Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5275 August 25, 1953

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUANITO DASIG, BALBINO GABUNI and MARCELINO DAYAO, defendants-appellants.

Domingo L. Vergara for appellants Juanito Dasig and Marcelino Dayao.

Perfecta E. de Vera for appellant Balbino Gabuni.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Ramon L. Avanceña for appellee.

LABRADOR, J.:

Defendants in the above-entitled case appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Isabela, finding them guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide, and sentencing them to
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Norberto Ramil, in the sum of
P4,000, and the complainant, Jacinta Galasinao, in the sum of P190, and to pay the costs of
the prosecution.

The record discloses that in the evening of December 23, 1949, at about midnight, while
Norberto Ramil and his wife, Jacinta Galasinao, and their daughter and son, Segunda and
Domingo, respectively, were sleeping in their house situated not far away from the municipal
building of Antatet (now Luna), Province of Isabela, the said spouses were suddenly awakened
by the barking of dogs and the grunting of pigs. Ramil got up and walked quietly towards a
window, to find out what the dogs were barking at, but just then two persons who had entered
the house faced him. The wife heard these persons talking in whispers and saw them in front.
She lighted a lamp, and as she did so the two intruders levelled their guns at her husband and
demanded from him to produce his pistol. As the husband could not produce any pistol and
said he had none at all, they fired at him. He used his two hands to protect himself, but to no
avail. As he received the shots, he fell down in a stooping position and then slumped on the
floor, face downwards. The wife and her two children, who had already been awakened, cried
for help, but the intruders levelled their guns at them, commanding them to keep quiet and
threatening to kill if they did not do so. For fear, they had to stop. The intruders then went
inside the bedroom and ran-sacked the contents of the trunk which contained their valuables.
P10 in cash and jewels worth P180 were taken away.

The Chief of Police of Antatet, who lived around twenty meters away from the house of Ramil,
heard three pistol shots, so he repaired to the municipal building to fetch one of his policemen,
then they passed by the house of the Mayor, and together with him they proceeded to the
house of Ramil. When they reached it the robbers were already gone. They found Ramil
already dead with gun-shots wounds on the left eye, in the right breast, at the back, and at the
left index finger. They questioned the wife, who recounted, to them what had happened. The
chief of police found a fired bullet, caliber .32, inside the truck, four empty .22 caliber cartridges
near the dead body, three empty .32 caliber shells, one near the broken box inside the
bedroom and the other two five meters from the house of the deceased, and three .45 caliber
empty shells under the house just below the body the dead body. The following day, a
physician of Antatet performed an autopsy on the dead body of Ramil and he found four
gunshot wounds in the places already indicated above. When he opened the chest cavity, he
discovered a .22 caliber slug right at the heart.

The above facts are not contradicted. The evidence, upon which the judgment of conviction is
based, consists of the testimony on one, Jose Mallillin, that of Andres Bumanglag, which in
part corroborates Mallillin's testimony, and the findings of a ballistic expert of the Philippine
Constabulary to the effect that the empty .32 caliber cartridges found under the house of Ramil
had been fired from the Llama auto-pistol possessed by, and licensed in the name of, Mallillin,
and that the .32 caliber slug, Exhibit C, which was found inside the trunk, had also been fired
therefrom. These findings were based on the fact that the striations found in the said bullet are
identical with and congruent to those which he fired from the same Llama auto-pistol, and the
pin marks at the empty .32 caliber cartridges are identical with and congruent to that found at
an empty cartridge fired from the same pistol.

Mallillin was formerly a school teacher of Antatet and had resided there, but on the date of the
robbery he was living in a contiguous town, Cauayan. He testified as follows: On the evening in
question, while he was on his way home, he saw four persons near a checkpoint, and as he
passed by, two of them got hold of him and a third snatched his pistol away and compelled him
to follow them. The four were later recognized by him to be the defendants Balbino Gabuni,
Juanito Dasig and Marcelino Dayao, and Sergio Eduardo. They boarded a jeep, which was
parked near the road and in which there were two others whom Mallillin did not recognize, and
then they drove to the junction of the Cabatuan-Antatet roads. Here they all went down and
walked towards Antatet.

When the party was around 100 meters from the municipal building, he saw his companions
talking to Andres Bumanglag. Taking Bumanglag aside, he informed the latter that he had been
held up. Upon Mallillin' suggestion, his companions asked Bumanglag how the house of Ramil
could be entered, and the latter answered that it could be done through a window near the
well. They also asked further information from him, and thereafter he was allowed to go away,
but with the warning that if he would squeal, he would be put to death.

After Bumanglag had left, they went to a place around fifty meters from the House of Ramil,
the intended victim. Here they waited till about midnight when they approached the house.
Gabuni then ordered Mallillin to stay in a place beside the road. Dasig and Eduardo then gave
him their shoes for him to keep, while the five, including the two unknown persons, approached
the house. Dasig and Eduardo entered the house through the window, while Gabuni stayed at
the door in front. Gabuni gave his carbine to Dayao and Mallillin's Llama pistol to Dasig, while
Eduardo held a .22 caliber pistol.

Five minutes after the three had gone up the house, Mallillin heard three shots. Then he heard
a voice calling for help. He got frightened, so he hurriedly went away bound for Cauayan.
While still in Antatet, he heard the policemen of Antatet exchange shots with his companions.
He arrived in Cauayan at about one o'clock. At around 4:30 that morning, Sergio Eduardo
called at his house and asked for their shoes, and as he went away, he warned Mallillin not to
squeal, otherwise he would be killed. Mallillin asked for his pistol and was informed that it was
with Marcelino Dayao. That same morning he went to Dayao and got it from the latter. Juanito
Dasig also called at his house that same morning, warning him that if he would squeal, he
would be in a bad fix, informing him further that their two companions, whom Mallillin had not
recognized, had gone to Manila to fetch some more of their companions until they reach as
many as twenty.

The above is Mallillin's version. He was apprehended by the authorities on December 31,
1949. Four days before his arrest, he further said, he had decided, after consultation with his
wife, to go to the chief of police of Cauayan to ask him to accompany him to Cabatuan, where
he was going to relate all that had happened, but that it so happened that when he saw the
chief of police, the latter had no time to hear him as he was going away and was then ready
with his baggage to go to Manila.

When Mallillin was taken to Constabulary barracks on December 31, 1949, he had a talk with
Lieutenant Panis of the Constabulary. Panis promised him that he would be used as a state
witness if he would disclose all that he knew about the robbery. With this promise Mallillin
made a complete disclosure of the above facts to Lieutenant Panis. His statement was put in
writing, although it was not sworn to before the justice of the peace until January 3, 1950. His
affidavit was introduced at the trial as Exhibit 4-Gabuni, Exhibit 3-Dasig-Dayao, and contains
substantially the same facts testified to by him during the trial.
The testimony of Andres Bumanglag is to the effect that that same evening, he had been
playing guitar with two companions at the house of one Labog, and that when they went home
and as they were approaching his house, he was suddenly held up by two persons. When
brought to a group to which the two belonged, he recognized Mallillin, Gabuni, chief of police of
Cauayan, and Dasig. He was asked about the number of policemen of Antatet, the arms that
they had, the caliber of the arms, and the persons who had firearms. Finally, they asked him to
draw a sketch of the house of Norberto Ramil and its position in relation to the house of the
mayor, as well as the position of the window through which entrance could be gained into the
house. Bumanglag was very much frightened because, at the beginning when he re-fused to
answer the questions that they asked him, he was kicked and threatened by the group.
Besides, Mallillin had informed him that he himself had been held-up, and that he should tell
what they asked him, he was kicked and threatened by the group. Besides, Mallillin had
informed him that he himself had been held-up, and that he should tell what they asked him,
other-wise both of them would be killed. After getting all the information they desired,
Bumanglag was allowed to go home. A few minutes after he went to bed he heard some shots,
and stray bullets hit his house and a kapok three nearby, so he and his family had to go down
the house to seek shelter from stray bullets.

On January 3, 1950, Andres Bumanglag also made an affidavit before Lieutenant Panis, which
was sworn to by him before the justice of the peace of Antatet. In this affidavit, Exhibit 5-
Gabuni, he mentions the fact that before the robbery a group of persons, four of whom were
armed, came and asked information from him about the house of Norberto Ramil, and that on
that occasion he also saw Mallillin with them, who told him that he was held saw held up by the
group.

The trial court gave credit to the testimonies of Mallillin and Bumanglag as above outlined, and
together with the identification made by the wife of Ramil of one of the appellants by the latter's
stature, and on the further ground that the cartridges and some of the bullets found in the
premises had been fired from the Llama pistol of Mallillin, held that the crime of robbery with
homicide had been committed by the accused-appellants herein, and sentenced them as
above indicated.

In this court the attorneys for the appellants contend that inasmuch as Mallillin's confession
was obtained by a promise made by the Constabulary Lieutenant Panis that Mallillin would be
excluded from the information and made a state witness, Mallillin's confession is not
admissible against him and neither should it be admissible against the appellants herein. It is
evident that counsel misunderstands the application of the principle in evidence that a
confession secured through promise of immunity is not admissible. The evidence submitted
against the appellants is not the confession made by Mallillin; it is his testimony given in open
court. There is, therefore, no occasion to invoke the principle of evidence in question.
The most important claim of the defendants-appellants is that inasmuch as Mallillin was an
accomplice in the crime and his testimony contains flaws in many particulars, the maxim
Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus should be applied to the whole of his testimony, and the
judgment of conviction would then have no leg to stand on. There are certainly many points or
particulars in Mallillin's testimony which can not stand careful scrutiny. First of all, we have the
supposed compulsion or hold-up which he claims he was subjected to. Mallillin admits that the
defendants-appellants had been his companions in various games, like poker, "pekyo", etc.
Then there is the circumstance that the supposed hold-up took place in the center of the town.
According to some defense witnesses, Mallillin had also been telling of robberies that might
take place in town. It is unreasonable, therefore, to conclude that Mallillin was not an unwilling
companion in the commission of the crime.

But, on the other hand, we find that his testimony is corroborated by evidence worthy of credit.
That he was present on the occasion of the robbery can not be denied, because his Llama
pistol was proven to have been fired at the scene of the robbery, as cartridges and bullets
proved to have been fired from the said pistol had been found in the house where the robbery
was committed. And the fact that appellants had been companions of Mallillin in many
gambling games points to the close acquaintance between them and them unity of purpose as
well. While his story that it was not he who furnished the data about the climbing of the house
and its surroundings, his statement that Juanito Dasig and Sergio Eduardo were the ones who
went inside the house is corroborated by the inmates of the house to the effect that only two of
the robbery entered the house.

Again, the testimony about the different arms used, a carbine in the possession of Dayao, a
pistol given Eduardo by Gabuni — these facts are corroborated by the finding of .22 caliber
slugs and empty shells in the heart of the victim and in the house and in the premises. The
testimony of Mallillin that Gabuni carried a .45 caliber pistol, which was his service pistol as
chief of police, is also untrue because the examination of the .45 caliber bullet found in the
premises shows that it was not fired from the service pistol of Gabuni. But Mallillin's assertion
may be due to innocent error on his part. He perhaps thought that the pistol that Gabuni
carried was his service pistol. But Gabuni may have planned to avoid identification by using a
firearm different from that which he used as member of the police force.

Then there is the corroboration of the testimony of Mallillin given by Andres Bumanglag, whom
the trial court considered as a trustworthy witness. We find nothing from the record which
would justify us in reversing the appraisal of the above testimony and the credit given this
corroborating witness by the trial court.
It has been stated that the rule (Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus) invoked is not a mandatory
rule of evidence, but rather a permissible one, which allows the jury or the court to draw the
inference or not to draw it as circumstances may best warrant. (70 C.J. 783.) The unbelievable
allegation of Mallillin, that he was forced into joining the band against his will, arises from the
natural desire of an accomplice to shift the blame to his co-conspirators and exculpate himself;
while his assertion that the gun Gabuni carried was his service pistol maybe an innocent
mistake on Mallillin's part. His claim that it was Bumanglag who indicated where access to the
victim's house may be had may also be untrue, be-cause Mallillin had been said to have been
in the house. Do these flaws and defects render his testimony wholly inadmissible under the
rule invoked?

We take advantage of this opportunity to explain the true scope of this much invoked and
abused rule of (Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus.) Professor Wigmore states that this rule
ceased to be the rule in England as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century. He
criticizes the board rule as unsound, because not true to human nature; that because a person
tells a single lie, he is lying throughout his whole testimony, or that there is strong possibility
that he is so lying. The reason for it is that once a person knowingly and deliberately states a
falsehood in one material aspect, he must have done so as to the rest. But it is also clear that
the rule has its limitations, for when the mistaken statement is consistent with good faith and is
not conclusively indicative of a deliberate perversion, the believable portion of the testimony
should be admitted. Because though a person may err in memory or in observation in one or
more respects, he may have told the truth as to others. (III Wigmore, Secs. 1009-1015, pp.
674-683.) There are, therefor, these requirements for the application of the rule, i.e., that the
false testimony is as to a material point, and that there should be a conscious and deliberate
intention to falsify. (Lyric Film Exchange, Inc. vs. Cowper, 1937, 36 Off. Gaz., 1642.)

The rule is also carefully considered in the case of the Santisima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, 5
Law. Ed. 454, thus:

Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as
in relation to the country of his birth, or his being in a vessel on particular voyage, or living in a
particular place, if the fact turn out otherwise, it is extremely difficult to exempt him from the
charge of deliberate falsehood; and courts of justice, under such circumstances, are bound
upon principles of law and morality and justice to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus. What ground of judicial belief can there be left when the party has shown such gross
insensibility to the difference between right and wrong, between truth and falsehood.

In the case of Godair vs. Ham National Bank, 80 N.E., 407, the Supreme Court of Illinois made
the following very illuminating expression of the scope of the rule:
As to the second criticism, it has uniformly been held by this Court that the maxim, "falsus in
uno, falsus in omnibus," should only be applied in cases where a witness has knowingly and
willfully given false testimony. Chittenden vs. Evans, 41 Ill. 251; City of Chicago vs. Smith, 48
Ill. 107; United States Express Co. vs. Hutchings, 58 Ill. 44; Pope vs. Dodson, Id. 360; Guliher
vs. People, 82 Ill. 145; Swan vs. People, 98 Ill. 610; Hoge vs. People, 117 Ill. 35, 6 N.E. 796;
Freeman vs. Easly, 117 Ill. 317, 7 N.E. 856; Overtoom vs. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad
Co., 181 Ill. 323, 54 N.E. 898; Matthews vs. Granger, 196 Ill. 164, 63 N.E. 658.

In City of Chicago vs. Smith, supra, on page 108 of 48 Ill., it was said: "As to the eight
instructions asked by the defendant and refused, we are of opinion, under the authority of the
case of Brenman vs. People, 15 Ill. 511, it should not have been given. There the court say it
does not follow, merely because a witness makes an untrue statement, that his entire
testimony is to be disregarded. This must depend on the motive of the witness. If he
intentionally swears falsely as to one matter, the jury may properly reject his whole testimony
as unworthy of credit. But, if he makes a false statement through mistake or misapprehension,
they ought not to disregard his testimony altogether. The maxim, 'falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus,' should only be applied in cases where a witness wilfully and knowingly gives false
testimony.

And in Pope vs. Dodson, supra, on page 365 of 58 Ill.: "The tenth instruction in the series given
for appellee is palpably erroneous. It told the jury that, if the witness Lovely, "has sworn falsely
in any material statement," the jury might disregard her entire statement except so far as it was
corroborated. A witness cannot be discredited simply on the ground of an erroneous statement.
It is only where the statements of a witness are willfully and corruptly false in contradicted on a
material point," then the jury had the right to disregard his whole testimony unless corroborated
by other testimony. The court said (page 146 of 82 Ill.): 'The instruction was clearly erroneous.
When analyzed, it plainly tells the jury that "if they believe, from the evidence, that Alfred F.
Foote has been contradicted on a material point, then the jury have a right to disregard his
whole testimony unless corroborated by other testimony." This is not the law. . . If the witness,
whether defendant or otherwise, is shown, by proof, to have sworn wilfully and knowingly false
on any material matter, his evidence may be rejected so far as it is not corroborated. . . The
mere fact, however, that he is contradicted as to some material matter is not enough to warrant
the rejection of his evidence altogether.

In Overtoom vs. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., supra, the court instructed the jury
that "if they believe any witness has testified falsely, then the jury may disregard such witness'
testimony except in so far as it may have been corroborated." In disposing of this instruction
the court said (page 330 of 181 Ill., page 901 of 54 N.E.): "A witness may have testified falsely
upon some matter inquired about from forgetfulness or honest mistake, and in such case the
jury would not be authorized to disregard his entire testimony, whether corroborated or not. It is
the corrupt motive, or the giving of false testimony knowing it to be false, that authorizes a jury
to disregard the testimony of a witness and the court to so instruct them."

With the above limitations of the rule in mind, it is clear that the maxim should not apply in the
case at bar for three reasons. First, there is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the
testimony. Second, the mistakes are not on the very material points. Third, the errors do not
arise from an apparent desire to pervert the truth, but from innocent mistakes and the desire of
the witness to exculpate himself though not completely.

The next legal question to decide is whether the credible evidence submitted, together with
that adduced on behalf of the defendants, prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was the three
appellants who participated in the commission of the crime. The evidence submitted by the
appellants of their defenses of alibi are not satisfactory to us. That presented by appellant
Juanito Dasig, which consists of the testimony of the nurse, that on the night in question Dasig
was in his house because his wife was suffering from stomach-ache, is not satisfactory for the
reason that the nurse did not positively state that the date when she went to attend Dasig's
wife was December 23, 1949. This date was included in the leading questions propounded by
counsel for appellants, where the date is insiduously joined with another fact and witness'
affirmative answer may refer to the more important fact contained in the answer, not to the
date. Thus, the first question asked was as follows:

"Q: Do you remember having attended to the wife of Juanito Dasig sometime or around
December 23, 1949? — A. yes, sir." (t.s.n., p.174)

The affirmative answer may well mean that she did actually attend, and may not imply that she
did so on December 23, 1949. Another question was:

Q. How many days previous to that trip of yours on December 24, 1949? Was it the day
previous?— A. Previous. (t.s.n. p. 176)

This question is a leading question. The witness also connects the night of the robbery with a
trip supposedly made by her with one Dr. Modales. But as to this occasion of the trip, her
answer as to the date is also ambiguous, thus:

Q. Do you remember the date of that trip of yours with Dr. Modales when you left him in
Antatet? A. — It seems to me it was on December 24, 1949. (t.s.n., p. 175; Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, however, this witness testified that she never keeps a record of the
cases that she attends to every day, and on being asked what cases she attended in
December, 1949, she answered that she can not tell unless she saw her record. Its date,
therefore, December 23, 1949, was not remembered by her but put into her mind by the
leading questions of the counsel. To convince the court that the attendance took place on
December 23rd, it was necessary for her to have shown that that date appeared in the record
she kept.

The alibi presented by Gabuni is to the effect that on December 23, he and Sergeant Tamani
were together the whole day and evening, and during the evening Gabuni stayed at home.
That Gabuni and Sergeant Tamani should stay in a barrio two kilometers away, on patrol, from
nine in the morning to six in the evening, of fully nine hours, is hard to understand. For them to
spend four more hours drinking and eating together in a restaurant, evidently without their
returning to their offices to report the results of their supposed mission, is still harder to believe.
But for them to eat again at the home of Gabuni, after they had already eaten in a restaurant,
is the height of improbability. Gabuni must have been on vacation that day, not on duty. If
Gabuni was really and actually on patrol on hat day, why was not the police blotter submitted?
But even if the above story, improbable as it is, were assumed to be true, and his claim that he
was at his house at ten in the evening and woke up at six in the morning, also true, it is still not
impossible for him to have gone down the house after ten o'clock in the evening to join the
commission of the robbery, and come back at home in time to be there and wake up at six
o'clock in the following morning.

Neither can the defense of alibi presented by appellant Marcelino Dayao stand the test of
careful scrutiny. That Dayao was with his witnesses on certain days and on the occasions
mentioned, in the case of witnesses Silverio Anies and Jauna Molina on the presentation of the
latter's claim, and in the case of witness Daniel Yuson on the occasion of a night of gambling,
may be assumed to be true. But their assertion that it was on the precise date, December 23,
1949, that they saw or were with Dayao is difficult to believe. Human memory on dates or days
is frail, and unless the day is an extraordinary or unusual one for the witness, there is no
reasonable assurance of its correctness. Dayao's witnesses did not prove that some
extraordinary or unusual thing had happened on that day, that would have made them
remember it. As to Anies, the presentation of the claim is admitted by him to be a common
occurrence, such that he had to admit he can not remember the dates when other similar
applicants saw him. As to witness Yuson, the playing of mahjong was also a common pastime.
Neither Anies nor Yuson presented any writing or book entry where the event or occasion they
mentioned took place. The trial court did not believe their testimony, and we are unable to find
that its conclusion is not borne out by human experience.

Having found that sufficient admissible evidence, worthy of credit, has been adduced to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants-appellants were the ones who perpetrated the
robbery in question, and the evidence with which they sought to prove their defenses of alibi
having been found to be unsatisfactory, we must affirm, as we hereby affirm, the judgment
appealed from, with costs against the appellants.

So ordered.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 137281 April 3, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VIRGILIO LUCENA y SANTIAGO, accused-appellant.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For the fatal hacking of Urbano U. Dulay and Lazaro U. Dulay, Sr., accused-appellant Virgilio
Lucena y Santiago was charged with Double Murder in an Information 1 which alleges:

That on or about the 18th day of July 1995 in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of La Union,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill and being armed with a bolo, did then and there, by means of treachery and with
evident premeditation and taking advantage of his superior strength, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on one URBANO DULAY y ULAT and
LAZARO DULAY, Sr. y ULAT, by hacking them to death with the said bolo and inflicting upon
them mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths, to the
damage and prejudice of their heirs.

Contrary to law.

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. 2 The case thereafter proceeded to
trial. Subsequently, the court a quo rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused VIRGILIO LUCENA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER for killing Lazaro Dulay and Urbano Dulay on July 18, 1995. This Court
appreciated the presence of alevosia as an aggravating circumstance in the killing of Lazaro
Dulay. This court could have appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling but it was
not alleged in the Information. Evident premeditation qualified the killings to Murder. Taking
advantage of his superior strength was also present considering the ages of the victims and
the perpetrator.

Evidently, the Prosecution is of the view that this incident presents a continuous offense on the
theory that there was only one criminal resolution on the part of the accused. Hence, the
charge is double murder.

This is a heinous crime.

This Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of death (Art. 63, par. 1, Revised Penal Code).

He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Lazaro Dulay, a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and
P25,000.00 for expenses in connection with his death. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs
of Urbano Dulay a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and P15,000.00 for expenses in connection
with his death. 3

On automatic review before this Court, accused-appellant alleges that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY
OF ROSALINA DULAY AND DISBELIEVING THE THEORY OF THE DEFENSE.

II

EVEN ASSUMING THAT APPELLANT IS GUILTY FOR THE DEATHS OF URBANO DULAY
AND LAZARO DULAY, THE COURT NONETHELESS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST
HIM THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION AND TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH.

The prosecution's version of the incident is summarized thus in the People's Brief:

At about 2:00 in the afternoon of July 18, 1995, Rosalina Dulay was inside her house in Barrio
Sta. Cecilia, Aringay, La Union. She was washing clothes near the entrance of the kitchen. Her
brother-in-law Lazaro Dulay, also known as Saroy, was sleeping on the kitchen table while her
husband, Urbano Dulay, was sleeping in the second storey of the house with their two children.
4

Appellant arrived inside the house and said something to Rosalina. Appellant who was carrying
a long and straight bolo, suddenly hacked the sleeping Lazaro. After hacking Lazaro, appellant
went upstairs, awakened Urbano and hacked him. Rosalina brought her two children to the
corn field to hide. Urbano later ran towards the corn field where he died due to his wounds.
Lazaro died inside the house. 5

Dr. Armando Avena, Municipal Health Officer of Aringay, La Union, conducted the autopsy on
the remains of Urbano and prepared a Post-Mortem Examination Report 6 stating that the
cause of death of Urbano was the massive loss of blood secondary to multiple hacked and
stab wounds. The weapon used in the killing of Urbano could have been a bolo which
penetrated six (6) centimeters (cm) and hit the heart. Another wound, a hack wound,
measuring seven (7) cms. in length was found at the right scapular region with the depth of
about three (3) cms. at the posterior aspect.

Dr. Avena also conducted the autopsy on Lazaro or Pertolino Dulay. He prepared a Post-
Mortem Examination Report 7 on the death of Lazaro stating the following findings:

There is a wound hacked 14 cm. linear hitting the anterior neck down to the left lower breast
about 6 cm. in depth hitting the ribs and anterior lower pillars. 8

Accused-appellant had a different story. He testified that in the morning of July 18, 1995, he
was at his house in Sta. Cecilia, Aringay, La Union, repairing its roof since 7:00 o'clock. 9 At
noon, he went to the house of Rosalina Dulay, which was about 100 meters away, to have
lunch. 10 He usually ate lunch at Rosalina's house. 11 He reached the house at around 1:30
o'clock in the afternoon. 12 Rosalina was outside the house. 13 When accused-appellant
entered the house, he found the brothers, Urbano and Lazaro Dulay, hacking each other with
bolos. 14 Since Urbano, who was older, was being attacked by the younger Lazaro, accused-
appellant intervened to restrain the latter. 15 While accused-appellant was pacifying Lazaro,
Urbano was able to run away. 16 Lazaro, however, turned to accused-appellant and hacked
him with the bolo five (5) times, hitting him in the head and on his left foot above the ankle. 17
Accused-appellant ran away but was pursued by Lazaro. In order to defend himself, accused-
appellant picked up Urbano's bolo and hacked Lazaro with it. 18 Accused-appellant then left
the Dulay residence, 19 leaving Lazaro lying on the floor, and went home. He brought with him
the bolo which he used to defend himself. 20 Accused-appellant was seen by his brother and
was brought to the Health Center in Agoo to have his bloodied head treated. 21

In sum, accused-appellant insists that it was Lazaro Dulay who hacked Urbano Dulay and that
when he intervened, Lazaro turned to him, thus forcing him to defend himself. Furthermore,
accused-appellant attempts to destroy the credibility of prosecution eyewitness, Rosalina
Dulay, pointing to "material and notable points which engender serious doubts in the
truthfulness of the prosecution's version and evidence," 22 to wit: (1) Rosalina was threatened
by the relatives of her husband to testify against accused-appellant; (2) Rosalina's testimony
that her husband was hacked by accused-appellant was not indicated in the testimony of the
doctor who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of her husband; (3) She testified on direct
examination that when Lazaro was attacked he was downstairs near the table, but on cross-
examination she declared that he was sleeping on top of the table; and (4) The prosecution
failed to establish any motive for the accused to kill the two victims.

The issues raised by accused-appellant boil down to a question of credibility. In this

connection, it has been consistently held by this Court that the matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge,
23 who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility
by the various indicia available but not reflected in the record. The demeanor of the person on
the stand can draw the line between fact and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant
pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest
blush or the guilty blanch — these can reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying through
his teeth. 24

For the reasons stated above, findings of the trial court on matters of credibility are binding and
conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted. 25 In the case at bar,
the trial court, which had the unique opportunity to directly hear the testimony of the
prosecution eyewitness Rosalina Dulay, gave credence to her assertion that she saw accused-
appellant hacking the victims. Accused-appellant has not shown sufficient grounds to deviate
from the aforesaid doctrine.

Accused-appellant asserts that Rosalina Dulay's testimony was not voluntarily given. He points
to a statement elicited during cross-examination that the relatives of her deceased husband
threatened to kill her if she was "going to testify on (sic) the other party." 26 Accused-appellant
also makes capital of the fact that Rosalina admits to have never been threatened by his
relatives, while at the same time acknowledging that she stayed twice in the house of the same
relatives when she went to Aringay, La Union sometime after the incident.

This lone discordant note in the testimonial declarations of Rosalina, as adverted to by

accused-appellant, will not extricate accused-appellant from his predicament. The controlling
rule in this regard is that the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in
part depending upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the
case. 27 By itself, prejudice against an accused cannot warrant the disqualification of a
witness or the total disregard of the witness's testimony. 28 Indeed:

The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a
positive rule of law; the rule is not an inflexible one of universal application. Modern trend in
jurisprudence favors more flexibility when the testimony of a witness may be partly believed
and partly disbelieved depending on the corroborative evidence presented at the trial. Thus,
where the challenged testimony is sufficiently corroborated in its material points, or where the
mistakes arise from innocent lapses and not from an apparent desire to pervert the truth, the
rule may be relaxed. It is a rule that is neither absolute nor mandatory and binding upon the
court, which may accept or reject portions of the witness' testimony based on its inherent
credibility or on the corroborative evidence in the case. 29

There is, furthermore, no standard of human behavior for a person confronted with a shocking
incident. One may immediately report the incident to the proper authorities while another, in
fear and/or avoiding involvement in a criminal investigation, may keep to himself what he had
witnessed. 30 Others may come forward to reveal the identity of the perpetrators of the crime
only after the lapse of a considerable length of time. 31

In this case, it should be noted that right after the incident, Rosalina voluntarily executed a
sworn statement implicating accused-appellant. That she later showed some hesitation should
not be taken against her, because the reluctance of a witness to testify in criminal actions due
to reprisal is of judicial notice, 32 and does not impair the witness's credibility. 33 The pertinent
excerpts of Rosalina's testimony reveal that while her husband's relatives did threaten her to
take the witness stand, it was not for the purpose of falsely testifying against the accused-
appellant, viz:

Q. While you were in Tarlac, Tarlac you were visited by the relatives of your husband,
Urbano Dulay?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And they were asking you to testify against the accused Virgilio Lucena, is that
correct?

A. They did not tell that, sir.

Q. And when they visited you in Tarlac, Tarlac, what was then the reason for their visit?

A. They delivered to me the subpoena, sir.

Q. And they asked you also to testify?

ATTY. CALOZA:
Already answered, Your Honor.

COURT:

Sustained.

ATTY. GAYMAN:

Q. Is it not a fact that you were also threatened by them to come and testify against
Virgilio Lucena?

ATTY. CALOZA:

Objection. No basis, Your Honor.

COURT:

Witness may answer.

A. Yes, sir. They were threatening to kill me if I am going to testify on the other party.

ATTY. CALOZA:

May we move to strike out the answer of the witness, on the other party, Your Honor.

COURT:

Remain on record the answer of the witness, on the other party.

Q. Were the relatives of your husband threatening you to testify?

A. They were not telling me that, sir. 34

Accused-appellant further contends that Rosalina's testimony as to his having attacked Urbano
many times was contrary to the medical findings. This is likewise bereft of merit. On the
contrary, her assertion is consistent with the findings of Dr. Armando Avena that the cause of
death was the "massive loss of blood secondary to multiple hacked wounds and stab wounds."
35 It must be remembered in this regard that the detailed testimony of a witness in a murder or
homicide case acquires greater weight and credibility if it corresponds with the autopsy report.
36
So, too, must fall accused-appellant's argument as to the alleged inconsistency in Rosalina's
testimony on direct examination that Lazaro Dulay was near the table downstairs, which
concededly conflicts with her claim on cross-examination that he was sleeping on top of the
table at the time he was attacked by accused-appellant. While indeed these statements are
contradictory, the alleged conflict is more apparent than real and refers to minor or trivial
matters which, in fact, serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a
crime, especially so when the crime is, as in this case, shocking to the conscience and
numbing to the senses. 37

These supposed inconsistencies hardly dent the credibility of Rosalina who remained steadfast
and unwavering in relating the principal occurrence and positively identifying the accused-
appellant as the assailant of the victims. 38 In other words, as long as the mass of the
testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing of statements dilute neither the witness's
credibility nor the veracity of the testimony — variations in the testimony of witnesses on the
same side in respect to minor, collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their
united testimony to the prominent facts. 39

For the foregoing considerations, accused-appellant's argument with regard to his supposed
lack of motive to kill the victims becomes a moot point. Suffice it to state in this regard that
proof of ill motive to commit the crime becomes irrelevant with the positive identification of the
accused. 40 Indeed, positive identification, where categorical and consistent, without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi
and denial. 41

In the second assigned error, accused-appellant takes the trial court to task for imposing the
death penalty on him contending that treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength were not attendant in the commission of the felonies.

With regard to treachery, accused-appellant insists that there was no evidence to show that he
deliberately hacked the victims in such manner as to avoid risk to himself. In the case of
Lazaro Dulay, accused argues that he merely chanced upon Lazaro and there was nothing to
show that he planned to kill him while he was sleeping. Accused-appellant also points out that
he had no grudge sufficient to motivate him to plan the killing of Lazaro.

There is alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. 42 What is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible
for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. 43 In this case, Lazaro Dulay was asleep when
he was hacked to death by accused-appellant. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that
there exists the qualifying circumstance of alevosia when one takes the life of a person who is
asleep. 44

As regards the slaying of Urbano, however, treachery can not be appreciated because it is not
clear if he was also asleep when he was assaulted. On the contrary, the evidence shows that
Urbano was initially asleep when accused-appellant entered his house and attacked the
sleeping Lazaro on the first floor of his house, but that he woke up when accused-appellant,
after hacking Lazaro, went upstairs and hacked him. In fact, Urbano was even able to run
towards the cornfield where he expired because of the severity of his wounds. 45

The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of superior strength vis-à-vis
the circumstances surrounding the slaying of Lazaro. When treachery qualifies the crime of
murder, the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength in necessarily
included in the former. 46 In other words, the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength is absorbed in treachery. 47

This aggravating circumstance cannot also be appreciated in the killing of Urbano because to
take advantage of superior strength means to use purposely excessive force out of proportion
to the means of defense available to the person attacked. 48 There has been no showing in
this case that accused-appellant purposely employed superior strength to consummate his
nefarious deed, hence, it can not be appreciated against him.

It, likewise, is unnecessary to consider evident premeditation in the twin killings although this
was also alleged in the information. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be
proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the following elements thereof, to wit: (1)
the time the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he
clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the
execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequence of his act. 49 The essence of
evident premeditation is that the execution of the crime is preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon a resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment. 50

In this case, the records are bereft of any evidence of any of the above requisites of evident
premeditation. There is absolutely no proof of the time when accused-appellant decided to
commit the crime. Neither is there any showing of how accused-appellant planned the killings,
nor of how much time elapsed before he executed his plan. Absent all these, evident
premeditation can not be appreciated. 51
The resolution of the issues raised in this case will not be complete without a word being made
on the defectively crafted Information indicting accused-appellant for the twin killings of the
Dulay brothers. It bears stressing that an indictment for multiple offenses in a single complaint
or information transgresses Rule 110, Section 13 52 of the Rules of Court, which states that a
"complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which
existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses." Be that as it may, this Court
held in People v. Ramon 53 that:

Regrettably for accused-appellant, however; he has failed to timely question the above defect,
and he may thus be deemed to have waived this objection to the multiplicity of charges. In
People vs. Conte, 54 this Court has ruled:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Under Sections 1 and 3 (e) of Rule 117, the appellant before entering his plea, should have
moved to quash the complaint for being duplicitous. For his failure to do so, he is deemed to
have waived this defect (Section 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court; People vs. Dulay, 217 SCRA 132
[1993]; People vs. Basay, 219 SCRA 404 [1993]; People vs. Ducay, 225 SCRA 1 [1993]).
Hence, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 120, the court could convict him of as many offenses as
are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them. 55

Given the foregoing factual backdrop, the penalties imposed on accused-appellant must be
modified. In the case of the killing of Lazaro U. Dulay, treachery qualified the offense to Murder,
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. 56 While the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength was alleged, this is absorbed in alevosia. Evident premeditation was likewise
alleged but it cannot be appreciated in the absence of evidence that the execution of the
criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during a space of time to arrive at a calm judgment. 57 In the absence of any
other aggravating circumstance to justify the imposition of the death penalty, only reclusion
perpetua, the lesser penalty, should be imposed. 58

On the other hand, the killing of Urbano U. Dulay was not attended by any qualifying
aggravating circumstance, thus, accused-appellant should be convicted of the lesser offense
of Homicide, which is punishable by reclusion temporal. 59 In the absence of any modifying
circumstance, the imposable penalty shall be in the medium period. 60 Since accused-
appellant is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty whose minimum must be within the range of prision
mayor, the penalty next lower in degree, and whose maximum shall be within the range of
reclusion temporal in its medium period. Taken in the light of the prevailing facts of the case,
this Court deems it proper to impose upon the accused-appellant an indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties prescribed by
law. 61

It appearing that civil indemnity awarded is in accordance with controlling case law on the
matter and that the other damages awarded are borne out by the evidence on record, the
same are likewise sustained.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31, in
Criminal Case No. A-3036, is MODIFIED as follows:

Accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the
killing of Lazaro U. Dulay, Sr., and is sentenced to serve the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

Accused-appellant is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

Homicide for the killing of Urbano U. Dulay, and is sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty
of Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and
Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.

The Decision under review, insofar as it orders accused-appellant to pay the heirs of Lazaro
Dulay the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 for expenses in connection
with this death, and to pay the heirs of Urbano Dulay the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P15,000.00 for expenses in connection with his death, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Today is Tuesday, November 12, 2019 home

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-37945 May 28, 1984

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ADRIANO CAÑETE and JOSE BILOG alias BOY, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Benjamin L. Bargas and Teresita Cruz Sison for defendants-appellants.

RELOVA, J.:

Charged and convicted of the crime of murder by the then Court of First Instance of Palawan
the two (2) accused, Adriano Cañete and Jose Bilog, were both sentenced to the maximum
penalty of death and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased, Douglas Bilog, in
the sum of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
proportional costs.

The People's version of the facts is as follows:

Accused Jose Bilog and Douglas Bilog were brothers. They were owners of adjoining ricelands
adjacent to the Inagawan-Sub Colony at Puerto Princess, Palawan (p. 10, tsn, Jan. 4, 1973,
Anonas). They were not in good terms and always quarrelled because Jose resented the fact
that Douglas has received a bigger share of the lands inherited from their parents. (pp. 12, 20,
tsn., Anonas).

The ire of Jose against his brother became unbearable that on or about April 28, 1971, he got
his father's shotgun and waylaid Douglas at the bridge leading their house. A tragic incident
was averted only when Concepcion the wife of Douglas, informed her uncle, Cervancia, of
Jose's evil scheme. Cervancia immediately went after Jose and succeeded in retrieving the
gun from the latter and tried to settle their differences (p. 10, tsn, Anonas).

Through the intercession of Mr. Aniceto Gamo, a Chief of Section in the Inagawan-Sub Colony,
Jose Bilog had allowed his farm to be worked by Nicasio Dayao, a prisoner at the Colony (pp.
4-5, 13, tsn, Duero). Sometime in May, 1971 while Dayao was working in the ricefield, Jose
Bilog offered him P300.00 if he (Dayao) would kill Douglas. Dayao asked Jose Bilog why he
wanted his brother liquidated. Jose replied that Douglas poisoned their mother and if Douglas
would not be liquidated he (Douglas) would eventually kill all of them in the family (p. 7, tsn.,
Duero). Dayao rejected the proposal and offer of reward. He explained to Jose that he could
not kill Douglas because he has many children to think about (p. 8, tsn., Duero).

On April 19, 1972, at about 5:00 p.m., Concepcion Bilog saw from the window of their house in
the ricefield, Jose Bilog riding on a bicycle going towards the ricefield. On that occasion she
saw Jose Bilog converse with two colonists (pp. 6-7, 10, tsn., Jan. 4, 1973, Anonas).

Almost at the same time on that day, Angel Rebong, a prisoner of the colony was sent by
Aniceto Gamo to get some palay from Roming who lived near the ricefield of Jose Bilog (p. 53,
tsn., Duero). On the highway, Angel Rebong met Jose Bilog who was then riding a bicycle.
Jose told him not to mention to anybody what he might see in the ricefield (pp. 35, 49, 53, tsn.,
Duero). Angel however, did not see anything unusual in the ricefield so he went directly to the
house of Roming. He left Roming's place at about 6:00 p.m. and reported to Mr. Gamo that he
failed to get the palay. Thereafter, he returned to the General Services Barracks in the colony's
compound. He reached his hut at about 7:00 p.m. (pp. 36-37, tsn., Duero).

At about 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon, Antonio Cabig, an inmate of the Colony was on his
way from the Colony's PX to the Coconut Division (pp. 64-66, tsn, Duero). He passed the
ricefield of Jose Bilog and saw Douglas and Jose drinking wine in the latter's hut. They were
seated in front of a table with about five bottles of 'Cuatro Cantos' gin on it (p. 92, tsn., Duero).
When Cabig was 3 or 4 meters from the hut, Douglas saw him and offered him a drink. He
accepted the drink but stayed outside the hut (pp. 68, 93, tsn., Duero). Not long thereafter, two
persons arrived and joined the drinking party. Appellant Adriano Cañete also arrived and joined
the group. He sat beside Jose Bilog (pp. 90, 93, tsn., Id.).

When those around the table were already drunk, Jose (Boy) Bilog stood up and drew from his
waist a "laring," a bladed instrument about 1-1/2 feet long. Suddenly, Jose stabbed Douglas at
the front part of his body (pp. 75, 77, 114, tsn., Id.). Cabig witnessed the incident, but could not
tell how many stab blows Jose Bilog delivered. He noticed that the knife embedded in Douglas'
body. At this juncture, Cañete got hold of the knife and stabbed Douglas on the stomach (p.
144, tsn., Id.). Douglas stood up and fought his assailants with karate blows (p. 118, tsn., Id.).
The two persons who had arrived earlier helped Jose and Cañete by hitting Douglas with a
piece of wood. When Boy Bilog caned for assistance, a colonist, one Roming, came and
helped them until Douglas fell dead. The victim was then dumped in a nearby canal. Cañete
got the 'laring' and proceeded to the Colony's brigade with it (p. 140, tsn., Duero).

When Angel Rebong arrived in his hut, Dugguan Abao, his hut-mate, informed him that
appellant Adriano Cañete came to their hut with blooded clothes. Cañete got Angel's clothes
and wore them and left his blooded clothes (pp. 37-38, tsn., Duero). Angel then left for the
General Services Barracks because he was to perform guard duty at 8:00 p.m. There he saw
appellant Cañete wearing his black pants and Vonnel T-Shirt. The latter told him that he got his
(Angel's) clothes because he had no clothes to wear (pp. 39, 44, 59, tsn., Duero).

On April 27, 1972, police investigators received information about the persons seen at the
scene of the crime prior to its commission. They took into custody Adriano Cañete and Angel
Rebong and brought them to Puerto Princess for interrogation. When they reached Puerto
Princess, Adriano Cañete informed Angel Rebong that he killed Douglas Bilog (p. 57, tsn.,
Duero). Upon investigation, appellant Cañete readily admitted that he together with Jose Bilog,
Pedro Macabihag and Ramon Dealogo killed Douglas Bilog. Cañete then voluntarily gave a
written statement. (Exhibit "C"; pp. 157, 158-159, tsn. Duero). Later, he led Sgt. Maduro to his
quarters in the Colony and surrendered the fatal knife (pp. 162, 180, tsn., Id.). On June 22,
1972 Cañete gave another statement. This time he stated that only he and Jose Bilog had a
hand in the killing of Douglas (p. 177, tsn., Duero).

Dr. Oscar Magtang, Rural Health Physician at Puerto Princess, Palawan conducted an autopsy
on the cadaver of Douglas Bilog. He found 26 injuries, twenty-four (24) of which were incised
and stab wounds scattered all over the body, particularly on the face, head, chest, abdomen,
back, arms, and fingers of both hands. There were abrasions on the neck and lower abdomen.
Death was due to severe hemorrhage (pp. 55-58, tsn. Anonas). Dr. Magtang made a written
report, Exhibit "F" (p. 53, tsn. Id.). According to said doctor, the most severe of these wounds
were those inflicted on the left mammary region of the chest going vertically downward and
injuring the heart, and the stab wound on the abdomen (pp. 60-61, tsn., Anonas).

Adela Pereyna, Chief, Record and Document Section and Parcel Investigation, of the Iwahig
Penal Colony testified that per records in her custody Adriano Cañete was convicted by the
Court of First Instance of Cebu of robbery on September 7, 1960; that he transferred to Davao
Penal Colony for work assignment bearing Serial No. 34831-P; that he escaped while serving
sentence on January 10, 1963, but was captured and recommitted to prison on the following
day; that he escaped again on April 7, 1964; that on August 6, 1966, he was committed to the
Iwahig Penal Colony after having been convicted of robbery by the Court of First Instance of
Ormoc City; that because he did not reveal his Identity, he was included in the list of new
arrivals and given serial No. 55791-P; that at the Verification and Identification Section, his
Identity was established as the same Adriano Cañete who was previously given Serial No.
34831-P and who escaped from the Davao Penal Colony or, April 7, 1964; that he was
prosecuted for evasion of sentence in the. Davao Court of First Instance with the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism; and, that his term of sentence was due to expire on August 23,
1975 (pp. 41-43, tsn. April 16,1973, Anonas; Exh. "D", p. 109, Rec). (pp. 4-10, Appellee's
Brief).
Appellant Adriano Cañete assails the decision against him and submits that the lower court
erred (1) in not rejecting his extra-judicial confession, Exhibit "C", notwithstanding that the case
was merely concocted, incredible and in conflict with the People's evidence; (2) in not finding
that there were at least seven (7) possibilities or versions as to who committed the crime and
in not acquitting him on reasonable doubt; (3) in finding that the crime was committed in
conspiracy with the attendance of evident premeditation, price, treachery and in not finding that
Cañete should have been found guilty only of physical injuries or at most homicide.

On the other hand, appellant Jose Bilog claims that the lower court erred (1) in giving credit to
the testimony of prosecution witness Antonio Cabig, notwithstanding that said witness is
"known to be a confirmed degenerate and an admitted perjurer"; (2) in disregarding his
defense of alibi; and (3) in not acquitting him on reasonable doubt.

Appellant Cañete subjects that the extra-judicial admission, Exhibit "C", should have been
disregarded, not due to violence in the taking thereof, but on the ground that the same had
been successfully explained by him; that the contents thereof were merely concocted and this
is supported by the evidence of the prosecution; that aside from the irreconciliable conflict
between what' is contained in his extra-judicial confession and what prosecution witness
Antonio Cabig testified in court, said extra-judicial confession contains statements which are
strikingly incredible; and that the credibility of prosecution witness Cabig as to the participation
of appellant Cañete in the killing of Douglas Bilog is doubtful.

The contention is utterly without merit. The findings of the trial court is entitled to great weight
that Cañete's retraction was merely a last minute effort at exculpation, considering that his
extra-judicial confession, Exhibit "C", given in April 1972, was freely and voluntarily given. The
fact is, there was no evidence presented that said confession was obtained as a result of
violence, torture, intimidation or promise of reward or leniency, nor that the investigating officer
could have been motivated to concoct facts narrated in said confession.

Besides, even with the exclusion of said Exhibit "C", there is the testimony of Antonio Cabig
who witnessed the incident from the time Jose Bilog stabbed his brother on his breast up to the
time Douglas fell after receiving the thrust of Cañete. Hereunder is Cabig's testimony regarding
the horrifying incident:

Q You said that Douglas Bilog was killed, do you know the persons who killed ...

Q Do you know how Douglas was killed?

A Yes, sir.
Q In what way was he killed'?

A Douglas was drunk and he was stabbed by Boy Bilog.

Q Where?

WITNESS:

A He was stabbed near the hut and near the river.

COURT: (To Witness)

Q Did you see by your own eyes when that incident happened?

A Yes, sir.

FISCAL DILIG:

Q Who was the companion of Boy Bilog when he hit Douglas Bilog?

A Cañete.

Q When you said Cañete, was he the same person whom you have just pointed to?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL DILIG:

Q You said that Boy Bilog hit with this bladed instrument marked as Exh. "B" Douglas
Bilog was Douglas Bilog hit?

A Yes, sir.

FISCAL DILIG:

Q In what part of the body of Douglas Bilog was hit?

A At the back of the body and here at the front.

Q After Boy Bilog hit his brother Douglas, do you know what happened to the knife marked
as Exh. "B"?

A Yes, sir.

Q What happened to that weapon marked as Exh. "B"?

A The knife dropped in the hand of Boy Bilog. After the knife was dropped, Douglas Bilog
stood up and he was hit again.

COURT: (To witness)

Q By whom?

A He was hit again by Cenete.

FISCAL DILIG:

Q You said that Douglas Bilog was hit by Adriano Cañete. What instrument did Cañete
stab Douglas?

A The same knife used by Boy Bilog.

Q And in what particular part of the body of Douglas was stabbed by Cañete with the
same weapon marked as Exh. "B"?

A At the left side and on the breast.

Q And after Douglas was hit and stabbed by Cañete on the side and breast, do you know
what happened to Douglas?

A Douglas stood up and the two civilians helped in clubbing Douglas.

Q After that, what happened?

A Douglas fell down.

Q And after Douglas Bilog had fallen down, what did you do, if any?
A I went home already to the Coconut Section.

Q Prior to that incident, did you already personally know Jose Bilog.

A Yes, sir.

(TSN, pp. 77-78, January 8, 1973 hearing)

Likewise, appellant Jose Bilog's alibi cannot prevail over the positive Identification of Cabig. He
points out that on the day of the incident, April 19, 1972, he was in his house doing household
chores as his wife was in Puerto Princess doing some marketing. On this score, the lower
court rightfully observed:

Jose Bilog's alibi has no merit. His house is but three kilometers away from the place of the
incident and he was seen by the widow of the deceased leaving his house on a bicycle about
4:00 o'clock that afternoon. At 5:00 o'clock, he was met by Angel Rebong at the highway while
riding his bicycle and at 6:00 o'clock late in the afternoon, Antonio Cabig saw him drinking
liquor with the deceased in his hut in the banana plantation (pp. 154-155, Rec.).

The defense of alibi cannot be believed where the distance between two barrios is only eight
kilometers and can be traversed by walking one and one-half hour (People vs. Manangan, L-
32733, Sept. 11, 1974, 59 SCRA 31). (pp. 9-10, Appellee's Brief).

Aside from the fact that courts exercise great caution in accepting alibi because it is easily
concocted, it may be proper to repeat what one author said about alibi as a defense: "it is a
reason with a bad reputation."

Again, We agree with the findings of the trial court that "while Jose Bilog tried to shift the blame
at Cañete, Cañete too wanted the Court to believe that it was Jose Bilog who did the heinous
act. Repudiating his confession, Cañete tried to convince the Court that he was simply offered
P1,000.00 in consideration of his admission of the crime. On cross- examination, however,
Cañete slipped and admitted that the P1,000.00 consideration was offered for him to execute
the killing. It is therefore evident that Cañete's testimony disowning the crime is but a last
minute attempt at exculpation."

The killing of Douglas Bilog was qualified by treachery because the attack was unexpected
and sudden, and the victim had no chance to defend himself. Likewise, the aggravating
circumstance of price was present in the commission of the crime and this affects not only the
person who received the money or the reward but also the person who gave it. (People vs.
Talledo, 58 Phil. 539).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED but, for lack of necessary votes, the
sentence is modified in that both appellants shall each suffer Reclusion Perpetua only, and
shall indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Douglas Bilog in the sum of P30,000.00.
Costs against both appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Show opinions
Show as cited by other cases (2 times)
DIVISION
[ GR No. 175479, Jul 23, 2008 ]
PEOPLE v. BIENVENIDO PAYOT +
DECISION
581 Phil. 575

TINGA, J,:

On automatic review is the Decision[1] dated 12 August 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabadbaran,
Agusan del Norte convicting appellant Bienvenido Salabao Payot, Jr. (Payot) of raping AAA.[2] The
dispositive portion of the decision provides:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Bienvenido Payot, Jr. y
Salabao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged in the Information.
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION [PERPETUA], to pay the
offended party [AAA], the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages,
to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs.

In the service of his sentence, accused is entitled to the full time during which he has undergone
preventive imprisonment, conformably to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The accused shall serve his sentence entirely at the Davao Prison and Penal Farm, Panabo City.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
Payot was charged with rape in an Information dated 14 December 1999, to wit:
That on or about the 17th day of July,[sic] 1999, at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less at
Barangay Jaliobong, Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, by means of force and intimidation did then and there[,] willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, [AAA], a woman[,] 16 years of
age.

CONTRARY TO LAW: (Art. 335, Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. [No.] 7659).[4]
At his arraignment on 14 February 2000, Payot, with the assistance of his counsel entered a plea of not
guilty.[5] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented the victim, AAA, and Dr.
Arsenia Referente (Dr. Referente), the physician who conducted an examination on AAA.

AAA testified that Payot is her elder sister's husband and that since she was 8 years old, she had been
living with him together with her elder sister,[6] her younger brother and Payot's two children.

AAA narrated that on 17 July 1999, after having taken their lunch together, her sister and brother went
up to the mountain to harvest bananas while the two children went to sleep in one room and she in
another. AAA was awakened by the pressing weight of Payot over her body, and she realized that her
skirt had already been pulled up and her panties rolled down to her knees. Payot, wearing only a vest
and without his underwear on, held down AAA's waist with his hands, inserted his penis into AAA's
vagina and made push-and-pull movements. Payot also kissed her on the neck. AAA could not shout for
help and was unable to break free as Payot was then holding a bolo with his left hand. AAA felt pain in
her vagina, and later on sensed a milky substance come out of Payot's penis as if the latter had urinated
inside her. AAA cried afterward. AAA also testified that the nearest house was about 75 meters away.[7]

A couple of months after the incident, AAA left for her friend's, BBB's,[8] house to ask for help and in
order to be away from Payot. BBB accompanied AAA to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development which reported the incident to the police. She was then examined by Dr. Referente.[9]

Dr. Referente testified that she found two old healed hymenal lacerations in AAA's genitalia at 3 o'clock
and 6 o'clock positions.[10] She stated that the lacerations could have been caused by the insertion of a
hard object into the vagina, possibly an erect male genital organ. She explained that the lacerations
could not have been caused by masturbation or by insertion of a finger into the vagina. She, however,
said that the forceful insertion of two fingers, all together measuring more than three centimeters, into
the vagina might produce lacerations of such nature.[11] She issued a medico-legal report containing
these findings.[12]

The defense presented two witnesses, namely, appellant Payot himself and his friend, Urbano
Sandulan (Sandulan).
Payot denied the charges against him and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that at noon time
of 17 July 1999, he had lunch with his family, AAA and her brother at his residence. At around 12:30
p.m., he asked permission from his wife to go to the barrio but before leaving, he instructed his wife to
harvest some bananas. He left and headed for the house of Caridad Damian (Caridad), which is
approximately ten (10) minutes away by foot, where he watched the television until 2:00 p.m. He then
went to the house of Rudy Mosende for a drink of tuba and stayed there until 3:00 p.m. after which,
he proceeded to go home.[13]

Payot also testified that he could not have held a bolo with his his left hand, contrary to AAA's
testimony, because he had always used his right hand for writing and for carrying weapons. He
likewise stated that he had more than once caught AAA in their house kissing her lesbian ("tomboy")
friend in June 1999 for which he scolded the duo. He claimed that AAA resented this and the latter's
lesbian friend allegedly angrily warned him to be careful as someday he would regret doing what he
had done. Payot moreover averred that there had been instances in the past when AAA's lesbian friend
slept over in their house, but after several reprimands AAA no longer slept at their house and slept
instead at her lesbian friend's house.[14]

Sandulan testified that at around 12:30 p.m. on 17 July 1999, he was heading for Payot's house to
remind the latter about their bible-sharing activity for the evening; he met Payot on his way but since
the latter was then on his way to the barrio, he (Sandulan) suggested that they go to the barrio
together. They parted ways at Caridad's house where Payot had planned on watching the television.
Sandulan then proceeded to Rudy Mosende's house, right across Caridad's house, also to remind
Mosende of the activity that evening which was going to be held at Payot's house. While there,
Mosende offered him a glass of tuba. During his stay at Mosende's house, Sandulan allegedly could tell
that Payot likewise remained at Caridad's house. Sandulan left for home at 1:45 p.m. and on his way,
saw Payot coming from Caridad's house and taking the direction to Mosende's.[15]

Upholding AAA's version of the events, the trial found Payot guilty in this wise:
x x x the conclusion is ineluctable that the lacerations were caused by an erect penis. In fact when she
testified, Dr. Referente confirmed that the lacerations could have been caused by an erect penis.

Now, it may be asked: When was the occasion that complaining witness had sexual intercourse?

According to her, the intercourse on 17 July 1999 was her first. Prior to this date and even after that,
there is showing that she had carnal knowledge by any other men. Thus, there can be no doubt,
therefore, that the erect penis of accused caused the 3:00 o'clock and 6:00 o'clock lacerations in her
vagina.
The insinuation by the defense that the lacerations could have been caused by the insertion of a finger
or fingers is farfetched. According to the physician, the insertion of a finger or fingers with consent
cannot cause laceration. Fingers can cause laceration only if inserted with force.

xxxx

And since the defense has not presented an indicium of evidence that complaining witness [AAA] was
actuated by improper motive to falsely testify against the accused, her declaration is worthy of belief
and credence x x x

xxxx

Aside from insinuating that a lesbian caused complaining witness's lacerations, accused also interposed
the defense of alibi by alleging that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was at the house of
Caridad Damian viewing T.V. But trite as it is, the Court has to impress upon the accused once again the
doctrine that alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct. It cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused. The shopworn rule is that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to show
that accused was at some place else at the time of the commission of the crime, it must also be proved
by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime of its commission and commit the crime.

As shown by the defense, the house of Caridad Damian is only about 300 meters from the house of
accused where the crime was committed. Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the
locus delicti at the time the crime was committed and commit the crime.

The defense also wanted to impress upon the Court that the offense could not have been committed
inside accused's house because at that time, his wife, children and private complainant's younger
brother were present then. Although the victim testified that only the children of the accused were still
in the house at the time and that they were sleeping in the other room, as accused's wife and her
younger brother, Anselmo Enoy, were out in the mountain harvesting bananas, it is not impossible for
accused to have committed the offense.

xxxx

The prosecution has established beyond a shadow of doubt that accused has carnal knowledge of the
private complainant at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of 17 July 1999. It has also established that
the carnal knowledge was by means of force and intimidation as he has a sharp bolo then in his
possession.

xxxx

Whenever rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua
to death. This is provided for under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There being
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance shown, the minimum thereof or reclusion perpetua,
should be the appropriate penalty.

Under the first circumstance of Article 266-B, the death penalty could have been imposed upon the
accused as he may be considered a guardian or relative by affinity within the fourth degree and that
the offended party is a minor. Although minority is alleged in the Information, there is, however, no
proof that the private complainant is really a minor. The circumstances of being a guardian or relative
by affinity within the fourth degree were not also alleged in the Information. Therefore, the death
penalty cannot be imposed.[16]
The judgment was elevated to the Court for automatic review. In a Resolution[17] dated 16 March 2005
of the Court in G.R. No. 161770,[18] the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate
review pursuant to the Court's ruling in People v. Efren Mateo.[19]

In a Decision[20] dated 7 June 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. The
appellate court held that the prosecution was able to prove Payot's guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
that AAA's testimony was clear, candid and straightforward and, thus worthy of faith and belief.
Moreover, the appellate court found no ill-motive on AAA's part to falsely charge Payot with the crime
of rape. In addition, medical findings supported AAA's testimony of forcible defloration.[21]

The appellate court gave scant consideration to Payot's contention that being right-handed, he could
not have held the bolo using his left hand. It stated that Payot's being right-handed does not mean that
he could not wield a bolo with his left hand. As regards Payot's defense of alibi, it maintained that even
assuming that he indeed had been at Caridad's house, it would not have been physically impossible for
him to be at his residence at the time of the commission of the offense as Damian's house was just
nearby.[22]

The appellate court affirmed the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and, in addition,
awarded another P50,000.00 as moral damages and deleted the grant of exemplary damages in view of
the absence of aggravating circumstances.[23]
In the Court's Resolution[24] dated 5 February 2007, the parties were required to submit their
respective supplemental briefs. Payot, through the Public Attorney's Office, manifested that he will
adopt all the issues and discussion in his appellant's brief[25] dated 16 April 2002.[26] The Office of the
Solicitor General likewise manifested that it will adopt the discussions in its appellee's brief[27] dated
11 February 2005 as its supplemental brief.[28]

The case is again before this Court for final disposition.

After a careful and meticulous review of the records of the case, the Court finds no reason to overturn
the findings of facts of and conclusions commonly reached by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
The Court thus affirms Payot's guilt.

Payot reiterates his assertion that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He
insists that during the time of the alleged rape, he was at Caridad's house watching television. He also
contends that AAA's allegation that he threatened her with a bolo using his left hand is a mere
fabrication as he had always been right-handed.

Payot's contentions are bereft of merit.

First, it should be reiterated that in a rape case, what is most important is the credible testimony of the
victim. A medical examination and a medical certificate are merely corroborative and are not
indispensable to a prosecution for rape. The court may convict the accused based solely on the victim's
credible, natural and convincing testimony.[29] In this case, both the courts are in agreement that AAA
was candid, natural, forthright and unwavering in her testimony that Payot raped her. AAA's credibility
is strengthened by the absence of evidence showing that she had any ill motive in testifying against
Payot.

Second, Dr. Referente's report and testimony revealed that she found two old, healed hymenal
lacerations at 3 o'clock and 6 o'clock positions. It should be noted that the examination was made in
September 1999, a couple of months after the rape incident occurred in July 1999. The presence of
such healed lacerations is consistent with and corroborative of AAA's testimony that she had indeed
been raped by Payot months before the date of the examination. Hymenal lacerations, whether healed
or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration.[30] And when the consistent and forthright
testimony of a rape victim is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a
conclusion that the essential requisite of carnal knowledge has been established.[31]

Third, AAA categorically said that Payot inserted his penis into her vagina.[32] This assertion is
supported by Dr. Referente's testimony.[33]
It should be pointed out that the trial court found AAA's testimony to be truthful, viz.:
x x x complainant has been living with the family of the accused since she was 8 years old. In other
words, having stayed in accused's house for eight (8) years, as she was allegedly 16 years of age when
the incident took place, it cannot be denied that she has been clothed, fed and treated like accused's
own children. It is, therefore, highly unthinkable that complaining witness would just fabricate a charge
as serious as rape, if it is not true that she became a victim of accused's lecherous act.

xxxx

Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that private complainant was scolded or reprimanded and that she
was angry at him, such a circumstance, the Court opines, is not sufficient reason for her to fabricate a
charge of rape.[34]
It is a settled principle that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is viewed as
correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to so conclude, having had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the manner in
which they gave their testimony. Unless, the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance
and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment on credibility must be
respected.[35]

Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, Payot merely interposed the defenses of denial
and alibi. He claimed that on the occasion of the rape, he was somewhere else and could not have
been at the scene of the crime.

Having been positively and unmistakably identified by AAA as her rapist, Payot's weak defenses of
denial and alibi cannot prosper. The settled jurisprudence is that categorical and consistent positive
identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying thereon,
prevails over the defenses of denial and alibi which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof,
as in the case at bar, constitute self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[36]

Alibi, like denial, is also inherently weak and easily fabricated. For this defense to justify an acquittal,
the following must be established: the presence of the appellant in another place at the time of the
commission of the offense and the physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime. These
requisites have not been met.[37] Payot claims that he was at a friend's house on the occasion of the
rape. Considering, however, that his friend's house is a mere ten-minute walk or about a hundred
meters[38] away from his own house where the rape was committed, it would have still been physically
possible for him to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its consummation.[39]
Anent the contention that AAA was telling a lie when she said that Payot used his left hand to hold the
bolo, the Court agrees with the appellate court that this deserves scant consideration. The fact that
Payot is right-handed does not absolutely cancel the possibility that at the time of the incident, he used
his left hand to wield the weapon. In any event, this inconsistency, if it is at all, does not diminish the
reliability and dependability of AAA's testimony.

In sum, the guilt of Payot was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Court therefore affirms his
conviction for rape in Criminal Case No. 99-77.

With respect to Payot's civil liability, the Court affirms the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages in favor of AAA, she being a victim of simple statutory rape.[40]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 7 June 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.-CR-HC No. 00230 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 138874-75 July 21, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO"; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY";
ALBERTO CAÑO alias "ALLAN PAHAK"; ARIEL BALANSAG, DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias "TISOY
TAGALOG"; JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG"; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM", Accused-
Appellants.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

At bar are four (4) motions for reconsideration separately filed by appellants (1) Francisco Juan
Larrañaga, (2) Josman Aznar, (3) Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag, and (4) James
Anthony Uy and James Andrew Uy, assailing our Decision dated February 3, 2004 convicting them of
the crimes of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and (b) simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-
45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias ‘PACO;’ JOSMAN
AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias ‘ALLAN PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and
JAMES ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;

(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias ‘PACO;’ JOSMAN
AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias ‘ALLAN PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and
JAMES ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA;

(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY, who was a minor at the time the
crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of TWELVE (12) years of
prision mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as MAXIMUM;

(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each case,
the amounts of (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b) ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, (c)
₱150,000.00 as moral damages, and (d) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No. 7659,
upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the
President for the possible exercise of Her Excellency’s pardoning power.
SO ORDERED."

Appellants anchor their motions on the following grounds:

A. LARRAÑAGA

"I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BARRING LARRAÑAGA AND THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(NBI) REGIONAL DIRECTOR FLORENCIO VILLARIN FROM TESTIFYING;

II

THE POLICE PLANTED EVIDENCE ON APPELLANTS;

III

LARRAÑAGA SUFFICIENTLY PROVED HIS ALIBI;

IV

THE TRIAL COURT PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF KEY DEFENSE EVIDENCE;

THE CORPSE FOUND IN THE RAVINE WAS NOT THAT OF MARIJOY; AND

VI

PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA WAS A COACHED WITNESS."1

B. AZNAR

"I

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF
THE ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
II

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN (A) DISCHARGING DAVID RUSSIA AS STATE WITNESS; AND (B)
CONVICTING THE APPELLANTS MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF RUSIA.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF APPELLANT AZNAR.

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE APPELLANTS."2

C. ADLAWAN, BALANSAG, CAÑO

"I

PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE A STATE WITNESS UNDER PARAGRAPHS (D)
AND (E), SECTION 17 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

II

RUSIA’S TESTIMONY AND THAT OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES WERE INCREDIBLE,
INCONSISTENT, AND UNWORTHY OF BELIEF.

III

BIAS AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE DEFENSE WERE GLARINGLY DISPLAYED BY THE COURT A QUO
WHICH GREATLY AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.

IV

THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT."3

D. JAMES ANDREW AND JAMES ANTHONY UY

"I
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR
AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;

II

THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY
18, 1997 WAS NEVER CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS EXHUMATION FOR DNA
TESTING;"4

In his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated March 25, 2004, Larrañaga submitted a separate
study of Dr. Racquel Del Rosario-Fortun, Forensic Pathologist, to show that the examination conducted
by the prosecution expert witnesses on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate.

In a similar supplemental motion for reconsideration5, Aznar submitted to this Court the Affidavit
dated February 27, 2004 of Atty. Florencio Villarin, Regional Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Central Visayas, to show that: (1) the police investigation of this case was flawed; (2) he
(Aznar) was arrested in 1997 not because of his involvement in this case but because he had in his
possession a pack of shabu and firearms; and (3) David Rusia is not a credible witness.

On July 15, 2004, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment6 praying that the four (4) motions
for reconsideration be denied with finality, there being no new argument raised. He responded to
appellants’ assignments of errors by exhaustively quoting portions of our challenged Decision.

In his consolidated comment7 to Aznar’s supplemental motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor
General enumerated the grounds why Atty. Villarin’s Affidavit should not be given consideration. On
February 15, 2005, Aznar filed a reply alleging that the Solicitor General "read out of context" certain
portions of the Affidavit. He argued that the

Affidavit only exposes the flawed investigation of the Chiong case and that, at the time of his arrest,
there was no evidence against him. On March 4, 2005, the Solicitor General filed a rejoinder stating
that Aznar’s reply "actually supports the undersigned counsel’s (Solicitor General’s) position that Atty.
Villarin’s Affidavit is utterly inadequate to prove his innocence or at least even acquit them on
reasonable doubt," thus, "it would be useless to call for new trial on the basis of such Affidavit." On
March 29, 2005, Aznar filed a sur-rejoinder insisting that the Affidavit should be given due
consideration.

Except for the motion filed by appellants Uy brothers with respect to James Andrew’s alleged minority,
we find all the motions bereft of merit.
At the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not impose on
us the obligation to discuss and rule again on the grounds relied upon by the movant which are mere
reiteration of the issues previously raised and thoroughly determined and evaluated in our Decision
being questioned. In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,8 we ruled that, "this would
be a useless formality of ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already set forth
in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the movant."

The foregoing principle applies squarely to the motions filed by appellants Larrañaga, Aznar, Adlawan,
Caño and Balansag, it being apparent that the points raised therein are not neoteric matters
demanding new judicial determination. They are mere rehash of the arguments set forth in their
respective briefs which we already considered, weighed and resolved before we rendered the Decision
sought to be reconsidered.

However, in view of the severity of the penalties for the crimes charged, we deem it necessary to stress
once more our basis in convicting appellants.

The following is a précis of the issues submitted by appellants in their motions:

This Court erred –

first, in according credence to Rusia’s testimony;

second, in rejecting appellants’ alibi;

third, in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to due process when it excluded the
testimony of other defense witnesses; and

fourth, in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of Marijoy.

In deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is always to look at the case in its entirety. The
totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus, averting
general conclusions from isolated pieces of evidence. This means that an appeal of a criminal case
opens its entire records for review.9

I
Appellants vigorously contend that we should not have sustained Rusia’s testimony hook, line and
sinker, owing to his tainted record and reputation. However, it must be stressed that Rusia’s testimony
was not viewed in isolation. In giving credence to Rusia’s testimony, the trial court took into
consideration the physical evidence and the corroborative testimonies of other witnesses. Thus, we
find no reason why we should not uphold the trial court’s findings.

We reiterate our pronouncement in our Decision that what makes Rusia’s testimony worthy of belief is
its striking compatibility with the physical evidence. Physical evidence is one of the highest degrees of
proof. It speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together.10 The presence of Marijoy’s ravished
body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her mouth and handcuffs on her wrists
certainly
bolstered Rusia’s testimony on what actually took place from Ayala Center to Tan-awan. Indeed, the
details he supplied to the trial court are of such nature and quality that only a witness who actually saw
the commission of the crimes could furnish. Reinforcing his testimony is its corroboration by several
other witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated. Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza witnessed
Jacqueline’s two failed attempts to escape from appellants near Ayala Center. Benjamin Molina and
Miguel Vergara recognized Rowen as the person who inquired from them where he could find a vehicle
for hire on the evening of July 16, 1997. Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen when he bought barbeque and
Tanduay at Nene’s Store while the white van, driven by Caño, was waiting on the side of the road and
he heard voices of "quarreling male and female" emanating from the van. And lastly, Manuel Camingao
and Rosendo Rio testified on the presence of Larrañaga and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July
17, 1997. All these bits and pieces of story form part of Rusia’s narration. Now, with such strong
anchorage on the physical evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, why should we not
accord credence to Rusia’s testimony? Even assuming that his testimony standing alone might indeed
be unworthy of belief in view of his character, it is not so when considered with the other evidence
presented by the prosecution.

II

Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained the trial court’s rejection of their alibi.
Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive
declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.11 Being evidence that is
negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.12 On top of its inherent weakness, alibi becomes
less plausible as a defense when it is corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the accused.13

This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is appellants’ alibi supported by
witnesses who were either their relatives, friends or classmates, while on the other end is the positive
identification of the herein appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were not, in any way, related
to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we are certain that the balance must tilt in favor
of the latter.

Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the appellants failed
to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of time and place.14 They failed to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu
City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman,
Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were all within the vicinity of Cebu City on July 16,
1997.

Not even Larrañaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required proof of physical
impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane from
Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline companies plying the route. One of the defense
witnesses admitted that there are several flights from Manila to Cebu each morning, afternoon and
evening. Indeed, Larrañaga’s presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 was proved to be not only a
possibility but a reality. Four (4) witnesses identified Larrañaga as one of the two men talking to
Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on July 16, 1997, at
around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larrañaga approach Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of
Ayala Center. The incident reminded her of Jacqueline’s prior story that he was Marijoy’s admirer.
Shiela confirmed that she knows Larrañaga since she had seen him on five (5) occasions. Analie
Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 o’clock, she saw
Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to two (2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized the
two (2) men as Larrañaga and Josman, having seen them several times at Glicos, a game zone, located
across her office at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard Redobles, the security guard then assigned
at Ayala Center, corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio,
a businessman from Cogon, Carcar, declared that he saw Larrañaga at Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the
morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the hood of a white van.15 And over and above
all, Rusia categorically identified Larrañaga as one of the participes criminis.

Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses in relation with that of Rusia, we are
convinced that Larrañaga was indeed in Cebu City at the time of the commission of the crimes and was
one of the principal perpetrators thereof.

At this juncture, it bears mentioning that this case is not the first time that Larrañaga was charged with
or complained of pruriently assaulting young female students in Cebu. Months before the abduction of
Marijoy and Jackie, the parents of a certain Rochelle Virtucio, complained about Larrañaga’s attempt to
snatch their young daughter and drag her in a black, stylish Honda Civic. It happened just near the gate
of Rochelle’s school, thus, showing his impudence. We quote a portion of the transcript of stenographic
notes dated September 23, 1998, thus:

"ATTY. HERMOSISIMA:

Your Honor please, this is a …. Inspector Era handed to this representation a copy of a Letter dated
September 25, 1996, addressed to the Student Affairs Office, University of San Carlos,P. del Rosario
Street, Cebu City, and this is signed by Leo Abayan and Alexander Virtucio and noted by Mrs. Aurora
Pacho, Principal, University of San Carlos, Girls High School, and for the record, I will read the content:

TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:

We the parents and guardians of Rochelle Virtucio, a first year high school student of your University of
San Carlos-Girls High School, are writing your good office about an untoward incident involving our
daughter and another student of your school.

xxxxxx

That last Monday at around 5:00 PM, Rochelle and other classmates, Michelle Amadar and Keizaneth
Mondejar, while on their way to get a ride home near the school campus, a black Honda Civic with five
young male teenagers including the driver, suddenly stopped beside them, and simultaneously one of
them, which was later identified as FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, a BSHRM I student of your school,
grabbed Rochelle by her hand to try to get Rochelle to their vehicle. She resisted and got away from
him. Sensing some people were watching what they were doing, they hurriedly sped away.

We are very concerned about Rochelle’s safety. Still now, she is suffering the shock and tension that she
is not supposed to experience in her young life. It is very hard for us parents to think about what she’d
been through."16

The presence of such complaint in the record of this case certainly does not enhance Larrañaga’s
chance of securing an acquittal.

III

Larrañaga and Aznar bewail our refusal to overturn the trial court’s exclusion of Professor Jerome
Bailen and Atty. Florencio Villarin, NBI, Regional Director, as defense witnesses. Professor Bailen was
properly excluded. First, he is not a finger-print expert but an archaeologist. And second, his report
consists merely of the results of his visual inspection of the exhibits already several months old. Anent
Atty. Villarin’s failure to testify before the trial court, suffice it to say that his belated Affidavit, which
Aznar submitted via his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated May 5, 2004, raises nothing to
change our findings and conclusions. What clearly appears in said Affidavit is a man trying to impress
people that he was the one responsible for solving the Chiong case and for that, he deserves a
promotion. The trial court, at the onset, must have seen such immateriality in his intended testimony.
Indeed, we agree with the Solicitor General’s observation that such Affidavit "is neither helpful nor
encouraging to Aznar’s cause." We quote his keen reflection on the matter:

"xxxxxx

Third. Atty. Villarin’s affidavit, in paragraphs 19 and 20 thereof, acknowledged that the body found in
the Carcar ravine was that of Marijoy. This assertion immediately conflicts with accused-appellant
Aznar’s claim in his Motion for Reconsideration that the corpse was not Marijoy’s. Surely, something is
amiss in accused-appellant Aznar’s recollection of his defense.

Fourth. Atty. Villarin confirmed in paragraph 24 of his affidavit that accused-appellant Francisco
Larranaga was a suspect in the subject crimes. Evidently, this statement completely supports this
Honorable Court’s findings in its Decision dated February 3, 2004.

Fifth. In paragraph 30 of Atty. Villarin’s affidavit, he stated that: ‘The arrest of Juzman Aznar was the
major breakthrough in the investigation of the case because witnesses came out and identified Juzman
Aznar as one of those allegedly seen talking to the victims on the night they disappeared.’ Hence,
accused-appellant Aznar was in the beginning already a first-grade suspect in the Chiong sisters’
celebrated abduction and killing.

Sixth. Atty. Villarin admitted in paragraph 36 of his affidavit that: ‘x x x I did not take this against [Supt.
Labra] for preempting our next move to get Juzman Aznar as we were already placing him under
surveillance because I knew [Supt. Labra] did it in his honest desire to help solve the crime x x x.’
Clearly, this statement is not an indictment of the investigation that the police undertook in the subject
crimes.

Seventh. Paragraphs 37 to 40 are nothing but personal tirades against alleged influence peddling by
Mrs. Thelma Chiong, mother of the victims, and the purportedly undue promotions of the lawyers and
police officers who unearthed the evidence against accused-appellants and successfully prosecuted the
latter. In executing the affidavit, it appears that Atty. Villarin would want to impress that he, rather than
those promoted, deserved the promotion.
Eighth. Atty. Villarin’s inability to testify in the criminal cases was not due solely to the prosecution’s
action. Whether he ought to testify or not was an argument openly discussed in court. Hence, for the
resulting inability, Atty. Villarin has no one to blame but the defense lawyers who did everything to
make a mockery of the criminal proceedings.

And lastly, there is nothing in Atty. Villarin’s affidavit of the quality of a "smoking gun" that would acquit
accused-appellants of the crimes they have been convicted. For he did not finish the police
investigation of the subject crimes; this is the long and short of his miniscule role in the instant case.
Indeed, judging by the substance of his affidavit, he would not be testifying in case a new trial is held
on anything that has not been said and rejected heretofore, except his own unsubstantiated opinions
(i.e. not facts as required by evidentiary rules), his self-congratulatory remarks, and his unmitigated
frustration over failing to get a promotion when almost everyone else did."17

Neither can we entertain at this late stage Dr. Fortun’s separate study to show that the examination
conducted on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate. Such study cannot be classified as
newly-discovered evidence warranting belated reception. Obviously, Larrañaga could have produced it
during trial had he wished to.

IV

Knowing that the prosecution’s theory highly rests on the truth of Rusia’ testimony, appellants
endeavor to destroy it by claiming that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan, Carcar
was not that of Marijoy. We must reiterate the reasons why we cannot give our assent to such
argument. First, Inspector Edgardo Lenizo,18 a fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of the
corpse match those of Marijoy.19 Second, the packaging tape and the handcuff found on the dead
body were the same items placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being detained.20 Third,
the body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was abducted.21 And fourth, the
members of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse to be that of Marijoy22 which they
eventually buried. They erected commemorative markers at the ravine, cemetery and every place
which mattered to Marijoy. As a matter of fact, at this very moment, appellants still fail to bring to the
attention of this Court any person laying a claim on the said body. Surely, if the body was not that of
Marijoy, other families who had lost someone of similar age and gender as Marijoy would have
surfaced and claimed the body. The above circumstances only bolster Rusia’s narration that Rowen and
Ariel pushed Marijoy into the deep ravine, following Josman’s instruction "to get rid" of her.

On the issue raised by appellants Uy brothers that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years and
two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes were committed, the records bear that on
March 1, 1999, James Andrew’s birth certificate was submitted to the trial court as part of the Formal
Offer of Additional Evidence,23 with the statement that he was eighteen (18) years old. On March 18,
1999, appellants filed a Manifestation of Erratum correcting in part the Formal Offer of Additional
Evidence by alleging that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years old.24

Now, James Andrew begs leave and prays that this Court admits at this stage of the proceedings his (1)
Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal Certificate. He prays
that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother James Anthony.

The entry of James Andrew’s birth in the Birth Certificate is not legible, thus it is extremely difficult for
us to determine the veracity of his claim. However, considering that minority is a significant factor in
the imposition of penalty, we find it proper to require the Solicitor General (a) to secure from the Local
Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James
Andrew’s Birth Certificate, and thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the motion for
reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews’ claim of
minority.

Insofar as James Anthony is concerned, we maintain his conviction and penalty, there being nothing in
his motion which warrants a reconsideration of our Decision.

In resolving the instant motions, we have embarked on this painstaking task of evaluating every piece
and specie of evidence presented before the trial court in response to appellants’ plea for the reversal
of their conviction. But, even the element of reasonable doubt so seriously sought by appellants is an
ignis fatuus which has eluded any intelligent ratiocination of their submissions. Verily, our conscience
can rest easy on our affirmance of the verdict of the trial court, in light of appellants’ clear culpability
which demands retribution.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by appellants Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman
Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag are hereby DENIED. The Solicitor General is
DIRECTED (a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics
Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrew’s Birth Certificate, and (b) within ten (10) days
therefrom, to file an extensive comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by James Andrew and
James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews’ claim of minority. The motion is likewise DENIED insofar
as James Anthony Uy is concerned.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 146327-29 June 5, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ERNIE BARO, appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It must avoid
pushing the judge to the pitfall of either convicting the innocent or acquitting the guilty. The
hornbook rule is that where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted. It would
be far more acceptable to acquit the guilty erroneously than to convict the innocent wrongly.

The Case

Ernie Baro appeals the Decision1 dated October 30, 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 86), finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3)
counts of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua for each count. The decretal portion
of the Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding the

accused Ernie Baro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape committed
against Roda Ongatan and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for each of the offense charged and to indemnify the victim Roda Ongotan the amount of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus costs."2

Three Complaints, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-98-76279, Q-98-76280 and Q-98-76282
were filed against appellant for raping Roda Ongotan on January 5, 1995, March 5, 1995 and
April 16, 1996. Except for the dates of the commission of the offense, the three Complaints
were similarly worded as follows:

"That on or about the 5th day of January, 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
by means of force and intimidation did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter
the room where the undersigned complainant was sleeping, and covered her mouth, poked a
knife at her neck, undressed her and removed her panty, and thereafter have carnal
knowledge of her against her will and without her consent."3
During his arraignment on August 3, 1998,4 appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de
oficio,5 pleaded not guilty to all three charges. After trial in due course, the RTC rendered the
assailed Decision.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief,6 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the prosecution's version of the facts
as follows:

"Roda Ongotan was an adopted daughter of Rodrigo and Leticia Ongotan. Rodrigo and Leticia
have eight (8) other children, namely: Ricardo, 21 years old; Ronald, 20 years old; Rogelio, 19
years old; Roberto, 18 years old; Rose, 16 years old; Rochelle, 13 years old; Rodel, 10 years
old and Racquel, 8 years old. They lived in a two-storey house at 104 Zusuaregui, Old Balara,
Quezon City. Roda's family occupied the second floor of the house, which had three (3)
bedrooms. The first bedroom was occupied by Roda' s parents and three (3) sisters. The
second bedroom was occupied by the brother of Roda's mother, Vivencio Padora, while the
third bedroom was occupied by Roda. Roda's five (5) brothers sleep in the sala. Roda's
bedroom was adjacent to the kitchen. Her room was about two armslength wide and one-and-
a-half armslength long. It had no door and only a curtain covered and separated it from the rest
of the house. Appellant, who was the uncle of Roda's mother, slept just outside Roda's
bedroom. When the rape incidents occurred in 1995 and 1996, the ground floor of the Ongotan
house was rented by Teresita Ongotan's (the sister of Roda's father) family.1âwphi1.nêt

"On January 5, 1995, around 5:00 a.m., Roda had just awakened and was still lying down
when appellant entered her room. Appellant immediately covered her mouth with a
handkerchief and threatened to kill her if she shouted. Using his left hand, appellant poked a
knife (balisong) at her. Appellant was then wearing a white shirt and black short pants while
Roda was wearing an orange-colored short pants and a pink dress. Appellant took off his short
pants and removed Roda's short pants and underwear. He forcibly spread her legs and
inserted his penis into her vagina. Roda could not remember how long was appellant's penis
remained inserted in her vagina. After raping her, appellant dressed up and left her room.

"On March 5, 1995, Roda went to bed around 8:00 p.m. Around 5:00 a.m. the following day,
Roda was awakened by the presence of appellant inside her bedroom. Upon seeing appellant,
Roda asked him what he wanted from her. Appellant told her to be quiet and immediately
covered her mouth with a handkerchief. Appellant wound the handkerchief around Roda's
head. Appellant then told her that should she shout or report what was happening to anyone,
he would kill her. Thereupon, appellant raised her duster. Roda resisted, but her strength was
no match for appellant's. Appellant told her not to resist and to make her immobile, appellant
poked a knife (balisong) at the left side of her neck. Roda started to cry when she realized the
futility of her resistance to appellant's lustful intention. Thereupon, appellant removed her
underwear. When this was removed, appellant lowered his maong pants and underwear. Then,
using his knees which were placed between Roda's legs, appellant forced her legs apart.
Appellant inserted his penis into Roda's vagina. Roda could not do anything but cry as she felt
weak. When appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, Roda felt pain. She could not
remember how long appellant's penis stayed inside her vagina. When appellant was finished
with her, he dressed up and removed the handkerchief around her head. When morning came,
Roda did not tell her mother of the incident out of fear of appellant.

"On April 16, 1996, around midnight, Roda was at the kitchen preparing the food to be brought
by her parents and five (5) siblings on their trip to the province. After she had prepared their
"baon", her parents, four (4) brothers and one (1) sister left the house. Only Roda, Rochelle,
Rodel and appellant were left in the house. Thereafter, she put to sleep Rochelle and Rodel
who slept at their parent's bedroom. Roda did not sleep because she was afraid of appellant
who was with them in the house. Before her parents left, Roda had pleaded with them not to
leave. She could not tell them the reason out of fear of appellant. She could not ask them
either to bring them all because no one would be left at the house. Neither could she go with
them because no one would look after her young brother and sister.

"Thereupon, Roda saw appellant already inside her room and appellant, upon seeing her
immediately covered her mouth to prevent her from making any noise. Appellant used a
handkerchief to cover her mouth and poked a knife at her neck. Roda resisted but appellant
was stronger. As they were still standing, appellant ordered her to lie down. Appellant told her
not to report the incident to anyone. Thereupon, appellant took off his short pants, and followed
that by removing Roda's short pants and underwear. When this was done, appellant forced her
legs open and inserted his penis into her vagina. Roda could not do anything but cry. She
could not remember how long appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. After appellant
raped her, he ordered her to dress up and threatened her that should she report what had
happened to anyone, he would kill her.

"On December 17, 1997, Roda summoned enough courage to file a complaint against
appellant. She first confided in her aunt, Antonia Espos, about her unfortunate ordeal in the
hands of appellant. Her aunt assured her that she would help her file charges against
appellant.

"Dr. Cristina Freyra, a Medico-Legal Officer at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory,
EDSA, Q.C., stated that she performed a genital examination on Roda Ongotan on December
16, 1997. At the time of Roda's examination, Roda was fifteen (15) years old. Dr. Freyra's
examination revealed that Roda's hymen had deep-healed lacerations at 3:00 and 9:00 o'clock
positions and a healed laceration at 5:00 o'clock position. Dr. Freyra opined that these
lacerations could have been caused by a hard blunt object like an erect male organ. Dr. Freyra
concluded that Roda was in a non-virgin state physically."7 (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, appellant narrates in his Brief8 his version of the facts as follows:

"Accused-appellant, Ernie Baro, was a former resident of Catubig, Northern Samar. He was
engaged in copra farming from the plantation of his parents prior to November 15, 1996, when
he came to Manila with his wife and three (3) children to find work upon the request and
invitation of his niece, Leticia Ongotan.

"In Manila, accused-appellant Ernie Baro and his wife, with their three (3) children, the eldest
being 3 years old and the youngest at 1 year old, stayed at the place located at Orocoy St.,
Montessorie, Manila. Later on, they transferred to the house of his niece, Leticia Ongotan at
104 Scout Zuzuarigue St., Old Balara, Quezon City, where they stayed for about 1 year.
Th[e]reat, accused, Ernie Baro met herein complainant Roda Ongot[a]n, who later on charged
him of three (3) counts of rape on December 17, 1997, allegedly committed by him on January
5; March 5, 1995 and April 16, 1996. The herein accused vehemently denied the charges
despite his denial, the trial court nonetheless found him guilty of the charge."9 (Citations
omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC gave credence to complainant's testimony, citing the principle that when a woman
says she has been raped, she says all that is necessary to prove her accusation. It also held
that her delay in reporting the incidents did not at all affect her credibility, for the delay had
satisfactorily been explained. Furthermore, it ruled that the Medico-legal Report and the
testimony of the examining physician bolstered her claim that she had experienced violent
sexual intercourse at a young age.10

The RTC did not give credence to the alibi and the denial interposed by the accused. It ruled
that neither would prevail over the positive testimony of complainant and that, as between a
positive identification of the accused by the victim herself and an alibi, the former is to be given
greater weight, especially when the victim has no motive to testify falsely against the
accused.11

Hence, this appeal.12

Assignment of Errors

In his Brief, appellant faults the court a quo with the following alleged errors:

"The lower court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of complainant, Roda
Ongotan y Padora, despite its inherent incredibility, contradictions and implausibility.

II

"The lower court likewise erred in disregarding accused-appellant's defense of alibi despite
having clearly satisfied the legal criteria for its being, and supported by the attendant milieu
and circumstances of the case."13

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious. This Court believes that the guilt of appellant was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

First Issue:

Credibility of Complainant's Testimony

Appellant submits that the RTC erred in according full faith and credence to complainant's
testimony despite its inherent incredibility, contradictions and implausibility.

We agree. While it is true that it may be the sole basis for convicting the accused in a rape
case,14 the complaining witness' testimony must be credible.15 In reviewing rape cases, this
Court has always been guided by the following principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be
made with facility -- while it may be difficult for the prosecution to prove, it is usually more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature
of the crime in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merits -- it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.16

After a painstaking review of the records of the case, this Court finds several circumstances
creating reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt. These are: (1) delay in filing the Complaint,
(2) failure of the prosecution to prove appellant's moral ascendancy over complainant, (3) lack
of support from the records for the RTC's finding of violent sexual intercourse between
appellant and complainant, and (4) discrepancies in the complainant's testimony.

Delay in Filing the Complaint

In rape, the complainant's delayed disclosure of the crime to kith or kin or persons of authority
does not always warrant the conclusion that the woman was not sexually molested or that her
charges against the accused are baseless and fabricated.17 However, the delay must be
adequately and satisfactorily explained; otherwise, it would generate doubt as to the guilt of the
accused.18

In the present case, the first rape was allegedly committed by appellant on January 5, 1995.
After two months, on March 5, 1995, he purportedly raped complainant again. More than a
year after the second rape, on April 16, 1996, the third rape supposedly occurred. Complainant
reported the alleged crimes only on December 17, 1997, or more than two years after the first
rape and more than a year after the third one allegedly occurred.

Her explanation for the delay was the threat of appellant to kill her if she reported the incident
to anyone. Note that at the time she reported the incident, he was still residing with her family.
She herself testified that he left their residence only on December 16, 1997,19 after she had
confided the alleged rapes to her aunt and had herself examined by a doctor. Hence, the threat
of death, if any, was still hanging precariously over her at the time. She merely said that she no
longer wanted to ruin her life, so she decided to reveal the rapes to her aunt. The relevant
portion of her testimony reads thus:

"xxx xxx xxx

Q: What prompted you to tell the story to your auntie despite the fact that one year has
lapsed already?

A: Because I don't want to ruin my life anymore because it [is] already ruined."20

The above quote does not, however, explain the gaps between the dates of the three
instances of the alleged rapes. The prosecution failed to show satisfactorily what finally
prompted complainant to report the purported crime after a period of two long years from the
time first rape supposedly took place and to disregard the threats allegedly made by appellant.

Proof of Moral Ascendancy

The RTC erred in stating that appellant had exercised moral ascendancy over complainant.
This was not proven during the trial. Neither do the records show that he exercised moral
ascendancy over her. He is in fact not much older than her brothers. It was not shown whether
he was her benefactor -- a source of financial support -- or whether he exercised discipline
over her. In other words, there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that it was his moral
ascendancy that prevented her from putting up a resistance.21 Presumptions of moral
ascendancy cannot and should not prevail over the constitutional presumption of
innocence.1âwphi1.nêt

Violent Sexual Intercourse Not Borne by the Records

The trial court likewise erred when it held that the Medico-legal Report and the testimony of Dr.
Ma. Cristina Freyra of the PNP Crime Laboratory indicated that the lacerations in the vagina of
complainant showed that she had experienced violent sexual intercourse during her younger
years, and that such experience caused those lacerations. The Report merely indicated that
healed lacerations were found in her hymen at the 5, the 3, and the 9 o'clock positions. We
reproduce pertinent portions of the Report as follows:

"FINDINGS:

GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are hemispherical with
pale brown areola and nipples from which no secretion could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat
and soft.

GENITAL:

There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coadapted with
pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an
elastic, fleshy-type hymen with shallow, sealed laceration at 5 and deep-healed lacerations at
3 and 9 o'clock positions. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the introduction
of the examining index finger. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is
normal in size, color and consistency.

CONCLUSION:

Subject is in a non-virgin state physically.

There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of the
examination."22

Furthermore, during her testimony, Dr. Freyra admitted that such lacerations23 could have
been caused by any hard blunt object or even by a finger or a vibrator.24 She never mentioned
violent sexual intercourse. This fact is clear from the Transcript of Stenographic Notes, which
we quote:

"Q: What was [sic] your findings if any in connection with your examination?

A: On examination, there were deep-healed lacerations at 3:00 and 9:00 o'clock positions
and there was healed laceration at 5:00 o'clock position.

Q: Could you tell us what could have caused the lacerations?

A: Any hard blunt object could produce the lacerations.

Q: Could you mention any?

A: An erect male organ.

Q: Could you tell us the size of that male organ that caused the laceration?

Atty Venturanza:

The question of the prosecutor is quite misleading. What was stated by the witness is any hard
blunt object and she just mentioned as one of the objects is an erect male organ and now he
[is] asking the size.

Court:

Lay the basis.

Fiscal Jamolin:

If you said that one of the causes of the laceration is an erect male organ. On the basis of this
possibility, could you tell us the size of that male organ that caused the lacerations?

A: It could be any size but it should be bigger. [B]y 1 cm. [i]norder to produce laceration,
the diameter of the hard thing that entered the hymen should be bigger by 1 cm."25
It must be noted that the healed lacerations found in complainant's hymen were not proven to
have been caused by rapes that supposedly happened two years earlier. Such lacerations may
simply mean that, depending on the changes observed in the affected tissues, a period
ranging from four days to one month passed from the time they had been inflicted up to the
time they were examined.26

Discrepancies in the Testimony of Complainant

More damaging to the prosecution, the discrepancies in the testimony of complainant cast
doubts on appellant's guilt.

First, during her testimony on September 17, 1998, complainant said that she was "surprised"
when appellant entered her room on the night of March 5, 1995.27 On January 22, 1999, she
again testified that she was "shocked" to see appellant inside her room on the night of January
5, 1995.28

For reasons known only to the prosecution, complainant testified on the second rape before
she testified on the first one. Stranger still is her statement that she asked him what he wanted
from her when she saw him in her room the second time.29 We note that she had allegedly
been raped by him already prior to that date. Thus, she need not have asked him what he
wanted from her. By then, she should have at the very least been able to guess his evil
intentions and felt alarmed accordingly.

Second, the house where the rapes allegedly took place was described during the trial as not
bigger than one half of the courtroom.30 It was occupied by at least twelve people, most of
whom were members of her immediate family. At any given night, at least ten people would be
asleep there. We cannot help but wonder why she allowed appellant to commit such dastardly
act three times, with her parents and four fully grown brothers within shouting distance.
Considering the cramped space and the quietness of the night, the faintest cry from her would
have been heard by one or more of her family members who were in that same house.

Third, complainant described each rape in a very uniform and even seemingly systematic
manner. Each rape always started with appellant entering the room and complainant asking
what he wanted from her. It always began with appellant covering her mouth with a
handkerchief and pulling down her underwear. There was no difference at all in the way the
rapes were committed. The manner in which she described them engenders the suspicion that
her testimony had been coached, rehearsed, or contrived.

Second Issue:
Alibi as a Defense

Appellant's Alibi a Plausible Excuse

Alibi, the plea of having been somewhere other than at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is not
always a weak defense. Sometimes, the fact that the accused was somewhere else may just
be the plain and unvarnished truth.

But to be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be
so airtight that it would admit of no exception.31 The rule is well-settled that in order for it to
prosper, it must be demonstrated that the person charged with the crime was not only
somewhere else when the offense was committed, but was so far away that it would have
been physically impossible to have been at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at
the time of its commission.32 The reason is that no person can be in two places at the same
time.

This Court has ruled in numerous cases that where the accused was only thirty minutes33 or
just a few kilometers from the place where the crime was committed,34 the defense of alibi will
not prosper.

Complainant alleges that appellant raped her three times -- one on each of the following dates:
January 5, 1995, March 5, 1995, and April 16, 1996. During his testimony, appellant stated that
he was in Catubig, Northern Samar until November 15, 1996, when he came to Manila upon
the invitation of complainant's mother.35 He likewise testified that it would take twenty-four
hours for a bus to travel from Catubig, Northern Samar, to Manila.36 It would have been highly
unlikely for him to take the 24-hour bus ride to Manila, commit the dastardly act upon
complainant, and then return to Catubig, Samar, by taking another 24-hour bus ride. He would
have had to do so three times in order to commit the three alleged rapes on the dates given.

No evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove that appellant was indeed in Manila
when the alleged rapes were committed. It would have been a simple matter for it to present
the testimony of complainant's mother, Leticia Ongotan, to contradict his testimony. It would
also have been a simple matter for it to present the testimony of any of the brothers or the
sisters of complainant to establish exactly on what date he had arrived in Manila.

Truly, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits. It cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of that for the defense. In the present case, the
testimony of appellant that he was in Catubig, Northern Samar, on the dates when the alleged
rapes were committed remain uncontradicted by the prosecution. Moreover, he testified that it
was upon the invitation of complainant's mother, his niece, that he moved his family to Manila
in November 1996 or seven months after the last rape allegedly occurred.

The Constitutional Presumption of Innocence

Indeed, when a woman says she was raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to prove
her accusation.37 Still, the presumption of innocence of the accused should not be thrown out
of the window and forgotten altogether. Such presumption holds until the contrary is proven.
Every circumstance favoring it must be taken into account in a criminal case. If the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with innocence and the other with guilt, then the evidence does not pass the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.38

In order to convict the accused of a crime, the prosecution must produce evidence showing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.39 A person charged with a serious crime stands to lose not
only reputation, but also liberty and maybe even life. Because of the gravity of the charge and
the great loss involved in the present case, the prosecution should not have rested easy on
haphazard facts and hastily thrown-in principles, forgetting in the process their duty of
overcoming the presumption of innocence of the accused in a criminal action.

The prosecution should take an active and direct part in the trial of the case, since it has the
onus probandi of showing the guilt of the accused.40 Even if it is, perhaps, the inadequacy of
details in the prosecution's evidence rather than the actual facts themselves that makes it
difficult for this Court to arrive at definite conclusions, still we cannot pin responsibility on
appellant. The moral conviction that may serve as basis for a finding of guilt in a criminal case
should be that which is the logical and inevitable result of the evidence on record, exclusive of
any other consideration. Short of this minimum requirement, it is not only the right of the
accused to be freed; it is, even more, this Court's constitutional duty to acquit them. Only then
may there be fealty to the constitutional presumption of innocence.41

The innocence of a defendant in a criminal case is always presumed until the contrary is
proven.42 Where two probabilities arise from the evidence, the one compatible with the
presumption of innocence will be adopted.43 Mere suspicion is not enough to take away one's
liberty and destroy one's reputation. Guilt must be proven by proof as clear as daylight, by
evidence so airtight that no room is left for any reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision issued on October 30,
2000 by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86, is hereby REVERSED and
appellant ACQUITTED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., abroad, on official leave.

Footnote

1 Penned by Judge Teodoro A. Bay.

2 Assailed Decision, p. 8; rollo, p. 25; records, p. 144.

3 Complaint dated March 2, 1998; rollo, pp. 8-9.

4 Order dated August 3, 1998; records, Vol. 1, p. 18.

5 Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza.

6 Signed by Assistant Solicitors General Carlos N. Ortega and Mariano M. Martinez, and
Solicitor Olivia V. Non.

7 Appellee's Brief, pp. 5-12; rollo, pp. 87-90.

8 Appellant's Brief was signed by Attorneys Arceli A. Rubin, Amelia C. Garchitorena, Teresita S.
de Guzman, and Nestor M. Hermida.

9 Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 45-46.

10 Assailed Decision, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 22-23.

11 Ibid., pp. 6 & 23.

12 This case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 12, 2002, upon receipt by this
Court of Appellee's Brief. The filing of a Reply brief was deemed waived, as none had been
filed within the reglementary period.

13 Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 46-47. Original in upper case.

14 People v. Dado, 244 SCRA 655, June 1, 1995.

15 People v. Gabris, 258 SCRA 663, July 11, 1996.

16 People v. Perez, 270 SCRA 526, March 26, 1997.

17 People v. Garcia et. al., 105 SCRA 6, June 11, 1981.

18 People v. Cueto, 84 SCRA 774, August 25, 1978.

19 TSN, May 28, 1999, p. 14.

20 Ibid., p. 15.

21 People v. Chua, GR No. 137841, October 1, 2001.

22 RTC Records, Vol. I, p. 4.

23 TSN, October 12, 1998, p. 4.

24 Ibid., p. 6.

25 Id., p. 4.

26 P. Solis, Legal Medicine, 1987, p. 494.

27 TSN, September 17, 1998, p. 3.

28 TSN, January 22, 1999, p. 3.

29 TSN, September 17, 1998, supra.

30 TSN, May 28, 1999, p. 5.

31 People v. Bracamonte, 257 SCRA 380, June 17, 1996.

32 People v. Barrera, 262 SCRA 63, September 19, 1996; People v. Tadulan, 271 SCRA 233,
April 15, 1997.

33 People v. Ligotan, 262 SCRA 602, September 30, 1996.

34 People v. Tadulan, supra; People v. Alfeche, 294 SCRA 352, August 17, 1998.

35 TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 2-3.

36 Ibid., p. 4.

37 People v. Tumala Jr., 284 SCRA 436, January 20, 1998.

38 United States v. Maaño, 2 Phil. 718, November 30, 1903.

39 United States v. Navarro, 3 Phil. 143, January 11, 1904.

40 People v. Barrera de Reyes, 82 Phil. 130, November 23, 1948.

41 People v. Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484, November 29, 1977, citing People v. Maisug, 27 SCRA
742, October 29, 1971.

42 US v. Boquilon, 10 Phil. 4, January 24, 1908; US v. Lim Sip et al., 10 Phil. 627, March 26,
1908; US v. Quijano, 11 Phil. 368, September 29, 1908; US v. Adolfo, 12 Phil. 296, December
19, 1908; US v. Esmundo, 27 Phil. 554, August 22, 1914; US v. Paicaoan, 34 Phil. 593, July
22, 1916; US v. Blanza, 34 Phil. 639, August 1, 1916; People v. Poblador, 76 SCRA 634, April
29, 1977; People v. Agripa, 130 SCRA 185, June 29, 1984.

43 People v. Agoncillo, 80 Phil. 33, January 23, 1948.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 180870 January 22, 2010

JULIUS CACAO y PRIETO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In order to safeguard its citizenry from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical
and mental well-being, the State pursued an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the
trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances.1 However, in our desire
to totally eradicate this social ill, we must adhere to the constitutional pronouncement that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.2
This case illustrates once more our faithful adherence to said constitutional requirement.

Factual Antecedents

For review is the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR

No. 29985 dated July 27, 2007 affirming in toto the Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case No. 11489-13 dated November 25, 2005 finding
herein petitioner Julius Cacao y Prieto (Cacao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12 years and
one day to 15 years and ordering him to pay a fine of ₱400,000.00. Also assailed is the
Resolution5 of the CA dated December 11, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration.

On October 15, 2004, two separate informations were filed against Joseph Canlas y Naguit6
and Cacao7 indicting them for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 before the RTC of
Laoag City. Insofar as pertinent to this petition, we shall quote the information only against
Cacao in Criminal Case No. 11489-13 which reads:

That on or about the 14th day of October, 2004, at Laoag City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously [sic] have in his possession, control and custody 1 plastic sachet of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu containing a total of 1.6 grams including plastic
sachets [sic] without any license or authority, in violation of the aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

When arraigned on November 30, 2004, Cacao pleaded not guilty.9 Thereafter trial on the
merits followed.
The inculpatory facts, as unveiled by the prosecution in its evidence given during the trial, were
briefly synthesized by the Office of the Solicitor General, viz:

On October 14, 2004, at around 7:45 in the evening, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Celso Pang-ag of
the Intelligence and Operation Section of the Laoag City Police Station received a telephone
call from an informant about a drug session being held inside Room 5 of the Starlight Hotel
located at Barangay 5, Ablan Avenue, Laoag City.

Acting on the information, PO3 Pang-ag, together with PO2 Jonel Mangapit, went immediately
to the Starlight Hotel to determine the veracity of the report. Upon arrival at the target area,
PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit approached the lady clerk manning the information counter
of Starlight Hotel and inquired about the alleged drug session at Room 5 of the hotel.

The lady clerk informed PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit that the roomboy of the hotel was
about to deliver a softdrink to Room 5 and they could follow him if they [so wish]. Thus, PO3
Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit followed the roomboy to Room 5. Upon arrival, the roomboy
knocked at the door and a woman, later identified as Mylene, opened the door wide enough to
enable the police officers to look inside.

PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit saw petitioner seated on top of the bed sniffing "shabu" while
Joseph Canlas was on the floor assisting petitioner sniffing "shabu". At this juncture, PO3
Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit arrested petitioner and Joseph and confiscated from them the
drug paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors, lighters and plastic sachets.

PO2 Mangapit frisked petitioner and recovered from him one plastic sachet containing "shabu".

After informing petitioner and Joseph of their constitutional rights, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit brought them to the Laoag City Police Station and turned them over to the police
officer on duty while the confiscated items were turned over to SPO3 Loreto Ancheta.

The Philippine National Police (PNP) laboratory conducted an examination on the specimen
recovered from appellant and his companion which tested positive for "shabu".10

Cacao professed his innocence and presented his defense in this wise:

In the afternoon of 14 October 2004, petitioner was waiting for a ride going home along the
National Road at the rotunda of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. Joseph Canlas [who was on his
way to] Laoag City aboard his motorcycle x x x pulled over and asked the petitioner if the latter
could spare a moment to estimate a work he wanted to be done in his house. Admittedly, the
petitioner is a contractor. Petitioner agreed and they both boarded Canlas’ motorcycle for
Laoag City.

While in Laoag City, petitioner and Canlas stopped at the public market for the latter to collect
[loan payment] as he is also a money lender. Petitioner stayed [by] Canlas’ motorcycle. When
Canlas returned, it was then that they decided to have "chicks" (or womanize). They then
proceeded to Starlight Hotel located along Ablan Ave., Laoag City on board Canlas’
motorcycle.

x x x at the Starlight Hotel, petitioner asked for a room and [was given] Room 5 x x x.
Thereafter, Canlas stayed inside Room 5 while petitioner went out to the hotel’s counter to wait
for the woman they [had] contacted. Present at the counter at the time was the lady cashier
[named] Cherry Corpuz.

In about thirty (30) minutes, a tricycle-for-hire arrived with a man and a woman on board as
passengers. The tricycle went inside the hotel and stopped right in front of the counter where
the petitioner and the lady cashier were. After alighting from the tricycle, the woman
companion inquired where Room 5 is [and was directed] by the lady cashier. The woman [who]
alighted from the tricycle in the company of another male person was later on identified to be
Mylene Daquioag. Thereafter, Mylene Daquioag proceeded to Room 5 while the male
companion stayed behind with the petitioner at the hotel’s counter. When petitioner could not
wait [any] longer because there was only one woman who arrived, he x x x asked the male
companion of Mylene Daquioag if another woman is coming. The male companion answered
in the negative. A couple of minutes [later], petitioner followed to Room 5 so he could [sic] go
home instead because it was then getting late.

Upon entering the room, petitioner saw Mylene Daquioag and Canlas seated at the table
inside the room. He also saw Mylene Daquioag offer something contained in plastic x x x to
Canlas. The latter refused as he said it is a woman that he was asking [for].

Barely a moment after entering Room 5, the two then heard a knock on the door from the
outside. Mylene Daquiaog immediately stood up and told the petitioner and Canlas that "they
are (her) companions".

As soon as the door was unlocked by Mylene Daquioag, several policemen barged inside the
room with their guns drawn out. Petitioner was shoved to the bed by one of the police. He was
later bodily searched but nothing was found from [sic] him except his wallet containing cash of
about ₱ 7,000.00. The wallet was later turned over to the petitioner’s wife at the Police Station
of Laoag, City. The ₱7,000.00 was never seen again.
As petitioner was made to sit at [sic] the bed, one of the police officers pointed to a plastic
sachet on the floor. It was about two (2) meters away from him and about a meter from the
police pointing [to] it. The same police then explained that the plastic sachet belongs to the
petitioner. Immediately, petitioner cried foul on the assertion.

Due to the suddenness of events, the petitioner was not as much as able to notice what the
other police did to Canlas.1avvphi1

Without much ado, the petitioner and Canlas were apprehended, handcuffed and brought to
the Laoag City Police Station. Charges were later on filed against them.11

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On November 25, 2005, the trial court rendered its judgment finding Cacao guilty of the
offense charged and sentenced him accordingly, viz:

WHEREFORE x x x

The accused Julius Cacao is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged of
illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride weighing 1.3987 grams in Criminal
Case No. 11489 and is therefore sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS and to
pay the fine of Four hundred thousand (₱400,000.00) pesos, Philippine Currency.

The sachets of shabu confiscated from the accused are all confiscated in favor of the
Government, the same to be disposed as the law prescribes. Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.12

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved by the Decision of the trial court, Cacao interposed an appeal to the CA. On July 27,
2007, the appellate court rendered judgment affirming Cacao’s conviction. It held that the
circumstances obtaining in this case validly cloaked the arresting officers with the authority to
search and seize any contraband or prohibited material which may be used as proof of the
offense of which Cacao is charged. It also ruled that there is no proof that the police officers
compelled Cacao to admit a crime. As to the alleged contradictory statements, the appellate
court ruled that they refer only to minor details which are not sufficient to overthrow the
probative value accorded them by the trial court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration13 but the motion was denied by the appellate court in its
Resolution14 dated on December 11, 2007.

Issues

In this petition, Cacao ascribes to the trial court the following errors:

I. The lower court gravely erred in ruling that the guilt of the accused was proven beyond
reasonable doubt considering the myriad material inconsistencies, discrepancies, and
incredible statements in the prosecution evidence.15

II. The lower court gravely erred in failing to lend credence to the critical testimony of Benedict
Villanueva.16

III. The lower court erred in not finding that the crucial first link in the chain of custody of the
specimen subjected for examination was not proven.17

IV. The lower court gravely erred in declaring that the defense of frame-up cannot be given
weight.18

V. The lower court gravely erred in relying on the weakness of the defense.19

VI. The lower court gravely erred in failing to find that the presumption of innocence of the
petitioner stands unrebutted, hence, his conviction is erroneous.20

Our Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

As a general rule, factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA are entitled to
great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, if there is any
indication that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would
substantially affect the disposition of the case,21 we will not hesitate to review the same. In
this case, we find it imperative to review the factual findings of the trial court because of certain
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on material points.

Jurisprudence holds that in prosecution of cases involving illegal possession of prohibited

drugs, the prosecution must establish with moral certainty the elemental act of possession of a
prohibited substance coupled with the fact that such possession is not authorized by law.
Essential, however, in a drug-related case is that the identity of the dangerous drug be
established beyond reasonable doubt.22 Since the dangerous drug constitutes the corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction,23 it
behooves upon the prosecution to establish and prove with certainty that the dangerous drug
presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same item recovered from his
possession.

We have scrutinized in detail the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and found not only
glaring inconsistencies on material points but more importantly a failure to identify indubitably
the prohibited drug allegedly confiscated from Cacao.

The testimonies of the prosecution’s principal witnesses are inconsistent as to who delivered
the prohibited drug to the evidence custodian.

PO3 Celso Pang-ag (Pang-ag) and PO2 Jonel Mangapit (Mangapit) both testified that it was
the latter who brought the item confiscated from petitioner to the evidence custodian, SPO3
Loreto Ancheta (Ancheta). Thus:

Q: What about the two plastic sachets you confiscated from the possession of the accused
Joseph and the one plastic sachet which Jonel Mangapit confiscated from the possession of
Julius Cacao as well as the drug paraphernalia you mentioned, what did you do with them?

A: We turned over the confiscated drug paraphernalia and the one I confiscated to the
evidence custodian, SP03 Loreto Ancheta and the one confiscated by P02 Mangapit was also
turned over by him to the evidence custodian, sir.

Q: Who was the evidence custodian whom you and Jonel Mangapit turned over the items you
said?

A: SPO3 Loreto Ancheta, Sir.24

Mangapit corroborated Pang-ag’s testimony that it was he who delivered to Ancheta the item
he seized from Cacao. Thus:

Q: How about the one big plastic sachet you were able to seize from the right front pocket of
accused Cacao, what did you do?

A: I turned it over to the evidence custodian, Sir.

Q: Who was that evidence custodian to whom you turned over that plastic sachet?
A: SP02 Loreto Ancheta, Sir.25

The foregoing assertions are totally at odds with the testimony of Ancheta, the evidence
custodian. The latter denied that it was Mangapit who delivered the item allegedly recovered
from Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and categorically declared that it was SP03 Balolong
(Balolong) from whom he received the plastic sachet of shabu.

Q: Who delivered to you the specimen allegedly confiscated from the possession of Cacao?

A: SP03 Balolong, Sir.26

During his cross-examination, Ancheta confirmed his declaration that it was Balolong and
definitely not Mangapit who handed to him the plastic sachet of shabu. Ancheta testified thus:

Q: You said that it was officer Balolong who handed to you the plastic sachet of shabu which
was allegedly taken from the possession of accused Julius Cacao, did I hear you right?

A: Julius Cacao, yes sir.

Q: It was not officer Mangapit who handed to you the plastic sachet of shabu?

A: Balolong, sir.

Q: It was not Mangapit?

A: No sir.27

When confronted with the afore-quoted testimony of Ancheta, Mangapit cannot explain the
variance. He just gave a sweeping answer "I do not know".28

We cannot understand why the courts below did not doubt or suspect the patently inconsistent
and contradictory testimonies of the principal witnesses of the prosecution. Contrary to the
findings of the appellate court, we are of the considered view that this contradiction is not so
inconsequential or minor but a discrepancy touching on substantial and significant matter
which could well affect the credibility of the witnesses.

The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish that the item presented in court was the same
item confiscated from Cacao.
The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one hand, and
the testimony of Ancheta on the other hand, necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic
sachet of shabu identified in court is the same item that was allegedly seized and confiscated
from petitioner. If the version of Mangapit is to be believed, then the most lamentable aspect
pertains to his failure to identify the seized item with certainty. For sure Mangapit, who is the
most competent person to make the proper identification being the officer who confiscated the
item from Cacao, never actually identified the same:

Q: If shown to you again that one big plastic sachet where you put markings would you be able
to recognize and identify the same?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Giving to you an already opened brown envelope with several contents, will you please sort
out [the] contents and bring out that big plastic sachet you claimed you confiscated from the
custody of accused Cacao?

A: (Witness sorting out the contents of the plastic bag containing several items). (Witness
examining the plastic sachet mounted on the bond paper marked as Exhibit B-1).

Q: Are the markings you claimed which were placed in the plastic sachet still visible and
readable?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you please read for record purposes the markings?

A: Initial JPC and my signature, sir.

(Witness pointing to the initials and signature written on a darker masking tape on the plastic
sachet).29

Verily, there was no actual and effective identification of the subject specimen. After sorting out
the contents of the plastic bag, witness Mangapit merely pointed to the initial and signature
written on a masking tape attached to the plastic sachet. At no instance did he make a
categorical and accurate declaration that the sachet contained the shabu allegedly confiscated
from Cacao.

The only other person who could have identified the subject drug is Pang-ag. However, we
cannot lend credence to his supposed identification, the same not being also positive, certain
and unequivocal. Besides, there is no showing that this witness actually saw the shabu at the
time it was allegedly seized from petitioner. In fact, Pang-ag is even incompetent to make the
identification since from all indications, he has never been in possession of it.1avvphi1

Be that as it may, any identification made by these witnesses on the item allegedly seized from
petitioner is rendered meaningless and bereft of probative value in view of the categorical
denial of the evidence custodian that he received the same from Mangapit. It is now clearly
evident from the records that the sachet of shabu which the evidence custodian received,
marked and submitted for examination and later presented in court is not the same sachet of
shabu which Mangapit claimed to have confiscated from petitioner and subsequently
transmitted to the evidence custodian.

Moreover, considering the testimony of Ancheta, it was Balolong who forwarded the seized
item. It is quite strange that Ancheta would point to Balolong as the sender of the seized items
if he had no basis in saying so. However, our own scrutiny of the records failed to show the
role of Balolong in the operation since admittedly, the only lawmen who participated therein
were Mangapit and Pang-ag. In fact, as testified to by Mangapit, Balolong proceeded to the
hotel after the operation.30 How then was Balolong able to get hold of the confiscated
substance when he was neither a party to nor present during the operation? Who entrusted the
substance to him assuming that somebody requested him to submit it for safekeeping? These
are only some of the lingering questions which must be answered convincingly and
satisfactorily so as to ensure that there had been no substitution, contamination or tampering
with the sachet of shabu allegedly taken from petitioner. It must be noted that Balolong was
never presented to testify in this case. Thus, there is no evidence to prove that what was
turned over to the evidence custodian by Balolong and later presented in court was the same
substance recovered from petitioner. The failure to establish the chain of custody is fatal to the
prosecution’s case. There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when
nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined
and established to be the prohibited drug.31 In People v. Casimiro,32 citing People v. Mapa,33
we acquitted the accused for failure of the prosecution to establish the identity of the prohibited
drug which constitutes the corpus delicti. Equally true in Zarraga v. People,34 we also
acquitted the accused in view of the prosecution’s failure to indubitably show the identity of the
shabu.

At this juncture, it must be stressed that the "corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases
constitutes the drug itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the
prohibited drug is essential".35

Likewise, our ruling in People v. Gutierrez36 on chain of custody rule is instructive. Thus:
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires the presentation of
the seized prohibited drugs as an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This would ideally
cover the testimony about every link in the chain, from seizure of the prohibited drug up to the
time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, to include, as much as possible, a description of
the condition in which it was delivered to the next in the chain.

Finally, petitioner’s defenses of denial and frame-up are concededly inherently weak and
commonly used in drug-related cases. However, it must be stressed that conviction of the
accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the evidence of
the prosecution.

Based on the foregoing, we are of the considered view that the quantum of evidence needed
to convict, that is proof beyond reasonable doubt, has not been adequately established by the
prosecution. While as a rule we desist from disturbing the findings and conclusions of the trial
court especially with respect to the credibility of witnesses, we must bow to the superior and
immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt because
the law presumes that the accused is innocent unless and until proven otherwise. Presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself override the constitutional right
of the accused to be presumed innocent unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling
evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 29985 dated July 27, 2007 affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 11489-13, and its Resolution dated
December 11, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Julius Cacao y Prieto is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice

ATTE STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 See Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 2.

2 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14(a).

3 Rollo, pp. 63-92; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso and concurred in by
Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Marlene Gonzales-Sison.

4 Records, Criminal Case No. 11489-13, pp. 97-108; penned by Judge Philip G. Salvador.

5 Rollo, p. 95.

6 Docketed as Criminal Case No. 11487-13.

7 Docketed as Criminal Case No. 11489-13.

8 Records, Criminal Case No. 11489-13, p. 1.

9 Id. at 31.

10 Rollo, pp. 134-136.

11 Id. at 21-23.

12 Records, Criminal Case No. 11487-13, pp. 7-8.

13 CA rollo, p. 164.

14 Id. at 207.

15 Rollo, p. 28.

16 Id. at 34.

17 Id. at 45.

18 Id. at 51.

19 Id. at 52.

20 Id.

21 American Home Assurance Company v. Chua, 368 Phil. 555, 565 (1999).

22 People v. Obmiranis, G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 140, 148; Malinlin
v. People, G.R No. 172950, April 27, 2007, 553 SCRA 619, 632.

23 Cariño v. People, G.R. No. 178757, March 13, 2009; People v. Simbahon, 449 Phil. 74, 83
(2003).

24 TSN, February 1, 2005, pp. 7-8.

25 TSN, February 24, 2005, p. 7.

26 TSN, February 7, 2005, p. 6.

27 Id. at 10.

28 TSN, February 24, 2005, p. 12.

29 TSN, February 24, 2005, p. 8.

30 TSN, February 24, 2005, p. 10.

31 Valdez v. People. G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 611, 628-629.

32 432 Phil. 966, 977 (2002).

33 G.R. No. 91014, March 31, 1993, 220 SCRA 670.

34 G.R. No. 162064, March 14, 2006, 484 SCRA 639, 652.

35 People v. Quebral, G.R. No. 185379, November 27, 2009.

36 G.R. No. 177777, December 4, 2009.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

[ GR No. 181354, Feb 27, 2013 ]

SIMON A. FLORES v. PEOPLE +
DECISION
G.R. No. 181354

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul
and set aside the August 27, 2004 Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan, First Division
(Sandiganbayan), in Criminal Case No. 16946, finding petitioner Simon A. Flores (Flores) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, and its November 29, 2007 Resolution[2]
denying his motion for reconsideration.
Flores was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information, dated July 9, 1991, filed
before the Sandiganbayan which reads:

That on or about the 15th day of August, 1989, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Alaminos,
Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer, being then the Barangay Chairman of San Roque, Alaminos,
Laguna, while in the performance of his official functions and committing the offense in relation
to his office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with intent to kill, shoot one
JESUS AVENIDO with an M-16 Armalite Rifle, thereby inflicting upon him several gunshot
wounds in different parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said JESUS AVENIDO.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

During his arraignment, on August 26, 1991, Flores pleaded "Not Guilty" and waived the pre-
trial. Thereafter, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Paulito Duran, one of
the visitors (Duran); Gerry Avenido (Gerry), son of the victim; Elisa Avenido (Elisa), wife of the
victim; and Dr. Ruben Escueta, the physician who performed the autopsy on the cadaver of the
victim, Jesus Avenido (Jesus).

For its part, the defense presented as witnesses, the accused Flores himself; his companion-
members of the Civilian Action Force Group Unit (CAFGU), Romulo Alquizar and Maximo H.
Manalo; and Dr. Rene Bagamasbad, resident physician of San Pablo City District Hospital.

The Version of the Prosecution

On August 15, 1989, on the eve of the barangay fiesta in San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna,
certain visitors, Ronnie de Mesa, Noli de Mesa, Marvin Avenido, and Duran, were drinking at
the terrace of the house of Jesus. They started drinking at 8:30 o'clock in the evening. Jesus,
however, joined his visitors only at around 11:00 o'clock after he and his wife arrived from Sta.
Rosa, Laguna, where they tried to settle a problem regarding a vehicular accident involving
one of their children. The drinking at the terrace was ongoing when Flores arrived with an M-16
armalite rifle.[4]

Duran testified that Jesus stood up from his seat and met Flores who was heading towards the
terrace. After glancing at the two, who began talking to each other near the terrace, Duran
focused his attention back to the table. Suddenly, he heard several gunshots prompting him to
duck under the table. Right after the shooting, he looked around and saw the bloodied body of
Jesus lying on the ground. By then, Flores was no longer in sight.[5]
Duran immediately helped board Jesus in an owner-type jeep to be brought to a hospital.
Thereafter, Duran, Ronnie de Mesa and Noli de Mesa went home. Jesus was brought to the
hospital by his wife and children. Duran did not, at any time during the occasion, notice the
victim carrying a gun with him.[6]

Gerry narrated that he was going in and out of their house before the shooting incident took
place, anxiously waiting for the arrival of his parents from Sta. Rosa, Laguna. His parents were
then attending to his problem regarding a vehicular accident. When they arrived, Gerry had a
short conversation with his father, who later joined their visitors at the terrace.[7]

Gerry was outside their house when he saw Flores across the street in the company of some
members of the CAFGU. He was on his way back to the house when he saw Flores and his
father talking to each other from a distance of about six (6) meters. Suddenly, Flores shot his
father, hitting him on the right shoulder. Flores continued shooting even as Jesus was already
lying flat on the ground. Gerry testified that he felt hurt to have lost his father.[8]

Elisa related that she was on her way from the kitchen to serve "pulutan" to their visitors when
she saw Flores, from their window, approaching the terrace. By the time she reached the
terrace, her husband was already lying on the ground and still being shot by Flores. After the
latter had left, she and her children rushed him to the hospital where he was pronounced dead
on arrival.[9]

As a consequence of her husband's untimely demise, she suffered emotionally. She testified
that Jesus had an average monthly income of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) before he
died at the age of forty-one (41). He left four (4) children. Although she had no receipt, Elisa
asked for actual damages consisting of lawyer's fees in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00) plus Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for every hearing, and Six Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P6,500.00) for the funeral expenses.[10]

Dr. Ruben Escueta (Dr. Escueta) testified that on August 17, 1989, he conducted an autopsy
on the cadaver of Jesus, whom he assessed to have died at least six (6) hours before his body
was brought to him.[11]

Based on the Autopsy Report,[12] it appeared that the victim suffered four gunshot wounds in
the different parts of his body, specifically: on the medial portion of the left shoulder, between
the clavicle and the first rib; on the left hypogastric region through the upper right quadrant of
the abdomen; on the tip of the left buttocks to the tip of the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the
right flank towards the umbilicus. The victim died of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due
to laceration of the liver.
The Version of the Defense

To avoid criminal liability, Flores interposed self-defense.

Flores claimed that in the evening of August 15, 1989, he, together with four members of the
CAFGU and Civil Service Unit (CSU), Maximo Manalo, Maximo Latayan (Latayan), Ronilo
Haballa, and Romulo Alquizar, upon the instructions of Mayor Samuel Bueser of Alaminos,
Laguna, conducted a ronda in Barangay San Roque which was celebrating the eve of its
fiesta.[13]

At around midnight, the group was about 15 meters from the house of Jesus, who had earlier
invited them for some "bisperas" snacks, when they heard gunshots seemingly emanating
from his house. Flores asked the group to stay behind as he would try to talk to Jesus, his
cousin, to spare the shooting practice for the fiesta celebration the following day. As he started
walking towards the house, he was stopped by Latayan and handed him a baby armalite. He
initially refused but was prevailed upon by Latayan who placed the weapon over his right
shoulder, with its barrel or nozzle pointed to the ground. Latayan convinced Flores that such
posture would gain respect from the people in the house of Jesus.[14]

Flores then proceeded to the terrace of the house of Jesus, who was having a drinking spree
with four others. In a calm and courteous manner, Flores asked Jesus and his guests to cease
firing their guns as it was already late at night and to save their shots for the following day's
fiesta procession. Flores claimed that despite his polite, unprovocative request and the fact
that he was a relative of Jesus and the barangay chairman, a person in authority performing a
regular routine duty, he was met with hostility by Jesus and his guests. Jesus, who appeared
drunk, immediately stood up and approached him as he was standing near the entrance of the
terrace. Jesus abruptly drew his magnum pistol and poked it directly at his chest and then fired
it. By a twist of fate, he was able to partially parry Jesus' right hand, which was holding the
pistol, and was hit on his upper right shoulder.[15]

With fierce determination, however, Jesus again aimed his gun at Flores, but the latter was
able to instinctively take hold of Jesus' right hand, which was holding the gun. As they
wrestled, Jesus again fired his gun, hitting Flores' left hand.[16]

Twice hit by bullets from Jesus' magnum pistol and profusely bleeding from his two wounds,
Flores, with his life and limb at great peril, instinctively swung with his right hand the baby
armalite dangling on his right shoulder towards Jesus and squeezed its trigger. When he
noticed Jesus already lying prostrate on the floor, he immediately withdrew from the house. As
he ran towards the coconut groves, bleeding and utterly bewildered over the unfortunate
incident that just transpired between him and his cousin Jesus, he heard more gunshots. Thus,
he continued running for fear of more untoward incidents that could follow. He proceeded to
the Mayor's house in Barangay San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna, to report what had
happened. There, he found his ronda groupmates.[17]

The incident was also reported the following day to the CAFGU Superior, Sgt. Alfredo Sta. Ana.

Decision of the Sandiganbayan

On August 27, 2004, after due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed
decision[18] finding Flores guilty of the offense charged. The Sandiganbayan rejected Flores'
claim that the shooting was justified for failure to prove self-defense. It gave credence to the
consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Flores shot Jesus with an armalite rifle
(M16) which resulted in his death. According to the Sandiganbayan, there was no reason to
doubt the testimonies of the said witnesses who appeared to have no ill motive to falsely testify
against Flores. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 16946 finding the accused
Simon A. Flores GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and to suffer the
penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to 17 years, and 4
months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. The accused is hereby ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the death of Jesus
Avenido, another Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Six Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P6,500.00) as actual or compensatory damages.

SO ORDERED.[19]

Flores filed a motion for the reconsideration. As the motion did not contain any notice of
hearing, the Prosecution filed its Motion to Expunge from the Records Accused's Motion for
Reconsideration."[20]

In its Resolution, dated November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for being a
mere scrap of paper as it did not contain a notice of hearing and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration of accused Flores is
considered pro forma which did not toll the running of the period to appeal, and thus, the
assailed judgment of this Court has become FINAL and EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.[21]
Hence, Flores filed the present petition before this Court on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors involving questions of substantive and procedural
laws and jurisprudence. Specifically, Flores raises the following

ISSUES

(I)

WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING

DUE CREDIT TO PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE

(II)

WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, COMMITTED SERIOUS BUT

REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN ARRIVING AT ITS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

(III)

WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN

NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED[22]

The Court will first resolve the procedural issue raised by Flores in this petition.

Flores claims that the outright denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Sandiganbayan
on a mere technicality amounts to a violation of his right to due process. The dismissal
rendered final and executory the assailed decision which was replete with baseless
conjectures and conclusions that were contrary to the evidence on record. He points out that a
relaxation of procedural rules is justified by the merits of this case as the facts, viewed from the
proper and objective perspective, indubitably demonstrate self-defense on his part.

Flores argues that he fully complied with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 37 and Section
4 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court when the motion itself was served upon the prosecution
and the latter, in fact, admitted receiving a copy. For Flores, such judicial admission amounts to
giving due notice of the motion which is the intent behind the said rules. He further argues that
a hearing on a motion for reconsideration is not necessary as no further proceeding, such as a
hearing, is required under Section 3 of Rule 121.

Flores' argument fails to persuade this Court.

Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:

SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten
(10) days after the filing of the motion.

Section 2, Rule 37 provides:

SEC. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof. The motion
shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefore, a written notice of which shall
be served by the movant on the adverse party.

xxxx

A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of
appeal.

Section 4, Rule 121 states:

SEC. 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. The motion for a new trial or
reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. X x x.
Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor.

As correctly stated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Sec. 2 of Rule 37 and Sec. 4
of Rule 121 should be read in conjunction with Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Basic is
the rule that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant except for those motions
which the court may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party.[23] The
notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date of the
hearing, with proof of service.

This Court has indeed held, time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, the requirement is mandatory. Failure to comply with the requirement renders
the motion defective. "As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma
and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite
pleading."[24]

In this case, as Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of hearing, his
motion was a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect whatsoever. Thus, his motion was
properly dismissed by the Sandiganbayan.
Flores invokes the exercise by the Court of its discretionary power to review the factual
findings of the Sandiganbayan. He avers that the ponente as well as the other members of the
First Division who rendered the assailed decision, were not able to observe the witnesses or
their manner of testifying as they were not present during the trial.[25] He, thus, argues that
there was palpable misapprehension of the facts that led to wrong conclusions of law resulting
in his unfounded conviction.

His contention is likewise devoid of merit.

"It is often held that the validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the
ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a
showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by him."[26]

"Moreover, it should be stressed that the Sandiganbayan, which functions in divisions of three
Justices each, is a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the
exchange of view and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority vote."[27]

In the present case, Flores has not convinced the Court that there was misapprehension or
misinterpretation of the material facts nor was the defense able to adduce evidence to
establish that the factual findings were arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the
Court sustains the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that Flores shot Jesus and continued riddling
his body with bullets even after he was already lying helpless on the ground.

Flores insists that the evidence of this case clearly established all the elements of self-defense.
According to him, there was an unlawful aggression on the part of Jesus. He was just at the
entrance of Jesus' terrace merely advising him and his guests to reserve their shooting for the
fiesta when Jesus approached him, drew a magnum pistol and fired at him. The attack by
Jesus was sudden, unexpected and instantaneous. The intent to kill was present because
Jesus kept pointing the gun directly at him. As he tried to parry Jesus' hand, which was holding
the gun, the latter kept firing. Left with no choice, he was compelled to use the baby armalite
he was carrying to repel the attack. He asserts that there was lack of sufficient provocation on
his part as he merely requested Jesus and his drinking buddies to reserve their shooting for
the following day as it was already late at night and the neighbors were already asleep.

In effect, Flores faults the Sandiganbayan in not giving weight to the justifying circumstance of
self-defense interposed by him and in relying on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
instead.

His argument deserves scant consideration.

The issue of whether Flores indeed acted in self-defense is basically a question of fact. In
appeals to this Court, only questions of law may be raised and not issues of fact. The factual
findings of the Sandiganbayan are, thus, binding upon this Court.[28] This Court, nevertheless,
finds no reason to disturb the finding of the Sandiganbayan that Flores utterly failed to prove
the existence of self-defense.

Generally, "the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent." If the accused,
however, admits killing the victim, but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to
him to prove such defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any
vestige of criminal aggression on his part. To escape liability, it now becomes incumbent upon
the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of that justifying
circumstance.[29]

In this case, Flores does not dispute that he perpetrated the killing of Jesus by shooting him
with an M16 armalite rifle. To justify his shooting of Jesus, he invoked self-defense. By
interposing self-defense, Flores, in effect, admits the authorship of the crime. Thus, it was
incumbent upon him to prove that the killing was legally justified under the circumstances.

To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of
the elements of self-defense. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who
acts in defense of his person or rights does not incur any criminal liability provided that the
following circumstances concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.

The most important among all the elements is unlawful aggression. "There can be no self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense."[30] "Unlawful aggression is
defined as an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a
person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful
intent to cause injury. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger not
merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real
and immediate threat to one's life."[31] "Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute
aggression warranting self-defense."[32]

In this case, Flores failed to discharge his burden.

The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the
probative value of evidence on record. As correctly noted by the Sandiganbayan, the defense
evidence, both testimonial and documentary, were crowded with flaws which raised serious
doubt as to its credibility, to wit:

First, the accused claims that Jesus Avenido shot him on his right shoulder with a magnum
handgun from a distance of about one (1) meter. With such a powerful weapon, at such close
range, and without hitting any hard portion of his body, it is quite incredible that the bullet did
not exit through the accused's shoulder. On the contrary, if he were hit on the part where the
ball and socket were located, as he tried to make it appear later in the trial, it would be very
impossible for the bullet not to have hit any of the bones located in that area of his shoulder.

Second, Simon Flores executed an affidavit on September 2, 1989. Significantly, he did not
mention anything about a bullet remaining on his shoulder. If indeed a bullet remained lodged
in his shoulder at the time he executed his affidavit, it defies logic why he kept mum during the
preliminary investigation when it was crucial to divulge such fact if only to avoid the trouble of
going through litigation. To wait for trial before finally divulging such a very material information,
as he claimed, simply stretches credulity.

Third, in his feverish effort of gathering evidence to establish medical treatment on his right
shoulder, the accused surprisingly did not bother to secure the x-ray plate or any medical
records from the hospital. Such valuable pieces of evidence would have most likely supported
his case of self-defense, even during the preliminary investigation, if they actually existed and
had he properly presented them. The utter lack of interest of the accused in retrieving the
alleged x-ray plate or any medical record from the hospital militate against the veracity of his
version of the incident.

Fourth, the T-shirt presented by the accused in court had a hole, apparently from a hard object,
such as a bullet, that pierced through the same. However, the blood stain is visibly
concentrated only on the area around the hole forming a circular shape. Within five (5) hours
and a half from 12:00 o'clock midnight when he was allegedly shot, to 5:35 a.m. in the early
morning of August 16, 1989, when his wounds were treated, the blood would naturally have
dripped down to the hem. The blood on the shirt was not even definitively shown to be human
blood.

Fifth, Jesus Avenido arrived at his house and joined his visitors who were drinking only at
11:00 o'clock in the evening. Both parties claim that the shooting incident happened more or
less 12:00 midnight. Hence, it is very possible that Jesus Avenido was not yet drunk when the
incident in question occurred. Defense witnesses themselves noted that the victim Jesus
Avenido was bigger in built and taller than the accused. Moreover, the victim was familiar and
very much experienced with guns, having previously worked as a policeman. In addition, the
latter was relatively young, at the age of 41, when the incident happened. The Court therefore
finds it difficult to accept how the victim could miss when he allegedly shot the accused at such
close range if, indeed, he really had a gun and intended to harm the accused. We find it much
less acceptable to believe how the accused allegedly overpowered the victim so easily and
wrestled the gun from the latter, despite allegedly having been hit earlier on his right shoulder.

Finally, it hardly inspires belief for the accused to have allegedly unlocked, with such ease, the
armalite rifle (M16) he held with one hand, over which he claims to have no experience
handling, while his right shoulder was wounded and he was grappling with the victim.[33]
(Underscoring supplied citations omitted)

The foregoing circumstances indeed tainted Flores' credibility and reliability, his story being
contrary to ordinary human experience. "Settled is the rule that testimonial evidence to be
believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must foremost be
credible in itself. Hence, the test to determine the value or credibility of the testimony of a
witness is whether the same is in conformity with common knowledge and is consistent with
the experience of mankind."[34]

The Court also sustains the finding that the testimony of Dr. Bagamasbad, adduced to prove
that Flores was shot by Jesus, has no probative weight for being hearsay. As correctly found
by the Sandiganbayan:

The testimony of defense witness Dr. Bagamasbad, cannot be of any help either since the
same is in the nature of hearsay evidence. Dr. Bagamasbad's testimony was a mere re-
statement of what appeared as entries in the hospital logbook (EXH. "8-a"), over which he
admitted to possess no personal knowledge. The photocopy of the logbook itself does not
possess any evidentiary value since it was not established by the defense that such evidence
falls under any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 3, Rule 130, which pertain to the rules
on the admissibility of evidence.[35] x x x

Granting for the sake of argument that unlawful aggression was initially staged by Jesus, the
same ceased to exist when Jesus was first shot on the shoulder and fell to the ground. At that
point, the perceived threat to Flores' life was no longer attendant. The latter had no reason to
pump more bullets on Jesus' abdomen and buttocks.

Indeed, the nature and number of the gunshot wounds inflicted upon Jesus further negate the
claim of self-defense by the accused. Records show that Jesus suffered four (4) gunshot
wounds in the different parts of his body, specifically: on the medial portion of the left shoulder,
between the clavicle and the first rib; on the left hypogastric region through the upper right
quadrant of the abdomen; on the tip of the left buttocks to the tip of the sacral bone or hip
bone; and on the right flank towards the umbilicus. According to Dr. Ruben Escueta, who
performed the autopsy on the victim, the latter died of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage
due to laceration of the liver.[36] If there was any truth to Flores' claim that he merely acted in
self-defense, his first shot on Jesus' shoulder, which already caused the latter to fall on the
ground, would have been sufficient to repel the attack allegedly initiated by the latter. But
Flores continued shooting Jesus. Considering the number of gunshot wounds sustained by the
victim, the Court finds it difficult to believe that Flores acted to defend himself to preserve his
own life. "It has been held in this regard that the location and presence of several wounds on
the body of the victim provide physical evidence that eloquently refutes allegations of self-
defense."[37]

"When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to kill or
wound the original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation
against the original aggressor."[38] Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation,
the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked
him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the
accused.[39]

The Court quotes with approval the following findings of the Sandiganbayan, thus:

x x x. The difference in the location of the entry and exit points of this bullet wound was about
two to three inches. From the entry point of the bullet, the shooting could not have taken place
when accused and his victim were standing and facing each other. Another bullet entered
through the medial portion of the victim's buttocks and exited through his abdominal cavity. A
third bullet entered through the left hypogastric region and exited at the upper right quadrant of
the victim's abdomen. The respective trajectory of these wounds are consistent with the
testimony of prosecution witnesses Elisa B. Avenido and Arvin B. Avenido that the accused
shot Jesus Avenido while the latter was already lying on the ground. Moreover, according to
Arvin Avenido, the first shot hit his father on the right shoulder making him fall to the ground.
Hence, even on the assumption that unlawful aggression initially existed, the same had
effectively ceased after the victim was first shot and fell to the ground. There was no more
reason for the accused to pull the trigger, at least three times more, and continue shooting at
the victim.[40] (Emphasis supplied)

The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature
and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent
or repel an unlawful aggression.[41] In this case, the continuous shooting by Flores which
caused the fatal gunshot wounds were not necessary and reasonable to prevent the claimed
unlawful aggression from Jesus as the latter was already lying flat on the ground after he was
first shot on the shoulder.
In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in finding accused Flores guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad, Villarama, Jr.,* and Leonen, JJ., concur.

* Designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, per Raffle
dated February 20, 2013.

[1] Annex "A" of Petition, rollo, pp. 36-47. Penned by Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De
Castro (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) with Associate Justice Diosdado M.
Peralta (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado,
concurring.

[2] Annex "B" of Petition, id. at 48-49.

[3] Records, p. 20-21.

[4] Rollo, pp. 36-37.

[5] Id. at 37.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id. at 37-38.

[9] Id. at 38.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Exhibit "A" for the Prosecution.

[13] Rollo, pp. 10-11.

[14] Id. at 11.

[15] Id. at 11-12.

[16] Id. at 12.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at 36-47.

[19] Id. at 46-47.

[20] Annex "D" of Petition, id. at 71-74.

[21] Id. at 49.

[22] Id. at 14; see also p. 127.

[23] Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

[24] Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation, G.R. No. 171872, June 28,
2010, 621 SCRA 636, 643.

[25] Rollo, p. 17.

[26] People v. Radam, Jr., 434 Phil. 87, 99 (2002), citing Quinao v. People, 390 Phil. 1092,
1100 (2000).

[27] Cabuslay v. People, 508 Phil. 236, 250 (2005), citing Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan, 235
Phil. 400, 410 (1987); Consing v. Court of Appeals, 257 Phil. 851, 859 (1989).

[28] Sazon v. Sandiganbayan, (Fourth Division), G.R. No. 150873, February 10, 2009, 578
SCRA 211, 219, citing Baldebrin v. Sandiganbayan, 547 Phil. 522, 533 (2007).

[29] Galang v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 145, 150-151 (2000).

[30] People of the Philippines v. Dolorido, G.R. No. 191721, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 496,
503, citing People v. Catbagan, 467 Phil. 1044, 1054 (2004).
[31] People of the Philippines v. Maningding, G.R. No. 195665, September 14, 2011, 657
SCRA 804, 814, citing People v. Gabrino, G.R. No. 189981, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 187,
201.

[32] Martinez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168827, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 176, 195, citing
People of the Philippines v. Saul, 423 Phil. 924, 934 (2001).

[33] Rollo, pp. 42-44.

[34] People v. Orias, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 417, 427.

[35] Rollo, p. 44.

[36] Id. at 38-39.

[37] People of the Philippines v. Villa, Jr., G.R. No. 179278, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 480,
498, citing People v. Saragina, 388 Phil. 1, 23-24 (2000).

[38] Martinez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168827, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 176, 195, citing
People of the Philippines v. Tagana, 468 Phil. 784, 802 (2004).

[39] Belbis, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181052, November 14, 2012, citing
People v. Vicente, 452 Phil. 986, 998 (2003).

[40] Rollo, pp. 44-45.

[41] Belbis, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, supra note 39.

GR No. 176389
ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 176864

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.

December 14, 2010

Facts:

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and xxx,
seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation,
the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial
court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the
real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by
the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had
solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed
that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony
Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez,
Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged
accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on
Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with
homicide against Webb, et al.

The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried
only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.

The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her
testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the
security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s
household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.

Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the
United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary
and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show
Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial
court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous,
and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations.
On January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment,
finding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an
indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial
court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty
imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award
of damages to Lauro Vizconde.

The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge
was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela
and in executing her mother and sister.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a
Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen
taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping
of the NBI.

The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence to give the
accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail
themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the
specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows,
however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in
evidence in the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to
due process.

Controlling Issues:

1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb,
Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who
committed it, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s
testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.

Other Issues:

1. Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s failure to
produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of
evidence that would prove his innocence; and

2. Whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and
sister.

Held:

The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of
violation of his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court
either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.

When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the
country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent
had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence.

Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the
motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up
the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the
proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals
or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other
accused.

They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by
the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the
appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when
the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the
accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on
reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future
time.

Suspicious Details

Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an "asset."
She supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal elements.
Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz
Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang"
that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very special
treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the
rooms at the NBI offices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she
was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the
real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring
that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to
press her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant.

Webb’s U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi through (a) the travel preparations;
(b) the two immigration checks; (c) details of US sojourn; (d) the second immigration check;
and (e) alibi versus positive identification; and (f) a documented alibi.

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a)
he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of
travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures
and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to
secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the
crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992.
Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to
fourteen hours.

Effect of Webb’s alibi to others

Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him,
but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if
the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place,
Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story.
Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.

Conclusion

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts
about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities,
but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious
mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner
being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an
NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde
massacre that she could not produce?

The Supreme Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005
and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336
and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A.
Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the
crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are
confined for another lawful cause.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 177743 January 25, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted an unlawful
aggression against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused cannot invoke
self-defense as a justifying circumstance.

The accused prays for the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006,1
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for murder handed down by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union.

Antecedents

At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in
Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head
with a piece of wood called bellang.2 Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him
again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only
because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing
him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where
Olais was pronounced dead on arrival.3

On April 25, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union filed an information for
murder against Fontanilla in the RTC, viz:

That on or about the 29th day of October 1996, along the Provincial Road at Barangay Butubut
Oeste, Municipality of Balaoan, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and strike with a long coconut night stick and thereafter hit with a stone the head of
Jose Olais, thereby inflicting on the latter head wounds which caused the death of the latter, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The accused pleaded not guilty.

The State presented Marquez and Abunan as its witnesses. They claimed that they were only
several meters away from Olais when Fontanilla struck him; that they shouted at Fontanilla,
who fled because of them; and that they were able to see and to identify Fontanilla as the
attacker of their father-in-law because the area was then well-lighted.5
Dr. Felicidad Leda, the physician who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Olais, attested
that her post-mortem examination showed that Olais had suffered a fracture on the left
temporal area of the skull, causing his death. She opined that a hard object or a severe force
had hit the skull of the victim more than once, considering that the skull had been already
fragmented and the fractures on the skull had been radiating.6

SPO1 Abraham Valdez, who investigated the slaying and apprehended Fontanilla, declared
that he had gone looking for Fontanilla in his house along with other policemen; that
Fontanilla’s father had denied that he was around; that their search of the house had led to the
arrest of Fontanilla inside; and that they had then brought him to the police station.7 Valdez
further declared that Fontanilla asserted that he would only speak in court.8

At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had
been standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to
be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the
latter had continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a
karate expert, had also kicked him with both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defend
himself by picking up a stone with which he had hit the right side of the victim’s head, causing
the latter to fall face down to the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house
upon seeing that Olais was no longer moving.9

Fontanilla’s daughter Marilou corroborated her father’s version.10

On June 21, 2001, the RTC declared Fontanilla guilty as charged, and disposed thusly:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring he
accused ALFONSO FONTANILLA Y OBALDO @ ‘Carlos’ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Sec. 6, and thereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos ( ₱50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.11

The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to
employ a big stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death"12 due to the
victim attacking him only with bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla did not suffer any injury
despite his claim that the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not receive any treatment,
and no medical certificate attested to any injury he might have suffered, having been
immediately released from the hospital;13 that Fontanilla’s failure to give any statement at the
time he surrendered to the police was inconsistent with his plea of self-defense;14 and that the
manner of attack against Olais established the attendance of treachery.15

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, holding that Fontanilla did not establish the indispensable
element of unlawful aggression; that his failure to report the incident to the police at the earliest
opportunity, or even after he was taken into custody, negated the plea of self-defense; and that
the nature of the victim’s injury was a significant physical proof to show a determined effort on
the part of Fontanilla to kill him, and not just to defend himself.16

The CA ruled that treachery was attendant, because Olais had no inkling that a fatal blow was
looming upon him, and because Fontanilla was inconspicuously hidden from view when he
struck Olais from behind, rendering Olais unable to retaliate.17

Nonetheless, the CA rectified the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death to only reclusion
perpetua upon noting the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and
disposed as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Balaoan, La Union, Branch 34, in Criminal Case No. 2561 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that appellant Fontanilla is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. No cost.

SO ORDERED.18

The accused is now appealing, insisting that the CA erred because:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S CLAIM

OF SELF-DEFENSE.

II.

EVEN GRANTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT KILLED THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER WHEN THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III.
FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE
SPECIAL PRIVILEGE[D] MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE
AND THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.

Ruling

We affirm the conviction.

Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by

clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.19 Unlawful aggression is
the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim
is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel.20 The character of the
element of unlawful aggression is aptly explained as follows:

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in
defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances
is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the
person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly,
the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely:
(a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be
actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is
impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor
must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver
at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack).
Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as
pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry
countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.21

By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused
the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide
admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his
criminal liability.22 Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla
came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the
court,23 and he would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient
and satisfactory proof.24 He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own
evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view
of his admission of the killing.25 Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.

Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not
commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s
head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an
unreasonable response to the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.

Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some injury from
the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity was found on the
person of Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital; hence, the attending physician
of the hospital did not issue any medical certificate to him. Nor was any medication applied to
him.26 In contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had
been hit on the head more than once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the
weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais
revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. We
consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the determined effort of the
accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.27

The CA and the RTC found that treachery was attendant. We concur. Fontanilla had appeared
out of nowhere to strike Olais on the head, first with the wooden stick, and then with a big
stone, causing Olais to fall to the ground facedown. The suddenness and unexpectedness of
the attack effectively denied to Olais the ability to defend himself or to retaliate against
Fontanilla.

The imposition of reclusion perpetua by the CA was warranted under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code,28 which prescribes reclusion perpetua to death as the penalty for murder. Under
the rules on the

application of indivisible penalties in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,29 the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua is imposed if there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances.
Yet, the Court points out that the RTC erroneously imposed "RECLUSION PERPETUA TO
DEATH" as the penalty. Such imposition was bereft of legal justification, for reclusion perpetua
and death, being indivisible, should not be imposed as a compound, alternative or successive
penalty for a single felony. In short, the imposition of one precluded the imposition of the other.

The Court also modifies the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death
indemnity of ₱50,000.00. When death occurs due to a crime, the damages to be awarded may
include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (b) actual or compensatory
damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.30

Accordingly, the CA and the RTC should also have granted moral damages in addition to the
death indemnity, which were of different kinds.31 The death indemnity compensated the loss of
life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the
mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of Olais.32 Although mental
anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family were not quantifiable with
mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore
the heirs of the deceased to their moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, ₱50,000.00
should be reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,33 we
are bound to award despite the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ mental
anguish and emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on human nature and
experience having shown that:

xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the
part of the victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when
a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing
not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his
love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has
been done to them.34 1âwphi1

Another omission of the CA and the RTC was their non-recognition of the right of the heirs of
the victim to temperate damages. The victim’s wife testified about her family’s incurring funeral
expenses of ₱36,000.00, but only ₱18,000.00 was backed by receipts. It is already settled that
when actual damages substantiated by receipts sum up to lower than ₱25,000.00, temperate
damages of at least ₱25,000.00 become justified, in lieu of actual damages in the lesser
amount actually proved by receipts. It would obviously be unfair to the heirs of the victim to
deny them compensation by way of actual damages despite their honest attempt to prove their
actual expenses by receipts (but succeeding only in showing expenses lower than ₱25,000.00
in amount).35 Indeed, the heirs should not be left in a worse situation than the heirs of another
victim who might be nonetheless allowed temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 despite not
having presented any receipts at all. With the victim’s wife having proved ₱18,000.00 worth of
expenses, granting his heirs temperate damages of ₱25,000.00, not only ₱18,000.00, is just
and proper. Not to do so would foster a travesty of basic fairness.
The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of
the civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances."36 The Civil Code permits such damages to be awarded "by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages."37 In light of such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the
entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages on account of the attendance of
treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in murder, and,
as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. As well explained in People v. Catubig:38

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has
a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to
the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary
or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern,
the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party
who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due
the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is
a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability
of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

For the purpose, ₱30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary damages,39 for a lesser
amount would not serve result in genuine exemplarity.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006 by the Court of
Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATION of the civil damages, by ordering accused Alfonso
Fontanilla y Obaldo to pay to the heirs of Jose Olais ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity and the
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on such amounts from the
finality of the judgment.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Vice Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, who took part in the proceedings in the Court
of Appeals, per raffle of January 18, 2012.

1 CA rollo, pp. 98-108; penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (later Presiding
Justice, now retired), with Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a Member of the
Court) and Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso concurring.

2 Bellang is a blunt instrument made of coconut wood used by barangay tanod in their patrols
(per TSN November 12, 1998, p. 6).

3 Records, pp. 167-168.

4 Id., p. 1.

5 Id., pp. 167-168.

6 Id., p. 170.

7 CA rollo, p.101.

8 Records, p.170.

9 Id., p. 168.

10 CA rollo, p. 101

11 Records, p. 172

12 Id., p. 169.

13 Id., p. 170.

14 Id.

15 Id., p. 172.

16 CA rollo, pp. 104-105.

17 Id., pp.105-106.

18 Id., pp. 107-108.

19 Article 11 (1), Revised Penal Code.

20 Calim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140065, February 13, 2001, 351 SCRA 559, 571.

21 People v. Nugas, G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011.

22 Cabuslay v. People, G.R. No. 129875, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 241, 256-257.

23 People v. Capisonda, 1 Phil. 575 (1902); People v. Baguio, 43 Phil. 683 (1922); People v.
Gutierrez, 53 Phil. 609 (1929); People v. Silang Cruz, 53 Phil. 625 (1929); People v. Embalido,
58 Phil. 152 (1933); People v. Dorico, No. L-31568, November 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 172, 183;
People v. Boholst-Caballero, G.R. No. L-23249, November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA 180, 186;
People v. Quiño, G.R. No. 105580, May 17, 1994, 232 SCRA 400, 403; People v. Camacho,
G.R. No. 138629, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 200, 207; People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 130397,
January 17, 2002, 374 SCRA 10, 16; People v. Mayingque, G.R. No. 179709, July 6, 2010,
624 SCRA 123.

24 People v. Gelera, G. R. No. 121377, August 15, 1997, 277 SCRA 450, 461; Cabuslay v.
People, G.R. No. 129875, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 241, 256-257.

25 People v. Molina, G.R. No. 59436, August 28, 1992, 213 SCRA 52, 65; People v. Alapide,
G.R. No. 104276, September 20, 1994, 236 SCRA 555, 560; People v. Albarico, G.R. Nos.
108596-97, November 17, 1994, 238 SCRA 203, 211; People v. Camahalan, G.R. No. 114032,
February 22, 1995, 241 SCRA 558, 569.

26 TSN, May 23, 2000, p. 12.

27 People v. Nagum, G.R. No. 134003, January 19, 2000, 322 SCRA 474, 479, People v.
Baniel, G.R. No. 108492, July 15, 1995, 275 SCRA 472,482.

28 Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment

or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of
any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an

earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
29 Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance,
the greater penalty shall be applied.

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is
no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act,
the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number
and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding
rules, according to the result of such compensation.

30 People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009, 580 SCRA 436, 456.

31 Heirs of Castro v. Raymundo Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327.

32 Article 2206, (3), in relation to Article 2217 and Article 2219, Civil Code, and Article 107,
Revised Penal Code.

33 ; People v. Salva, G.R. No. 132351, January 10, 2002, 373 SCRA 55, 69; People v.
Osianas, G.R. No. 182548, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 319, 340; People v. Buduhan,
G.R. No. 178196, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 337, 367-368; People v. Domingo, G.R. No.
184343, March 2, 2009, 580 SCRA 436, 456-457; People v. Berondo, G.R. No. 177827, March
30, 2009, 582 SCRA 547.

34 People v. Panado, G.R. No. 133439, December 26, 2000, 348 SCRA 679, 690-691.

35 People v. Lacaden, G.R. No. 187682, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 784, 804-805.

36 Article 2230, Civil Code.

37 Article 2229, Civil Code.

38 G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621, 635.

39 See People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 188353, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 738, People v.
Del Rosario, G.R. No. 189580, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 625.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Self-defense not appreciated - G.R. No. 177743

G.R. No. 177743

"x x x.

Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by

clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[19] Unlawful aggression
is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the
victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel.[20] The character
of the element of unlawful aggression is aptly explained as follows:

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in
defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances
is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the
person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly,
the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely:
(a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be
actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is
impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor
must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver
at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack).
Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as
pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry
countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.[21]

By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused
the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide
admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his
criminal liability.[22] Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla
came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court,
[23] and he would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and
satisfactory proof.[24] He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own
evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view
of his admission of the killing.[25] Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.

Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not
commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s
head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an
unreasonable response to the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.

Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some injury from
the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity was found on the
person of Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital; hence, the attending physician
of the hospital did not issue any medical certificate to him. Nor was any medication applied to
him.[26] In contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had
been hit on the head more than once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the
weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais
revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. We
consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the determined effort of the
accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 121802 September 7, 2000

GIL MACALINO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals2 dated August 31, 1995, in CA-G.R. CR No. 14513, convicting petitioner Gil Macalino,
Jr. of the crime of Frustrated Homicide.

The record shows that on January 5, 1987, Provincial Fiscal Victoriano L. Tizon filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Siquijor an Information charging Gil Macalino, Jr. with frustrated
homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 in relation to Article 250 of the Revised
Penal Code, which was allegedly committed as follows:

That at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of March 23, 1986, at the wharf area of Larena,
Siquijor, situated at North Poblacion, Larena, Siquijor, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloneously stabbed one Fely "Pono" Garcia, using a bladed weapon, hitting the victim at the
mid clavicular line, subcostal area (1) left; which injury would have caused the death of the
victim had not been due to a timely and expert medical attendance extended to him and not by
virtue of the assailants spontaneous desistance.

Contrary to the Provisions of the RPC.3

Arraigned on September 7, 1989, petitioner Gil Macalino, Jr., assisted by his counsel, pleaded
"Not Guilty".4

The pertinent facts are the following:

Victim Fely Garcia testified that on March 23, 1986, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, he
was in front of Virgie’s Store at the wharf area of Larena, Siquijor with his friends, Salvador
Rocamora and June Uzarraga, to have a drinking spree.5 While waiting for their companions,
Gil Macalino, Jr., along with his father and two other brothers, Manny and Ogie, arrived on
board a jeep at Nicarter Mahusay Eatery, which was located beside Virgie’s Store.6 Fely
Garcia approached the Macalinos to talk about the incident that happened between them on
March 17, 1986 and to ask for forgiveness.7 The March 17, 1986 incident involved a fistfight
between the two younger brothers of Macalino, Jr. and the group of Fely Garcia, which
resulted in the filing of a case against the group of Fely Garcia before the Metropolitan Trial
Court. Macalino, Jr. did not reciprocate his plea for forgiveness and told Fely Garcia that he
had another purpose, after which Fely Garcia went back to Virgie’s Store.8

A few minutes later, Fely Garcia saw the Macalino brothers advancing towards him at Virgie’s
Store. Santos "Junjun" Garcia, a brother of Fely Garcia, went near his brother, Fely Garcia, but
the latter shoved him away. Upon reaching Fely Garcia, Macalino, Jr. suddenly stabbed Fely
Garcia.9 The knife used was a rambo knife about 9 ½ inches long with a jagged edge.10 After
Fely Garcia was hit on the stomach, he ran for a distance of about 30 meters towards the
wharf, and then fell down. Fely Garcia was brought to Siquijor Provincial Hospital where he
was treated for one (1) month. For the said medical treatment, Fely Garcia spent P9,000.00.11

Salvador Rocamora, Jr. corroborated the testimony of Fely Garcia on all material points. He
further testified that Macalino, Jr. attempted to incite trouble in front of Virgie’s Store which
drew the ire of Santos Garcia. Santos tried to assault Macalino, Jr. but Salvador and Fely
Garcia pushed him away. Turning to his right, after pushing Santos Garcia, Salvador saw
Macalino, Jr. pulling back the hunting knife from the body of Fely Garcia.12

Dr. Timoteo J. Badoy, Jr., physician at Siquijor Provincial Hospital testified that on March 23,
1986, he treated a certain Fely Garcia for a stab wound on the stomach.13 He issued a
certification that contains the following findings:

Stab wound, mid-clavicular line, subcostal area (L) with:

1. Perforated penetrated jejunum

2. Hemoperitoneum

3. Hypovolemia14

Dr. Timoteo Badoy, Jr. likewise declared that the injury sustained by Fely Garcia was fatal and
that he might have died if he had not been given medical attention. Dr. Badoy opined that a
pointed and sharp-edge instrument caused the wound.15

Patrolman Fortunato S. Ates, member of the Siquijor Integrated National Police, was at the
Larena wharf on the evening of March 23, 1986. While waiting for the departure of the boat, he
heard someone shouting, "Help, there is a stabbing incident, Pano is stabbed."16 Ates
immediately rushed to the scene of the crime and saw Macalino, Jr. still holding the bladed
weapon. Ates introduced himself as a policeman and asked Macalino, Jr. to drop his weapon.
Macalino, Jr. did not resist the arrest by Ates who later turned Macalino, Jr. over to a certain Lt.
Balimbingan.

The defense gave a different version of the incident.

Gil Macalino, Sr., father of the accused, testified that at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
March 23, 1986, he and some employees of the Department of Agriculture were having a
"despedida" party in Tugawe Beach in Cang-alwang, Siquijor.17 Suddenly, Alex Bonachita
appeared in a motorcycle, and challenged the group asking "Who is brave among you?"18
Before leaving, Alex Bonachita told them that he would be waiting for them at Larena.19
Threatened, Macalino, Sr. sought assistance from the PC headquarters at Caipilan and was
provided with security by Lt. Balimbingan.

Macalino, Sr. met Lt. Balimbingan at the Larena wharf that same evening and upon seeing
him, the latter just nodded at him.

While Macalino, Sr. was waiting for his co-employees to board the ferryboat at the Larena
wharf, Fely Garcia approached him and asked in a provocative manner, "What now sir?" Taken
by surprise, Macalino, Sr. answered "Why?"20 After such brief exchange of words, the boat
signaled for departure so Macalino, Sr. returned to the restaurant.21 However, before he could
get out of the restaurant, a commotion occurred at the wharf which was about 2 to 3 meters
away from the restaurant.22 Later on, he learned of the stabbing incident and that his son,
Macalino, Jr., was involved. The authorities brought Macalino, Jr. to the PC headquarters at
Caipilan. While in jail, his son complained of some pain. Macalino Sr. accompanied his son to
Lazi Medicare and Community Hospital in Siquijor where he was confined for more than two
weeks.23

Dr. Magdalena Tan-Lim, physician of Lazi Medicare and Community Hospital treated Macalino,
Jr. on March 24, 1986.24 Macalino, Jr. was admitted in the hospital from March 24 to April 2,
1986. The medical certificate indicated the following injuries suffered by Macalino, Jr.:
"hematoma on the left cheek and traumatic injury hypogastric region."25

Vice-Mayor Soledado Lomosad, a resident of Larena, Siquijor for more than 62 years testified
on the reputation and character of the Garcia brothers. He stated that the Garcias were
troublemakers and, in fact, several criminal cases had been filed against them.

Petitioner Gil Macalino, Jr. testified that at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening of March 23,
1986, he was fetched at the instance of his father from his house in Bontod, Larena. He was
asked to drive a vehicle taken by his father’s companion.26 Upon reaching the vehicle parked
on the side of Nicarter Mahusay Eatery, his father came out of the restaurant and told him to
stay. While sitting on the driver’s seat, Lt. Balimbingan approached him and asked where his
father was. Macalino, Jr. called his father who was then inside the Nicarter Mahusay Eatery,
and thereafter, Macalino, Sr. and Lt. Balimbingan had a conversation.27

Lt. Balimbingan approached Macalino, Jr. for the second time and told him to settle his
differences with the Garcias. At that instance, Macalino, Jr. alighted from the jeep and walked
with Lt. Balimbingan toward Virgie’s Store. After Lt. Balimbingan left, Fely Garcia and Santos
Garcia arrived and approached him. He noticed that something was bulging on the right side of
Santos Garcia’s waist. Santos Garcia asked him, "What now, do you wish to fight" and
immediately after, Santos Garcia kicked him. Macalino, Jr. was thus forced to bend down and
before he could straighten up, Fely Garcia boxed him on the left side of his face causing him to
reeled around. After that, he heard a shout saying "Watch out from behind Jun". Macalino, Jr.
then immediately faced the Garcia brothers. At that time, he noticed that Santos was holding a
knife in his right hand. He immediately held Santos’ hand and took hold of the knife, all in a
span of one minute. Upon seeing Fely Garcia, together with his companions,28 rushing
towards him, he drew the knife from the scabbard and stabbed Fely Garcia.29 While still
holding the knife, a certain man in civilian clothes approached Macalino, Jr. The man identified
himself as Patrolman Ates and ordered him to drop his weapon. Macalino, Jr. willingly
complied with the order.30

On November 9, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision convicting petitioner Gil Macalino,
Jr., the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds, and so holds, that Gil Macalino, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide defined and penalized in Art. 249 in relation to Art.
250 in the Revised Penal Code and judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the accused Gil
Macalino, Jr., applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to an imprisonment of Two (2) years,
Four (4) months and One (1) day of Prision Correccional as minimum to Ten (10) years of
Prision Mayor as maximum together with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to pay
the amount of NINE THOUSAND PESOS (P9,000.00) for actual damages, THREE
THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) for compensatory damages and FIFTEEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P15,000.00) for moral damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.31

On December 14, 1992, Macalino, Jr. filed a Motion for Reconsideration32 but, the same was
denied for lack of merit.33
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. Except
for the deletion of the awards for actual and moral damages, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, except for the deletion of the awards for actual and moral damages, the
appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED, in all other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.

Hence, petitioner filed this appeal and interposed two (2) assigned errors, to wit:

THE KNIFE IN QUESTION IS OWNED BY THE BROTHER OF [sic] SANTOS GARCIA,

WRENCHED SAID KNIFE INTENDED TO HARM THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER AND USED
BY PETITIONER IN STABBING ONCE FELY GARCIA WHILE ATTACKING THE ACCUSED-
PETITIONER WITH COMPANIONS OF SAID VICTIM; TO DISABLE THE SUPERIOR
STRENGTH THAT WILL HARM THE ACCUSED; SAID EVIDENCE UNCONTRADICTED AND
UNREBUTTED BY THE PROSECUTION, THEREFORE, THE SELF-DEFENSE OF
ACCUSED UNREBUTTED.

II

THE CONVICTION CONCLUDED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND APPROVED BY

THE COURT OF APPEALS IS BASED ON PROBABILITIES, SURMISES, CONJECTURES
AND SUPPOSITION, INSTEAD OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT THE COURT OF
APPEALS HAS NO AUTHORITY OR EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY, AMOUNTING TO GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.34

Thus, petitioner’s grievances deal with issues of facts, which, in turn, eventually hinge upon the
credibility of the witnesses.

In weighing the version of the prosecution as well as of the defense, the trial court found the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses more credible. It is a settled doctrine that, as a
general rule, this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in the appreciation
of evidence and credibility of witnesses for it is only the trial court that had the opportunity to
observe, weigh and assess these matters. Only when it is evident in the records that some
facts or circumstances of weight and influence have been overlooked by the trial court which, if
considered, would affect the result, will this Court act otherwise.35 In the present case, no
cogent reason justifies our departure from the aforecited rule. Fely Garcia accurately narrated
the manner of how Macalino, Jr. stabbed him, thus:
PROSECUTOR DOMINGUEZ:

While you were already back at the store of Virgie Gomez, did you know what these Macalino
brothers do?

A They approached towards us.

Q And when they approached you, were you still standing with your companions Salvador
Rocamora and June Uzarraga?

A Yes.

xxx xxx xxx

Q What happened when they were already in front or near you, can you recall what
happened?

A Yes.

Q What happened.

A I was stabbed.

Q Who stabbed you?

A Gil Macalino, Jr.

Q Do you know Gil Macalino, Jr. personally?

A Yes.

Q If he is in the courtroom this morning, can you point to him?

A Yes.

Q Will you please point to him?

A That one (witness pointed to a man who answered when asked that his name is Gil
Macalino, Jr.).
Q What did he use in stabbing you?

A A hunting knife.

Q Will you please describe how the stabbing incident started?

A While I was standing in front of Virgie’s store, they approached us and my younger brother
Junjun Garcia thought that I was being ganged up, so he went near me and I shoved him
aside.

ATTY. FUA:

Your Honor please, we move for the deletion of the thinking of his brother Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

WITNESS:

After I shoved him aside, I was hit here (witness pointed to the right side of his body showing a
scar).

COURT:

Q Who was the younger brother of yours?

A Santos Garcia, Jr.

PROSECUTOR DOMINGUEZ:

Q Do you mean to say that this is the scar of the wound that was inflicted on you by the
accused, Gil Macalino, Jr.?

A Yes.36

For his part, prosecution witness Salvador Rocamora testified in this wise:

ATTY. FUA:

Q As far as Gil Macalino, Jr. actuations can you tell if Gil Macalino, Jr. was looking for trouble?
A I could not tell.

Q You could not tell because he was only listening to the advise [sic] of Lt. Balimbingan and his
actuations were not looking for trouble?

A Yes.

Q And so when Junjun Garcia arrived, you pushed him away because to your mind there was
no reason why he should rushed to Gil Macalino, Jr., is that correct?

A Mine was only to pacify Junjun Garcia because I don’t want trouble and I don’t want him to
be involved in a trouble.

Q But until that moment when you pacified Junjun Garcia you were certain that Gil Macalino,
Jr. did not yet stab Fely Garcia?

A When Junjun Garcia rushed towards Gil Macalino, Jr. the first to parry him was Fely Garcia
and Junjun Garcia was pushed towards me, so I have to push him out and when I pushed him
out, I turned my head and I saw that Fely Garcia was being stabbed, and I saw the hunting
knife being pulled out, and after that I could not remember, after I pushed out Junjun Garcia,
Fely Garcia was facing already with Gil Macalino, Jr.

Q As far as you can remember this Junjun Garcia was not able to rush at the accused here Gil
Macalino, Jr. he was prevented by Fely Garcia and by you, is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And as far as you can remember Fely Garcia had not touched at all Gil Macalino, Jr., is that
correct?

A Yes.

Q You are saying to the court, therefore, that on that entire evening of March 23, 1989 this Gil
Macalino, Jr. never sustained any injury, which was inflicted by the Garcia brothers?

PROSECUTOR DOMINGUEZ:

Objection, Your Honor. The witness would be incompetent. This witness testified that he
followed Fely Garcia to the hospital and he would not know whether there was anything that
transpired during that …. After that.
COURT:

That is why the question is being asked. Let the witness answer.

A I cannot be certain about that because after the incident, I followed Fely Garcia to the
hospital, so that I could not know anymore what happened the rest of the evening.

COURT:

You mean the Court to understand that before you left the scene, you never saw Gil Macalino,
Jr. being inflicted with injuries from the hands of any Garcia?

A I have never seen it.37

Based on the above testimonies, Santos "Junjun" Garcia had no opportunity to go near
Macalino, Jr. How can Macalino, Jr., therefore, wrested the knife from the former? The Court of
Appeals, in conformity with the observation of the trial court, stated that:

There is sustainable basis for the trial court’s observation that it was unbelievable for appellant
to have wrested subject knife from Santos (Junjun) Garcia, Jr. Aptly rationalized and concluded
the lower court:

xxx xxx xxx

x x x It is unbelievable that, alone at the time of the scuffle between him and Pano Garcia and
Santos Garcia, Jr. he was able to wrest away the knife from Santos Garcia, Jr. And the knife
was still in its scabbard when he wrested it from Santos Garcia. If Santos Garcia, Jr. really did
wield the knife against Gil Macalino, Jr. surely Santos Garcia Jr. would have wielded the knife
without scabbard. It is improbable that he got the knife from Santos Garcia, Jr., scabbard and
all. The truth of the matter is that in all probability the knife was his own and he drew it from its
scabbard and stabbed Pano Garcia with it."38

Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that the questioned knife was actually owned by Santos
Garcia, and that Macalino, Jr. merely used the same to ward off the attack of Fely Garcia, the
question that now arises is: Would the act of stabbing Fely Garcia still be justified? We answer
in the negative.

In this appeal, Macalino, Jr. reiterates his contention before the Court of Appeals that he acted
in self-defense. He tries to maintain a posture of innocence, and to support his claim of self-
defense, he presented a medical certificate39 showing hematoma on his left cheek and
traumatic injury hypogastric region.

In pleading self-defense, petitioner in effect admitted that he stabbed the victim. It was then
incumbent upon him to prove that justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court,
relying on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. The
reason is that even if the prosecution evidence were weak, such could not be disbelieved after
petitioner admitted the fact of stabbing the victim.40 Hence, the burden of proof shifts to the
petitioner, who must establish with clear and convincing evidence all of the elements of self-
defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.41

In the present case, petitioner’s claim of self-defense does not persuade us. His version of the
events, does not support finding of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression presupposes an
actual, sudden and unexpected attack or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude; there has to exist a real danger to the life or personal safety
of the person claiming self-defense. Nothing of that sort could reasonably be said of the
actuation of the Garcia brothers. At most, they merely displayed a threatening or intimidating
attitude. This is evident from the testimony of petitioner himself, and we quote:

PROS. DOMINGUEZ:

What was the position of Junjun Garcia42 when you saw him after you turned your back?

A He was holding this way (witness demonstrates his two hands as if holding something).

Q And it was in this position when you were able to get hold of the arm including the handle of
the knife?

A Not the handle but the hand that was holding the knife.

Q You mean to say that you held the hand before any trusting motion was made?

A Not yet because he made an attempt to draw the scabbard.

xxx xxx xxx

PROS. DOMINGUEZ:
In the middle of the fifth paragraph43 do you remember having testified to this "When I heard a
shout from my brother Elpedio who was standing near the jeep at that time, in vernacular
"Bantay sa luyo, Jun". Sensing that I was gravely in danger, I immediately made an about face
when I discovered that Santos Garcia, Jr. had already drawn his knife and was making a thrust
towards my stomach." Do you remember having testified to this?

A He just made an attempt to draw.

Q So you are now repudiating the statement that you made in this counter affidavit in this
particular portion the fact that he was already thrusting you?

A Yes.

xxx xxx xxx

PROS. DOMINGUEZ:

When you were able to grab the knife together with the scabbard was the snap button that
includes the handle of the knife already opened?

ATTY FUA:

We will object to that, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

So it is established that it is the same knife and there is a scabbard and over that scabbard is a
little snap, [sic] that is closed by a snap. You agree [sic] that?

PROS. DOMINGUEZ:

Yes, Your Honor.

Was that snap already opened or closed when you got possession of the knife?

A It was opened.

Q Can you demonstrate how long did it take you to wrest the knife and to unsheath [sic] it?
A One minute [sic] more or less when I grabbed for it.

Q And did you not say that when you turned around you saw Junjun Garcia already holding a
knife and you also saw Fely Garcia also holding his knife?

A Yes, he was holding also a knife.

Q And the knife that was held by Pano Garcia did not have any scabbard, it was already bare
blade?

A I was not able to notice whether there was a scabbard but he must have been holding the
knife.

Q When you tried to take hold of the hand of Junjun Garcia which held the knife and also tried
to wrest the knife from him did you have to employ both of your hands?

A Yes.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And this process took you one minute?

A Yes, more or less.

Q And Fely Garcia who was only about one meter from you and also holding a knife was not
able to do anything in that one meter while both of your hands was employed in holding the
arm of Junjun Garcia?

A I did not notice because my intention was to the knife?44

The court finds it incredible that Fely Garcia did not, even once, make use of his knife in
attacking Macalino, Jr.1âwphi1 if such was indeed his intention. Incidentally, Macalino, Jr.
admitted he was not alone that night. He even testified that his three younger brothers were in
the crime scene and in fact one of them gave him a warning, "Watch out from behind, Jun".
Macalino Jr. should have presented his brothers who were present in the crime scene, to
corroborate his testimony, but he did not.

In the case of People v. Jotoy,45 we ruled that:

But even if We assume that it was the deceased who attacked the accused with a knife, as the
latter would make Us believe, We still hold that there was no self-defense because at that point
when the accused was able to catch and twist the hand of the deceased, in effect immobilizing
him, the unlawful aggression had already ended. Thus, the danger having ceased, there was
no more need for the accused to start stabbing the deceased, not just once but five (5) times.

We reiterated the same rule in People vs. Tampon,46

Even granting arguendo that the initial act of aggression came from Entellano as alleged by
the appellant, we still cannot sustain his plea of self-defense. As testified by the appellant, he
grappled with Entellano for the knife and was able to take possession of the same. At this
point, it was no longer necessary for appellant to stab Estellano in order to protect himself. His
subsequent act of stabbing the now unarmed Estellano belies his claim that he acted in self-
preservation, and indicates nothing more than the preserve desire to kill.

In sum, petitioner failed to prove self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. His testimony
suffers seriously from want of credibility; it is more of denial, which, like alibi, is inherently a
weak defense and can easily be concocted.47

Therefore, we find no error in the trial court in finding petitioner Gil Macalino, Jr. responsible for
stabbing the victim Fely Garcia.

With regards to damages, the Court of Appeals is correct in deleting the award of actual or
compensatory damages and moral damages. Moral damages cannot be awarded without
factual basis or proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.48 Likewise,
the court can only grant actual or compensatory damages for such expenses if supported by
receipts.49

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated August 31, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 14513 is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court)
and concurred in by Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Godardo A. Jacinto.; Rollo, pp.
21-31.

2 Special Second Division.

3 Original Record, p. 2.

4 Original Record, p. 46.

5 TSN, October 23, 1989, pp. 4-6.

6 TSN, October 23, 1989, pp. 6, 10.

7 TSN, October 23, 1989, pp. 29-30.

8 TSN, October 23, 1989, p. 8.

9 Id., p.12.

10 Id., p. 20.

11 Id., pp. 16-17.

12 TSN, October 23, 1989, pp. 71-72.

13 TSN, October 24, 1989, p. 5.

14 Rollo, pp. 24-25.

15 TSN, October 24, 1989, p. 10.

16 TSN, October 24, 1989, pp. 13-15.

17 TSN, October 30, 1989, p. 5-6.

18 Id., p. 7.

19 Id., p. 10.
20 Id., p. 16.

21 Id., p. 44.

22 Id., pp. 44-45.

23 Id., p. 25.

24 TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 4-5.

25 Original record, p. 67.

26 TSN, November 6. 1989, p. 11.

27 Id., pp. 14-15.

28 Composed of Era Samson, Flyn Garcia, Alex Bonachita and Boboy Calibo.

29 Id., pp. 16-17, 19-20, 22-27.

30 Id., p. 27-28.

31 Original Record, p. 88.

32 Id., pp. 93-98.

33 Id., p. 106.

34 Rollo, pp. 12, 17.

35 People v. Tanoy, G.R. No. 115692, May 12, 2000; People v. Repollo, G.R. No. 134631, May
4, 2000; People v. Gaviola, G.R. No. 126125, March 9, 2000; People v. Galedo, G.R. No.
128883, February 22, 2000.

36 TSN, October 23, 1989, pp. 10-13.

37 TSN, October 23, 1989, pp. 96-100.

38 Rollo, p. 30.
39 Original Record, p. 67

40 People v. Francisco, G.R. No. 121682, April 12, 2000.

41 People v. Cotas, G.R. No. 132043, May 31, 2000.

42 Nickname of Santos Garcia.

43 Referring to Macalino Jr.’s counter affidavit executed before Fiscal Tizon.

44 TSN dated November 6, 1989, pp. 63-70.

45 People v. Jotoy, 222 SCRA 801, 806 [1993].

46 258 SCRA 115, 124 [1996].

47 People v. Mier, G.R. No. 130598, February 3, 2000.

48 Article 2217 of the Civil Code; People v. Cara, 283 SCRA 96, 109 [1997]; People v.
Teodoro, 280 SCRA 384, 399 [1997].

49 People v. Go-od, G.R. No. 134505, May 9, 2000; People v. Gutierrez, 268 SCRA 643, 666
[1999].

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

[ GR No. 202847, Oct 23, 2013 ]

PEOPLE v. ANTERO GAMEZ Y BALTAZAR +
DECISION
G.R. No. 202847

REYES, J.:

For review[1] is the Decision[2] dated May 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00671 which affirmed the Judgment[3] dated May 9, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Burauen, Leyte, Branch 15, convicting and sentencing accused-appellant
Antero Gamez y Baltazar (accused-appellant) to reclusion perpetua for the crime of parricide.
The Facts

Accused-appellant was accused of killing his own father, Apolinario Gamez (Apolinario)
through an Information articulating the following criminal charges, viz:

That on or about the 21st day of August, 2004, in the Municipality of Burauen, Province of
Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hack and wound one APOLINARIO GAMEZ y AMORILLO, his
father, with the use of a long bladed weapon (sundang) and sickle (sarad) which the accused
provided himself for the purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon Apolinario Gamez y
Amorillo multiple hacking and incised wounds on the different parts of his body which were the
direct and approximate cause of his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

When arraigned, he entered a "Not Guilty" plea. He thereafter desired to amend his plea to
"Guilty" during the pre-trial conference held on September 26, 2005 but the RTC denied the
said plea bargaining. In view however of the accused-appellant's invocation of self-defense,
an inverted trial scheme ensued.[5]

Through the testimonies of the accused-appellant himself, Dr. Irene Astilla Dacut, his attending
physician, and eyewitness Bienvenido Buhalog, the defense narrated the events that
culminated into the encounter that claimed Apolinario's life.[6]

The accused-appellant and 69-year old Apolinario had a less than ideal father and son
relationship with the former claiming that the latter did not treat him well when he was a child.
Their relationship got more strained when Apolinario meddled with the accused-appellant's
personal relationship with his wife. Apolinario apparently told the accused-appellant that his
wife was being unfaithful. The unsolicited information irked the accused-appellant.

On August 21, 2004, the accused-appellant had a drinking spree in his house at Barangay
Gamay, Burauen, Leyte, with his two brothers, Nicolas and Cornelio from 12 noon until 3:00
p.m. As he was about to go out of the kitchen door, the accused-appellant saw Apolinario
standing at the doorway with a long bolo. Apolinario appeared to be drunk.

To prevent any commotion, Nicolas held Apolinario but he was able to free himself from his
son's grip. The accused-appellant then spoke to Apolinario: "I think that you are looking for me
and I believe it is since last night." An argument ensued between them. In order not to prolong
the spat, the accused-appellant and his brothers took their father to his nipa hut about 500
meters away. But before the accused-appellant could leave, he got into another argument with
Apolinario.

The accused-appellant then set out to the place where he gathered tuba while his brothers
went back to his house. After gathering tuba and tethering his carabao, the accused-appellant
proceeded home. He met Apolinario along a pathway. With no one to pacify them, they
decided to resume their quarrel.

The accused-appellant first remarked: "Father, what are the words that you uttered?" to which
Apolinario responded, "It is better if one of us will perish." Apolinario then instantaneously
hacked the accused-appellant with a long bolo hitting him twice on the head for which he
sustained a 5-centimeter long and scalp-deep incised wound with fracture of the underlying
bone and another 5-cm long incised wound on the frontal right portion of his head.

The accused-appellant fell to his knees as Apolinario delivered another blow which the former
was able to parry by raising his left arm. The accused-appellant was wounded on the left 3rd
interdigital space posterior to his palm.

The accused-appellant then held Apolinario's hands, grabbed the bolo and used the same to
hack the latter several times, the count of which escaped the accused-appellant's
consciousness as he was already dizzy. The accused-appellant thereafter left the scene and
went home. His brother brought him to the hospital upon seeing that his head was teeming
with blood. He was hospitalized for six (6) days before he was taken to the municipal hall by
the police officers.

The rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, on the other hand, principally consisted of the
testimony of Maura Anadia (Maura), Apolinario's daughter and the accused-appellant's sister.
According to Maura, at around 4:30 p.m. of August 21, 2004, she was with her father at their
house located at Barangay Gamay, Burauen, Leyte when his elder brother, the accused-
appellant, arrived. He was carrying a long bolo and a scythe was tucked on his waist.

He approached her and said: "Will you join the killing spree today including your child that you
are carrying?" before turning to Apolinario with this query: "What are the stories that you were
talking?"

Frightened, Maura ran away and hid at a grassy portion near the house. She then saw her
father flee but the accused-appellant gave him a chase. Apolinario was able to run for about
20 m before the accused-appellant was able to catch up.
The accused-appellant then hacked the unarmed Apolinario on the right side of his head using
the bolo. Apolinario fell down and the accused-appellant finished him off by slashing his neck
with the scythe. Maura thereafter left to report the incident to the police.

The autopsy conducted on Apolinario's cadaver by Dr. Leonita Azores, MD,[7] showed that he
sustained two (2) fatal wounds one of which almost decapitated his head while the other hit the
parietal aspect thereof exposing the skin and connective tissue. Apolinario also obtained two
(2) incised wounds on his neck and left forearm and two (2) lacerations on his fingers. He
perished at the crime scene.[8]

Ruling of the RTC

In its Judgment[9] dated May 9, 2006, the RTC found that both the prosecution and the
defense deliberately withheld vital details of the incident. The prosecution did not reveal that
the initial unlawful aggression was committed by Apolinario who, based on medical records,
hacked the accused-appellant in the parietal area of his head. The defense, on the other
hand, concealed that accused-appellant pursued the victim after the latter fled. These findings
completed the sequence of the incident and revealed that the accused-appellant's claim of
self-defense is unmeritorious.

The RTC held that when accused-appellant hacked and killed Apolinario, the unlawful
aggression which the latter initially perpetrated has already ceased because he has already
ran away for 20 m. Hence, accused-appellant's act was not self-defense but rather one of
retaliation which, in turn, props up the conclusion that he intentionally killed his father. The
decretal portion of the RTC decision thus reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] this Court finds the accused ANTERO GAMEZ y
Baltazar GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Parricide penalized
under Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code and considering the presence of one (1) mitigating
circumstance without any aggravating to offset it, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment
of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to pay the Heirs of Apolinario Gamez Php50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for his death and to pay the costs of this suit.

The accused who underwent preventive imprisonment since August 21, 2004 shall be credited
with the full time during which he was deprived of his liberty if he agreed voluntarily and in
writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise[,]
he will be [e]ntitled to only four-fifths (4/5) thereof.[10]

Ruling of the CA
The CA adopted the RTC's findings and similarly concluded that the accused-appellant put up
retaliation and not self-defense because the aggression proffered by the victim has already
ended when the accused-appellant attacked him. From the time Apolinario ran away and was
disarmed by the accused-appellant, the aggression originally heaved by the former has
ceased. Hence, when the accused-appellant chased and hacked Apolinario several times,
self-defense can no longer be invoked. The CA affirmed the conviction and sentence rendered
by the RTC as well as the award of civil indemnity but an additional award of moral damages
was granted for Apolinario's heirs. The CA Decision[11] dated May 25, 2011 disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the assailed May 9, 2006 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Burauen, Leyte, Branch 15, in CRIM. CASE NO. Bn-05-03-4125, is
hereby AFFIRMED with modification. Aside from the civil indemnity already awarded, the
accused is also hereby directed to pay the heirs of Apolinario Gamez the amount of
Php50,000.00 as moral damages in accordance with the recent jurisprudence.

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The accused-appellant manifested before the Court that in the present review, he is adopting
the arguments contained in his Brief filed before the CA whereby he argued that his guilt for
the crime of parricide was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in
ruling that he failed to prove self-defense.

The Court's Ruling

The Court affirms the accused-appellant's conviction.

The arguments proffered by the accused-appellant essentially attack the evaluation by the trial
court of the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Maura, and its ruling that the
same satisfactorily repudiate his claim of self-defense.

This Court has consistently adhered to the rule that the matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge,
who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by
the various indicia available but not reflected on the record. Hence, the corollary principle that
absent any showing that the trial court overlooked substantial facts and circumstances that
would affect the final disposition of the case, appellate courts are bound to give due deference
and respect to its evaluation of the credibility of an eyewitness and his testimony as well as its
probative value amidst the rest of the other evidence on record.[13]
We see no compelling reason to depart from the foregoing tenets especially in view of the
accused-appellant's failure to identify significant details, which if considered, will alter the
outcome of the trial court's judgment and the affirmation accorded it by the CA. At any rate, an
examination of the records at hand shows that the factual basis of accused-appellant's plea of
self-defense cannot relieve him from criminal liability.

Self-defense, when invoked, as a justifying circumstance implies the admission by the accused
that he committed the criminal act.[14] Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he
was in fact innocent. However, if the accused admits killing the victim, but pleads self-defense,
the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his part.[15]

In order to escape criminal liability, it becomes incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear
and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following requisites under the second
paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, viz: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. [16]

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be
invoked.[17] "There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual
or imminent danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be
actual physical force or actual use of a weapon."[18] It is present only when the one attacked
faces real and immediate threat to one's life. It must be continuous; otherwise, it does not
constitute aggression warranting self-defense.[19]

Here, the accused-appellant, miserably failed to discharge his burden of proving that unlawful
aggression justifying self-defense was present when he killed Apolinario.

The aggression initially staged by Apolinario was not of the continuous kind as it was no longer
present when the accused-appellant injured Apolinario. As testified by the accused-appellant
himself, he was able to grab the bolo from Apolinario. From that point on, the aggression
initially staged by Apolinario ceased to exist and the perceived threat to the accused-
appellant's life was no longer attendant.

Hence, the accused-appellant was no longer acting in self-defense, when he, despite having
already disarmed Apolinario, ran after the latter for about 20 m and then stabbed him. The
accused-appellant's claim of self-defense is further negated by the fatal incision on Apolinario's
neck that almost decapitated his head, a physical evidence which corroborates Maura's
testimony that after stabbing Apolinario with the bolo, the accused-appellant pulled out the
scythe on his waist and used the same to slash Apolinario's neck. The use of a weapon
different from that seized from the victim and the nature of the injury inflicted show the
accused-appellant's determined resolve to kill Apolinario.

When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to kill or wound
the original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation
against the original aggressor. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the
aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked
him; while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the
accused.[20]

The CA was thus correct in upholding the findings and conclusions of the RTC, thus:

[A]lthough, it is supported by the medical report, that the [accused-appellant] was indeed
initially attacked by the victim, the act of the [accused-appellant] of going after the victim, who
was already running away from the [accused-appellant] after the latter has gained possession
of the weapon, is anathema to the self-defense theory invoked by the [accused appellant].

xxxx

In the instant case, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witness
that the victim tried to run away from the [accused-appellant] but the [accused-appellant] ran
after him. When the [accused-appellant] was able to overtake the victim, the latter was hacked
on the right side of his head. To finish him off, the [accused-appellant] slashed the victim's neck
with the use of a scythe until the victim (his own father) died. Thus, assuming arguendo that
the father was indeed the first aggressor, the aggression ceased the moment the [accused-
appellant] disarmed him and the victim tried to run away from the [accused-appellant]. When
the [accused-appellant] then continued to chase his 69 year-old father and hacked several
times the already disarmed victim, self-defense can no longer be invoked.[21]

In fine, there is no justifiable cause exempting the accused-appellant from criminal liability and
the courts a quo were correct in convicting him for parricide.

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.[22]
Here, it is an undisputed fact that Apolinario was the accused-appellant's father.
Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal, the crime of parricide is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. It must be noted that the declaration of the RTC in its Judgment dated May
9, 2006 on the presence of a mitigating circumstance is not supported by any allegation or
evidence on record. Nonetheless, in view of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346[23] prohibiting the
imposition of death penalty, the courts a quo correctly sentenced the accused-appellant to
reclusion perpetua.[24]

It must be emphasized, however, that the accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole
pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 which states that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua,
by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."[25]

The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of Apolinario is proper and in line with
current jurisprudence.[26] Civil indemnity is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the
victim and the culpability of the accused for such death.[27] The award of P50,000.00[28] as
moral damages is likewise correct. Even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the
heirs' emotional suffering, it has been recognized that the loss of a loved one to a violent death
brings emotional pain and anguish.[29]

The Court finds that an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00[30] is in
order considering that the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present in the crime of
parricide.[31]

Lastly, in conformity with current policy, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages an
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.[32]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00671 finding the accused-appellant, Antero Gamez y Baltazar, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. Antero Gamez y Baltazar is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Apolinario
Gamez, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of damages shall earn legal interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Pursuant to People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640, 653-658.

[2] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, with Associate Justices Ramon
Paul L. Hernando and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 73-81.

[3] Issued by Executive Judge Yolanda U. Dagandan; id. at 10-17.

[4] Id. at 10.

[5] Id. at 74.

[6] As culled from accused-appellant's Brief filed before the CA, id. at 27-30; and from the
narration of facts in the RTC Judgment dated May 9, 2006, id. at 12-13 and CA Decision dated
May 25, 2011, id. at 74-75.

[7] His testimony was dispensed with on account of the admission by the defense of the
authenticity and due execution of the medical certificate he issued for the victim, Apolinario
Gamez; id. at 11.

[8] As culled from the appellee's Brief filed before the CA, id. at 54-65; and from the narration
of facts in the RTC Judgment dated May 9, 2006, id. at 12-13 and CA Decision dated May 25,
2011, id. at 76.

[9] Id. at 10-17.

[10] Id. at 16-17.

[11] Id. at 73-81.

[12] Id. at 80-81.

[13] People of the Philippines v. Ronald Credo aka "Ontog", Randy Credo and Rolando Credo
y Buenaventura, G.R. No. 197360, July 3, 2013.

[14] People v. Maningding, G.R. No. 195665 , September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 804, 813.

[15] Simon A. Flores v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013.
[16] People v. Concillado, G.R. No. 181204, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 363, 379.

[17] People v. Paycana, Jr., 574 Phil. 780, 787 (2008).

[18] People v. Comillo, Jr., G.R. No. 186538, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 756, 772.

[19] Simon A. Flores v. People of the Philippines, supra note 15.

[20] Id.

[21] CA rollo, pp. 79-80.

[22] People v. Paycana, Jr., supra note 17, at 789.

[23] An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.

[24] See People v. Tibon, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 510, 521.

[25] See People v. Dejillo, G.R. No. 185005, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 537, 556, citing
People v. Tadah, G.R. No. 186226, February 1, 2012, 664 SCRA 744, 747.

[26] People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 03, 2011, 658 SCRA 367, 381.

[27] People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 187683, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 364, 374.

[28] Supra note 26.

[29] Supra note 24, at 522.

[30] Supra note 26.

[31] Supra note 24, at 523.

[32] Supra note 26.

G.R. No. 95851 March 1, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
MANOLO VILLANUEVA alias "BOY" VILLANUEVA, accused.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

It was the town fiesta of San Pablo, Laguna. But what could have augured an otherwise festive
atmosphere was preempted by the discovery of the lifeless body of a barrio lass sprawled on
the cold cement floor of their conjugal home. Blood was oozing out of her mouth. She was six
months pregnant. The suspected assailant was her husband who allegedly beat her to death
after she slapped him earlier in front of his friends.

Charged with and convicted of parricide with unintentional abortion MANOLO VILLANUEVA
also known as "Boy" Villanueva is now before us still professing innocence. He claims that he
was watching a live concert when his wife, Nora Magpantay, 19, committed suicide by taking
sodium cyanide. She was supposedly burdened with family problems and wanted to follow the
footsteps of her sister who had earlier taken her life.

But the evidence shows otherwise. Isidro Magpantay, father of Nora, testified that on 14
January 1989, at around five or six o'clock in the afternoon, he went to the house of his
daughter where she and Manolo were engaged in a heated argument. Manolo was drunk. After
seeing his son-in-law slap his daughter, Isidro felt bad and left.1

The following morning, at around five o'clock, Isidro was informed by Manolo's parents that
Nora had poisoned herself.2 Forthwith, Isidro went to the hospital to look into the-medical
records of his daughter. But failing to find any, he proceeded to the funeral parlor where he
saw his lifeless daughter with contusions on the right cheek, breast, abdomen and at the back
of her left ear. Her mouth was swollen. Her forearms were raised; he straightened them.3

To augment the testimony of Isidro and to refute altogether the alibi of the accused, 15-year old
Abigail Bandoy narrated that on 14 January 1989, at around seven-thirty in the evening, while
in the house of Manolo and Nora, she witnessed the accused mauling Nora for about fifteen
(15) minutes, striking Nora several times in the stomach below her left breast and in different
parts of her body over Nora's incessant pleas "[t]ama na Boy." But Manolo would not stop until
Nora fell unconscious on the cement floor. Then Manolo left. After making sure he had already
gone Abigail went home leaving Nora behind.4
Dr. Nida Glorioso, City Medical Officer, recounted that on 15 January 1989, at around nine-
fifteen in the morning, she examined the cadaver of Nora and found a "contusion on the left
cheek including the lateral aspect of the eye"5 which could have been caused by a clenched
fist, a kick, a piece of wood, a broken bottle or any hard object.6 She also noticed a "bloody
mucoid discharge com(ing) out from her mouth."7 She then proceeded to open her abdomen
to determine the presence of poison as it was alleged by the victim's husband that his wife had
poisoned herself. The abdomen of the victim however failed to emit the characteristic odor of a
chemical poison, negating the allegation that the victim had poisoned herself.

Nevertheless, to completely rule out poisoning as the cause of death the victim's stomach and
intestines were sent to the PC Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, for a "chemical
analysis."8 Capt. Luena E. Layador of he PC Crime Laboratory disclosed that "[t]oxicological
examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave NEGATIVE result to the tests
for common metallic, non-metallic, volatile and non-volatile poisons, cyanides, organic
phosphates, organic chlorides."9 Thus, Dr. Glorioso concluded that "[i]n view of the negative
result of the toxicological examination from the P.C. Crime Lab., Camp Crame, Q.C., . . . and
considering the contusio-ecchymosis, cheek, lateral aspect of eye, left, the CAUSE OF DEATH
is SHOCK DUE TO CEREBRAL CONCUSSION secondary to a severe blow on the head.10

Manolo Villanueva however has a different tale. He averred that on 14 January 1989, at
around six-thirty in the evening, he went home to change his clothes since he was going to
watch the concert of singer Randy Santiago at Canossa College in San Pablo City later that
evening. As he was about to leave their house, his wife tried to stop him. His mother who saw
them even reprimanded him. 11 Nevertheless, at around seven-thirty, he left the house. 12 He
returned at around two-thirty the following morning. After knocking at the door, calling out to his
wife but failing to get a response for about thirty minutes, he forcibly opened the door only to
find his wife lying prostrate on the floor of their living room. He then noticed the bottle of
sodium cyanide, which he was using for poisoning rats, already empty.13

On cross-examination, Manolo admitted that on 14 January 1989 he was slapped by his wife in
front of his friends which resulted in a little misunderstanding ("tampuhan"). Although
embarrassed, according to him, he nonetheless did not get angry. He merely ushered his wife
back to their house and then left again.14

Sherwin Isleta, 17, took the witness stand for the defense. His house is adjacent to the
conjugal home of Manolo and Nora with only a party wall separating the two houses. He said
that on 14 January 1989 at around eight o'clock in the evening, he saw Nora sitting near the
gate in front of their house, apparently waiting for someone. 15 That was the last time he saw
her. At around three o'clock the following morning he was awakened by the loud knock on the
neighbor's door and repeated calls for Nora. A little later he heard Manolo screaming, "Nora,
Nora, why did you do this?16

In its Decision of 27 April 1990 the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Br. 31,17 ruled —

A close scrutiny of the evidence discloses that: on January 14, 1989, between 5:00 P.M. and
6:00 P.M. at their house, accused and his wife, Nora, quarreled with the former slapping the
latter in the presence of Isidro Magpantay who, after half an hour stay thereat, left them;
accused also left and went to his hangout; at 6:30 P.M.; accused returned and in the presence
of his friends, was slapped by his wife; between 7:30 P.M. and 8:00 P.M., accused mauled his
wife by giving her several fist blows, thereby causing her to fall and hit her head on the
cemented floor; also between the same period of time, accused left their house and attended a
concert with his friend, Nick Dalisay, from 9:00 P.M. up to 2:00 A.M. of the following day; at
3:00 A.M. of January 15, 1989, accused found the lifeless body of his wife on the cemented
floor in the bedroom of their house; at 9:15 A.M., Dr. Glorioso conducted an autopsy on the
cadaver and found contusions on the different parts of the body notably, on the left cheek and
eye; and, deceased could have died between 9:00 P.M. of January 14, 1989 and 12:00 A.M. of
January 15, 1989 (citations omitted).18

and held that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that accused is
guilty of parricide with unintentional abortion. The accused was initially sentenced to suffer the
death penalty which is the penalty for parricide, the more serious crime, applied in its
maximum period. But since the death penalty could not at that time be imposed under the
1987 Constitution, the penalty for parricide under Art. 246, The Revised Penal Code, was
reclusion perpetua, the penalty next lower to death. However, instead of imposing reclusion
perpetua the trial court sentenced the accused to suffer life imprisonment.19

A careful review of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that save for minor
inconsistencies in the statements of prosecution witnesses which even enhance their
truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of being rehearsed, their testimonies were consistent,
in accord with one another, and were given in simple, straightforward manner, mentioning
details of the incident that could not have been merely concocted. Thus, their averments
among others included the fact that accused was slapped by the victim in front of his friends
which caused him extreme embarrassment, leading to a heated argument and escalating into
the mauling of the victim. Matter-of-factly, the manner in which the witnesses for the state
testified and their narration of events bear the hallmarks of candidness and sincerity.

And neither do we find material discrepancies or substantial inconsistencies in their

testimonies which may engender serious doubt on their reliability and veracity. Except for
witness Isidro Magpantay to whom bias is imputed by reason of his being the father of the
victim who allegedly despised accused as his son-in-law, there appears to be no motive on the
part of Abigail and Dr. Glorioso to testify falsely. The absence of evidence as to improper
motives actuating the principal witnesses for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the
conclusion that no such improper motives existed, and that their testimonies are worthy of full
faith and credit.20 There was no reason at all for Abigail and Dr. Glorioso to lie and incriminate
the accused. More so with Abigail who was then only fifteen (15) years old when she took the
witness stand. It has been held that the testimony of a minor of sound mind is likely to be more
correct and truthful than that of an older person, so that once established that the former has
fully understood the character and nature of an oath, his testimony should be accorded full
credence. 21 What is more, the eyewitness account of Abigail conforms with the autopsy
findings, making her testimony even more reliable and faithworthy.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to which the lower court has given full faith lead
to a fair and reasonable inference that the accused was indeed responsible for the death of the
victim. Isidro Magpantay narrated that he witnessed the misunderstanding between his
daughter and her husband who was then reeking with liquor, which the latter even admitted on
cross-examination. Abigail Bandoy was an eyewitness to the altercation between the spouses
which led to the fatal mauling of the victim. And Dr. Nida Glorioso, after examining the
deceased and taking into consideration the result of the tests, concluded that the cause of
death was "shock due to cerebral concussion secondary to a severe blow on the head,"
contrary to the submission of the accused that his wife had poisoned herself. Certainly, the
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain leading to a logical conclusion that the
accused, to the exclusion of others, perpetrated the crime.

In brief, as this Court has repeatedly ruled, the alibi and denial of the accused cannot prevail
over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses and their clear identification of him as the
perpetrator of the crime.22 Thus, against the strength of the evidence of the prosecution, the
arguments of the defense have proved to be unavailing.

The submission of the accused that the trial court erred in lending credence to the testimony of
the father of the deceased who has shown his dislike and bias against the former even before
the death of Nora is unsustainable. Isidro Magpantay merely narrated that, the last time he
saw his daughter alive was in the afternoon before she died when she and her husband were
quarreling. While he may have previously manifested his enmity towards the accused, Isidro
only testified that he saw his daughter and the accused in a heated altercation, which per se is
not incriminatory, and which the accused himself even admitted, downplaying it as a mere
"tampuhan." It has long been settled that relationship of the prosecution witness to the victim
does not necessarily categorize him as biased and interested and thus tarnish his testimony.
23 In fact, it is highly doubtful that Isidro would aid in the prosecution of the accused simply
because he disliked the latter. For sure, he would like to send the real killer of his daughter to
jail, and not just anyone whom he despised. Hence, there is no reason why Isidro's testimony
should not be believed.

The contention of the accused that the deceased should have suffered more contusions, and
not merely on the "left cheek including the lateral aspect of the eye," considering the numerous
blows she supposedly received from him as narrated by witness Abigail, is ungrounded. We
have repeatedly said that absence of external injuries does not rule out the possibility that a
blow had in fact been administered by the offender. 24

The proposition of counsel of the accused that the toxicological examination performed by Dr.
Glorioso was very limited," 25 and that her conclusions were merely based on her opinion and
not on medical findings is likewise untenable.26 In fact, we find this amusing coming as it does
from counsel who has neither presented his qualifications nor cited any medical authority in
forming such self-serving conclusions. We thus sustain the opinion of Dr. Glorioso who
certainly appears to be more competent in the field of medicine than counsel who simply
proffered speculations that have remained unsubstantiated.

Thus, even the assertion of the accused that his wife took sodium cyanide is very doubtful, not
only because her toxicological examination yielded negative result for the presence of poison,
but also because the pieces of broken bottle which supposedly contained the poison were also
found negative for "volatile, non-volatile and metallic poisons." 27

The defense, contending that "the prosecution should not have been allowed to spring a
surprise," then seeks to nullify the account of rebuttal witness Abigail Bandoy that the accused
mauled the victim, and binds the prosecution to its earlier statements that the rebuttal witness
will testify only for the purpose of rebutting the alibi of the accused that he attended the concert
of Randy Santiago.

We are not persuaded. The Court finds it difficult to believe that the defense was surprised by
the testimony of witness Abigail considering that it was able to subject her to a grueling and
rigorous cross-examination, ceaselessly trying to elicit contradictory statements from her. If
indeed the defense was caught flat-footed, as it now makes it appear, then it could not have
extensively cross-examined the 15-year old witness. Suffice it to state that what Abigail said
she saw and where she was at the time of the incident are the natural and logical allegations to
show that "the accused was not in the Randy Santiago show," 28 which is the essence of the
testimony of the rebuttal witness, as stated by the prosecutor, to refute the denial of the
accused.

The accused also takes to task the testimony of Abigail because of her delay in reporting the
incident. She witnessed the mauling of the victim on 14 January 1989. Yet, she executed an
affidavit only on 23 January 1990, or after more than one year. Abigail however explains that
she was not aware that the victim had died as a result of the mauling and that a case was filed
against the accused since after the mauling she left for Manila to continue her schooling.
Hence, it was only sometime in November 1989 when she learned that Nora was dead, and
only on 23 January 1990 that a case was filed against the accused. We thus accept the
elucidation of Abigail. She has satisfactorily shown that she was indeed in Manila to continue
her studies, and was not well-posted on developments in the province. It was only some ten
(10) months later when she returned to San Pablo that she learned of Nora's death.

It has been repeatedly held that delay in divulging the name of the perpetrator of a crime, if
sufficiently explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness and his testimony nor
destroy its probative value.29 And, the failure of a witness to report at once to the police
authorities the crime he had witnessed cannot be taken against him for it is not uncommon for
a witness to a crime to show some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case.30 It
has become judicial knowledge that prosecution witnesses are, more often than not, afraid to
testify. This was manifested by the prosecutor in the instant case. Hence, in one case, 31 we
said that fear of reprisal is a valid excuse for the momentary silence of prosecution witnesses.

Thus the testimony of defense witness Sherwin Isleta that he saw Nora at around eight o'clock
in the evening before she was found dead has lost its relevance as it has not shown that the
accused was precluded from having mauled the victim and causing her eventual death. In fine,
we uphold the pronouncement of the trial court that "[t]he defense of alibi raised by the
accused showing that he was at the Canossa College in San Pablo City (watching the concert
of singer Randy Santiago) with a friend, Nick Dalisay, who was not even presented in Court, at
the time when his wife could have allegedly died even if true is still of no moment as his act
(mauling) committed prior thereto is the one in issue."32

Consequently, we affirm the conclusion of the trial court that accused Manolo Villanueva is
guilty of parricide with unintentional abortion, for a husband who with violence kills his pregnant
wife, occasioning the death of the fetus, is guilty of parricide with unintentional abortion.33

Applying Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which in part provides that "[w]hen a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies . . . the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period," accused should be
sentenced to death, the maximum period of the penalty for parricide which is the more serious
crime. 34 However, in view of Sec. 19, par. (1), Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, which
proscribes the imposition of the death penalty, and the inapplicability of R.A. 7659 which
restores the death penalty, considering that the act charged was committed prior to the
effectivity of said statute, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, which is the proper
penalty as prescribed by The Revised Penal Code, and not life imprisonment as erroneously
imposed by the trial court. Time and again this Court has said that reclusion perpetua is not the
same as life imprisonment. The former entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after
which the convict becomes eligible for parole, and carries with it accessory penalties.35

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from finding accused MANOLO VILLANUEVA also
known as "BOY" VILLANUEVA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of
life imprisonment should instead be reclusion perpetua, and consistent with existing
jurisprudence, the civil indemnity for the death of the victim and the award for moral damages
should be as they are increased to P50,000.00 and P30,000.00, respectively, while the actual
damages and costs of P3,000.00 remain.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 TSN, 24 October 1989, pp. 15; 42.

2 Id., pp. 10-12.

3 Id., pp. 12-18; 33.

4 Id., 12 March 1990, pp. 139-142; 157-158.

5 Id., 6 November 1989, p. 4.

6 Id., pp. 19-20.

7 Id., p. 16.

8 Id., pp. 8-9.

9 Chemistry Report No. C-175-89, Crime Laboratory Service, Camp Crame, Quezon City;
Exh. "C;" Records, p. 4.

10 Necropsy Report prepared by Dr. Nida E. Glorioso; Exh. "A;" Records, p. 2.

11 TSN, 8 January 1990, pp. 25-26.

12 Id., p. 31.

13 Id., pp. 33-35; 37-38.

14 Id., pp. 38-41.

15 Id., pp. 7-8.

16 Id., pp. 1-10.

17 Judge Stella Cabuco-Andres, presiding, who succeeded Judge Enrique B. Inting

midway in the trial.

18 Decision, p. 5.

19 Id., pp. 5-6.

20 People v. Blas, G.R. NP. 97930, 27 May 1992, 209 SCRA 339.

21 Collado v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72780, 13 February 1992, 206 SCRA
206, citing People v. Pedrosa, G.R. No. 56457, 27 January 1989, 169 SCRA 546.

22 People v. Danico, G.R. No. 95554, 7 May 1992, 208 SCRA 472.

23 People v. Buligon, G.R. No. 94338, 4 February 1992, 205 SCRA 766.

24 See People v. Naguita, G.R. No. 76002, 22 April 1991, 208 SCRA 206.

25 Appellant's Brief, p. 6.

26 Ibid.

27 Chemistry Report No. C-005-89; Exh. "D;" Records, p. 5.

28 TSN, 8 January 1990, pp. 50-51.

29 People v. Pascua, G.R. No. 100990, 27 February 1992, 206 SCRA 628; People v.
Canciller, G.R. No. 97926, 4 March 1992, 206 SCRA 827; People v. Aguiluz, G.R. No. 91662,
11 March 1992, 207 SCRA 187.

30 People v. Pugal, G.R. No. 90637, 29 October 1992, 215 SCRA 247.

31 People v. Peran, G.R. No. 95259, 26 October 1992, 215 SCRA 152.

32 Decision of the trial court, p. 5.

33 People v. Desalisa, G.R. No. 95262, 4 January 1994, 229 SCRA 35.

34 Art. 246, The Revised Penal Code.

35 People v. Penillos, G.R. No. 65673, 30 January 1992, 205 SCRA 546.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 93932-33 June 5, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VIVENCIO SABELLANO and WESLY SABELLANO, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Cruz B. Carbon for defendants-appellants.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal purportedly interposed by two of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 65155
(for frustrated homicide) and 67688 (for murder) which were jointly tried and then decided by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 156 on June 6, 1990. The dispositive
portion of the assailed judgment of conviction reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:

The court finds accused VIVENCIO SABELLANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 65155 and hereby sentences said accused VIVENCIO
SABELLANO to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor and to pay the
costs.

Let alias warrant be issued for the arrest of VIVENCIO and MAYOLING SABELLANO the
same to be served by the NBI and other national police agencies.

Accused WESLY and JAIME SABELLANO on the other hand are hereby acquitted of the
offense charged in said Criminal Case No. 65155 with costs de oficio.

In Criminal Case No. 67688, the Court finds accused WESLY SABELLANO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified by treachery, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences said accused WESLY
SABELLANO to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to
indemnify the heirs of victim Benito Abrogar, in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

In the service of his sentence, accused WESLY SABELLANO shall be credited in full with the
period of his preventive imprisonment.

Let alias warrant be issued for the arrest of accused VIVENCIO and JIMMY SABELLANO the
same to be served by the NBI and other national police agencies. (RTC Decision, pp. 13-14;
Rollo, pp. 34-35)

The accused-appellants whose surnames had occasionally been misspelled in the records
were both charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide and murder in two separate
informations. In Criminal Case No. 65155, the accused-appellants together with Jaime and
Mayoling, also surnamed Sabellano were indicted of the crime of frustrated homicide
committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of February, 1985, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, with
intent to kill, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one
Benito Abrogar, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby causing him stab
wounds which would ordinarily cause his death, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of homicide, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of their will, that is due to the timely and able medical attendance
rendered to said Benito Abrogar, which prevented his death. (RTC Decision, p. 1; Rollo, p. 22)

In Criminal Case No. 67688, the accused-appellants with one Jimmy Sabellano were charged
with the crime of murder committed as follows:

That on or about the 9th day of March, 1986, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together with one John Doe whose true identity and
present whereabout are still unknown and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent
to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one Benito Abrogar with a bladed weapon on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds which directly caused his
death. (RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p.236)

On April 18, 1986, all the accused in Criminal Case No. 65155 except Mayoling Sabellano who
had remained at large up to the present time, entered a plea of "not guilty" with the assistance
of counsel. Subsequently, accused Vivencio and Jaime jumped bail, hence, they were tried in
absentia.

On December 8, 1987, the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano, duly assisted by counsel,

pleaded not guilty to the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 67688.

Initially, the case for frustrated homicide was dismissed for the repeated failure of prosecution
witnesses to appear in court. However, the case was revived and consolidated with the murder
case after a motion for reconsideration and/or to revise case filed by the private respondent,
Walderita Abrogar, wife of the deceased Benito Abrogar, was granted by the trial court in an
Order dated January 12, 1988.

The antecedent facts in Criminal Case No. 65155 as summarized by the trial court from the
lone testimony of the prosecution witness Walderita Abrogar are as follows:

. . . [O]n February 6, 1985, she was in her house at 536 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong
watching a wake across the street. A game had then been in progress for about two (2) hours
between one Julio Catayong and Wesly. A few people were watching said game among them,
the son of the deceased, Almar Abrogar. Due to both players' zealousness, a
misunderstanding ensued. Julio cursed "putang ina mo" and delivered a fist blow to the
rightside jaw of Wesly. Seeing the trouble erupt, Salvador, brother of Julio, pulled out a knife
and advanced towards Wesly. Vivencio Sabellano, at the same time, had also approached and
held up Salvador preventing the latter from attacking Wesly. As this occurred, Wesly went
home and after getting hold of a knife, rushed back and stabbed Salvador twice. In the
process, Wesly had held Salvador's right arm and stabbed him with the knife on his right hand.
Salvador was released and ran to his Aunt's house. Almar, who was then a mere three (3) arm-
lengths (sic) away watching, followed to see if Salvador's wounds were serious. Salvador
asked Almar to fetch a taxi to which the latter obliged. When the taxi arrived however, its path
was blocked by Wesly, Vivencio and Paulino Sabellano. Wesly confronted Almar and said
"putang ina mo huwag kang makialam bayaan mo siyang mamatay" while pulling out the knife.
Almar ran to the house and hid. The deceased, Benito Abrogar, was at that time fixing the
toilet. Hearing the commotion, he went out holding a bolo. He was met by Vivencio, Mayoling,
Wesly and Jaime who struck him with a bareta. Mayoling and Wesly mauled Benito while
Vivencio delivered a stab to the back with a 29" knife. Benito fell to the ground wounded. He
was then picked-up by his wife who, along with other relatives, took him to Nayan where a
doctor advised that he be taken to the Rizal Provincial Hospital and confined for ten (10) days.
(RTC Decision, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 24-25)

In Criminal Case No. 67688, the pertinent facts that led to the conviction of the accused-
appellant Wesly Sabellano are stated by the trial court, to wit:

On March 9, 1986, Benito and Walderita with Gertrudes Basilides were walking along
Cordillera Street near Sierra Madre Street on their way to Divisoria to buy merchandise to be
resold later in the day. It was 3:45 a.m. as they chanced upon the group of Vivencio, Wesly,
Jimmy and John Doe at a grocery store. The Abrogars ignored them. Further down the street
however, Gertrudes noticed that two (2) joggers, were coming up behind them. One of the
joggers, Wesly, grabbed Walderita with his left arm around her neck and warned her "huwag
kang sisigaw, papatayin kita kapag sumigaw ka". The other jogger, Vivencio, embraced Benito
and stabbed the latter on the right breast. Two (2) persons, Jaime and John Doe came from
Cordillera and Sierra Madre Streets and stabbed Benito in the abdomen. Wesly released
Walderita and stabbed Benito in the back. As Benito dropped to the ground, his assailants ran
in different directions to escape and Walderita tried to help Benito for home but he died shortly
thereafter. Gertrudes was only an arm-length away when the attack occurred. With light
coming from a nearby house, she was able to recognize the assailants. She also remembered
the clothes that the attackers had worn. Wesly was wearing a white sando and maong pants;
Jaime had an orange T-shirt and maong and Vivencio was in a black jacket and maong pants.
Seeing Benito fall to the ground, Gertrudes looked at him before going back to Calbayog Street
to get help from their relatives. Walderita stayed with Benito until help arrived. She then called
for the police to bring the deceased to the Municipal Hall and later to Camp Crame for autopsy.
A request for autopsy (Exhibit "H") was made and a Certificate of Death (Exhibit "I") was
issued. Medico Legal Report M-0-418-86 (Exhibit D) was issued on the findings as testified to
by Dr. Moraleda. Walderita executed a statement (Exhibit "E") and so did Gertrudes. (Exhibit
"G") (RTC Decision, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 25-26)

After a joint trial on the merits, the trial court promulgated the questioned decision from which
the present appeal was filed assigning as errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT (SIC) ACCUSED-APPELLANT VIVENCIO

SABELLANO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 65155.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING MUCH CREDENCE TO THE CLEARLY BIASED,
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE, CONTRADICTORY AND CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF
WALDERITA ABROGAR (WIFE OF THE DECEASED BENITO ABROGAR) AND
GERTRUDES BASELIDES (NIECE OF THE SAID DECEASED).

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SABELLANOS, ACCUSED-

APPELLANT WESLY SABELLANO BEING ONE THEM, (SIC) WERE THE PERSONS WHO
HELD UP AND KILLED THE DECEASED BENITO ABROGAR IN THE MORNING OF MARCH
9, 1986 IN THE CORNER OF CORDILLERA AND SIERRA MADRE STREETS,
MANDALUYONG, METRO MANILA.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD

ESTABLISHED OR PROVED THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT WESLY SABELLANO
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 67688 FOR MURDER. (Rollo, p.
52)

At the outset, we are constrained to review the trial court's decision only insofar as the
accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano's conviction for the murder of Benito Abrogar is concerned
considering that with respect to the other accused-appellant Vivencio Sabellano, an order
dated June 8, 1990 was issued by the trial court which states:
He who wants to avail of the processes of the Court must be within the reach of the Court.
Having escaped from detention, accused Vivencio Sabellano's Notice of Appeal through
counsel must perforce be DENIED DUE COURSE and it is hereby SO ORDERED. (Records,
p. 487)

Either by deliberate omission or on account of ignorance of the rules of procedure specifically

Section 18, Rule 114 and Section 8, Rule 124, the counsel for the accused Vivencio Sabellano
failed to seasonably question the above order which by this time has become final and
executory. Well-settled is the rule that the right to appeal is a statutory right, not a natural or
inherent one, so that the party who seeks to avail of the said right must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost. (Ozaete v. Court of Appeals,
179 SCRA 800 [1989]). Hence, as regards Criminal Case No. 65155 accused Vivencio
Sabellano, who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide,
lost his right to appeal from the trial court's judgment of conviction.

Anent Criminal Case No. 67688, the issue is whether or not the evidence for the prosecution
establishes the guilt of the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano beyond reasonable doubt

In support of his prayer for a reversal of the trial court's verdict, the accused-appellant Wesly
Sabellano makes the following contentions in his brief, namely: (a) that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses contained material inconsistencies and contradictions, so that the trial
court erred in giving much credence thereto; (b) that the complaining witness, Walderita
Abrogar, failed to immediately report to the police officer who conducted the "on-the-spot
investigation" on the day of the incident in question that the Sabellanos were the persons
responsible for the death of her husband, Benito Abrogar; and (c) that the trial court unjustly
failed to appreciate the defense of alibi despite the fact that the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses who allegedly identified Benito's assailants is highly questionable.

The alleged contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses alluded to by the
accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano are that while Walderita Abrogar stated in her testimony in
court that it was only on March 9, 1986, the day of the fatal incident that the other prosecution
witnesses, Gertrudes Baselides, accompanied the former and her husband, Benito Abrogar to
Divisoria to buy some merchandise, Gertrudes testified that she went with her uncle and aunt,
Benito and Walderita, to Divisoria everyday (Appellant's Brief, pp. 22-23); that Walderita
testified that when she and her deceased husband were held up by the accused-appellants
Wesly and Vivencio Sabellano, respectively, Gertrudes ran back to her house immediately,
while Gertrudes claimed that she remained at the scene of the fatal incident while her uncle
and aunt were embraced by the accused-appellants until she saw her uncle being stabbed
after which she ran home (Appellants' Brief, pp. 23-24); that while Walderita said in open court
that after the stabbing of her husband, she saw four (4) persons run to different directions,
some towards Libertad Street and the others towards Sierra Madre Street, Gertrudes asserted
that all the assailants ran towards only one direction, towards the Producers Market
(Appellants' Brief, pp. 24-26); and that while Walderita claimed that there were police officers at
the scene of the fatal incident since she was the one who summoned them on March 9, 1986,
Gertrudes categorically stated that no policeman arrived at the scene of the crime. (Appellants
'Brief, pp. 26-28)

The discrepancies pointed out by the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano are not only on
minor details but they do not alter the fact that the deceased Benito Abrogar was fatally
stabbed on March 9, 1986 and that one of the assailants was the accused-appellant Wesly
Sabellano. The autopsy report (Exh. "D"; Records, p. 356) indicated that Benito suffered from
cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of stab wounds of the trunk
and upper extremity.1âwphi1

Prosecution witness Desiderio Moraleda, the medico-legal examiner who conducted the
autopsy on the deceased Benito Abrogar described in court the nature of the six (6) stab
wounds inflicted on the victim's body and made a conclusion that the mortal wound caused by
a single-bladed knife was that located on the right side of the chest and indicated as Stab
Wound No. 1 in the report. (TSN, June 6, 1989, pp. 6-7)

The straight-forward and detailed testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, Walderita
Abrogar and Gertrudes Baselides relating to the fatal stabbing of Benito Abrogar clearly
pinpointed the authors of the crime under consideration. (TSN, April 12, 1988, pp. 10-14; TSN,
August 25, 1988, pp. 3-5). The inconsistencies and contradictions specified by the accused-
appellant Wesly Sabellano merely pertain to minor details which cannot affect the credibility of
Walderita's and Gertrudes' testimonies. Our ruling in the case of People v. Tomas Gadiana
(G.R. No. 92509, March 13, 1991) bears reiterating. We stated:

As this Court had remarked in People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 76742, August 7, 1990:

The truth need not be narrated with perfect symmetry. Several persons remembering the same
incident may vary in their recollections of some of the details but these differences do not
necessarily make liars of them all. What is important is that they agree on essential facts and
that their respective versions, corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to make a
consistent and coherent whole. (at pp. 4-5)

The accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano further presents the argument that since the
complaining witness, Walderita Abrogar, reported to the police authorities the matter of her
husband's death and identified the Sabellanos as the culprits only after the lapse of two (2)
days and not immediately when she had the very first opportunity to do so, i.e., at the time the
police conducted an "on-the-spot" investigation on March 9, 1986, then, there is ground to
believe that the credibility of Walderita's entire testimony is greatly weakened.

In the light of the circumstances in the case at bar, the delay in relating to the police authorities
the attendant facts of the crime for which the Sabellanos had been charged is consistent with
normal behavior considering that after a tragic incident, the last thing that the bereaved would
want to happen is to provoke further reprisals from the perpetrators of the felonious act.
Although there is a natural tendency to seek the ends of justice for the treacherous killing of a
dearly departed, mourning and rites for the dead take priority as dictated by our culture. As we
have held in the case of People v. John Gabriel Gamboa (G.R. No. 91374, February 25, 1991):

It is quite understandable when the witnesses do not immediately report the identity of the
offender after a startling occurrence more especially when they are related to the victim as
they just had a traumatic experience . . . Nevertheless, a delay of about a few hours before the
identification of the offender by the prosecution witnesses does not thereby affect their
credibility. (at p. 9)

Moreover, in the case of People v. Ponciano Mandapat, (G.R. No. 76953, April 22, 1991), we
distinctly stated that:

As a general rule, the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he
had witnessed cannot be taken against him (People v. Demate, 113 SCRA 353 [1982]) for "it is
not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some reluctance about getting involved in a
criminal case. The natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of
judicial notice" (People v. Pacabes, 137 SCRA 158 [1985]; People v. Coronado, 145 SCRA 250
[1986]) and the fear of eyewitness when townmates are involved in the commission of the
crime is understandable for they may provoke reprisals from the accused (People v. Rosario,
134 SCRA 496 [1985]). The delay, when adequately explained, does not impair the credibility
of the witness, as in the case at bar (People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94 [1985]; People v. Millora,
119 SCRA 417 [1984]); neither will it render his testimony biased (People v. Itura, 129 SCRA
127 [1984]); nor will it destroy its probative value (People v. Millora, supra) . . . (at pp. 5-6)

Lastly, the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano tries to buttress his claim that he is innocent of
the crime imputed to him by adducing evidence in support of the defense of alibi. Hence, he
testified that at the time of the incident in question, he was asleep in his house and was
awakened only by Walderita shouting about her being held-up together with her husband
(TSN, March 13, 1990, pp. 9-12). Corroborative evidence on the defense of alibi was also
given by Erlinda Sabellano, accused-appellant Wesly's mother, who stated in her testimony
that on March 6, 1986, between 3:00 o'clock and 4:00 o'clock in the morning, she was
preparing food for her children which included accused-appellant Wesly who were all asleep at
that time. (TSN, January 24, 1990, pp. 6-8)

We affirm the trial court's rejection of the defense of alibi in line with the doctrinal rule that the
defense of alibi being inherently weak cannot prevail against the prosecution's positive
identification of the accused and in the absence of any convincing evidence showing physical
impossibility of the accused's being at the time and place of the crime. (See People v. Roberto
Soriano y Bruan alias "Ruben", et al., G.R. No. 74783, April 22, 1991, citing People v.
Garcellano, 23 SCRA 595 [1968]; People v. Naba-unag, 79 SCRA 32 [1977]; see also People
v. Magno Gupo y Gayeta, et al., G.R. No. 75814, September 24, 1990 citing People v. Reunir,
157 SCRA 686 [1988]) As the trial court stated:

Also, as clearly shown in Exhibit "3" for the defense, the house of accused Wesly is not far
enough from the scene of the crime for him to have been physically impossible to have
participated in the crime and be at his house shortly thereafter. Established is the rule that the
accused must be able to show that he was at another place at the time the crime was
committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the
particular moment it was perpetrated.

Lastly, Mrs. Abrogar and Gertrudes Baselides gave such a vivid account of the attack, clearly
identifying the attackers and the clothes worn that the defense of alibi must necessarily fail.
Alibi is not credible where the prosecution witnesses directly testify as to how the assault was
committed and positively identified the accused as the offenders. (Rollo, pp. 33-34)

Moreover, the trial court correctly ruled that alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it
is mainly established by the accused himself and his immediate relatives who would naturally
be expected to make statements in his favor, as in this case it was the mother of accused-
appellant Wesly Sabellano who supported the accused's alibi. (People v. Dennis de Guzman y
de Leon, G.R. No. 95685, March 4, 1991, citing People v. Somera, 173 SCRA 684 [1989]).

We find no cogent reason to overturn the trial court's finding that conspiracy exists among the
assailants of the deceased Benito Abrogar. In the case at bar, although the records do not
show any direct proof showing that the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano together with his
three other companions agreed to inflict fatal wounds on the person of the deceased, there is
overwhelming evidence from the elaborate testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that
Benito's attackers were at the time and place of the stabbing incident that led to the death of
the said victim, Benito Abrogar, and that all of them acted in consonance with a common
design so that the guilt of one becomes the guilt of all. (People v. Martin Cagadas, Jr., et al., G.
R. No. 88044, January 23, 1991 citing People v. Maralit, 165 SCRA 427; People v. Newman,
163 SCRA 496; People v. Salvador, 163 SCRA 574) Conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence but can be inferred from the acts of the accused tending to show community of
criminal purpose. (People v. Valeriano Pacris, et al., G.R. No. 69986, March 5, 1991 citing
People v. Balane, 123 SCRA 614; People v. Baltazar Alan Alitao, et al., G.R. No. 74736,
February 19, 1991 citing People v. Pineda, 157 SCRA 71; People v. Palino, 183 SCRA 680)

After a careful review of the instant case, we find that the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano
is guilty of the crime of murder qualified by treachery considering that he and his other
companions adopted a mode of attack that insured the killing of the deceased Benito Abrogar
without risk to themselves inasmuch as their attack was swiftly and methodically done as
observed by the trial court and their victim and his party were unarmed and taken by surprise.
(see People v. Luis Mision y Salipot, G.R. No. 63480, February 26, 1991 citing Bernabe v.
Bolinas, Jr., 18 SCRA 812; see also People v. Mabubay, 185 SCRA 675 [1990] citing People v.
Lopez, 80 SCRA 18; People v. Alegria 84 SCRA 614).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the trial court's decision dated June 6, 1990 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of indemnity be increased to FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) in accordance with the Court's recent pronouncements.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 100513 June 13, 1997

SEVERINO ANTONIO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 111559 June 13, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CARLITO ANTONIO, accused-appellant.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

These cases have been consolidated in a Resolution1 by this Court dated September 19, 1994
to avoid possible conflicting decisions that may arise as they involve the same facts and
incidents.

G.R. No. 100513 is a petition for review of the decision2 of the Court of Appeals3 promulgated
on April 30, 1991 in CA-G.R. CR No. 07956, affirming with slight modifications the decision4 of
the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 72, finding the petitioner Severino Antonio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

On the other hand, G.R. No. 111559 is an appeal from the decision5 dated December 11,
1992, of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 74, in Criminal Case No. 6741-MN,
finding also the accused-appellant Carlito Antonio y Linao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder by direct participation.6

Antecedent facts follow:

On July 25, 1988, an Information7 was filed against both Severino Antonio and Carlito Antonio,
blood brothers, charging them with the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code,8 before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 72, in
Criminal Case No. 6741-MN, committed as follows:

That on or about January 20, 1988, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, and confederating
together with one (1) alias Oryo and one (1) John Doe, whose true named (sic) and
whereabouts are still unknown and who are still at large, mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, armed with gun, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm one GONZALO
GUTIERREZ, thereby inflicting upon the victim gunshot wounds at the back and head, which
directly caused his death.

Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued against both accused, but only Severino Antonio
was arrested on August 18, 1988 and subsequently tried. At that time, his co-accused Carlito
Antonio, an overseas contract worker, was abroad. Hence, the arrest warrant could not be
served against him and trial had to proceed without his participation.

Petitioner Severino Antonio pleaded not guilty and thereafter trial proceeded as to him.

On September 18, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment finding Severino Antonio guilty of
murder, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused

Severino Antonio GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, defined and
penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
said accused is hereby sentenced to a prison term ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS of
prison mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1)
DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with all the accessory penalties thereof. He
is also ordered to pay the heirs of GONZALO GUTIERREZ the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) PESOS as indemnification for the latter's death.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.9

From this Decision, 10 petitioner Severino Antonio appealed to the Court of Appeals. 11 On
April 30, 1991, the appellate court affirmed the aforesaid decision 12 of the court a quo with
slight modifications, appreciating the presence of conspiracy and treachery, but not the
circumstance of evident premeditation. The decretal portion of said decision states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding appellant Severino Antonio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery. The imposable penalty is from
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, (People vs. Melgar, 137 SCRA
718), since death penalty, which was prescribed in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, has
already been abolished by the 1987 Constitution (People vs. Guevarra, 155 SCRA 327, 335).
There being no other modifying circumstances attending the commission of the crime, and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, appellant Severino Antonio is
sentenced to the penalty of, from fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Gonzalo Gutierrez the sum of P50,000.00 (People vs. Sison, G.R. No. 86453,
September 14, 1990) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

With this modification, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

Petitioner Severino Antonio moved to have the decision reconsidered, but the same was
denied in a Resolution 14 dated June 20, 1991; hence, he filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari 15 with this Court.

Before us, petitioner pleads for his acquittal by raising the following errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE VERY CONVINCING REAL

EVIDENCE OF THE GUNSHOT WOUNDS BELYING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION'S "EYEWITNESSES."

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE STORIES

OF THESE "EYEWITNESSES" IN THE LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING
THIS CASE.

III

IT WAS ALSO AN ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT TO SACRIFICE TRUTH FOR A
DUBIOUS TECHNICALITY AND IGNORING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IN THE
ONGOING TRIAL OF CO-ACCUSED CARLITO ANTONIO.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN STATING "FINDINGS OF FACTS"

WITHOUT STATING FROM WHICH THEY ARE BASED; AS INDEED IT MADE "FINDINGS
OF FACTS" NOT SUPPORTED BY ANYTHING ON RECORD. 16
Carlito Antonio was in turn arrested on June 23, 1990 pursuant to an alias warrant of arrest
dated June 18, 1990. He was tried under the same Information, 17 by the lower court.

When arraigned, accused-appellant Carlito Antonio, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. After the prosecution rested its case, the appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence dated
April 16, 1991, but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order 18 dated July 16, 1991.

After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision dated December 11, 1992, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, and finding the accused, CARLITO ANTONIO y
LINAO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder by direct participation, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos Philippine Currency. With costs
of suit against the accused.

SO ORDERED. 19

Aggrieved by the trial court's decision, 20 accused-appellant Carlito Antonio appealed his case
to us.

In his appellant's brief, the herein appellant raises the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE IMPORTANCE TO THE GUNSHOT WOUNDS.

II

IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN EXCUSING THE ADMITTED CONTRADICTIONS AND

INCONSISTENCIES OF THE PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES AS "TRIVIAL, INSIGNIFICANT
AND UNIMPORTANT.

III

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.

IV
NO SUFFICIENT MOTIVE FOR THE KILLING WAS SHOWN. 21

On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that the trial court's decision 22 convicting
accused-appellant Carlito Antonio should be affirmed and further prays that the civil indemnity
awarded by the court a quo should be increased to P50,000.00 from the award of P30,000.00.
23

The undisputed facts involving the charge of murder against both accused, as culled from the
records of both the trial court 24 and appellate
court 25 follows:

The accused CARLITO ANTONIO and SEVERINO ANTONIO are the brothers-in-law of the
victim, Gonzalo Gutierrez, the latter being the husband of accused' elder sister, Mrs. Priscilla
Antonio-Gutierrez . . . The victim and his family together with Carlito and his family, Severino,
Areng, Betty and Erly lived in separate houses situated in the Antonio compound which is
owned by the mother of the Antonios.

At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 20, 1988, Jaime Robles, a candidate for councilor
but lost, was in Barangay Wawa, Tangos, Navotas, Metro Manila, on a house to house visit to
thank people or voters who supported him in the local election. He was then conversing with
Luis Pantaleon and Jonathan Narciso. On the other hand, Reynaldo Gutierrez was also there
on Santos Street, and was talking to one Sony Sengco, when his father Gonzalo Gutierrez
arrived in the place on his way to their residence nearby. Reynaldo followed his father.
Suddenly Carlito Antonio, . . . appeared from behind of the latter, and at close range fired at
him in the back. When Gonzalo stumbled after walking a few steps, he was picked up by
appellant Severino Antonio, brother of Carlito Antonio, and one Oryo, held him by the two arms
and dragged him across the street near the gate of the Abalos compound. Oryo held a knife.
Both Severino Antonio and Oryo forced Gonzalo to kneel down, and while the latter was in that
position, Carlito Antonio, grabbing Gonzalo's head by the hair, poked a pistol on his left temple,
Gonzalo pleaded for forgiveness and that he be brought to the hospital.

It appears that Gonzalo Gutierrez was claiming ownership of the compound which belonged to
the mother of Gonzalo's wife and the Antonio brothers; Gonzalo was saying that he was the
master or boss "naghari-harian" of the place, which the Antonio brothers strongly resented. To
the plea of Gonzalo, Carlito replied that he must die now, and fired his gun at the head of
Gonzalo. Reynaldo could not do anything to protect his father because he was afraid, and
another one, a companion, was holding a gun warning him not to move or else he would also
be killed. All that he could say was a plea to stop the shooting; "tama na, tama na". Still not
satisfied, Carlito fired his gun, hitting Gonzalo on the neck. All the four (4) assailants filed from
the scene. Gonzalo was brought by Reynaldo to the house, together with his brother Camilo
Gutierrez, who arrived, while Robles went to the Office of the Barangay to seek the assistance
of the police, but there was no officer around, so he went home. Robles' auntie Sonia arrived,
and informed Robles that Gonzalo (Along) was killed. Robles told her that he already knew
about it and suggested that he already be brought to the funeral parlor.

The case was investigated by the police of Navotas. One of the investigators was Cpl. Wilfredo
Mendoza. The latter was informed by Reynaldo Gutierrez that one of the killers of his father
was appellant Severino Antonio. Not knowing how to file the case, Reynaldo did not go to the
police headquarters not until April 22, 1988, when he gave his written statement to PFC.
Manolo Rodriguez narrating how his father, Gonzalo, was shot and killed by Carlito Antonio,
appellant Severino Antonio, one Oryo and still another person, and how the four hatched the
plan at about noontime at the seashore which he (Reynaldo) overheard when he passed by.

An autopsy was performed by Dr. Benjamin Dizon, Municipal Health Officer of Navotas. His
examination showed that the cause of death of Gonzalo Gutierrez was multiple gunshot
wounds on the head, neck and back. In the course of his post-mortem examination, he
prepared a human sketch, where he depicted and indicated that he found bullet wounds on the
head, the point of entry on the left temple and the point of exit was on the forehead or "tuktok";
bullet wounds on the back of the neck below the right ear as the point of entry and wound on
the back below the left armpit as point of exit; and bullet wound on the back, on the left side
near the waistline as the point of entry, and wound on the front left side below the ribs as the
point of exit . . .

For the defense, Carlito Antonio averred that on the day the incident happened, he left his
house at around 10:00 a.m. to go to the Magsaysay Lines at T.M. Kalaw St., Manila, in
connection with his job application as a seaman. He stayed in that office until 4:00 p.m. of that
day. After that, he proceeded to his aunt Clarita Guevarra and arrived there at 5:30 p.m. There
he saw a child of her cousin named Vener. He stayed there up to 10:00 p.m. as he was
exchanging stories with her aunt. The accused-appellant
also presented two (2) witnesses in the person of Mrs. Filomena Antonio Besido and Mrs.
Clarita Guevarra which substantially corroborated his testimony. 26

The Court, after a thorough evaluation and painstaking review of the records of these cases,
conformably with the existing laws and jurisprudence on the matter, is of the firm position that
the herein petition lacks merit.

As the first and second assigned errors of the brothers Antonio in these consolidated eases
are identical, we shall discuss them jointly.
Both the herein petitioner Severino Antonio and accused-appellant Carlito Antonio contend that
the testimonies of the prosecution's two principal witnesses, Reynaldo Gutierrez and Jaime
Robles, on the nature and position of the gunshot wounds sustained by the victim, Gonzalo
Gutierrez, and how these were inflicted, do not correspond with, and are belied by, the physical
evidence as depicted in the testimony of Navotas Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Benjamin Dizon,
the Government doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination of the victim. They both
assail the trial court for giving more weight to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
despite certain errors, inconsistencies and contradictions in their declarations. In particular,
they assert the following:

Gunshot wounds "B-1" and "B-2" do not tally with the "eyewitness" account. The slug in "B-1"
went inside the back portion of the head and exited at the front while the assailant was at the
left side of the victim who were both standing. But the eyewitnesses testified that Gonzalo who
was kneeling then was pleading to Carlito, Carlito was holding his hair, answered cruelly
"kailangang mamatay ka", then pulled the trigger as the gun was pointed at his temple.

Gunshot "B-2" had its slug entering at the lower behind at the right ear and exiting at the right
area with the assailant in a much higher level. The "eyewitnesses" account had the shot fired
immediately after the shot at the temple as the victim's head hang down. They evidently again
mistook the point of entry and exit from one another. Note that the doctor denied the possibility
that Gonzalo was in a kneeling position even as the Fiscal led him to answer in such a manner.
27

After carefully examining the records of these cases, we find the above-quoted allegations to
be untenable. The court sees no reason to set aside the findings of fact of the trial court, which
are supported by the testimony of witnesses who have no reason whatsoever to testify falsely
against the accused-brothers. A witness' testimony ought to be entitled to great weight when
his accusing words are directed against a close relative. 28 It goes beyond logic and normal
human experience for a kinsman to prosecute a blood relative. He risks the ire and reprisal of
other relatives, if he were not guided by truth and motivated by a quest for justice. Time and
again, we have ruled in a catena of authorities that the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed because the trial judge is in a better position to
rule on questions of fact, he having observed the deportment of the witnesses and their
manner of testifying during the trial, 29 except when it appears in the record that the trial court
had overlooked, ignored, or disregarded some fact
or circumstance of weight or significance that, if considered, would alter the result. 30 The
petitioner and accused-appellant failed to demonstrate that their case falls under such an
exception. Thus, as elucidated by the court a quo:
The medico-legal findings on the cause of death of the victim, Gonzalo Gutierrez confirms the
eye witnesses accounts of the incident. Dr. Benjamin Dizon who autopsied the remains of the
deceased confirmed that three (3) shots were fired at the victim, with his medical finding that,
the victim sustained three (3) bullet wounds, to wit: a) bullet wounds on the head, the point of
entry on the left temple and the point of exit on the forehead "Tuktok"; b) bullet wounds on the
back of the neck below the right ear as the point of entry, and wound on the back below the
armpit as the point of exit; c) bullet wound on the back, on the left side near the waistline as
the point of entry, and the wound on the front side below the ribs as point of exit.

The finding of the doctor as to the location of the points of entry and exit of the bullet wounds
sustained by the victim, is consistent and conformable with the eye witnesses testimony. To the
mind of the Court, any variance thereof as to the exact location and nature of the wounds
would be inconsequential and trivial matters and would not affect the credibility of the
witnesses. It is common experience that the human eye and mind could not perceive with
mechanical precision and with exactitude all the details of on incident. Especially in this case
when a murder was committed and the eyewitnesses to the gruesome killing are the close
relatives of the victim and the assailants. . . .

In no occasion or instance that this Court entertains doubt as to the credibility of the
prosecution's witnesses. It always adheres to the legal principle or doctrine that, the testimony
itself must not only be credible but also the source thereof. . . . 31

As to the other alleged contradictions and inconsistencies regarding the testimony of the
prosecution's witnesses, we find that they relate only to trivial, insignificant and unimportant
matters and consequently do not materially impair or impugn the very testimony of said
witnesses. Accordingly, it has been held by this Court in the case of People vs. Daen, Jr. 32
that, "a witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection down to
insignificant and minute details." Errorless testimonies cannot be expected especially when a
witness is recounting details of a harrowing experience 33 and as long as the mass of
testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing statements dilute neither the witnesses'
credibility nor the veracity of their testimony. Such inconsistencies on minor details would even
enhance credibility as these discrepancies indicate that the responses are honest and
unrehearsed. 34

We find that the positive testimony of eyewitnesses, like Gutierrez and Robles, has a greater
probative value than the hypothetical statements made by a witness who was not even present
at the locus criminis, like Dr. Dizon.

The petitioner and accused-appellant further contend that the delay in reporting the crime to
the police was inexcusable and unreasonable and that the reasons given therefor are mere
conjectures and suppositions not supported by evidence on record. Therefore, they allege that
the delay in reporting the crime to the police authorities casts doubt on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.

To this contention, we find no merit.

The delay on the part of eyewitnesses Reynaldo Gutierrez and Jaime Robles, assuming there
was any, was not unreasonable. It is a well-established rule needing minimal discussion that
delay or vacillation in reporting a crime, if sufficiently explained, does not impair the credibility
of witnesses and their testimony nor destroy its probative value. 35 Delay of a witness in
revealing to the authorities what he knows about a crime does not render his testimony false,
for the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most people and their abhorrence to
get involved in a criminal case. 36 And, the natural reluctance of witnesses to volunteer
information to the police authorities in criminal cases is consistent with normal behavior and is
a matter of judicial notice. 37

In the case at bench, Reynaldo Gutierrez sufficiently accounted for the delay in reporting the
crime to the police, while Jaime Robles explained the reason for his reluctance to be involved
in the case. The Court of Appeals ruled on the matter in this manner:

It would appear that, out of sheer ignorance or lack of sufficient education, and his being in a
state of helplessness, witness Reynaldo Gutierrez was not able to go to the police
headquarters and give his statement not until much later.

However, when Cpl. Wilfredo Mendoza was investigating the case, he was already informed by
Reynaldo that one of the killers of his father was appellant Severino. . . .

There can be no doubt as to the presence of Reynaldo Gutierrez at the scene of the killing to
enable him to witness the shooting of his father, as the same is confirmed by the other present
witness Jaime Robles who was also present at the scene of the incident. As a matter of fact,
witness Reynaldo was prevented from extending any help to his beleaguered father, as one of
the companions of appellant held him at bay by poking a gun at him. And as soon as the killers
left, Reynaldo went to approach his father and brought him to their home. If Reynaldo was not
there to witness the incident, appellant could have easily checked with Sony Sengco, with
whom witness was talking immediately before his father was shot, and appellant could have
made him as his witness to dispute the witness' claim that he was there after the scene of the
shooting.

As to the witness Jaime Robles, it would appear that he did not want to be involved as he
simply went to the barangay office to look for a policeman, and having failed to find one he
simply went home. It appears that Robles is related to both the family of appellant and the
deceased. He is the cousin of the Antonios by his father side; he is also the cousin of the
deceased by his mother side. He was terribly depressed and saddened about the whole affair,
since the parties involved are his relatives. Be that as it may, we do not find said witness to be
a false one. As we examined the records, he testified in a clear and straight forward manner,
responsive and positive, indicating that he is a truthful witness. We find no motive why he
should testify falsely against appellant if the truth was that he was not there at the scene and
witnessed the commission of the crime. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that he did not come
forward and report the incident to the police authorities, like other persons or bystanders who
were present and saw the incident and did not also take the trouble to go to the police station,
witness Jaime Robles' credibility was not affected thereby. It is well-known that eyewitnesses
to killings usually do not want to undergo the trouble and inconvenience of an investigation and
of appearing in court, being grilled by lawyers and being exposed to reprisal from the accused
(People vs. Medrana, 110 SCRA 130, 141). Initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer
information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in criminal
investigations are common and do not affect their credibility (People vs. Untalasco, 125 SCRA
159, 170). 38 (Emphasis supplied).

As to the assigned error, to wit:

The trial court, of course, denied the demurrer. But it did not say there was proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt. Neither did it consider the various points raised by the
accused against the testimonies of the alleged two "eyewitnesses". The trial court merely
stated that there is a prima facie proof the accused, and that the two eyewitnesses "pinpointed
to the accused Carlito Antonio as the triggerman." 39

we find the contention to be not well-taken. Judicial action on a motion to dismiss or demurrer
to the evidence is left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Unless there is a grave abuse
thereof, amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. 40 In the
case at bench, the trial court, after hearing the evidence presented by the prosecution, was
convinced that said evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding of guilt. In its Order dated July
16, 1991 denying appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed on April 12, 1991, the trial court stated
that:

In clear contrast with the case at bar, the prosecution has at least shown prima facie the guilt
of the accused, or as frequently stated, the essential element of the crime charged. The
uncontroverted facts remain that the deceased Gonzalo Gutierrez was shot three (3) times on
the different parts of his body at Navotas, Metro Manila in the 20th day of January 1988 at
around 7:00 P.M. The doctor who conducted the autopsy and post mortem examination on the
body of the deceased testified that the cause of death was gunshot wounds. That the two (2)
witnesses, namely: Reynaldo Gutierrez and Jaime Robles testified that they saw the actual
killing and pinpointed to the accused Carlito Antonio as the triggerman. As to the motive of the
killing, the Court took note that even the accused admitted that there was existing family feud
between the deceased and the accused-brothers, Carlito and Severino Antonio. 41 (Emphasis
supplied).

Hence, although the trial court did not expressly state in its Order 42 denying appellant's
demurrer to evidence that there was "proof beyond reasonable doubt, "such degree of proof
was actually existing and present in the aforesaid Order. The prosecution was successful in
proving every fact and circumstance essential to show the guilt of the accused. The court a
quo found: (a) the uncontroverted facts remain that the deceased Gonzalo Gutierrez was shot
three (3) times on the different parts of the body at Navotas, Metro Manila in the 20th day of
January 1988 at around 7:00 P.M.; (b) two (2) witnesses, namely: Reynaldo Gutierrez and
Jaime Robles testified that they saw the actual killing and pinpointed the accused Carlito
Antonio as the triggerman; and (3) the accused admitted that there was an existing family feud
between the deceased and the accused-brothers, Carlito and Severino Antonio. 43

Furthermore, in denying a demurrer to evidence, the court need not state that the prosecution
has established "proof beyond reasonable doubt." It is sufficient that words of similar import,
such as those stated in this case — "the essential elements of the crime charged," 44 — be
present to indicate that there was a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the
accused. Therefore, the trial court did not commit any error in its Order dated July 16, 1991
denying the appellant's demurrer to evidence for there was sufficient compliance.

Going now to the alibi interposed by the accused-appellant, we find the same to be bereft of
merit.

It is undisputed jurisprudential rule that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must
prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed but that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime. 45
This the appellant failed to prove. Moreover, alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it
is mainly established by the accused himself and his immediate relatives and not by credible
persons. 46 Besides, positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi
and denial which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-
serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. 47

In the instant case, the herein accused-appellant and petitioner was definitely identified and
established as having been in the Antonio compound at about 6:00 P.M. of January 20, 1988
by no less than their elder sister, Priscilla A. Gutierrez. 48 Moreover, Carlito Antonio was
positively identified by prosecution witnesses Reynaldo Gutierrez and Jaime Robles as the one
who shot and killed, together with co-accused Severino Antonio and a certain Oryo, the victim
Gonzalo Gutierrez on January 20, 1988 at Wawa, Navotas, Metro Manila. 49 Thus, the trial
court stated:

On the other hand, witnesses, Reynaldo Gutierrez and Jaime Robles had positively identified
the assailants and their testimonies corroborate each other on material points. Both of them
testified that they personally witnessed the killing of Gonzalo Gutierrez by accused, Carlito
Antonio and his co-conspirators on the fateful evening of January 20, 1988 in Wawa, Tangos,
Navotas, Metro Manila. They positively identified Carlito Antonio as the gunwilder (sic) and
narrated in a detailed and straight-forward manner how the latter fired his gun at the back of
the victim while he was walking towards his house. Thereafter, Severino and Oryo grasped the
hands of the victim, and dragged the latter about four (4) meters away towards the gate of the
Ablola family, where they forced the victim to kneel down. Carlito Antonio then grabbed the
victim's head by hair and pointed a gun on his left temple and after a few exchange of words
squeezed the trigger. After the shot, the victim's head hanged forward "lumungayngay" and at
this precise moment Carlito shot again the victim on his neck. 50

Finally, while in his fourth assigned error, accused-appellant Carlito Antonio contends that:

Aside from a vague reference to a family dispute (which was uncorroborated and the specifics
of which are not stated), there is no clear motive for the killing. With such a brutal, merciless
assault, the rage of the assailants must have been great. What brought such anger? What
impelled such demonic act? There's no answer from the prosecution's evidence. 51

it is our holding that this argument is without merit, because motive is not essential to convict
when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit. 52 The fact that the witnesses had
positively and categorically identified the accused as the malefactors, negatives the need for
establishing the motive for the killing of the victim. 53

But, the motive behind the killing of Gonzalo Gutierrez was in fact satisfactorily established by
the testimony of prosecution witness Reynaldo Gutierrez when the latter testified that:

Q. By the way, do you know any personal misunderstanding exist between your father and
your uncles before January 20, 1988?

A. Yes, sir. There was.

Q. What was that?

A. About our land, sir.

Q. You said there was a misunderstanding between your father and the two (2) accused
about your land will you please tell this honorable court what is that misunderstanding about
the land?

A. Because they say that my father wants to act as King in our compound.

Q. They complain that your father was acting as a king in your compound, what compound
are you referring to?

A. The land of my grandmother, sir.

Q. You said it was the land of your grandmother, in that compound, who was residing?

A. Our house is near the house of my uncles, sir.

Q. You said your house is near the house of your uncles, who are these uncles?

A. They are Tiyo Caring, Sebing, Areng, Betty and Erly.

Q. These Caring and Sebing, are they the same accused Carlito Antonio and Severino
Antonio in this case?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You stated that it was complained or rather they complained that your father was acting
as a King in this compound, who made that complaint that your father is "naghahari-harian."

A. My uncle, sir.

Q. Who in this particular, among your uncles?

A. Carlito Antonio, Sir.

Q. You said that the compound where your house and the houses of your uncles situated is
owned by your grandmother, whose grandmother you are referring to?

A. My grandmother in my mother side, sir. 54 (Emphasis supplied)

Priscilla Gutierrez, another prosecution witness likewise corroborated the above-quoted
testimony. We quote relevant portions of her testimony:

Q. It is admitted by the defense that you are a sister of the accused, Carlito Antonio and
Severino Antonio, now will you please tell the Honorable Court who among the three (3) of you
is the eldest?

A. I am the one, sir.

Q. It is also admitted by the defense that you Carlito Antonio and Severino Antonio live in
the same compound?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In whose compound do you and accused, Severino and Carlito Antonio live?

A. To our mother, sir.

Q. Do you want to tell this Honorable Court that the land on which your houses are erected
are owned by your mother?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long have you and your brothers Severino and Carlito been neighbors in the
compound owned by your mother before January 20, 1988?

A. It has been a long time, about 20 years now, sir.

Q. As neighbors, did your husband get along with your brothers Carlito and Severino?

A. Before we were in good terms but later on we have a misunderstanding between them,
sir.

Q. What was that misunderstanding between your husband and your brother, Carlito?

A. They are claiming that we are occupying a bigger portion of the lot and saying that my
husband was and I quote, "NAGHAHARIAN-HARIAN." 55 (Emphasis supplied)
As to civil indemnity, we hold that the amount of P30,000.00 awarded by the trial court in
Criminal Case No. 6741-MN dated December 11, 1992, 56 to the heirs of the victims should be
increased to P50,000.00, in line with present jurisprudence. 57

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review in G.R. No. 100513 is DISMISSED
for lack of merit, while the judgment appealed from in G.R. No. 111559, except for the above
mentioned modification, is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Rollo of G.R. No. 111559, p. 160.

2 Composed of J. Jaime M. Lantin, ponente; JJ. Reynato S. Puno (division chairman) and
Cesar D. Francisco, concurring.

3 Fifth Division.

4 Penned by Judge Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr. dated September 18, 1989, p. 5; Original
Records, p. 58.

5 Penned by Judge Bienvenido L. Reyes.

6 Rollo of G.R. No. 111559, p. 38.

7 Original Records, p. 7.

8 Art. 248.Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1 With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2 In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3 By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fail of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with
the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4 On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an

earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5 With evident premeditation.

6 With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

9 Decision of the Trial Court dated September 18, 1989, p. 5; Original Records, p. 58.

10 Ibid.

11 Docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 07956.

12 Decision of the Trial Court dated September 18, 1989, p. 5; Original Records, p. 58.

13 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 07956 dated April 30, 1991, pp. 12-
13; Rollo of G.R. No. 100513, pp. 91-92.

14 Rollo of G.R. No. 100513, p. 94.

15 Docketed as G.R. No. 100513.

16 Petition dated August 7, 1991, p. 9; Rollo of G.R. No. 100513,

p. 15.

17 Original Records, p. 7.

18 Original Records, p. 230.

19 Decision of the Trial Court in Crim. Case No. 6741-MN dated December 11, 1992, p. 16;
Rollo of G.R. No. 111559, p. 38.

20 Ibid.
21 Appellant's Brief dated January 10, 1994, p. 1; Rollo of G.R. No. 111559, p. 45.

22 Decision of the Trial Court in Crim. Case No. 6741-MN dated December 11, 1992, p. 16;
Rollo of G.R. No. 111559, p. 38.

23 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee dated May 23, 1994, pp. 31-32; Rollo of G.R. No. 111559, pp.
135- 136.

24 Decision of the Trial Court in Crim. Case No. 6741-MN dated December 11, 1992, pp. 2-
8; Rollo of G.R. No. 111559, pp. 24-30.

25 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 07956 dated April 30, 1991, pp. 2-
4; Rollo of G.R. No. 100513, pp. 81-83.

26 From the Decisions, supra.

27 Petition dated August 7, 1991, pp. 19-20; Rollo of G.R. No. 100513, pp. 25-26;
Appellant's Brief dated January 10, 1994, p. 16; Rollo of G.R. No. 111559, p. 60.

28 See People vs. Lao, 249 SCRA 137 [1995].

29 People vs. Cabiles, 248 SCRA 207 [1995]; People vs. Acuña, 248 SCRA 668 [1995];
People vs. Lazaro 249 SCRA 234 [1995]; People vs. Lua, 256 SCRA 539 [1996].

30 People vs. Pidia, 249 SCRA 687 [1995]; People vs. Sanchez, 250 SCRA 14 [1995];
People vs. Polongco, 251 SCRA 503 [1995].

31 Decision of the Trial Court in Crim. Case No. 6741-MN dated December 11, 1992, pp.
11-13; Rollo of G.R. No. 111559, pp. 33-35.

32 244 SCRA 382 [1995].

33 People vs. Cura, 240 SCRA 234 [1995].

34 People vs. Pacapac, 248 SCRA 77 [1995]; People vs. Ledesma, 250 SCRA 166 [1995];
People vs. Español, 256 SCRA 137 [1996].

35 People vs. Villanueva, 242 SCRA 47 [1995]; People vs. Reoveros, 247 SCRA 628
[1995]; People vs. Francisco, 249 SCRA 526 [1995].
36 People vs. Punzalan, 153 SCRA 1 [1987].

37 People vs. Sabillano, 198 SCRA 196 [1991]; People vs. Caringal, 176 SCRA 404
[1989].

38 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 07956 dated April 30, 1991, pp. 6-
9; Rollo of G.R. No. 100513, pp. 85-88.

39 Appellant's Brief dated January 10, 1994, pp. 23-24; Rollo of G.R. No. 111559, pp. 67-
68.

40 People vs. Mercado, 159 SCRA 453 [1988].

41 Order dated July 16, 1991, pp. 3-4; Original Records, pp. 229-230.

42 Dated July 16, 1991, p. 4; Original Records, p. 230.

43 Order dated July 16, 1991, pp. 3-4; Original Records, pp. 229-230.

44 Order dated July 16, 1991, p. 3; Original Records, p. 229.

45 People vs. Umali, 241 SCRA 17 [1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 20 [1995].

46 People v. Caritativo, 256 SCRA 1 [1996].

47 People v. Amania, 248 SCRA 486 [1995].

48 T.S.N. February 25, 1991, pp. 11-13.

49 T.S.N., October 8, 1990, pp. 18-26; T.S.N., December 12, 1990, pp. 12-26.

50 Decision of the Trial Court dated December 11, 1992, p. 11; Rollo of G.R. No. 111559, p.
33.

51 Appellant's Brief dated January 10, 1994; p. 30; Rollo of G.R. No. 1 115597, p. 74.

52 People v. Cabrera, 241 SCRA 28 [1995].

53 People v. Reoveros, 247 SCRA 628 [1995].

54 T.S.N., October 8, 1990, pp. 15-18.

55 T.S.N., February 25, 1991, pp. 8-10.

56 Rollo of G.R. No. 111559, p. 38.

57 People vs. Bartulay, 192 SCRA 621 [1990]; People vs. Dasig, 221 SCRA 549 [1993];
People vs. Javier, et al., G.R. No. 84449, March 4, 1997.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. 177827 March 30, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ANSELMO BERONDO, JR. y PATERES, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the November 7, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00386 entitled People of the Philippines v. Anselmo Berondo, Jr. y Pateres
which held accused-appellant Anselmo Berondo, Jr. guilty of homicide. The CA Decision
modified the September 23, 2003 Decision2 in Criminal Case No. 11760-02 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 in Malaybalay City, which held accused-appellant liable for murder.

The Facts

At around 11:30 p.m. of February 13, 1999, after joining the Miss Gay competition at New
Danao, Sinaysayan, Kitaotao, Bukidnon, Herbert Nietes, Jr. walked home to Puntian, Quezon,
Bukidnon. While on the way, he suddenly heard a gunshot from nearby. Feeling afraid, he ran
towards the grassy area by the roadside to hide. After about five minutes, he saw accused-
appellant, Julie Tubigon, and Jesus Sudario, each holding a knife, walk towards the road and
take turns in stabbing a person who was already slumped on the ground. He recognized the
three as they are his townmates. Thereafter, he ran away from the area and went to Bato-Bato,
Sinaysayan, Kitaotao, Bukidnon, where he spent the night. The next day, he learned that the
person stabbed was Genaro Laguna. He later testified that he did not reveal what he had
witnessed to anyone because he was afraid of getting involved.3

At about the same time, Pedro Tero, who was also walking along the road towards Puntian,
saw Tubigon shoot Laguna. After the victim fell, about five to six persons whom he did not
recognize went near the victim. He then immediately ran away from the scene and no longer
saw what had happened next to the victim. On the following day, he told a certain Hoseas
Sagarino what he saw but did not report it to the authorities.4

Two years after the incident, Nietes and Tero admitted to Dolores, Laguna’s widow, that they
had witnessed the crime. They then reported the matter to the police and, accordingly,
executed their respective sworn statements. Thereafter, an Information for robbery with murder
was filed against accused-appellant, Tubigon, and Sudario. The Information reads:

That on or about the 13th day of February 1999, in the evening, at Purok 2, barangay West
Dalurong, [Kitaotao], [Bukidnon], Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally take, rob and carry
away cash amounting to SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS [PhP 6,500], belonging to
GENARO LAGUNA, to his damage and prejudice in the aforementioned amount;

That on the occasion of the said Robbery, the above name accused, acting on the same
conspiracy, and to enable them to consummate their desire, with intent to kill by means of
force and taking advantage of superior strength, armed with a firearm with an unknown caliber,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally attack, assault and shoot GENARO
LAGUNA, inflicting upon his person multiple stab and gunshot wounds, which caused the
instantaneous death of GENARO LAGUNA to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of
GENARO LAGUNA in such amount as may be allowed by law.

Contrary to and in Violation of Article 294 in relation to Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by R.A. 7659.5

Trial proceeded only against accused-appellant because the two other accused remained at-
large.

In his defense, accused-appellant denied any involvement in the killing of Laguna. He claimed
that in the evening of February 13, 1999, he was with his wife and daughter watching the
activities during the Araw ng New Danao (New Danao Day) at the Poblacion, New Danao,
Sinaysayan. When the activities ended at about two o’clock in the morning of the next day,
they went home together. Hours later, Geno Laguna, the victim’s cousin, told him about the
incident and together they proceeded to the place where the victim’s body was found. Further,
he alleged that prosecution witness Nietes was his daughter’s former sweetheart. Their
relationship became unfriendly after Nietes acted rudely against accused-appellant’s
daughter.6

On September 23, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the accused ANSELMO BERONDO JR. y PATERES is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of MURDER under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and is sentenced to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The accused is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Genaro Laguna the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (PhP50,000.00) as actual damages and civil indemnity in the sum of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (PhP50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

The case was appealed to the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

Affirming the decision of the trial court, the appellate court found credible Nietes’ testimony
pointing to accused-appellant as one of the persons who stabbed the victim. It dismissed the
imputation of ill motive against Nietes and held that the clear and straightforward manner in
which he testified is worthy of belief. Also, it held that Nietes’ delay in reporting the crime was
reasonable considering that eyewitnesses have a tendency to remain silent rather than imperil
their lives or that of their family.

The CA, however, found that the prosecution failed to prove the attendance of the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. It held that no evidence was presented to prove
that the three accused purposely took advantage of their numerical superiority. Thus, accused-
appellant was held guilty only of homicide and not murder.

The CA also modified the award of damages. Finding that there was absence of proof of actual
damages, the CA instead awarded temperate damages in the amount of PhP 50,000.

The fallo of the November 7, 2006 CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is modified. In lieu of murder, the Court finds
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and he is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Genaro Laguna the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (Php 50,000.00) as temperate damages and fifty thousand pesos (Php
50,000.00) as civil indemnity.7

Hence, we have this appeal.

The Issues

In a Resolution dated August 22, 2007, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental
briefs if they so desired. On October 25, 2007, accused-appellant, through counsel, signified
that he was no longer filing a supplemental brief. Thus, the following issues raised in accused-
appellant’s Brief dated November 16, 2004 are now deemed adopted in this present appeal:

I.

The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of [homicide] despite the
prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

II.

The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the incredible and inconsistent
testimony of the prosecution witnesses.8

In essence, the case involves the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses and the
sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.

The Ruling of the Court

The appeal is without merit.

Accused-appellant’s guilt is anchored only on the testimony of Nietes. Accused-appellant,

however, faults Nietes for belatedly reporting the identities of the assailants. He claims that the
delay impaired Niete’s credibility; thus, the latter’s testimony should be disregarded.

We disagree. Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily
impair the credibility of a witness, especially where sufficient explanation is given.9 No
standard form of behavior can be expected from people who had witnessed a strange or
frightful experience.10 Jurisprudence recognizes that witnesses are naturally reluctant to
volunteer information about a criminal case or are unwilling to be involved in criminal
investigations because of varied reasons. Some fear for their lives and that of their family;11
while others shy away when those involved in the crime are their relatives12 or townmates.13
And where there is delay, it is more important to consider the reason for the delay, which must
be sufficient or well-grounded, and not the length of delay.14

In this case, although it took Nietes more than two years to report the identity of the assailants,
such delay was sufficiently explained. Nietes stated that he feared for his life because the
three accused also lived in the same town and the incident was the first killing in their
area.1avvphi1 He only had the courage to reveal to Dolores what he had witnessed because
his conscience bothered him.

Despite the delay in reporting the identities of the malefactors, Nietes testified in a categorical,
straightforward, and spontaneous manner, and remained consistent even under grueling
cross-examination. Such bears the marks of a credible witness.15

As regards the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence, we affirm the findings of the CA that
the crime committed was only homicide and not murder. As correctly noted by the appellate
court, the attendant circumstances of conspiracy and abuse of superior strength were not
proved, thus:

The Court notes that witness Nietes Jr. was not able to identify the person who shot the victim.
It was witness Tero who said that it was accused Julie Tubigon, but he did not witness the
stabbing. Witness Nietes Jr. did. No evidence exists to show the events preceding the attack
and those occurring after. The simultaneity of the delivery of stabs by the three assailants
alone is not sufficient to prove conspiracy.

The Court likewise finds error in finding that the killing of the deceased was committed with
abuse of superior strength, because no evidence was presented to prove that the accused
purposely took advantage of their numerical superiority.

Absent clear and convincing evidence of any qualifying circumstance, conviction should only
be for homicide.16

On the award of damages, the appellate court did not grant actual damages due to lack of
proof of actual expenses, but instead granted temperate damages in the amount of PhP
50,000. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered when
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. In this case, it
cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim incurred funeral and burial expenses although the
exact amount was not established. In line with current jurisprudence, the amount of temperate
damages should, however, be decreased to PhP 25,000.17

The CA also properly awarded civil indemnity as such is given without need of proof other than
the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of accused-appellant’s responsibility for it.18
The trial court, however, failed to award moral damages. Moral damages are awarded without
need of further proof other than the fact of the killing.19 Thus, PhP 50,000 in moral damages is
additionally awarded in favor of the heirs of the victim.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the November 7, 2006 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00386 with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision shall
read:

WHEREFORE, the accused ANSELMO BERONDO JR. y PATERES is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is
likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP
25,000 as temperate damages, and PhP 50,000 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTE STATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 4-18. Penned by Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella Jr. and concurred in by
Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Mario V. Lopez.

2 CA rollo, pp. 11-19. Penned by Judge Agustin Q. Javellana.

3 Id. at 13-14.

4 Id. at 14.

5 Rollo, p. 5.

6 CA rollo, p. 39.

7 Id. at 17.

8 Id. at 34.

9 People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 118912, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 40, 49; People v. Abendan,
G.R. Nos. 132026-27, June 28, 2001, 360 SCRA 106, 123.
10 People v. Dulanas, G.R. No. 159058, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 58, 74; People v. Quirol,
G.R. No. 149259, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 509, 516; People v. Plazo, G.R. No. 120547,
January 29, 2001, 350 SCRA 433, 442.

11 See People v. Zuniega, G.R. No. 126117, February 21, 2001, 352 SCRA 403; People v.
Rimorin, G.R. No. 124309, May 16, 2000, 332 SCRA 178.

12 People v. Paraiso, G.R. No. 131823, January 17, 2001, 349 SCRA 335.

13 See People v. Ignas, G.R. Nos. 140514-15, September 30, 2003, 412 SCRA 311; People v.
Alarcon, G.R. No. 133191-93, July 11, 2000, 335 SCRA 457; People v. Suza, G.R. No. 130611,
April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 167.

14 People v. Natividad, G.R. No. 138017, February 23, 2001, 352 SCRA 651, 661.

15 People v. Torres, G.R. Nos. 135522-23. October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 408, 424; Sevalle v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122858, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 33, 43.

16 Supra note 1, at 16-17.

17 People v. Jabiniao, Jr., G.R. No. 179499, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 769, 787-788; People v.
Dacubo, G.R. No. 175594, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 458, 477; People v. Belonio, G.R.
No. 148695, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 579, 596.

18 People v. Whisenhunt, G.R. No. 123819, November 14, 2001, 368 SCRA 586, 610.

19 People v. Geral, G.R. No. 145731, June 26, 2003, 405 SCRA 104, 111; People v. Cabote,
G.R. No. 136143, November 15, 2001, 369 SCRA 65, 78; citing People v. Panado, G.R. No.
133439, December 26, 2000.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANSELMO BERONDO JR. G.R. No. 177827, March 30,
2009
Criminal Case Digest / Digested Case
Murder to Homicide

Facts:
 At around 11:30 p.m. of February 13, 1999, after joining the Miss Gay competition at New
Danao, Sinaysayan, Kitaotao, Bukidnon, Herbert Nietes, Jr. walked home to Puntian, Quezon,
Bukidnon. While on the way, he suddenly heard a gunshot from nearby. Feeling afraid, he ran
towards the grassy area by the roadside to hide. After about five minutes, he saw BERONDO,
Julie Tubigon, and Jesus Sudario, each holding a knife, walk towards the road and take turns
in stabbing a person who was already slumped on the ground. He recognized the three as they
are his townmates. Thereafter, he ran away from the area and went to Bato-Bato, Sinaysayan,
Kitaotao, Bukidnon, where he spent the night. The next day, he learned that the person
stabbed was GENARO LAGUNA. He later testified that he did not reveal what he had
witnessed to anyone because he was afraid of getting involved.

Two years after the incident, Nietes and Tero (another witness) admitted to Dolores, Laguna’s
widow, that they had witnessed the crime.

Trial proceeded only against accused-appellant BERONDO for murder, because the two other
accused remained at-large, where he was convicted. The CA affirmed conviction, but ruled that
BERONDO was liable only for homicide.

ISSUES:

1. Does the belated reporting of Nietes of what he witnessed defeat his credibility as a
witness?

2. Was the CA correct in holding that BERONDO was liable only for homicide?

HELD:

1. No. Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily
impair the credibility of a witness, especially where sufficient explanation is given.No standard
form of behavior can be expected from people who had witnessed a strange or frightful
experience. Jurisprudence recognizes that witnesses are naturally reluctant to volunteer
information about a criminal case or are unwilling to be involved in criminal investigations
because of varied reasons. Some fear for their lives and that of their family; while others shy
away when those involved in the crime are their relatives or townmates. And where there is
delay, it is more important to consider the reason for the delay, which must be sufficient or well-
grounded, and not the length of delay.

Despite the delay in reporting the identities of the malefactors, Nietes testified in a categorical,
straightforward, and spontaneous manner, and remained consistent even under grueling
cross-examination. Such bears the marks of a credible witness.
2. Yes. The Court finds error in the Trial Court’s finding that the killing of the deceased was
committed with abuse of superior strength, because no evidence was presented to prove that
the accused purposely took advantage of their numerical superiority. Absent clear and
convincing evidence of any qualifying circumstance, conviction should only be for homicide.

Show opinions
681 Phil. 462

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 180157, February 08, 2012 ]
EQUITABLE CARDNETWORK, INC., PETITIONER, VS. JOSEFA BORROMEO
CAPISTRANO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
ABAD, J.:

This case is about the sufficiency of the defendant's allegations in the answer denying the due
execution and genuineness of the plaintiff's actionable documents and the kind of evidence
needed to prove forgery of signature.

The Facts and the Case

Petitioner Equitable Cardnetwork, Inc. (ECI) alleged in its complaint that in September 1997
respondent Josefa B. Capistrano (Mrs. Capistrano) applied for membership at the Manila
Yacht Club (MYC) under the latter's widow-membership program. Since the MYC and ECI had
a credit card sponsorship agreement in which the Club would solicit for ECI credit card
enrollment among its members and dependents, Mrs. Capistrano allegedly applied for and was
granted a Visa Credit Card by ECI.

ECI further alleged that Mrs. Capistrano authorized her daughter, Valentina C. Redulla (Mrs.
Redulla), to claim from ECI her credit card and ATM application form.[1] Mrs. Redulla signed
the acknowledgment receipt[2] on behalf of her mother, Mrs. Capistrano. After Mrs. Capistrano
got hold of the card, she supposedly started using it. On November 24, 1997 Mrs. Redulla
personally issued a P45,000.00 check as partial payment of Mrs. Capistrano's account with
ECI. But Mrs. Redulla's check bounced upon deposit.
Because Mrs. Capistrano was unable to settle her P217,235.36 bill, ECI demanded payment
from her. But she refused to pay, prompting ECI to file on February 30, 1998 a collection suit
against her before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City.

Answering the complaint, Mrs. Capistrano denied ever applying for MYC membership and ECI
credit card; that Mrs. Redulla was not her daughter; and that she never authorized her or
anyone to claim a credit card for her. Assuming she applied for such a card, she never used it.
Mrs. Redulla posed as Mrs. Capistrano and fooled ECI into issuing the card to her.
Consequently, the action should have been brought against Mrs. Redulla. Mrs. Capistrano
asked the court to hold ECI liable to her for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
and litigation expenses.

After trial, the RTC[3] ruled that, having failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of ECI's actionable documents that were attached to the complaint, Mrs. Capistrano
impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of those documents. In effect she
admitted: 1) applying for membership at the MYC;[4] 2) accomplishing the MYC membership
information sheet[5] which contained a request for an ECI Visa card; 3) holding herself liable
for all obligations incurred in the use of such card; 4) authorizing Mrs. Redulla to receive the
Visa card issued in her name;[6] 5) applying for an ATM Card with ECI; [7] and 6) using the
credit card in buying merchandise worth P217,235.36 as indicated in the sales slips.

The RTC said that when an action is founded upon written documents, their genuineness and
due execution shall be deemed admitted unless the defendant specifically denies them under
oath and states what he claims to be the facts.[8] A mere statement that the documents were
procured by fraudulent representation does not raise any issue as to their genuineness and
due execution.[9] The RTC rejected Mrs. Capistrano's argument that, having verified her
answer, she should be deemed to have denied those documents under oath. The RTC
reasoned that she did not, in her verification, deny signing those documents or state that they
were false or fabricated.

The RTC added that respondent Mrs. Capistrano could no longer raise the defense of forgery
since this had been cut-off by her failure to make a specific denial. Besides, said the RTC,
Mrs. Capistrano failed to present strong and convincing evidence that her signatures on the
document had been forged. She did not present a handwriting expert who could attest to the
forgery. The trial court ordered Mrs. Capistrano to pay ECI's claim of P217,235.36 plus
interests, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Mrs. Capistrano appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals (CA).

On May 10, 2007 the CA reversed the trial court's decision and dismissed ECI's complaint.[10]
The CA ruled that, although Mrs. Capistrano's answer was somewhat infirm, still she raised the
issue of the genuineness and due execution of ECI's documents during trial by presenting
evidence that she never signed any of them. Since ECI failed to make a timely objection to its
admission, such evidence cured the vagueness in her answer. Further, the CA ruled that Mrs.
Capistrano sufficiently proved by evidence that her signatures had been forged.

The Issues Presented

The issues presented are:

1. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that, although Mrs. Capistrano failed to make an
effective specific denial of the actionable documents attached to the complaint, she overcame
this omission by presenting parol evidence to which ECI failed to object; and

2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that Mrs. Capistrano presented clear and convincing
evidence that her signatures on the actionable documents had been forged.

Ruling of the Court

One. An answer to the complaint may raise a negative defense which consists in defendant's
specific denial of the material fact that plaintiff alleges in his complaint, which fact is essential
to the latter's cause of action.[11] Specific denial has three modes. Thus:

1) The defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not
admit and whenever practicable set forth the substance of the matters on which he will rely to
support his denial;

2) When the defendant wants to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment in the
complaint, he must specify so much of the averment as is true and material and deny the
remainder; and

3) When the defendant is without knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state and this shall have the
effect of a denial.

But the rule that applies when the defendant wants to contest the documents attached to the
claimant's complaint which are essential to his cause of action is found in Section 8, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 8. How to contest such documents. --When an action or defense is founded upon a
written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding Section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party
does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an
inspection of the original instrument is refused.

To determine whether or not respondent Mrs. Capistrano effectively denied the genuineness
and due execution of ECI's actionable documents as provided above, the pertinent averments
of the complaint and defendant Capistrano's answer are here reproduced.

ECI's complaint:

3. That sometime in 1997, defendant applied for membership, as widow of a deceased

member of the Manila Yacht Club;

4. That in connection with her application for membership in the Manila Yacht Club, defendant
applied for and was granted a Manila Yacht Club Visa Card in accordance with Credit Card
Sponsorship Agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the Manila Yacht Club wherein
Manila Yacht Club shall solicit applications for the Manila Yacht Club Visa Cards from Manila
Yacht Club members and dependents. Copy of the Manila Yacht Club Information Sheet is
hereto attached as Annex "A";

Mrs. Capistrano's answer:

3. She specifically denies paragraph[s] 3 and 4 of the complaint for want of sufficient
knowledge to form a belief as to the veracity of the allegations contained therein and for the
reasons stated in her special and affirmative defenses.

xxxx

ECI's complaint:

5. That defendant authorized her daughter, Mrs. Valentina Redulla to get the said credit card
including her ATM application form from the plaintiff which enabled the defendant to avail of the
cash advance facility with the use of said card; Copy of the authorization letter, application
form and acknowledgment receipt showing that Valentina C. Redulla received the said credit
card are hereto attached as Annexes "B", "C", and "D", respectively;

Mrs. Capistrano's answer:

4. She specifically denies paragraph 5 of the complaint for want of sufficient knowledge to form
a belief as to the allegations contained therein. She never authorized any person to get her
card. Valentina Redulla is not her daughter.

xxxx

ECI's complaint:

6. That with the use of the said Manila Yacht Club Visa Card, defendant could purchase goods
and services from local and accredited stores and establishments on credit and could make
cash advances from ATM machines since it is the plaintiff who pays first the said obligations
and later at a stated period every month, the plaintiff will send a statement of account to
defendant showing how much she owes the plaintiff for the payments it previously made on
her behalf. Copy of the monthly statement of accounts for the months of November and
December 1997 are hereto attached as Annexes "E" and "F", respectively;

Mrs. Capistrano's answer:

5. She specifically denies paragraph 6 of the complaint for want of sufficient knowledge to form
a belief as to the veracity of the allegations contained therein and for the reasons as stated in
her special and affirmative defenses.

xxxx

ECI's complaint:

7. That it is the agreement of the parties that in the event that an account is overdue, interest
at 1.75% per month and service charge at 1.25% will be charged to the defendant;

Mrs. Capistrano's answer:

6. She specifically denies paragraph 7 of the complaint for want of sufficient knowledge to form
a belief as to the veracity of the allegations contained therein.

xxxx

ECI's complaint:
8. That on November 24, 1997, defendant's daughter, Mrs. Valentina C. Redulla issued
Solidbank Check No. 0127617 dated November 24, 1997 in the amount of P45,000.00 in
partial payment of defendant's account with the plaintiff;

9. That when the said check was deposited in the bank, the same was dishonored for the
reason "Account Closed." Copy of said said check is hereto attached as Annex "G";

Mrs. Capistrano's answer:

7. She denies paragraph[s] 8 and 9 for want of sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the
veracity of the allegations contained therein and for the reasons aforestated. It is quite
peculiar that herein defendant's alleged account would be paid with a personal check of
somebody not related to her.

xxxx

ECI's complaint:

10. That defendant has an unpaid principal obligation to the plaintiff in the amount of
P217,235.326;

Mrs. Capistrano's answer:

8. She denies paragraph 10 for want of sufficient knowledge as to the veracity of the
allegations contained therein and for the reasons stated in her special and affirmative
defenses. Granting ex gratia argumenti that defendant did indeed apply for a card, still, she
vehemently denies using the same to purchase goods from any establishment on credit.

xxxx

ECI's complaint

11. That plaintiff made demands on the defendant to pay her obligation but despite said
demands, defendant has failed and refused to pay her obligation and still fails and refuses to
pay her obligation to the plaintiff and settle her obligation, thus, compelling the plaintiff to file
the present action and hire the services of counsel for the amount of P53,998.84 and incur
litigation expenses in the amount of P30,000.00;

12. That it is further provided as one of the terms and conditions in the issuance of the Manila
Yacht Club Card that in the event that collection is enforced through court action, 25% of the
amount due of P53,998.84 will be charged as attorney's fees and P53,998.84 will be charged
as liquidated damages;

Mrs. Capistrano's answer

9. She denies paragraph[s] 11 and 12 for want of sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the
veracity of the allegations therein. If ever there was any demand sent to herein defendant the
same would have been rejected on valid and lawful grounds. Therefore, any damage or
expense, real or imaginary, incurred or sustained by the plaintiff should be for its sole and
exclusive account.

xxxx

Further, Mrs. Capistrano's special and affirmative defenses read as follows:

10. Defendant repleads by reference all the foregoing allegations which are relevant and
material hereto.

11. Defendant denies having applied for membership with the Equitable Cardnetwork, Inc. as
a widow of a deceased member of the Manila Yacht Club.

12. She has never authorized anyone to get her alleged card for the preceding reason.
Therefore, being not a member, she has no obligation, monetary or otherwise to herein
plaintiff.

13. Plaintiff has no cause of action against herein answering defendant.

14. This Valentina C. Redulla is not her daughter. In all modesty, defendant being a member
of one of the prominent families of Cebu and being a board member of the Borromeo Brothers
Estate whose holdings include Honda Cars Cebu as well as other prestigious establishments,
it would be totally uncalled for if she would not honor a valid obligation towards any person or
entity.

15. She surmises that this Valentina Redulla has been posing as Josefa Capistrano.
Therefore, plaintiff's cause of action should have been directed towards this Redulla.

16. Even granting for the sake of argument that herein answering defendant did indeed
authorized somebody to pick up her card, still, she never made any purchases with the use
thereof. She, therefore, vehemently denies having used the card to purchase any
merchandise on credit.
In substance, ECI's allegations, supported by the attached documents, are that Mrs.
Capistrano applied through Mrs. Redulla for a credit card and that the former used it to
purchase goods on credit yet Mrs. Capistrano refused to pay ECI for them. On the other
hand, Mrs. Capistrano denied these allegations "for lack of knowledge" as to their truth.[12]
This mode of denial is by itself obviously ineffectual since a person must surely know if he
applied for a credit card or not, like a person must know if he is married or not. He must also
know if he used the card and if he did not pay the card company for his purchases. A person's
denial for lack of knowledge of things that by their nature he ought to know is not an
acceptable denial.

In any event, the CA ruled that, since ECI did not object on time to Mrs. Capistrano's evidence
that her signatures on the subject documents were forged, such omission cured her defective
denial of their genuineness and due execution. The CA's ruling on this point is quite incorrect.

True, issues not raised by the pleadings may be tried with the implied consent of the parties as
when one of them fails to object to the evidence adduced by the other concerning such
unimpleaded issues.[13] But the CA fails to reckon with the rule that a party's admissions in
the course of the proceedings, like an admission in the answer of the genuineness and true
execution of the plaintiff's actionable documents, can only be contradicted by showing that
defendant made such admission through palpable mistake.[14] Here, Mrs. Capistrano never
claimed palpable mistake in the answer she filed.

It is of no moment that plaintiff ECI failed to object to Mrs. Capistrano's evidence at the trial
that the subject documents were forgeries. As the Court ruled in Elayda v. Court of Appeals,
[15] the trial court may reject evidence that a party adduces to contradict a judicial admission
he made in his pleading since such admission is conclusive as to him. It does not matter that
the other party failed to object to the contradictory evidence so adduced.

Notwithstanding the above, the Court holds that the CA correctly ordered the dismissal of ECI's
action since, contrary to the RTC's finding, Mrs. Capistrano effectively denied the genuineness
and due execution of ECI's actionable documents. True, Mrs. Capistrano denied ECI's
actionable documents merely "for lack of knowledge" which denial, as pointed out above, is
inadequate since by their nature she ought to know the truth of the allegations regarding those
documents. But this inadequacy was cured by her quick assertion that she was also denying
the allegations regarding those actionable documents "for the reasons as stated in her special
and affirmative defenses."
In the "Special and Affirmative Defenses" section of her answer, Mrs. Capistrano in fact denied
ECI's documented allegations that she applied for a credit card, was given one, and used it.
She said:

11. Defendant denies having applied for membership with the Equitable Cardnetwork, Inc. as
a widow of a deceased member of the Manila Yacht Club.

12. She has never authorized anyone to get her alleged card for the preceding reason.
Therefore, being not a member, she has no obligation, monetary or otherwise to herein
plaintiff.

Neither the RTC nor the CA can ignore Mrs. Capistrano's above additional reasons denying
ECI's allegations regarding its actionable documents. Such reasons form part of her answer.
Parenthetically, it seems that, when Mrs. Capistrano denied the transactions with ECI "for lack
of knowledge," it was her way of saying that such transactions took place without her knowing.
And, since Mrs. Capistrano in fact verified her claim that she had no part in those transactions,
she in effect denied under oath the genuineness and due execution of the documents
supporting them. For this reason, she is not barred from introducing evidence that those
documents were forged.

Two. Here, apart from presenting an officer who identified its documents, ECI presented no
other evidence to support its claim that Mrs. Capistrano did business with it. On the other
hand, the evidence for the defense shows that it was not likely for Mrs. Capistrano to have
applied for a credit card since she was already 81 years old, weak, bedridden, and suffering
from senility at the time in question.[16] What is more, she had been staying in Cagayan de
Oro under the care of his son Mario; whereas she made the alleged cash advances and
purchases using the credit card in different malls in Cebu City, Bohol, and Muntinlupa City.[17]

Further, as the CA found, Mrs. Capistrano's specimen signatures on a Deed of Sale,[18] an

Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person,[19] a Waiver of Rights,[20] and a
handwritten note,[21] executed at about the time in question, clearly varied from the signatures
found on ECI's documents.[22] The testimony of a handwriting expert, while useful, is not
indispensable in examining or comparing handwritings or signatures.[23] The matter here is
not too technical as to preclude the CA from examining the signatures and ruling on whether or
not they are forgeries. The Court finds no reason to take exception from the CA's finding.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and AFFIRMS the order of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 79424 dated May 10, 2007 that directed the dismissal of the complaint
against respondent Josefa B. Capistrano.
SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

[1] Exhibit "F."

[2] Exhibit "E."

[3] Rollo, pp. 77-82.

[4] Exhibit "A."

[5] Exhibit "C."

[6] Exhibit "E."

[7] Exhibit "F."

[8] RULES OF COURT, Rule 8, Sec. 8.

[9] Songco v. Sellner, 37 Phil. 254, 256 (1917).

[10] Rollo, pp. 34-43.

[11] RULES OF COURT, Rule 6, Sec. 5.

[12] Rollo, pp. 71-72, paragraphs 3 to 9.

[13] Rules of Court, Rule 10, Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence. -- When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform
to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.
xxx

[14] Rule 129, Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may
be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. (2a)

[15] G.R. No. 49327, July 18, 1991, 199 SCRA 349, 353.

[16] TSN, March 16, 2001, pp. 7-8.

[17] Annex "E."

[18] Exhibits "8" and "9."

[19] Exhibit "10."

[20] Exhibit "11."

[21] Exhibit "7."

[22] Exhibit "F."

[23] Progressive Trade & Service Enterprises v. Antonio, G.R. No. 179502, September 18,
2009, 600 SCRA 683, 689.
[ GR No. 148919, Dec 17, 2002 ]
PEOPLE v. TERESA CORPUZ Y VARGAS +
DECISION
442 Phil. 405

PANGANIBAN, J.:

When the question boils down to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, this
Court almost always relies upon the assessment made by the trial court which had the distinct
advantage of having observed their demeanor, conduct and manner of testifying.
The Case

For review before this Court is the May 30, 2001 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Malabon City (Branch 170) in Criminal Case No. 20334-MN. The RTC found Teresa V.
Corpuz and Marcy J. Santos guilty of violating Section 15 of Article III of Republic Act (RA)
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659
(RA 7659). The dispositive portion of the appealed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds both accused Teresa Corpuz y Vargas
and Marcy Santos y Javier guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 15, Article III
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act 7659, and considering that the total
aggregate quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride is 286.678 grams, and there being no
modifying circumstances hereby sentences each of them to suffer penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00), plus cost of the suit.

"The three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride subject
matter of this case are hereby forfeited in favor of the government, and the Office-in-Charge,
Office of the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to turn over the aforesaid items to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition."[2]

The Information, dated January 6, 1999, charged appellants as follows:

"That on or about the 4th day of January, 1999 in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, being private persons and without authority
of law, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver in consideration
of the amount of P300,000.00 to a poseur- buyer [t]hree (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic
bags each marked Exhibit A-1, A-2, & A-3, with white crystalline substance weighing 99.784,
105.812 and 81.082 grams when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive results for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as 'shabu' which is a regulated drug."[3]

During their arraignment on February 18, 1999, appellants, assisted by their counsel,[4]
pleaded not guilty.[5] After trial in due course, the lower court rendered its assailed Decision.

The Facts

Prosecution's Version

In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution's version of the
facts as follows:

"On January 4, 1999, around 6 o'clock in the evening, a confidential police informant, a.k.a.
'Josie', went to the Special Anti-Narcotics Enforcement Team at Camp Gen. Pantaleon, Imus,
Cavite and informed team leader Inspector Nolasco Cortez of a transaction that involved
appellants Teresa Corpuz (alias 'Tess') and Marcy Santos (alias 'Mar') as sellers of three
hundred (300) grams of shabu worth P300,000.00. It appears that prior to 'Josie's' arrival at
Camp Pantaleon, the information was already relayed to Cortez through telephone.
"Acting on the information, Inspector Cortez formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation
designating PO3 Albert Colaler as the poseur-buyer with SPO2 Joseph Yatco and PO1 Aldrin
Agravante as back-up arresting officers. Colaler was handed a marked P1,000-peso bill which
he placed over a bundle of boodle money. The plan was for 'Josie' to introduce Colaler as an
interested shabu buyer. As a pre-arranged signal, Colaler would remove his white b[a]ll cap to
signify that the evidence was already with him.

"The buy-bust was to take place along Rizal Avenue in Malabon, near a Jollibee outlet and a
church. Prior to the operation, the team coordinated with the Malabon Police Station.

"The buy-bust team arrived at the scene around 11:15 in the evening. The police back-up
immediately positioned themselves at a strategic location while Colaler and 'Josie' waited.
When appellants arrived, 'Josie' introduced Colaler who was asked by appellant Tess if he had
the money with him. Colaler showed her the boodle money but told Tess he would not give it to
her unless he saw the shabu first. Thereupon, appellant Mar[cy] took out from his belt three (3)
transparent plastic containing white substance and gave them to Tess. The exchange was then
consummated. Mar was about to open the plastic bag with the boodle money when Colaler
immediately removed his white b[a]ll cap -- the pre-arranged signal. The two (2) back-up
officers showed up and introduced themselves as police officers. They arrested appellants and
recovered from them the boodle money. Appellants [were] thereafter taken and booked at
Camp Pantaleon.

"Based on the chemistry report prepared by Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, the qualitative examination conducted on the specimen confiscated from
appellants indicated that the same was indeed 'methamphetamine hydrochloride' otherwise
known as shabu."[6] (Citations omitted)

Defense's Version

Appellants, on the other hand, argue that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Their version of the facts is as follows:

"On January 4, 1999 at around 5:30 P.M., [Appellant Teresa Corpuz] was sleeping at her
house when awakened by a knock at the door. She stood and opened the door only to see
Zeny and her three (3) female companions at the door step. Zeny said, her friends need her
service being a 'manghihilot'. After she administered 'hilot' to a certain Josie, she went out to
buy food. Upon her return, she saw one of the companions of Josie talking to somebody
through the cellular phone by the doorstep. They then [talked] about their lives while drinking
softdrinks and Josie took pity on her and promised to introduced [sic] her to her (Josie) boss
who allegedly helps people like the accused. Josie then asked her to accompany them to
Jollibee since they were unaccustomed to Malabon and for fear that they might be victimized
by hold-uppers. However, Josie first asked her company in buying medicine at Mercury Drug
Store, which is just nearby the food chain. This is because Josie had difficulty in breathing on
account of asthma. Coming from the drug store, they proceeded to Jollibee. As soon as Josie's
boss arrived, they went out of the store where she was introduced to the former whom she
eventually came to know to be Lt. Cortez in Cavite. Moments [later] a tricycle came behind the
car. There were three (3) persons on board. One of them approached Josie and gave [her]
something gift-wrapped about three to six inches in size. She was surprised why the man has
attempt[ed] to run away immediately after bringing out the wrapped thing. Nonetheless, Josie
was able to take hold of the said thing before the man fled. She was only three steps behind
Josie when she witnessed the shocking and swift incident. A shooting spree ensued in pursuit
of the [speeding] tricycle. One of the female companion[s] of Josie then handcuffed her while
another male person pushed her inside the car. She was not able to do anything except to cry
after being told that not to speak a word against and just to explain her side when they arrived
in Cavite. Reaching the place, Lt. Cortez showed to her the packets. She denied knowing
anything [about] what was wrapped. Whereupon, Lt. Cortez open[ed] the pack and she saw
three (3) separate plastic bags with white crystalline substance inside. She was told that the
contents are 'Shabu'. Lt. Cortez also asked her whether she is aware of the penalty attached to
the [possession] of illegal drugs which she denied knowing neither the identity of the owner of
the same. The police officer then exhibited to her list of names wherein hers does not appear.
She was queried whether she knows those persons listed and again she denied. Lt. Cortez
finally read the names and forced her to single out a particular one in exchange for her
freedom. She likewise added that she is not aware if Josie and her companions were also
arrested.

"On other hand, Marcy Santos gave a different scenario:

"He said that he was on his way home after having gone [to] Monumento. He was not able to
reach his destination because Inday a.k.a. Teresa Corpuz saw him in C-4 and requested him
to go with her in going to Mercury Drug located at the town proper where they would buy
medicine. Corpuz was with her son and two women companions. They went to Jollibee,
afterwhich, he brought Teresa's son home by taking a ride near Seven Eleven Store where he
[was] noticed and [they] immediately arrested him. He told them that he does [not] know
anything but was instead advised to explain when they reach[ed] their office. He was then
shoved inside the car and admonished not to shout. At Imus, Cavite, he was forced to admit
that he was the one carrying the wrapped thing. He, however, claimed that he was only
standing at the place. Santos denied having sold or received any money involving drug
transaction."[7]
Ruling of the Trial Court

After a judicious assessment of the evidence submitted by both parties, the RTC ruled that the
prosecution had been able to prove with certainty all the elements of the illegal sale of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. It described as clear and
straightforward the poseur-buyer's testimony, which was amply corroborated by the other
members of the buy-bust team.[8]

Further, the RTC rejected appellants' defense of denial. Not only was it inconsistent and
contradictory, it also failed to achieve the intended purpose.[9] It likewise held that the
entrapment and the arrest of appellants were not effected haphazardly. Furthermore, it held
that no ill motive could be attributed to the police officers who had conducted the buy-bust
operation.[10]

Hence, this appeal.[11]

The Issue

In their Brief, appellants assign the following errors for the Court's consideration:

"Trial court erred in not finding that the buy-bust operation was in fact tainted by abuse on the
part of the police authorities;

II

"The trial court also erred in finding that the case of the prosecution is strong and the version of
the accused is weak."[12]

In the main, this Court will take up two issues: the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence,
particularly the buy-bust operation; and the defense of denial.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is not meritorious.

Main Issue:
Sufficiency of the Buy-Bust Operation
Appellants argue that the buy-bust operation conducted was tainted with abuse of authority.
They aver that if indeed they were validly arrested after having allegedly been caught in
flagrante delicto, there was no reason for the police to ask Appellant Corpuz to single out a
name from a list shown to her in exchange for her freedom -- a scheme known in street
parlance as palit ulo.[13]

The contention is untenable.

Many times, this Court has already ruled that a buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment
which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Law."[14] The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of
drugs are as follows: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[15]

What is essential in a prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs is proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place and the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,[16]
which has two elements: (1) proof of the occurrence of a certain event and (2) a person's
criminal responsibility for the act.[17]

Further, in a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes a contest
of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. In such a situation, this Court generally relies
upon the assessment by the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the
conduct or demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.[18] Hence, its factual findings
are accorded respect -- even finality -- absent any showing that certain facts of weight and
substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misapplied.[19] We find no reason to deviate from this rule in the case before us.[20]

The principal witnesses clearly established the elements of the crime: an illegal sale of the
dangerous drug actually took place, and appellants were the authors thereof. The testimony of
PO3 Albert Colaler, the poseur-buyer, was clear and straightforward. It was amply corroborated
by the testimonies of SPO1 Joseph Yatco and PO1 Aldrin Agravante, the back-up police
officers during the entrapment.[21] PO3 Colaler narrated the circumstances leading to the
arrest of appellants as follows:

"Q
Where were you assigned as policeman on January 4, 1999?
A
I was assigned at Special Anti-Narcotics Enforcement Team, Camp Gen. Pataleon, Imus,
Cavite, sir.
Q
At around 6:00 o'clock in the morning on that day January 4, 1999 where were you?
A
I was in our office, sir.

Q
What happened while you were there?
A
On or about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon a confidential informant arrived and informed our
team leader, Insp. [N]olasco Cortez, about his transaction that said confidential informant will
have a transaction with two persons whose names were Teresa Corpuz and Marcy Santos
who are both residing at Tañong, Malabon, sir.

Q
What happened next after that conversation of the confidential informant with Insp. Cortez?
A
He also informed us that the two friends have an interested buyer from Cavite willing to buy
shabu with a quantity of 300 grams worth P300,000.00, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Q
After this conversation with the confidential informant and Insp. Cortez what happened?
A
Based on the information, our team leader Insp. Nolasco Cortez formed a team to conduct
buybust operation and I will act as poseur-buyer with members of the team, SPO2 Joseph
Yatco and PO1 Aldrin Agravante as back-up arresting officers, sir.

Q
What preparations were made in connection with that supposed transaction?
A
I was given P1,000.00 bill and I placed marking with my initial/alias AL on the neck of picture of
the person appearing on said bill, sir.

Q
What else did you do?
A
After placing AL, the money was placed on top of the [boodle] money then I placed the money
inside a transparent plastic, sir.

Q
After that where did you proceed?
A
After that we talked about our pre-arranged signal which is to remove my white b[a]ll cap
signa[l]ing that the evidence is already with me, sir.

Q
Where did you proceed next?
A
After that on or about 9:30 in the evening we left our office and went to the target area wherein
the suspects and our confidential informant will meet and while approaching the place our
confidential informant called alias Tess saying that we are coming, sir.

Q
Where is that target place that you mentioned?
A
Rizal Avenue, Malabon, near Jollibee and church, sir.

Q
What time did you arrive at the target place?
A
We arrived [on] or about 11:15 in the evening, sir.

Q
What happened when you arrived at the target place?
A
While my companions, SPO1 Yatco and PO1 Agravante, were positioned strategically at a
certain place, the confidential informant and I waited at the place agreed upon, sir.

Q
What is the exact place that you positioned yourself with the confidential inf[o]rmant?
A
In front of the church, before entering, where our vehicle was parked, sir.

Q
What happened while you were waiting?
A
After a few moments, alias Tess and Ma[r] arrived, sir.

Q
How do you know they are alias Tess and Ma[r] who arrived?
A
After the duo arrived they greeted the confidential informant and the latter introduced me to the
duo, sir.

Q
Your confidential informant is a boy?
A
Girl, sir.

Q
After you were introduced to Tess and Mar what happened next?
A
After I was introduced as buyer of shabu, alias Tess asked if I have the money to be used as
payment for shabu, sir.

Q
What was your answer?
A
I told her the money is with me and I showed the [boodle] money, sir.

Q
How did you show the money?
A
When she asked about the money I showed her the plastic wherein the [boodle] money was
amounting to P300,000.00 wherein the P500.00 bill as on top, sir.

Q
What happened next after you [showed] that plastic containing the money?
A
After they have seen the money, I asked them if they brought the shabu, sir.

Q
What were you wearing at that time?
A
Pants and polo and shoes, sir.

Q
What happened next?
A
After asking that question, Mar put out the three transparent plastic with white substance which
he took from his belt-bag and which he handed to alias Tess, sir.

Q
After these three packs coming from Mar were turned over to Tess what did Tess do with
these?
A
She handed the same to me and I saw that they were of good [quality]. I gave to alias Tess the
[boodle] money, P300,000.00, as payment and she gave it to Mar. sir.

Q
You said you considered these three packs as good quality of what?
A
White granules suspected to be shabu, sir.

Q
After you delivered the [boodle] mo[ney] to Tess what happened next?
A
When she was holding the money… [interrupted]

Court:
The money was delivered to Mar.

Pros. (witness)

Q
After the money was delivered to Mar, what happened next?
A
When Mar was about to open the said plastic containing the money I took off my b[a]ll cap to
signal my companions and then SPO1 Yatco and PO1 Agravante arrived and we int[ro]duced
ourselves as policemen. SPO1 Yatco arrested alias Tess and PO1 Agravante arrested Mar and
[re]covered the [boodle] money, sir."[22]
Without doubt, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs[23] and to prove the charge of illegal sale of shabu.[24] The clear,
straightforward and consistent testimonies of PO3 Colaler and other members of the
entrapment team were concurrent on material points, replete with relevant details, and
sufficiently supportive of the RTC's conclusions.[25] Absent any persuasive evidence showing
that they testified falsely, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive existed, and
that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.[26]

Further, the collective testimonies of these prosecution witnesses were corroborated by the
physical evidence on record as contained in Chemistry Report No. D-0011-99.[27] Upon
laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance found in appellants' possession, was
positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride.[28]

While appellants allege that the buy-bust operation was tainted with abuse, they have not
advanced any reason why the lower court should have disbelieved the testimony of PO3
Colaler.[29] Except for their self-serving statements, they have likewise failed to present
evidence to establish that the police operation was tainted with abuse of authority.[30]

Instead, the facts show that appellants were apprehended in flagrante delicto during a buy-
bust operation. Their arrest falls within the ambit of Section 5(a)[31] of Rule 113 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure on arrests without a warrant.[32] Their unsubstantiated charge that the
entrapping officers abused their authority in conducting the buy-bust operation cannot prevail
over the categorical and unshaken testimonies of the latter, who caught appellants red-
handed.[33]

The police officers allegedly asked Appellant Corpuz to single out a name from the list shown
to her in exchange for her freedom. The fact that appellants have not filed a single complaint
against them evidently shows that the former's allegation of abuse of authority was a mere
concoction.[34]

With nothing to substantiate such malicious accusation, credence shall be given to the
narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses, as they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner.[35] This presumption of
regularity has not been sufficiently controverted by appellants.[36] Certainly, it must prevail
over their unfounded allegations.[37]

Second Issue:
Defense of Denial
The defense of denial, like alibi, is invariably viewed with disfavor by courts, because it can
easily be concocted. It is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[38] As has been held, denial is a weak form of defense,
particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.[39]

Appellant Corpuz claims that on the day of the incident, she was introduced to "Josie," whom
she later accompanied to Jollibee. Thereafter, she was given a wrapped package by unknown
persons and then arrested by the police.[40] Evidently, her claim now -- that in the middle of
the night, she accompanied a person she had just met for the first time -- tests the limits of
credibility.[41]

Similarly unbelievable is the story of Appellant Santos that after they had gone to Mercury Drug
Store, he was asked by Appellant Corpuz to bring home her son.[42] Moreover, Appellant
Santos did not offer any satisfactory explanation why the police officers would single him out
from among the crowd milling around Seven-Eleven on that particular day and arrest him for
no apparent reason.[43] The records show that there was no prior surveillance conducted
against appellants.[44]

Evidently, the defense of denial resorted by appellants is weakened by their conflicting and
irreconcilable statements on the witness stand.[45] As correctly pointed out by the RTC, it is
difficult to understand why they presented two different stories about the events prior to their
apprehension, when they had a common stand on the issue.[46] Verily, their denial cannot
prevail over the prosecution witnesses' positive testimonies.[47]

Alleged Inconsistencies

Appellants further claim that there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers,
who were the principal prosecution witnesses.[48] We are not convinced.

There were no such material inconsistencies. Rather, those testimonies complemented one
another in giving a complete picture of how the illegal sale of the prohibited drug had
transpired, and how it led to appellants' apprehension in flagrante delicto.[49] At the very least,
whatever inconsistencies there were in PO3 Colaler's testimony were minor and did not detract
from the veracity and the weight of the prosecution evidence.[50]

What is material and indispensable is that the sale of the illegal drugs was adequately
established;[51] the prosecution eyewitness clearly identified both appellants as the offenders,
[52] and the substance itself was presented before the court.[53] The exact denomination of
the genuine bills that had been placed on top of the boodle money is not a critical fact. It is
enough that the prosecution proved that money had been paid to appellants for the sale and
the delivery of shabu.[54]

On the basis of such evaluation and analysis, the trial court clearly committed no error in
according greater weight to the positive identification and forthright declarations made by the
prosecution witnesses.[55] Bare denials cannot prevail over their positive identification of
appellants as the persons who sold the shabu.[56]

Under Section 15 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by RA 7659, the sale of
regulated drugs without proper authority is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from P500,000 to P10,000,000.[57] Under Section 20 thereof, the penalty in
Section 15, Article III shall be applied if the dangerous drug involved is, in the case of shabu or
methamphetamine hydrochloride, 200 grams or more.[58]

As early as People v. Simon,[59] this Court has already recognized the suppletory application
of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to the Dangerous Drugs Act after the
amendment of the latter by RA 7659 on December 31, 1993.[60] Since there were no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending appellants' violation of the law, and the
aggregate quantity of shabu seized was 286.678 grams, reclusion perpetua is the penalty that
may be imposed, pursuant to Article 63[61] of the Revised Penal Code. [62]

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
fine is increased to P500,000. Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 14-18; penned by Judge Benjamin T. Antonio.

[2] Assailed Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 18; records, p. 228.

[3] Rollo, pp. 6; signed by 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Nepthali A. Aliposa.

[4] Atty. Jose Rico Domingo.

[5] See Order dated February 18, 1999; records, p. 19.

[6] Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-7; rollo, pp. 57-61. The Brief was signed by Assistant Solicitor
General Carlos N. Ortega, Assistant Solicitor General Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and Associate
Solicitor Arnold G. Frane.

[7] Appellants' Brief, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 34-35. The 10-page-Brief was signed by Atty. Jose Rico
P. Domingo.

[8] Assailed Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 17.

[9] Id., pp. 7 & 18.

[10] Id., pp. 6 & 17.

[11] This case was deemed submitted for resolution on May 27, 2002, upon the Court's receipt
of appellee's Brief. Appellants' Brief was received by the Court on January 15, 2002. The filing
of a reply brief as deemed waived, as none was submitted within the reglementary period.

[12] Appellants' Brief, p. 1; rollo, p. 33. O`riginal in upper case.

[13] Id., pp. 5 & 36.

[14] People v. Juatan, 260 SCRA 532, August 20, 1996, per Vitug, J.

[15] People v. Montano, 337 SCRA 608, August 11, 2000; People v. Cueno, 298 SCRA 621,
November 16, 1998; People v. De Vera, 275 SCRA 87, July 7, 1997.

[16] People v. Uy, 327 SCRA 335, March 7, 2000; People v. Castro, 274 SCRA 115, June 19,
1997.

[17] People v. Boco, 309 SCRA 42, June 23, 1999; People v. Cabodoc, 263 SCRA 187,
October 15, 1996. [18] People v. Sy, GR No. 147348, September 24, 2002; People v. Chen Tiz
Chang, 325 SCRA 776, February 17, 2000.

[19] People v. Chen Tiz Chang, supra.

[20] People v. Yatco, GR No. 138388, March 19, 2002.

[21] Assailed Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 17.

[22] TSN, August 12, 1999, pp. 2-5.

[23] People v. Concepcion, GR No. 133225, July 26, 2001.

[24] People v. Uy, supra.

[25] People v. Cheng Ho Chua, 305 SCRA 28, March 18, 1999.

[26] People v. Julian-Fernandez, GR Nos. 143850-53, December 18, 2001; People v. Cuba,
336 SCRA 389, July 24, 2000; People v. Bernal, 254 SCRA 659, March 13, 1996.

[27] Records p. 10.

[28] Ibid.

[29] People v. Medina, 292 SCRA 439, July 10, 1998.

[30] People v. Montano, supra.

[31] This section provides:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant ; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

xxxxxxxxx

[32] People v. Montano, supra.

[33] People v. Medina, supra.

[34] People v. Alegro, 275 SCRA 216, July 8, 1997.

[35] People v. Julian-Fernandez, supra.

[36] Mallari v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 456, December 9, 1996.

[37] People v. Concepcion, supra.

[38] People v. Sy Bing Yok, 309 SCRA 28, June 23, 1999.

[39] People v. Mustapa, 352 SCRA 252 February 19, 2001.

[40] TSN, June 6, 2000, pp. 2-6.

[41] People v. Bongalon, GR No. 125025, January 23, 2002.

[42] TSN, August 10, 2000, pp. 3-4.

[43] People v. Bongalon, supra.

[44] Ibid.

[45] People v. Tilos, 349 SCRA 281, January 16, 2001.

[46] Assailed Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 18.

[47] People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220, April 6, 1990.

[48] Appellants' Brief, p. 5; rollo, p. 36.

[49] People v. Ganenas, GR No. 141400, September 6, 2001.

[50] People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, January 22, 1999.

[51] People v. Castro, supra.

[52] People v. Ganguso, 250 SCRA 268, November 23, 1995; People v. Hoble, 211 SCRA 675,
July 22, 1992.

[53] People v. Beriarmente, GR No. 137612, September 25, 2001; People v. Boco, 309 SCRA
42, June 23, 1999.

[54] People v. Doria, supra.

[55] People v. Medina, supra.

[56] People v. Sy Bing Yok, supra.

[57] This article provides:

"SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of

Regulated Drugs.- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug.

x x x x x x x x x."

[58] This article provides:

"SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or instruments
of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and
Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs
involved is in any of the following quantities:

1. 40 grams or more of opium;

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;"

xxxxxxxxx

[59] 234 SCRA 555, July 29, 1994.

[60] People v. Medina, supra.

[61] This article provides:

"ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.- In all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

"In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance,
the greater penalty shall be applied.

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied."
xxxxxxxxx

[62] People v. Chua, GR No. 133789, August 23, 2001; People v. Che Chun Ting, 328 SCRA
592, March 21, 2000.

[ GR No. 183819, Jul 23, 2009 ]

PEOPLE v. ARSENIO CORTEZ Y MACALINDONG +
DECISION
611 Phil. 360

VELASCO JR., J.:

The Case

Accused-appellant Arsenio M. Cortez appeals from the Decision dated September 20, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02269, affirming the March 21, 2006
Decision in Crim. Case No. 13003-D of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 164 in Pasig
City. The RTC found him guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

In an Information dated October 28, 2003, Cortez was charged with the crime of violation of
Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 9165, allegedly committed as follows:

On or about October 26, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to SPO2 Dante Zipagan, a police
poseur-buyer, one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing four (4)
centigrams (0.04 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the tests for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.

Contrary to law.[1]

When arraigned, Cortez entered a plea of "not guilty."

During the pre-trial conference and as shown by the Pre-Trial Order,[2] the defense admitted
the authenticity and due execution of the prosecution's Exhibit "B," the memorandum
requesting laboratory examination of a substance suspected of being shabu, and Exhibit "C,"
Physical Science Report No. D-2061-03E dated October 26, 2003. The defense also
manifested that it would interpose the defense of denial.

To prove its case, the prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of SPO2 Dante
Zipagan and PO1 Michael Espares, both members of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit
(SDEU), Pasig City Police Station. On the other hand, the defense presented Arsenio M.
Cortez himself, and one Pedrito T. de Borja.

Version of the Prosecution

On October 26, 2003, at about 2 o'clock in the morning, a confidential informant reported to the
Pasig City Police SDEU that a certain "Archie" was selling shabu in the vicinity of Brgy. Buting,
Pasig City. Upon being apprised of this bit of information, SDEU Chief P/Insp. Melbert
Esguerra held a briefing, formed a four-man team to conduct a buy-bust operation, and
designated SPO2 Zipagan to act as team leader poseur-buyer. Two (2) PhP 100 bills to be
used as buy-bust money were handed to SPO2 Zipagan who then put his initials "DZ" on the
bill notes. A pre-operation report was made and submitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency which then gave it control number 2610-03-01.

Thereafter, the team, composed of, among others, PO1 Espares and SPO2 Zipagan, with the
informant, proceeded to the target area. SPO2 Zipagan and the informant proceeded ahead of
the group. At the corner of San Guillermo and E. Mendoza streets, they located the target
person whereupon the informant introduced the poseur-buyer to "Archie." When asked how
much he wanted to buy, SPO2 Zipagan replied PhP 200 worth only and gave alias "Archie" the
marked money. Thereafter, "Archie" took out from his right pocket and handed to SPO2
Zipagan a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance.
Thereupon, SPO2 Zipagan executed the pre-arranged signal, by removing his hat, signifying
the consummation of the transaction. SPO2 Zipagan then introduced himself and announced
the seller's arrest.

Meanwhile, the back-up police operatives, who were 10 meters away, upon noticing the pre-
arranged signal, rushed toward their team leader to help him hold "Archie." SPO2 Zipagan
then directed "Archie" to empty his pocket. From his left pocket, "Archie" brought out with his
left hand the buy-bust money. PO1 Espares later testified having witnessed this particular
episode.

Afterwards, the team hauled "Archie" to the Pasig City Police Station for investigation. The
investigator, PO1 Clarence Nipales, then prepared a request for laboratory examination on the
white crystalline substance subject of the buy-bust operation. SPO2 Zipagan executed a sworn
statement in connection with the arrest of "Archie," who was later identified as accused-
appellant Cortez.

The seized transparent plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance was
forwarded to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office on St. Francis St.,
Mandaluyong City. P/Insp. Joseph M. Perdido, Forensic Chemical Officer, conducted a
qualitative examination on the said specimen weighing 0.04 gram. The examined specimen
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The corresponding Report No.
D-2061-03E contained the following pertinent entries:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

A - One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking `AMC 10-26-03' containing
0.04 gram white crystalline substance.

xxxx

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of any dangerous drug.

xxxx

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the
tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

xxxx

CONCLUSION:

Specimen A contain Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[3] x x x

Version of the Defense

Cortez denied committing the crime charged. His own version of what transpired may be
summarized as follows:
He recounted that on October 26, 2003, between 12 o'clock midnight and 1 o'clock in the
morning, he was in a house on Capt. Cortez St., Pateros, in bed with his live-in partner, Gina
Flores, when he heard and answered a knocking sound outside. At the door was someone he
met thrice who used to pawn things to him. Once allowed entry, the visitor offered to sell a cell
phone. When Cortez expressed disinterest, the visitor took the cell phone unit out and pressed
the dial button. At that moment, the door suddenly opened and two persons entered, followed
later by two others.

Afterwards, Cortez was alternately brought out and in the house. All the while, he kept on
inquiring what the case against him was all about only to be told to talk to the team leader.
Finally, he was taken outside the house for a ride in a car driven by the cell phone seller. They
stopped at a gasoline station and then boarded a tricycle which brought him to the Pasig City
Police Station, where he was investigated and finally detained.

Pedrito, the second witness for the defense, testified in gist that in the morning in question,
while he was on his way home after buying a cigarette, he saw four persons banging the door
of Cortez's house. Moments later, he heard one of the intruders uttered, "Kilala ko yan, kilala
ko yan (I know him. I know him.)." Then Cortez, followed by Flores, asked about the intrusion
but did not get a satisfactory answer.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On March 21, 2006, in Crim. Case No. 13003-D, the RTC rendered judgment convicting
Cortez of the offense charged and sentenced him as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Arsenio Cortez y Macalindong a.k.a. "Archie" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of selling shabu penalized under Section 5, Article II of
R.A. 9165 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and fine of Five
Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos with all the accessory penalties under the law.

The plastic sachet containing shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit "E-1") is

hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government and turned over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for destruction.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

Forthwith, Cortez went on appeal to the CA. On September 20, 2007, the CA rendered the
assailed decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision
is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[5]

In so ruling, the appellate court dismissed suggestions of frame-up and Cortez's allegations
regarding the inability of the prosecution to prove that the drug presented in court was the
same drug seized from him.

Cortez filed a Notice of Appeal which the CA gave due course. This Court, by Resolution of
September 3, 2008, required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. To
date, Cortez has not filed any brief, while the People manifested that it is no longer filing any
supplemental brief. Cortez's inaction and the prosecution's manifestation indicate their
willingness to submit the case on the basis of the records already on file, thus veritably
reiterating their principal arguments raised in the CA, which on the part of Cortez may be
formulated, as follows:

THE [CA] ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED

DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT

Our Ruling

We sustain Cortez's conviction.

Buy-Bust Operation is a Form of Entrapment

As before the appellate court, Cortez decries that he was a victim of a frame-up, implying the
illegality of the buy-bust operation undertaken by the Pasig City anti-drug operatives.

Cortez's challenge about the legality of a buy-bust operation is already a closed issue. In
People v. Bongalon,[6] the Court elucidated on the nature and legality of a buy-bust operation,
noting that it is a form of entrapment that is resorted to for trapping and capturing felons who
are pre-disposed to commit crimes. The operation is legal and has been proved to be an
effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and
legal safeguards is undertaken.[7] Entrapment should be distinguished from instigation which
has been viewed as contrary to public policy.

In American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" generally has a negative connotation, because
the idea to commit the criminal act originates from the police, as opposed to the accused
having a predisposition to commit the crime.[8] In Sorrells v. United States, entrapment was
defined as the "conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its
commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion or
fraud of the officer."[9]

In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, the Court laid down the distinction between entrapment
and instigation or inducement, to wit:

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.--While it has been said that the practice of entrapping
persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and
while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has
sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is
that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were
purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the `decoy solicitation' of
persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were
present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases
where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes
evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if
the offense was committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The
fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the
latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of
such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner
or the public authorities, and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying
out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to
a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a `spotter,' detective,
or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary.[10]

It is fairly clear that the concept of entrapment under the American criminal justice system
bears a similarity to the concept of instigation or inducement under the Philippine judicial
setting. Such that once the criminal intent arises from the police officers without any
predisposition from the defendant to commit the crime, both jurisdictions consider the act as
illegal. Entrapment in the Philippines is, however, not a defense available to the accused;
instigation is, and is considered, an absolutory cause.[11]
In determining the occurrence of entrapment, two tests have been developed: the subjective
test and the objective test.[12] Under the "subjective" view of entrapment, the focus is on the
intent or predisposition of the accused to commit a crime.[13] Under the "objective" view, on
the other hand, the primary focus is on the particular conduct of law enforcement officials or
their agents and the accused's predisposition becomes irrelevant.[14] The government agent's
act is evaluated in the light of the standard of conduct exercised by reasonable persons
generally and whether such conduct falls below the acceptable standard for the fair and
honorable administration of justice.[15]

Courts have adopted the "objective" test in upholding the validity of a buy-bust operation. In
People v. Doria, the Court stressed that, in applying the "objective" test, the details of the
purported transaction during the buy-bust operation must be clearly and adequately shown,
i.e., the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, and the
promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of
the illegal drug subject of the sale. We further emphasized that the "manner by which the initial
contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the
payment of the `buy-bust' money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant
alone or the police officer, must be subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding
citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense."[16]

In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the police officers used entrapment to nab
Cortez in the act of selling shabu. As aptly found below, it was the confidential informant who
made initial contact with Cortez when he introduced SPO2 Zipagan as buyer. SPO2 Zipagan
then asked to buy PhP 200 worth of shabu and paid using the previously marked money.
Cortez then gave SPO2 Zipagan a plastic sachet containing what turned out to be shabu.
Then, upon the sending out of the pre-set signal, Cortez was arrested. The established
sequence of events categorically shows a typical buy-bust operation as a form of entrapment.
The police officers' conduct was within the acceptable standard of fair and honorable
administration of justice.

Elements of the Crime Established; Chain of Custody Observed

In his further bid for acquittal, Cortez advances the matter of custodial chain. As he asserted in
his Brief,[17] the apprehending police officers failed, after the buy bust, to make an inventory of
the seized item and mark the container of the substance allegedly recovered from him, thus
raising doubts as to the identity of what was seized.

We disagree.
In People v. Pendatun, the Court reiterated the essential elements of the crime of illegal sale of
prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another and (2) he
knew that what he had sold and delivered was a prohibited drug.[18] All these elements were
ably proved by the prosecution in the instant case. The fact of sale and eventual delivery by
Cortez, as seller, of a substance later identified as shabu to SPO2 Zipagan, as buyer who paid
PhP 200 for it, had been established. The Court considers the ensuing vivid account of SPO2
Zipagan on this point:

Q:
When you arrived at the scene or the reported place, what transpired next, if any?

A:
I asked the other operatives to position themselves in a viewing distance and I myself[,]
together with the informant[,] proceeded to the corner of San Guillermo and Mendoza Street to
locate the suspect.

Q:
How far where your companions were from you and [the] suspect during the conduct of the
actual buy-bust?

xxxx

A:
More or less ten (10) meters.

xxxx

Q:
Were you able to in fact locate the subject?

A:
Yes, sir.

Q:
How were you able to locate him[?] [Did] you know him personally before the operation?

A:
Only the informant, sir, knew the suspect.

Q:
And what transpired when you [located] the suspect?

A:
I [was] introduced by the informant to the suspect that I will buy a shabu, sir.

Q:
And what happened after that?

A:
The suspect asked me if how much I will buy, sir.

Q:
What did you tell him?

A:
Only 200 pesos.

Q:
And 200 pesos worth of shabu is how many in terms of grams?

A:
I could not........ (discontinued)

Q:
You do not know?

A:
Yes, sir.

Q:
And what did the subject person tell you or do after that?

A:
I gave the money and then he dipped his right hand on his right pocket and gave me on (1)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.

Q:
When you said that the person gave you the one (1) transparent plastic sachet you meant that
it was actually in your possession at the precise time, you already took possession of the
sachet?

A:
Yes, sir.

Q:
Will you describe what was inside the plastic sachet at that time?

A:
It contains white crystalline substance, sir.

Q:
And at that very moment[,] what transpired after you have already obtained the plastic sachet
from the suspect?

A:
I gave my pre-arrange[d] signal to my other co-operatives.

Q:
And what happened next?

A:
I introduced myself to the accused and I [held] him [as] my two (2) co-operatives helped me in
holding the said accused, sir.

Q:
Did you announce your arrest on the accused?

A:
Yes, sir.

Q:
By the way, what was the name of this person from whom you bought this white crystalline
substance contained in the plastic sachet?

A:
He [was] identified later on as Arsenio Macalindong Cortez.

xxxx

Q:
After you announced the arrest of the accused and you have obtained the illegal substance
and recovered the buy-bust money, to where did you bring the accused?

A:
In our office in Pasig City Police Station, sir.

Q:
And [did] you conduct an investigation?

A:
Yes, sir.

Q:
In connection with the investigation conducted on the accused, what documentation from your
recollection was ever prepared?

A:
He made a request to examine the recovered evidence.

Q:
Who made the request?

A:
Our investigator, sir. x x x

Q:
Are you familiar with the signature of your police investigator? By the way, who was the
investigator who made the report?

A:
PO1 Nipales.
Q:
If said request will be shown to you will you be able to identify it?

A:
Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q:
You mentioned that the substance was confiscated from the accused [and] was forwarded to
the crime laboratory, is that correct?

A:
Yes, sir.

Q:
Was there a report given by a crime laboratory on the examination conducted?

A:
Yes, sir.

Q:
When was the report returned or forwarded back to you[?] [W]as it on the same day?

A:
I could not remember.

Q:
But you were able to get a hold of the copy?

A:
Yes, sir.

Q:
How about the substance, was there any markings made on said substance before it was
forwarded to the crime laboratory?

A:
Yes, sir.

Q:
Who made the markings?

A:
I, sir.

Q:
And if said markings or the substance contained the markings is again shown to you, will you
still be able to identify [it] again?

A:
Yes, sir.

Q:
Showing to you this plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance with sub-markings.

I have this plastic sachet with white crystalline substance with markings AMC 10-26-03 with
additional marking D-2061-03E enclosed in quotation letter A JMP. At the back portion Exhibit
E-1 1-29-04. Can you go over this piece of evidence, plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substances, you tell this Honorable Court which markings did you place among the markings
which according to you [you] made on said plastic sachet?

A:
Capital letter AMC, sir, and the date the accused [was] arrested.

xxxx

Q:
Aside from that[,] were there any other markings made by you, the other markings D-2061-03E
JMP, whose markings was that?

A:
I do not know.

Q:
What relation has this piece of plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, is that the
same plastic sachet which was taken from the accused during the buy-bust operation?

A:
Yes, sir, this is the same evidence.

Q:
Meaning, this was the crystalline substance which was shown to you by the accused during
the buy-bust operation?

A:
Yes, sir.
xxxx

Q:
Do you know what was the result of the laboratory examination?

A:
Yes, sir.

Q:
Tell the court what was the result?

A:
It gave positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Q:
Were you able to get hold of the Physical Science Report of the said substance?

A:
Yes, sir.

Q:
If said result will be shown to you will you still be able to identify it?

A:
Yes, sir.

Q:
I'm showing to you this Physical Science Report No. D-2061-03E, is this the report you were
referring to?
A:
Yes, sir.

Q:
Can you go over the result specifically the finding and the conclusion, please read for the
benefit of the court the contents of the findings?

A:
Findings: Qualitative findings conducted on the above-stated specimen gave positive result to
the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[19] x x x (Emphasis added.)

PO1 Espares, who provided back-up assistance to SPO2 Zipagan in the buy-bust operation,
corroborated the foregoing testimony.

Without a trace of equivocation, the trial court held that the prosecution has proved the
elements of the crime charged. The trial court wrote:

From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the identities of the buyer and the seller
were sufficiently shown. The object and consideration were also identified in open court. The
buy-bust money was marked and formally offered in evidence x x x and the object which is the
0.04 gram of shabu was also identified and offered in evidence as Exhibit `E-1'. The object
which is the 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance was tested positive to the tests for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, after a laboratory examination conducted
by P/Insp. Joseph M. Perdido, a Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory x x x.
Report No. D-2061-03E submitted by said Forensic Chemical officer was marked and formally
offered in evidence as Exhibits `C' and `C-1'. The testimony of the Forensic Chemical Officer
was dispensed with by both the public prosecutor and the defense counsel after they made
some stipulations. Moreover, the testimony of SPO2 Dante Zipagan as regards the transaction
that took place on October 26, 2003 was corroborated by PO1 Michael Espares and supported
by documentary as well as object evidence as enumerated beforehand.

Therefore, in the opinion of the court, the elements mentioned above are sufficiently proven by
the prosecution.[20]

This brings us to the matter of the custodial chain.

It bears stressing that in every prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation
in evidence of the seized drug, as an integral part of the corpus delicti, is most material.[21] It
is, therefore, essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be proved with moral certainty.
Even more than this, what must also be established with the same degree of certitude is the
fact that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered
in court as exhibit. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures
that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.[22]

As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally cover the testimony about
every link in the chain, from seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered in
evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, to include, as much as possible, a description of the condition in which it
was delivered to the next link in the chain.[23]

To be sure, testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. Cognizant of this fact, the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 on the handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs
provide as follows:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
A close examination of the IRR of RA 9165 readily reveals that the custodial chain rule admits
of exceptions. Thus, contrary to the brazen assertions of Cortez, the prescriptions of the IRR's
Sec. 21 need not be followed with pedantic rigor as a condition sine qua non for a successful
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not, by
itself, render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from the accused
inadmissible in evidence.[24] What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused."[25]

In the instant case, there had been substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the
handling of the seized item. Its integrity and evidentiary value had not been diminished. The
chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case has not been shown to have been
broken. The factual milieu of the case yields the following: After SPO2 Zipagan confiscated the
0.04 gram of shabu in question, as well as the marked money, following Cortez's arrest, the
seized sachet of suspected shabu was without delay brought to the Pasig City police station
and marked as AMC 10-26-03. Immediately thereafter, the confiscated substance, with a letter
of request for examination, was referred to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination to
determine the presence of any dangerous drug. Per Report No. D-2061-03E, the specimen
submitted contained methamphetamine hydrochloride. The examining officer, P/Insp. Perdido,
duly marked the sachet with his initials, JMP. The contents of the seized plastic sachet had
been found to be the same substance identified and marked as Exhibit "E-1" and adduced in
evidence in court.

In Malillin v. People,[26] the Court stressed the importance of the testimonies of all persons, if
available, who handled the specimen to establish the chain of custody. Thus, the prosecution
offered the testimony of SPO2 Zipagan who first had custody of the seized shabu. The
testimony of the next handling officer, P/Insp. Perdido, was, however, dispensed with after the
public prosecutor and the defense counsel stipulated that Exhibit "E-1"[27] is the same
specimen mentioned in Exhibits "B-1"[28] and "C-1,"[29] and that the said specimen was
regularly examined by the said witness.[30]

It would, thus, appear that the chain in the custody of the illicit drug purchased from Cortez had
been prima facie established as unbroken. Or at the very least, the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized item had not, under the premises, been compromised.

Defense of Denial is Weak

Cortez's main defense of denial cannot prevail over the affirmative and credible testimony of
SP02 Zipagan pointing Cortez as the seller of the prohibited substance. Denial, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, is negative and self-serving evidence and of little,
if any, weight in law. As it can easily be fabricated, in fact a common standard line of defense in
most prosecutions arising from violations of RA 9165,[31] denial is inherently weak.[32] And
the Court is at loss to understand how Cortez can with a straight face set up the defense of
denial after having been caught in possession of the prohibited substance for which he
received PhP 200 from SPO2 Zipagan.

The conclusion may perhaps be different if the police authorities have a motive in falsely
charging Cortez with illegal peddling of shabu. But the element of ill motive does not obtain
under the premises, as determined by the trial court:

Moreover, SPO2 Dante Zipagan and PO1 Michael Espares are police officers who are
presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the absence of proof to the contrary (see
Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court). The evidence offered by the defense failed to show
any ill motive from the prosecution witnesses that would impel them to arrest the accused,
Arsenio M. Cortez.[33]

Lest it be overlooked, Cortez declared not knowing any of the arresting police officers, having
first met them only when they arrested him. This reality argues against the idea that these
operatives would falsely testify, or plant evidence, against him. Cortez, on cross-examination,
testified, as follows:

Q:
Did Zipagan approach you to ask for anything?

A:
No, sir.

Q:
Did any of the three (3) other police officers who arrested you x x x [approach] you and [ask
you for] anything?

A:
No, sir.

Q:
Did you previously know these three (3) police officers previous to your arrest?

A:
No, sir.

Q:
Do you know if all these four (4) police officers had an [axe] to grind against you or you had
any misunderstanding against with them previous to your arrest?

A:
This is the first time I saw the police officers.[34]

In all then, we uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and
find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving Cortez's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02269
finding accused-appellant Arsenio Cortez guilty of the crime charged is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Carpio Morales*, Chico-Nazario, and Peralta, JJ., concur.

* As per Raffle dated July 8, 2009.

[1] CA rollo, p. 5.

[2] Records, p. 16.

[3] Id. at 54.

[4] CA rollo, p. 43.

[5] Rollo, p. 17.

[6] G.R. No. 125025, January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 289, 306.

[7] People v. Herrera, G.R. No. 93728, August 21, 1995, 247 SCRA 433, 439.

[8] 22 C.J.S. CRIMLAW § 72.

[9] 287 U.S. 435, 454, 53 S.Ct. 210, 86 A.L.R. 249, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932).

[10] 56 Phil. 44, 52-53 (1931).

[11] People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668, 694.

[12] 22 C.J.S. CRIMLAW § 77.

[13] Sorrells, supra note 9.

[14] See People v. Smith, 31 Cal. 4th 1207, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559, 80 P.3d 662 (2003); State v.
Vallejos, 1997-NMSC-040, 123 N.M. 739, 945 P.2d 957 (1997); Elders v. State, 321 Ark. 60,
900 S.W.2d 170 (1995); State v. Babers, 514 N.W.2d 79 (Iowa 1994); State v. Nehring, 509
N.W.2d 42 (N.D. 1993); State v. Nakamura, 65 Haw. 74, 648 P.2d 183 (1982); State v. Little,
121 N.H. 765, 435 A.2d 517 (1981); State v. Berger, 285 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 1979); People v.
Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947 (1979).

[15] Keaton v. State, 253 Ga. 70, 316 S.E.2d 452 (1984); Bruce v. State, 612 P.2d 1012
(Alaska 1980).

[16] Supra note 11, at 698-699.

[17] CA rollo, pp. 26-37.

[18] G.R. No. 148822, July 12, 2004, 434 SCRA 148, 155-156; citing People v. Cercado, G.R.
No. 144494, July 26, 2002, 385 SCRA 277; People v. Pacis, G.R. No. 146309, July 18, 2002,
384 SCRA 684.

[19] TSN, March 8, 2004, pp. 7-17.

[20] CA rollo, pp. 42-43.

[21] Doria, supra note 11, at 718.

[22] Malillin v. People, G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619, 632.

[23] Id.

[24] People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 430, 448; citing People v.
Del Monte, G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 627.

[25] Id.; citing People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 421.

[26] Supra note 22.

[27] CA rollo, p. 4. One (1) pc. heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance weighing 0.04 gram.

[28] Id. Request for Laboratory Examination.

[29] Id. Original copy of Report No. D-2061-03E.

[30] Records, p. 28.

[31] People v. Eugenio, G.R. No. 146805, January 16, 2003, 395 SCRA 317, 323; People v.
Barita, G.R. No. 123541, February 8, 2000, 325 SCRA 22, 38.

[32] People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 150624, February 24, 2004, 423 SCRA 652, 662.

[33] CA rollo, p. 16.

[34] TSN, July 14, 2005, p. 11.

Show opinions
DIVISION
[ GR No. 191727, Mar 31, 2014 ]
PEOPLE v. MANUEL APLAT Y SUBLINO +
DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is an appeal from the November 27, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03156 which affirmed the November 5, 2007 Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Baguio City, finding appellant Manuel Aplat y Sublino (appellant)
and his co-accused Jackson Danglay y Botil (Danglay) guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in Criminal
Case No. 26080-R and thereby sentencing each of them to suffer the penalties of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

Factual Antecedents

In an Information[3] dated April 19, 2006, appellant and Danglay were charged with Violation of
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the pertinent portion of which reads:

That on or about the 12th day of April 2006, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and
deliver one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves with fruiting tops wrapped in a newspaper
weighing 950 grams, more or less, for [P]1,500.00 to PO3 PHILIP R. FINES, a bonafide
member of the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Baguio City Police Office, who acted as poseur-
buyer, knowing fully well that said drug is a dangerous drug and that the sale and delivery of
such drug is prohibited without authority of law to do so, in violation of the aforementioned
provision of law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Appellant and Danglay pleaded not guilty to the charge upon their separate arraignment held
on September 14, 2006 and June 22, 2006, respectively.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presents its version of the facts in the following manner:

At around 3:00 p.m. of April 12, 2006, SPO4 Edelfonso L. Sison (SPO4 Sison), while on duty
at the Baguio City Police Office Drug Enforcement Section,[4] received information from a
civilian informant that his acquaintance named "Manuel" was looking for a prospective buyer of
dried marijuana leaves. Forthwith, SPO4 Sison instructed the informant to get in touch with
Manuel and accept the latter's offer. The informant acceded and shortly thereafter returned to
tell SPO4 Sison that Manuel accepted the offer to buy and that the sale would take place
between 4:30 to 5:00 p.m. of the same day in front of JR Bakery along Kayang corner Hilltop
Streets, Baguio City.
SPO4 Sison immediately relayed the information to his superior, Police Senior Inspector
Damian Dulnuan Olsim (P/Sr. Insp. Olsim), who, acting on the same, organized a buy-bust
team for Manuel's entrapment. The team was composed of SPO4 Sison as team leader, PO3
Philip R. Fines (PO3 Fines) as poseur-buyer, with PO3 Robert Sagmayao (PO3 Sagmayao)
and PO2 Roy C. Mateo (PO2 Mateo) as back-ups. PO3 Fines was provided with one
P1,000.00 bill and one P500.00 bill as buy-bust money.[5] He photocopied the bills and had
them authenticated by Prosecutor Victor Dizon and then coordinated the operation with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.

Accompanied by the informant, the team proceeded to the target area, which is only about 50
meters away from their office. Upon arrival thereat at about 4:30 p.m., PO3 Fines and the
informant posted themselves at the terminal of Sablan-bound passenger jeepneys, just across
JR Bakery. Simultaneously, the rest of the team members took strategic positions at the
loading area of the jeepneys bound for Plaza Quezon Hill where they would wait for the pre-
arranged signal from the poseur-buyer. Not long thereafter, two men, one with a sando plastic
bag, arrived from Upper Kayang. Manuel, who turned out to be the appellant, approached the
informant and asked where the buyer was. The informant pointed to PO3 Fines and
introduced him as the prospective buyer. After a brief conversation, appellant demanded the
payment from PO3 Fines who immediately handed to him the marked money. Upon receipt,
appellant in turn took an item wrapped in a newspaper from the sando bag held by his
companion, later identified as Danglay, and gave the same to PO3 Fines. PO3 Fines smelled
and assessed the item and once convinced that it was a brick of marijuana leaves, tapped
appellant's shoulder as a signal to his companions that the sale was already consummated.
With the brick in hand, PO3 Fines then introduced himself as a police officer and with the aid of
SPO4 Sison arrested appellant. Danglay, on the other hand, was arrested by PO3 Sagmayao
and, when frisked by the latter, was found possessing 1½ bricks of suspected marijuana.[6]
After appellant and Danglay were apprised of their violation and constitutional rights, the team
brought them to the police station.

At the police station, PO3 Fines marked the suspected marijuana brick he bought from
appellant with "PRF, 04-12-06, BB" representing his initials, date of operation and the word
buy-bust. PO3 Sagmayao, on the other hand, marked the confiscated bricks from Danglay
with "RPS, 04-12-06." They likewise placed their signatures on the sando plastic bag.
Appellant and Danglay were also identified at the police station and the suspected dried
marijuana leaves inventoried[7] and photographed[8] in their presence as well as of the
representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the media and an elected barangay
official. After a preliminary test on the bricks were made at their office, PO2 Mateo brought on
the same day the confiscated items to the Regional Crime Laboratory at Camp Baldo Dangwa,
La Trinidad, Benguet for chemistry examination per request of P/Sr. Insp. Olsim.[9] Forensic
Chemist Officer P/Sr. Insp. Emilia Gracio Montes[10] then examined the bricks and found them
positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.[11]

Version of the Defense

Appellant and Danglay interposed the defense of denial. Both claimed that there was no buy-
bust operation, no money recovered and no bricks of marijuana seized from them. They
averred that they were just having their snacks at the JR Bakery when they were suddenly
arrested and brought to the police station.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision dated November 5, 2007, the RTC found appellant and Danglay guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision with its corresponding amendment[12]
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding both the accused GUILTY beyond any
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 26080-R and both are hereby sentenced to suffer LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and each to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, appellant and Danglay separately appealed to the CA[13] wherein they questioned
the chain of custody of the subject drugs and the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
against them.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Like the RTC, the CA gave credence to the police officers' narration of the incident as
prosecution witnesses. It brushed aside for being minor inconsistencies the discrepancies in
the testimonies of the said witnesses regarding the details of the buy-bust operation, the actual
color of the bag containing the subject drugs as well as who was carrying the same. Moreover,
the CA rejected appellant and Danglay's defense of denial as they were caught in flagrante
delicto during a legitimate entrapment operation. Thus, on November 27, 2009, the CA
affirmed the amended RTC Decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated November 5, 2007, as amended by the Order
dated November 14, 2007, in Criminal Case Nos. 26080-R x x x of the RTC, Branch 61,
Baguio City, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Undeterred, appellant interposed the present appeal.[15]

Issue

The sole issue presented for the Court's consideration is whether appellant's guilt for the illegal
sale of marijuana, a dangerous drug, was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Our Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

The alleged defects in the prosecution's

version of the incident as well as in the
testimonies of its witnesses, as pointed
out by appellant, do not affect the material
points of the crime charged.

In his quest for the reversal of his conviction, appellant asserts that there was no valid buy-bust
operation since, per the prosecution's version, a mere exchange of goods and money without
any negotiation, particularly on the quantity and value of the drugs, transpired between him, as
the alleged seller, and PO3 Fines, as the poseur-buyer. Moreover, PO3 Fines merely looked
at the confiscated item which was then wrapped in paper and packing tape and did not even
inspect the same prior to his handing over of the marked money to appellant.

Appellant's arguments fail to impress. While it may be true that it was the informant who
brokered the transaction, appellant and the poseur-buyer talked to each other after the
informant introduced to appellant PO3 Fines as the prospective buyer. As testified to by PO3
Fines, appellant demanded the money from him after their brief conversation. And upon
receipt of the item from appellant, he immediately smelled and assessed the contents of the
wrapped item and found the same to be a brick of marijuana.[16]

Appellant further challenges the legality of the buy-bust operation by adverting to the alleged
inconsistency between the testimony of PO3 Fines, who claims that he did not notice who was
carrying the plastic bag containing the alleged dangerous drug or where it came from, and that
of SPO4 Sison, who stated that it was Danglay who was carrying the bag. He also invites the
Court's attention to the conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to the color of
the bag. While PO3 Fines mentioned a red colored bag, SPO4 Sison and PO3 Sagmayao
stated that Danglay was carrying a blue colored sando bag.

The Court, however, finds that the CA correctly agreed with the appellee that the perceived
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are insufficient to diminish their
credibility. Indeed, the inconsistencies alluded to by the appellant refer merely to minor details
and collateral matters that do not in any way affect the material points of the crime charged.
As held in People v. Castro,[17] "[i]nconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do
not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies".
"It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give
varying details as there may be some details which one witness may notice while the other
may not observe or remember."[18]

Elements of the crime adequately

established; Buy-bust operation
regularly conducted.

"In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that the
transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as
evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified."[19] "The commission of the
offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling
transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. Settled is
the rule that as long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer and his offer
was accepted by appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former, the crime is
considered consummated by the delivery of the goods.[20]

In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that a sale of one brick of marijuana for
P1,500.00 took place between PO3 Fines, as buyer, and appellant as seller. The brick of
marijuana was presented before the trial court as Exhibit "O." PO3 Fines positively identified
appellant as the seller. It is, therefore, beyond doubt that a buy-bust operation involving the
illegal sale of marijuana, a dangerous drug, actually took place. Moreover, such buy-bust
operation, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary and based on the facts obtaining in
this case, was regularly carried out by the police operatives.

"A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan."[21]
In this regard, police authorities are given a wide discretion in the selection of effective means
to apprehend drug dealers and the Court is hesitant to establish on a priori basis what detailed
acts they might credibly undertake in their entrapment operations for there is no prescribed
method on how the operation is to be conducted. As ruled in People v. Salazar,[22] a buy-bust
operation deserves judicial sanction as long as it is carried out with due regard to constitutional
and legal safeguards, such as in this case.

The police officers' alleged non-compliance with the requirements under Section 21, Article II
of RA 9165 was raised by appellant for the first time on appeal; Chain of Custody properly
observed in this case.

Appellant harps on the buy-bust team's alleged deviation from the mandated procedure in
taking post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug as provided under Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165. In his Brief, appellant contends that the physical inventory and marking of the
subject illegal drug were not made in his presence and at the place of seizure. Such omission,
he asserts, cast grave doubt on whether the drug submitted for laboratory examination, and
subsequently presented as evidence in court, was the very same drug allegedly sold by him.

Appellant's insinuation hardly lends credence.

Before anything else, it must be stressed that appellant raised the police operatives' alleged
non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 for the first time on appeal. We have
painstakingly scrutinized the transcripts of stenographic notes in this case and found no
instance wherein appellant at the very least intimated during trial that there were lapses in the
safekeeping of the seized item which affected its integrity and evidentiary value. Neither did
he try to show that doubts were cast thereon. Such belated attempt on the part of appellant to
raise this issue at this point in time can no longer be entertained. Following our ruling in
People v. Sta. Maria,[23] several subsequent cases[24] teem with pronouncement that
objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the
court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. The above ruling finds
proper application in the present case.

Be that as it may, the fact that the inventory and marking of the subject item were not made
onsite is of no moment and will not lead to appellant's exoneration. From a cursory reading of
Section 21(a)[25] of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165, it can be gleaned
that in cases of warrantless seizures, as in this case, inventory and marking of the seized item
can be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending authorities,
whichever is practicable, and not necessarily at the place of seizure. As held in People v.
Resurreccion,[26] "marking upon immediate confiscation" does not exclude the possibility that
marking can be done at the police station or office of the apprehending team.[27] Thus, in the
present case, the apprehending team cannot be faulted if the inventory and marking were
done at their office where appellant was immediately brought for custody and further
investigation.

Moreover, "[t]he integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a
showing of bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered with."[28] Notably
here, appellant, upon whom the burden of proving that the inventory and marking of the item
was not done in his presence, failed to overcome such presumption. While he admitted that
there was an inventory, appellant insists that he does not remember if he was present when
the same was made. But the photographs[29] taken during the inventory before the
representative of the DOJ, media and a barangay official belie appellant's protestation.

It bears stressing that the Court has already held in numerous cases[30] that non-compliance
with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is not fatal and will not render an accused's arrest illegal
or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is that
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items was properly preserved and
safeguarded through an unbroken chain of custody, as further illustrated below.

To wrap up, the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, both testimonial and
documentary, clearly shows an unbroken chain of custody as follows: Immediately after the
brick of marijuana was handed to PO3 Fines and the arrest of appellant was made, the buy-
bust team brought him and the seized item to the police station. Thereat, PO3 Fines marked
the wrapping of the brick with "PRF, 04-12-06, BB" referring to his initials, date of operation
and "buy-bust" and affixed his signature thereon.[31] An inventory of the seized item was
thereafter conducted and the corresponding certificate of inventory was signed by
representatives from the DOJ, media and an elected barangay official.[32] Afterwards, the
seized item was forwarded by PO2 Mateo, a member of the team, to the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory for forensic examination through a request for laboratory examination[33] prepared
and signed by P/Sr. Insp. Olsim. Upon chemical examination, P/Sr. Insp. Montes found the
brick of marijuana, which contained the same marking placed by PO3 Fines, positive for
marijuana as reflected in her Chemistry Report No. D-016-2006.[34] When presented in court
during the trial, PO3 Fines positively identified the marked brick of marijuana as the same brick
of marijuana appellant sold to him.[35] Hence, the Court agrees with the following
pronouncement of the CA:

x x x In view of the properly documented accounts of the marking, transfer, and submission to
chemistry examination, which ensured the prudent preservation thereof by the apprehending
team, we find no reason to rule that the identity and integrity of the subject drugs has been
compromised. x x x[36]

Appellant's defense of denial must fail.

Against the credible and positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses duly supported by
documentary evidence, appellant's defense of denial and frame-up necessarily crumble. This
line of defense cannot prevail over the established fact that a valid buy-bust operation was
indeed conducted and that the identity of the seller and the drug subject of the sale are proven.
Moreover, such defenses have been invariably viewed by the court with disfavor for they can
easily be concocted and are common and standard defense ploys in most cases involving
violations of Dangerous Drugs Act.[37]

The Imposable Penalty

Appellant sold and delivered a brick of marijuana, a dangerous drug, weighing 931.4 grams.
Under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the sale of dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity
and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine of P500,000.00 to P10
million. With the advent of RA 9346[38] the penalty of death cannot, however, be imposed and
consequently, appellant has to be meted only the penalties of life imprisonment and payment
of fine. Hence, the Court sustains the penalties of life imprisonment and payment of fine of
P500,000.00 imposed by the RTC upon appellant, as affirmed by the CA, for being in
accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. CR-H.C. No. 03156 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 61, finding appellant Manuel Aplat y Sublino guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. 26080-R of illegal sale of dangerous drug and sentencing him to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of suit, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

[1] CA rollo, pp. 177-202; penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid and concurred in
by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Michael P. Elbinias.

[2] Records, pp. 294-302; penned by Judge Antonio C. Reyes; see also the RTC Order dated
November 14, 2007, id. at 303-304.

[3] Id. at 1.

[4] Now known as the City Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force.
[5] Exhibit "L," records, p. 88.

[6] This incident became the subject in Criminal Case No. 26081-R entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Jackson Danglay y Botil for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165.

[7] Exhibit "D," records, p. 79.

[8] Exhibit "P," id. at 99.

[9] Exhibit "G," id. at 83.

[10] Oral testimony dispensed with due to the stipulation of facts by the parties, id at 102.

[11] Exhibit "H," id at 84.

[12] See Order dated November 14, 2007, id. at 303-304.

[13] CA rollo, pp. 24-26.

[14] Id. at 201.

[15] Id. at 207-208; As Danglay did not appeal, the CA Decision insofar as he is concerned
thus became final on December 29, 2009, id. at 214.

[16] TSN, February 5, 2007, pp. 31-32.

[17] 588 Phil. 872, 882 (2008).

[18] People v. Rosas, 591 Phil. 111, 119 (2008).

[19] People v. De la Cruz, 591 Phil. 259, 269 (2008).

[20] People v. Dumlao, 584 Phil. 732, 738 (2008).

[21] People v. Honrado, G.R. No. 182197, February 27, 2012, 667 SCRA 45, 51.

[22] 334 Phil. 556, 570 (1997).

[23] 545 Phil. 520, 534 (2007).

[24] People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 184804, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 625, 645; People v.
Lazaro, Jr., G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 250, 274; People v. Domado, G.R.
No. 172971, June 16, 2010, 621 SCRA 73, 84; People v. Desuyo, G.R. No. 186466, July 26,
2010, 625 SCRA 590, 609; People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 189327, February 29, 2012, 667
SCRA 357, 370; People v. Robelo, G.R. No. 184181, November 26, 2012, 686 SCRA 417,
427-428.

[25] Section 21(a). The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;

[26] G.R. No. 186380, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 510.

[27] Id. at 520.

[28] People v. De Mesa, G.R. No. 188570, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 248, 257.

[29] Exhibit "P," records, p. 99.

[30] People v. Agulay, 588 Phil. 247, 274 (2008); People v. Naquita, 582 Phil. 422, 441-442
(2008); People v. Concepcion, 578 Phil. 957, 971 (2008); People v. Del Monte, 575 Phil. 576,
586 (2008).

[31] TSN, February 5, 2007, p. 37.

[32] Exhibit "D," records, p. 79.

[33] Exhibit "G," id. at 83.

[34] Exhibit "H," id. at 84.

[35] TSN, February 5, 2007, pp. 36-37

[36] CA rollo, p. 200.

[37] People v. Honrado, supra note 21 at 54.

[38] An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 165987 March 31, 2006

JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S. ALFELOR, Petitioners,

vs.
JOSEFINA M. HALASAN, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757, as well as the Resolution2 dated June 28, 2004
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

On January 30, 1998, the children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor
filed a Complaint for Partition3 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. Among the
plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed
to be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the deceased Alfelor Spouses.
The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 26,047-98, was raffled to Branch 17 of said court.

On October 20, 1998, respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention,4 alleging
as follows:

1. That she has legal interest in the matter of litigation in the above-entitled case for partition
between plaintiffs and defendants;
2. That she is the surviving spouse and primary compulsory heir of Jose K. Alfelor, one of the
children and compulsory heirs of Telesforo I. Alfelor whose intestate estate is subject to herein
special proceedings for partition;

3. That herein intervenor had not received even a single centavo from the share of her late
husband Jose K. Alfelor to the intestate estate of Telesforo K. Alfelor.

WHEREFORE, movant prays that she be allowed to intervene in this case and to submit
attached Answer in Intervention.5

Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in Intervention,6 claiming that she was the
surviving spouse of Jose. Thus, the alleged second marriage to Teresita was void ab initio for
having been contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage. Josefina further alleged
that Joshua and Maria Katrina were not her husband’s children. Josefina prayed, among
others, for the appointment of a special administrator to take charge of the estate. Josefina
attached to her pleading a copy of the marriage contract7 which indicated that she and Jose
were married on February 1, 1956.

Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the motion for hearing. Josefina presented
the marriage contract as well as the Reply-in- Intervention8 filed by the heirs of the deceased,
where Teresita declared that she knew "of the previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor with
that of the herein intervenor" on February 1, 1956.9 However, Josefina did not appear in court.

Teresita testified before the RTC on February 13, 2002.10 She narrated that she and the
deceased were married in civil rites at Tagum City, Davao Province on February 12, 1966, and
that they were subsequently married in religious rites at the Assumption Church on April 30,
1966. Among those listed as secondary sponsors were Josefina’s own relatives–Atty.
Margarito Halasan, her brother, and Valentino Halasan, her father.11 While she did not know
Josefina personally, she knew that her husband had been previously married to Josefina and
that the two did not live together as husband and wife. She knew that Josefina left Jose in
1959. Jose’s relatives consented to her (Teresita’s) marriage with Jose because there had
been no news of Josefina for almost ten years. In fact, a few months after the marriage,
Josefina disappeared, and Jose even looked for her in Cebu, Bohol, and Manila. Despite his
efforts, Jose failed to locate Josefina and her whereabouts remained unknown.

Teresita further revealed that Jose told her that he did not have his marriage to Josefina
annulled because he believed in good faith that he had the right to remarry, not having seen
her for more than seven years. This opinion was shared by Jose’s sister who was a judge.
Teresita also declared that she met Josefina in 2001, and that the latter narrated that she had
been married three times, was now happily married to an Englishman and residing in the
United States.

On September 13, 2002, Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order12 denying the motion and
dismissed her complaint, ruling that respondent was not able to prove her claim. The trial court
pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear to testify in court to substantiate her claim.
Moreover, no witness was presented to identify the marriage contract as to the existence of an
original copy of the document or any public officer who had custody thereof. According to the
court, the determinative factor in this case was the good faith of Teresita in contracting the
second marriage with the late Jose Alfelor, as she had no knowledge that Jose had been
previously married. Thus, the evidence of the intervenor did not satisfy the quantum of proof
required to allow the intervention. Citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals,13 the RTC ruled that
while Josefina submitted a machine copy of the marriage contract, the lack of its identification
and the accompanying testimony on its execution and ceremonial manifestation or formalities
required by law could not be equated to proof of its validity and legality.

The trial court likewise declared that Teresita and her children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, were
the legal and legitimate heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor, considering that the latter referred to
them as his children in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities, among others. Moreover, the
oppositor did not present evidence to dispute the same. The dispositive portion of the Order
reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of intervenor, Josephina (sic) Halasan through counsel,
not sufficient to prove a preponderance of evidence and compliance with the basic rules of
evidence to proved (sic) the competent and relevant issues of the complaint-in-intervention, as
legal heir of the deceased Jose K. Alfelor, the complaint (sic) of intervention is ordered dismiss
(sic) with cost[s] de oficio.

On the other hand, finding the evidence by Teresita Sorongon Aleflor, oppositor through
counsel sufficient to proved (sic) the requirement of the Rules of Evidence, in accordance with
duly supporting and prevailing jurisprudence, oppositor, Teresita Sorongon Alfelor and her
children, Joshua S. Alfelor and Maria Katrina S. Alfelor, are declared legal and legitimate Heirs
of the late Jose K. Alfelor, for all purposes, to entitled (sic) them, in the intestate estate of the
latter in accordance to (sic) law, of all properties in his name and/or maybe entitled to any
testate or intestate proceedings of his predecessor-[in]-interest, and to receive such
inheritance, they are legally entitled, along with the other heirs, as the case maybe (sic).13

Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 insisting that under Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court, an admission need not be proved. She pointed out that Teresita
admitted in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999 that she (Teresita) knew of
Jose’s previous marriage to her. Teresita also admitted in her testimony that she knew of the
previous marriage.16 Since the existence of the first marriage was proven in accordance with
the basic rules of evidence, pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 80 of the New Civil Code, the
second marriage was void from the beginning. Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial
court, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that the person entitled to claim good faith is the
"spouse present" (thus, the deceased Jose and not Teresita). Josefina concluded that if the
validity of the second marriage were to be upheld, and at the same time admit the existence of
the second marriage, an absurd situation would arise: the late Jose Alfelor would then be
survived by two legitimate spouses.

The trial court denied the motion in its Order17 dated October 30, 2002.

Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging that the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in
declaring that she failed to prove the fact of her marriage to Jose, in considering the bigamous
marriage valid and declaring the second wife as legal heir of the deceased. Josefina also
stressed that Articles 80 and 83 of the New Civil Code provide for a presumption of law that
any subsequent marriage is null and void. She insisted that no evidence was presented to
prove that she had been absent for seven consecutive years before the second marriage.

In their comment, Teresita and her children countered that anyone who claims to be the legal
wife must show proof thereof. They pointed out that Josefina failed to present any of the
following to prove the fact of the previous marriage: the testimony of a witness to the
matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged
wedding; the birth and the baptismal certificates of children during such union, and other
subsequent documents mentioning such union. Regarding Teresita’s alleged admission of the
first marriage in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999, petitioners claim that it was
mere hearsay, without probative value, as she heard of the alleged prior marriage of decedent
Jose Alfelor to Josefina only from other persons, not based on her own personal knowledge.
They also pointed out that Josefina did not dispute the fact of having left and abandoned Jose
after their alleged marriage in 1956, and only appeared for the first time in 1988 during the
filing of the case for partition of the latter’s share in his parents’ estate. They further pointed out
that Josefina does not even use the surname of the deceased Alfelor. Contrary to the
allegations of Josefina, paragraph 2, Article 83 of the Civil Code, now Article 41 of the Family
Code, is applicable. Moreover, her inaction all this time brought to question her claim that she
had not been heard of for more than seven years.

In its Decision dated November 5, 2003, the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court. It held
that Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and in writing) that Josefina had been married
to the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial
admission no longer requires proof. Consequently, there was no need to prove and establish
the fact that Josefa was married to the decedent. Citing Santiago v. De los Santos,18 the
appellate court ruled that an admission made in a pleading cannot be controverted by the party
making such admission, and is conclusive as to such party; and all contrary or inconsistent
proofs submitted by the party who made the admission should be ignored whether objection is
interposed by the other party or not. The CA concluded that the trial court thus gravely abused
its discretion in ordering the dismissal of Josefina’s Complaint-in-Intervention. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed orders, having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Resultantly, the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ordered to admit petitioner’s complaint in intervention
and to forthwith conduct the proper proceeding with dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.19

Thus, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition, assailing the ruling of the
appellate court.

Petitioners limit the issue to the determination of whether or not the CA erred in ordering the
admission of private respondent’s intervention in S.P. Civil Case No. 26,047-98. They insist
that in setting aside the Orders of the trial court, dated September 13, 2002 and October 30,
2002, the CA completely disregarded the hearsay rule. They aver that while Section 4 of Rule
129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an admission does not require proof, such
admission may be contradicted by showing that it was made through palpable mistake.
Moreover, Teresita’s statement in the Reply-in-Intervention dated February 22, 1999, admitting
knowledge of the alleged first marriage, is without probative value for being hearsay.

Private respondent, for her part, reiterates that the matters involved in this case fall under
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, and thus qualify as a judicial admission
which does not require proof. Consequently, the CA did not commit any palpable error when it
ruled in her favor.

Petitioners counter that while Teresita initially admitted knowledge of Jose’s previous marriage
to private respondent in the said Reply-in- Intervention, Teresita also testified during the
hearing, for the purpose, that the matter was merely "told" to her by the latter, and thus should
be considered hearsay. They also point out that private respondent failed to appear and
substantiate her Complaint-in-Intervention before the RTC, and only submitted a machine copy
of a purported marriage contract with the deceased Jose Alfelor.
The issue in this case is whether or not the first wife of a decedent, a fact admitted by the other
party who claims to be the second wife, should be allowed to intervene in an action for partition
involving the share of the deceased "husband" in the estate of his parents.

The petition is dismissed.

The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners herein, admitted the
existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC, to wit:

1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the previous marriage of the late Jose K.
Alfelor, with that of the herein intervenor were married on February 1, 1956;20

Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late
husband had been previously married to another. To the Court’s mind, this admission
constitutes a "deliberate, clear and unequivocal" statement; made as it was in the course of
judicial proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial admission.21 A party who judicially
admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof;22
production of evidence is dispensed with.23 A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact
from the field of controversy.24 Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all
proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not.25 The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position
contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.26

On the matter of the propriety of allowing her motion for intervention, the pertinent provision of
the Revised Rules of Court is Section 1, Rule 19, which provides:

SEC. 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court
or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court
shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.

Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the
matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the
parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition
of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof.27 Intervention is "a proceeding in a
suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either
joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in
resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or
proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the
admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by
which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged
by him to be affected by such proceedings."28

Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners’ mother, the Court rules that respondent
Josefina Halasan sufficiently established her right to intervene in the partition case. She has
shown that she has legal interest in the matter in litigation. As the Court ruled in Nordic Asia
Ltd. v. Court of Appeals:29

x x x [T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties must be
in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will
either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons
not parties to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily
complicated, expensive and interminable. And this would be against the policy of the law. The
words "an interest in the subject" means a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded,
one that would put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint
without the establishment of which plaintiff could not recover.30

In Uy v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court allowed petitioners (who claimed to be the surviving
legal spouse and the legitimate child of the decedent) to intervene in the intestate proceedings
even after the parties had already submitted a compromise agreement involving the properties
of the decedent, upon which the intestate court had issued a writ of execution. In setting aside
the compromise agreement, the Court held that petitioners were indispensable parties and that
"in the interest of adjudicating the whole controversy, petitioners’ inclusion in the action for
partition, given the circumstances, not only is preferable but rightly essential in the proper
disposition of the case."32

Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the case of Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals33 is not in point,
as the Court therein did not discuss the propriety of allowing a motion for intervention, but
resolved the validity of a marriage. In relying on the merits of the complaint for partition, the
Court ultimately determined the legitimacy of one of the petitioners therein and her entitlement
to a share in the subject properties.

CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
74757 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ORDERED to admit
respondent Josefina Halasan’s Complaint-in-Intervention and forthwith conduct the proper
proceedings with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Asscociate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-
Magtolis (Chairman) and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring; rollo, pp. 38-47.

2 Rollo, p. 48.

3 Id. at 49-59.

4 CA rollo, pp. 40-42.

5 Id. at 41.

6 Id. at 43-47.

7 Id. at 53.

8 Id. at 48-52.

9 Id. at 48.

10 Order dated September 13, 2002, id. at 13.

11 CA rollo, p. 14.

12 Id. at 13-20.

13 G.R. No. 96740, March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 138.

14 CA rollo, p. 20.

15 Id. at 21-28.

16 TSN, 13 February 2002, pp. 9-10, 18-19, 22, 27; CA rollo, pp. 23-26.

17 CA rollo, p. 29.

18 G.R. No. L-20241, November 22, 1974, 61 SCRA 146, 149.

19 Rollo, p. 47.

20 CA rollo, p. 48.

21 In Re Lefkas General Partners No. 1017, 153 B.R. 804 (N.D.Ill. 1993).

22 Sherill v. W.C.A.B. (School Dist. of Philadelphia), 154 Pa.Cmwlth. 492 (1993).

23 Re Marriage of Maupin, 829 S.W.2d 125 (1992).

24 Mobil Oil Co. v. Dodd, 515 S.W.2d 350 (1974).

25 Elayda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 49327, July 18, 1999, 199 SCRA 349, 353, citing Joe’s
Radio Electric Supply v. Alto Electronics Corp., 104 Phil. 333 (1958).

26 Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232 (1948), citing McDaniel v. Apacible, 44 Phil 248
(1922).

27 First Philippine Holdings Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 88345, February 1, 1996,
253 SCRA 30, 38.

28 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Br. 39, G.R. No. 89909,
September 21, 1990, 189 SCRA 820, 824.

29 451 Phil. 482 (2003).

30 Id. at 492-493.

31 G.R. No. 102726, May 27, 1994, 232 SCRA 579.

32 Id. at 585.

33 Supra note 13.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Alfelor vs. Halasan Case Digest

● A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are
a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes
an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as
to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored,
whether objection is interposed by the party or not.

● The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against

the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what
was pleaded.
Facts:

The children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint for
Partition. Among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two children, Joshua and Maria
Katrina, who claimed to be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the
deceased Alfelor Spouses.

Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention alleging that she has legal interest in the
matter of litigation for partition, she being the surviving spouse and primary compulsory heir of
Jose. Josefina attached to said motion her Complaint-in-Intervention wherein she alleged that
the second marriage to Teresita was void ab initio for having been contracted during the
subsistence of a previous marriage. Josefina further alleged that Joshua and Maria Katrina
were not her husband’s children. Josefina attached to her pleading a copy of the marriage
contract which indicated that she and Jose were married.

Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the motion for hearing. Josefina presented
the marriage contract as well as the Reply-in-Intervention filed by the heirs of the deceased,
where Teresita declared that she knew of the previous marriage of the late Jose with that
Josefina. However, Josefina did not appear in court.

Teresita testified that she and Jose were married. While she did not know Josefina personally,
she knew that her husband had been previously married to Josefina and that the two did not
live together as husband and wife. She knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959. Jose’s relatives
consented to her (Teresita’s) marriage with Jose because there had been no news of Josefina
for almost ten years.

Judge denied the motion and dismissed intervenor’s complaint, ruling that respondent was not
able to prove her claim. The trial court pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear to testify
in court to substantiate her claim. Moreover, no witness was presented to identify the marriage
contract as to the existence of an original copy of the document or any public officer who had
custody thereof. Teresita and her children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, were the legal and
legitimate heirs of the late Jose, considering that the latter referred to them as his children in
his Statement of Assets and Liabilities, among others.

Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. CA reversed the ruling of the
trial court. It held that Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and in writing) that Josefina
had been married to the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence, a judicial admission no longer requires proof. Consequently, there was no need to
prove and establish the fact that Josefa was married to the decedent.
Issues:

1. Was there need to prove the existence of Josefina's marriage to Jose?

2. Should Josefina be allowed to intervene in the action for partition?

Held:

1. No. The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners herein,
admitted the existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC.
Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late husband had been previously
married to another. This admission constitutes a “deliberate, clear and unequivocal” statement;
made as it was in the course of judicial proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial
admission. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial
admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an
admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission
and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith
should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The allegations,
statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A
party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.

2. Yes. Intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the matter in
litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or
when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in
the custody of the court or an officer thereof.

Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners’ mother, the Court rules that respondent
Josefina Halasan sufficiently established her right to intervene in the partition case. She has
shown that she has legal interest in the matter in litigation. (Alfelor vs. Halasan, G.R. No.
165987, March 31, 2006)

G.R. No. 132558 May 9, 2000

BEBERISA RIÑO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM,
respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Death benefits under the Labor Code, as amended, are awarded only when the cause of death
is listed as an occupational disease by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or when
the claimant presents proof that the working conditions increased the risk of contracting the
fatal disease.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
set aside the June 30, 1997 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)2 in CA-GR SP No. 41257.
The dispositive portion of the challenged CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission is AFFIRMED, and

the petition DISMISSED.3

The Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed by the CA

disposed as follows:

Based on the foregoing medical findings, it would appear that the etiology of deceased's
ailment which caused his death is not attributable to his employment. Since the ailment is not
deemed work-connected, the instant claim for death benefits cannot be given due course.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Social Security System appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, and the instant case is dismissed for want of merit. 4

Petitioner also assails the January 29, 1998 Resolution5 of the appellate court denying
reconsideration.

The Facts

Virgilio T. Riño Sr., husband of herein petitioner, was employed by Allied Port Services Inc. as
stevedore since July, 1982. His duties included: (1) handling of steel cargoes; (2) loading and
unloading of silica sand; (3) handling, loading and unloading of lumber products; (4)
supervising other stevedores; and (5) performing other related work.6

On July 19, 1992, Virgilio Riño collapsed while working at the South Harbor, Manila. He was
rushed to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) because of "melena, fever, chills and
abdominal pains 8 days [prior to confinement] . . . ." He died three days later. According to the
Medical Certificate issued by Fe B. Bais, chief of the PGH Medical Records Division, the cause
of death was "uremia [secondary] to chronic renal failure. Chronic glomerulonephritis. . . ."7

Petitioner Beberisa Riño, his spouse, filed a claim for death benefits before the Social Security
System (SSS). However, the SSS denied the claim in this wise:8

The cause of death of your husband cannot be considered work-connected because based on
the clinical abstract you submitted, your husband had already on and off attack of edema and
hypertension which are signs of kidney disease even before his employment with the
company.9

On appeal, the ECC affirmed the findings of the SSS. 10 Ruling that petitioner failed to present
relevant evidence to establish the causal connection between the deceased's ailment and his
work as stevedore, the ECC held:

Moreover, medical evaluation suggests that Uremia is the sine qua non of chronic renal failure.
It results from the retention in the blood of urea and other end products of metabolism normally
excreted into the urine. Chronic Renal Failure on the other hand, is a toxic clinical condition
associated with renal insufficiency and retention in the blood of nitrogenous waste products. It
may be due to the following:

a) nephritis

b) congestive heart failure

c) couch syndrome

d) poison

(Reference: Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 11th Edition p. 1155).

Based on the foregoing medical findings, it would appear that the etiology of deceased's
ailment which caused his death is not attributable to his employment. Since the ailment is not
deemed work-connected, the instant claim for death benefits cannot be given due course. 11

After the ECC denied the Motion for Reconsideration, 12 petitioner appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the ECC, the Court of Appeals ruled:

Since petitioner failed to establish any causal connection of the disease which led to the death
of her husband with the nature of his working conditions, and, in particular, that said working
condition had increased the risk of contracting the disease, then the claim for death benefits
must fail.

The former law on compensation, the Workmen's Compensation Act, was replaced by a novel
scheme in the New Labor Code under the title "Employees" Compensation and State
Insurance Fund.' The new law discarded, among others, the concept of "presumption of
compensability and aggravation" and substituted one based on social security principles. The
purpose was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay
workmen's compensation and employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death
or disability. . . .

While as a rule, labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the
applicant, such liberal construction of labor laws may not be applied where the pertinent
provisions of law are clear and leave no room for interpretation. 1

Hence, this Petition for Review. 14

Issue

The lone issue submitted for this Court's resolution is:

Whether . . . petitioner's claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, shall
prosper under the increased risk theory. 15

This Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:

Compensability of Riño's Death

Under the Labor Code, as amended, 16 the beneficiaries of an employee are entitled to death
benefits if the cause of death is a sickness listed as occupational disease by the ECC; or any
other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by the working conditions. 17
The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Riño's death are not listed as occupational
diseases. Hence, petitioner should have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, showing
that the nature of her husband's employment or working conditions increased the risk of
uremia, chronic renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis. 18 This the petitioner failed to do.

Petitioner did not adduce any proof of a reasonable connection between the work of the
deceased and the cause of his death. There was no showing that the progression of the
disease was brought about largely by the conditions in Virgilio's job. Indeed, petitioner
presented no medical history, records or physician's report in order to substantiate her claim
that the working conditions at the Port Area increased the risk of uremia, renal failure or
glomerulonephritis. 19

As we ruled in Sante v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 20 ". . . a claimant must

submit such proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either that the
conditions of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions
had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would
constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to
reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis.
That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to
prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real . . . not merely
apparent." At most, petitioner merely claims that:

. . . The nature of his work required physical strength in handling cargoes and at the same time
giving full attention in supervising his men as the group's leadman assigned at Del Pan Area. It
is worth mentioning that in the place where the deceased was assigned, there were no
available comfort rooms to enable him to answer the "call of nature". In effect, delayed
urination was a reality, coupled with the fact that being the leadman of his group, his continuing
physical presence at the work's premises was indispensable. . . . 21

Such bare allegation does not ipso facto make Virgilio's death compensable. Awards of
compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions. 22 The beneficiaries must present
evidence to prove a positive proposition. 2

While this Court has ruled that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its
beneficiaries, 24 it is likewise important to note that such sympathy must be balanced by the
equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for compensation. "Compassion for the
victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the
trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families to look to for compensation
whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur." 25 In this case, this Court has no
other course but to apply the clear provisions of the law. 26

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Purisima, J., took no part, abroad.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 34-38.

2 Eighth Division. The Decision was written by J. Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, with the concurrence of
JJ Jaime M. Lantin (Division chairman) and Buenaventura J. Guerrero (member).

3 CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 38.

4 ECC Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 29.

5 CA Rollo, p. 75.

6 Rollo, p. 21.

7 CA rollo, p. 20.

8 Through Dr. Florencia C. Peña, manager of the Medical Evaluation Department of the SSS.

9 Rollo, p. 24.

10 Rollo, pp. 26-29.

11 ECC Decision, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 28-29.

12 Rollo, p. 30.

13 CA Decision, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 37-38.

14 The case was deemed submitted for decision on April 6, 1999, upon receipt by this Court of
respondents' Memorandum signed by Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta and
Solicitor Antonio D. Marigomen. Petitioner's Memorandum, signed by Attys. Amelia C.
Garchitorena and Eden B. Chavez of the Public Attorney's Office, was filed on March 23, 1999.

15 Petition, p. 4; rollo, p. 15. See also petitioner's Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 75.

16 Art. 194.

17 Art. 167 (l) of the Labor Code, as amended. See also Rule III of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation; Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals and
Zenaida Liwanag, 296 SCRA 514, September 25, 1998.

18 Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) and Government Service Insurance System

(GSIS) v. Court of Appeals and Lilia S. Arreola, 264 SCRA 248, November 14, 1996.

19 See Librea v. Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance

System, 203 SCRA 545, November 14, 1991.

20 174 SCRA 557, 565, June 29, 1989, per Feliciano, J.

21 Petition, p. 6; rollo, p. 17.

22 Kirit Sr. v. Government Service Insurance System and Employees' Compensation

Commission, 187 SCRA 224, July 6, 1990.

23 Raro v. Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance

System, 172 SCRA 845, April 27, 1989.

24 Employees' Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals and Aida Alvaran, 257 SCRA
717, 726, June 28, 1996.

25 Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 514, 531-532,
September 25, 1998, per Davide, J. (Now CJ).

26 Government Service Insurance System v. Angelita L. Gabriel, G.R. No. 130379, June 21,
1999. See also Raro v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

BEBERISA RIÑO vs. ECC and SSS, G.R. No. 132558, May 9, 2000

Facts:

Virgilio T. Riño Sr., was a stevedore at Allied Port Services since July 1982. In 1992, he died of
“Uremia secondary to chronic renal failure” three days after he was rushed to the hospital after
collapsing at work. Virgilio’s widow claimed for death benefits from the SSS. The claim was
denied by the system and, subsequently, by the ECC for failure to present proof of causal
connection between the decedent’s illness and his work as a stevedore.

Issue:
Whether or not Riño’s Death was compensable under PD626 by virtue of the increased risk
theory.

Ruling:
The Court held that the decedent’s death was non-compensable.

The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Riño’s death are not listed as occupational
diseases. Hence, petitioner should have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, showing
that the nature of her husband’s employment or working conditions increased the risk of
uremia, chronic renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis. Bare allegations do not ipso facto
make the death compensable. Since the petitioner failed to must adduce evidence to prove
work-connection, the denial of claim was held proper.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 152807 August 12, 2003

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN: BERNARDO S. SABANPAN, RENE S. SABANPAN,

DANILO S. SABANPAN and THELMA S. CHU; HEIRS OF ADOLFO SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ
TAPIZ, MA. VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN, MA. BELEN SAEZ and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and
HEIRS OF CRISTINA SAEZ GUTIERREZ: ROY SAEZ GUTIERREZ and LUIS SAEZ JR.,
petitioners,
vs.
ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA, HERDIN C. COMORPOSA, OFELIA C. ARIEGO,1 REMEDIOS
COMORPOSA, VIRGILIO A. LARIEGO,1a BELINDA M. COMORPOSA and ISABELITA H.
COMORPOSA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value. Just because a
piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in
dispute.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside
the August 7, 2001 Decision and the February 27, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals3
(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 60645. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as
follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Decision dated 22
June 2000 rendered by Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur,
REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz,
Davao del Su[r]."4

The assailed Resolution5 denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The CA summarized the factual antecedents of the case as follows:

"A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by [petitioners] against
[respondents] before the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.

"The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot No.
845, Land 275 located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur with an area of 1.2 hectares. In
1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.

"In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was terminated from
his job. The termination of his employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Being a
close family friend of [Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos
Saez's son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out of pity
and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of
Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors and transferred to a portion of
the land subject matter of this case. Such transfer was witnessed by several people, among
them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa occupied a portion of Marcos
Saez' property without paying any rental.

"Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the
respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through
petitioners' tolerance.

"On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises
but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they [were] the legitimate claimants
and the actual and lawful possessor[s] of the premises. A [C]omplaint was filed with the
barangay office of Sta. Cruz[,] Davao del Sur, but the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement. Thus, the corresponding Certificate to File Action was issued by the said barangay
and an action for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against respondents.

"Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the [C]omplaint and alleged
that they entered and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful
claimants, possessors and owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to the present time;
that they have acquired just and valid ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary
or extraordinary prescription, and that the Regional Director of the DENR, Region XI has
already upheld their possession over the land in question when it ruled that they [were] the
rightful claimants and possessors and [were], therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title.

"The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners but the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal, reversed and set
aside the said decision. x x x"6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA upheld the right of respondents as claimants
and possessors. The appellate court held that -- although not yet final -- the Order issued by
the regional executive director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) remained in full force and effect, unless declared null and void. The CA added that the
Certification issued by the DENR's community environment and natural resources (CENR)
officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable
and was not yet allocated to any person.

According to the CA, respondents had the better right to possess alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, because they have sufficiently proven their actual, physical, open,
notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960. The
appellate court deemed as self-serving, and therefore incredible, the Affidavits executed by
Gloria Leano Saez, Noel Oboza and Paulina Paran.

Hence, this Petition.7

The Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for the Court's consideration:

"I

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and [err] in sustaining the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court giving credence to the Order dated 2 April 1998 issued by the regional
executive director?

"II

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in sustaining the Regional Trial
Court's ruling giving weight to the CENR Officer's Certification, which only bears the facsimile
of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and, [worse], it is a new matter raised for
the first time on appeal?

"III

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in holding that the land subject
matter of this case has been acquired by means of adverse possession and prescription?

"IV

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion, and err in declaring that, 'neither is there
error on the part of the Regional Trial Court, when it did not give importance to the affidavits by
Gloria Leano Saez, Noel [Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly being self serving?'"8

To facilitate the discussion, the fourth and the third issues shall be discussed in reverse
sequence.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
The DENR Order of April 2, 1998

Petitioners claim that the reliance of the CA upon the April 2, 1998 Order issued by the regional
director of the DENR was erroneous. The reason was that the Order, which had upheld the
claim of respondents, was supposedly not yet final and executory. Another Order dated August
23, 1999,9 issued later by the DENR regional director, allegedly held in abeyance the
effectivity of the earlier one.

Under the Public Land Act,10 the management and the disposition of public land is under the
primary control of the director of lands11 (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau
or LMB),12 subject to review by the DENR secretary.13 As a rule, then, courts have no
jurisdiction to intrude upon matters properly falling within the powers of the LMB.

The powers given to the LMB and the DENR to alienate and dispose of public land does not,
however, divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants
or applicants to protect their respective possessions and occupations.14 The power to
determine who has actual physical possession or occupation of public land and who has the
better right of possession over it remains with the courts.15 But once the DENR has decided,
particularly through the grant of a homestead patent and the issuance of a certificate of title, its
decision on these points will normally prevail.16

Therefore, while the issue as to who among the parties are entitled to a piece of public land
remains pending with the DENR, the question of recovery of possession of the disputed
property is a matter that may be addressed to the courts.

Second Issue:
CENR Officer's Certification

Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document,
because the signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument,
they cite Garvida v. Sales Jr.17 and argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by
respondents for the first time on appeal.

We are not persuaded.

In Garvida, the Court held:

"A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of
printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and
representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. x x x"18

Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As
such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are
genuine or authentic.19

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature
of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is
alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined
as a signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial,
and business transactions.20

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional
director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998:

"x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a 'CERTIFICATION' dated 22 July 1997, certified
among others, that: x x x per records available in his Office, x x x the controverted lot x x x was
not allocated to any person x x x."21

If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have
used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR
officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the former's direct control and
supervision.

Petitioners' claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As
early as the pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had
already been marked as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order.22 The
Certification was not formally offered, however, because respondents had not been able to file
their position paper.

Neither the rules of procedure23 nor jurisprudence24 would sanction the admission of
evidence that has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is
applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure --
cases in which no full-blown trial is held.25

Third Issue:
Affidavit of Petitioners' Witnesses
Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of their witnesses, insisting
that the Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits. They also claim that the
failure of respondents to file their position paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC
amounts to an admission by silence.

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility
refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while
probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue.26
Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on
judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.27

While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses' respective

testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set
forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action,
because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.28

Fourth Issue:
Defense of Prescription

Petitioners claim that the court a quo erred in upholding the defense of prescription proffered
by respondents. It is the former's contention that since the latter's possession of the land was
merely being tolerated, there was no basis for the claim of prescription. We disagree.

For the Court to uphold the contention of petitioners, they have first to prove that the
possession of respondents was by mere tolerance. The only pieces of evidence submitted by
the former to support their claim were a technical description and a vicinity map drawn in
accordance with the survey dated May 22, 1936.29 Both of these were discredited by the
CENR Certification, which indicated that the contested lot had not yet been allocated to any
person when the survey was conducted.30 The testimony of petitioners' witnesses alone
cannot prevail over respondents' continued and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot for
a considerable length of time.

Furthermore, this is an issue of fact that cannot, as a rule, be raised in a petition for review
under Rule 45.31

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Also spelled "Ariega" in the pleadings.

1a Also spelled "Lariega" in the pleadings.

2 Rollo, pp. 11-37.

3 Eighth Division. Written by Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona and concurred in by Justices Eugenio
S. Labitoria (Division chairman) and Eloy R. Bello Jr. (member).

4 Assailed Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 49.

5 Rollo, p. 52.

6 Assailed Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 45-46.

7 This case was deemed submitted for decision on January 15, 2003, upon the Court's receipt
of respondents' Memorandum, signed by Atty. William G. Carpentero. Petitioners'
Memorandum, filed on January 10, 2003, was signed by Atty. Oswaldo A. Macadangdang.

8 Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 283. Original in upper case.

9 Annex I; rollo, pp. 91-92.

10 Commonwealth Act 141 as amended.

11 §4 of CA 141 as amended.

12 The LMB absorbed the functions of the Bureau of Lands, which was abolished by Executive
Order No. 131, except those line functions that were transmitted to the regional field offices.

13 §3 of CA 141 as amended.

14 Omandam v. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 483, January 18, 2001; Solis v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 198 SCRA 267, June 19, 1991; Rallon v. Ruiz Jr, 138 Phil. 347, May 26, 1969;
Molina et al v. Bacud et al., 126 Phil. 166, April 27, 1967; Bohayang v. Maceren, 96 Phil. 390,
December 29, 1954; Pitargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, September 17, 1952.

15 Solis v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, citing National Development Company v.

Hervilla, 151 SCRA 520, June 30, 1987; Espejo v. Malate, 205 Phil. 216, January 27, 1983.

16 Omandam v. Court of Appeals, supra.

17 338 Phil. 484, April 18, 1997.

18 Id., p. 496, per Puno, J., citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1976), p. 813.

19 bid.

20 "Facsimile signature," Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1976), p. 813.

21 Rollo, p. 104.

22 Id., p. 121.

23 §34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

24 People v. Carino, 165 SCRA 664, September 26, 1988; Veran v. Court of Appeals, 157
SCRA 438, January 29, 1988.

25 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 277 SCRA 633, August 18, 1997; De los
Reyes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 176 SCRA 394, August 11, 1989.

26 PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38, October 8, 1998.

27 Id., p. 59.

28 People v. Villar, 322 SCRA 393, January 19, 2000; Pacific Banking Corporation Employees
Organization v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 438, March 27, 1998; Rivera v. Court of Appeals,
348 Phil. 734, January 23, 1998; Ramcar Incorporated v. Garcia, 114 Phil. 1026, April 25,
1962.

29 Rollo, pp. 83-84.

30 Id., p. 105.
31 §1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; Heirs of Anastacio Fabela v. Court of Appeals, 414 Phil
838, August 9, 2001; American President Lines Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 336 SCRA 582, July
31, 2000; Liberty Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil.
490, June 28, 1996.

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DIVISION
[ GR No. 188551, Feb 27, 2013 ]
EDMUNDO ESCAMILLA Y JUGO v. PEOPLE +
DECISION
G.R. No. 188551

SERENO, C.J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] dated 20 August 2009. It seeks a review of the 10
June 2009 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30456, which denied
the Motion for Reconsideration[3] of the 10 November 2008 CA Decision[4] affirming the
conviction of Edmundo Escamilla (petitioner) for frustrated homicide.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case, culled from the records, are as follows:

Petitioner has a house with a sari-sari store along Arellano Street, Manila.[5] The victim,
Virgilio Mendol (Mendol), is a tricycle driver whose route traverses the road where petitioner's
store is located.[6]

Around 2:00 a.m. of 01 August 1999, a brawl ensued at the corner of Estrada and Arellano
Streets, Manila.[7] Mendol was about to ride his tricycle at this intersection while facing
Arellano Street.[8] Petitioner, who was standing in front of his store, 30 meters away from
Mendol,[9] shot the latter four times, hitting him once in the upper right portion of his chest.[10]
The victim was brought to Ospital ng Makati for treatment[11] and survived because of timely
medical attention.[12]

The Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information[13] dated 01 December 1999
charging petitioner with frustrated homicide. The Information reads:

That on or about August 1, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence upon the person of one Virgilio Mendol, by then and there shooting the latter
with a .9mm Tekarev pistol with Serial No. 40283 hitting him on the upper right portion of his
chest, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound which is necessarily fatal and mortal, thus
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of Homicide as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes, independent of his will,
that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Virgilio Mendol which
prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.[14] During trial, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of Mendol, Joseph Velasco (Velasco) and Iluminado Garcelazo (Garcelazo), who
all positively identified him as the shooter of Mendol.[15] The doctor who attended to the
victim also testified.[16] The documentary evidence presented included a sketch of the crime
scene, the Medical Certificate issued by the physician, and receipts of the medical expenses of
Mendol when the latter was treated for the gunshot wound.[17] In the course of the
presentation of the prosecution witnesses, the defense requested an ocular inspection of the
crime scene, a request that was granted by the court.[18] On the other hand, the defense
witnesses are petitioner himself, his wife, Velasco and Barangay Tanod George Asumbrado
(Asumbrado).[19] The defense offered the results of the paraffin test of petitioner and the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the court's ocular inspection of the crime scene.
[20]

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses deserve far
more weight and credence than the defense of alibi.[21] Thus, it found petitioner guilty of
frustrated homicide.[22] The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Edmund Escamilla Y Jugo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide under Articles 249 and 50 [sic] of the
Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences the accused to suffer an indeterminate sentence
of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Accused is hereby ordered to indemnify
complainant Virgilio Mendol the sum of P34,305.16 for actual damages, P30,000.00 for moral
damages.

SO ORDERED.[23]

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated 14 July 2006.[24] In the brief that the CA required him
to file,[25] he questioned the credibility of the prosecution witnesses over that of the defense.
[26] On the other hand, the Appellee's Brief[27] posited that the prosecution witnesses were
credible, because there were no serious discrepancies in their testimonies.[28] Petitioner, in
his Reply brief,[29] said that the prosecution witnesses did not actually see him fire the gun.
[30] Furthermore, his paraffin test yielded a negative result.[31]

The CA, ruling against petitioner, held that the issue of the credibility of witnesses is within the
domain of the trial court, which is in a better position to observe their demeanor.[32] Thus, the
CA upheld the RTC's appreciation of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses in the present
case.[33] Also, the CA ruled that the victim's positive and unequivocal identification of
petitioner totally destroyed his defense of alibi. Hence, it found no reason to disbelieve
Mendol's testimony.[34] In addition, it said that a paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that a
person has not fired a gun and is inconsequential when there is a positive identification of
petitioner.[35]

A Motion for Reconsideration[36] dated 08 December 2008 was filed by petitioner, who
asserted that the defense was able to discredit the testimony of the victim.[37]

In its 10 June 2009 Resolution,[38] the CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for
being without merit, because the matters discussed therein had already been resolved in its 10
November 2008 Decision.[39]

Hence, this Petition[40] assailing the application to this case of the rule that the positive
identification of the accused has more weight than the defense of alibi.[41] This Court
resolved to require the prosecution to comment on the Petition.[42] In his Comment[43] dated
15 December 2009, the victim said that his positive identification of petitioner was a direct
evidence that the latter was the author of the crime.[44] Furthermore, what petitioner raised
was allegedly a question of fact, which is proscribed by a Rule 45 petition.[45] Thus, the victim
alleged, there being no new or substantial matter or question of law raised, the Petition should
be denied.[46]

We then obliged petitioner to file a reply.[47] In his Reply dated 01 March 2010,[48] he
assigned as an error the application by the CA of the rule that the positive identification of the
accused has more weight than the defense of alibi.[49] He posits that the lower court
manifestly overlooked relevant facts not disputed by the parties, but if properly considered
would justify a different conclusion.[50] This Court, he said, should then admit an exception to
the general rule that the findings of fact of the CA are binding upon the Supreme Court.[51]

ISSUES

The questions before us are as follows:

Whether the prosecution established petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[52]

Whether a defense of alibi, when corroborated by a disinterested party, overcomes the positive
identification by three witnesses.[53]

COURT'S RULING

We deny the Petition.

I. The prosecution proved petitioner's

guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner was positively identified by
three witnesses.
Petitioner argues that there was reasonable doubt as to the identity of the shooter.[54] He is
wrong. As correctly held by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the identity of the assailant was
proved with moral certainty by the prosecution, which presented three witnesses the victim
Mendol, Velasco, and Garcelazo who all positively identified him as the shooter.[55] We have
held that a categorical and consistently positive identification of the accused, without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses, prevails over denial.[56] All the three
witnesses were unswerving in their testimonies pointing to him as the shooter. None of them
had any ulterior motive to testify against him.

Mendol said that he was about to ride his tricycle at the corner of Arellano and Estrada Streets,
when petitioner, who was in front of the former's store, shot him.[57] The first shot hit its target,
but petitioner continued to fire at the victim three more times, and the latter then started to run
away.[58]

Velasco, who was also at the corner of Estrada and Arellano Streets, heard the first shot,
looked around, then saw petitioner firing at Mendol three more times.[59]
Lastly, Garcelazo testified that while he was buying bread from a bakery at that same street
corner, he heard three shots before he turned his head and saw petitioner pointing a gun at the
direction of the victim, who was bloodied in the right chest.[60] Garcelazo was just an arm's
length away from him.[61]

The three witnesses had a front view of the face of petitioner, because they were all facing
Arellano Street from its intersection with Estrada Street, which was the locus criminis.[62]
Although the crime happened in the wee hours of the morning, there was a street lamp five
meters from where petitioner was standing when he shot the victim, thus allowing a clear view
of the assailant's face.[63] They all knew petitioner, because they either bought from or
passed by his store.[64]

The intent to kill was shown by the

continuous firing at the victim even
after he was hit.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution was unable to prove his intent to kill.[65] He is mistaken.
The intent to kill, as an essential element of homicide at whatever stage, may be before or
simultaneous with the infliction of injuries.[66] The evidence to prove intent to kill may consist
of, inter alia, the means used; the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim; and the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing
of the victim.[67]

Petitioner's intent to kill was simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. Using a gun,[68] he shot
the victim in the chest. [69] Despite a bloodied right upper torso, the latter still managed to run
towards his house to ask for help. [70] Nonetheless, petitioner continued to shoot at him three
more times,[71] albeit unsuccessfully.[72] While running, the victim saw his nephew in front of
the house and asked for help.[73] The victim was immediately brought to the hospital on
board an owner-type jeep.[74] The attending physician, finding that the bullet had no point of
exit, did not attempt to extract it; its extraction would just have caused further damage.[75]
The doctor further said that the victim would have died if the latter were not brought
immediately to the hospital.[76] All these facts belie the absence of petitioner's intent to kill the
victim.

II. Denial and alibi were not proven.

In order for alibi to prosper, petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that,
first, he was in another place at the time of the offense; and, second, it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. [77] The appreciation of the defense of alibi
is pegged against this standard and nothing else. Petitioner, as found by both the RTC and
CA, failed to prove the presence of these two requisite conditions. Hence, he was wrong in
asserting that alibi, when corroborated by other witnesses, succeeds as a defense over
positive identification.[78]

Petitioner was unable to establish

that he was at home at the time of
the offense.
The alibi of petitioner was that he was at home asleep with his wife when Mendol was shot.[79]
To support his claim, petitioner presented the testimonies of his wife and Asumbrado.[80]

The wife of petitioner did not know

if he was at home when the shooting
happened.
The wife of petitioner testified that both of them went to sleep at 9:00 p.m. and were awakened
at 3:00 a.m. by the banging on their door.[81] However, she also said that she did not know if
petitioner stayed inside their house, or if he went somewhere else during the entire time she
was asleep.[82] Her testimony does not show that he was indeed at home when the crime
happened. At the most, it only establishes that he was at home before and after the shooting.
Her lack of knowledge regarding his whereabouts between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. belies the
credibility of his alibi. Even so, the testimonies of relatives deserve scant consideration,
especially when there is positive identification[83] by three witnesses.

Asumbrano did not see the entire

face of the shooter.
Petitioner is questioning why neither the RTC nor the CA took into account the testimony of
Asumbrado, the Barangay Tanod on duty that night.[84] Both courts were correct in not giving
weight to his testimony.

Asumbrado said that he was there when the victim was shot, not by appellant, but by a big
man who was in his twenties.[85] This assertion was based only on a back view of the man
who fired the gun 12 meters away from Asumbrado.[86] The latter never saw the shooter's
entire face.[87] Neither did the witness see the victim when the latter was hit.[88] Asumbrado
also affirmed that he was hiding when the riot took place.[89] These declarations question his
competence to unequivocally state that indeed it was not petitioner who fired at Mendol.

Petitioner's home was just in front of

the street where the shooting occurred.

Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when
the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access
between the two places.[90] Petitioner failed to prove the physical impossibility of his being at
the scene of the crime at the time in question.

Both the prosecution and the defense witnesses referred to the front of appellant's house or
store whenever they testified on the location of the shooter. Petitioner was in front of his house
when he shot the victim, according to Velasco's testimony.[91] Meanwhile the statement of
Asumbrado that the gate of the store of the petitioner was closed when the shooting
happened[92] can only mean that the latter's house and store were both located in front of the
scene of the crime.

Petitioner proffers the alibi that he was at home, instead of showing the impossibility of his
authorship of the crime. His alibi actually bolsters the prosecution's claim that he was the
shooter, because it placed him just a few steps away from the scene of the crime. The charge
is further bolstered by the testimony of his wife, who could not say with certainty that he was at
home at 2:00 a.m. the approximate time when the victim was shot.

Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the lower courts overlooked any fact that could
have justified a different conclusion. Hence, the CA was correct in affirming the RTC's
Decision that petitioner, beyond reasonable doubt, was the assailant.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED. The 10 June 2009
Resolution[93] and 10 November 2008 Decision[94] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.
No. 30456 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

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DIVISION
[ GR No. 188551, Feb 27, 2013 ]
EDMUNDO ESCAMILLA Y JUGO v. PEOPLE +
DECISION
G.R. No. 188551

SERENO, C.J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] dated 20 August 2009. It seeks a review of the 10 June
2009 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30456, which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration[3] of the 10 November 2008 CA Decision[4] affirming the conviction of Edmundo
Escamilla (petitioner) for frustrated homicide.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case, culled from the records, are as follows:

Petitioner has a house with a sari-sari store along Arellano Street, Manila.[5] The victim, Virgilio
Mendol (Mendol), is a tricycle driver whose route traverses the road where petitioner's store is located.
[6]

Around 2:00 a.m. of 01 August 1999, a brawl ensued at the corner of Estrada and Arellano Streets,
Manila.[7] Mendol was about to ride his tricycle at this intersection while facing Arellano Street.[8]
Petitioner, who was standing in front of his store, 30 meters away from Mendol,[9] shot the latter four
times, hitting him once in the upper right portion of his chest.[10] The victim was brought to Ospital
ng Makati for treatment[11] and survived because of timely medical attention.[12]

The Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information[13] dated 01 December 1999 charging
petitioner with frustrated homicide. The Information reads:

That on or about August 1, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon
the person of one Virgilio Mendol, by then and there shooting the latter with a .9mm Tekarev pistol
with Serial No. 40283 hitting him on the upper right portion of his chest, thereby inflicting upon him
gunshot wound which is necessarily fatal and mortal, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of causes, independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to
said Virgilio Mendol which prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.[14] During trial, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of Mendol, Joseph Velasco (Velasco) and Iluminado Garcelazo (Garcelazo), who all
positively identified him as the shooter of Mendol.[15] The doctor who attended to the victim also
testified.[16] The documentary evidence presented included a sketch of the crime scene, the Medical
Certificate issued by the physician, and receipts of the medical expenses of Mendol when the latter was
treated for the gunshot wound.[17] In the course of the presentation of the prosecution witnesses, the
defense requested an ocular inspection of the crime scene, a request that was granted by the court.
[18] On the other hand, the defense witnesses are petitioner himself, his wife, Velasco and Barangay
Tanod George Asumbrado (Asumbrado).[19] The defense offered the results of the paraffin test of
petitioner and the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the court's ocular inspection of the
crime scene.[20]

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses deserve far more
weight and credence than the defense of alibi.[21] Thus, it found petitioner guilty of frustrated
homicide.[22] The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Edmund Escamilla Y Jugo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Frustrated Homicide under Articles 249 and 50 [sic] of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences the accused to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Accused is
hereby ordered to indemnify complainant Virgilio Mendol the sum of P34,305.16 for actual damages,
P30,000.00 for moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[23]

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated 14 July 2006.[24] In the brief that the CA required him to file,
[25] he questioned the credibility of the prosecution witnesses over that of the defense.[26] On the
other hand, the Appellee's Brief[27] posited that the prosecution witnesses were credible, because
there were no serious discrepancies in their testimonies.[28] Petitioner, in his Reply brief,[29] said that
the prosecution witnesses did not actually see him fire the gun.[30] Furthermore, his paraffin test
yielded a negative result.[31]

The CA, ruling against petitioner, held that the issue of the credibility of witnesses is within the domain
of the trial court, which is in a better position to observe their demeanor.[32] Thus, the CA upheld the
RTC's appreciation of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses in the present case.[33] Also, the CA
ruled that the victim's positive and unequivocal identification of petitioner totally destroyed his defense
of alibi. Hence, it found no reason to disbelieve Mendol's testimony.[34] In addition, it said that a
paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun and is inconsequential when
there is a positive identification of petitioner.[35]

A Motion for Reconsideration[36] dated 08 December 2008 was filed by petitioner, who asserted that
the defense was able to discredit the testimony of the victim.[37]
In its 10 June 2009 Resolution,[38] the CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for being
without merit, because the matters discussed therein had already been resolved in its 10 November
2008 Decision.[39]

Hence, this Petition[40] assailing the application to this case of the rule that the positive identification
of the accused has more weight than the defense of alibi.[41] This Court resolved to require the
prosecution to comment on the Petition.[42] In his Comment[43] dated 15 December 2009, the victim
said that his positive identification of petitioner was a direct evidence that the latter was the author of
the crime.[44] Furthermore, what petitioner raised was allegedly a question of fact, which is
proscribed by a Rule 45 petition.[45] Thus, the victim alleged, there being no new or substantial matter
or question of law raised, the Petition should be denied.[46]

We then obliged petitioner to file a reply.[47] In his Reply dated 01 March 2010,[48] he assigned as an
error the application by the CA of the rule that the positive identification of the accused has more
weight than the defense of alibi.[49] He posits that the lower court manifestly overlooked relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, but if properly considered would justify a different conclusion.[50]
This Court, he said, should then admit an exception to the general rule that the findings of fact of the
CA are binding upon the Supreme Court.[51]

ISSUES

The questions before us are as follows:

Whether the prosecution established petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[52]

Whether a defense of alibi, when corroborated by a disinterested party, overcomes the positive
identification by three witnesses.[53]

COURT'S RULING

We deny the Petition.

I. The prosecution proved petitioner's

guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner was positively identified by
three witnesses.
Petitioner argues that there was reasonable doubt as to the identity of the shooter.[54] He is wrong.
As correctly held by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the identity of the assailant was proved with moral
certainty by the prosecution, which presented three witnesses the victim Mendol, Velasco, and
Garcelazo who all positively identified him as the shooter.[55] We have held that a categorical and
consistently positive identification of the accused, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses, prevails over denial.[56] All the three witnesses were unswerving in their testimonies
pointing to him as the shooter. None of them had any ulterior motive to testify against him.

Mendol said that he was about to ride his tricycle at the corner of Arellano and Estrada Streets, when
petitioner, who was in front of the former's store, shot him.[57] The first shot hit its target, but
petitioner continued to fire at the victim three more times, and the latter then started to run away.[58]

Velasco, who was also at the corner of Estrada and Arellano Streets, heard the first shot, looked
around, then saw petitioner firing at Mendol three more times.[59]

Lastly, Garcelazo testified that while he was buying bread from a bakery at that same street corner, he
heard three shots before he turned his head and saw petitioner pointing a gun at the direction of the
victim, who was bloodied in the right chest.[60] Garcelazo was just an arm's length away from him.[61]

The three witnesses had a front view of the face of petitioner, because they were all facing Arellano
Street from its intersection with Estrada Street, which was the locus criminis.[62] Although the crime
happened in the wee hours of the morning, there was a street lamp five meters from where petitioner
was standing when he shot the victim, thus allowing a clear view of the assailant's face.[63] They all
knew petitioner, because they either bought from or passed by his store.[64]

The intent to kill was shown by the

continuous firing at the victim even
after he was hit.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution was unable to prove his intent to kill.[65] He is mistaken. The
intent to kill, as an essential element of homicide at whatever stage, may be before or simultaneous
with the infliction of injuries.[66] The evidence to prove intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the
means used; the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; and the conduct of
the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim.[67]

Petitioner's intent to kill was simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. Using a gun,[68] he shot the
victim in the chest. [69] Despite a bloodied right upper torso, the latter still managed to run towards
his house to ask for help. [70] Nonetheless, petitioner continued to shoot at him three more times,[71]
albeit unsuccessfully.[72] While running, the victim saw his nephew in front of the house and asked for
help.[73] The victim was immediately brought to the hospital on board an owner-type jeep.[74] The
attending physician, finding that the bullet had no point of exit, did not attempt to extract it; its
extraction would just have caused further damage.[75] The doctor further said that the victim would
have died if the latter were not brought immediately to the hospital.[76] All these facts belie the
absence of petitioner's intent to kill the victim.

II. Denial and alibi were not proven.

In order for alibi to prosper, petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that, first, he
was in another place at the time of the offense; and, second, it was physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime. [77] The appreciation of the defense of alibi is pegged against this standard
and nothing else. Petitioner, as found by both the RTC and CA, failed to prove the presence of these
two requisite conditions. Hence, he was wrong in asserting that alibi, when corroborated by other
witnesses, succeeds as a defense over positive identification.[78]

Petitioner was unable to establish

that he was at home at the time of
the offense.
The alibi of petitioner was that he was at home asleep with his wife when Mendol was shot.[79] To
support his claim, petitioner presented the testimonies of his wife and Asumbrado.[80]

The wife of petitioner did not know

if he was at home when the shooting
happened.
The wife of petitioner testified that both of them went to sleep at 9:00 p.m. and were awakened at
3:00 a.m. by the banging on their door.[81] However, she also said that she did not know if petitioner
stayed inside their house, or if he went somewhere else during the entire time she was asleep.[82] Her
testimony does not show that he was indeed at home when the crime happened. At the most, it only
establishes that he was at home before and after the shooting. Her lack of knowledge regarding his
whereabouts between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. belies the credibility of his alibi. Even so, the
testimonies of relatives deserve scant consideration, especially when there is positive identification[83]
by three witnesses.

Asumbrano did not see the entire

face of the shooter.
Petitioner is questioning why neither the RTC nor the CA took into account the testimony of
Asumbrado, the Barangay Tanod on duty that night.[84] Both courts were correct in not giving weight
to his testimony.
Asumbrado said that he was there when the victim was shot, not by appellant, but by a big man who
was in his twenties.[85] This assertion was based only on a back view of the man who fired the gun 12
meters away from Asumbrado.[86] The latter never saw the shooter's entire face.[87] Neither did the
witness see the victim when the latter was hit.[88] Asumbrado also affirmed that he was hiding when
the riot took place.[89] These declarations question his competence to unequivocally state that indeed
it was not petitioner who fired at Mendol.

Petitioner's home was just in front of

the street where the shooting occurred.

Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime
transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two
places.[90] Petitioner failed to prove the physical impossibility of his being at the scene of the crime at
the time in question.

Both the prosecution and the defense witnesses referred to the front of appellant's house or store
whenever they testified on the location of the shooter. Petitioner was in front of his house when he
shot the victim, according to Velasco's testimony.[91] Meanwhile the statement of Asumbrado that the
gate of the store of the petitioner was closed when the shooting happened[92] can only mean that the
latter's house and store were both located in front of the scene of the crime.

Petitioner proffers the alibi that he was at home, instead of showing the impossibility of his authorship
of the crime. His alibi actually bolsters the prosecution's claim that he was the shooter, because it
placed him just a few steps away from the scene of the crime. The charge is further bolstered by the
testimony of his wife, who could not say with certainty that he was at home at 2:00 a.m. the
approximate time when the victim was shot.

Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the lower courts overlooked any fact that could have
justified a different conclusion. Hence, the CA was correct in affirming the RTC's Decision that
petitioner, beyond reasonable doubt, was the assailant.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED. The 10 June 2009 Resolution[93] and 10
November 2008 Decision[94] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30456 are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED.
People vs. Gallarde Case Digest

Facts:

In the evening of 26 May 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in Brgy. Trenchera,
Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them were Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato,
Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel
Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. After a while,
Roger stood up and invited Jaime and Gallarde to dine in the kitchen. As they partook of the meal,
Gallarde suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside the house, he chanced
upon Gallarde and Editha talking to each other. Jaime whistled at Gallarde but instead of minding him,
the latter sprinted towards the road leading to his house. Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and
took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going. Editha answered
that she would look for Gallarde. Soon Editha left enroute to where Gallarde fled. By 10:00 p.m., the
drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco, Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renato's place
where they talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them that Editha was
missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her. Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-
kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her daughter's disappearance. The latter, together with his son
Edwin, wife Virginia and nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search the
houses, dikes and fields to look for the missing child. When Jaime mentioned that Gallarde was the last
person he sawtalking to Editha, the searchers went back to the house of Gallarde. The searchers found
Gallarde squatting with his short pants at the toilet about 6 meters away from Gallarde's house; his
hands and knees covered with soil. Asked where Editha was, Gallarde replied: "I do not know, I did not
do anything to her." To the question, "where did you come from since a while ago you were not yet in
this toilet?" Gallarde answered "I was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the searchers Mario
Bado, got angry and countered that Gallarde's statement was impossible because Kiko was with him
drinking. After the confrontation at the toilet, Ex-kagawad Fernandez brought Gallarde to Brgy. Captain
Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that Gallarde was the last person seen talking with the missing
child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers. Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet
ground. The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses, and a wide hole among the disheveled
grass. When Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then Editha's hand pitted
out. Fernandez screamed in terror. Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heardshouts saying: "She is
here, she is now here already dead!" Mindful of Gallarde's safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to
bring Gallarde to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on board a vehicle.
He flagged them down and turned over the person of Gallarde, saying: "Here is the suspect in the
disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to you." The policemen
together with Gallarde proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of the policemen shoved
more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when she was recovered. A picture of
Gallarde was taken without any counsel present.

Gallarde was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. The trial court rendered a
decision convicting Gallarde of the crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with
homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of
P70,000.00. The trial court rejected the photographs (Exhibits "I," "J" and "K") taken of Gallarde
immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken while he was already under
the mercy of the police." Gallarde appealed his conviction to the SC.

Issue:

Whether The taking of pictures of an accused violates of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination.

Held:

The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical
act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused
does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The
essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence
against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery
may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may
be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for
medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his
victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its
identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes
removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. (People vs.
Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025. February 17, 2000)
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DIVISION
[ GR No. 188969, Feb 27, 2013 ]
PEOPLE v. JOHN ALVIN PONDIVIDA +
DECISION
G.R. No. 188969

SERENO, C.J.:

Before this Court is the 26 June 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the 10
January 2008 judgment of conviction[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan in Criminal Case
No. 2678-M-2005. The RTC found accused John Alvin Pondivida, alias "Scarface," guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, as well as to pay civil indemnity and damages.

On 6 October 2005, the assistant provincial prosecutor of Malolos, Bulacan, charged accused-appellant
Pondivida under the following Information:[3]

That on or about the 8th day of July 2005, in the municipality of Obando, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with firearm, and with intent to kill one Gener
Bondoc y Cudia, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, attack, assault and shoot with their firearm the said Gener
Bondoc y Cudia, hitting the latter on his body and head, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds
which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Rodelyn Buenavista, witness for the prosecution, testified that at 3:30 a.m. of 8 July 2005, she was
roused from sleep by incessant knocking and the sound of someone kicking the front door of their
house. She immediately woke her common-law partner, Gener Bondoc. His brother, Jover Bondoc
(nicknamed Udoy), was also awake and was peeping through the door of one of the rooms. Outside he
saw accused George Reyes, John Alvin Pondivida, and Glen Alvarico who was carrying an armalite rifle.
When Rodelyn answered the door, the three men asked for the whereabouts of "Udoy" and "Bagsik,"
both brothers of Gener. One of the men, later identified as accused George Reyes, searched the house
and asked her who Gener was. Rodelyn merely replied that he was neither Udoy nor Bagsik, and that
the persons they were looking for were not inside the house. In response, the men fired four shots,
prompting her to plead that her children were sleeping upstairs.

Rodelyn recounted that the three men seemed to be discussing something near the well outside their
house for a considerable period, before Reyes again approached them. He asked Gener to step outside
the house to "have a conversation" with them, but Gener declined, stating that they were armed.
Rodelyn again reminded Reyes that there were children inside the house and tried to prevent him from
entering and going up the stairs.[4]

While Reyes was talking to Rodelyn, Pondivida and Alvarico suddenly entered through the window of
the house and chased Gener. Both Reyes and Alvarico shot at Gener. Rodelyn heard the gunshots, but
when she approached Gener to investigate, he was already sprawled on the floor with blood oozing
from a wound in his head. Police later ascertained that both Pondivida and Alvarico had climbed the
guava tree outside the house to gain access to the window located at the second floor. Jover further
testified that both he and his brother Bagsik had an earlier altercation with a gasoline station employee
who happened to be a friend of the assailants.[5]

Pondivida fled to Olongapo City for five months, but was apprehended upon returning to Obando,
Bulacan. Co-accused Alvarico and

Reyes were never located and are currently at large. The RTC found accused-appellant Pondivida guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder; imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and ordered him to
pay P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, P25,000 as exemplary damages, P10,000 as
actual damages, and the costs of suit.[6] On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the findings
of the trial court, but clarified that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was
absorbed in the element of treachery in murder.[7]

Accused-appellant comes before this Court arguing that the prosecution's case was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and that there was insufficient evidence to establish conspiracy among the accused.
Both he and the Solicitor General manifested that their respective positions were already thoroughly
discussed in the Briefs they had filed with the appellate court, and that they were thus no longer filing
supplemental briefs.

After a judicious review of the records, this Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of
either the RTC or the CA. Accused-appellant Pondivida admitted in the Brief he submitted to the CA
that on the evening of 8 July 2005, he went with Glen Alvarico and George Reyes to the house of Gener
Bondoc; that he, Pondivida, was the one who knocked on the door; that he and his companions were
able to enter the house; and that both Glen Alvarico and George Reyes shot the victim.[8] Thus, his
argument that Rodelyn Buenavista's failure to witness the actual shooting constituted reasonable
doubt of his guilt is unconvincing. His admissions place him at the scene of the crime and confirm that
he was with Reyes and Alvarico when they shot the victim. The RTC may still take cognizance of
Rodelyn's eyewitness testimony on all the events, except the actual shooting, and properly appreciate it
as positive identification through circumstantial evidence.

In People v. Caliso,[9] the Court stated:

The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require
direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are
no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification
and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the Court has
distinguished two types of positive identification in People v. Gallarde, to wit: (a) that by direct
evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial
evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the victim immediately before or after the crime.
The Court said:

x x x. Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an
eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A
witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an
eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may,
however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of
commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with
the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of
positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with
other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion,
which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual
eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the
exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is
basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively
identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt.[10] (Emphases in the original)
Thus, while witness Rodelyn admittedly failed to see the actual shooting, her account properly falls
under the second type of positive identification described above. To require her positive identification
of accused-appellant as the actual shooter is absurd. She last witnessed her common-law husband held
at gunpoint in their own house by the accused and his companions, a fact admitted by accused-
appellant himself. Direct evidence is not the only means to prove commission of the crime.

In any case, accused-appellant conflates the purported lack of an eyewitness testimony with his own
contention that conspiracy was not established by the prosecution. The pivotal question remains:
whether it was sufficiently shown that accused Pondivida conspired with Reyes and Alvarico. He insists
that the trial court erroneously convicted him on the basis of the weakness of the defense evidence,
and not the strength of the prosecution's.[11] Before the shooting on 8 July 2005, Glen Alvarico and
George Reyes had allegedly passed by his house and prevailed upon him to visit the house of Gener
Bondoc. Alvarico poked a gun at him to force him to knock at the door. He saw Alvarico and Reyes kill
Gener, but still complied with all the instructions of his companions, only because he was afraid for his
life.[12]

Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated; or inferred from the acts of the accused when those acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of interests.[13] Proof of a previous agreement and decision
to commit the crime is not essential, but the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the
same objective suffices.[14] In a long line of cases, we have held thus:

To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take
part in every act. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common
criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals.[15]

In this case, the prosecution decisively established a community of criminal design among Alvarico,
Reyes, and appellant Pondivida. While there is no evidence of any previous agreement among the
assailants to commit the crime, their concerted acts before, during and after the incident establish a
joint purpose and intent to kill.

As attested to by accused-appellant, they all went to the intended victim's house bearing firearms.
Accused-appellant himself knocked on the door. After failing to locate "Udoy" and "Bagsik," and
discovering that Gener was the latter's brother, they then engaged in a lengthy conversation, as they
circled around a nearby well outside the house.[16] Accused even admitted to shouting the name
"Bagsik" over and over.[17] They all asked Gener to step outside and speak with them. Upon his refusal,
appellant Pondivida, together with Alvarico, entered the house through an upstairs window. Alvarico
fired at George who was at the stairs. Reyes, from his vantage point at the front door, also shot at
George.[18] After fleeing the scene, appellant Pondivida admitted that he met with Alvarico in
Novaliches. Alvarico gave him money, and the latter thereafter boarded a bus headed to Olongapo City.
[19]

The trial court correctly rejected Pondivida's claim that he feared for his life. His account of being held
at gunpoint and forced to commit murder is incredible, considering that he accompanied the other
assailants to the victim's house without resistance; banged and shouted at the front door without any
prompting; willingly climbed the guava tree to enter the house and chase the victim; and accepted the
money from Alvarico in order to escape. Most telling is the fact that accused himself banged at the
front door and shouted the name "Bagsik" over and over. At no urging from his companions, he
climbed a tree located right beside the second-floor window to gain entry.

These were not the acts of a man who purportedly "feared for his life." He was shown to have
performed precisely those specific acts incidental to the commission of the crime with such closeness
and coordination with his other co-accused. Their acts together were indicative of a common purpose,
which was murder. We also concur with the trial court in finding that the actuations of the accused
after the murder did not indicate in the slightest that he had been coerced. That he was able to tidy his
things, pack a getaway bag, and even meet with his co-conspirators to receive money were not the acts
of a scared, innocent man.

Jurisprudence dictates that "when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on the findings are accorded high respect, if not conclusive
effect. This dictum would be more true if the findings were affirmed by the CA, since it is settled that
when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, these findings are generally
binding upon this Court."[20]

In sum, we find no cogent reason to reject the Decision of the CA. Appellant is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, for which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay complainant Rodelyn Buenavista P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as
moral damages, and P10,000 as actual damages. To conform to recent jurisprudence,[21] exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000 awarded by the CA are hereby increased to P30,000.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 26 June 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. H.C. No. 03237,
with the modification that the award of exemplary damages is increased from P25,000 to P30,000.
SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Leonen, JJ.*, concur.

* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes per raffle dated 25 February 2013.

[1] In CA G.R. H.C. No. 03237, penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican concurred in by Associate
Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Marlene Gonzales-Sison; rollo, pp. 2-11.

[2] Penned by Judge Gregorio S. Sampaga; CA rollo, pp. 14-23.

[3] Id. at 7.

[4] Id. at 4.

[5] Rollo, pp. 4-5.

[6] Dispositive portion, RTC Decision, pp. 9-10; CA rollo, pp. 22-23.

[7] Dispositive portion, CA Decision p. 8; rollo, p. 9.

[8] CA rollo, p. 41.

[9] G.R. No. 183830, 19 October 2011, 659 SCRA 666.

[10] Id. at 677-678.

[11] CA rollo, pp. 48-49.

[12] Id. at 41.

[13] Aquino v. Paiste, G.R. No. 147782, 25 June 2008, 555 SCRA 255, 260.

[14] People v. Amodia, G.R. No. 173791, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 518, 541.
[15] People v. Medice, G.R. No. 181701, 18 January 2012, 66 SCRA 334, 345-346; People v. Anticamara,
G.R. No. 178771, 8 June 2011, 651 SCRA 489, 507, citing People v. PO3 Tan, 411 Phil. 813, 838 (2001);
People v. De Jesus, 473 Phil. 405, 429 (2004).

[16] CA rollo, p. 16.

[17] Id. at 19.

[18] Id. at 16.

[19] Id. at 21.

[20] People v. Adallom, G.R. No. 182522, 7 May 2012; Decasa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 172184, 10
July 2007, 527 SCRA 267, 287.

[21] People v. Dones, G.R. No. 188329, 20 June 2012; People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 195534, 13 June
2012; People v. Villamor, G.R. No. 187497, 12 October 2011, 659 SCRA 44, 55.

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THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 141633 December 14, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REX T. CANLAS and other JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.

CARPIO, J.:

Where the court relies solely on circumstantial evidence, the combined effect of the pieces of
circumstantial evidence must inexorably lead to the conclusion that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty, whether it
proceeds from direct or circumstantial evidence.

The Case
On appeal before us is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City,
dated January 19, 2000, in Criminal Case No. 98-755 finding appellant REX T. CANLAS guilty
of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

The Charge

Appellant was charged together with six other unidentified men who were designated in the
Information as Richard Doe, Peter Doe, Rommel Doe, Winston Doe, and Charlie Doe. The
Information alleges:

"That on or about the 14th day of June, 1998, in Brgy. Palat, municipality (sic) of Porac,
province (sic) of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent
of (sic) gain, and with violence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away with them merchandise consisting of assorted clothes worth P4,000.00
and cash money in the amount of P1,000.00, belonging to the deceased, Jing Garcia Flores,
with a total value of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) Philippine Currency, and on the
occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away
the said articles, accused in pursuance of their conspiracy, and taking advantage of their
superior strength and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the deceased, Jing Garcia Flores with the use
of a lead pipe and a hunting knife, inflicting upon him mortal and fatal injuries which caused his
death.

Contrary to law."2

Arraignment and Plea

When arraigned on October 7, 1998, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not
guilty.3 Trial then ensued.

The Trial

The evidence of the prosecution consisted of the oral testimonies of SPO2 Henry Ayson (for
brevity "SPO2 Ayson"), Jose Tamayo (for brevity "Jose"), Willie Silva (for brevity "Silva"),
Ismael Victoria (for brevity "Victoria"), Dr. Olga Bausa (for brevity "Dr. Bausa"), and Dr. Lilia
Panlilio, as well as documentary and object evidence. The defense for its part presented
appellant as its lone witness.
Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution through the Office of the Solicitor General narrates its version of the facts, as
follows:

"On June 14, 1998, at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Willie Silva, Ismael Victoria, Daniel
Flores and Jing Flores, all ambulant vendors, went to Palat, Porac, Pampanga to sell different
kinds of clothes, such as t-shirts, shorts and sandos. Daniel Flores and Ismael Victoria were
the first to be called by customers, while Willie Silva and Jing Flores went on their way to look
for other customers. When Willie Silva was called by a customer to whom Willie showed his
wares, Jing Flores continued walking and entered a small alley. After Willie Silva finished
attending to his buyer, Willie followed Jing Flores at the small alley. Not finding Jing Flores,
Willie asked the residents there if they saw where Jing went. After receiving negative replies,
except from a deaf-mute who said that Jing was embraced by someone, Willie Silva went back
to his companions. Willie, this time accompanied by Ismael Victoria and Daniel Flores, went
back to the alley and looked for Jing Flores. They also searched the back of a house and the
creek, but to no avail. At the time he disappeared, Jing Flores was wearing a white Hanes t-
shirt, maong short pants, blue sandals, a cap with "Bench" marking and a red towel.

Thereafter, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Willie Silva, Ismael Victoria and Daniel
Flores went to Towking, Porac to continue selling their goods. The three of them returned to
Palat an hour later. They continued looking for Jing Flores until 8:00 o'clock in the evening.
Thereafter, they all went home to Dolores, Mexico, Pampanga.

Upon learning that Jing Flores had not yet gone home, Willie Silva and his companions sought
the help of their barangay captain and several barriomates. Their group, numbering twenty,
went back to Palat, Porac to look for Jing Flores. Arriving midnight at Palat, the group sought
the help of the barangay captain thereat and thereupon searched for Jing Flores. They
searched the whole barangay for hours. At around 6:00 to 7:00 o'clock in the morning the
following day, June 15, 1998, the lifeless body of Jing Flores was found in a creek with his
head and upper body covered with animal feed sack.

Roberto Bautista, the Barangay Captain of Dolores, Mexico, reported to SPO2 Henry Ayson of
the Porac Police Station that the dead body of Jing Flores was found in a creek at Palat,
Porac. SPO2 Ayson, together with SPO2 Edilberto David and other policemen, went to the site
where the cadaver of Jing Flores was found. SPO2 Ayson ordered the taking of pictures before
and after retrieving the cadaver, which was positively identified by Roberto Bautista as that of
Jing Flores.
Traces of blood were seen not only at the place where the lifeless body of Jing Flores was
found, but also on the leaves of the different plants which lead to the backyard of the house,
around 300 meters away from the creek, of Jose Tamayo. Since there were still traces of blood
leading to the kitchen of Jose Tamayo's house, SPO2 Ayson asked the permission of Jose if
the former could enter the latter's house. When said permission was granted, SPO2 Ayson,
together with his policemen-companions and some barangay officials and members of the
search party, entered the house and found traces of blood on the kitchen floor which was
covered with sand. Traces of blood that lead to one of the rooms were also found. Upon
entering the said room, SPO2 Ayson found underneath a bamboo bed a bag containing
assorted clothes, some of which were soaked in blood. SPO2 Ayson likewise found inside the
room a red sack containing a blue cap with "Bench" markings, a red towel wet with blood, a
bed sheet with blood stains and blue sandals. At the corner of the bamboo bed was a lead pipe
likewise stained with blood. A hunting knife inside one of the drawers in the house was also
recovered.

Lucila, the wife of Jose Tamayo, told SPO2 Ayson that Rex Canlas is their grandson, and that
the bag which was recovered inside the room belongs to Rex who used to occupy the bamboo
bed. Upon further questioning by SPO2 Ayson, Lucila narrated that she saw Rex Canlas call
Jing Flores to enter the house. Rex asked Lucila to get out of the house and, when she
complied, Rex locked the door. Outside, Lucila heard someone was being beaten inside the
house. After an hour, Lucila found the dead body of Jing Flores inside the house and Rex
Canlas cleaning the kitchen floor.

In the course of his investigation, SPO2 Ayson also found that, at around 9:00 o'clock in the
morning of June 14, 1998, Rex Canlas had a drinking spree with his cousins as it was the
birthday of one of their relatives. That appellant attended said birthday celebration was
admitted by appellant himself.

Willie Silva, who was among those who went inside the house of Jose Tamayo, also saw blood
on the wall in the kitchen. Willie likewise found that the clothes inside the bag and the blue
sandals which were recovered inside one of the rooms in the house were those of Jing Flores.
He also saw Lucila Tamayo washing a white Hanes t-shirt stained with blood.

Ismael Victoria likewise identified the clothes that were placed inside the bag which was
recovered underneath the bamboo bed as those being sold by Jing Flores, and that the blue
sandals, cap and red towel were those worn by Jing Flores at the time he disappeared the day
before. Ismael recalled that the first time he and his companions looked for Jing Flores in the
afternoon of June 14, 1998, Ismael saw Rex Canlas standing under a tree across the house of
Jose Tamayo.
Dr. Olga Bausa, a forensic chemist of the PNP, Camp Crame, conducted an examination to
determine the presence of human blood on the evidence (sic) the police gathered that led
them to the house of Jose Tamayo and those that were recovered therein. According to Dr.
Bausa, all except the bladed weapon, gave positive results for the presence of human blood.

Dr. Lilia Panlilio, the Municipal Health Officer of Porac, Pampanga, conducted an autopsy of
the cadaver of Jing Flores. According to Dr. Panlilio, Jing Flores suffered numerous incised
and lacerated wounds. She also found that all of the lobes of the brain of Jing's cadaver had
blood, and that the most fatal wound inflicted upon Jing was the one which caused epidural
hemorrhages in the brain. Dr. Panlilio concluded that Jing died of cardio-respiratory arrest
secondary to intracranial hemorrhages, and that the weapon used in inflicting the aforesaid
hemorrhages could have been a blunt object such as a lead pipe.

Jose Tamayo declared that he is the father of appellant's mother, Remedios. After Remedios
died, Jose Tamayo and his wife took care of appellant. When appellant would come home from
work, he would sometimes sleep in (sic) the bamboo bed in the house of Jose Tamayo.

The heirs of Jing Flores spent sums of money totaling P54,000.00 for Jing's funeral, burial and
related expenses. They also suffered emotional pain, sleepless nights and mental anguish as a
result of Jing's death."4

Version of the Defense

In his testimony in court, appellant denied any involvement in the commission of the crime. The
trial court summarized appellant's testimony in this wise

"Accused Rex Canlas testified that he was working at Maybunga, Pasig on the date of the
incident as a factory worker. He went home to his father's house at Palat, Porac in the evening
of June 13, 1998. At 7 o'clock of the following morning, June 14, 1998, and when he was about
to return to Pasig for work, he was invited by his cousin Dexter Canlas to attend the latter's
birthday. He went to Dexter's house which is near the house of his grandfather, Jose Tamayo.
He left the house of Dexter at 10:30 a.m. and proceeded to the jeepney terminal at barangay
Tokwing. The jeepney that he boarded left the terminal at 11:30 a.m. and he arrived at Angeles
City at noon where he boarded a Philippine Rabbit bus that brought him to Manila. He arrived
in Manila at 2:30 p.m. and boarded a passenger jeepney going to Pasig. He arrived at his
place of work at around 4:30 p.m. of the same day. He denied the charge made against him as
he already left barangay Palat when the incident happened. He likewise denied that he lives
with Jose Tamayo and alleged that he was living in his father's house which was also located
at barangay Palat. He admitted, however, that he sometimes slept at the house of Jose
Tamayo. He denied though, that he slept on the wooden bed as he only slept on the sofa. He
further alleged that he had nothing to do with the death of Jing Garcia Flores."5

The Trial Court's Ruling

After trial, the trial court rendered the now assailed judgment convicting appellant, thus:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Rex Canlas is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Accused Rex Canlas is further ordered to pay the heirs of Jing Garcia Flores the sum of
P54,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim and
P50,000.00 for and as moral damages.

SO ORDERED."6

The Issues

In this appeal, appellant continues to profess his innocence and seeks his acquittal based on
these errors allegedly committed by the trial court:

"I. THE LOWER COURT IS (SIC) ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY OF THE CRIME AS CHARGED THRU (SIC) CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

II. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT IN ORDER TO ACQUIT HIM."7

The Court's Ruling

After a careful and thorough review of the facts and evidence on record, we rule for appellant's
acquittal.

There is no direct evidence in this case that could link appellant to the commission of the
crime. As stated by the trial court, "(N)obody actually saw how the victim was killed and how
the robbery was committed."8 The trial court was thus compelled to rely solely on
circumstantial evidence. The trial court enumerated the pieces of circumstantial evidence that
justified its finding of guilt:
"1. Jing Garcia Flores was last seen alive at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon of June 14,
1998 entering a small alley leading to the house of Jose Tamayo.

2. The victim was wearing a blue "Bench" cap and a pair of blue "Beach Walk" sandals,
with a red towel and carrying assorted merchandise when last seen entering a small alley.

3. While conducting the search for Jing Garcia Flores in the afternoon of June 14, 1998,
prosecution witness Ismael Victoria saw accused Rex Canlas standing under a tree across the
house of Jose Tamayo contrary to the accused (sic) allegation that he was already in Metro
Manila at that time.

4. In the early morning of June 15, 1998, the lifeless body of Jing Garcia Flores was found
in a creek bearing contusions and incised wounds.

5. The creek is only around three hundred meters away from the house of Jose Tamayo.

6. Drips of blood and blood stains (sic) were found at the creek were the body of the victim
was recovered.

7. The drips of blood and blood stains (sic) were also found on the leaves of different
plants that lead to the backyard of Jose Tamayo.

8. Blood stains (sic) were also found leading to the kitchen of Jose Tamayo's house.

9. At the kitchen floor, drips of blood were found which were covered with sand. Blood
stains (sic) were also found on the wall and on the small table of the kitchen.

10. When the police and the searching party entered the house of Jose Tamayo, they saw
the grandmother of the accused washing a white "Hanes" shirt stained with blood in a basin.
The grandmother said that the clothing belonged to the victim and at the same time requesting
that she be not involve (sic) in the case as she is already old.

11. Underneath a bamboo bed inside one of the rooms of the house of Jose Tamayo was
found a bag containing assorted clothings (103 pieces of short pants and 34 pieces of sandos)
with some soaked in blood and were identified to belong to the victim.

12. The blue cap with "Bench" marking, the blue sandals, and a red towel stained with
blood all belonging to the victim were also found inside the said room. At the corner of the
bamboo bed was a lead pipe with blood stains (sic).
13. A bedsheet (sic) with blood stains (sic) was also found inside the room.

14. Dr. Olga Bausa, a forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame,
testified that these items with blood stains (sic) when subjected for examination gave positive
results for the presence of human blood.

15. Jose Tamayo testified that after the accused (sic) mother died, said accused lived with
them and they were the ones who send (sic) Rex to school.

16. Jose Tamayo also admitted that the accused used to stay and sleep at the room where
the items belonging to the deceased were recovered.

17. Accused admitted that in the morning of June 14, 1998, he was at his cousin Dexter
Canlas' house and attended the birthday of the latter. Dexter Canlas' house is very near the
house of Jose Tamayo."9

We do not agree with the trial court that the foregoing circumstantial evidence inexorably lead
to the conclusion that appellant robbed and killed the victim, Jing Flores.

True, conviction is not always based on direct evidence for it may also rest purely on
circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series
of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference.10 It is founded on
experience, observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known
and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.11 Conviction may be warranted on the
basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.12 With respect to
the third requisite, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an
unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.13

Based on these requisites, the circumstantial evidence invoked by the trial court raises doubt
rather than moral certainty as to the guilt of appellant. The circumstantial evidence of the
prosecution fails to muster the quantum of proof required in criminal cases — guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Moreover, the circumstances enumerated by the trial court do not
completely discount the possibility that other than appellant, there could be another person or
persons who could have perpetrated the crime.

First, the trial court gave much weight to the testimony of Victoria who claimed he saw
appellant standing under a tree across the house of Jose in the afternoon of June 14, 1998, at
the time Victoria and his companions were looking for the victim.14 The trial court considered
the presence of appellant at the crime scene at the time the victim disappeared as sufficient to
incriminate appellant to the commission of the crime. Such presence of appellant at the crime
scene does not necessarily mean that appellant authored the crime. Such presence at the
crime scene merely debunks appellant's alibi that he was in Manila.15

While the defense of alibi is by nature a weak one, it assumes commensurate significance and
strength where the evidence for the prosecution is also intrinsically weak.16 There is no
evidence that appellant was the person who was last seen with the victim. There is also no
evidence that appellant ever approached the victim. Silva, one of the companions of the victim,
testified that when he was looking for the victim in the afternoon of June 14, 1998, a deaf-mute
gestured to him that someone had embraced the victim.17 However, Silva was not able to
check the veracity of the deaf-mute's claim because the deaf-mute's mother prevented him
from further communicating with Silva.18 The deaf-mute was not presented in court. The
absence of proof connecting appellant to the disappearance of the victim that fateful day
compels us to consider with caution the other pieces of circumstantial evidence.

Second, we do not agree that the pieces of circumstantial evidence enumerated by the trial
court "clearly make an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion
which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime."19
The events that transpired from the time of the disappearance of the victim at about 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon of June 14, 1998 to 7:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day, the
time when the victim's body was discovered, are unaccounted for. There is no concrete proof
showing that appellant was with the victim during that span of time. The records also do not
show when the victim was actually killed.

Third, in view of the inherently weak evidence of the prosecution against appellant, the
possibility that another person or persons could have authored the crime cannot be totally
discounted. SPO2 Ayson, the police officer who investigated the crime, testified that the house
of Jose has neither a fence nor a gate. While the back of the house has a "single barbed wire",
anybody could enter said house.20 SPO2 Ayson further testified that the room where the
personal properties of the victim were found and where the pipe with bloodstains was also
discovered has no door, making it open.21 The house and the said room are easily accessible
to entry by other persons. Even the police investigators originally theorized that several
persons committed the crime. SPO2 Ayson testified that:

"Q: Officer Ayson, when you decided to file a case, whom did you charge?

A: Rey Canlas, Gerald Canlas, Rex Canlas and Angelito Galang.

Q: That was (sic) included Rex Canlas?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you please explain to the court why you charged those persons in the first
instance, what was your basis?

A: Because all of them participated in the drinking bout.

Q: Did you find out the relationship of Gerald Canlas, Ramil Canlas to Rex Canlas?

A: They are all cousins.

Q: What about Angelito Galang?

A: May be a relative of them (sic).

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

Q: In your investigation, where were these persons drinking together?

A: At the house of the celebrant, Dexter Canlas, a brother of Gerald Canlas.

Q: Did you find out what time of the day?

A: They started drinking from 9 o'clock. They added they went home before 1 o'clock
already in the (sic) intoxicated condition.

Q: On what day?

A: 14 June, 1998, sir.

Q: Where were they drinking together? In what house?

A: Gerald Canlas, sir.

Q: That Gerald Canlas' house, how far was that from the house of Jose Tamayo?

A: Only adjacent. They are immediate neighbors, sir.

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

That will be all for the witness, Your Honor.

COURT:

Q: Mr. Witness, why did you include the others in this case as accused?

A: Based on our theory, sir.

Q: But per information given you by the grandmother it was only Rex Canlas who was
inside the room when the incident happened?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: It was only your theory that others also participated?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: As what?

A: Because they were together when the victim passed-by, sir."22

Due to the insufficiency of evidence against the other suspects, the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor in a Resolution dated September 4, 1998, ordered the dropping of these suspects
from the case and directed the filing of the Information for robbery with homicide against
appellant and other unidentified suspects designated in the Information as Richard Doe, Peter
Doe, Rommel Doe, Winston Doe, etc.23

The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to
convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with
each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused's guilt
and inconsistent with his innocence.24 The circumstantial evidence must exclude the
possibility that some other person has committed the offense.25 In this case, the evidence at
hand does not convincingly prove appellant's complicity in the crime, nor does it foreclose the
possibility that another person is liable for it.

Fourth, the following pieces of circumstantial evidence do not conclusively point to appellant as
the assailant of the victim: (1) the traces of blood from the creek where the body was
discovered leading to the house of the grandfather of appellant; (2) the bloodstains on the
kitchen floor of the house of said grandfather; (3) a bag containing the items belonging to the
victim found under the bamboo bed inside a room that appellant allegedly slept in occasionally;
(4) the cap of the victim and a pipe with bloodstains also found inside said room; and (5) a
hunting knife found inside the kitchen cabinet. No other independent physical evidence that
could connect appellant to the crime, like appellant's fingerprints, was found at the scene of the
crime or on the object evidence gathered by the investigators.

It is lamentable that the integrity of the evidence collected by the police investigators is highly
questionable. SPO2 Ayson admitted in court that on June 15, 1998, around 150 people were in
the places where they were conducting their investigation and that the police investigators
were unable to secure or cordon off these places.26 Also, due to the investigators' failure to
submit a sufficient quantity of blood samples for testing, Dr. Bausa, the Forensic Chemist of
the Philippine National Police, was unable to conduct further examinations such as blood
typing.27 She was thus prevented from confirming that the traces of blood in the vicinity of the
crime and on the object evidence were those of the victim.28 All that Dr. Bausa could confirm
from the samples was that the blood submitted for examination was human blood.29

The conviction of appellant cannot stand on the basis of sketchy and doubtful circumstantial
evidence. It is when evidence is purely circumstantial that the prosecution is much more
obligated to rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence
for the defense, and that conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty.30

Fifth, the most compelling evidence that could have been used against appellant is the alleged
statement of Lucila Tamayo to SPO2 Ayson during the course of his investigation of the crime
on June 15, 1998. Lucila, the grandmother of appellant, supposedly stated that: (1) appellant
called the victim inside the house pretending to buy merchandise; (2) appellant asked her to
leave the house and he then locked the door; (3) Lucila heard someone being beaten up inside
the house; and (4) after an hour, she saw the victim's cadaver and appellant thereafter cleaned
the floor.31 However, Lucila was never presented in court to testify. Without Lucila's testimony,
her statement incriminating appellant to the crime belongs to the realm of hearsay evidence
and therefore has no probative value.

The settled rule is conviction can never be based on hearsay evidence.32 Any oral or
documentary evidence is hearsay by nature if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person who was never
presented on the witness stand.33 Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a
witness can only testify to those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge, otherwise,
such testimony is inadmissible for being hearsay.34 The underlying reasons for this rule are:
(1) to afford the judge the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witness, and (2) to
allow the adverse party a chance of cross-examining the witness.35
SPO2 Ayson's testimony recalling Lucila's statement merely proves the fact that such
statement was made or the tenor of such statement, but it does not establish the truth of the
fact asserted in the statement.36 Lucila should have been presented in court to prove the truth
of the matter surrounding appellant's alleged involvement in the crime. This would have
afforded appellant his constitutional right of confrontation, or to meet the witness against him
face-to-face.37

Finally, every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two things: (1) the fact of
the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands
charged, and (2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime.38 Here, appellant
was charged with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. To be liable for the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove:
(a) the taking of the personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person;
(b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain
or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide was committed.39 What is crucial for a conviction for the crime of robbery with
homicide is for the prosecution to firmly establish the offender's intent to take personal property
before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually carried out.40 There
must be a showing that the death of the victim occurred by reason or on occasion of the
robbery.

No shred of evidence is on record that could support the conclusion that appellant's primary
motive was to rob the victim and that he was able to accomplish it. While the trial court noted
that there were no eyewitnesses to the robbery,41 nonetheless, it ruled that the robbery aspect
of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide was sufficiently proven because:

"(T)he assorted clothings and other items of the victim was them (sic) carrying to be sold to
customers were nowhere to be found near the scene where the victim's body was recovered.
They were later found inside the house of Jose Tamayo. Hence, the robbery angle is also
beyond dispute."42

The trial court's conclusion that there was robbery simply because the items belonging to the
victim were found in the house of the grandfather of appellant is speculative. The evidence is
not definitive as to whether appellant regularly slept in the house of his grandfather or
specifically, on the bamboo bed under which the personal effects and items peddled by the
victim were found. Mere speculation and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required in
establishing the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.43
The evidence to establish the homicide aspect of the subject composite crime also falls short
of proving that appellant was indubitably the assailant of the victim. The trial court, citing the
cases of People vs. Kagui Malasugui,44 People vs. Lorenzo,45 United States vs. Divino,46
and People vs. Ramos,47 held that "(I)n the absence of an explanation of how one has come
into possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he
must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of the said person and
of the robbery committed on him."48 The presumption in these cases must not be taken in
isolation, for the guilt of the accused in these cases was determined not on the basis of
tenuous circumstantial evidence. The totality of the evidence in People vs. Kagui Malasugui,
People vs. Lorenzo, and People vs. Ramos clearly pointed to the accused therein as the
assailants of the victims.

In People vs. Kagui Malasugui, the victim's dying declaration named the accused as his killer
and the accused was arrested in possession of the victim's personal effects. The accused
could not give a plausible explanation as to how such possession came about. In People vs.
Lorenzo, an eyewitness recounted on the witness stand the stabbing of the victim. The
accused were arrested shortly after the killing and a portion of the proceeds of the robbery was
retrieved from one of the accused. In People vs. Ramos, the accused were nabbed while
fleeing from the scene of the crime with the bloodstained weapon. And in the case of United
States vs. Divino, the crime charged was robbery only. The accused, who was convicted of
robbery, was caught in possession of the stolen livestock.

The factual milieu of the present case is different. Appellant was not found in possession of the
properties of the victim. The bag containing the items peddled by the victim was discovered
under the bamboo bed in the house of the grandfather of appellant. The grandfather denied
that the bag belonged to appellant.49 The evidence is not certain as to whether appellant
regularly slept on the bamboo bed where the bag in question was found. It was not even
proven that appellant slept in the house of his grandfather the night before the killing of the
victim. The fact that the house wherein the personal properties of the victim were recovered
was easily accessible precludes us from concluding with certainty that no other person or
persons, aside from appellant, could have stashed away the properties of the victim in the
house of appellant's grandfather.

Robbery with homicide is a special complex crime against property.50 Absent clear and
convincing evidence that the crime of robbery was perpetrated, and that, on occasion or by
reason thereof, a homicide was committed, an accused cannot be found guilty of robbery with
homicide, but only of homicide or murder, as the case may be.51 There is a paucity of
evidence to show that appellant had a hand in the killing of the victim. We cannot convict
appellant for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide or for the separate crimes of
robbery or homicide when the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court is plainly
inadequate and unconvincing in proving appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated January 19, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 59, Angeles City in Criminal Case No. 98-755 finding appellant, Rex T. Canlas, guilty of
the crime of robbery with homicide is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. He is ordered
IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from confinement unless held for some other legal cause.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Judge Eliezer R. de los Santos.

2 Records of Criminal Case No. 98-755, p. 4.

3 Ibid., p. 25.

4 Rollo, pp. 93-100.

5 Ibid, p. 26.

6 Ibid, p. 32.

7 Ibid, p. 48.

8 Ibid, p. 27.

9 Ibid, pp. 29-30.

10 People vs. Ayola, G.R. No. 138923, September 4, 2001.

11 Ibid.
12 Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.

13 People vs. Ayola, supra.

14 TSN, January 20, 1999, pp. 16-18.

15 See People vs. De la Cruz, 279 SCRA 245 (1997).

16 Ibid., p. 257.

17 TSN, January 5, 1999, p. 11.

18 Ibid., p. 12.

19 Rollo, p. 31.

20 TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 24.

21 Ibid., p. 34.

22 Ibid., pp. 19-20.

23 Records of Criminal Case No. 98-755, p. 5.

24 People vs. Ayola, supra, see note 10.

25 Ibid.

26 TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 27.

27 TSN, July 1, 1999, p. 17.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 People vs. Caparas, Jr., 290 SCRA 78 (1998), p. 90.

31 Rollo, p. 21.
32 People vs. Cui, 314 SCRA 153 (1999), p. 166.

33 Ibid.

34 People vs. Manhuyod, 290 SCRA 257 (1998), p. 270.

35 De la Torre vs. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 196 (1998), p. 204.

36 See Sebastian vs. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 114028, October 18, 2000.

37 See People vs. Manhuyod, supra.

38 People vs. Ayson, supra, see note 10.

39 People vs. Faco, 314 SCRA 505 (1999), p. 522.

40 People vs. Sanchez, 298 SCRA 48 (1998), p. 58.

41 Rollo, p. 27.

42 Ibid., p. 34.

43 People vs. Dela Rosa, 284 SCRA 158 (1998), p. 172.

44 63 Phil. 221 (1936).

45 200 SCRA 207 (1991).

46 18 Phil. 425 (1911)

47 240 SCRA 191 (1995).

48 Rollo, p. 31.

49 TSN, December 18, 1998, pp. 19-20.

50 People vs. Arondain, G.R. Nos. 131864-65, September 27, 2001.

51 Ibid.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No.179535 June 9, 2014

JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO ESPINELI, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Jurisprudence teaches us that "for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a

conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent x x x."1 Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld
provided that the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person.2

Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari3 is the July 6, 2007 Decision4 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02252 which modified the August 31, 1999
Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, by finding petitioner
Jose Espineli a.k.a. Danilo "Danny" Espineli (petitioner) guilty of the crime of homicide instead
of murder.

Also questioned is the CA’s September 14, 2007 Resolution6 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.7

Factual Antecedents

On June 24, 1997, an Information8 charging petitioner with the crime of murder was filed
before the RTC,9 the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of December, 1996 in the Municipality of Imus, Province of
Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, together with one (1) Sotero Paredes and three (3) other unidentified persons, whose
real names, identities and whereabouts are still unknown, said Sotero Paredes having been
earlier charged with the same offense, and is now undergoing trial before Branch 90, of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, then armed with firearms, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and
taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
attack, assault and shoot one Alberto Berbon y Downie with the use of said firearms, thereby
inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds on his head and different parts of his body
which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Alberto
Berbon y Downie. CONTRARY TO LAW.10

Petitioner was arrested on July 1, 1997 and when arraigned on July 7, 1997 with the
assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.11

The facts show that in the early evening of December 15, 1996, Alberto Berbon y Downie
(Alberto), a 49-year old Senior Desk Coordinator of the radio station DZMM, was shot in the
head and different parts of the body in front of his house in Imus, Cavite by unidentified
malefactors who immediately fled the crime scene on board a waiting car.

Meanwhile, the group of Atty. Orly Dizon (Atty. Dizon) of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) arrested and took into custody one Romeo Reyes (Reyes) for the crime of Illegal
Possession of Deadly Weapon. Reyes confided to the group of Atty. Dizon that he was willing
to give vital information regarding the Berbon case. In due course, NBI Agent Dave
Segunial(NBI Agent Segunial) interviewed Reyes on February 10, 1997 and reduced his
statement into writing whereby Reyes claimed that on December 15, 1996, he saw petitioner
and Sotero Paredes (Paredes) board a red car while armed with a .45 caliber firearm and
armalite, respectively; and that petitioner told Paredes that "ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas
yang si Berbon."12 Subsequently, Reyes posted bail and was released on February 14, 1997.
Thenceforth, he jumped bail and was never again heard of. NBI Agent Segunial testified on
these facts during the trial.

The victim’s widow, Sabina Berbon (Sabina) likewise testified. According to her, sometime in
the third week of February 1997 Reyes sought financial help so he could transfer his family to
the province and protect them from any untoward consequence that may result from his giving
information to the NBI regarding the death of Sabina’s husband. Sabina gave him the total
amount of ₱1,500.00 and promised to help him in applying for the witness protection program.
This was affirmed on the witness stand by Sabina’s brother, Bartolome Pakingan. After that,
however, Reyes never came back.

Another prosecution witness, Rodolfo Dayao (Rodolfo), testified that he sold his red Ford
Escort car to three persons who came to his residence in the afternoon of September 1, 1996.
He later identified the said car from the photographs presented to him by the police officers.
Dr. Ludivino J. Lagat (Dr. Lagat), the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who conducted a post-mortem
examination on Alberto, declared in his Autopsy Report that the victim suffered multiple
gunshot wounds in the head and body. He also stated that based on the size of the gunshot
wounds or entrance, high-powered guns were used in the killing.

Petitioner, on the other hand, did not adduce evidence for his defense. Instead, he filed a
Demurrer to Evidence13 without leave of court. As no action whatsoever was taken thereon by
the trial court, petitioner just moved that the case be deemed submitted for decision.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision14 dated August 31, 1999, the trial court adjudged petitioner guilty of murder,
thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO "Danny"

ESPINELI, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of "Murder" as
charged. He is, therefore, sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and is
likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Alberto Berbon y Downie, the civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00,
and actual and compensatory damages in the total amount of ₱135,000.00 as funeral
expenses (Exhibit "H"), interment fee of ₱8,360.00 (Exhibit "C"), medical expenses in the total
amount of ₱1,519.45 (Exhibit[s] "D", "D-1" and "D-2") and for the contract fees of Memorial
Park Care the amount of ₱15,700.00 (Exhibit "E").

Furthermore, considering that he is a high risk prisoner, his transfer to the National Penitentiary
at Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, is immediately ordered.

SO ORDERED.15

Petitioner seasonably appealed his conviction before this Court. Pursuant, however, to the
Court’s pronouncement in People v. Mateo,16 the case was ordered transferred to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition through a Resolution17 dated March 22, 2006.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision18 promulgated on July 6, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the findings of
the trial court. It ratiocinated that since none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing
of the victim was perpetrated, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot
be appreciated. Neither can nighttime serve as an aggravating circumstance as the time of the
commission of the crime was not even alleged in the Information. In view thereof, the CA found
petitioner guilty only of homicide instead of murder. The decretal portion of the appellate court’s
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The appealed
Decision dated August 31, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

In all other respects, the said decision STANDS.

In the service of his sentence, accused-appellant shall be credited in full with the period of his
preventive imprisonment.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.19

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 which the CA denied in its
Resolution21 dated September 14, 2007.

Hence, this Petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner posits that the CA should not have affirmed the Decision of RTC as the latter erred:

1. x x x [in admitting, considering and giving] probative value to Exhibit "A", the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" of [Reyes] because [he] was not presented in court to confirm, affirm and
authenticate the contents of his sworn statement. It resulted in the denial of petitioner’s
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine his accusers.22

2. x x x [in convicting] the [petitioner] based on unproven, inadmissible circumstantial

evidence.23

3. x x x in not acquitting the petitioner for failure of the prosecution to prove [his guilt] beyond
reasonable doubt x x x.24
In sum, petitioner anchors his quest for the reversal of his conviction on the alleged erroneous
admission in evidence of the Sinumpaang Salaysay25 of Reyes for being hearsay and
inadmissible. He avers that the said sworn statement should not have been given probative
value because its contents were neither confirmed nor authenticated by the affiant. Thus, all
circumstances emanating from or included in the sworn statement must be totally brushed
aside as lacking any evidentiary and probative value. Petitioner emphasizes that as found by
the courts below, there was no direct evidence linking him to the crime; therefore, he wants this
Court to review the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence upon which his conviction was
based as he believes that the same failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent People of the
Philippines, concurs with the petitioner and recommends his acquittal.26 It is also of the view
that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving petitioner’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Truly, "direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from which a court
may draw its finding of guilt."27 The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that
evidence "which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder
draws from the evidence established."28 Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict the offender "if i)there is more than one
circumstance; ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and iii) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt."29 All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that
the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.30

In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as forming an unbroken chain leading to one
fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person
are the following:

1. In the morning of December 15,1996, petitioner was heard telling his co-accused Sotero
Paredes (Sotero) "ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" before boarding a red
car. Sotero was holding an armalite rifle while petitioner was armed with a .45 caliber pistol;
2. The said red car was identified or recognized by prosecution witness Rodolfo to be the
same car he had sold to Sotero for ₱10,000.00 in September 1996;

3. The victim Alberto was fatally shot later in the day (December 15, 1996) by unidentified
gunmen who thereafter immediately fled riding a red car; and

4. Post-mortem examination of the victim’s body showed that he sustained multiple gunshot
wounds, the nature, severity and characteristics of which indicate that they were inflicted using
high-powered guns, possibly anarmalite rifle and .22 caliber pistol.31

The records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Alberto. Thus the courts
below were forced to render their verdict of conviction on circumstantial evidence as
sanctioned under Section 4, Rule 13332 of the Rules of Court. The central issue now
confronting this Court is whether the prosecution has amply proved by circumstantial evidence
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals sufficiently support petitioner’s
conviction.

The Court has carefully scrutinized the evidence presented in this case in the light of the
standards discussed above and finds the foregoing circumstantial evidence sufficient to
support a judgment of conviction. Several reasons deserve our acceptance of the
circumstances upon which petitioner’s conviction was based, to wit:

First, NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had investigated Reyes and reduced the latter’s
statement into writing declaring, among others, that in the morning of December 15, 1996, he
(Reyes) overheard petitioner telling Sotero "Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon"
and saw them armed with .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a red
car. The CA gave weight to Reyes’ sworn statement in this wise:

The probative value of Romeo Reyes’s worn statement as to the words spoken by appellant to
his co-accused Sotero Paredes in the morning of December 15, 1996 cannot be disputed. x x
x33

Petitioner takes vigorous exception to the said findings, insisting that the said sworn statement
belongs to the category of hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible. He asserts that its
contents were never confirmed or authenticated by Reyes, thus, it lacks probative value.

The Court is unconvinced.

The hearsay evidence rule as provided under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
states:

Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency
and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce.
However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person
given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly
hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is
merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made.
Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such
statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown.
As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary,
for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the
existence of such a fact.34 This is known as the doctrine of independently relevant
statements.35

In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he was investigating
Reyes, the latter confided to him that he (Reyes) heard petitioner telling Sotero "Ayaw ko nang
abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" and that he saw the two (petitioner and Sotero) armed with
a .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boardinga red car, cannot be regarded
as hearsay evidence. This is considering that NBI Agent Segunial’s testimony was not
presented to prove the truth of such statement but only for the purpose of establishing that on
February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn statement containing such narration of facts. This
is clear from the offer of the witness’ oral testimony.36 Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself
candidly admitted that he is incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes’ statement.37
Verily then, what the prosecution sought to be admitted was the fact that Reyes made such
narration of facts in his sworn statement and not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. Thus,
the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of an independently relevant statement
where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes made such statement and the truth and falsity
thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible as evidence
and the hearsay rule does not apply.38 Moreover, the written statement of Reyes is a notarized
document having been duly subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a
supervising agent of the NBI. As such, it may be presented in evidence without further proof,
the certificate of acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the due execution of this
instrument or document involved pursuant to Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. As
held in Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza,39 a notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption
of authenticity and due execution which must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
Here, no clear and convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to overcome such
presumption. Clearly, therefore, the CA did not err in its appreciation of Reyes’ sworn
statement as testified to by NBI Agent Segunial.

Second, the identification and recognition through photograph by Rodolfo of the 1971 Ford
Escort red colored car as the same car he had sold to Sotero in September 1996 clearly and
convincingly prove that it was the very same red car used in the killing of Alberto on December
15, 1996.

Third, Alberto was shot and killed on December 15, 1996 and the gunmen immediately fled the
scene riding a red car which was identified as the same car previously sold by Rodolfo to
Sotero.

Fourth, though the testimony of Dr. Lagat was limited to the post-mortem examination of the
cadaver of Alberto, his findings that the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds and that the
same were caused by high-powered guns, served as corroborative evidence and contributed
in a significant way in establishing the level of proof that the law requires in convicting
petitioner.

Lastly, petitioner’s escape from detention on August 26, 1998 while the case was pending can
also be considered as another circumstance since it is a strong indication of his guilt.

All told, this Court finds the concordant combination and cumulative effect of the alleged
established circumstances, which essentially were the same circumstances found by the trial
court and the appellate court, to have satisfied the requirement of Section 4, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court. Indeed, the incriminating circumstances, when taken together, constitute an
unbroken chain of events enough to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner was responsible for
the killing of the victim.

Besides, it is "[a]n established rule in appellate review x x x that the trial court’s factual
findings, including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of
their testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded
respect, if not conclusive effect. These factual findings and conclusions assume greater weight
if they are affirmed by the CA,"40 as in this case.

The Crime Committed and the Proper Penalty.

The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner is guilty only of the crime of homicide in view of
the prosecution’s failure to prove any of the alleged attendant circumstances of abuse of
superior strength and nighttime. As aptly observed by the appellate court:

The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of

forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the
commission of the crime. However, as none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing
was perpetrated, abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case. Neither can
nighttime serve as an aggravating circumstance, the time of the commission of the crime was
not even alleged in the Information.41 (Citations omitted)

The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal.42 In view of the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence should be within the range of reclusion temporal
in its medium term which has a duration of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum should be within the
range of prision mayor which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. Thus, the imposition by the CA of an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, is in order.

Petitioner’s Civil liability

While the CA correctly imposed the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, it failed, however,
to award moral damages. These awards are mandatory without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder or
homicide.43 Thus, for moral damages, the award of ₱50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim is
only proper.

Anent the award of actual damages, this Court sees no reason to disturb the amount awarded
by the trial court as upheld by the CA since the itemized medical and burial expenses were
duly supported by receipts and other documentary evidence.

The CA did not grant any award of damages for loss of earning capacity and rightly so. Though
Sabina testified as to the monthly salary of the deceased, the same remains unsubstantiated.
"Such indemnity cannot be awarded in the absence of documentary evidence except where
the victim was either self-employed or a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws.''44 The exceptions find no application in this case.
In addition and in conformity with current policy, an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
is imposed on all the monetary awards for damages from date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
July 6, 2007 and Resolution dated September 14, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02252 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that petitioner JOSE ESPINEL!
a.k.a. DANILO "DANNY'' ESPINEL! is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim ALBERTO
BERBON y DOWNIE PS0,000.00 as moral damages as well as interest on all the damages
assessed at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTE STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 People v. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 860 (1999).

2 People v. Abdulah, 596 Phil. 870, 876 (2009).

3 Rollo, pp. 10-39.

4 CA rollo, 119-142; penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of
this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Sesinando S. Villon.

5 Records, pp.183-196; penned by Executive Judge Dolores L. Espanol.

6 CA rollo, p. 164

7 Id. at 147-152.

8 Records, pp. 1-2.

9 Later docketed as Criminal Case No. 4898-97.

10 Records, p. 1.

11 Id. at 30, 32.

12 Id. at 36.

13 Id. at 133-136.

14 Id. at 183-196.

15 Id. at 196.
16 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

17 CA rollo, pp. 39-40.

18 Id. at 119-142.

19 Id. at 141.

20 Id. at 147-152.

21 Id. at 164.

22 Rollo, p. 29.

23 Id. at 32.

24 Id. at 35.

25 Records, pp. 36-37.

26 See the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, rollo, pp. 142-157.

27 People v. Manchu, 593 Phil. 398, 406 (2008).

28 People v. Osianas, 588 Phil. 615, 627 (2008).

29 People v. Gaffud, Jr., 587 Phil. 521,530 (2008).

30 People v. Abdulah, supra note 2.

31 CA rollo, pp. 138-139.

32 Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inference are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

33 CA rollo, p. 139.

34 Republic v. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr., 441 Phil. 656, 672 (2002).

35 Id.

36 TSN, August 1, 1993, p. 3.

37 Id. at 25.

38 People v. Gumimba, 545 Phil. 627, 652 (2007).

39 G.R. No. 185477, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 807,817.

40 People v. Villasan, 618 Phil. 240, 251 (2009).

41 CA rollo, p. 140.

42 REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 249.

Art. 249. Homicide. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding
article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

43 People v. Orias, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 20!0, 622 SCRA 417,437-438.

44 People v. Mamaruncas, G.R. No. 179497 January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 182, 202.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. 142531 October 15, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
DANILO ASIS y FONPERADA and GILBERT FORMENTO y SARICON, appellant.
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not
sufficient to convict. It must do more than just raise the possibility, or even the probability, of
guilt. It must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the constitutional presumption of innocence
prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal.

The Case

For automatic review before this Court is the March 8, 2000 Decision1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 54) in Criminal Case No. 98-163090, finding Danilo Asis y
Fonperada and Gilbert2 Formento y Saricon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide aggravated by abuse of confidence, superior strength and treachery. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the two (2) accused are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence,
superior strength and treachery; and each is sentenced to death under Article 294, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code; they are also ordered to jointly and severally pay P100,000.00 as
damages to the heirs of the victim."3

Appellants were charged in an Information4 dated February 18, 1998, worded as follows:5

"That on or about February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence upon
person, to wit: by then and there stabbing one YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING with a bladed
instrument on the different parts of the body thereafter take, rob and carry away the following,
to wit:

Cash money in the amount of P20,000.00

one (1) wristwatch

one (1) gold necklace

and undetermined items

or all in the total amount of P20,000.00 more or less, belonging to said YU HING GUAN @
ROY CHING against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid
amount more or less of P20,000.00, Philippine Currency, and as a result thereof, he sustained
mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death."6

When arraigned on July 9, 1998, both appellants pleaded not guilty.7 Found to be deaf-mutes,
they were assisted, not only by a counsel de oficio,8 but also by an interpreter from the
Calvary Baptist Church. After due trial, appellants were found guilty and sentenced to death.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief,9 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) detailed the facts in the following
manner:

"The prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. Although none of them had actually seen the
crime committed, strong and substantial circumstantial evidence abound linking beyond
reasonable doubt both appellants to the crime.

"As culled from the records, hereunder are the pertinent facts of the case:

"George Huang, the nephew of the victim Yu Hing Guan a.k.a. Roy Ching, always passes by
the store of the victim at 1042 Benavidez Street, Binondo, Manila to bring food stuff, ice and
other things to his uncle and mother, Diana Yu, who work[s] in the office of said store.

"On February 9, 1998, at around 6:30 o’clock in the morning, Huang arrived at the victim’s
store and discovered that the steel door of the store was locked from the outside. When he
opened the steel door, he found everything to be normal except for the inner door which had
always been left open but which was closed at that time with only a chair blocking it.

"When he removed the blocking chair, he discovered the body of his uncle, Yu Hing Guan
a.k.a. Roy Ching (victim), lying prostrate on the ground with a knife embedded on his nape. He
closed the door and proceeded to Luneta, where [his] mother exercises, to inform her of what
he saw. After informing [his] mother, Huang first went to the Chinatown Police Station and
reported the incident; thereafter, he went to another station located in Soler corner Reina
Regente to report the incident again.
"Diana Yu, the sister of the victim, testified that on February 9, 1998, before 8:30 o’clock in the
evening, she was in the office of her brother where she was working at 1042 Benavidez St.,
Binondo, Manila. She saw the two appellants, namely: Danilo Asis and Gilbert Formento, and
her brother (the victim), who are all deaf-mutes, talking in sign language. She testified that
Danilo Asis frequented the office of the victim, while Gilbert Formento came only on the night
of February 9, 1998. At around 8:30 o’clock in the evening, she left the office, leaving both
appellants and the victim behind. The following morning, at around 7:30 o’clock in the morning,
her son, George Huang, informed her of her brother’s (victim’s) death. Upon learning of said
incident, she went to the office where she saw her brother’s body. She discovered that the
sales proceeds of the preceding day were missing and the necklace of her brother (victim)
which he always wore was also missing.

"On re-direct examination, Diana testified that she suspected both appellants, especially
Gilbert Formento, to have perpetrated the crime because of the fact that she saw the pair of
shorts of the victim in the bag of appellant Gilbert Formento.

"Jimmy Pagaduan testified that he was a helper in the Yu Hing Guan Auto Supply for five years
already. He saw the two appellants everyday in the store of the victim. Furthermore, he
testified that as far as he knows, Danilo Asis owed the victim PhP 3,000.00 and that he saw a
list thereof which the victim showed him. On February 9, 1998, he left the store at around 6:00
o’clock in the evening and he saw both appellants conversing with the victim.

"SPO2 Pablo Ileto of WPD Homicide Section testified that on February 11, 1998, he was at
Barangay Sto. Ni[ñ]o, Hagunoy, Bulacan together with Sgt. Napoleon Timbol, PO3 Luis Chico,
and witness, Diana Yu. The three (3) of them were trying to locate the whereabouts of
appellant Gilbert Formento in connection with the death of Yu Hing Guan a.k.a. Roy Ching.
They coordinated with the Hagunoy Bulacan police and searched the area. Diana Yu saw
Gilbert Formento in a delivery truck and she pointed him to them. Thereafter, they invited
Gilbert Formento to their office at the WPD Homicide Section. But before going to the WPD
station, they first brought Gilbert Formento to his house. Upon reaching the house, Diana Yu
asked from the wife of the suspect for the stolen money. However, they could not understand
each other, so the wife gave Diana Yu the bag of Gilbert Formento where Diana Yu noticed the
pair of shorts which belonged to the victim. PO2 Ileto noticed what appears to be blood stains
on the pair of shorts.

"SPO1 Benito Cabatbat testified that he, together with SPO1 Alfredo Opriasa, SPO1 Raul
Olavario, the photographer SPO2 Tabio, and fingerprint technician Domingo Daclan of the
District Crime Laboratory Division went to the crime scene to conduct the investigation on
February 10, 1998. Upon arriving at the scene, they saw the victim lying prostrate on the
ground, barefooted, and clad only in brief.
"After photographing the victim, the team went upstairs where traces of blood were seen on
the second and third floors.

"During the course of investigation, SPO1 Cabatbat received a phone call from a relative
informing him that one of the suspects, appellant Danilo Asis, went back to the scene of the
crime. Afterwards, they brought Danilo Asis to the police station for investigation, who
expectedly denied having anything to do with the killing of the victim.

"During investigation (February 10, 1998), SPO1 Balatbat noticed that there was a bloodstain
in Asis’ T-shirt.

"During the presentation of prosecution witness Dr. Olga Bausa, they stipulated that the
bloodstains found in the white t-shirt with a lettering of ‘Collorrific’ and in the short pants were
human blood."10 (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, appellants’ version of the facts is as follows:11

"GILBERT FORMENTO is a deaf-mute who is one of the accused in this case. He testified
through sign interpreter, Mrs. Nelda Bahena. On February 9, 1998 at about 11 am., he was in
the house of Roy Ching[.] They talked about things and events. When he left the house of
Ching he proceeded to Bulacan while Asis went to Luneta. He denied having in possession of
the clothes of Ching found with him in Bulacan. A policeman met him in his house in Sto. Nino,
Hagunoy, Bulacan. They handcuffed him immediately. He was whipped for the first time in his
life. He was brought to Manila at Funeraria Paz. The relatives of Roy Ching were pointing to
him while he was being whipped by the two policemen.

"NESTOR PAGLINAWAN is a friend of Danilo Asis. He is a vendor who vends at the PICC
area. He testified that accused-appellant Danilo Asis occasionally help[s] him in vending by
guarding his selling items and preparing coffee. He communicated with accused-appellant Asis
through sign language. He had known Asis for five years. On February 9, 1998, at about 10:00
p.m., Danilo Asis was with him at the PICC. Accused-appellant Asis stayed with him until 7:00
am of the following day.

"DANILO ASIS is a deaf-mute and one of the accused in this case. He testified through sign
interpreters, Ms. Theta Figuerres and Mrs. Nelda Bahena. Roy Ching was his friend since
1995. On February 9, 1998, he went to the store of Roy Ching because he was called by
Ching to help him in his store. When he arrived at Ching’s store, Gilbert Formento was there
already. The three of them drank beer. He left the store at 9:00 p.m., ahead of Gilbert
Formento. He proceeded to PICC to help his friend Nestor, a cigarette vendor.

"He denied killing Ching. When he went back to Roy Ching’s store at 10 a.m. the following day,
he felt depressed upon knowing that Roy Ching was dead. He was arrested and incarcerated
on that same day."12 (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC held that the "crime charged and proved is robbery with homicide under Article 294,
No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code."13 It ruled that "although no witnesses to the actual killing
and robbery were presented, the circumstantial evidence including the recovery of
bloodstained clothing from both accused definitely proved that the two (2) x x x committed the
crime."14 Finally, the RTC also appreciated the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
confidence, superior strength and treachery and thus sentenced both appellants to the
supreme penalty of death.

Hence, this automatic review before us.15

Issues

In their Brief, appellants fault the trial court with the following assignment of errors:

"I

The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of robbery with homicide notwithstanding the insufficiency of the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution.

"II

The trial court gravely erred in concluding that evident premeditation, treachery and conspiracy
attended the killing of Roy Ching.

"III

The trial court gravely erred in not considering the physical infirmities of the two accused-
appellants who are deaf-mutes."16

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is meritorious. The prosecution’s evidence does not prove the guilt of appellants
beyond reasonable doubt; hence, their constitutional right to be presumed innocent remains
and must be upheld.

Main Issue:

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

In the present appeal, two things stand out: first, there were no eyewitnesses to the robbery or
to the homicide; and second, none of the items allegedly stolen were recovered or presented
in evidence.

Appellants argue that the pieces of circumstantial evidence submitted by the prosecution are
insufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution counters that these
pieces of evidence, taken together, necessarily lead to their conviction.

Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that the accused may be convicted of the crime
charged.17 Circumstantial evidence is resorted to when direct testimony would result in setting
felons free and deny proper protection to the community.18 The former is not a "weaker form
of evidence vis-à-vis the latter."19 The accused may be convicted on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, provided the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain
leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person.20 "Circumstantial evidence is akin to a tapestry; it should be made up of
strands which create a pattern when interwoven."21 This pattern should be reasonably
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time totally
inconsistent with the proposition that he or she is innocent.22

The Rules on Evidence23 allow conviction by means of circumstantial evidence as follows:

"SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt."
Bloodstained Trousers

The prosecution argues that the strongest piece of evidence damning appellants is the victim’s
bloodstained pair of short pants recovered from the bag of Gilbert Formento. It argues that
since the trousers were recovered from one of the appellants, then Rule 131 (j) of the Revised
Rules of Court should apply. The said provision is worded, thus:

"Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions.

The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:

xxx xxx xxx

(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is
the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him;"24

We disagree. It escapes this Court how the recovery of a bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly
owned by the victim should give rise to the presumption that one of the appellants was the
"taker and doer of the whole act"25 of robbery with homicide. By itself, the retrieval of the pair
of shorts does not prove that appellants, or even just one of them, robbed the trouser owner of
cash and jewelry and also killed him, as charged in the Information. Neither does it show that
appellants, or one of them, perpetrated the aggression leading to the victim’s death.

Furthermore, the ownership of the pair of shorts was not definitively determined. And even
granting for the sake of argument that it indeed belonged to the victim, still, there is no
evidence to prove that it was taken from him on the night of the homicide. Neither can it be
ruled out that he might have lent it or gave it to either one of the two. It was neither
extraordinary nor impossible for him to have allowed Appellant Formento to use it, considering
that they were friends, and that they shared a commonality as deaf-mutes.

The OSG harps on the bloodstains found on the shorts. But as testified to by the pathologist26
who examined them, although the origin was human blood, the blood grouping could not be
determined.27 Thus, its mere presence on the pair of shorts did not in any way support the
prosecution’s theory linking appellants to the crime.

Evidence Is Inadmissible
In any event, appellants’ argument of illegal search and seizure cannot simply be brushed
aside, considering the guarantee so sacredly enshrined in our Constitution.

There is no question that appellants were collared without any arrest warrant. Neither was
there any valid search warrant obtained against them. However, they never questioned the
legality of their arrest through a motion to quash the Information. Instead, they entered a plea
of not guilty and participated in the trial. Settled is the rule that any objection involving the
arrest or the trial court’s procedure of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be made before the arraignment; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.28

Indeed, appellants do not now question the legality of their arrest. What they object to is the
introduction of the bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly recovered from the bag of Appellant
Formento. They argue that the search was illegally done, making the obtainment of the pair of
shorts illegal and taints them as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends
that it was the wife of appellant who voluntarily surrendered the bag that contained the
bloodstained trousers of the victim.29 Her act, it claims, constituted a valid consent to the
search without a warrant.30

We clarify. Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are
invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or her behalf.31 In the present case,
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that at the time the bloodstained pair of
shorts was recovered, Appellant Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present.
Being the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have given consent. Since
he was physically present, the waiver could not have come from any other person.

The OSG cites Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs,32 which validated a waiver of a

warrantless search, when a woman thought to be the wife of the accused -- but who later
turned out to be a manicurist -- surrendered to the police the papers belonging to the appellant.
The instant appeal, however, presents a different situation, because here the accused himself
was present when the search was made. Hence, consent should have been obtained from or
given by him. In Lopez, the accused was not present when the search was made; hence, the
consent given by the occupant of the hotel room was deemed the consent of the accused who
was then renting the space.

The OSG’s argument loses even more cogency when evaluated against the well-settled
principles on searches and seizures without warrants.

To constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that first, the right exists; second, the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and third, the
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.33 How could Appellant Formento have
consented to a warrantless search when, in the first place, he did not understand what was
happening at that moment? The prosecution witnesses themselves testified that there was no
interpreter to assist him -- a deaf-mute -- during the arrest, search and seizure. Naturally, it
would seem that he indeed consented to the warrantless search, as the prosecution would
want this Court to believe.

As early as 1938, Justice Jose P. Laurel pointed out in Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin:

"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force,
or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a
search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of
regard for the supremacy of the law."34

This point becomes even more pronounced in the present case, in which appellant is a deaf-
mute, and there was no interpreter to explain to him what was happening. His seeming
acquiescence to the search without a warrant may be attributed to plain and simple confusion
and ignorance.

Verily, "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental

constitutional rights and x x x we do not presume acquiescence [to] the loss of fundamental
rights."35

Neither can the OSG claim that appellant’s wife voluntarily surrendered the bag that contained
the bloodstained trousers of the victim.36 As admitted by Prosecution Witness PO2 Pablo
Ileto, the victim’s sister and appellant’s wife "cannot understand each other."37 Eventually,
appellant’s wife gave the belongings of Gilbert Formento where the bloodstained shorts of the
victim were recovered.38 How can the surrender of appellant’s belongings in this case be
voluntary, when the person surrendering them did not even understand the person she was
communicating with?

To be sure, the OSG cannot even use the argument that the search was made by a private
individual, the victim’s sister, and thereby skirt the issue of constitutional protection against
unlawful searches by the State.

The victim’s sister herself testified against this argument as follows:

"ATTY. FONTANILLA
Q So Gilbert Formento was not wearing the alleged trouser[s]?

A The bag was given by his mother or his wife, sir.

Q To whom?

A To the policemen, sir.

Q And they searched this, is that right?

A Yes sir."39

This testimony clearly forecloses the assertion that it was not the police authorities who
conducted the search. This testimony in fact belies that of PO2 Pablo Ileto40 that it was the
prosecution witness who was talking to appellant’s wife, and who conducted the search that
yielded the bloodstained shortpants.

All told, the bloodstained pair of shorts was a piece of evidence seized on the occasion of an
unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it is tainted and should thus be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.41 In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.42

Bloodstained Shirt

The prosecution then contends that when the other appellant, Danilo Asis, was brought to the
police station for investigation the following day, the police found bloodstain on his shirt.

Again, this fact cannot be taken as an indication of guilt on the part of Appellant Asis. It does
not point to the conclusion that he was involved in the crime charged against him. We cannot
agree that since there was bloodstain on his clothing, ergo, he committed the robbery and the
attendant killing. At most, this piece of circumstantial evidence, taken with the other one, may
lead to suspicion. But courts do not rely on circumstantial evidence that merely arouses
suspicion or conjecture.43 For circumstantial evidence to lead to conviction, it must do more
than just raise the mere possibility or even probability of guilt.44 It must engender moral
certainty.

Motive for the Crime

The prosecution then attempts to ascribe motive to appellants by arguing that one of them,
Appellant Asis, allegedly owed the victim P6,070.45

Indeed, motive becomes material when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and
there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has
committed it.46 But the prosecution’s contention again fails, as the fact of indebtedness was
never conclusively established. According to the sister of the victim, Asis still owed her brother
the amount of P6,070. Yet, during the testimony of the said appellant, it was shown that it was
actually the victim who had been indebted to the former. The prosecution, in fact, uses this
testimony of Asis to bolster its claim that he became "madder and madder" at the victim.
Coming from the prosecution itself, this argument casts doubts on whether it was appellant
who owed the victim or the other way around.

The Public Attorney’s Office, the defense counsel, correctly points out that the victim himself
had made the entries in his logbook which served as bases for the prosecution’s averment that
appellant owed him some amount. The sister, who was explaining the entries, admitted that
she had no personal knowledge thereof. More important, their veracity was never established.
Neither were the erasures or scratches thereon sufficiently explained.

To show that there was sufficient motive to commit the crime charged, the prosecution uses
the testimony of Asis that he got "madder and madder" at the victim. This statement is too
speculative to deserve serious consideration.

The Last Persons Seen

Talking with the Victim

It is also argued that appellants were the last persons seen with the victim; ergo, the suspicion
that they were the authors of the crime. Admittedly, this circumstance may raise a speculation,
but it is insufficient to establish their guilt. As this Court has consistently stressed, mere
suspicions and speculations can never be the bases of conviction in a criminal case.47

Neither is the mere presence of appellants at the locus criminis sufficient to implicate them.
Their being at the store of the victim was not unusual, as testified to by the witnesses. In fact, it
was established that he and appellants had known one another well, and that they had
regularly met at his store. Moreover, there was paucity of evidence indicating that, other than
appellants, no other person had or could have had access to the store where he was robbed
and killed.
As they themselves correctly observe, their complicity in the crime becomes even more
doubtful because, as testified to by his sister, the neighbors heard shouts; these could not
have come from deaf-mutes. Furthermore, appellants question the non-presentation of the
results of the tests conducted on the fingerprints lifted from the crime scene.

Appellants Pointed to Each Other?

Finally, we do not find any evidence that appellants indeed pointed to one another as the
author of the crime charged. In fact, even during their cross-examination, neither of them
specifically shifted the blame to the other. When questioned by the public prosecutor, they
even denied having done so.

All told, to sustain a conviction for the complex crime of robbery with homicide, which is
primarily an offense against property, it is essential that the robbery be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.48 Proof of the homicide alone is not sufficient to support a conviction for the
aforesaid complex crime.49

Essential to robbery is the taking, with intent to gain, of personal property belonging to another
by means of violence or intimidation against another person by the use of force upon things.
There is robbery with homicide when, by reason or on the occasion of a robbery with the use
of violence against or intimidation of persons, homicide is also committed.50

Accordingly, in robbery with homicide cases, the prosecution needs to prove these elements:
(a) the taking of personal property is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a
person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to
gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime
of homicide -- here used in its generic sense -- is committed.51

Robbery Completely

Unsubstantiated

The prosecution tried its best to prove the crime of homicide, even if unsuccessfully, but in the
process, it left the crime of robbery totally unsubstantiated.

More glaring is the fact that the Information charged appellants "as conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other."52 Yet, the RTC Decision found them
both guilty of the crime charged without any pronouncement as to the presence of conspiracy.
To serve effectively as a basis for conviction, conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as
the criminal act itself.53
Had the alleged conspiracy to commit the crime been established, then the precise modality of
each individual conspirator becomes secondary. The applicable rule in conspiracy is that the
act of one shall be deemed to be the act of all.54 The degree of actual participation in the
commission of the crime is immaterial.55 However, since there was neither proof nor finding of
conspiracy, then the extent of the individual participation of each appellant should have been
clearly delineated.

In criminal cases, the prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the
accused.56 Ei incumbit probatio non qui negat. He who asserts -- not he who denies -- must
prove.57 The burden must be discharged by the prosecution on the strength of its own
evidence, not on the weakness of that for the defense.58 Hence, circumstantial evidence that
has not been adequately established, much less corroborated, cannot be the basis of
conviction.59 Suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof
beyond reasonable doubt.60 Indeed, "the sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that
embarks upon it is without rudder or compass."61

It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not
whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable
doubt as to their guilt.62 Where there is no moral certainty as to their guilt, they must be
acquitted even though their innocence may be questionable. The constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.63

In the final analysis, the circumstances narrated by the prosecution engender doubt rather than
moral certainty on the guilt of appellants.

In view of the above findings, we deem it unnecessary to deal with the other issues raised by
appellants.

WHEREFORE, the automatically appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 54) in Criminal Case No. 98-163090 is SET ASIDE. Danilo Asis and Gilbert Formento
are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt, and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody,
unless they are being held for some other lawful cause.

The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith
and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellants were
actually released from confinement. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo Sr.,
JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Austria-Martinez, on official
leave.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Judge Manuel T. Muro; rollo, pp. 22-30; records, pp. 155-163.

2 When pointed to by Prosecution Witness PO2 Pablo Ileto in court on August 27, 1998,
appellant identified himself as "Gilberto," not "Gilbert."

3 RTC Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 30; records, p. 163.

4 Rollo, pp. 8-9; records, pp. 1-2.

5 Signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Francisco G. Supnet and "approved for the city
prosecutor" by Chief of the Inquest Division Nelson A. Salva.

6 Rollo, p. 8; records, p. 1.

7 Order dated July 9, 1998; records, p. 66.

8 Atty. Romel Fontanilla.

9 Appellee’s Brief was signed by Solicitor General Simeon V. Marcelo, Assistant Solicitor
General Ma. Aurora P. Cortes and Solicitor Arturo C. Medina.

10 Appellee’s Brief, pp. 4-11; rollo, pp. 86-93.

11 Appellant’s Brief was signed by Attys. Amelia C. Garchitorena and Isabelito E. Sicat of the
Public Attorney’s Office.

12 Appellants’ Brief, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 51-52.

13 RTC Decision, p. 8; rollo, p. 29; records, p. 162.

14 Ibid.

15 This case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 22, 2002, upon receipt by this
Court of appellants’ Reply Brief filed by the Public Attorney’s Office. Earlier, appellants’ Brief
was received by the Court on June 28, 2001, while appellee’s Brief was submitted on
November 5, 2001.

16 Appellants’ Brief, p. 1; rollo, p. 45. Original in upper case.

17 People v. Ayola, GR No. 138923, September 4, 2001; People v. Icalla, 353 SCRA 805,
March 7, 2001; People v. Oliva, 349 SCRA 435, January 18, 2001.

18 People v. Felixminia, GR No.125333, March 30, 2002; People v. Gallo, GR No. 133002,
October 19, 2001.

19 People v. Prado, 254 SCRA 531, 539, March 8, 1996, per Kapunan, J., citing People v.
Ramos, 240 SCRA 191, January 18, 1995.

20 People v. Labuguen, 337 SCRA 488, August 9, 2000.

21 People v. Cabrera, 241 SCRA 28, 32, February 1, 1995, per Bellosillo, J.

22 People v. Obosa, GR No. 129688, April 2, 2002; People v. Abriol, GR No. 123137, October
17, 2001; People v. Teves, 356 SCRA 14, April 2, 2001; People v. Caliwan, 343 SCRA 693,
October 19, 2000; People v. Operaña Jr., 343 SCRA 43, October 13, 2000.

23 §4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.

24 §3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

25 Appellee’s Brief, p. 20; rollo, p. 102.

26 Dra. Olga M. Bausa.

27 TSN, January 28, 1999, p. 10.

28 People v. Bongalon, GR No. 125025, January 23, 2002; People v. Whisenhunt, GR No.
123819, November 14, 2001; People v. Castillon III, GR No. 132718, October 5, 2001; People
v. Del Mundo, GR No. 138929, October 2, 2001.
29 Appellee’s Brief, p. 22; rollo, p. 104.

30 Ibid., pp. 24 & 106.

31 People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547, August 12, 1992.

32 68 SCRA 320, December 3, 1975.

33 People v .Compacion, GR No. 124442, July 20, 2001; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1,
September 4, 1986; Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, June 20, 1938.

34 Supra at 34, p. 695, per Laurel, J.

35 People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, 16, September 4, 1986, per Gutierrez Jr., J.

36 Appellee’s Brief, p. 22; rollo, p. 104.

37 TSN, August 27, 1998, p. 11.

38 Ibid.

39 TSN, August 20, 1998, pp. 36-37.

40 TSN, August 27, 1998, pp. 33-36.

41 Del Rosario v. People, GR No. 142295, May 31, 2001; People v. Valdez, 341 SCRA 25,
September 25, 2000.

42 1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 3(2).

43 People v. Williams, GR No. 125985, April 20, 2001.

44 Ibid.

45 Appellee’s Brief, p. 25; rollo, p. 107.

46 People v. Garcia, GR No. 135666, July 20, 2001; People v. Astorga, 283 SCRA 420,
December 22, 1997.
47 People v. Lugod, 352 SCRA 498, February 21, 2001; People v. Albao, 287 SCRA 129,
March 6, 1998.

48 People v. Geron, 281 SCRA 36, October 17, 1997; People v. Parel, 261 SCRA 720,
September 16, 1996.

49 People v. Geron, supra; People v. Parel, supra; People v. Pagal, 79 SCRA 570, October 25,
1977.

50 People v. Geron, supra; People v. Parel, supra; People v. Barlis, 231 SCRA 426, March 24,
1994.

51 People v. Robles, 333 SCRA 107, June 8, 2000; People v. Sumallo, 307 SCRA 521, May
24, 1999.

52 Information dated February 18, 1998; rollo, p. 8; records, p. 1.

53 People v. Leaño, GR No. 138886, October 9, 2001; People v. Miana Sr., GR No. 134565,
August 9, 2001; People v. Gonzales, GR No. 128282, April 30, 2001.

54 People v. Liad, 355 SCRA 11, March 22, 2001; People v. Catuiran Jr., 343 SCRA 293,
October 17, 2000; People v. Bariquit, 341 SCRA 600, October 2, 2000.

55 People v. Lising, 285 SCRA 595, January 30, 1998; People v. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369,
February 15, 1995.

56 People v. Quarre, GR Nos. 140729-30, February 15, 2002; People v. Villanueva, GR No.
131773, February 13, 2002; People v. Ombreso, GR No. 142861, December 19, 2001; People
v. Mariano, GR Nos. 135511-13, November 14, 2001; People v. Arondain, GR Nos. 131864-65,
September 27, 2001; People v. Francisco, 354 SCRA 475, March 15, 2001.

57 People v. Masalihit, 300 SCRA 147, December 14, 1998.

58 People v. Hernani, 346 SCRA 73, November 27, 2000; People v. Guillermo, 336 SCRA 247,
July 20, 2000; People v. Bantilan, 314 SCRA 380, September 14, 1999; People v. Gomez, 270
SCRA 432, March 26, 1997.

59 People v. Olivarez Jr., 299 SCRA 635, December 4, 1998; People v. Maluenda, 288 SCRA
225, March 27, 1998; People v. Ilaoa, 233 SCRA 231, June 16, 1994.
60 §2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.

61 People v. Marquita, 327 SCRA 41, March 1, 2000, per Quisumbing, J.; People v. Aquino,
310 SCRA 437, July 19, 1999; People v. Geron, supra.

62 People v. Aspiras, GR No. 138382-84, February 12, 2002; People v. Villarin, GR No.
136847, July 31, 2001; People v. Williams, GR No. 125985, April 20, 2001; People v. Pagaura,
267 SCRA 17, January 28, 1997.

63 People v. Baulite, GR No. 137599, October 8, 2001.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

585 Phil. 712

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated August 31, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00244 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 19, Naga City in Criminal Case No. 98-7182, convicting Antonio Nogra
(appellant) of large scale illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) in relation to Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. No. 8042),[2] otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995."[3]

The inculpatory portion of the Information charging one Lorna G. Orciga and appellant with
large scale illegal recruitment reads as follows:
That sometime during the period of March 1997 to November, 1997 in the City of Naga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being the General Manager and Operations Manager of LORAN INTERNATIONAL
OVERSEAS RECRUITMENT CO., LTD., with office at Concepcion Grande, Naga City,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, representing themselves
to have the capacity to contract, enlist, hire and transport Filipino workers for employment
abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement to the herein complaining witnesses RENATO ALDEN, OLIVER
SARMIENTO, FE ZABALLA, TEOFILA LUALHATI, PILIPINA MENDOZA and KERWIN
DONACAO, but failed to actually deploy them without valid reason, as well as to reimburse
their documentation, placement and processing expenses for purposes of deployment despite
their repeated demands for the return of the same, to their damage and prejudice in the
amounts as may be proven in court.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Only appellant was brought to the jurisdiction of the trial court since Lorna G. Orciga was then
and still is at large. Arraigned with the assistance of counsel, appellant entered a plea of "NOT
GUILTY" to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.

Of the six complainants, the prosecution was able to present five of them, namely: Renato
Alden, Fe Zaballa, Teofila Lualhati, Filipina Mendoza and Kerwin Donacao. Anaielyn
Sarmiento, wife of complainant Oliver Sarmiento, also testified for the prosecution.

The facts, as established by the prosecution, are aptly summarized by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), as follows:
Appellant held office at Loran International Overseas Recruitment Co., (Loran) in Concepcion
Grande, Naga City (p. 4, TSN, October 19, 1998). A nameplate on his table prominently
displayed his name and position as operations manager (p. 11, TSN, November 17, 1998; p. 4,
TSN, January 12, 1999; p. 21, TSN, November 19, 1998). The license of Loran also indicated
appellant as the operations manager (p. 5, TSN, February 10, 1999). The POEA files also
reflect his position as operations manager of Loran (Exhibit L to L-4, pp. 5-9, TSN, November
19, 1998).

Sometime in December 1996, Renato Alden went to Loran to apply for a job as hotel worker
for Saipan. He was interviewed by appellant, who required Alden to submit an NBI clearance
and medical certificate and to pay the placement fee. Alden paid the amount of P31,000.00.
The additional amount of P4,000.00 was to be paid prior to his departure to Saipan (pp. 5-6,
TSN, November 17, 1998). Appellant promised Alden that he would leave within a period of
three to four months. After one year of waiting Alden was not able to leave. Alden filed a
complaint with the NBI when he was not able to recover the amount and could no longer talk
with appellant (p. 6, TSN, November 17, 1998).

On April 18, 1997, Teofila Lualhati applied for employment as hotel worker for Saipan with
Loran (pp. 1-3, 10, TSN, November 19, 1998). Appellant required her to submit an NBI
clearance and medical certificate and to pay the processing fee in the amount of P35,000.00
so she could leave immediately. She paid the amount of P35,000.00 to Loran's secretary in the
presence of appellant. She was promised that within 120 days or 4 months she would be able
to leave (pp. 11-13, TSN, November 19, 1998). Despite repeated follow-ups, Lualhati was
unable to work in Saipan. She demanded the refund of the processing fee. When the amount
was not returned to her, she filed a complaint with the NBI (pp. 14-15, TSN, November 19,
1998).
Sometime in April 1998, Filipina Mendoza went to Loran to apply for employment as hotel
worker (p. 4, TSN, July 12, 1999). She paid the amount of P35,000.00 as placement fee.
When she was not able to work abroad, she went to Loran and sought the return of
P35,000.00 from appellant (p. 7, TSN, January 21, 1999).

Sometime in October 1997, Kerwin Donacao went to Loran to apply for employment as
purchaser in Saipan (p. 4, TSN, February 10, 1999). He was required to submit NBI clearance,
police clearance, previous employment certificate and his passport. He paid the placement fee
of P35,000.00 (pp.4-5, TSN, February 10, 1999). After paying the amount, he was told to wait
for two to three months. When he was not able to leave for Saipan, he demanded the return of
the placement fee, which was not refunded (pp. 6-7, TSN, February 10, 1999).

During the first week of November 1997, Annelyn Sarmiento and her husband, Oliver
Sarmiento, applied for overseas employment. For the application of Oliver Sarmiento, they
submitted his medical certificate and certification of previous employment. They were also
made to pay the amount of P27,000.00 as processing fee. Oliver Sarmiento was promised that
within 1 month, he would be able to leave. Initially, Oliver Sarmiento was told that allegedly his
visa was yet to be obtained. When he was not able to leave and what he paid was not
refunded, he filed a complaint with the NBI (pp. 4-6, TSN, April 23, 1999).

Sometime in May 1997, Fe Zaballa applied for overseas employment in Saipan with Loran (p.
4, TSN, May 21, 1999). She was required to submit her medical certificate, original copy of her
birth certificate, NBI clearance and police clearance. She was also required to pay the amount
of P35,000.00 as placement fee. When she could not be deployed, she sought to recover the
amount she paid, which was not returned (pp. 7-8, TSN, May 2, 1999).[5]
On the other hand, appellant presented the following evidence:
The defense presented [appellant] Antonio Nogra and the agency's secretary and cashier,
Maritess Mesina.

From their testimonies it was established that LORAN INTERNATIONAL OVERSEAS

RECRUITMENT CO., LTD., (LORAN, for brevity) was owned by accused Lorna Orciga and
Japanese national Kataru Tanaka (TSN, September 30, 2000, p. 7). Sometime in July 1994,
[appellant] Antonio Nogra read from outside the agency's main office at Libertad, Mandaluyong
City that it was in need of a liaison officer. He applied for the position. The part-owner and co-
accused, Lorna Orciga, hired him instead as Operations Manager as the agency was then still
in the process of completing the list of personnel to be submitted to the POEA. (TSN, January
31, 2001, p. 5).
[Appellant] Nogra started working with LORAN in October 1994. In 1995, he was transferred to
Naga City when the agency opened a branch office thereat. Although he was designated as
the Operations Manager, [appellant] Nogra was a mere employee of the agency. He was
receiving a monthly salary of P5,000.00 and additional P2,000.00 monthly meal allowance. He
was in-charge of the advertisement of the company. He also drove for the company. He
fetched from the airport the agency's visitors and guests and drove them to hotels and other
places. (TSN, May 3, 2000, pp. 2-9).

Although part-owner Lorna Orciga was stationed in Manila, she, however, actually remained in
control of the branch office in Naga City. She conducted the final interview of the applicants
and transacted with the foreign employers. She also controlled the financial matters and
assessment fees of the agency in Naga City (TSN, September 20, 2000, pp. 8-9). The
placement and processing fees collected by the agency in Naga City were all deposited in the
bank account of Lorna Orciga and not a single centavo went to the benefit of [appellant] Nogra
(TSN, January 10, 2000, pp. 14-22).[6]
On March 26, 2003, the RTC rendered Judgment[7] finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ANTONIO NOGRA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment Committed in Large Scale defined under Sections
6(m) and 7(b) of RA 8042, otherwise known as The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 and, accordingly, hereby imposes upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

SO ORDERED.[8]
On April 10, 2003, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.[9] The RTC ordered the transmittal of the
entire records of the case to this Court.

Conformably to the ruling in People v. Mateo,[10] the case was referred to the CA for
intermediate review.[11]

On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision[12] affirming the decision of the RTC. The CA
held that being an employee is not a valid defense since employees who have knowledge and
active participation in the recruitment activities may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment
activities, based upon this Court's ruling in People v. Chowdury[13] and People v. Corpuz;[14]
that appellant had knowledge of and active participation in the recruitment activities since all
the prosecution witnesses pinpointed appellant as the one whom they initially approached
regarding their plans of working overseas and he was the one who told them about the fees
they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit; that the mere fact that appellant
was not issued special authority to recruit does not exculpate him from any liability but rather
strongly suggests his guilt; that appellant's invocation of non-flight cannot be weighed in his
favor since there is no established rule that non-flight is, in every instance, an indication of
innocence.

A Notice of Appeal[15] having been timely filed by appellant, the CA forwarded the records of
the case to this Court for further review.

In his Brief, appellant assigns as errors the following:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS A
MERE EMPLOYEE OF THE RECRUITMENT AGENCY DESPITE HIS DESIGNATION AS ITS
OPERATIONS MANAGER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

OFFENSE-CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT UNDER THE LAW, HE WAS NOT
CRIMINALY LIABLE FOR HIS AGENCY'S TRANSACTIONS.[16]
Appellant argues that the agency was under the management and control of Orciga, and that
he was a mere employee; that he could not be held personally liable for illegal recruitment in
the absence of any showing that he was validly issued special authority to recruit workers,
which was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA); that his
non-flight is indicative of his innocence.

Appellee, through the OSG, counters that appellant is not a mere clerk or secretary of Loran,
but its Operations Manager who directly participated in the recruitment scheme by promising
private complainants work abroad, but failed to deploy them and refused to reimburse the
applicants' placement fees when demanded.

The appeal fails. The CA did not commit any error in affirming the decision of the RTC.

R.A. No. 8042 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under the

Labor Code[17] and provided stiffer penalties, especially those that constitute economic
sabotage, i.e., Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a
Syndicate.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 defined when recruitment is illegal:

SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether
for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated
under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be
deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any
person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:

xxxx

(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor
and Employment; and

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment
does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a
syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices, and
accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction
of their business shall be liable. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, evidence for the prosecution showed that Loran

International Overseas Recruitment Co., Ltd. is a duly licensed recruitment agency with
authority to establish a branch office. However, under R.A. No. 8042, even a licensee or holder
of authority can be held liable for illegal recruitment, should he commit or omit to do any of the
acts enumerated in Section 6.

Appellant was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale under Section 6 (l) and (m) of R.A.
No. 8042. Section 6 (l) refers to the failure to actually deploy without valid reason, as
determined by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Section 6 (m) involves the
failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and
processing for purposes of deployment, in cases in which the deployment does not actually
take place without the worker's fault.
A thorough scrutiny of the prosecution's evidence reveals that it failed to prove appellant's
liability under Section 6 (l) of R.A. No. 8042. The law requires not only that the failure to deploy
be without valid reason "as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment." The law
envisions that there be independent evidence from the DOLE to establish the reason for non-
deployment, such as the absence of a proper job order. No document from the DOLE was
presented in the present case to establish the reason for the accused's failure to actually
deploy private complainants. Thus, appellant cannot be held liable under Section 6 (l) of R.A.
No. 8042.

As to Section 6 (m) of R.A. No. 8042, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt
that private complainants made payments to Loran, and appellant failed to reimburse the
amounts paid by private complainants when they were not deployed. The prosecution
presented the receipts issued by Loran to private complainants evidencing payment of
placement fees ranging from P27,000.00 to P35,000.00.

Appellant does not dispute that private complainants were not deployed for overseas work,
and that the placement fees they paid were not returned to them despite demand. However, he
seeks to exculpate himself on the ground that he is a mere employee of Loran.

The Court is unswayed by appellant's contention.

The penultimate paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 explicitly states that those criminally
liable are the "principals, accomplices, and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the
officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable." Contrary to
appellant's claim, the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and the documentary evidence
for the prosecution clearly established that he was not a mere employee of Loran, but its
Operations Manager. The license of Loran, the files of the POEA and the nameplate
prominently displayed on his office desk reflected his position as Operations Manager. As
such, he received private complainants' job applications; and interviewed and informed them of
the agency's requirements prior to their deployment, such as NBI clearance, police clearance,
medical certificate, previous employment certificate and the payment of placement fee. He was
also responsible for the radio advertisements and leaflets, which enticed complaining
witnesses to apply for employment with the agency. Clearly, as Operations Manager, he was in
the forefront of the recruitment activities.

The defense of being a mere employee is not a shield against his conviction for large scale
illegal recruitment. In People v. Gasacao[18] and People v. Sagayaga,[19] the Court reiterated
the ruling in People v. Cabais,[20] People v. Chowdury[21] and People v. Corpuz[22] that an
employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as
principal by direct participation, together with its employer, if it is shown that he actively and
consciously participated in the recruitment process.

In the present case, it was clearly established that appellant dealt directly with the private
complainants. He interviewed and informed them of the documentary requirements and
placement fee. He promised deployment within a three or four month-period upon payment of
the fee, but failed to deploy them and to reimburse, upon demand, the placement fees paid.

The Court is not persuaded by appellant's argument that his non-flight is indicative of his
innocence. Unlike the flight of an accused, which is competent evidence against him tending to
establish his guilt, non-flight is simply inaction, which may be due to several factors. It may not
be construed as an indication of innocence.[23]

Of marked relevance is the absence of any showing that the private complainants had any ill
motive against appellant other than to bring him to the bar of justice to answer for the crime of
illegal recruitment. Besides, for strangers to conspire and accuse another stranger of a most
serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings would certainly be against human nature and
experience.[24] Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand
under the solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and credence.[25]

It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the
witnesses' credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by the Supreme Court,
particularly when the CA affirmed such findings.[26] After all, the trial court is in the best
position to determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses.[27] The absence of
any showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the
Court to defer to the trial court's determination according credibility to the prosecution
evidence.

Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be considered
an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in large scale, viz, committed against
three or more persons individually or as a group. In the present case, five complainants
testified against appellant's acts of illegal recruitment, thereby rendering his acts tantamount to
economic sabotage. Under Section 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8042, the penalty of life imprisonment and
a fine of not less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000.000.00 shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage.

Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large
scale illegal recruitment.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated August 31, 2995 of the Court of
Appeals affirming the conviction of appellant Antonio Nogra for large scale illegal recruitment
under Sections 6 (m) and 7 (b) of Republic Act No. 8042 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr.[*], and Reyes, JJ., concur.

[*] Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. as additional member per the July 30, 2008 Division
Raffle, vice Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria (now retired) and concurred in by
Associate Justices Eliezer R. delos Santos (now deceased) and Arturo D. Brion (now a
member of this Court), CA rollo, p. 123.

[2] An Act to Institute the Policies of Overseas Employment and Establish a Higher Standard of
Protection and Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers, Their Families and Overseas
Filipinos in Distress and for Other Purposes.

[3] Now often referred to as the Magna Carta for Overseas Filipino Workers.

[4] CA rollo, p. 17.

[5] Rollo, pp. 27-30.

[6] Brief for Appellant, CA rollo, pp. 58-59.

[7] Id. at 33.

[8] CA rollo, pp. 38-39.

[9] Id. at 40.

[10] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

[11] Id. at 50-a.

[12] Id. at 123.

[13] 582 Phil. 459 (2000).

[14] 459 Phil. 100 (2003).

[15] CA rollo, p. 137.

[16] Id. at 59-60.

[17] Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment and placement as
follows:

(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided,
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

[18] G.R. No. 16445, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 812, 822.

[19] 467 Phil. 961, 971 (2004).

[20] 407 Phil. 37 (2001).

[21] Supra note 14.

[22] Supra note 15.

[23] People v. Omar, 383 Phil. 979, 987 (2000).

[24] People v. Logan, 414 Phil. 113, 124 (2001).

[25] People v. Cabbab, Jr., G.R. No. 173479, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 589, 602.

[26] People v. Aguila, G.R. No. 171017, December 6, 2006,510 SCRA 642.

[27] Abarquez v. People, G.R. No. 150762, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 225, 233.
Today is Tuesday, November 12, 2019 home

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 146296 October 15, 2007

EDUARDO GULMATICO y BRIGATAY, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated July 31, 2000
which affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, dated April
16, 1999, convicting petitioner Eduardo Gulmatico (petitioner) of the crime of Robbery, with the
modified conclusion that the felony proven was Theft instead.

The Facts

Petitioner was charged with the crime of Robbery in an Information dated January 2, 1997
which reads:

That on or about the 31st day of December, 1996, in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and by
means of force, that is, by breaking the door, and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away
one (1) AIWA VHS worth ₱8,000.00, one (1) BL Rayban, worth ₱3,000.00, one (1) gold
necklace worth ₱1,200.00, one (1) camera Fuji worth ₱1,400.00 and one (1) leather wallet with
cash money of ₱100.00 belonging to one REBECCA HUERVA-LIPAYCO, to the damage and
prejudice of the owner in the total amount of ₱12,800.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment on January 15, 1997, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.5
Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

Spouses Gary Lipayco (Gary) and Rebecca Huerva-Lipayco (Rebecca) -- the Lipaycos -- are
employees of CDO-Foodsphere, Inc. and reside at 2-D Bonifacio St. Canumay, Valenzuela
City. On December 31, 1996, the spouses went to work. When Rebecca returned home
between 11:00 in the morning and 12:00 noon of the same day, she found their door broken
open, their place in shambles and some of their things missing. She went to report the incident
first to the barangay but finding no official in the barangay hall, she went to the nearest police
outpost and had the incident blottered. An investigation was immediately conducted and the
statements of witnesses were taken. Angelo "Cookie" Alera (Angelo) and Michael Arnaldo
(Michael), then both eight (8) years old, testified that at about noon of December 31, 1996,
while they were playing nearby together with other children,6 they saw petitioner push the door
of the house of the Lipaycos, enter the same, ransack the cabinet and take a VHS player7 and
a wallet containing ₱100.00.8 Conchita Alera (Conchita) corroborated the statements of Angelo
and Michael since she also saw the petitioner inside the house of the Lipaycos.9 The items
missing and unrecovered were one (1) AIWA VHS player worth ₱8,000.00; one (1) Bausch &
Lombe (BL) Rayban worth ₱3,000.00; one (1) gold necklace worth ₱1,200.00; one (1) Fuji
camera worth ₱1,400.00; and one (1) leather wallet containing ₱100.00, or a total of
₱12,800.00.10

Version of the Defense

Petitioner is a family friend of the Lipaycos and a godfather of the latter's child. He is also
employed at CDO-Foodsphere, Inc. as a company driver. Due to the nature of his work,
petitioner was often away and entertained himself with a car stereo which he would always
bring with him. Petitioner claimed that he would place the said car stereo on top of the delivery
vehicle's dashboard. After work, he would bring the car stereo with him.11 Petitioner denied the
accusations made against him. He testified that on December 30, 1996, he made deliveries in
Malolos, Bulacan, where he stayed overnight. The next day, December 31, 1996, he returned
to their office and left work at already about 11:30 in the morning. He waited for a while so that
he could get the second half of his 13th month pay. Then, he went to another company
compound to get a suitable box for his holiday ham which he entrusted to Conchita for
safekeeping. After securing a box, he went to Conchita's house to get the ham. While Conchita
was getting petitioner's ham, he passed by the house of the Lipaycos to see if Gary was there,
by calling out for him at the door12 since Rebecca asked petitioner at their office if he saw
Gary. Petitioner attested that the door was slightly opened and he slightly pushed it to look for
Gary. However, Gary was out.13 Thereafter, Conchita gave the ham to petitioner and he
placed it inside the box. Carrying the same in a big plastic bag and his car stereo, petitioner on
board a tricycle, went to his sleeping quarters. Ricky Acostosa, also an employee of CDO-
Foodsphere, Inc. testified that he and the petitioner boarded the same tricycle on the said date
on the way to their sleeping quarters. He observed that petitioner was carrying a car stereo
and a box of ham at the time and that he did not notice that petitioner was carrying any VHS
player.14 Thereafter, petitioner left for Villamor Airbase in Pasay City where he celebrated the
New Year’s Eve with his relatives. He returned to his quarters on January 1, 1997 and in the
afternoon of the same date, upon knowledge that Rebecca was looking for him, petitioner went
to the Lipaycos' house where he was apprehended by the police and was subsequently
detained.15 Upon posting the corresponding bail bond for his provisional liberty in the amount
of ₱24,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release.16

The RTC's Ruling

On April 16, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial and alibi cannot prevail
over the positive identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by Michael and
Angelo, who testified with sufficient coherence and clarity. Thus, the RTC disposed of this case
in this wise:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused EDUARDO GULMATICO y

BRIGATAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as principal of the crime of robbery and,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to a penalty of TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum. The accused is further sentenced
to pay complaining witness Rebecca Huerva-Lipayco the amount of ₱12,800.00 representing
the total value of the goods stolen without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Finally, the accused is sentenced to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.17

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.18

The CA's Ruling

On July 31, 2000, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the petitioner's defenses of denial
and alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by the eyewitnesses
which were categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the latter's part.
However, the CA opined that while asportation was proven, the element that petitioner entered
the Lipaycos' house by breaking its door was not established since Michael and Angelo
testified that petitioner merely pushed the door open in order to gain entry. Moreover, based on
the photographs of the said door, the CA found that the same was intact and unbroken. Thus:

Properly, then, the felony proven against Gulmatico is Theft defined in Art. 308 and penalized
under Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code, although the end penalties imposable are just the
same as those imposed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, except for the felony which is instead Theft as defined and punished in Arts.
308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.19

On August 25, 2000, petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration20 of the assailed Decision
which the CA denied in its Resolution21 dated December 8, 2000.

Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals
decided correctly in finding herein petitioner still guilty of Theft notwithstanding the fact that the
evidence of the prosecution was preponderantly flawed and unmeritorious, short of the
required proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Correlatively, the instant Petition is based on the following grounds:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING HEREIN

ACCUSED-APPELLANT STILL GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF THEFT WHEN IT PREMISED
ITS FINDING OF THE AFFIRMATION ON THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

a) That there were two eyewitnesses (two 8-year-olds) who were familiar with the accused and
had good opportunity to observe the felony and the felon;

b) That the veracity of the testimonies of these two eyewitnesses should not be doubted
because the Trial Court has shown its appreciation of the testimonies of witnesses 'who were
able to relay to the (Trial) court with sufficient coherence and clarity what they saw;

c) That there was another witness who corroborated the testimonies of the two boys;
d) That the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses were aboveboard as 'none of the
witnesses were discredited by the defense as having ill will towards or motive against the
accused,' concluding therefore that there was nothing which could have tainted the truthfulness
of said testimonies;

e) That the defense put up by the accused using DENIAL, was no match to the prosecution
where the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were positive, clear and unbiased;

f) That the defense of ALIBI cannot also save the day for the accused.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE

FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH FOUND ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF A
CRIME BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF DEFENSE

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, JUST LIKE THE TRIAL
COURT, IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE DEFENSE EVIDENCE.22

Moreover, petitioner argues that the testimonies of Michael and Angelo are deficient as the two
boys merely testified that petitioner took the VHS player and the wallet; that the witnesses'
testimonies are incoherent due to their numerous loopholes as regards the alleged taking; that
it was physically impossible for the witnesses to view the commission of the crime, considering
the interior of the Lipaycos' residence; that the prosecution failed to rebut petitioner's testimony
that he was in the premises for the purpose of getting his ham from Conchita; that Michael and
Angelo were pre-coached in giving their testimonies by their respective mothers; that Michael
and Angelo mistakenly identified petitioner's car stereo as the VHS player; that petitioner's
non-flight speaks of his innocence; that Rebecca's testimony before the police and the
photographs of the broken door are pieces of evidence which are contrary to the witnesses'
testimony that the petitioner merely pushed the door in order to gain entry, hence, the finding
of the crime of Theft; and that since the witnesses merely saw that petitioner take only the VHS
player and the wallet, the value of the items lost amounts only to ₱8,100.00, hence, the
petitioner, without conceding the offense charged, is entitled to the imposition of a lesser
penalty. Lastly, petitioner attests that he is innocent of the offense charged and prays for his
acquittal.23

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) posits that the direct, positive and categorical testimonies of Michael and
Angelo pointing to the petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime of Theft are entitled to full faith
and credit; that petitioner failed to prove any improper motive on the part of the mothers of
Michael and Angelo in allegedly coaching the minors to testify against him; that petitioner's
defenses of denial and alibi are unavailing; that factual findings of the RTC particularly in its
assessment of credibility of witnesses are entitled to respect; and that non-flight is not proof of
innocence.24

The Petition lacks merit.

While it is true that the RTC and the CA had separate and different findings as to the crime
committed, this Court holds that asportation was indeed established. Thus, we agree with the
ruling of the CA that the crime of Theft was committed based on the evidence presented.

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft as follows:

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain
but without violence, against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latter's consent.

The elements of theft are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property
belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done
without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.25 Therefore, in theft, corpus
delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it
was lost by felonious taking.26

At this juncture, petitioner offers the defense of denial, postulating that when Michael and
Angelo saw the petitioner, he was carrying at the time his car stereo which they have mistaken
to be the VHS player of the Lipaycos. Moreover, petitioner contends that he is not invoking the
defense of alibi because he admittedly passed by the house of the Lipaycos on December 31,
1996.27 However, a perusal of the petitioner's pleadings before this Court shows that the
proffered defense is still alibi, since petitioner alleged that he cannot be at two places at the
same time.28

We reject petitioner’s arguments.

First. It could not be said that Michael and Angelo, young as they were, could have mistakenly
identified petitioner's car stereo for the VHS player. On cross-examination, both Michael and
Angelo manifested that they know what a VHS player is and even described the size and color
thereof before the RTC.29 Moreover, Angelo also testified that the petitioner, aside from taking
the VHS player, ransacked the cabinet of the Lipaycos and took the wallet.30 In sum, the car
stereo cannot fully and adequately fill in for the felonious taking of the other lost and
unrecovered items of the Lipaycos.

Second. Other than petitioner's own admission that he passed by the house of the Lipaycos on
December 31, 1996,31 Michael and Angelo, as corroborated by Conchita, testified that
petitioner was there before Rebecca arrived, who eventually found that their things were
scattered all over the place and that certain items were missing. More importantly, Michael and
Angelo, throughout their respective testimonies before the RTC, positively and categorically
identified the petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime.32

Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the weakest of all defenses,
because they are easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, they cannot prevail
over the positive and unequivocal identification of the accused by the principal witnesses.
Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, a
categorical, consistent and positive identification of the accused prevails over denial and alibi.
Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, denial and alibi are negative, self-serving
and undeserving of any weight in law.33

We cannot discern any improper motive on the part of, and no such motive was ever imputed
to, the prosecution's witnesses, namely, Michael, Angelo, Conchita and even Rebecca that
they would falsely implicate the petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime. The absence of
evidence as to improper motive actuating the principal witnesses for the prosecution strongly
sustains the conclusion that none existed, and consequently, their testimonies are worthy of
full faith and credit.34

Stripped of the defenses of denial and alibi, the instant Petition now hinges on the assessment
of the credibility of the witnesses presented.

The CA, citing the RTC Decision, aptly and judiciously held, to wit:

The principal eyewitnesses were Michael and Angelo then both 8 years old who were familiar
with the accused and had good opportunity to observe the felony and the felon. The
testimonies of these eyewitnesses were appreciated by the trial court as follows:

Michael and Angelo, both 8 years of age, and who were able to relay to the court with sufficient
coherence and clarity what they saw on the date and at the time in question positively
identified the accused as the one who entered the house of Rebecca and as the one who took
away from that house the betamax. (Decision, p. 104, record)
Their testimonies were corroborated in part by Conchita Alera who also saw Gulmatico inside
the house. None of these witnesses were discredited as having ill will towards or motive
against Gulmatico.

Petitioner claims that Michael and Angelo were pre-coached when they gave their respective
testimonies before the police and before the RTC as their respective mothers and Rebecca
were there at the time.

We disagree.

This Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the assessment made by the RTC, duly
affirmed by the CA anent the credibility of the said prosecution witnesses who testified during
the trial of this case. Michael and Angelo clearly pointed out their exact location and the
surrounding circumstances when they observed the petitioner and the felonious taking. Upon
the directive of the trial court judge, Angelo even described his location and the respective
distances of the houses in the neighborhood by walking around the courtroom.35 It bears
stressing that full weight and respect to the determination by the trial court of the credibility of
witnesses is usually accorded by the appellate courts, since the trial court judge had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.36 This Court is not a trier of facts and,
as a rule, we do not weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the trial court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.37 Thus, in the case of Siccuan v. People,38 we clearly held:

We have consistently adhered to the rule that where the culpability or innocence of an accused
would hinge on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies,
findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect. These findings will not be
ordinarily disturbed by an appellate court absent any clear showing that the trial court has
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts of circumstances of weight or substance
which could very well affect the outcome of the case. It is the trial court that had the
opportunity to observe 'the witnesses' manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness,
sighs or their scant or full realization of their oaths. It had the better opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination.

Furthermore, Michael and Angelo are child witnesses. A child witness could not be expected to
give a precise response to every question posed to him. His failure to give an answer to the
point of being free of any minor inconsistencies is understandable and does not make him a
witness less worthy of belief.39 Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, when referring
only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their declarations or
the veracity or the weight of their testimonies. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor
details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the accused.40 To this Court,
Michael and Angelo's testimonies are sufficiently and consistently credible as to establish that:
(1) the crime of Theft was committed against the Lipaycos and (2) petitioner committed the
said crime.

Lastly, we are not persuaded by petitioner's contention that the fact that he came back to the
Lipaycos' house on January 1, 1997 shows that he is innocent of the offense charged. It is
established in this jurisdiction that while flight indicates guilt, non-flight does not mean
innocence.41 Much like the defenses of alibi and denial, non-flight cannot prevail against the
weight of positive identification of the accused.42 Therefore, the Court finds no reason to
overturn the judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of Theft as the
prosecution sufficiently proved his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 23230, finding petitioner Eduardo Brigatay Gulmatico guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Theft, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTE STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Eduardo Gulmatico y Brigatay,

Accused-Appellant and dated January 30, 2001; rollo, pp. 9-38.

2 Particularly docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23230, penned by Associate Justice Roberto A.

Barrios (now deceased), with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola (now deceased) and
Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., concurring; id. at 45-51.

3 Particularly docketed as Crim. Case No. 5969-V-97; id. at 39-43.

4 Records, p. 1.

5 RTC Order dated January 15, 1997, id. at 26.

6 The children were a certain Nene and Paw-paw, TSN, August 27, 1997, p. 9.

7 Also referred to as VHS, Betamax or "Beta" in other pleadings and statements of the
witnesses.

8 TSN, April 16, 1997, pp. 8-13 and TSN, August 27, 1997, pp. 11-14.

9 TSN, August 13, 1997, pp. 5-8.

10 TSN, February 14, 1997, pp. 5-8.

11 TSN, October 22, 1997, pp. 24-27.

12 TSN, November 10, 1997, p. 8.

13 TSN, December 15, 1997, p. 19.

14 TSN, April 15, 1998, pp. 6-8.

15 TSN, November 10, 1997, pp. 9-13.

16 Order of Release dated January 6, 1997, records, p. 24.

17 Records, p. 106.

18 Notice of Appeal dated April 28, 1999, id. at 108.

19 CA rollo, p. 100.

20 Id. at 101-120.

21 Rollo, p. 53.

22 Petitioner's Memorandum dated December 17, 2001, id. at 125-126.

23 Id.

24 OSG's Memorandum dated November 26, 2001, rollo, pp. 100-116.

25 Gaviola v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163927, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 436,
444.

26 Tan v. People of the Philippines, 372 Phil. 93, 105 (1999).

27 Supra note 20, at 134-135.

28 Id. at 143.

29 TSN, April 16, 1997, p. 20 and TSN, August 27, 1997, p. 30.

30 TSN, August 27, 1997, p. 12.

31 Supra note 11, at 19-20.

32 TSN, April 16, 1997, p. 9 and TSN, August 27, 1997, p. 11.

33 People of the Philippines v. Hamton, 443 Phil. 198, 236-237 (2003).

34 Jose v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 148371, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 294, 306.

35 Supra note 26, at 20-25.

36 People v. Roma, G.R. No. 147996, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 413, 426-427.

37 Chua v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 150926 and 30, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA
161, 167.

38 G.R. No. 133709, April 28, 2005, 457 SCRA 458, 464, citing Reyes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
374 SCRA 86 (2002).

39 People of the Philippines v. De Leon, 387 Phil. 779, 789 (2000).

40 Id. at 788.

41 People of the Philippines v. Diaz, 443 Phil. 67, 89 (2003); People of the Philippines v.
Temanel, 395 Phil. 414, 421 (2000); People of the Philippines v. Almacin, 363 Phil. 18, 31
(1999); People of the Philippines v. Toledo, 333 Phil. 261, 273 (1996); and People of the
Philippines v. Desalisa, G.R. No. 95262, January 4, 1994, 229 SCRA 35, 47.

42 People of the Philippines v. Bangcado, 399 Phil. 768, 780 (2000).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. 194255 June 13, 2012

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NURFRASIR HASHIM y SARABAN a.k.a "FRANZ/FRANS," MAKDUL JAMAD y BUKIN (AL)
a.k.a. "MACKY," a certain "TAS," and a certain "JUN," Accused,
BERNADETTE PANSACALA a.k.a. "Neneng Awid," Accused-Appellant.
DECISION

SERENO, J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00644-MIN
promulgated on 20 July 2010, which affirmed the conviction of herein accused-appellant
Bernadette Pansacala a.k.a Neneng Awid, together with co-accused Nurfrasir Hashim y
Saraban a.k.a "Franz/Frans," Makdul Jamad y Bukin a.k.a. "Macky," a certain "Tas" and a
certain "Jun" for the crime of illegal recruitment as defined under Section 6 in relation to
Section 7(b) of Republic Act. No. (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995.

The Facts

On 10 March 2004, accused-appellant was charged as follows:2

That on or about June 11, 2003 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one
another without having previously obtained from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, license or authority to engage in the recruitment and deployment of overseas
workers, did then and there willfully [sic], unlawfully and feloniously, illegally recruit for a
promised employment abroad particularly in Brunei and Malaysia, thus causing and prompting
the persons of BBB and AAA3 to apply which employment however did not materialize
because in truth and in fact, the promised employment is non-existent, in flagrant violation of
the above-mentioned law and causing damage and prejudice to said complainants; further, the
commission of the above stated offense tantamount to economic sabotage in that the same
was committed by a syndicate.

Only accused-appellant and Nurfrasir Hashim y Saraban were arrested, and both entered a
plea of "not guilty" when arraigned.

Private complainants AAA and BBB, Police Chief Inspector Ronald Añonuevo, and police
officers Edmond Ranel Villareal and Renato Rabuya dela Peña were presented by the
prosecution to prove the following:

On 10 June 2003, accused-appellant approached AAA, who was then doing her job as a
waitress at a stall in Paseo de Zamboanga, Buenavista, Zamboanga City, to encourage AAA to
work in Malaysia, as accused-appellant knew certain persons who would soon be leaving for
that country.
On the next day, 11 June 2003, private complainant BBB was at her house in Talon-talon Loop,
Zamboanga City, when accused-appellant paid her a visit and invited her to work as a
saleslady in Brunei. After being assured that the prospective employment was above board
and that she would be well compensated, BBB accepted the invitation.

The day after, accused-appellant, together with co-accused Makdul Amad y Bukin a.k.a.
"Macky" (Macky) and a certain "Jun," returned to the house of BBB. Accused-appellant
informed BBB that the latter would be escorted to Malaysia by the two men, and that they
would meet the next day at 1:00 p.m. at Plaza Pershing, Zamboanga City.

On 13 June 2003, BBB, Macky and Jun met as planned. They proceeded to Shop-O-Rama,
where they met with co-accused Nurfrasir Hashim, a.k.a. "Franz" (Franz), who assured BBB
that she would be easily hired because of her beauty and height. They then agreed to meet at
3:00 p.m. that same day at Paseo de Zamboanga.

At Paseo de Zamboanga, BBB, accused-appellant, Macky, and Jun met with AAA, a certain
CCC (allegedly another recruit) and Arlene (allegedly AAA’s employer). Then at 7:00 p.m. of
that same day, they all proceeded to the wharf, where they met accused Franz and a certain
Cristy, who was also allegedly invited by accused-appellant to work in Malaysia.

Thereafter, AAA, BBB, CCC, Cristy, Macky and Jun boarded the M/V Grand Flora and were
given pieces of paper containing a name. Franz, accused-appellant Bernadette and a certain
Titing did not board the boat. Accused-appellant informed private complainants and their
companions that she and Franz would follow and bring their passports. We quote the Decision
of the CA to describe the journey of the group after boarding the M/V Flora bound for Bongao,
Tawi-Tawi, at 10:00 p.m.:4

On June 14, 2003, they (BBB, AAA, CCC, Cristy, accused Macky) and Jun disembarked at
Bongao, Tawi-Tawi, and then they proceeded to Sitangkai, Tawi-Tawi where they stayed for two
days. On June 16, 2003, they went to Pundohan, which is a terminal going to Lahad Datu,
Sabah, Malaysia.

On June 17, 2003, at 6:00 o’clock [sic] in the morning[,] they arrived at Lahad Datu and soon
thenafter [sic] they boarded a van going to Samporna, Malaysia where they met accused
Macky’s cousin named Pat. They waited at Samporna until 5:00 o’clock [sic] in the afternoon
when accused Franz and Tash[,] who was allegedly their financier[,] arrived. Accused Franz
then distributed to AAA, BBB, CCC and Cristy their respective passports.
Thereafter, they boarded a bus going to Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, and they arrived thereat at
7:00 o’clock [sic] in the morning of June 18, 2003. Later, they boarded again a bus going to
Minumpo, Malaysia and then a barge going to Labuan, Malaysia where they stayed at a hotel
[the Classic Hotel] for three nights or from the night of June 18, 2003 until June 20, 2003.

On June 21, 2003, accused Franz instructed BBB, AAA, CCC and Cristy to wear "sexy
clothes" because they were going to meet their supposed boss named Bunso at Cape Imperial
located at Labuan, Malaysia.

When they arrived at Cape Imperial, accused Macky and Jun talked to Bunso but they failed to
reach an agreement on the purported compensation of the four girls. So, accused Macky and
Jun brought the girls to Golden Lotus Barber Salon (Salon for brevity) where the latter were
introduced to a certain person named Mommy Cindy, the alleged owner of the salon, and their
purported manager Hako who was called Mommy Susan.

The prosecution also alleged that while the group was staying at the Classic Hotel in Labuan,
BBB was forced on numerous occasions to have sexual intercourse with Franz at his bidding,
even in the presence of other people. She followed his orders for fear that he would inflict
physical harm on her.

At first, private complainants were not aware of the circumstances surrounding their
employment at the Golden Lotus. It was only after they agreed to stay there for employment
that they were forced to become sex workers to earn money and pay off the debts they
incurred from their travel from Zamboanga City to Labuan, Malaysia.

Thus, from 21 June 2003 to 13 July 2003, AAA and BBB worked as prostituted women. Each
of the girls would be booked to a customer for the whole night for 300 Ringgit at a certain hotel
near the Golden Lotus. Meanwhile, during the day, they would be hired by customers for a
"short time" for 150 Ringgit in one of the rooms of the Golden Lotus. The girls were told that
they would be made to pay a fine of 150 Ringgit if they refused to have sexual intercourse with
the customers.

On 12 July 2003, BBB had a customer who was a law enforcer at Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia.
She sought his help for her return to the Philippines, and he agreed.

The following day, on 13 July 2003, the Golden Lotus was raided by the Immigration Officers of
Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, and the prostituted Filipino women, including AAA and BBB, were
detained at the Balay Polis (Police Department) in Labuan until all the women were deported
to the Philippines.
The defense, on the other hand, presented three witnesses: accused-appellant Bernadette,
her common-law partner Majujie Jailya Misuari, and co-accused Franz.

According to accused-appellant, she and BBB were friends and neighbors in Talon-talon,
Zamboanga City. Sometime in April 2003, when asked by BBB why accused-appellant
returned to the Philippines from Malaysia, the latter said that she had been made a prostituted
woman in Malaysia.

Accused-appellant denied having offered BBB a job in Malaysia, a denial corroborated by

Majujie Jailya Misuari. Accused-appellant also denied knowing AAA and Franz. She claimed
that she only met AAA when the latter, together with BBB, visited her in jail and offered to
withdraw the case if accused-appellant would give them money.

Co-accused Franz merely denied knowing AAA, BBB or accused-appellant.

On 27 June 2008, after trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City
rendered a Decision,5 the dispositive portion of which states:6

WHEREFORE, the Court finds both accused NURFRASIR HASHIM y SARABAN a.k.a
"FRANZ/FRAS" and BERNADETTE PANSACALA a.k.a "NENENG AWID" GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT defined under Section 6 and
penalized under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 otherwise known as the "Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995", as principals by direct participation, committed
by a syndicate, against BBB and AAA, and SENTENCES each of said accused to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of ₱ 1,000,000.00 each;7 to pay each of
the above victims ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages; ₱ 300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

The trial court considered that, in the course of the trial, the prosecution and the defense had
entered into a stipulation that neither accused-appellant Bernadette nor Franz had a license or
an authority to recruit or deploy workers for overseas employment.

Moreover, the trial court found that the crime was committed in conspiracy by the accused and
other persons. It painstakingly enumerated the overt acts of the accused-appellant showing
her direct participation in the commission of the crime. These acts included inducing AAA and
BBB to work in Malaysia; introducing Macky, Jun and Franz to the victims; and escorting them
to the wharf, where the victims boarded the vessel that took them away from their families and
their country and brought them to Malaysia, where – heretofore unbeknownst to them – they
were made to work as prostituted women.

It further held that the credible and positive testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
prevailed over those of the defense of mere denial, absent any showing that the witnesses for
the prosecution had any ill motive to falsely testify and implicate the accused in the
commission of the crime charged.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of fact of the trial court in the former’s assailed
Decision, but modified the award of damages, to wit:8

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated June 27, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16 of Zamboanga City in Criminal Case No. 19921 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages in favor of the private
complainants be reduced to ₱ 25,000.00 each.

SO ORDERED.

In the present appeal, instead of filing a supplemental brief, both accused-appellant and the
Office of the Solicitor General opted to adopt their respective Briefs filed with the CA.

The appeal is unmeritorious.

To be convicted of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, the following

elements must occur:9

1. The accused have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.

2. The accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement by actually recruiting,
deploying and transporting.

3. Illegal recruitment was committed by three persons conspiring and confederating with one
another.

As to the first element, accused-appellant admitted that she did not have a valid license to
recruit persons for overseas employment, consistent with her defense that she did not engage
in the recruitment of persons for employment.
Anent the second element, both victims, AAA and BBB, narrated in great detail how they were
induced by accused-appellant to accept an employment opportunity, and how they were
successfully transported from Zamboanga City to Malaysia where they eventually worked as
prostituted women.

On the third element, accused-appellant posits that the prosecution failed to prove that there
were more than two persons involved in the alleged crime of illegal recruitment, since the trial
court held only two of the accused liable for the crime. The prosecution, she alleges, failed to
establish that the other accused Macky, Jun, and Tas also had no license or authority to recruit
workers for overseas employment.

In the recent case People v. Lalli,10 we affirmed the trial court’s findings in which 2 of the 3
accused were convicted of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, even though the third
accused was at-large. In so ruling, we took note of the fact that the victim would not have been
able to go to Malaysia were it not for the concerted efforts of the three accused. We held thus:

Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in
order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The
unexplained flight of an accused person may as a general rule be taken into consideration as
evidence having a tendency to establish his guilt. Clearly, in this case, the flight of accused
Relampagos, who is still at-large, shows an indication of guilt in the crimes he has been
charged.

It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos, Lolita was
recruited and deployed to Malaysia to work as a prostitute. Such conspiracy among Aringoy,
Lalli and Relampagos could be deduced from the manner in which the crime was perpetrated
— each of the accused played a pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of illegal recruitment, and
evinced a joint common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.

For these reasons, this Court affirms the CA Decision, affirming the RTC Decision, declaring
accused Ronnie Aringoy y Masion and Hadja Jarma Lalli y Purih guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate in Criminal Case No. 21930,
with a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱ 500,000 imposed on each of the accused.
(Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, the prosecution was similarly able to establish that accused-appellant
Bernadette and Franz were not the only ones who had conspired to bring the victims to
Malaysia. It was also able to establish at the very least, through the credible testimonies of the
witnesses, that (1) Jun and Macky were the escorts of the women to Malaysia; (2) a certain
Tash was their financier; (3) a certain Bunso negotiated with Macky for the price the former
would pay for the expenses incurred in transporting the victims to Malaysia; and (4) Mommy
Cindy owned the prostitution house where the victims worked. The concerted efforts of all
these persons resulted in the oppression of the victims.

Clearly, it was established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant, together with at
least two other persons, came to an agreement to commit the felony and decided to commit it.
It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit
agreement laying down the details of how an unlawful scheme or objective is to be carried out.
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated;
or from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest.11

Findings of fact of the CA, when they affirm those of the trial court, are binding on this Court,
unless the findings of the trial and the appellate courts are palpably unsupported by the
evidence on record, or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.12

Likewise, we have time and again ruled that mere denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of a witness. A mere denial, just like an alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence,
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declarations of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a categorical testimony that has the
ring of truth on the one hand and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to
prevail.13

We, however, find it proper to modify the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded
by the CA.

On 12 May 2003, Congress passed R.A. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act. This law
was approved on 26 May 2003. Ironically, only a few days after, private complainants found
themselves in a situation that this law had sought to prevent.

In Lalli, we increased the amount of moral and exemplary damages from ₱ 50,000 to ₱
500,000 and from ₱ 50,000 to ₱ 100,000, respectively, having convicted the accused therein of
the crime of trafficking in persons. In so doing, we said:

The Civil Code describes moral damages in Article 2217:

Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are awarded in addition to the payment of moral
damages, by way of example or correction for the public good, as stated in the Civil Code:

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.1âwphi1
Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

The payment of ₱ 500,000 as moral damages and ₱ 100,000 as exemplary damages for the
crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code,
which states:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this
article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes
of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a
prostitute without one’s consent and to be sexually violated four to five times a day by different
strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, and social humiliation when she was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since
the crime of Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award
of exemplary damages is likewise justified. (Emphasis supplied.)

We find no legal impediment to increasing the award of moral and exemplary damages in the
case at bar.1âwphi1 Neither is there any logical reason why we should differentiate between
the victims herein and those in that case, when the circumstances are frighteningly similar. To
do so would be to say that we discriminate one from the other, when all of these women have
been the victims of unscrupulous people who capitalized on the poverty of others. While it is
true that accused-appellant was not tried and convicted of the crime of trafficking in persons,
this Court based its award of damages on the Civil Code, and not on the Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act, as clearly explained in Lalli.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00644-MIN dated 20 July 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-
appellant Bernadette Pansacala a.k.a. "Neneng Awid" is ORDERED to pay AAA and BBB the
sum of ₱ 500,000 each as moral damages and ₱ 100,000 each as exemplary damages and to
pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

C E RTI F I CATI O N

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. No. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.)

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 3-18; penned by Associate Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba, with Associate Justices
Edgardo A. Camello and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela concurring.

2 Rollo, p. 4.

3 The real names of private complainants were disclosed in the proceedings before the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. However, pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. 9208 or
the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, the real names of private complainants herein are
withheld and replaced with fictitious initials to protect their identity. While the case was not
prosecuted under R.A. 9208, the policy behind the confidentiality provision – to protect human
dignity – is nevertheless applicable to the case at bar.

4 Rollo, pp. 6-7.

5 CA rollo, pp. 21-43.

6 Id. at 43.

7 At the time of the conviction, the amount of the fine imposed by R.A. 8042 was not less than
₱ 500,000 and not more than ₱ 1 million. It was later amended by R.A. 10022, which was
passed on 8 March 2010.

8 Rollo, p. 18.
9 People v. Lalli, G.R. No. 195419, 12 October 2011.

10 Id.

11 People v. Fegidero, 392 Phil. 36 (2000).

12 Pangonorom v. People, 495 Phil. 195 (2005).

13 People v. Villanueva, 440 Phil. 409 (2002).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Fact: Accused-appellant approached AAA, who was then doing her job as a waitress
encourage AAA to work in Malaysia, as accused-appellant knew certain persons who would
soon be leaving for that country. private complainant BBB was at her house when accused-
appellant paid her a visit and invited her to work as a saleslady in Brunei. After being assured
that the prospective employment was above board and that she would be well compensated,
BBB accepted the invitation. On June 17, 2003, at 6:00 o’clock [sic] in the morning[,] they
arrived in Malaysia, accused Franz instructed BBB, AAA, CCC and Cristy to wear “sexy
clothes” because they were going to meet their supposed boss. The prosecution also alleged
that while the group was staying at the Classic Hotel in Labuan, BBB was forced on numerous
occasions to have sexual intercourse with Franz at his bidding, even in the presence of other
people. She followed his orders for fear that he would inflict physical harm on her. Thus, from
21 June 2003 to 13 July 2003, AAA and BBB worked as prostituted women. On 13 July 2003,
the Golden Lotus was raided by the Immigration Officers of Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, and the
prostituted Filipino women, including AAA and BBB, were detained at the Balay Polis (Police
Department) in Labuan until all the women were deported to the Philippines. Complainant filed
a complaint in the RTC who finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the findings of fact of the trial court in the former’s assailed Decision, but modified
the award of damages, Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether the accused committed the crime of Illegal Recruitment?

Held: Yes, to be convicted of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, the
following elements must occur: 1. The accused have no valid license or authority required by
law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. 2. The
accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement by actually recruiting, deploying
and transporting. 3. Illegal recruitment was committed by three persons conspiring and
confederating with one another.

As to the first element, accused-appellant admitted that she did not have a valid license to
recruit persons for overseas employment, consistent with her defense that she did not engage
in the recruitment of persons for employment. Anent the second element, both victims, AAA
and BBB, narrated in great detail how they were induced by accused-appellant to accept an
employment opportunity, and how they were successfully transported from Zamboanga City to
Malaysia where they eventually worked as prostituted women. On the third element, accused-
appellant posits that the prosecution failed to prove that there were more than two persons
involved in the alleged crime of illegal recruitment, since the trial court held only two of the
accused liable for the crime. The prosecution, she alleges, failed to establish that the other
accused Macky, Jun, and Tas also had no license or authority to recruit workers for overseas
employment. The court affirmed the trial court’s findings in which 2 of the 3 accused were
convicted of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, even though the third accused was
at-large. In so ruling, we took note of the fact that the victim would not have been able to go to
Malaysia were it not for the concerted efforts of the three accused. Flight in criminal law is the
evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or
detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained flight of an
accused person may as a general rule be taken into consideration as evidence having a
tendency to establish his guilt.