Lawyers Must Exercise Care in Handling Cases

G.R. No.
155010 August 16, 2004
JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
Spouses SUHARTO MANGUDADATU and MIRIAM SANGKI MANGUDADATU, respondents.
D EC ISI ON
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers must be careful in handling cases, because their negligence in the performance of their duties binds their
clients. The issues in the instant case stem from the failure of the counsels and their client to attend the pretrial.
Their non-appearance was compounded by their subsequent inaction, which resulted in the eventual finality and
execution of the default judgment.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 6, 2002 Decision2 and
the September 2, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 69556. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit."4
The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
Respondent-Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the
12th Judicial Region in Tacurong City, Sultan Kudarat, a Complaint for damages against Petitioner Jonathan
Landoil International Co., Inc. ("JLI"). The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 537 and raffled to Branch
20.5 Initially, petitioner had countered with a Motion to Dismiss; but when this was denied, it filed its Answer
dated November 23, 1999.6
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective Pretrial Briefs. 7 Trial proceeded without the participation of
petitioner, whose absence during the pretrial on August 8, 2000, had led the trial court to declare it in default. 8
On July 3, 2001, petitioner received a copy of the RTC’s Decision dated June 19, 2001. 9 On July 18, 2001, it filed
an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Change of Venue.10 This Motion was deemed submitted for resolution on
August 7, 2001,11 but was eventually denied by the trial court in an Order dated September 12, 2001. 12
On December 12, 2001, petitioner received a copy of a Writ of Execution dated December 4, 2001. Alleging that
it had yet to receive a copy of an Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial, petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash/Recall Writ of Execution on December 14, 2001. 13
On January 7, 2002, its counsels -- Attys. Jaime L. Mario Jr. and Dioscoro G. Peligro -- submitted separate
withdrawals of appearance.14 On the same date, the law firm Ong Abad Santos & Meneses filed an Entry of
Appearance with Supplement to Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution.15 To its Supplement, petitioner
attached the Affidavits of Attys. Mario and Peligro attesting that they had not yet received a copy of the Order
resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial. 16
On the same day, January 7, 2002, petitioner received a Sheriff’s Notice dated December 26, 2001, regarding the
public auction sale of its properties.17 By reason of the immediate threat to implement the Writ of Execution, it
filed with the CA on January 14, 2002, a Petition for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Writ
until the resolution of the Motion to Quash. 18 The Petition was docketed as CA-GR SP No. 68483.19
On January 9, 2002, the RTC issued an Order directing respondents to file their written comment on the Motion
to Quash and scheduled the hearing thereon for February 1, 2002.20
On January 23, 2002, petitioner received a copy of respondents’ Vigorous Opposition (Re: Motion to
Quash/Recall Writ of Execution, and its Supplement) dated January 16, 2001. Attached to this pleading were two
separate Certifications supposedly issued by the postmaster of Tacurong City, affirming that the Order denying
the Motion for New Trial had been received by petitioner’s two previous counsels of record.21 The Certifica tio n
pertaining to Atty. Peligro alleged that a certain Michelle Viquira had received on October 19, 2001, a copy of
the Order intended for him.22 The Certification as regards Atty. Mario stated that he had personally received his
copy on December 21, 2001.23
On January 24, 2002, petitioner personally served counsel for respondents a Notice to Take Deposition Upon
Oral Examination of Attys. Mario and Peligro. 24 The Deposition was intended to prove that petitioner had not
received a copy of the Order denying the Omnibus Motion for New Trial. 25
At 9:30 a.m. on January 28, 2002, the deposition-taking proceeded as scheduled -- at the Business Center
Conference Room of the Mandarin Oriental Hotel in Makati City -- before Atty. Ana Peralta-Nazareno, a notary
public acting as deposition officer.26 At 12:00 noon of the same day, respondents sent petitioner a fax message
via JRS Express, advising it that they had filed a Motion to Strike Off from the records the Notice to Take
Deposition; and asking it not to proceed until the RTC would have resolved the Motion,27 a copy of which it
eventually received later in the day, at 3:10 p.m.
On January 29, 2002, separate Notices were sent by Atty. Nazareno to Attys. Mario and Peligro, as witnesses, for
them to examine the transcript of their testimonies. 28 On the same date, Atty. Nazareno filed via registered mail a
Submission to the RTC attaching (1) a Certification that the witnesses had been present and duly sworn to by her;
(2) a transcript bearing their signatures, attesting that it was a true record of their testimonies; (3) a copy of the
Notice to Take Deposition delivered to her; and (4) a copy of the Notice signed by respondents’ counsel. 29
During the February 1, 2002 hearing on the Motion to Quash, petitioner submitted its (1) Formal Offer of Exhibits,
together with the documentary exhibits marked during the deposition-taking; (2) Reply to respondents’ Vigorous
Opposition to the Motion to Quash; and (3) Opposition ad Cautelam to respondents’ Motion to Strike Off the
Notice to Take Deposition.30
Meanwhile, on February 26, 2002, the CA issued a Resolution denying the Petition for Prohibition in CA-GR SP
No. 68483.
On March 6, 2002, petitioner received a copy of the RTC’s Resolution dated February 21, 2002, denying the
Motion to Quash.31 On March 8, 2002, it received a copy of respondents’ Motion to Set Auction Sale of
Defendant’s Levied Properties.
On March 11, 2002, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 32 seeking to hold in
abeyance the February 21, 2002 RTC Resolution and the December 4, 2001 Writ of Execution. Petitioner alleged
that since it had not received the Order denying its Motion for New Trial, the period to appeal had not yet
lapsed.33 It thus concluded that the judgment, not being final, could not be the subject of a writ of execution.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 6, 2002, the CA issued the assailed Decision denying JLI’s Petition. It ruled that petitioner could no
longer avail itself of a deposition under Rule 23 of Rules of Court, since trial had already been terminated. 34 The
appellate court also opined that the alleged error committed by the trial court -- when the latter disregarded two
witnesses’ oral depositions -- was an error of judgment not reviewable by certiorari or prohibition. 35 Finally, it
ruled that between the denial of a lawyer and the certification of a postmaster, the latter would prevail. 36
Hence, this Petition.37
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
"I.
Whether or not the trial court judge has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicia l
proceedings, and the Court of Appeals has sanctioned such departure by the trial court judge, when he
denied petitioner’s Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution despite clear and convincing evidence
showing that petitioner and/or its counsel has yet to receive an order resolving petitioner’s timely
filed Motion for New Trial, which warrants the exercise by this Honorable Court of its power of
supervision.
"II.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred and decided a question of substance in a way not in
accord with law and applicable decisions of this Honorable Court, when it ruled that petitioner can no
longer avail of the taking of oral depositions under Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
"III.
accord with law and applicable decisions of this Honorable Court, when it ruled that the trial court judge
committed a mere error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction.
"IV.
accord with law and applicable decisions of this Honorable Court, when it considered the manner by which
the trial court judge gave evidentiary weight to witnesses presented before him during trial on the merits
when what is being questioned before the Court of Appeals is the propriety of presenting deposition
evidence (wherein the trial court judge could not have been present) in support of the Motion to Quash.
"V.
accord with law and applicable decisions of this Honorable Court, when it applied the ruling of this
Honorable Court in Aportader[a] v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 695) and Philippine National Bank v.
CFI of Rizal (209 SCRA 294) on the evidentiary value of a postmaster’s certification vis-à-vis a denial of
receipt by counsel."38
In the main, the issues boil down to two: (1) whether petitioner received the Order denying its timely filed Motion
for New Trial; and (2) whether the taking of oral depositions was proper under the circumstances.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Appreciation of Facts
It is readily apparent that petitioner is raising factual issues that this Court does not review. While the rule admits
of exceptions,39 petitioner has not satisfactorily shown any. Given the circumstances surrounding the filing of its
Motion for New Trial and the allegations therein, we find no compelling reason to disturb the CA’s factual
findings. It may therefore not insist, contrary to the finding of the CA, that it did not receive the Order denying
its timely filed Motion for New Trial.
Motion for New Trial Improper
A motion for new trial may be filed on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that
could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights
have probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved
party could not have discovered and produced at the trial; and that, if presented, would probably alter the
result.40 In its Omnibus Motion for New Trial,41 petitioner argued that its counsel Atty. Mario was sick, a fact that
allegedly constituted excusable negligence for his failure to appear at the August 8, 2000 pretrial. 42 With regard
to Atty. Rogelio Fernandez, the collaborating counsel, it alleged that the Board of Directors had terminated his
legal services on August 4, 2000.43
These grounds relied upon by petitioner cannot properly secure a new trial. Counsels are not the only ones required
to attend the pretrial. The appearance of the plaintiff and the defendant is also mandatory. The pertinent rule
states:
Section 4. Appearance of parties. -- It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the
pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a
representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement,
to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts
and of documents.44
The rationale for this requirement of compelling the parties to appear personally before the court is to exhaust the
possibility of reaching a compromise.45 While notice of the pretrial is served on counsels, it is their duty to notify
the party they represent.46
The explanation offered by petitioner as regards the absence of its counsel from the pretrial is therefore
unacceptable. It should have also justified its own absence therefrom. Having failed to do so, it had no valid
ground to request a new trial.
Petitioner also failed to justify the absence of both its counsels. Until their formal withdrawal is granted, lawyers
are deemed to be the representatives of their clients. 47
Atty. Fernandez may have been notified of the termination of his services on August 7, 2004. 48 But as far as the
trial court was concerned, he continued to be petitioner’s counsel of record, since no withdrawal of appearance
had yet been granted. Hence, his absence from the pretrial was still not excusable. While he could no longer
represent petitioner, his presence would have afforded him an opportunity to make a formal withdrawal of
appearance. An improvident termination of legal services is not an excuse to justify non-appearance at a pretrial.
Otherwise, the rules of procedure would be rendered meaningless, as they would be subject to the counsel’s will.
The Proper Remedy
Under the new Rules, the consequence of non-appearance without cause at the pretrial is not for the petitioner to
be considered "as in default,"49 but "to allow the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte and [for] the court to render
judgment on the basis thereof."50 This procedure was followed in the instant case.
To the trial court’s order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, the defendant’s remedy
is a motion for reconsideration.51 An affidavit of merit is not required to be attached to such motion, because the
defense has already been laid down in the answer. 52
Liberality is the rule in considering a motion for reconsideration. 53 It is best for the trial court to give both the
plaintiff and the defendant a chance to litigate their causes fairly and openly, without resort to
technicality.54 Unless the reopening of the case is clearly intended for delay, courts should be liberal in setting
aside orders barring defendants from presenting evidence. Judgments based on an ex parte presentation of
evidence are generally frowned upon. 55
In the present case, petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration after the trial court had allowed
respondents’ ex parte presentation of evidence. The Rules of Court does not prohibit the filing of a motion for a
new trial despite the availability of a motion for reconsideration. But the failure to file the latter motion -- without
due cause -- is a factor in determining whether to apply the liberality rule in lifting an order that allowed the ex
parte presentation of evidence. In its motions and petitions filed with this Court and the lower courts, petitioner
did not explain why it had failed to file a motion for reconsideration.
The lapse of time -- from the August 8, 2000 pretrial to the September 5, 2000 ex parte presentation of evidence,
and until the June 19, 2001 promulgation of the Decision56 -- shows the negligence of petitioner and its counsels.
Prior to the trial court’s resolution of the case, it had ample opportunity to challenge the Order allowing the ex
parte presentation of evidence. Too late was the challenge that it made after the Decision had already been
rendered.
Non-Receipt of the Order
In addition to the foregoing facts, petitioner fails to convince us that it has not received the trial court’s Order
denying its Motion for New Trial.
There is a disputable presumption that official duties have been regularly performed.57 On this basis, we have
ruled that the postmaster’s certification prevails over the mere denial of a lawyer. 58 This rule is applicable here.
Petitioner has failed to establish its non-receipt of the trial court’s Order denying its Motion for New Trial.
This Court notes the trial court’s finding that petitioner received a copy of respondents’ September 24, 2001
Motion for Execution and November 21, 2001 Motion for Early Resolution, as well as the trial court’s September
28, 2001 Order submitting the Motion for Execution for resolution.59 Given these unrebutted facts, it is
unbelievable that petitioner did not know that a ruling on the Motion for New Trial had already been issued. At
the very least, the Motions filed by respondents should have alerted it of such issuance. Otherwise, it could have
opposed their Motion for Execution by requesting the RTC to resolve the Motion for New Trial; or the trial court
could have been informed by petitioner of the latter’s non-receipt of the Order resolving respondents’ Motion.
Second Issue:
The Taking of Depositions
The appellate court supposedly erred, too, in declaring that the taking of the depositions of petitioner’s witnesses
was improper. We agree with this contention.
Deposition Pending Action
A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property that is the subject of the action; or, without such leave, after an answer has been served. 60 Deposition is
chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of
disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the
preparation for trial.61 The liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure, as an attribute of discovery, is "well-
nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in
good faith and within the bounds of the law."62
Limitations would arise, though, if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry; or when the inquiry touches upon the irreleva nt
or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege. 63
As a mode of discovery resorted to before trial, deposition has advantages, as follows:
"1. It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury. x x x
"2. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses.
"3. It makes available in a simple, convenient, and often inexpensive way facts which otherwise could not
have been proved, except with great difficulty and sometimes not at all.
"4. It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses, thereby
encouraging settlements out of court.
"5. It expedites the disposal of litigation, saves the time of the courts, and clears the docket of many cases
by settlements and dismissals which otherwise would have to be tried.
"6. It safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delays, and narrows and simplifies the issues to be
tried, thereby expediting the trial.
"7. It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of cases."64
The Rules of Court65 and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode
of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after
trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand.
In Dasmariñas Garments v. Reyes,66 we allowed the taking of the witnesses’ testimonies through deposition, in
lieu of their actual presence at the trial.
Thus, "[d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or
convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibitio n
against the taking of depositions after pre-trial."67 There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the
process of executing final and executory judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or
complicated.68
In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding,69 depositions are allowed as a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of
examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge."70 Depositions are
allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of
court if the summons have been served, without leave of court if an answer has been submitted); and provided,
further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court).
The Rules of Court vests in the trial court the discretion to order whether a deposition may be taken or not under
specified circumstances that may even differ from those the proponents have intended. 71 However, it is well-
settled that this discretion is not unlimited. It must be exercised -- not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively --
but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be
attained.72
When a deposition does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material
injury to the adverse party, its taking should not be allowed. This was the primary concern in Northwest Airlines
v. Cruz.73 In that case, the ends of justice would be better served if the witness was to be brought to the trial court
to testify. The locus of the oral deposition therein was not within the reach of ordinary citizens, as there were time
constraints; and the trip required a travel visa, bookings, and a substantial travel fare. 74 In People v. Webb,75 the
taking of depositions was unnecessary, since the trial court had already admitted the Exhibits on which the
witnesses would have testified.76
Safeguards Available
The Rules of Court provides adequate safeguards to ensure the reliability of depositions.77 The right to object to
their admissibility is retained by the parties, for the same reasons as those for excluding evidence if the witness
were present and had testified in court;78 and for errors and irregularities in the deposition. 79 As a rule, depositions
should be allowed, absent any showing that taking them would prejudice any party.
Use of Depositions
Depositions may be used for the trial or for the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, under the
circumstances specified hereunder:
Section 4. Use of Depositions. -- At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutor y
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used
against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice
thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony
of deponent as a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director,
or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party may be
used by an adverse party for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the
court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred
(100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his
absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or
testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition
has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice,
that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due
regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the
deposition to be used; and
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to
introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts. 80
The present case involved a circumstance that fell under the above-cited Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23 -- the witnesses
of petitioner in Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of hearing. Petitioner
offered the depositions in support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for the purpose of proving
that the trial court’s Decision was not yet final. As previously explained, despite the fact that trial has already
been terminated, a deposition can still be properly taken.
We note, however, that the RTC did not totally disregard petitioner’s depositions. In its February 21, 2001
Resolution, the trial court considered and weighed -- against all other evidence -- that its Order denying the Motion
for New Trial filed by petitioner had not been received by the latter’s counsels. Despite their depositions,
petitioner failed to prove convincingly its denial of receipt.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122629 December 2, 1998
PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHIL., INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., SPS. EDGARDO DE VERA and SALVACION
LOCSIN DE VERA and ANNA A. LOCSIN, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Subject of the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 377011 which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138 2 denying
petitioner's oral Motion for Postponement of a scheduled hearing due to unavailability of witnesses and declaring
that petitioner has waived the right to present evidence in support of its defenses, and further denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid order.
The instant case arose out of the "Pepsi Number Fever Promotion" sponsored by petitioner Pepsi Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. ("PCPPI"), wherein numerous holders of the supposedly winning "349" crowns were not honored
and paid by petitioner due to an alleged mistake in the security codes in the crowns. 3 Private respondents Edgardo
De Vera, Salvacion Locsin De Vera, and Anna A. Locsin are unpaid holders of "349" Pepsi Crowns who instituted
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati a civil case for collection of sum of money and damages against petitioner
herein.
From its inception, the case was fraught with cancellations of scheduled hearings by reason of the absence and/or
illness of the presiding Judge and the postponements sought by the petitioner herein. While private respondent
commendably finished the presentation of evidence on the scheduled dates of hearings, petitioner, however, has
repeatedly sought and was granted postponements due to unavailability of its witnesses.
The presentation of petitioner's evidence was initially scheduled on May 28, 1993, July 15, 1993, August 6, 1993,
and August 23, 1993. On May 28, 1993, petitioner presented its first witness Mr. Luisito V. Gutierrez. However,
the other scheduled hearings were cancelled due to the absence of then presiding Judge Hon. Fernando Agdamag.
The further hearing for presentation of petitioner's evidence was reset to October 14, 1993, but on the day of the
hearing, petitioner orally moved for cancellation of hearing due to the absence of its witnesses, which was granted
by the trial court with a warning that the failure to present its witnesses on the next scheduled hearing would be
deemed a waiver of its right to present evidence. Hence, the hearing was reset to December 10, 1993, wherein
petitioner presented its second witness Mr. Rafael Eladio Battung, Jr.. The scheduled hearings on January 20,
1994 and February 9, 1994 were also cancelled because the Presiding Judge was then on leave. In the interve ning
period, the Presiding Judge retired and was replaced by public respondent Hon. Sixto Marella, Jr., and petitioner's
counsel 4 was substituted by its in-house counsel, De Jesus and Associates.
The hearing for the presentation of petitioner's evidence was reset to November 18, 1994, but on said date,
petitioner once more orally moved for postponement due to the inability of petitioner's witnesses to appear. The
hearing was reset to January 20, 1995 and February 9, 1995, with the directive to petitioner's counsel to finis h
with the presentation of its evidence, and that should the allocated time in the morning be insufficient, the parties
should be ready for continuance in the afternoon of the same dates. The court also issued a warning that the
scheduled hearings are "intransferrable in character.
On January 20, 1995, heedless of the trial court's previous warnings, petitioner's counsel appeared and orally
moved for cancellation of the hearing on the ground that its witnesses were all preoccupied with other
commitments. Finding no merit in the verbal motion, the trial court denied the motion and issued the questioned
Order dated January 20, 19955 which reads:
ORDER
The Court finds no merit in the motion of the defendant for cancellation of today's hearing
considering that these settings have been agreed upon as early as November 18, 1994 at which
time an order was issued setting this case for today and on February 9, 1995 for the presentation
of evidence for the defendant. In said Order the Court directed that the settings shall be
instransferrable in character.
On motion of the plaintiff, and it appearing that the defendant had been given ample opportunity
to present its evidence but still failed, the defendant is hereby declared to have waived its right to
present further evidence in support of its defenses.
Let this case be deemed submitted for decision after thirty (30) days during which period parties
are directed to file their respective memoranda in support of their respective claims and defenses.
The hearing scheduled on February 9, 1995 is hereby cancelled.
SO ORDERED.
On February 8, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 of the aforesaid Order. Petitioner explained
that its intended witness, Ms. Rosemarie Valera, was also the witness on the same day (January 20, 1995) in Civil
Case No. Ir-2486 entitled "Silvino Amoroso vs. PCPPI," pending with the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City,
Branch 37, and that substitute witnesses in the persons of Atty. Juan Cruz Madarieta and Atty. Edgardo L. de
Jesus were also not available since Atty. Madarieta was the handling lawyer of "Silvino Amoroso vs. PCPPI" and
was also in Iriga City, while Atty. Edgardo L. de Jesus was counsel for petitioner in Civil Case No. 62726 entitled
"People Pagdanganan vs. PCPPI" at the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 163, on the same day.
In an Order dated May 12, 1995,7 the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration stating that:
The Court does not find merit on the ground cited by the defendant, for reasons (a) the Court has
directed that the setting on January 20, 1995 shall be instransferable in character; Defendant was
therefore forewarned that it should be ready to present its evidence on said date; Assuming that
the witnesses were in fact, attending to the other cases there was no showing on record which was
earlier set hence would warrant priority attention. In addition, the setting on January 20, 1995 was
by agreement of the parties, made as early (sic) as November 18, 1994 or about two (2) months,
which is sufficient to allow defendant to make reasonable arrangement with other courts; (b)
fairness dictates that given the predicament of the defendant, assuming the same to be true, it
should have filed the corresponding written Motion for Cancellation of the hearing long before the
scheduled date, instead of a mere verbal motion presented on the day of the hearing itself; (c) the
Motion for Reconsideration does not state the nature of the testimony of the intended witnesses,
hence the Court does not have basis to determine whether they would merely be corroborative or
simply cumulative to the evidence already presented; (d) the case has been pending for quite
sometime; and (e) defendant has been given ample opportunity to present its evidence but it opted
not to exercise its rights.
IN VIEW THEREOF, defendant's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
On July 6, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari8 under Rule 65 with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction alleging that respondent Judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders
denying both petitioner's Motion for Postponement and Motion for Reconsideration.
On November 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition holding that:9
Counsel for petitioner knows as early as November 18, 1994 or thereabout of the date scheduled
for continuation of reception of petitioner's evidence on January 20, 1995 since the November 18th
hearing was cancelled upon motion of counsel. Counsel therefore has more than two months within
which to prepare for the January 20th scheduled trial. He has to schedule and prepare the witnesses
that he intends to present. He is expected to manage and budget his time fairly, equally, and allot
the same to avoid conflict of schedule of trials before respondent court and before the other courts
where he has to present the same set of witnesses. He should also be conscious of the fact that
private respondents had formally rests (sic) their case as early as February 5, 1992, and that on
January 20, 1995, the case has been pending for about three years. Most importantly, there is the
court's directive for him to finish with the presentation of his witnesses, and the court was prepared
to hear petitioner's witnesses morning and afternoon. There is also the court's warning that the
hearing as scheduled is "intransferrable in character". Obviously, petitioner's counsel preferred to
present his witness before other courts.
The comment of counsel for private respondents that those numerous cases involving the crowns
bearing number 349 against petitioner, as well as the fact that they have the same set of witnesses
that they presented or intended to present on those cases, cannot be considered as legal
justifications for giving preference to the other cases to the detriment and the resulting delay of the
disposition of the case at bar.
On the whole, We find that the reasons stated in respondent court's Order of May 12th is in order,
in line with the rules that motions for continuance or postponement of hearing are addressed to the
sound discretion of the court and its action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts in the
absence of a patent and manifest abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is DISMISSED.
Hence, the present recourse to this Court by way of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Petitioner
contends that, first, the decision of the Court of Appeals contravenes the due process clause and is not in accord
with law jurisprudence. Second, the trial court's departure from accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings
call for the exercise of the Supreme Court of its supervisory powers. And third, the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion in upholding the orders of the trial court denying the oral motion for postponement and
motion for reconsideration.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right,10 but is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court,11 and its action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts in the absence of clear and manife st
abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice. 12 Section 4 of Rule 22 of the Revised Rules of
Court13 specifically requires that "[a] motion to postpone a trial on the ground of absence of evidence can be
granted only upon affidavit showing the materiality of evidence expected to be obtained, and that due dilige nce
has been used to procure it. . . ." In considering motions for postponement of trials or for new trials, two
circumstances should be taken into account by the court, namely, (1) the merit of the case of the movant, and (2)
the reasonable of the postponement or new trials.14 The records would show that petitioner not only failed to
allege and prove the materiality of the testimonies of its witnesses, it even refused to make such an averment
contending that the materiality of testimonies of its witnesses can only be appreciated after they are presented in
court.15 Neither did petitioner present a meritorious claim or defense. Instead petitioner simply cited cases of
different factual milieu wherein postponements were allowed for valid cause. Thus, in De Guzman v. Elbinias 172
SCRA 240, 245 (1989), postponement of the first hearing for the defense was justified by the following
circumstances: (1) counsel for petitioner had a previous intransferable hearing in a criminal case scheduled the
same day; (2) counsel only received the notice of hearing two days prior to the said hearing; (3) the distance of
some 65 kilometers from the residence of counsel and the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 5. None of
the aforementioned circumstances are availing in the instant case. In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v.
Genovea, 116 SCRA 395, 400, 405 (1982), counsel for defendant (PLDT) moved for another postponement of a
scheduled hearing for presentation of evidence on the ground of sudden illness of its witness. The trial court, upon
objection of defendant's counsel, denied the motion and plaintiff was deemed to have waived its right to present
its evidence and the case deemed submitted for decision. While we later on the reopening of the case for the
reception of defendant's evidence in the interest of substantial justice, we admonished defendant to present its
evidence with the least possible delay, limiting requests for postponement to the minimum. We do not find
petitioner herein similarly situated as the grounds relied upon for postponement are different. In Sayson v. People,
166 SCRA 680, 689-690 (1988), also cited by petitioner, we ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion in
the trial court's denial of a motion for postponement due to illness of counsel considering that petitioner's motion
was not seasonably filed as the three-day notice required under Rule 15, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court
was not complied with, and that said motion was not accompanied by an affidavit or medical certificate to support
the alleged illness of counsel, contrary to Rule 22, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It would not be amiss to point out that the case below was instituted in the trial court on or about June 11, 1992,
and private respondents formally rested their case on February 5, 1993. Petitioner had already been allowed
several postponements due to unavailability of its witnesses and the case dragged on for a period of almost two
(2) years. Yet on the next scheduled hearing on January 20, 1995, petitioner brazenly sought another
postponement due to the absence of its witnesses who were then allegedly testifying in similar cases elsewhere
— a contingency which counsel could have easily foreseen and avoided by a careful scheduling of the hearings
of its witnesses. Petitioner blithely explained that it did not file a written Motion for Postponement because it was
hoping that even at the last hour, a witness would be available for that day's hearing. 16 How can petitioner make
this preposterous claim when it knew fully well that its intended witness, Ms. Valera was already in Iriga City
even two (2) days before the hearing, and that Atty. Madarieta was likewise in Iriga City on the day of the hearing
itself, while Atty. de Jesus had a hearing on the same day in Pasig City? The granting of a motion to postpone,
especially one made on the day of the hearing itself, is discretionary upon the courts and a litigant should not act
on the assumption that it would be automatically granted. 17 We also note that counsel for a petitioner has shown
reprehensible propensity for dilatory schemes which we have always viewed with grave concern and utmost
disfavor.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not
discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this
Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a
case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets.
They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do
not deserve the attention of the Court. 18
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122346 February 18, 2000
PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., HERNANDO S. EUSEBIO, ROSENDO

GALLARDO, and AUGUSTO ARREZA, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JULIE P. SONG, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision,1 dated October 13, 1995, of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 135, Makati, which ordered petitioners to pay private
respondent damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P160,776.00, plus costs of suit.
The facts are as follows:
In 1985, private respondent Julie P. Song filed a complaint for attempted parricide against her husband, Hernane
Song, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Manila, where the case was docketed as Crim. Case No. 85-34865.
On August 5, 1988, private respondent and her husband entered into a compromise agreement 2 with respect to
the civil aspect of the case, and on the same day, judgment3 was rendered by the trial court as follows:
In the conference this morning, the accused, Hernane B. Song, assisted by his counsel, Atty. Romeo R.
Robiso, and the private complainant, Julie Parcon Song, assisted by her counsel, Atty. Dante Garin, and
Trial Fiscal Leonardo L. Lacalda, filed the following compromise agreement, dated August 5, 1988:
The accused, assisted by his counsel, and the private complainant, Julie Parcon-Song, assisted by
the Trial Fiscal, respectfully submit the following compromise agreement:
1. Whereas, the accused and the private complainant are husband and wife, although they have
been estranged and living apart from each other since 1984;
2. Whereas, they have a daughter, Gladeslie P. Song, who is five years old and living with the
private complainant;
3. Whereas the accused is a licensed seaman third mate, and his employment with the Prometheus
Maritime Company was recently terminated.
4. Wherefore, for and consideration of their mutual premises hereunder specified, the accused and
the private complainant have agreed to settle amicably the civil aspect of this case under the
following terms and conditions;
(a) Whenever the accused is employed as seaman third mate or marine officer, his basic salary
shall be distributed as follows:
(1) Forty (40%) percent shall be allocated, remitted or paid to the private complainant;
(2) Forty (40%) percent shall be retained by the accused;
(3) The remaining twenty (20%) percent shall be deposited in a trust account in the name
and for the support and education of their daughter Gladys P. Song;
(4) At the start of his employment as a seaman third mate or marine officer, the accused
shall, in addition, pay the sum of P1,800.00 per month to the private complainant for a
period of ten (10) months, or a total of P18,000.00;
(5) The accused shall have the right to visit their daughter, Gladys P. Song, as often as
necessary or possible.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the foregoing Compromise Agreement be approved.
Finding the Compromise Agreement not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy, the same is hereby approved.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the basis of the compromise agreement and the parties
are hereby enjoined to comply with the terms and conditions thereof.
SO ORDERED.
It appears, however, that Hernane Song failed to comply with his obligation under the decision for which reason,
on December 1, 1992, a Notice of Garnishment4 was issued by the trial court to petitioner Philippine Transmar ine
Carriers, Inc., as Hernane Song's employer. The Notice of Garnishment reads:
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED by these presents that by virtue of the 2nd Alias Writ of Executio n
issued by the Honorable Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., copy of which is hereto attached and served upon you,
for the recovery by the private complainant against the accused is the amount as breakdown hereunder:
(a) US $420.00 — representing the 10% difference in allotment due to private complainant which
was only 50% when it should have been 60% pursuant to the compromise agreement.
(b) US $1,457.40 — representing unpaid monthly allotment of US $466.20 for March 1991 and
US $495.60 for January 1992 which were not remitted to the private complainant since the accused
collected the same by way of cash advance and pay-on-board.
(c) US$1,877.40 — representing allotment of 60% of the basic salary of Hernane B. Song for the
months of November 1992, December 1992, January 1993 and February 1993 or total of US
$3,745.80 and
(d) P16,000.00 — balance of arrears in support remaining unpaid, due to said complainant in
connection with this 2nd alias Writ of Execution, Garnishment is hereby made upon all the
moneys, interests, receivables and other personal properties by the accused, Hernane B. Song
under your control as of the date of service hereof, sufficient to cover the above-mentioned claim,
attached hereof are the judgment and order dated August 28, 1989 of this Court and the breakdown
prepared by the private complainant, Julie Song.
You are further notified that you should not deliver, transfer or otherwise dispose such properties in your
possession or under your control belonging to said accused or to any person or entity except to the
undersigned, deputy Sheriff, under Penalty Prescribed by Law.
You are requested to make a reply to this Garnishment as to such properties to the accused in your
possession or under your control of any debt and receivables owned by you to said accused and forward
the same to the undersigned within five (5) days from your receipt hereof, under warning that if no reply
is made, you may be examined under oath before this Court.
The notice was served on petitioner-company on December 3, 1992. But, according to the Sheriff's Return, 5 on
May 24, 1993, petitioner-company released only two checks, with the total amount of P31,000.00, representing
the allotment for May 1993 only. The rest of the amounts indicated in the Notice of Garnishment was unsatisfied.
On July 20, 1993, private respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner-company and its officers,
petitioners Hernando S. Eusebio, Rosendo Gallardo and Augusto Arreza, Jr. The complaint, which was filed in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 135, Makati, alleged in pertinent parts:6
6. That despite the said Notice of Garnishment, the salaries of the accused for the remaining contract
months of December 1992, January 1993 and February 1993 which were in the possession and under the
control of defendants, were not being duly garnished; that instead, the allotments of herein plaintiff for
the said months were withheld, so that during those months and the months that followed, plaintiff and
her minor child greatly suffered financial problems as their support by way of allotment has been
oppressively withheld by defendants; that it was only on 24 May 1993 that the allotments for plaintiff and
that of the minor child representing only a total of 60% of the total salaries of the accused, were finally
released and turned over by defendants thru the Deputy Sheriff, as evidenced by the Sheriff's Return,
machine copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "C" forming integral part thereof;
7. That herein defendants, in total disregard of the Notice of Garnishment in a manner that is wanton,
oppressive, reckless and fraudulent, and in contravention of the said Notice that defendants should not
deliver, transfer or otherwise dispose such properties in their possession or under their control belonging
to the accused to any person or entity except to the Deputy Sheriff, have caused the release of the remaining
40% of the accused's salaries together with his Leave Pay for two (2) months, to the accused, to the great
prejudice and damage of herein plaintiff;
8. That the said willful, wanton and oppressive omission of defendants in not garnishing the total and
entire salaries of the accused, has caused actual damages to plaintiff in the amount representing the
remaining 40% or P20,776.00 plus the Leave Pay of P50,000.00 or a total of P70,776.00;
9. That the act of omission on the part of herein defendants has caused plaintiff to suffer several sleepless
nights, mental anguish, serious anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and
social humiliation, for which under the law, defendants individually are civilly liable to plaintiff for moral
damages in the amount not less than P200,000.00; that the wrongful omission being done in a wanton
manner, reckless, and oppressive, herein defendants are likewise individually liable to plaintiff for
exemplary damages in the amount not less than P200,000.00;
10. That in order to protect the rights and interests of herein plaintiff, the latter sought legal services of
counsel for an agreed attorney's fees of P30,000.00.
In their answer,7 petitioners denied private respondent's allegations. They alleged that —
8. After the notice of garnishment was received by defendant Company, the latter stopped the remittance
of the allotments of Hernane Song to the bank of his designated allottees in compliance with the
garnishment.
9. Subsequent to its receipt of the notice of garnishment, defendant Company before any further action on
the matter, made its own verification with the court on the actual existence of the case filed against
Hernane Song and the actual issuance of the notice of garnishment.
10. Contrary to plaintiff's claim that defendants withheld the amounts due her, plaintiff was the one who
failed to come and get her share in the garnished salaries of Hernane Song. All the while defendant
Company was waiting in good faith for her to claim her share and that of her minor child in the monthly
allotments of her estranged husband.
11. In accordance with the compromise agreement approved by the court under which plaintiff's estranged
husband is entitled to retain 40% of his basic salary, defendant allowed in good faith the release to Hernane
Song for his subsistence an amount equivalent only to 20% of his basic salaries remitted to the Philippines.
Petitioners claimed that the P50,000.00 leave pay released to Hernane Song was not "basic salary" and, thus,
private respondent was not entitled thereto. By way of counterclaim, petitioners prayed for moral damages of
P500,000.00, exemplary damages of P200,000.00 and attorney's fees/litigation costs of P200,000.00.
After private respondent filed her reply and answer to petitioners' counterclaim, the trial court required the parties
to submit their pre-trial briefs and scheduled the pre-trial conference on October 12, 1993.
On October 7, 1993, Atty. Mylene T. Marcia, on behalf of petitioners' counsel, Atty. Albert Q. Daquigan, filed
an "Urgent Motion for Re-Setting" of the pre-trial conference on the ground that Atty. Daquigan was on sick
leave and petitioners themselves were unavailable on the scheduled date. However, her motion was denied by the
trial court in its order dated October 12, 1993 and petitioners were declared "as in default," on the ground that no
medical certificate had been attached to the motion. Private respondent was then allowed to present her
evidence ex parte.
On October 19, 1993, petitioners asked the court to set aside its order of default, attaching to their motion a duly
notarized medical certificate as well as an affidavit of merit signed by Atty. Daquigan. Petitioners' motion was
denied for lack of merit in an order dated December 1, 1993 and the case was considered submitted for decision
on the basis of private respondent's evidence.
On December 8, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision, 8 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants:
1. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of the P70,776.00 as actual damages;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages;
3. Ordering defendants to pay P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
4. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 for attorney's fees; and,
5. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court on February 23, 1994. 9 They
then brought the matter to the Court of Appeals which, on October 13, 1995, rendered a decision affirming the
trial court's decision in toto.
Hence, this petition for review. Petitioners assign the following errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT
DECLARING PETITIONERS AS IN DEFAULT AND DENYING THEIR MOTION TO LIFT SAID ORDER
OF DEFAULT.
A. ATTY. DAQUIGAN'S ILLNESS WAS CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED AND, THEREFORE,
THE DEFAULT ORDER HAS NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS.
B. THE ABSENCE OF ATTY. DAQUIGAN SHOULD NOT HAVE AUTOMATICALLY

WARRANTED THE ISSUANCE OF THE DEFAULT ORDER SINCE ATTY. MARCIA WHO
BELONGED TO THE SAME LAW OFFICE AS THE FORMER WAS PRESENT IN COURT DURING
THE PRE-TRIAL.
C. PETITIONERS' URGENT MOTION TO RESET THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE WAS

GROUNDED NOT ONLY ON ATTY. DAQUIGAN'S ILLNESS BUT ALSO ON THE
UNAVAILABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS WHO WANTED TO BE PRESENT DURING
THE PRE-TRIAL.
D. PETITIONERS' FAILURE TO SUBMIT ON TIME THEIR PRE-TRIAL BRIEF WAS DUE TO

JUSTIFIABLE REASONS.
E. PETITIONERS HAVE VALID AND MERITORIOUS DEFENSES.
II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF
ACTUAL, MORAL, AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES TO JULIE SONG.
A. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT JULIE SONG SUFFERED ACTUAL LOSS IN THE AMOUNT
OF P70,776.00.
B. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS ACTED IN BAD FAITH SO AS TO ENTITLE

JULIE SONG TO MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
The petition is meritorious.
It is true that under the 1964 Rules of Court, the trial judge has authority to declare "as in default" parties who
fail to appear at the pre-trial conference.10 They may also be declared "as in default" for their failure to file their
pre-trial briefs at least three days before the pre-trial conference.11
In deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for postponement of pre-trial, the court must take into account the
following factors: (a) the reason for the postponement, and (b) the merits of the case of movant.12
In this case, there is no showing that petitioners, in asking for the re-setting of the pre-trial conference, sought
merely to cause unjustifiable delay in the proceedings. It is noteworthy that the motion to reset pre-trial, filed five
days before the scheduled conference, was the first of such nature filed by petitioners. It was made on the ground
that the lawyer handling the case, Atty. Daquigan, was indisposed and petitioners were unavailable due to
"previously scheduled professional engagements." While it may be true that petitioners' counsel failed to attach
to said motion a medical certificate attesting to the fact of his illness, the court should have lifted its default order
after a duly notarized certificate signed by the attending physician was annexed to the motion to set aside the
order of default.13 As this Court held in Sarmiento v. Juan:14
The denial by Judge Juan of the petitioner's motion to postpone the pre-trial scheduled on February 5,
1980 may have appeared valid at the outset, considering that it was filed at the last minute and was not
accompanied by a medical certificate although the ground alleged was illness on the part of the petitioner.
Nonetheless, a different appraisal of the petitioner's plea should have been made after the petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration which was made under oath. Due regard should have been given to the
repeated pronouncements by this Court against default judgments and proceedings that lay more emphasis
on procedural niceties to the sacrifice of substantial justice. After all, the ex-parte presentation of evidence
had not yet been conducted nor had a decision been rendered in the case. It appeared to be a simple matter
of giving the petitioner a chance to have his day in court in order to defend himself against the claim filed
by the private respondent.
Moreover, the presence of another lawyer from counsel's law firm during the scheduled pre-trial conference
negates any suggestion of bad faith or wanton disregard of the rules on the part of petitioners. 15 As we noted
in Tejero v. Rosete,16 in those cases where we sustained the orders declaring parties nonsuited for failure to appear
at the pre-trial, the pattern and scheme to delay the disposition of the case was evident. But in the case at bar, no
such pattern to delay or wanton attitude on the part of petitioner is disclosed by the records.
Above all, petitioners present valid and meritorious defenses — a fact which should have persuaded the trial court
to reconsider its order of default. The allegations in petitioners' answer cannot simply be dismissed or ignored.
In Villareal v. Court of Appeals,17 we held:
[The term meritorious defense] may imply that the applicant has the burden of proving such a defense in
order to have the judgment set aside. The cases usually do not require such a strong showing. The test
employed appears to be essentially the same as used in considering summary judgment, i.e. whether there
is enough evidence to present an issue for submission to the trier of fact, or a showing that on the
undisputed facts it is not clear the judgment is warranted as a matter of law.
. . . The defendant must show that she has a meritorious defense otherwise the grant of her motion will
prove to be a useless exercise. Thus, her motion must be accompanied by a statement of the evidence
which she intends to present if the motion is granted and which is such as to warrant a reasonable belief
that the result of the case would probably be otherwise if a new trial is granted.
In the case at bar, private respondent relies, in her complaint, on the Notice of Garnishment issued in Crim. Case
No. 85-34865 and the sheriff's return indicating that the writ of execution was "unsatisfied." It is curious to note,
however, that while the total amount indicated in the Notice of Garnishment and testified to by private respondent
is $3,754.80 and P16,000.00,18 she is claiming actual damages in the amount of P70,776.00 only which is alleged
to be equivalent to the remaining 40% of the monthly salary (P20,776.00) and the P50,000.00 leave pay released
to Hernane Song.
For their part, petitioners claim that they have already paid 40% of Hernane Song's monthly salary, as evidenced
by the checks issued to private respondent who admits receipt of the checks but claims to be entitled to something
more. Petitioners also allege that private respondent is not entitled to the P50,000.00 leave pay since such benefits
are not considered part of Hernane Song's "basic salary."
To be sure, private respondent cannot validly seek to obtain satisfaction of the writ of execution in this case.
Precisely, garnishment proceedings are the means by which the judgment creditor seeks to subject to his claim
the property of the judgment debtor in the hands of a third person; such proceedings must be had in the trial court
which has jurisdiction over the suit in which the judgment creditor prevailed. 19 Rule 39 of the 1964 Rules of Court
provides the procedure in cases wherein the writ of execution is returned unsatisfied, viz.:
Sec. 38. Examination of judgment debtor when execution returned unsatisfied. — When an execution
issued in accordance with law against property of a judgment debtor, or anyone of several debtors in the
same judgment, is returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, the judgment creditor, at any time after such
return is made, shall be entitled to an order from the judge of the Court of First Instance of the province
in which the judgment was rendered or of the province from which the execution was returned, requiring
such judgment debtor to appear and answer concerning his property and income before such judge of the
Court of First Instance, or before a commissioner appointed by him, at a specified time and place; and
proceedings may thereupon be had for the application of the property and income of the judgment debtor
toward the satisfaction of the judgment. But no judgment debtor shall be so required to appear before a
judge of first instance or commissioner outside the province in which such debtor resides or is found.
Sec. 39. Examination of debtor of judgment debtor. — After an execution against the property of a
judgment debtor has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, and upon proof, by affidavit of a party
or otherwise, to the satisfaction of the judge, that a person, corporation, or other legal entity has property
of such judgment debtor, or is indebted to him, the judge may, by an order, require such person,
corporation, or other legal entity, or any officer or member thereof, to appear before the judge, or a
commissioner appointed by him, at a time and place within the province in which the order is served, to
answer concerning the same. The service of the order shall bind all credits due the judgment debtor and
all money and property of the judgment debtor in the possession or in the control of such person,
corporation, or legal entity from the time of service; and the judge may also require notice of such
proceedings to be given to any party to the action in such manner as he may deem proper.
Moreover, it is well-settled that actual damages must be proved by the best evidence available to the injured party.
The Court cannot rely on the uncorroborated testimony of a witness, particularly if he was not cross-examined. 2 0
Anent private respondent's claim of moral and exemplary damages on the ground that petitioners' wanton refusal
to surrender to her the amounts indicated in the Notice of Garnishment caused her sleepless nights, serious anxiety
and the like,21 petitioners allege that it was in fact private respondent who failed to collect the monthly allotments
due her and her child. If this is true, there will be no basis for the award of moral and exemplary damages to
private respondent.
Petitioners, however, cannot now question the validity of the Notice of Garnishment since it was not an issue
raised in the courts below.22
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. The order of default, dated October 12,
1993, and the decision, dated December 8, 1993, both issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 135, Makati
are SET ASIDE, and the case is REMANDED to said court for further proceedings according to law.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. G.R. No. 150936 August 18, 2004
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
D EC ISI ON
PANGANIBAN, J.:
How much just compensation should be paid for an easement of a right of way over a parcel of land that will be
traversed by high-powered transmission lines? Should such compensation be a simple easement fee or the full
value of the property? This is the question to be answered in this case.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the
November 23, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 60515. The CA affirmed the June
24, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court4 (RTC) of Naga City (Branch 26), directing the National Power
Corporation (NPC) to pay the value of the land expropriated from respondent for the use thereof in NPC’s Leyte-
Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project.
The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of the case as follows:
"In 1996, [Petitioner] NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, a government-owned and controlled

corporation created for the purpose of undertaking the development and generation of hydroelectr ic
power, commenced its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. The project aims to
transmit the excess electrical generating capacity coming from Leyte Geothermal Plant to Luzon and
various load centers in its vision to interconnect the entire country into a single power grid. Apparently,
the project is for a public purpose.
"In order to carry out this project, it is imperative for the [petitioner’s] transmission lines to cross over
certain lands owned by private individuals and entities. One of these lands, [where] only a portion will be
traversed by the transmission lines, is owned by [respondent] MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.
"Hence, on 03 December 1996, [petitioner] filed a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City against [respondent] in order to acquire an easement of right of way over the land
which the latter owns. The said land is situated at Km. 8, Barangay Pacol, Naga City, Camarines Sur and
described with more particularity, as follows:
TCT/OCT NO. TOTAL AREA AREA CLASS.

IN SQ.M. AFFECTED OF LAND
IN SQ. M.
17795 490,232 21,386.16 Agri.

17797 40,848 1,358.17 Agri.
17798 5,279 217.38 Agri.
TOTAL 22,961.71
"On 02 January 1997, [respondent] filed its answer. Thereafter, the court a quo issued an order dated 20
January 1997 authorizing the immediate issuance of a writ of possession and directing Ex-Offic io
Provincial Sheriff to immediately place [petitioner] in possession of the subject land.
"Subsequently, the court a quo directed the issuance of a writ of condemnation in favor of [petitio ner]
through an order dated 14 February 1997. Likewise, for the purpose of determining the fair and just
compensation due to [respondent], the court appointed three commissioners composed of one
representative of the petitioner, one for the respondent and the other from the court, namely: OIC -Branch
Clerk of Court Minda B. Teoxon as Chairperson and Philippine National Bank-Naga City Loan Appraiser
Mr. Isidro Virgilio Bulao, Jr. and City Assessor Ramon R. Albeus as members.
"On 03 and 06 March 1997, respectively, Commissioners Ramon Albeus and Isidro Bulao, Jr. took their
oath of office before OIC Branch Clerk of Court and Chairperson Minda B. Teoxon.
"Accordingly, the commissioners submitted their individual appraisal/valuation reports. The

commissioner for the [petitioner], Commissioner Albeus, finding the subject land irregular and sloppy,
classified the same as low density residential zone and recommended the price of P115.00 per square
meter. On the other hand, Commissioner Bulao, commissioner for the [respondent], recommended the
price of P550.00 per square meter. The court’s Commissioner and Chairperson of the Board Minda
Teoxon, on the other hand, found Commissioner Albeus’ appraisal low as compared to the BIR Zonal
Valuation and opted to adopt the price recommended by Commissioner Bulao. On the assumption that the
subject land will be developed into a first class subdivision, she recommended the amount of P550.00 per
square meter as just compensation for the subject property, or the total amount of P12,628,940.50 for the
entire area affected."5
Taking into consideration the condition, the surroundings and the potentials of respondent’s expropriated
property, the RTC approved Chairperson Minda B. Teoxon’s recommended amount of P550 per square meter as
just compensation for the property. The trial court opined that the installation thereon of the 350 KV Leyte-Luzon
HVDC Power Transmission Project would impose a limitation on the use of the land for an indefinite period of
time, thereby justifying the payment of the full value of the property.
Further, the RTC held that it was not bound by the provision cited by petitioner -- Section 3-A6 of Republic Act
63957 , as amended by Presidential Decree 938. This law prescribes as just compensation for the acquired
easement of a right of way over an expropriated property an easement fee in an amount not exceeding 10 percent
of the market value of such property. The trial court relied on the earlier pronouncements of this Court that the
determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Thus, valuations made by the
executive branch or the legislature are at best initial or preliminary only.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the RTC, the CA held that RA 6395, as amended by PD No. 938, did not preclude expropriatio n.
Section 3-A thereof allowed the power company to acquire not just an easement of a right of way, but even the
land itself. Such easement was deemed by the appellate court to be a "taking" under the power of eminent domain.
The CA observed that, given their nature, high-powered electric lines traversing respondent’s property would
necessarily diminish -- if not damage entirely -- the value and the use of the affected property; as well as endanger
lives and limbs because of the high-tension current conveyed through the lines. Respondent was therefore deemed
entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the property
taken. Accordingly, the appellate found the award of P550 per square meter to be proper and reasonable.
Hence, this Petition.8
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this lone issue for our consideration:
"Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the Decision dated June 24,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Naga City considering that its Decision dated November 23,
2001 is not in accord with law and the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court."9
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Sole Issue:
Just Compensation
Petitioner contends that the valuation of the expropriated property -- fixed by the trial court and affirmed by the
CA -- was too high a price for the acquisition of an easement of a mere aerial right of way, because respondent
would continue to own and use the subject land anyway. Petitioner argues that in a strict sense, there is no "taking"
of property, but merely an imposition of an encumbrance or a personal easement/servitude under Article 614 10 of
the Civil Code. Such encumbrance will not result in ousting or depriving respondent of the beneficial enjoyment
of the property. And even if there was a "taking," petitioner points out that the loss is limited only to a portion of
the aerial domain above the property of respondent. Hence, the latter should be compensated only for what it
would actually lose.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioner averred in its Complaint in Civil Case No. RTC 96-3675 that it had sought to acquire an easement of a
right of way over portions of respondent’s land -- a total area of 22,961.71 square meters. 11 In its prayer, however,
it also sought authority to enter the property and demolish all improvements existing thereon, in order to
commence and undertake the construction of its Power Transmission Project.
In other words, the expropriation was not to be limited to an easement of a right of way. In its Answer, respondent
alleged that it had already authorized petitioner to take possession of the affected portions of the property and to
install electric towers thereon.12 The latter did not controvert this material allegation.
Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondent’s property was purely an easement of a right of
way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full value of the property.
The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. This conclusio n
finds support in similar cases in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private
property condemned for public use.13 Republic v. PLDT14 held thus:
"x x x. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to,
and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not
be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement
of right of way."15
True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full
ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by
the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land
for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is
entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of
the land.16
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the
meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. 17
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned
property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is "that sum of money which a person desirous
but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given
and received therefor."18 Such amount is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the schedule of
market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee. However, these values may serve as
factors to be considered in the judicial valuation of the property. 19
The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably undeveloped, raw agricultural land. But a dominant
portion thereof has been reclassified by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Naga -- per Zoning Ordinance No. 94-
076 dated August 10, 1994 -- as residential, per the August 8, 1996 certification of Zoning Administrator Juan O.
Villegas Jr.20 The property is also covered by Naga City Mayor Jesse M. Robredo’s favorable endorsement of the
issuance of a certification for land use conversion by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on the ground
that the locality where the property was located had become highly urbanized and would have greater economic
value for residential or commercial use. 21
The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much
just compensation should be given to the landowner. 22 All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. 23
In fixing the valuation at P550 per square meter, the trial court had considered the Report of the commissio ne rs
and the proofs submitted by the parties. These documents included the following: (1) the established fact that the
property of respondent was located along the Naga-Carolina provincial road; (2) the fact that it was about 500
meters from the Kayumanggi Resort and 8 kilometers from the Naga City Central Business District; and a half
kilometer from the main entrance of the fully developed Naga City Sports Complex -- used as the site of the
Palarong Pambansa -- and the San Francisco Village Subdivision, a first class subdivision where lots were priced
at P2,500 per square meter; (3) the fair market value of P650 per square meter proffered by respondent, citing its
recently concluded sale of a portion of the same property to Metro Naga Water District at a fixed price of P800
per square meter; (4) the BIR zonal valuation of residential lots in Barangay Pacol, Naga City, fixed at a price
of P220 per square meter as of 1997; and (5) the fact that the price of P430 per square meter had been determined
by the RTC of Naga City (Branch 21)24 as just compensation for the Mercados’ adjoining property, which had
been expropriated by NPC for the same power transmission project.
The chairperson of the Board of Commissioners, in adopting the recommendation of Commissioner Bulaos, made
a careful study of the property. Factors considered in arriving at a reasonable estimate of just compensation for
respondent were the location; the most profitable likely use of the remaining area; and the size, shape, accessibility
as well as listings of other properties within the vicinity. Averments pertaining to these factors were supported by
documentary evidence.
On the other hand, the commissioner for petitioner -- City Assessor Albeus -- recommended a price of P115 per
square meter in his Report dated June 30, 1997. No documentary evidence, however, was attached to substantiate
the opinions of the banks and the realtors, indicated in the commissioner’s Report and computation of the market
value of the property.
The price of P550 per square meter appears to be the closest approximation of the market value of the lots in the
adjoining, fully developed San Francisco Village Subdivision. Considering that the parcels of land in question
are still undeveloped raw land, it appears to the Court that the just compensation of P550 per square meter is
justified.
Inasmuch as the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function, 25 and the trial
court apparently did not act capriciously or arbitrarily in setting the price at P550 per square meter -- an award
affirmed by the CA -- we see no reason to disturb the factual findings as to the valuation of the property. Both the
Report of Commissioner Bulao and the commissioners’ majority Report were based on uncontroverted facts
supported by documentary evidence and confirmed by their ocular inspectio n of the property. As can be gleaned
from the records, they did not abuse their authority in evaluating the evidence submitted to them; neither did they
misappreciate the clear preponderance of evidence. The amount fixed and agreed to by the trial court and
respondent appellate court has not been grossly exorbitant or otherwise unjustified. 26
Majority Report of Commissioners Sufficient
Deserving scant consideration is petitioner’s contention that the Report adopted by the RTC and affirmed by the
CA was not the same one submitted by the board of commissioners, but was only that of its chairperson. As
correctly pointed out by the trial court, the commissioner’s Report was actually a decision of the majority of the
board. Note that after reviewing the Reports of the other commissioners, Chairperson Teoxon opted to adopt the
recommendation of Commissioner Bulao. There has been no claim that fraud or prejudice tainted the majority
Report. In fact, on December 19, 1997, the trial court admitted the commissioner’s Report without objection from
any of the parties.27
Under Section 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the court may "accept the report and render judgment in
accordance therewith; or for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of
facts, or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners, or it may accept the report in part and reject
it in part; x x x." In other words, the reports of commissioners are merely advisory and recommendatory in
character, as far as the courts are concerned. 28
Thus, it hardly matters whether the commissioners have unanimously agreed on their recommended valuation of
the property. It has been held that the report of only two commissioners may suffice, even if the third
commissioner dissents.29 As a court is not bound by commissioners’ reports it may make such order or render
such judgment as shall secure for the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of the latter’s right of
condemnation; and for the defendant, just compensation for the property expropriated. For that matter, the court
may even substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the evidence on record.30
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

155010 August 16, 2004

JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO., INC., petitioner,

"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit."4

The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Hence, this Petition.37

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

The Petition has no merit.

Motion for New Trial Improper

Non-Receipt of the Order

As a mode of discovery resorted to before trial, deposition has advantages, as follows:

"7. It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of cases."64

PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHIL., INC., petitioner,

The hearing scheduled on February 9, 1995 is hereby cancelled.

IN VIEW THEREOF, defendant's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., HERNANDO S. EUSEBIO, ROSENDO

The facts are as follows:

(2) Forty (40%) percent shall be retained by the accused;

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the foregoing Compromise Agreement be approved.

3. Ordering defendants to pay P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;

5. To pay the costs of suit.

B. THE ABSENCE OF ATTY. DAQUIGAN SHOULD NOT HAVE AUTOMATICALLY

C. PETITIONERS' URGENT MOTION TO RESET THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE WAS

D. PETITIONERS' FAILURE TO SUBMIT ON TIME THEIR PRE-TRIAL BRIEF WAS DUE TO

E. PETITIONERS HAVE VALID AND MERITORIOUS DEFENSES.

B. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS ACTED IN BAD FAITH SO AS TO ENTITLE

The petition is meritorious.

In Villareal v. Court of Appeals,17 we held:

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

The CA summarized the antecedents of the case as follows:

"In 1996, [Petitioner] NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, a government-owned and controlled

TCT/OCT NO. TOTAL AREA AREA CLASS.

17795 490,232 21,386.16 Agri.

"Accordingly, the commissioners submitted their individual appraisal/valuation reports. The

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

We are not persuaded.

Majority Report of Commissioners Sufficient

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