Case 1:

ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE O. YU, Petitioners, vs.BALTAZAR PACLEB, Respondent.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This petition was filed to set aside the decision made by the Court of Appeals in ruling that the
respondent has the better right over the subject property and is the true owner thereof.
FACTS: Respondent Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, are the owners of parcel of land in Langcaan,
Dasmarinas, Cavite covered by a transfer certificate of title.
Sometime in September 1992, Ruperto Javier offered the said land to spouses Ernesto and Elsie Yu. Javier claimed that he
purchased the property from Rebecca Del Rosario who bought it from spouses Baltazar Pacleb and Angelita Chan. Despite
the alleged sales being unregistered, the spouses Yu accepted the offer and made a down payment and entered into an
Agreement for the sale of the property. After giving the amount, the spouses Yu discovered that a portion of the property was
tenanted by Ramon Pacleb, one of the respondent's sons. The petitioners then demanded the cancellation of their agreement
and the return of their initial payment.
Javier then made arrangements with Ramon to vacate the property and to pay Ramon for his disturbance compensation. With
that, Javier and the spouses YU proceeded to enter into a Contract to Sell. But, Javier failed to comply with his obligations.
So, on April 23, 1993, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for specific performance and damages against Javier to
compel Javier to deliver to them ownership and possession, and the title to the property. However, Javier did not appear in
the proceedings and was declared in default, so, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The decision
and its Certificate of Finality were annotated in the title of the property. On March 10, 1995, the petitioners and Ramon and
his wife entered into an agreement that the spouses will pay Ramon P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights
over the land. On October 12, 1995, the respondent filed a Complaint for annulment of deed of sale and other documents
arising from it claiming that the deed of sale supposedly executed between him and his late first wife and Del Rosario was
spurious and the signatures were forged. He also moved for the summons to be served upon Del Rosario via publication
since her address cannot be found, but was denied. So, respondent moved to dismiss the case which was granted by the trial
court. On November 23, 1995, the petitioners filed an action for forcible entry against the respondent with the MTC. They
contend that they had prior physical possession over the property through their trustee Ramon Pacleb, until the respondent
ousted them in September 1995. The MTC and the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, but the Court of Appeals set aside
the decisions of the lower courts. The CA decided that it was the respondent who had prior physical possession of the property
which was shown by his payment of real estate taxes thereon. On May 29, 1996, respondent filed an instant case for removal
of cloud from title with damages alleging that the deed of sale between him and his late first wife could not have been executed
on the date appearing thereon. He claimed that he was residing in the US at that time and that his late first wife died 20 years
ago. On May 28, 1997, while the case was still pending, the respondent died, hence, he was substituted by his surviving
spouse and some of his children. On December 27, 2002, the respondent's case was dismissed and the petitioners were held
to be purchasers in good faith. The trial court also held that the petitioners' action for specific performance against Javier was
already final, and the trial court also ordered the respondents' heirs and all other persons claiming under them to surrender
the possession of the property to the petitioners. Upon appeal by the respondent, the CA reversed the trial court's decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the action for specific performance filed by the petitioners against Javier is not merely an action in personam,
but an action in rem, and is thus, conclusive and binding upon respondent even if he was not a party thereto since it involves
a question of possession and ownership of real property.
HELD: The action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioners against Javier to compel him to perform his
obligations under their Contract to Sell is an action in personam.
The purpose of the action is to compel Javier to accept the full payment of the purchase price, and to execute a deed of
absolute sale over the property in favor of the petitioners. The obligations of Javier mentioned attach to Javier alone and do
not burden the property. Thus, the complaint filed by the petitioners is an action in personam and is binding only upon the
parties properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. So, the action cannot bind the
respondent since he was not a party therein and considering the fact that his signature and that of his late first wife were
forged in the deed of sale. Hence, the petition is denied and the Court affirms the ruling of the CA finding the respondent
having a better right over the property as the true owner thereof.
Case 2:
ALEJANDRO MILLENA, petitioner, vs CA and FELISA JACOB, represented herein by her
attorney-in-fact JAIME LLAGUNO, respondents.
Facts:
- A 14,282 sq.mtr. land (Lot 1874) is a subject of cadastral proceeding w/ claimants Gregroria Listana and her sister-in-law
Potencia Maramba Listana w/ her 7 children
- Parties reached a compromise agreement w/c was submitted to the Court and
adjudicated accordingly where Gregoria gets 1/4 share (3,934 sq.mtr) and Potencia and
children gets 3/4 share
- Gregoria was sick of TB and death being inevitable executed an SPA authorizing cousin
Antonio Lipato to sell her portion of Lot 1874 for proceeds to be used for her burial
- Lipato sold Gregoria’s portion to Gaudencio Jacob on Oct 23, 1926 and incidentally on
the same day Gregoria died
- Jacob thereafter took possession of land and started harvesting coconuts therein
- Potencia having learned of Jacob’s entry of Gregroia’s lot portion, filed an ejectment
case
- Court dismissed case on Dec 31, 1926 ruling Jacob’s possession of land was authorized
having with him a document of sale as evidence
- Thereafter, Jacob had a continuous, actual and peaceful possession of said lot for 40 yrs
until Apr 4, 1966 when such land was adjudicated to her daughter Felisa Jacob in an
extra-judicial settlement
- Right after acquiring the property, Felisa instructed her nephew Jaime Llaguno to
continue working as caretaker of the land making improvements on it and paid it’s
property taxes
- Sometime in Nov 1981 Felisa discovered that Florencio Listana, son of Potenciana,
acquired from the Bureau of Lands a Free Patent Certificate dated Aug 28, 1980
covering the entire 14,284-square meter area of Lot 1874 which included her portion
- Felisa immediately filed a protest before the Bureau of Lands alleging that she was the
absolute owner of a 1/4 portion of Lot 1874 and that through misrepresentation and
deceit Florencio was able to secure title for the whole lot and prayed that an investigation
be conducted and that the Free Patent issued be annulled and set aside
- Subsequently, Florencio died and despite the protest filed by Felisa, the heirs of
Florencio sold the entire Lot 1874 to Alejandro Millena (nephew of Florencio) on Sep 30,
1986 who was eventually issued TCT covering the whole of Lot 1874
- On Mar 17, 1992 Felisa filed a complaint against Millena for annulment of title and claim
for reconveyance of 1/4 porition of Lot 1874, with preliminary injunction on the
construction of a house on said lot and damages
- RTC ruled in favor of Felisa w/c was affirmed by CA upon appeal
- A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 was filed in SC by Millena contending
that lower courts failed to consider the issue of prescription
Issue
Whether or not action for reconveyance is barred by prescription.
Ruling
No. While an action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes 4 years from the
discovery of the fraud w/c is deemed to take place at the issuance of OCT and 10 years if it
is based on an implied or a constructive trust, from the issuance of the OCT or TCT, there
is an exception to this rule. Prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance
when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed.
 Possession of a certificate of title alone does not necessarily make the holder, the true
owner of all the property described therein since the inclusion of an area which the
registered owner or successful applicant has no claim on and any right of ownership is void
and of no effect.
Petition is denied and petitioner is ordered to reconvey w/in 30 days from the finality of
Decision that portion of Lot 1874 consisting of 3,934 square meters in favor of Felisa Jacob,
represented by her attorney-in-fact Jaime Llaguno.

Case 3:
Case Title: Samtos vs. Manalili Nature of the case: Petition for review on certiorari
Doctrine: A sale of a piece of land appearing in a private deed cannot be considered binding on third persons if it is not
embodied in a public instrument and recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
Facts: At the core of the controversy is a 4,608 square-meter parcel of land which originally formed part of the “Furukawa
Plantation” situated in the District of Toril, Davao City. After the war, the land was turned over to the Philippine government
and administered by the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation, and thereafter by the respondent Board of
Liquidators (BOL).
On August 6, 1970, Reynaldo Manalili filed with the BOL an application to purchase the subject property, attaching therewith
his Occupant’s Affidavit. The application was granted. BOL required Manalili to pay the downpayment of 10% of the
purchase price or P1,865.28. Thereafter, Manalili declared the land for taxation purposes.
After the lapse of nine (9) years and even as the BOL had already issued a Certification of Full Payment endorsing the
approval of the sale of the land in question to applicant Reynaldo Manalili, herein petitioner Rodolfo Santos wrote an
undated letter to the BOL protesting Manalili’s application.
TC ruled in favor of Manalilis. CA Affirmed.
Issue (detailed): WHETHER THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE SALE OF THE LOT TO THE
RESPONDENT WAS NOT FRAUDULENT AND THAT THE PETITIONER’S PROTEST WAS DULY INVESTIGATED.
Held: Petition denied.
Petitioner’s claim of having bought the land from a certain Ernesto Abalahin who, in turn, bought it from one Col. Agsalud,
allegedly a guerrilla veteran who occupied the lot from 1956 to 1959, is without basis.
For one, no proof has been presented by petitioner as to the alleged title of Col. Agsalud or the transfer of any rights from
the latter to Ernesto Abalahin, petitioner’s alleged immediate transferor.
For another, the supposed Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner and Ernesto Abalahin does not even sufficiently
identify the lot which was the subject of the sale. Worse, that same deed is not notarized and is unregistered. A sale of a
piece of land appearing in a private deed cannot be considered binding on third persons if it is not embodied in a public
instrument and recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
Petitioner’s evidence do not support his allegation of fraud. It is a matter of record that petitioner’s protest, filed nine (9)
years after Reynaldo Manalili filed his application with attached occupant’s affidavit, and after the BOL had already issued a
Certification of Final Payment in Manalili’s favor, was duly investigated by the BOL, after which it recommended the sale of
the land to Manalili, which recommendation was formally acted upon by the Office of the President which ultimately
approved the Deed of Sale for Manalili. It is well-settled that fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
Petitioner failed in this venture.
Case 4:
BUKIDNON DOCTORS HOSPITAL v. METROBANK
G.R. No. 161882 July 8, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner Bukidnon Doctors Hospital, Inc., obtained a loan of P25 million from respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company to be used for the construction of its hospital. To secure this loan, the petitioner mortgaged six parcels of land
registered in the name of Dr. Rene Sison and Rory P. Roque, President and Administrator, respectively, of the petitioner.
Upon petitioners default in the payment of the loan, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the mortgaged lots
were sold in a public auction to respondent bank, being the sole and highest bidder. The petitioner failed to redeem the
properties within the period of redemption.Hence, the respondent was issued new certificates of title.
Petitioner expressed its desire to continue staying in the subject premises so that the operation of the hospital erected
thereon would not be disrupted. For that purpose, the petitioner proposed to pay rent by virtue of a lease contract.
A year and eight months after the agreed effectivity date of the lease contract, the respondent asked the petitioner to vacate
the leased premises within fifteen days. The petitioner refused, invoking the subsisting lease agreement.
Respondent filed with the RTC an Ex Parte Motion for a Writ of Possession. The trial court issued an order granting
respondents ex parte motion for a writ of possession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo correctly ruled that respondent, a former mortgagee-buyer, was still entitled to a writ of
possession as a matter of right as provided under act 3135, despite a lease agreement between itself and the former
mortgagor-seller executed after respondent became the absolute owner of the foreclosed properties.

RULING:
The law and jurisprudence are clear that in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, an order for a writ of possession issues as
a matter of course, upon proper motion, after the expiration of the redemption period without the mortgagor exercising the
right of redemption, or even during the redemption period provided a bond is posted to indemnify the debtor in case the
foreclosure sale is shown to have been conducted without complying with the requirements of the law or without the debtor
violating the mortgage contract.
The rationale for the ministerial issuance of a writ of possession is to put the foreclosure buyer in possession of the property
sold without delay, since the right to possession is founded on ownership of the property.
However, in the instant case, a writ of possession was not the correct remedy for the purpose of ousting the petitioner from
the subject premises. It must be noted that possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.
It is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that a thing or right is subject to
the action of ones will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
By material occupation of a thing, it is not necessary that the person in possession should be the occupant of the property;
the occupancy can be held by another in his name.
Thus Articles 524 and 525 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 524. Possession may be exercised in ones own name or in that of another.
Art. 525. The possession of things or rights may be had in one of two concepts: either in the concept of owner, or in that of
the holder of the thing or right to keep or enjoy it, the ownership pertaining to another person.
In other words, an owner of a real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically occupying the property, or
when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is occupying it.
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that after the foreclosure of the property in question and the issuance of new certificates
of title in favor of the respondent, the petitioner and the respondent entered into a contract of lease of the subject properties.
This new contractual relation presupposed that the petitioner recognized that possession of the properties had been legally
placed in the hands of the respondent, and that the latter had taken such possession but delivered it to the former as lessee
of the property.
By paying the monthly rentals, the petitioner also recognized the superior right of the respondent to the possession of the
property as owner thereof. And by accepting the monthly rentals, the respondent enjoyed the fruits of its possession over
the subject property.
Clearly, the respondent is in material possession of the subject premises. Thus, the trial courts issuance of a writ of
possession is not only superfluous, but improper under the law. Moreover, as a lessee, the petitioner was a legitimate
possessor of the subject properties under Article 525 of the Civil Code. Thus, it could not be deprived of its lawful
possession by a mere ex parte motion for a writ of possession.
In a nutshell, where a lease agreement, whether express or implied, is subsequently entered into by the mortgagor and the
mortgagee after the expiration of the redemption period and the consolidation of title in the name of the latter, a case for
ejectment or unlawful detainer, not a motion for a writ of possession, is the proper remedy in order to evict from the
questioned premises a mortgagor-turned-lessee. The rationale for this rule is that a new relationship between the parties
has been created. What applies is no longer the law on extrajudicial foreclosure, but the law on lease. And when an issue
arises, as in the case at bar, regarding the right of the lessee to continue occupying the leased premises, the rights of the
parties must be heard and resolved in a case for ejectment or unlawful detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Case 5:
Republic. vs. Rev. Claudio R. Cortez
G.R. No. 197472
September 7, 2015
Facts: Rev. Cortez, a missionary, established an orphanage and school in Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has
been in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares of land located in the western portion of Palaui Island in Sitio Siwangag,
Sta. Ana, Cagayan which he, with the help of Aetas and other people under his care, cleared and developed for agricultural
purposes. Proclamation No. 201 reserved a parcel of the public domain situated in Palaui Island for military. More than
twodecades later, Proclamation No. 447 was enacted declaring Palaui Island and the surrounding waters situated in the
Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan as marine reserve. In 2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction Biñas in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval
Command in Sta. Ana, Cagayan. According to him, some members of the Philippine Navy, upon orders of Biñas, disturbed
his peaceful and lawful possession of the said 50-hectare portion of Palaui Island when they commanded him and his men,
through the use of force and intimidation, to vacate the area. Thus, Rev. Cortez and his men were constrained to leave the
area. In view of these, Rev. Cortez filed the said Petition with the RTC seeking preliminary mandatory injunction ordering
Biñas to restore to him possession and to not disturb the same, and further, for the said preliminary writ, if issued, to be
made permanent.
Issue: Whether or not Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction.
Held: No, Rev. Cortez is not entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction.
Jus possessionis or possession in the concept of an owner is one of the two concepts of possession provided under Article
525 of the Civil Code. Also referred to as adverse possession,this kind of possession is one which can ripen into ownership
by prescription.
As correctly asserted by Rev. Cortez, a possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he
possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. However, the following cannot be appropriated and
hence, cannot be possessed: property of the public dominion, common things (res communes) such as sunlight and air, and
things specifically prohibited by law. Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of
possession, he, nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not part of the public domain
and therefore can be the object of possession.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. To prove that a land is alienable, the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the land as
alienable and disposable must be established.
In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and
disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same. Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain.
Being such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code.
Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez' claimed right of possession has no leg to stand on. His possession of the subject area,
even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the
property cannot be lawfully possessed in the first place

Case 6:

DIZON V. SUNTAY- Pledge of Immovable

An owner of a movable unlawfully pledged by another is not estopped from recovering possession. Where the owner
delivered the diamond ring solely for sale on commission but the seller instead pawned it without authority, the owner is not
stopped form pursuing an action against the pawnshop.

FACTS:
Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3-carat diamond ring valued at P5,500. She and Clarita Sison entered into a transaction
wherein the ring would be sold on commission. Clarita received the ring and issued a receipt. After some time, Lourdes
made demands for the return of the ring but the latter refused to comply. When Lourdes insisted on the return, Clarita gave
her the pawnshop ticket which is the receipt of the pledge and she found out that 3 days after the ring was received by
Clarita, it was pledged by Melia Sison, the niece of Clarita’s husband in connivance with Clarita with the pawnshop of
Dominador Dizon for P2,600. Lourdes then filed an estafa case. She then asked Dominador Dizon for the return of the ring
pledged but refused to return the ring thus the case filed by Lourdes.
The CFI issued a writ of replevin so Lourdes was able to have possession of the ring during the pendency of the case. The
CFI also ruled in her favor which was affirmed by the CA on appeal. Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in ruling that Lourdes has a right to possession of the ring
HELD: NO
It reiterated the ruling in de Garcia v. CA, that the controlling provision is Art. 559 of the CC which states that the possession
ofmovable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of
which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its
return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Lourdes, being unlawfully deprived of her ring thus she has a right to recover it from the current possessor. Dizon is
engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would require him to inquire whether or not an individual who
is offering the jewelry by pledge is entitled to do so. The principle of estoppel cannot help him at all. Since there was no
precaution availed of, perhaps because of the difficulty of resisting opportunity for profit, he only has himself to blame and
should be the last to complain if the right of the true owner of the jewelry should be recognized.
Other issues raised:
Principle of estoppel = has its roots in equity, moral right and natural justice.
> For estoppel to exist, there must be a declaration, act or omission by the party who is sought to be bound.
> A party should not be permitted to go against his own acts to the prejudice of another.
Concurring opinion by J. Teehankee:
> Interpretation of the “unlawfully deprived” in Art. 559 of the CC. It is understood to include all cases where there has been
no valid transmission of ownership. If our legislature intended interpretation to be that of the French Code, it certainly would
have adopted and used a narrower term than the broad language of Art. 559 (formerly 464) and the accepted meaning in
accordance with our jurisprudence.
Case 7: --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

REGALADO, J.:

The decision promulgated on September 30, 1987 by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 09536,[1] which
reversed the decisions of the Regional Trial Court[2] and, correlatively, the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City,[3] is
assailed in this petition for review on certiorari.

Private respondent Inocencio V. Chua filed an action for forcible entry in the then City Court of Olongapo City for the
eviction of petitioner Gabriel Elane from a portion of a parcel of land designated as Block V, LC Project No. 14, Olongapo
City, BF Map LC 2427, which was the subject of a permit to occupy issued to private respondent by the Bureau of Forestry
on August 16, 1961. Private respondent alleges that on February 15, 1980, while visiting the property, he discovered that
petitioner was constructing a semi-concrete building on a portion thereof, without his knowledge and consent. The order
made by private respondent upon petitioner to desist therefrom was ignored by the latter.[4] When his demand letter of
March 1, 1980 to stop said construction was refused, private respondent filed an action for forcible entry. [5]

In his answer, petitioner Elane claims that he was granted a permit by the Bureau of Forest Development over a parcel of
land located at Upper Kalaklan, with an area of 360 square meters, more or less, designated as Block V, LC Project No. 14,
Olongapo City, BF Map LC 2427, as allegedly evidenced by a certification from the said bureau dated April 10, 1979; that
he has been in possession and occupation of that parcel of land continuously and uninterruptedly since 1970, having
originally erected a hut thereon which was later replaced by a bungalow; and that the land has been declared for taxation in
his name and the real property taxes thereon paid by him for the years 1970 to 1979. [6]

On February 14, 1984, the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and which,
on appeal, was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City.

Thereafter, herein private respondent elevated the case on a petition for review to respondent court which reversed the
decisions of the two courts a quo and rendered judgment ordering therein respondent Elane to remove or demolish the
residential house or building that he constructed on that part of the land in question, to vacate and return possession of said
parcel of land to therein petitioner Chua and to pay said petitioner P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, with the costs of
suit.[7] A motion for reconsideration was denied on November 3, 1987.[8]

In the present appeal, petitioner contends that the respondent court (1) gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to
the petition for review notwithstanding the fact that the decision sought to be reviewed had already become final and
executory; and (2) gravely erred in holding that "the instant petition must be resolved on the all important issue of priority of
possession instead of the issue as to who is the legal possessor of the lot subject of the litigation".[9]

Concordant with the claim of private respondent, the respondent court found the following relevant facts established by the
evidence of record:
"On August 16, 1961, Ordinary Residence Permit No. 1675 was issued by the Bureau of Forestry authorizing the petitioner
to occupy four hectares of public forest land situated in Sitio Upper Kalaklan, Olongapo, Zambales (Exhibit A), on which he
constructed a warehouse and a gasoline station pursuant to permits issued to him by the said bureau (Exhibits C, C-1, 1
and J), which on February 10, 1970 were declared for purposes of taxation in his name (Exhibits E and E-1) and taxes due
thereon were paid (Exhibits F-4 and F-5).
"On January 19, 1977, the parcel of land in question, designated as Block V, LC Project No. 14, Olongapo City, BF Map LC.
2427, containing an area of 42,086 square meters, covered by the sketch (Exhibit G), having been declared alienable and
disposable, the petitioner filed an application with the Bureau of Lands to purchase it under Miscellaneous Sales Application
No. (111-4) 9019 (Exhibit M).
"On March 1, 1980, the petitioner wrote to the respondent advising him to stop construction of the building that he was
putting up within the parcel of land in question (Exhibit H).
On March 6, 1980, the respondent having refused to desist from constructing the building that he was putting up, the
petitioner filed the instant complaint for forcible entry in the then City Court of Olongapo."[10]
We initially take up the first error imputed by petitioner which, although the records do not show that the same was raised in
the petition for review in respondent court, deserves a corresponding resolution since it indirectly attributes a jurisdictional
defect.

Petitioner claims that a copy of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City was sent by registered mail to the
counsel of private respondent at his given address. However, the envelope was supposedly returned to the court when
counsel for private respondent allegedly failed to claim the same after a second notice was made on July 10, 1985.
Petitioner then contends that, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, the decision of the regional trial court
became final on July 15, 1985, private respondent not having seasonably filed either a motion for reconsideration or a notice
of appeal.[11]

We are not persuaded by this argument belatedly raised by petitioner. It is incumbent upon a party who relies upon
constructive service under Section 5 of Rule 13 of the Rules to prove that the first notice of the registered letter was sent
and delivered to the addressee, as the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed does not apply to such a
situation.[12] Here, the assertions in the petition of the facts stated in the next preceding paragraph are unsubstantiated. In
the absence of such proof in the record, the disputable presumption of completeness of service does not arise.
Furthermore, not only has petitioner failed in such requisite proof but, as earlier stated, the records do not show that such
issue was raised or proved by him in the respondent court when, the petition for review was filed with and was pending
therein. The principle of estoppel by laches, which is in the interest of a sound administration of the laws, consequently bars
this objection from being raised by petitioner for the first time and at this late stage.[13]

It is next alleged that respondent court gravely erred in adjudicating the case on the basis of priority of physical possession
instead of legal possession.

As already adumbrated, respondent court held that private respondent was granted a residence permit over a lot with an
area of 42,086 square meters by the Bureau of Forestry on August 16, 1961, and a permit to construct a warehouse and
gasoline station thereon by the then municipal government of Olongapo on October 1, 1963.[14] This residence permit,
which was renewable every year, was not renewed after June 30, 1969 because it was stopped by then Vice-President
Fernando Lopez, although private respondent continued to pay rental fees for the land until 1973.[15] Upon application by
private respondent, the said lot was declared alienable and disposable public land and released by the Bureau of Forest
Development to the Bureau of Lands in March, 1973. Thereafter, he filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application with the
Bureau of Lands on January 19, 1977 for the purchase of the said lot.[16] It likewise appears that private respondent
declared the warehouse and gasoline station for taxation purposes and paid taxes thereon in 1970 and 1971.[17]
On the other hand, petitioner claims that he entered into and took possession of the contested lot in 1970 pursuant to a
permit granted to him by the Bureau of Forest Development, as supposedly evidenced by a certification from the latter dated
April 10, 1979,[18] and a building permit and sanitary/plumbing permit issued for the construction of his house thereon.[19]
This is an egregious inaccuracy as aptly observed by respondent court, thus:

"Said permits (Annexes A, B and C to answer) were not actually introduced in evidence by the respondent Elane in support
of his allegations and defenses. They may not, therefore, be considered at all as evidence. Besides, the certification
(Annex A to answer) do (sic) not attest to the issuance of any permit to occupy the parcel of land in question in favor of the
respondent Elane. It merely certified to the fact that the parcel of land in question 'was found to be Alienable and
Disposable Land.' And the building and sanitary/plumbing permits (Annexes B and C to answer) could not have established
his possession of the parcel of land since 1970 because aside from the fact that they bear no date of actual issuance, they
were accomplished by the applicant whose residence certificate appears to have been issued only on January 5, 1979.
How then can it be correctly concluded that based upon such certification and permits (Annexes A, B and C to answer), the
respondent Elane had entered into and had taken possession of the parcel of land in question since 1970?
"Moreover, the survey of the parcel of land in question was prepared for the respondent Elane only on February 25, 1979
(Exhibit 6). His miscellaneous sales application was filed in the Bureau of Lands only on March 26, 1979 (Exhibit 7). The lot
and residential building constructed thereon were declared for purposes of taxation only on October 18, 1979 and April 1,
1981 (Exhibits 4-A and 5). The realty taxes due for 1970-73, 1974-78 and 1979 (Exhibit 8) and those due for the
succeeding years were paid only on April 14, 1980, May 8, 1981 and March 16, 1982 (Exhibits 8-1 to 8-5). Respondent
Elane's possession based on those documents cannot, therefore, retroact as of 1970."[20]
Under these circumstances, We are convinced that private respondent has priority of possession over petitioner whose
entry into the subject lot may be reckoned only as of 1979. There is no merit in the suggestion that petitioner was authorized
by the Bureau of Forest Development to occupy the land by virtue of an alleged permit issued by said bureau. A cursory
examination of said document readily shows that it is a mere certification that the lot claimed by petitioner is part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Nowhere is it stated therein that petitioner is allowed to take
possession of the subject lot. Furthermore, it is uncontroverted that private respondent was issued a residence permit way
back in 1961 which entitled him to possession of the disputed land starting in the same year.

Petitioner, however, submits that the expiration of private respondent's permit in 1969, and its non-renewal, deprived the
latter of his possessory right over and the corresponding right to eject petitioner from the subject lot. Petitioner argues that
by reason of the expiration of said permit, the right of possession over the land reverted to the Bureau of Lands thereby
vesting in said entity the sole right to institute any forcible entry case over the land in question.

We likewise reject this submission.

The respondent court expressly observed that while private respondent's permit to occupy the land may have expired in
1969, he remained in physical possession thereof. Since the decisive issue is priority of possession and private respondent
had been in actual and continuous possession of the land since August 16, 1961, his material possession must be
protected in this ejectment case until a competent court in an appropriate case determines which of the contending parties
has the better right of possession.[21]

As tersely emphasized by respondent court, and correctly so, "it is of no moment that petitioner's right to occupy said parcel
of land by reason of the permit issued to him by the Bureau of Forestry has already expired. For, it is not whether he has a
legal right to possess it that is in issue; it is whether he is in actual physical possession of it that is decisive in the instant
case for forcible entry."[22]
In sum, private respondent was in earlier possession of the contested lot; his sales application preceded that of petitioner;
his warehouse and gasoline station already existed long before petitioner took possession of the parcel of land in question;
and he has been paying taxes and rental fees thereon since 1968. As provided by the Civil Code -

"Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the case of
co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there
are two possessors, the one longer in possession; x x x."
Having been in prior continuous possession, private respondent is preferentially entitled to occupy the land.

Petitioner's intrusion upon the disputed premises can properly be categorized as one effected through stealth. Where
forcible entry was thus made clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from the time private
respondent demanded that the deforciant desist from such dispossession when the former learned thereof.[23] The records
reflect that such discovery and prohibition took place on February 15, 1980, reiterated thereafter in the demand letter of
March 1, 1980, both to no avail. Consequently, the one-year period had not expired on March 6, 1980 when private
respondent filed the ejectment suit with the then City Court of Olongapo City.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Case 8:
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING CO., INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS,
193 SCRA 71 (1991)
Facts:The Fredia Mineral claim of 9 hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet was located sometime between December
25 and 31, 1930 by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the provisions of Congress’ Act known as Philippine Bill of 1902 in a
so-called Declaration of Location. The said Declaration of Location of the mineral claim has been duly recorded inthe Office
of the Mining Recorder sometime January 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining
Co., which was the earlier name of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company, Inc. in a Deed of Sale executed November 2, 1931.
Ever since, Atok has been in continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim up to present.
Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia mineral claim as well as other mineral claims owned by
them as declared under Tax Declaration 9535. In view of Presidential Decree 1214, Atok filed an application for lease
covering the Fredia mineral claim.
Liwan Consi, respondent, owns a lot below the land of Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet, where he constructed a
house thereon in 1964. Said lot is covered by Tax Declaration 9462. When he first constructed his house below the lot of
Mr. Acay, he was told that it was not necessary for him to obtain a building permit as it was only a nipa hut and no one
prohibited him from entering theland as well as constructing a house thereon.In January 1984, Consi had the house
repaired and people came to take pictures and told him that the lot belongs to Atok. However, Consi has been paying taxes
on the said land, which his father before him had occupied.
Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against Liwan Consi on March 1, 1984.
The Municipal Trial Court of Itogon, presided over by Judge Irving rendered a decision on January 29, 1987 dismissing the
case against Consi.ATOK appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio and Benguet, presided over by
Judge Ruben Ayson and on December 5, 1987, the RTC rendered decision stating that the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Itogon is reversed and set aside. Liwan Consi is ordered to vacate the premises of the Fredia Mineral claim at
Tuding, Itogon, Benguet immediately, demolish the house, and to restore possession to Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint regarding forcible entry action.
The determination of whether the subject lot is mineral land or agricultural awaits the decision of the Secretary of Natural
Resources in a proceeding called for that purpose.
 There is a chance that the subject property may be classified as alienable agricultural land. At any rate, the mining
company may not so readily describe Liwan Consi as a "squatter" he also has possessory rights over the property.
Such rights may mature into ownership on the basis of long-term possession under the Public Land Law, thus, both Consi
and ATOK are of equal legal footing with regards the subject lot. Both hold possessory titles to the land in question —the
petitioner through his long term occupancy of the same; the respondent mining firm by virtue of its being the claim locator
and applicant for a lease on the mineral claim within which the subject lot is found.
But it was established that the petitioner has been in actual and beneficial possession of the subject lot since before the
Second World War inthe concept of owner and in good faith.
Issue:Whether or not an individual's long term occupation of land of the public domain vests him with such rights over the
same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim?
Held:YES. The Court enunciated that the petitioner, Atok, has the exclusive right to the property in question. The court
grants the petition. The decision of the RTC is upheld and the decision of CA is reversed and set aside.
Ratio:As held in the case of Gold Creek Mining Corporation, it is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a
patent, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the
provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by
patent.
The evidence on record pointed that the petitioner Atok has faithfully complied with all the requirements of the law regarding
the maintenance of the saidFredia Mineral Claim. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land
and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over
the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of
a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they
did, to Benguet and Atok.
The record shows that the lot in question was acquired through a Deed of Sale. The legal effect of a valid location of a
mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of
the claim and the right to a patent therefore upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there
is a valid location of mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public and the property of the locator.
It is evident that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining
claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain
except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the timeof its adoption.
On the issue of possession, Atok has been in continuous and exclusive possession since 1931. Consi started only
sometime in 1964 when he constructed a house thereon. Atok has, indeed, superior possessory rights than Consi. Atok has
the right to sue for ejectment being in actual possession of the land and for the deprivation of his rights

Case 9:
RODOLFO EUSEBIO, Petitioners vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ROHIMUST SANTOS,
Respondents.
Facts: The LOT was part of a subdivision owned by a corporation. As early as 1924, it was occupied by Philip Zinsineth as a
lessee, and he had constructed a house and garage thereon. After his death, his "leasehold rights" were inherited by his two
daughters, Mary, the mother of ROHIMUST, and Isabel, the deceased mother of RODOLFO’s wife.
On April 15, 1974, the parties concerned agreed that the leasehold rights will be placed in the name of RODOLFO to the
extent of 383 sq. m., and in the name of FERNANDO J. Santos, Jr. (brother of ROHIMUST), to the extent of 428.30 sq. m.
On that same date, a contract to sell the LOT on installment was executed by the corporation in favor of RODOLFO.
FERNANDO was not included in the contract because the corporation wanted to deal only with one person. However, on
July 2, 1974, RODOLFO and FERNANDO signed an affidavit statin, in sum, that the LOT will be subdivided between them
for their corresponding portions, upon full payment. (RODOLFO — 383.00 sq. m.; FERNANDO — 428.30 sq. m)
By August 5, 1976, installment payments under the Contract to Sell had not been kept up to date. RODOLFO and
FERNANDO then made an agreement that if one party fails to pay its corresponding share, the said parcel of land will be
subdivided according to the amount of payment by each party. In 1978, full payment was made and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 244154 of the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila was issued solely in the name of RODOLFO. For the full payment
of the amount paid, FERNANDO was not able to contribute his full share. In 1980, FERNANDO transferred his rights to
ROHIMUST. There are houses constructed on the LOT which may be owned in common, or which one party might claim to
have been constructed by him separately.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE:
Ordered the partition of the LOT (RODOLFO – 611.30 sq. m; ROHIMUST – 200 sq. m – partition was modified since
RODOLFO paid for most of the LOT) and that any improvement existing thereon which encroached on that portion
appertaining to the other party shall be demolished. Trial Court simply provided for the demolition of any building or part
thereof, claimed by either party, which would be within the area assigned to the other party. No mention of compensation
was made. ROHIMUST took an appeal from the Trial Court’s Decision to the IAC.
INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT:
Initially affirmed the trial court’s ruling but upon motion for reconsideration of ROHIMUST held that ROHIMUST has the legal
right to retain the house together with its improvements and the possession thereof until full payment of the value thereof.
IAC cites par. 2 of Article 546 of the Civil Code reads: "Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good
faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the
amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
RODOLFO, in the instant Petition for Review, has alleged this to be erroneous and be set aside.
Issue: Whether or not the IAC is correct in applying Art. 546 of the Civil Code? NO. It should be Art. 543.
SUPREME COURT RULING: The Appellate Tribunal was in error in invoking Article 546 which prescribes the rights of the
possessor in good faith as regards useful expenses. Article 546 presupposes, but does not establish, possession in good
faith, the requisites of which are laid down in Article 526, thus:
"ART. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw which invalidates it. "He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the
foregoing."Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.”
It may be mentioned that, prior to April 15, 1974, the possession of the parties was in the concept of lessees of the LOT,
which was not possession in good faith for purposes of Article 546. Conceding, for the sake of avoiding immaterial
complications, that the parties became co-owners after April 15, 1974, when the contract to sell was executed, neither co-
owner can claim possession in himself of any particular identified part of the LOT . As stated in Cabello v. Cabello, 37 Phil.
328, 336, "the possession held by a co-heir of the undivided estate is understood to be enjoyed in the name of the rest of
the heirs." An undivided estate is co-ownership by the heirs. The ownership of the physically undivided thing pertains to
more than one person, thus defined as "the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of
a thing which is not physically divided"
The provision of the Civil Code which should be applicable is Article 543, which
"ART. 543. Each one of the participants of a thing possessed in common shall be deemed to have exclusively possessed
the part which may be allotted to him upon the division thereof, for the entire period during which the co-possession lasted.
Interruption in the possession of the whole or a part of a thing possessed in common shall be to the prejudice of all the
possessors. However, in case of civil interruption, the Rules of Court shall apply."
Under the foregoing provision, after the LOT is actually partitioned, ROHIMUST would be "deemed to have exclusively
possessed" since April 15, 1974, the part which may be allotted to him upon the division thereof" consisting of the definite
200 sq. meter area assigned to him, together with all buildings and parts of buildings erected therein (Section 11, Rule 69).
RODOLFO can have no claim over such buildings or parts of a building, which improvements ROHIMUST can keep or
demolish without paying any compensation thereof to RODOLFO. For the same reason, if there were buildings or part of a
building, found in the definite 611.30 sq. m. area assigned to RODOLFO, he will be deemed to have been in exclusive
possession thereof since April 15, 1974, and he can keep or demolish these improvements without paying any
compensation therefor to ROHIMUST.
The Case was Remanded to the Trial Court for actual partition of the LOT between its co-owners under the provisions of
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Case 10:
 CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC v. CA
G.R. No. L-80294-95 September 21, 1988
Gancayco, J.
Doctrine:
The bailees’ failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor does not mean adverse possession on the part
of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum.
Facts:
Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province (VICAR for brevity) filed an application for registration of title over Lots 1,
2, 3, and 4, said Lots being the sites of the Catholic Church building, convents, high school building, school gymnasium,
school dormitories, social hall, stonewalls, etc. The Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed their
Answer/Opposition on Lots Nos. 2 and 3, respectively, asserting ownership and title thereto since their predecessors’ house
was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed.. After trial on the merits, the land
registration court promulgated its Decision confirming the registrable title of VICAR to Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4.
The Heirs of Juan Valdez appealed the decision of the land registration court to the then Court of Appeals, The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision. Thereupon, the VICAR filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing his application for registration of Lots 2 and 3.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure to return the subject matter of commodatum constitutes an adverse possession on the part of the
owner
Held:
No. The bailees’ failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the
part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum.
Petitioner repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its name for taxation purposes.

Case 11:
G.R. No. 147951 December 14, 2009

ARSENIO OLEGARIO and Heirs of ARISTOTELES F. OLEGARIO, represented by

CARMELITA GUZMAN-OLEGARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO C. MARI, represented by LILIA C. MARI-CAMBA, Respondent.

Factual antecedents
As early as 1916, Juan Mari, the father of Pedro Mari, declared his ownership over a parcel of land in Nancasalan,
Mangatarem for tax purposes. He took possession of the same by delineating the limits with a bamboo fence, planting
various fruit bearing trees and bamboos and constructing a house thereon. Tax Declaration No. 8048 for the year 1951
specified the subject realty as a residential land with an area of 897 square meters and as having the following boundaries:
North- Magdalena Fernandez; South - Catalina Cacayorin; East - Camino Vecinal; and West – Norberto Bugarin. In 1974,
the subject realty was transferred to respondent, Pedro Mari, by virtue of a deed of sale.
In 1947, Wenceslao Olegario, the husband of Magdalena Fernandez and father of petitioner Arsenio Olegario, filed a new
tax declaration9 for a certain 50-square meter parcel of land, then on May 1961, he executed a "Deed of Quit-Claim of
Unregistered Property"10 in favor of Arsenio transferring to the latter the aforementioned 50-square meter property. The
subject realty was identified as Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and 14356.
In 1988, respondent filed with the DENR a protest against the petitioners because of their encroachment into the disputed
realty. DENR decided in favor of the respondent and found the latter to be the owner of Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and 14356.
Petitioners did not appeal and the said decision became final and executory.
In 1989, Arsenio caused the amendment of his tax declaration12 for the 50-square meter property to reflect an increased
area of 341 square meters. In 1990, after discovering the amended entries in Arsenio’s Tax Declaration, respondent filed a
complaint14 with the RTC for Recovery of Possession and Annulment of Tax Declaration. RTC rendered judgment in favor
of the petitioners.
CA reversed the trial court's findings.

Issues
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision in adjudicating ownership of the
said lots in favor of the respondent;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its failure to declare the action as barred by
laches;

Ruling
The petition has no merit.
1. Circumstances clearly show that Juan Mari was in possession of subject realty in the concept of owner, publicly and
peacefully since 1916 or long before petitioners entered the disputed realty sometime in 1965.Based on Article 538 of the
Civil Code,26 the respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefiting from his father's tax declaration of the subject
realty since 1916, he has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners acquired joint
possession only sometime in 1965. Petitioners' acts of a possessory character - acts that might have been merely tolerated
by the owner - did not constitute possession. No matter how long tolerated possession is continued, it does not start the
running of the prescriptive period.30 Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession as against the owner and
is insufficient to vest title, unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner. There should be a
hostile use of such a nature and exercised under such circumstance as to manifest and give notice that the possession is
under a claim of right. Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period – ipso jure and without the need of judicial
or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. Ownership of immovable property is acquired by
an extraordinary prescription through possession for 30 years.35 For purposes of deciding the instant case, therefore, the
possession by respondent and his predecessor had already ripened into ownership of the subject realty by virtue of
prescription as early as 1946.
2. Petitioners cannot find refuge in the principle of laches. It is not just the lapse of time or delay that constitutes laches.
The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
through due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it had earlier abandoned or declined to assert it.
The essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise
to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainant's rights after he had knowledge of defendant's acts and
after he has had the opportunity to sue; © lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right
on which he bases his suit and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant.
In the instant case, the second and third elements are missing. Petitioners had notice and knew all along the position of the
respondent and his predecessor Juan Mari - they were standing pat on his ownership over the subject realty. On the other
hand, it was petitioners who suddenly changed their position in 1989 by changing the area of the property declared in their
name from 50 square meters to 341 square. Upon discovery of this clear and unequivocal change in status of petitioners’
position over the disputed land respondent immediately acted. He filed in 1990 the complaint for recovery of possession and
nullification of tax declaration. Hence, we find no laches in the instant case.

Case 12:
Escritor vs. IAC
GR No. 71283
Date: November 12, 1987
Facts
 Lot No. 2749, located at Atimonan, Quezon, was the subject of cadastral proceedings in the Court of First Instance. Miguel
Escritor, as claimant, filed an answer thereto declaring his ownership over the lot alleging that he acquired it by inheritance
from his deceased father. The lot having become uncontested, only Miguel Escritor appeared in order to adduce his
evidence of ownership.
The Court rendered a decision in the abovementioned case, Cadastral Case No. 72, adjudicating the lot with its
improvements in favor of claimant Escritor and confirming his title thereto. Immediately thereafter, Escritor took possession
of the property.
The Court directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the decree of registration in favor of Escritor,
the decision in Cadastral Case No. 72 having become final.
Simeon S. Acuna, the herein respondent, filed a petition for review of the above-mentioned decision contending that it was
obtained by claimant Escritor through fraud and misrepresentation. The petition was granted and a new hearing was set.
While the proceedings were going on, claimant Escritor died. His heirs, the petitioners in the case, took possession of the
property.
Thirteen years after the disputed decision was rendered, the Court adjudicated Lot No. 2749 in favor of respondent Acuna,
ordering petitioners to vacate the land. A writ of possession was later issued and petitioners voluntarily gave up their
possession.
More than four years later, respondent Acuna filed with the same Court a complaint for recovery of damages against
petitioners for the fruits of lot No. 2749 which was allegedly possessed by the latter unlawfully for thirteen years. According
to the respondent, the registration of the said lot was effectuated by the deceased claimant Escritor through fraud, malice,
and misrepresentation.
The lower court rendered a decision dismissing Acuña's complaint for damages, finding that though petitioners enjoyed the
fruits of the property, they were in good faith possessing under a just title, and the cause of action, if there was any, has
already prescribed.
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the decision of the lower court ordering petitioners to pay the fruits
received for the 13 years they have been in unlawful possession of the property.
Issue/s Whether or not the petitioner should be liable for damages? No.
Ruling It should be remembered that in the first decision of the cadastral court dated May 15, 1958, Lot No. 2749 was
adjudicated in favor of claimant Escritor, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In this decision, the said court found to its
satisfaction that claimant Escritor acquired the land by inheritance from his father who in turn acquired it by purchase, and
that his open, public, continuous, adverse, exclusive and notorious possession dated back to the Filipino-Spanish
Revolution. It must also be recalled that in its Order for the issuance of decrees dated July 15, 1958, the same Court
declared that the above-mentioned decision had become final. Significantly, nowhere during the entire cadastral proceeding
did anything come up to suggest that the land belonged to any person other than Escritor.
On the basis of the aforementioned favorable judgment which was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, Escritor
honestly believed that he is the legal owner of the land. With this well-grounded belief of ownership, he continued in his
possession of Lot No. 2749. This cannot be categorized as possession in bad faith.
As defined in the law, a possessor in bad faith is one in possession of property knowing that his title thereto is defective.
Here, there is no showing that Escritor knew of any flaw in his title. Nor was it proved that petitioners were aware that the
title of their predecessor had any defect.
Nevertheless, assuming that claimant Escritor was a possessor in bad faith, this should not prejudice his successors-in-
interest, petitioners herein, as the rule is that only personal knowledge of the flaw in one's title or mode of acquisition can
make him a possessor in bad faith, for bad faith is not transmissible from one person to another, not even to an heir.
Under Article 527 of the Civil Code, good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a
possessor rests the burden of proof. If no evidence is presented proving bad faith, like in this case, the presumption of good
faith remains.
Respondent Acuna, on the other hand, bases his complaint for damages on the alleged fraud on the part of the petitioners'
predecessor in having the land registered under his (the predecessor's) name. A review of the record, however, does not
indicate the existence of any such fraud. It was not proven in the cadastral court nor was it shown in the trial court.
Lot No. 2749 was not awarded to Escritor on the basis of his machinations. What is clear is that in the hearing of January
22, 1958, the Court permitted Escritor to adduce his evidence of ownership without opposing evidence as the lot had
become uncontested.

Case 13:
MARK SOLEDAD y CRISTOBAL, Petitioner- vs. - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS: Henry Yu received a call from Rochelle Bagaporo offering a loan assistance at a low interest rate. Private
complainant then invited her to go to his office. Bagaporo then indorsed private complainant to a certain Arthur, herein
petitioner. In their telephone conversation, petitioner told private complainant to submit documents. Private complainant
submitted various documents, such as his Globe handyphone original platinum gold card, identification cards and
statements of accounts. Subsequently, private complainant followed up his loan status but failed to do so.
Private complainant then received his Globe handyphone statement of account where he was charged for two mobile phone
numbers which were not his. Upon verification with the phone company, private complainant learned that he had additional
five mobile numbers in his name, and the application for said cellular phone lines bore the picture of petitioner and his
forged signature. Private complainant also checked with credit card companies and learned that his Citibank Credit Card
database information was altered and he had a credit card application with Metrobank. You then lodged a complaint with
NBI which conducted an entrapment operation.
During the entrapment operation, NBIs Special Investigator posed as delivery boy of the Metrobank credit card. The agent
reached the address written on the delivery receipt and asked for Henry Yu. Petitioner said he was Henry Yu and presented
two identification cards with the name and signature of Henry Yu, while the picture showed the face of petitioner. Petitioner
signed the delivery receipt. Thereupon, the investigator introduced himself as an NBI agent and apprehended him.
Petitioner was then charged with violation of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484 for possessing a counterfeit access device or
access device fraudulently applied for.
Petitioner avers that he was never in possession of the credit card because he was arrested immediately after signing the
acknowledgement receipt thus he did not yet know the contents of the envelope delivered and had no control over the
subject credit card. In RTC, petitioner was found guilty. The conviction was affirmed in CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was legally in possession of the credit card subject of the case.
HELD: YES. The trial court convicted petitioner of possession of the credit card fraudulently applied for. The law, however,
does not define the word possession. Thus, the term was used as defined in Article 523 of the Civil Code, that is,
possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. The acquisition of possession involves two elements: the
corpus or the material holding of the thing, and the animus possidendi or the intent to possess it. Animus possidendi is a
state of mind, the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant events in each case. It may be
inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.
In this case, prior to the commission of the crime, petitioner fraudulently obtained from private complainant various
documents showing the latter’s identity. He, thereafter, obtained cellular phones using private complainants identity.
Undaunted, he fraudulently applied for a credit card under the name and personal circumstances of private complainant.
Upon the delivery of the credit card applied for, the messenger (NBI agent) required two valid identification cards. Petitioner
thus showed two identification cards with his picture on them, but bearing the name and forged signature of private
complainant. As evidence of the receipt of the envelope delivered, petitioner signed the acknowledgment receipt shown by
the messenger, indicating therein that the content of the envelope was the Metrobank credit card.
Petitioner materially held the envelope containing the credit card with the intent to possess. Contrary to petitioners
contention that the credit card never came into his possession because it was only delivered to him, the above narration
shows that he, in fact, did an active part in acquiring possession by presenting the identification cards purportedly showing
his identity as Henry Yu. Certainly, he had the intention to possess the same. Had he not actively participated, the envelope
would not have been given to him. Moreover, his signature on the acknowledgment receipt indicates that there was delivery
and that possession was transferred to him as the recipient. Undoubtedly, petitioner knew that the envelope contained the
Metrobank credit card, as clearly indicated in the acknowledgment receipt, coupled with the fact that he applied for it using
the identity of private complainant.