
dissolve their marriage and live separately.
have known that the Kasunduan had
Omana prepared a document entitled
absolutely no force and effect on the validity
“Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” Espinosa
of the marriage between Acebedo and
and Marantal started implanting the
Irader. Article 1 of the Family Code provides
conditions of the said contract. However,
that marriage is ―an inviolable social
Marantal took custody of all their children
and took possession of most of the conjugal
property. Espinosa sought the advice of
Glindo, his fellow employee who is a law
graduate, who informed him that the contract
executed by Omana was not valid. They hired
the services of a lawyer to file a complaint
against Omana before the IBP-CBD. Omana
denied that she prepared the contract. She
admitted that Espinosa went to see her and
requested for the notarization of the contract
but she told him that it was illegal. Omana
alleged that Espinosa returned the next day
while she was out of the office and managed
to persuade her part-time office staff to
notarize the document. Her office staff forged
her signature and notarized the contract.
ISSUE: W/N Omaña violated the CPR in
notartizing the “Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay.” W/N the Kasunduaan ng
Paghihiwalay is valid.
HELD: SC has ruled that the extrajudicial
dissolution of the conjugal partnership
without judicial approval is void. The Court
has also ruled that a notary public should not
facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and
the family by encouraging the separation of
the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the
conjugal partnership, which is exactly what
Omaña did in this case.
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE
AVENIDO, Petitioner, vs. TECLA
HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 173540, 22 January 22 2014.
PEREZ, J.:
This case involves a contest between two
women both claiming to have been validly
married to the same man, now deceased.
Facts: Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla)
instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido
(Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla is the
lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio
Avenido (Eustaquio).
Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio
was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in
Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the
Parish Priest of the said town. While the a
marriage certificate was recorded with the
local civil registrar, the records of the LCR
were destroyed during World War II. Tecla
and Eustaquio begot four children, but
Eustaquio left his family in 1954.
In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got
married to another woman by the name of
Peregrina, which marriage she claims must
be declared null and void for being bigamous.
In support of her claim, Tecla presented
eyewitnesses to the ceremony, the birth
certificate of their children and certificates to
the fact that the marriage certificate/records
were destroyed.
Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she
is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio
who died on 22 September 1989, their
marriage having been celebrated on 30
March 1979 and showed the marriage
contract between her and Eustaquio.
RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on
Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of
marriage to Eustaquio. Without such
certificate, RTC considered as useless the
certification of the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Talibon over the lack of records.
The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It
held there was a presumption of lawful
marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as
they deported themselves as husband and
wife and begot four children. Such
presumption, supported by documentary
evidence consisting of the same
Certifications disregarded by the RTC, and
testimonial evidence created sufficient proof
of the fact of marriage. The CA found that its
appreciation of the evidence presented by
Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Between Tecla and Peregrina, who
was the legal wife of Eustaquio?
RULING: TECLA
While a marriage certificate is considered the
primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence
of marriage. The fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s
birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between
his parents.
It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule
that without the marriage certificate, no other
proof can be accepted.
The execution of a document may be proven
by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized
the signatures of the parties; or even by those
to whom the parties have previously narrated
the execution thereof.
In this case, due execution was established by
the eyewitness testimonies and of Tecla
herself as a party to the event. The subsequent
loss was shown by the testimony of the
officiating priest. Since the due execution and
the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary
evidence–testimonial and documentary–may
be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
The starting point then, is the presumption of
marriage.
Every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such
is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living
in the constant violation of decency and of
law.
REPUBLIC vs ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
This is a case of MARRIAGE FOR
CONVENIENCE.
FACTS
Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel
Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She later
on filed a petition to nullify their marriage.
She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really
had any intention of entering into a married
state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations. She said that
she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American
citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that
after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because
he never processed her petition for
citizenship. She described their marriage as
one made in jest and, therefore, null and
void ab initio.
The RTC ruled in her favor.
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void,
the RTC ruled that when a marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception. In its
resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain
that the marriage was declared void because
the parties failed to freely give their consent
to the marriage as they had no intention to
be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means for the respondent to acquire
American citizenship.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal
before the CA. The CA, however, upheld the
RTC decision.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that
the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did
not understand the nature and consequence
of getting married. As in the Rubenstein
case, the CA found the marriage to be
similar to a marriage in jest considering that
the parties only entered into the marriage for
the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended
to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build
a family.
The OSG then elevate the case to the
Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of
Albios and Fringer be declared null and
void.
RULING:
No, respondent’s marriage is not void.
The court said:
“Based on the above, consent was not
lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice
of consent. Their consent was also conscious
and intelligent as they understood the nature
and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their
consent was freely given is best evidenced
by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage.
Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage. There was a clear intention to
enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full
and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.”
The court also explained that “There is no
law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and
it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.”
“No less than our Constitution declares that
marriage, as an in violable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of
the contracting parties. This Court cannot
leave the impression that marriage may
easily be entered into when it suits the needs
of the parties, and just as easily nullified
when no longer needed.”
Leonila Santiago v. People of the PH
GR 200233
July 15, 2015
Facts:
4 months after solemnization of
marriage, Leonila (petitioner) and Nicanor
Santiago were served an information for
Bigamy for the prosecution adduced that
Nicaonor was still married to Estela when he
entered into the 2nd marriage; he was able to
escape while petitioner pleaded ‘not guilty’
relying on the fact that when she married
him, she thought he was single. She soon
averred that their marriage was void due to
lack of marriage license, wherein she should
not then be charged with bigamy. 11 years
after inception if criminal case, Estela
Galang, the first wife, testified for the
prosecution. She alleged that she had met
petitioner and introduced herself as the legal
wife. Petitioner denied allegation and stated
that she met Estela only after she had
already married Nicanor.
Issue: W/N petitioner is co-accused
in the instant case of Bigamy.
W/N marriage between
Leonila and Nicanor is valid
Held:
Lower courts consistently found that
petitioner indeed knew of the first marriage
as shown by the totality of the following
circumstances: (1) when Nicanor was
courting and visiting petitioner in the house
of her in-laws, they openly showed their
disapproval of him (2) it was incredible for a
learned person like petitioner to not know of
his true civil status (3) Estela, who was the
more credible witness, compared to
petitioner who had various inconsistent
testimonies, straightforwardly testified that
she had already told petitioner on two
occasions that the former was the legal wife
of Nicanor. In People v. Archilla,
knowledge of the second wife of the fact of
her spouse’s existing prior marriage,
constitutes an indispensable cooperation in
the commission of Bigamy, which makes
her responsible as an accomplice. She is not
co-accused. She is guilty of Bigamy as an
accomplice thereby sentenced to 6m arresto
mayor to 4y prision correccional.
RENE RONULO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182438, 2 July 2014.
BRION, J.:
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were
scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the
Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos
Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the
church's officiating priest refused to
solemnize the marriage because of lack of a
marriage license.
With the couple and the guests already
dressed for the wedding, they headed to an
Aglipayan Church. The Aglipayan priest,
herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a
ceremony on the same day where the couple
took each other as husband and wife in front
of the guests. This was despite Petitioner's
knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage
license.
Petitioner was eventually charged of
violating Article 352 of the RPC for
performing an illegal marriage ceremony.
The MTC did not believe Petitioner's
defense that what he did was an act of
blessing and was not tantamount to
solemnization of marriage and was found
guilty.
The decision was affirmed by both the RTC
and the CA.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an
illegal marriage.
RULING: Yes.
Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an
authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage
ceremony. The elements of this crime are:
1. authority of the solemnizing
officer; and
2. his performance of an illegal
marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner
himself admitted that he has authority to
solemnize a marriage.
The second element is present since the
alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an illegal
marriage ceremony.
There is no prescribed form or rite for the
solemnization of a marriage. However,
Article 6 of the Family Code provides that it
shall be necessary:
1. for the contracting parties to
appear personally before the
solemnizing officer; and
2. declare in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age
that they take each other as husband
and wife.
The first requirement is present since
petitioner admitted to it. The second
requirement is likewise present since the
prosecution, through the testimony of its
witnesses, proved that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other
as husband and wife.
The penalty for violating Article 352 of the
RPC is in accordance with the provision of
the Marriage Law, specifically Article 44,
which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any
violation of any provision of this Act not
specifically penalized, or of the regulations
to be promulgated by the proper authorities,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than
two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for
not more than one month, or both, in the
discretion of the court.
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of
violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as
penalty.
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN
BANGAYAN, JR. CASE DIGEST [G.R.
No. 201061, July 3, 2013, CARPIO, J.]
TOPIC: Property Regime of Unions
Without Marriage (Article 148)
DOCTRINE: Benjamin and Sally
cohabitated without the benefit of marriage.
Thus, only the properties acquired by them
through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions, in accord with
Article 148.
FACTS: Benjamin and Sally developed a
romantic relationship in 1979. Sally’s father
was against the relationship. Sally brought
Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig
City where they signed a purported marriage
contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital
status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered. Sally filed
criminal actions for bigamy and falsification
of public documents against Benjamin,
using their simulated marriage contract as
evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition
for declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the trial court on the ground that his
marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it
lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court
for the partition of the properties he acquired
with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of
the Family Code, for his appointment as
administrator of the properties during the
pendency of the case, and for the declaration
of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate
children. A total of 44 registered properties
became the subject of the partition before
the trial court. Aside from the seven
properties enumerated by Benjamin in his
petition, Sally named 37 properties in her
answer.
The trial court ruled that the marriage was
not recorded with the local civil registrar
and the National Statistics Office because it
could not be registered due to Benjamin’s
subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial
court ruled that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally are void for not having a
marriage license
2. Whether Art. 148 should govern
Benjamin and Sally’s property relations
3. Whether bigamy was committed by the
petitioner
HELD:
1. YES.
We see no inconsistency in finding the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally null
and void ab initio and, at the same time,
non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family
Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, except those covered by Article 34
where no license is necessary, “shall be void
from the beginning.” In this case, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly
established that no marriage license was
issued to them and that Marriage License
No. N-07568 did not match the marriage
license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of
February 1982. The case clearly falls under
Section 3 of Article 35which made their
marriage void ab initio. The marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was also non-
existent. Applying the general rules on void
or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of
the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are
“inexistent and void from the beginning.”
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
null and void ab initio and non-existent.
2. YES.
The property relations of Benjamin and
Sally is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code which states: Art. 148. In cases
of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community of
conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith
is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall
likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the
benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective
contributions. Thus, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the
37 properties being claimed by Sally which
were given by Benjamin’s father to his
children as advance inheritance. Sally’s
Answer to the petition before the trial court
even admitted that “Benjamin’s late father
himself conveyed a number of properties to
his children and their respective spouses
which included Sally x x x.”
As regards the seven remaining properties,
we rule that the decision of the CA is more
in accord with the evidence on record. Only
the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was
registered in the names of Benjamin and
Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of
Benjamin with the descriptive title “married
to Sally.” The property covered by CCT
Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the
name of Sally with the descriptive title
“married to Benjamin” while the properties
under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were
registered in the name of Sally as a single
individual. We have ruled that the words
“married to” preceding the name of a spouse
are merely descriptive of the civil status of
the registered owner. Such words do not
prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses,
there can be no co-ownership under Article
148 of the Family Code.
3. NO.
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is
bigamous under the concept of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is
not bigamous. It is required that the first or
former marriage shall not be null and void.
The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena
shall be assumed as the one that is valid,
there being no evidence to the contrary and
there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity
on the face of their marriage contract.
However, if the second marriage was void
not because of the existence of the first
marriage but for other causes such as lack of
license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. For bigamy to exist, the second
or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage.In this case,
there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a
marriage license. The supposed marriage
was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office.
In short, the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally did not exist. They lived together
and represented themselves as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage.
RAQUEL G. KHO v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B. KHO ,
G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016
Facts: The present petition arose from a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage filed by herein petitioner with the
RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent
portions of the Petition allege as follows:
Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972,
petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio
Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the
office of the municipal treasurer, instructing
said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever
necessary papers were required for the
intended marriage between petitioner and
respondent supposedly to take place at
around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to
exclude the public from witnessing the
marriage ceremony; 4. Petitioner and
Respondent thereafter exchanged marital
vows in a marriage ceremony which actually
took place at around 3:00 o'clock before
dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there
was a public dance held in the town plaza
which is just situated adjacent to the church
whereas the venue of the wedding, and the
dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock
of same early morning of June 1, 1972;5.
Petitioner has never gone to the office of the
Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage
license and had not seen much less signed
any papers or documents in connection with
the procurement of a marriage license;6.
Considering the shortness of period from the
time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's
office was told to obtain the pertinent papers
in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required
for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage
up to the moment the actual marriage was
celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no
marriage license therefore could have been
validly issued, thereby rendering the
marriage solemnized on even date null and
void for want of the most essential
requisite;7. For all intents and purposes,
thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage
aforestated was solemnized sans the
required marriage license, hence, null and
void from the beginning and neither was it
performed under circumstances exempting
the requirement of such marriage license;
Among the pieces of evidence presented by
petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has
neither record nor copy of a marriage license
issued to petitioner and respondent with
respect to their marriage celebrated on June
1, 1972.
On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered
its Decision granting the petition.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Court hereby declares the marriage
contracted between Raquel G. Kho and
Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and
void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the
Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the
Family Code. The foregoing is without
prejudice to the application of Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code.The RTC found
that petitioner's evidence sufficiently
established the absence of the requisite
marriage license when the marriage between
petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As
such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles
53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the absence of the said marriage
license rendered the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab
initio.
Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA
in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA
promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing
thus:WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September
2000 of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage
between the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho
and Veronica Kho is declared valid and
subsisting for all intents and purposes.The
CA held that since a marriage was, in fact,
solemnized between the contending parties,
there is a presumption that a marriage
license was issued for that purpose and that
petitioner failed to overcome such
presumption. The CA also ruled that the
absence of any indication in the marriage
certificate that a marriage license was issued
is a mere defect in the formal requisites of
the law which does not invalidate the parties'
marriage.
Issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED
"ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO
PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO
AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH
ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN
REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS
MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH
RESPONDENT;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST
PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE
THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID
NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN
COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY
VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN ALTOGETHER
DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S
OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF
LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND
GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD TO
UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS
ASSAILED DECISION; and
4 WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR
REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S
JUDGMENT DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER
AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR
ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE
MARRIAGE LICENSE.10
Petitioner's basic contention in the present
petition centers on the alleged failure of the
CA to give due credence to petitioner's
evidence which established the absence or
lack of marriage license at the time that
petitioner and respondent's marriage was
solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA
erred in deciding the case not on the basis of
law and evidence but rather on the ground of
what the appellate court calls as ethical
considerations as well as on the perceived
motive of petitioner in seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with
respondent.
Held: The Court finds for the petitioner.The
marriage of petitioner and respondent was
celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code.12 Hence, the
Civil Code governs their union.
Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code
spells out the essential requisites of marriage
as a contract, to wit:
ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized
unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting
parties;(2) Their consent, freely given;(3)
Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and (4) A marriage license, except
in a marriage of exceptional
character.Article 58 of the Civil Code makes
explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the
local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but
not those under Article 75.14 Under the
Civil Code, marriages of exceptional
character are covered by Chapter 2, Title
111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These
marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo
mortis or at the point of death during peace
or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3)
consular marriages; (4) ratification of
marital cohabitation; (5) religious
ratification of a civil marriage; (6)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7)
mixed marriages. Petitioner's and
respondent's marriage does not fall under
any of these exceptions.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it
clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this
being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage
contract.15 The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license under the
Civil Code is that it is the authority granted
by the State to the contracting parties, after
the proper government official has inquired
into their capacity to contract
marriage.16Stated differently, the
requirement and issuance of a marriage
license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.17
As stated above, petitioner was able to
present a Certification issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor
copy of any marriage license ever issued in
favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and
Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose
marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972."21
Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the
presumed validity of the marriage of
petitioner and respondent has been
overcome and it becomes the burden of
respondent to prove that their marriage is
valid as it is she who alleges such validity.
As found by the RTC, respondent was not
able to discharge that burden.
It is telling that respondent failed to present
their alleged marriage license or a copy
thereof to the court. In addition, the
Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the
officiating priest does not contain any entry
regarding the said marriage license.
Respondent could have obtained a copy of
their marriage contract from the National
Archives and Records Section, where
information regarding the marriage license,
i.e., date of issuance and license number,
could be obtained. However, she also failed
to do so. The Court also notes, with
approval, the RTC's agreement with
petitioner's observation that the statements
of the witnesses for respondent, as well as
respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a
marriage ceremony was conducted but
neither one of them testified that a marriage
license was issued in favor of petitioner and
respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's
categorical claim that she and petitioner
were able to obtain a marriage license, she
failed to present evidence to prove such
allegation. It is a settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
and mere allegation is not evidence.23
Based on the Certification issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's
failure to produce a copy of the alleged
marriage license or of any evidence to show
that such license was ever issued, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no
valid marriage license was, in fact, issued.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot
be said that there was a simple defect, not a
total absence, in the requirements of the law
which would not affect the validity of the
marriage. The fact remains that respondent
failed to prove that the subject marriage
license was issued and the law is clear that a
marriage which is performed without the
corresponding marriage license is null and
void.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, it is a disputable presumption that an
official duty has been regularly performed,
absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary. We held, "The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty." No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the
Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records
of their office, thus the presumption must
stand.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to
be considered void on the ground of absence
of a marriage license, the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must
be apparent on the marriage contract, or at
the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties.32
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to
show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was
signed does not operate to cure the absence
of a valid marriage license.33 As cited
above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code
clearly provides that a marriage solemnized
without a license is void from the beginning,
except marriages of exceptional character
under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code.
As earlier stated, petitioner's and
respondent's marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exceptions.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to
annul his marriage to respondent, it may
well be that his motives are less than pure -
that he seeks a way out of his marriage to
legitimize his alleged illicit affair with
another woman. Be that as it may, the same
does not make up for the failure of the
respondent to prove that they had a valid
marriage license, given the weight of
evidence presented by petitioner. The law
must be applied. As the marriage license, an
essential requisite under the Civil Code, is
clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated
March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September
25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is
REINSTATED.
NGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as
Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO
NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa
Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was
shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April
24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed
an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in
a car accident
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the
said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of
the second marriage would affect petitioner’s
successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that petitioners have no cause
of action since they are not among the
persons who could file an action for
annulment of marriage under Article 47 of
the Family Code.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living
together as husband and wife for at least five
years exempts them from obtaining a
marriage license under Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause
of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of
this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal
is already dead
Ruling:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma
have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage,
that five-year period should be computed on
the basis of cohabitation as “husband and
wife” where the only missing factor is the
special contract of marriage to validate the
union. In other words, the five-year common
law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. The five-year period should be the
years immediately before the day the
marriage and it should be a period
of cohabitationcharacterized by
exclusivity—meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years,
and continuity—that is, unbroken.
Otherwise, if that five-
year cohabitation period is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those
who lived faithfully with their spouse.
(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. Consequently, void marriages can
be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not
after death of either, in which case the parties
and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.
Republic vs. Dayot
GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the
Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In
lieu of a marriage license, they executed a
sworn affidavit that they had lived together
for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual. They were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board.
Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for
bigamy against Jose and an administrative
complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a
complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage where he
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a
sham and his consent was secured through
fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa
is valid considering that they executed a
sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license
requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and
Felisa have not lived together for five years
at the time they executed their sworn affidavit
and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or
barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage on November 1986. Findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding
in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without
prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the
falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s
cohabitation, which would have qualified
their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be
a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely
required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s
marriage is void ab initio. The court also
ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. The right to impugn
marriage does not prescribe and may be
raised any time.
LLAVE V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
This petition for review on certiorari assails
the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution
dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring
petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s
(Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J.
Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen.
Tamanomarried Estrellita twice – initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May
27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently,
under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC
Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2,
1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen.
Tamano s civilstatus was indicated as
“divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been
representing herself to the whole world as
Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his
widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents
Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and
her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in
their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of
Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with
Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of
Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen.
Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint
alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on
May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this
marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and
the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.
HELD:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of
Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their marriage
was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen.
Tamano s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is
void ab initio.
RATIO:
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano
and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The
only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-
Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time. Under
the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which
was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen.
Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,
the law that codified Muslim personal laws.
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita.
Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the
law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein
both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the
male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law
or this Code in any part of the Philippines.”
But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide
for a situation where the parties were married
both in civil and Muslim rites.”
Uy v. Lacsamana (2015)
Petitioner: Luis Uy, substituted by 2
daughters
Respondent: Sps. Jose Lacsamana,
substituted By Corazon Buena
DOCTRINE:
Persons living together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, absent any
counter presumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married.
Properties acquired during cohabitation
are presumed co-owned unless there is
proof to the contrary.
FACTS:
1. Uy filed with RTC Batangas a complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of Documents
with Damages against Petra Rosca and
Sps. Lacsamana.
2. Uy alleged that he was the lawful
husband of Rosca, living together as
husband and wife from 1944 until 1973
(29 years) when they separated (because
of Uy’s alleged affair).
a. They had 8 children.
3. Subject of this case is a piece of
residential land Rosca bought from Sps.
Manuel.
4. This property, together with the house
Rosca built was then subsequently sold to
Sps. Lacsamana.
5. Uy alleges that the property is part of the
sale of Rosca to Sps. Lacsamana was void
for failure to obtain his marital consent,
the property being conjugal in nature.
6. Uy then filed a complaint, praying that
the Deed of Sale (executed by Rosca in
favor of Sps. Lacsamana) be declared null
 and void with respect to his rights,
interest, and ownership and damages.
a. Rosca defense: purchase of land was
from her paraphernal funds and that
she was never married to Uy.
7. Upon Uy’s death, 2 daughters substituted.
Upon Rosca’s death and Sps.
Lacsamana’s sale of the property to
Buena, Buena substituted.
8. RTC: no valid marriage between Uy and
Rosca, Deed of Sale by Rosca in favor of
Lacsamana was valid; CA- affirmed
RTC; MR- denied.
ISSUES: WON Deed of Sale executed by
Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor
of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.
RULING + RATIO: YES. Valid Deed of
Sale.
1. Validity of sale of property by Rosca
alone is anchored on whether Uy and
Rosca had a valid marraige.
2. There is a presumption established in our
Rules "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.” Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio — Always presume
marriage. However, this presumption
may be contradicted by a party and
overcome by other evidence.
3. Marriage may be proven by any
competent and relevant evidence.
a. Testimony by one of the parties or
witnesses, person who officiated at
the solemnization
b. Documentary evidence – marriage
contract
4. RTC findings – Uy and Rosca not legally
married.
a. In his Petition for Naturalization as
a Filipino citizen filed before CFI,
Uy said, "I am married (not legally)."
b. The Sworn Statement of Batangas
Governor executed in support of the
Uy's Petition for Naturalization
categorically states, that Uy was
married (not legally).
c. The Immigrant Certificate of
Residence - Uy also known by his
Chinese name of Uy Suan Tee,
regarded himself as "single" when
filling up his civil status therein.
d. Alien Certificate
e. Affidavit of a prominent citizen of
Batangas – not legally married
f. Rosca’s testimony thay they were
not legally married because their
marriage was not consummated
(because of WW2)
5. With the presumption of marriage
sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi
of Rosca shifted to Uy to prove the
marriage but Uy failed to present any
additional proof of such.
6. Since Uy failed to discharge the burden
that he was legally married to Rosca, their
property relations would be governed by
Article 147 of the Family Code which
applies when a couple living together
were not incapacitated from getting
married ------ co ownership of properties
is presumed unless there is proof to the
contrary.
7. Rosca was able to prove that the subject
property is not co-owned but is
paraphernal.
a. Land Registration Commission
Resolution recognized Rosca as sole
registered owner of the property.
b. Deed of Sale with Sps. Manuel,
where Uy stood as a mere witness so
he admitted the paraphernal nature
of Rosca’s property
c. In the loan application of Rosca,
affidavit of ownership stated Petra
Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy.
i. Word “married to” is merely
descriptive of Rosca's status at
 the time the property was
registered in her name.
ii. Otherwise, if the property was
conjugal, the title to the
property should have been in
the names of Luis Uy and Petra
Rosca.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we DENY
the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated
14 September 2011 and Resolution dated 1
March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 93786.
Morigo vs. People
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were
boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for
a while but after receiving a card from
Barrete and various exchanges of letters,
they became sweethearts. They got married
in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for
work and in 1991 she filed petition for
divorce in Ontario Canada, which was
granted. In 1992, Morigo married
Lumbago. He subsequently filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity
on the ground that there was no marriage
ceremony. Morigo was then charged with
bigamy and moved for a suspension of
arraignment since the civil case pending
posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy
case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming
that his marriage with Barrete was void ab
initio. Petitioner contented he contracted
second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed
declaration for the nullity of his marriage
with Barrete before his second marriage in
order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab
initio considering that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between them
by a solemnizing officer instead they just
merely signed a marriage contract. The
petitioner does not need to file declaration of
the nullity of his marriage when he
contracted his second marriage with
Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit
bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF
JUAN LUCES LUNA, GR No. 171914,
2014-07-23
Facts:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and
ineffectual under the nationality rule
adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any
settlement of property between the parties of
the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce
obtained in a... foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be
enforceable against the assets of the husband
who contracts a subsequent marriage.
ATTY. LUNA... was at first a name partner
in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar,
Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law
Offices at that time when he was living with
his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(EUGENIA), whom he initially married in a
civil ceremony
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA
obtained a divorce decree of his marriage
with EUGENIA from the Civil and
Commercial Chamber of the First
Circumscription of the Court of First
Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican
Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican
Republic, on the same... date, ATTY. LUNA
contracted another marriage, this time with
SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and
lived together as husband and wife until
1987.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share
in the condominium unit including the
lawbooks, office furniture and equipment
found therein were taken over by Gregorio
Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA's son of the first
marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out
the 25/100 portion of the... condominium
unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato
G. De la Cruz who established his own law
firm named Renato G. De la Cruz &
Associates.
On November 11, 2005, the CA
promulgated its assailed modified
decision,[9] holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate
wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter's death
on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce
decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the
Dominican Republic did not terminate his
prior marriage with EUGENIA because
foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens is not recognized in our
jurisdiction. x x x[10]
Issues:
The decisive question to be resolved is who
among the contending parties should be
entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share in
the condominium unit; and to the law books
(i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal
Supreme Court
Reports).
Ruling:
Atty. Luna's first marriage with Eugenia...
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in
the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The
law in force at the time of the solemnization
was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted
the nationality rule. The Civil Code
continued to... follow the nationality rule, to
the effect that Philippine laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons were
binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
although living abroad.[15] Pursuant to the...
nationality rule, Philippine laws governed
this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and
Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the
death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997
terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first
marriage on September 10, 1947 until the
present, absolute divorce between Filipino
spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute
divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family
Code,[16] even if either or both of the
spouses are residing abroad.[17] Indeed, the
only two types of defective marital unions
under our laws have been the void and the
voidable marriages. As such, the remedies
against such... defective marriages have
been limited to the declaration of nullity of
the marriage and the annulment of the
marriage.
Atty. Luna's marriage with Soledad, being
bigamous,... was void; properties acquired
during their marriage... were governed by
the rules on co-ownership
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna's
subsequent marriage to Soledad on January
12, 1976 was void for being bigamous,[22]
on the ground that the marriage between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been
dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered
by the CFI... of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic but... n the Philippines,
marriages that are bigamous, polygamous,
or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the
Civil Code clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages as... determined by Philippine
law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by
contracting a second or subsequent marriage
before the first marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means
of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.[23] A bigamous marriage is
considered void ab initio.[24]
Article 144. When a man and a woman live
together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed... by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that her own
independent funds were used to buy the law
office condominium and the law books
subject matter in contention in this case
proof that was required for Article 144 of
the New Civil Code and Article
148 of the Family Code to apply as to cases
where properties were acquired by a man
and a woman living together as husband and
wife but not married, or under a marriage
which was void ab initio. Under Article 144
of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-
ownership would... govern. But this was not
readily applicable to many situations and
thus it created a void at first because it
applied only if the parties were not in any
way incapacitated or were without
impediment to marry each other (for it
would be absurd to create a co-ownership
where there... still exists a prior conjugal
partnership or absolute community between
the man and his lawful wife). This void was
filled upon adoption of the Family Code.
Article 148 provided that: only the property
acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of... money,
property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions
and corresponding shares were prima facie
presumed to be equal. However, for this
presumption to arise, proof of actual
contribution was... required. The same rule
and presumption was to apply to joint
deposits of money and evidence of credit. If
one of the parties was validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership
accrued to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such... valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith
was not validly married to another, his or
her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the Article
147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if
both parties were in bad faith.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros
M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ
in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on
May 24, 1981. Related imageThey were
blessed with a with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States
bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986.
After few years, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife
had obtained a divorce decree sometime in
2000 and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley and lived in California.
He then filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition
was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the
court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it
was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for
review of certiorari on the Decision of the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Orbecido can
remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
Held:
Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in
holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse
who had acquired a citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry under Philippine
law.
The article should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on,one of them became
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained
a divorce decree.
The instant case was one where at the time
the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the
wife was naturalized as an American citizen
and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed, she
remarried an American citizen while residing
in the US. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.
However, since Orbecido was not able to
prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he was
still barred from remarrying.
CORPUZ V. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 186571, [11 August 2010]
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized
Canadian citizen who married respondent
Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently
left for Canada due to work and other
professional commitments. When he
returned to the Philippines, he discovered that
Sto. Tomas was already romantically
involved with another man.
This brought about the filing of a petition for
divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was
eventually granted by the Court Justice of
Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the
divorce decree took effect. Two years later,
Corpuz has fallen in love with another
Filipina and wished to marry her. He went
to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to
register the Canadian divorce decree on his
marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas.
However, despite the registration, an official
of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz
that the former marriage still subsists under
the Philippine law until there has been a
judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce
decree by a competent judicial court in view
of NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of dissolution of marriage with
the RTC. However, the RTC denied the
petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot
institute the action for judicial recognition of
the foreign divorce decree because he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided
further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party
who can institute an action under the
principle of Article 26 of the Family Code
which capacitates a Filipino citizen to
remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a
foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz
the right to institute a petition for judicial
recognition of a foreign divorce decree?
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision
REVERSED.
The Supreme Court qualifies the above
conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
rights in favor of aliens -with the
complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code to aliens does not necessarily
strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition
the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s
national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as
a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at the
same time, will allow other interested parties
to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive
evidence of aright by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure
conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment,
once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata between the parties, as provided in
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Fujiki vs. Marinay
GR No. 196049, June 26, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a
Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could
not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara got married in Quezon City.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they
were able to re-establish their relationship.
Fujiki then helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan
declaring her marriage in Maekara void on
the ground of bigamy.
Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a
petition for a Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment before the RTC.
However, the trial court dismissed the
petition maintaining that Fujiki lacks
personality file the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
RULING:
Yes, a husband or wife of a prior marriage
can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment
only requires proof of fact of the judgment,
it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Section 1 of the said rule provides for
who may file such petition, to wit:
Sec. 1: Who may file petition. — Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is
located.
In this case, there is no doubt that the prior
spouse, Fujiki, has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property
relations arising from it. Thus, he has the
legal personality to file the petition.
PETITION GRANTED.
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA v.
MICHIYUKI KOIKE, GR No. 215723,
2016-07-27
Facts:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a
Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki
Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national,
were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon
City, Philippines.[4] Their union bore two
children, Masato Koike, who was born on
January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was
born on April 4, 2007.[5]
On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki,
pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for
divorce[6] before the Mayor of Ichinomiya
City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were
divorced on even date as appearing in the
Divorce Certificate[7] and the same was
duly recorded in the Official Family
Register of Michiyuki Koike.[8]
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate
annotated on her Certificate of Marriage[9]
on file with the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7,
2013 a petition[10] for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry pursuant to the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code[11] before the RTC
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose
the petition.[12] On the other hand, Doreen
presented several foreign documents,
namely, "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate
of Acceptance of Divorce"[13] and "Family
Register of Michiyuki Koike"[14] both
issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and
duly authenticated by the Consul of the
Republic of the Philippines for Osaka,
Japan. She also presented a certified
machine copy of a document entitled
"Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul
for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that
was authenticated by the Department of the
Foreign Affairs, as well as a
Certification[15] issued by the City Civil
Registry Office in Manila that the original of
said divorce certificate was filed and
recorded in the said Office. In addition,
photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and
their corresponding English translation, as
well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil
Code of Japan 2000"[16] and "The Civil
Code of Japan 2009"[17] were likewise
submitted as proof of the existence of
Japan's law on divorce.[18]
In a Decision[19] dated July 31, 2014, the
RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in
an action for recognition of foreign divorce
decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family
Code, the foreign divorce decree and" the
national law of the alien recognizing his or
her capacity to obtain a divorce must be
proven
The RTC ruled that while the divorce
documents presented by Doreen were
successfully proven to be public or official
records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short
of proving the national law of her husband,
particularly the existence of the law on
divorce. The RTC observed that the "The
Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil
Code of Japan 2009," presented were not
duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul
in Japan... adding too that the testimony of
Doreen relative to the applicable provisions
found therein and its effect on the
matrimonial relations was insufficient since
she was not presented as a qualified expert
witness nor was shown to have, at the very
least, a working knowledge of the laws of
Japan, particularly those on family relations
and divorce.
Since no expert witness on the subject
matter was presented and considering
further that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and
law.[23]
Doreen's motion for reconsideration[24] was
denied in a Resolution[25] dated November
28, 2014
Issues:
The core issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not the RTC erred in denying the
petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce.
Ruling:
At the outset, it bears stressing that
Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
However, Article 26 of the Family Code -
which addresses foreign marriages or mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is validly obtained abroad by an
alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. The provision reads:... the law
confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree
to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial
to determine the validity of the dissolution
of the marriage.[26]
This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence, together with the
alien's applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself
or herself.
Both the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven.[30]
Since our courts do not take judicial notice
of foreign laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must
be alleged and proven like any other
fact.[31]
Considering that the validity of the divorce
decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as
well as the existence of pertinent laws of
Japan on the matter are essentially factual
that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence
presented before the RTC, the issue raised in
the instant appeal is obviously a question of
fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45
petition for review.
The resolution of factual issues is the
function of the lower courts, whose findings
on these matters are received with respect
and are in fact binding subject to certain
exceptions.[32] In this regard, it is settled
that appeals taken from judgments or final
orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction raising questions of fact
or mixed questions of fact and law should be
brought to the Court of Appeals (CA)
It bears to stress that procedural rules were
intended to ensure proper administration of
law and justice. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense, for they are adopted to help
secure, not override, substantial justice. A
deviation from its rigid enforcement may
thus be allowed to attain its prime objective,
for after all, the dispensation of justice is the
core reason for the existence of the
courts.[35]
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly
procedure and substantial justice, the case is
hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals
for appropriate action including the
reception of evidence to DETERMINE and
RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in
accordance with this Decision.
Republic v. Manalo
G.R. No. 221029
April 24, 2018
Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a
Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo
filed a case for divorce in Japan and after
due proceedings, a divorce decree dated
December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo
now wants to cancel the entry of marriage
between her and Minoro from the Civil
Registry and to be allowed to reuse her
maiden surname, Manalo.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code,
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law
Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate
the divorce instead of the foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn
Manalo from Japan valid here in the
Philippines?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting
the law, the intent should be taken into
consideration. According to Justice Alicia
Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, the aim of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation
of having the Filipino deemed still married
to a foreign spouse even though the latter is
no longer married to the former. According
to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article
26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires
only that there be a valid divorce obtained
abroad and does not discriminate as to who
should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the
Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also,
even if assuming arguendo that the provision
should be interpreted that the divorce
proceeding should be initiated by the foreign
spouse, the Court will not follow such
interpretation since doing so would be
contrary to the legislative intent of the law.
In the issue of the application of Article 15
of the Civil Code in this case, the Court
ruled that even if Manalo should be bound
by the nationality principle, blind adherence
to it should not be allowed if it will cause
unjust discrimination and oppression to
certain classes of individuals whose rights
are equally protected by the law.
The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the
Family Code is in violation of the equal
protection clause. They said that the
limitation provided by Article 26 is based on
a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical
classification. The violation of the equal
protection clause in this case is shown by the
discrimination against Filipino spouses who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and
Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree
because the foreign spouse had initiated the
divorce proceedings. Their circumstances
are alike, and making a distinction between
them as regards to the validity of the divorce
decree obtained would give one undue favor
and unjustly discriminate against the other.
The Court also said that it is the State’s duty
not only to strengthen the solidarity of the
Filipino family but also to defend, among
others, the right of children to special
protection from all forms of neglect abuse,
cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development. The State cannot do this
if the application of paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code is limited to only
those foreign divorces initiated by the
foreign spouse.
2. The Court cannot determine due to
insufficient evidence.
It has been ruled that foreign laws must be
proven. There are two basic types of
divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage,
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro,
which suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.
The presentation solely of the divorce decree
will not suffice to lead the Court to believe
that the decree is valid or constitutes
absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must
still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law
on divorce must still be proved.
In this case, the Court remanded the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings
and reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.
[ GR No. 224015, Jul 23, 2018 ]
STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI v.
REPUBLIC
Capili vs. People G.R. No. 183805, July 03,
2013 Bigamy
JANUARY 27, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of
bigamy before the RTC. Petitioner thereafter
filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings
alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case
for declaration of nullity of the second
marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City
filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the
event that the marriage is declared null and
void, it would exculpate him from the
charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of
the civil case for the declaration of nullity of
the second marriage serves as a prejudicial
question in the instant criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of
nullity of the second marriage is a ground
for dismissal of the criminal case for
bigamy.
RULING:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as
follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy,
therefore, are: (1) the offender has been
legally married; (2) the marriage has not
been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code; (3) that he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second
or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the
elements of the crime of bigamy were
present when the Information was filed on
June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent
was contracted on December 8, 1999 during
the subsistence of a valid first marriage
between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-
Capili contracted on September 3, 1999.
Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself
declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private
respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the
prosecution of petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding
that the accused may still be charged with
the crime of bigamy, even if there is a
subsequent declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage, so long as the first
marriage was still subsisting when the
second marriage was celebrated.
SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs.
SUSAN CARINO, defendant
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
Facts:
During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S.
Carino, he contracted two marriages, the
first with Susan Nicdao Carino with whom
he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee)
and with Susan Yee Carino with whom he
had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away
under the care of Susan Yee who spent for
his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Nicdao was able to
collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee
received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an
action for collection of sum of money
against Nicdao, contending that the marriage
of the latter with Santiago is void ab initio
because their marriage was solemnized
without the required marriage license. The
trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering
Nicdao to pay Yee half of acquired death
benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Santiago
Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of
marriage license.
Ruling:
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in
force when the marriage of Nicdao and
Carino was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage
and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab
initio. In the case at bar, the marriage does
not fall within any of those exceptions and a
marriage license therefore was indispensable
to the validity of it. This fact is certified by
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila. Such being the case, the presumed
validity of the marriage of Nicdao and
Carino has been sufficiently overcome and
cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and
Carino is void ab initio as well for lack of
judicial decree of nullity of marriage of
Carino and Nicdao at the time it was
contracted. The marriages are bigamous;
under Article 148 of the Family Code,
properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to
the co-ownership. The decision of the trial
court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen
Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, Jenneth Quiazon
and Maria Jennifer Quiazon v. Ma. Lourdes
Belen, for and in behalf of Maria Lourdes
Elise Quiazon
G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
Perez, J.
FACTS:
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise
Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother,
Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas
City.
In her Petition, Elise claims that she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her
parents were both capacitated to marry each
other. Insisting on the legal capacity of
Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage
to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous
for having been contracted during the
subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito).
To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
among others, attached to the Petition for
Letters of Administration her Certificate of
Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In
the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo
left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and
personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In
order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to
prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise
sought her appointment as administratrix of
her late father’s estate.
ISSUE:
Did the Court err in declaring the marriage
of Amelia to Eliseo void?
HELD:
No. The existence of a previous marriage
between Amelia and Filipito was
sufficiently established by no less than the
Certificate of Marriage issued by the
Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the
officiating priest of the Parish of San
Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The
said marriage certificate is a competent
evidence of marriage and the certification
from the National Archive that no
information relative to the said marriage
exists does not diminish the probative value
of the entries therein.
in a void marriage, no marriage has taken
place and it cannot be the source of rights,
such that any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage. Relevant to the foregoing, there is
no doubt that Elise, whose successional
rights would be prejudiced by her father’s
marriage to Amelia, may impugn the
existence of such marriage even after the
death of her father. The said marriage may
be questioned directly by filing an action
attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally
by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse, such as in the case at bar.
Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has
a cause of action for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the void marriage of
Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either
party to the said marriage does not
extinguish such cause of action.
SUAZO v. SUAZO
G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010
FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were
married when they were 16 years old
only. Without any means to support
themselves, they lived with Angelito’s
parents while Jocelyn took odd jobs and
Angelito refused to work and was most of the
time drunk. Petitioner urged him to find
work but this often resulted to violent
quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn
left Angelito. Angelito thereafter found
another woman with whom he has since
lived. 10 years later, she filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Art.
36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified
on the alleged physical beating she received.
The expert witness corroborated parts of
Jocelyn’s testimony. Both
her psychological report and testimony
concluded that Angelito was psychologically
incapacitated. However, B was not
personally examined by the expert witness.
The RTC annulled the marriage on the
ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with
his marital obligation, such as “immaturity,
i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational
judgment and responsibility, otherwise
peculiar to infants (like refusal of the
husband to support the family or excessive
dependence on parents or peer group
approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the
condition by which a person lives for the
next drink and the next drinks” but the CA
reversed it and held that the respondent may
have failed to provide material support to the
family and has resorted to physical abuse, but
it is still necessary to show that they were
manifestations of a deeper psychological
malaise that was clinically or medically
identified. The theory of the psychologist
that the respondent was suffering from an
anti-social personality syndrome at the
time of the marriage was not the product
of any adequate medical or clinical
investigation. The evidence that she got
from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could
equally show that the behavior of the
respondent was due simply to causes like
immaturity or irresponsibility which are not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the
failure or refusal to work could have been the
result of rebelliousness on the part of one who
felt that he had been forced into a loveless
marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify
Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The Court find the petition devoid of
merit. The CA committed no reversible
error of law in setting aside the RTC decision,
as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s
marriage with Angelito a nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code and its related
jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish
Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The
psychologist evaluated
Angelito’s psychological condition only in
an indirect manner – she derived all her
conclusions from information coming from
Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of
course be doubted. The psychlologist, using
meager information coming from a directly
interested party, could not have secured a
complete personality profile and could not
have conclusively formed an objective
opinion or diagnosis of
Angelito’s psychological condition. While
the report or evaluation may be conclusive
with respect to Jocelyn’s
psychological condition, this is not true for
Angelito’s. The methodology employed
simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required
to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering
from a psychological disorder. Both the
psychologist’s report and testimony simply
provided a general description of Angelito’s
purported anti-social personality disorder,
supported by the characterization of this
disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The
psychologist was conspicuously silent,
however, on the bases for her conclusion or
the particulars that gave rise to the
characterization she gave. Jurisprudence
holds that there must be evidence showing a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself. A’s
testimony regarding the habitual
drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a
job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves,
show psychological incapacity. All these
simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere
refusal to perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged
to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital
obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor – an adverse
integral element in the respondent’s
personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligations – must be
shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in
the performance of marital obligations or ill
will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness;
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a person’s
refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015
PONENTE: Bersamin, J.
TOPIC: Psychological incapacity,
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
FACTS:
In the case at bar, Kalaw presented
the testimonies of two supposed expert
witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s
experts heavily relied on petitioner’s
allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out
with friends, adultery, and neglect of their
children. Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when performed
constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as
mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD.
However, the Supreme Court in its
September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the
complaint for declaration of nullity of the
marriage on the ground that there was no
factual basis for the conclusion of
psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the marriage was
void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
HELD:
YES. The Court in granting the
Motion for Reconsideration held that
Fernandez was indeed psychologically
incapacitated as they relaxed the previously
set forth guidelines with regard to this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the
Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES
and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated
on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES
the decision rendered by the Regional Trial
Court declaring the marriage between the
petitioner and the respondent on November
4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO
due to the psychological incapacity of the
parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Matudan vs Republic
ROBERT F. MALLILIN v. LUZ G.
JAMESOLAMIN, GR No. 192718, 2015-
02-18
Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September
6, 1972. They begot three (3) children. On
March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage before
the RTC. On March 7, 1996, RTC... denied
the petition... n January 29, 1999, the CA
reversed the RTC... decision "due to lack of
participation of the State as required under
Article 48 of the Family Code."
In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the
time of the celebration of their marriage,
Luz was suffering from psychological and
mental incapacity and unpreparedness to
enter into such marital life and to comply
with its essential obligations and
responsibilities. Such... incapacity became
even more apparent during their marriage
when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of
immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of
independent rational judgment, and inability
to cope with the heavy and oftentimes
demanding obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim
contesting the complaint. She averred that it
was Robert who manifested psychological
incapacity in their marriage. Despite due
notice, however, she did not appear during
the trial.
When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz
was already living in California, USA, and
had married an American. He also revealed
that when they were still engaged, Luz
continued seeing and dating another
boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also
claimed that from the outset, Luz... had been
remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a
mother as shown by the following
circumstances: (1) it was he who did the
cleaning of the room because Luz did not
know how to keep order; (2)it was her
mother who prepared their meal while her
sister was the one who washed... their
clothes because she did not want her
polished nails destroyed; (3)it was also her
sister who took care of their children while
she spent her time sleeping and looking at
the mirror; (4) when she resumed her
schooling, she dated different men; (5) he
received anonymous... letters reporting her
loitering with male students; (6) when he
was not home, she would receive male
visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in
their house when he was away; and (6) she
would contract loans without his knowledge.
In addition, Robert presented the testimony
of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva
(Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending
before the trial court, Robert filed a petition
for marriage annulment with the
Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for
the Archdiocese of Manila
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan
Tribunal handed down a decision declaring
their marriage invalid ab initio on the
ground of grave lack of due discretion on the
part of both parties as contemplated by the
second paragraph of Canon 1095. This
decision was... affirmed by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
Prior to that,on September 20, 2002, the
RTC had rendered a decision declaring the
marriage null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Luz
as she failed to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
The State, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an
appeal with the CA. The CA,... granted the
petition and reversed the RTC decision.
Robert filed a motion for reconsideration,
but it was denied by the CA
Issues:
Whether the totality of the evidence adduced
proves that Luzwas psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage warranting the
annulment of their marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Ruling:
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to
nullify a marriage under Article 36of the
Family Code, should refer to no less than a
mental not merely physical incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed... and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed in Article 68of the Family Code,
among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together; observe love,
respect and fidelity; and render help and
support. There is hardly a doubt that the
intendment of... the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity"
to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.[7]
Psychological incapacity as required by
Article 36 must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr.,[9]the Court
reiterated the well-settled guidelines in
resolving petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina,[10] based on Article
36 of the Family Code.Thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be... psychological not
physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes.
The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their
children.
Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. The trial court
must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state Guided by these
pronouncements, the Court is of the
considered view that Robert's evidence
failed to establish the psychological
incapacity of Luz. First, the testimony of
Robert failed to overcome the burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage.
Other than his self-serving testimony, no
other evidence was adduced to show the
alleged incapacity of Luz.
Second, the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity of Luz was not
medically or clinically identified, and
sufficiently proven during the trial. As
correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity
or perversion and abandonment do not, by
themselves, constitute grounds for declaring
a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity. Third, the psychological report
of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of
the Northern Mindanao Medical Center,
Cagayan de Oro City, was insufficient to
prove the psychological incapacity of Luz.
Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan
Tribunal is insufficient to prove the
psychological incapacity of Luz. Although it
is true that in the case of Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina,[14] the Court stated
that interpretations given by... the NAMT of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts, still it is
subject to the law on evidence.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided
correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce
sufficient and convincing evidence to prove
the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA
FUENTE, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO DE LA
FUENTE, JR.,respondent.
G.R. NO. 188400
March 08, 2017
Facts:
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa Tani and
Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got married in
Mandaluyong City after being in a
relationship for five (5) years. They had two
children.
While they were still sweethearts, Maria
Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an
introvert and was prone to jealousy. His
attitude worsened as they went on with their
marital life. His jealousy became so severe
that he even poked a gun to his 15 year old
cousin and he treated Maria Teresa like a
sex slave who made the latter feel
maltreated and molested. Sometime in 1986,
the couple quarreled because Rodolfo
suspected that Maria Teresa was having an
affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo
poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. She left
and never saw Rodolfo again after that, and
supported their children by herself.
On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. As support to her petitions, clinical
psychologist, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez was
presented as an expert witness. However,
Rodolfo did not file any responsive
pleading. The trial court eventually deemed
his non-appearance as a waiver of his right
to present evidence.
Before the promulgation of its decision, on
June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the
Office of the Solicitor General to submit its
comment on Maria Teresa's formal offer of
evidence. The Office of the Solicitor
General was also directed to submit its
certification. The Office of the Solicitor
General, however, failed to comply with the
trial court's orders; thus, the case was
submitted for decision without the
certification and comment from the Office
of the Solicitor General. On August 14,
2002, the trial court promulgated its decision
granting the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
On August 20, 2002, the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a motion for
reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor
General explained that it was unable to
submit the required certification because it
had no copies of the transcripts of
stenographic notes. It was also unable to
inform the trial court of its lack of
transcripts due to the volume of cases it was
handling On September 13 2002, the trial
court denied the motion for reconsideration..
The Office of the Solicitor General filed an
appeal before the Court of Appeals. It
argued that the trial court erred a) in
deciding the case without the required
certification from the Office of the Solicitor
General, 58 and b) in giving credence to Dr.
Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe
personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's
finding was based on insufficient data and
did not follow the standards set forth in the
Molina case. Still, Rodolfo did not file any
responsive pleading.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the RTC. In its resolution dated May 25,
2009, CA denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Maria Teresa.
On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari. This time
Rodolfo filed a Comment 70 stating that he
was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition
since "[h]e firmly believes that there is in
fact no more sense in adjudging him and
petitioner as married."
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
denying the petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage.
Held:
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in denying
the petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals, we find that there was sufficient
compliance with Molina to warrant the
nullity of petitioner's marriage with
respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge
the burden of proof that respondent suffered
from psychological incapacity. The Court of
Appeals is mistaken when it chided the
lower court for giving undue weight to the
testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no
chance to personally conduct a thorough
study and analysis of respondent's mental
and psychological condition
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the
non-examination of one of the parties will
not automatically render as hearsay or
invalidate the findings of the examining
psychiatrist or psychologist, since
"marriage, by its very definition, necessarily
involves only two persons. The totality of
the behavior of one spouse during the
cohabitation and marriage is generally and
genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.
Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the
husband and wife "to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support." In this case,
petitioner and respondent may have lived
together, but the facts narrated by petitioner
show that respondent failed to, or could not,
comply with the obligations expected of him
as a husband. He was even apathetic that
petitioner filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of their marriage.
The incurability and severity of respondent's
psychological incapacity were likewise
discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a
person with paranoid personality disorder
would
refuse to admit that there was something
wrong and that there was a need for
treatment. This was corroborated by
petitioner when she stated that respondent
repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner
consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor,
and suggested couples counseling to
respondent; however, respondent refused all
of her attempts at seeking professional help.
Respondent also refused to be examined by
Dr. Lopez.
Dr. Lopez concluded that because of
respondent's personality disorder, he is
incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations of giving love, respect, and
support to the petitioner. He recommends
that the marriage be annulled.
Respondent's repeated behavior of
psychological abuse by intimidating,
stalking, and isolating his wife from her
family and friends, as well as his increasing
acts of physical violence, are proof of his
depravity, and utter lack of comprehension
of what marriage and partnership entail. It
would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to
decree that petitioner should remain married
to respondent. After she had exerted efforts
to save their marriage and their family,
respondent simply refused to believe that
there was anything wrong in their marriage.
This shows that respondent truly could not
comprehend and perform his marital
obligations. This fact is persuasive enough
for this Court to believe that respondent's
mental illness is incurable.
The petition is granted.
REPUBLIC v. JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, GR
No. 199194, 2016-02-10
Facts:
On November 4, 2008
Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a
Petition[5] before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Ozamiz[6] City-Branch 15 the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife,
Netchie S.[7]
Sareñogon (Netchie).
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in
Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991,[11]
They later became sweethearts and on
August 10,1996, they got married in civil
rites at the Manila City Hall.[12] However,
they lived together as... husband and wife
for a month only because he left to work as a
seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as
a domestic helper.[13] For three months, he
did not receive any communication from
Netchie.[14] He likewise had no idea about
her... whereabouts.[15] While still abroad,
he tried to contact Netchie's parents, but
failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin,
Misamis Occidental.[16] He returned home
after his contract expired.[17] He then...
inquired from Netchie's relatives and friends
about her whereabouts, but they also did not
know where she was.[18] Because of these,
he had to presume that his wife Netchie was
already dead.[19] He filed the Petition
before the RTC so... he could contract
another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of
the Family Code.[20]
Jose's testimony was corroborated by his
older brother Joel Sareñogon, and by
Netchie's aunt, Consuelo Sande.
The RTC... found that Netchie had
disappeared for more than four years, reason
enough for Jose to conclude that his wife
was indeed already dead.
the Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the
judgment of the RTC to the CA via a
Petition for Certiorari[28], under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
the CA held that the Republic used the
wrong recourse by instituting a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The CA perceived no error
at all in the RTC's judgment granting
Jose's Petition for the declaration of the
presumptive death of his wife, Netchie.
the Republic's appeal sought to correct or
review the RTC's alleged misappreciation of
evidence which could not translate into
excess or lack of jurisdiction... amounting to
grave abuse of discretion.
The Republic insists that a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court is the proper remedy to
challenge an RTC's immediately final and
executory Decision on a presumptive death
The Republic claims that based on
jurisprudence, Jose's alleged efforts in
locating Netchie did not engender or
generate a well-founded belief that the latter
is probably dead.
Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did
not categorically assert that he wanted to
have Netchie declared presumptively dead
because he intends to get married again, an
essential premise of Article 41 of the Family
Code.
Issues:
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
DISMISSING THE REPUBLIC'S
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, ON THE
GROUND THAT THE PROPER REMEDY
SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO APPEAL THE
RTC DECISION, BECAUSE
IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND
EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS OR
DECISIONS ARE NOT APPEALABLE
UNDER THE EXPRESS PROVISION OF
LAW.
THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF
RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS
MISSING WIFE DO NOT
SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELL-
FOUNDED BELIEF" THAT
RESPONDENT'S ABSENT WIFE X X X
IS PROBABLY DEAD
Ruling:
This Court finds the Republic's petition
meritorious.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the proper remedy to
question the RTC's Decision in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death... the RTC's Decision on
a Petition for declaration of presumptive
death pursuant to Article 41 of the Family
Code is immediately final and executory.
Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to...
entertain a notice of appeal pertaining to
such judgment.[49] Concurring in the result,
Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio
Panganiban further therein pointed out that
the correct remedy to challenge the RTC
Decision was to institute a petition for...
certiorari under Rule 65, and not a petition
for review under Rule 45.
By express provision of law, the judgment
of the court in a summary proceeding shall
be immediately final and executory. As a
matter of course, it follows that no appeal
can be had of the trial court's judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive... death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes
without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the Court of
Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the
Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and
the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an...
unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family
Code, the losing party in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death may file a petition for
certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court
committed grave abuse of... discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the
Decision of the C A, the aggrieved party
may elevate the matter to this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
The law did not define what is meant by
"well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a
case-to-case basis. To be able to comply
with this requirement, the present spouse
must prove that... his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts and
inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that
based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a... mere
passive one).
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose
1ms "well-founded belief that Netchie was
already dead upon the following grounds:
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie's
parents while he was still out of the country,
but did not reach them as they had allegedly
left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was
already dead because when he returned
home, he was not able to obtain any
information that Netchie was still alive from
Netchie's relatives and friends;
(3) Jose's testimony to the effect that
Netchie is no longer alive, hence must be
presumed dead, was corroborated by Jose's
older brother, and by Netchie's aunt, both of
whom testified that he (Jose) and Netchie
lived together as husband and wife only for
one month and... that after this, there had
been no information as to Netchie's
whereabouts.
Given the Court's imposition of "strict
standard" in a petition for a declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code, it must follow that there was
no basis at all for the RTC's finding that
Jose's Petition complied with the requisites
of Article 41 of the
Family Code, in reference to the "well-
founded belief standard. If anything, Jose's
pathetically anemic efforts to locate the
missing Netchie are notches below the
required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from
his bare claims that he had... inquired from
alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie's
whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness
stand specific individuals or persons whom
he allegedly saw or met in the course of his
search or quest for the allegedly missing
Netchie. Neither did he prove that he...
sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media,
Nor did he show mat he undertook a
thorough, determined and unflagging search
for Netchie, say for at least two years (and
what those years were), and naming the
particular places, provinces,... cities,
barangays or municipalities that he visited,
or went to, and identifying the specific
persons he interviewed or talked to in the
course of his search.
REPUBLIC v. EDNA ORCELINO-
VILLANUEVA, GR No. 210929, 2015-07-
29
Facts:
Edna and Romeo were married on
December 21, 1978, in Iligan City.
In 1992, Edna worked as domestic helper in
Singapore while her husband worked as a
mechanic in Valencia City, Bukidnon. In
1993, Edna heard the news from her
children that Romeo had left their conjugal
home without reason or information as to his
whereabouts.
Thereafter, Edna took a leave from work and
returned to the country to look for Romeo.
She inquired from her parents-in-law and
common friends in Iligan City. Still, she
found no leads as to his whereabouts or
existence. She also went to his birthplace in
Escalante, Negros
Oriental, and inquired from his relatives.
On August 6, 2009, Edna filed before the
RTC a petition[5] to declare Romeo
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the
Family Code.
During the trial, Edna was presented as the
lone witness. In its October 8, 2009
Order,[6] the RTC granted the petition on
the basis of her well-founded belief of
Romeo's death.
On August 13, 2010, the OSG filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court before the CA alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
finding that Edna had a well-founded belief
that Romeo, her absent spouse, was dead.
On October 18, 2013, the CA dismissed
the... petition
On November 20, 2013, the OSG filed a
motion for reconsideration but the CA
denied it on January 8, 2014.
Issues: She went as far as the birthplace of her
husband in Escalante, Negros Oriental, so
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN she could inquire from her husband's
AFFIRMING THE RTC DECISION relatives.
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
CONCLUSION REACHED BY THE RTC Despite her efforts, she averred that she
IS CONTRARY TO PREVAILING received negative responses from them
JURISPRUDENCE. because none of them had knowledge of the
existence of her husband who had been
Ruling: missing for 15 years.
The Court grants the petition. Moreover, no document was submitted to
Article 41 of the Family Code provides that corroborate the allegation that her husband
before a judicial declaration of presumptive had been missing for at least fifteen (15)
death may be granted, the present spouse years already. As the OSG observed, there
must prove that he/she has a well-founded was not even any attempt to seek the aid of
belief that the absentee is dead.[14] In this the authorities at the time her husband
case, Edna failed. disappeared.
The well-founded belief in the absentee's Verily, it makes sense to conclude that her
death requires the present spouse to prove efforts were not diligent and serious enough
that his/her belief was the result of diligent to give meaning to her well-founded belief
and reasonable efforts to locate the absent that Romeo was already dead.
spouse and that based on these... efforts and
inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already
dead.
Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond
the period required by law), lack of any
news that the absentee... spouse is still alive,
mere failure to communicate, or general
presumption of absence under the Civil
Code would not suffice.
Accordingly, in a string of cases, this Court
has denied petitions for the declaration of
presumptive death on the said basis.
In this case, Edna claimed to have done the
following to determine the whereabouts and
the status of her husband:
She took a vacation/leave of absence from
her work and returned to the Philippines to
look for her husband.
She inquired from her parents-in-law in
Iligan City and from their common friends
in the same city and in Valencia City.