Discuss the transition from communism to democracy in post

communist states. 2017

Sn: post communist states 2018

1. Intro:

A ) Many countries that hardly existed as sovereign nation-states in early

1980s, let alone as democracies, are now recognised members of the
European Union.

B ) There are important differences over time and space. Some countries
started democratisation late or half-heartedly (e. g. most of the former
Soviet Union) and never made it to real democracy, while other countries
slipped back into less democratic states (e. g. Belarus after 1996 under
Aleksandr Lukashenko).

2. Three Waves: (write in brief)

In the book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century published by the American political scientist Samuel P.
Huntington (1927–) in 1991.

He shows that democratisation proceeds not as a continuous process, but in surges and reversals – a kind of ebb and flow or
two-steps-forwards, one-step-backwards process. In each ‘wave’ a relatively large number of non-democratic states make their first
moves towards democracy:

1 ) The first wave is very long and covers the second half of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth century.
In this period many western nation-states were transformed into mass democracies. Yet even in this period a general pattern is not
easy to detect – apart of the common processes of economic development and nation building, many peculiar historical factors are
needed to explain the differences between, say, democratisation in Britain, Germany and Sweden.

How did it end: The first wave ends with the fascist reversal in Italy in the 1920s.

2 ) The second wave is much shorter and starts with the end of the Second World War.

In the direct aftermath of the war many states were newly founded (for instance Yugoslavia, West and East Germany, and China), a
large number gaining independence with the collapse of colonial rule (for instance Indonesia, India and Algeria). Quite a number of
these newly founded states tried to implement democratic rule, but not all survived as democracies, although India did.

Foreign intervention and wars of independence appear to be important for the rise of democracy in many countries.

How did it end: The second wave ebbed away when some places reverted to authoritarian rule in the 1960s (Greece and several
countries in Latin America).

3 ) The third wave started in the mid-1970s.

In this period, some of the non-democratic countries of Latin America and Asia were democratised, frequently on the basis of mass
movements opposing ruling cliques and autocrats (for example in South Korea or the Philippines). The disintegration of the Soviet Union
resulted in an additional growth of democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe. Here, too, mass pressure and opposition groups
played a decisive role (for instance in Poland, Ukraine and Hungary).

How did it end: faded away at the end of the twentieth century

Whereas democracy was a minority phenomenon until recently and mainly limited to north-western Europe and North America,
the third wave changed this situation. By the end of the twentieth century democracy had reached every part of the world, South
America, all of western Europe and considerable parts of Asia included.

Almost thirty countries suddenly found themselves in the midst of a “transition” at approximately the same time and with at
least one very strikingly similar precondition: decades of communist rule.

3. Three kinds of regimes

Following Herbert Kitschelt’s typology, three different types of

communist regimes can be discerned, each leading to different types of
transition:

1 ) bureaucratic-authoritarian communism (e. g. Czechoslovakia, German

Democratic Republic, ), which emerged in highly developed countries and
ended in a regime implosion;

2 ) national-accommodative communism (Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia) which

also can be found in more developed societies and the transition of which
tended to be negotiated;

3 ) patrimonial communism (virtually all of the former Soviet Union) where

transition has been either negotiated or initiated by pre-emptive reform
by the old elites

4. Reasons for transition

All three theories: apply them to communist countries

Opp to communist rule:

1 ) It was only in the Central European countries that anticommunist

opposition became politically significant.

2 ) In addition, it was there more than in other countries that important

segments of the communist elite turned to reformist ideas during the final
decade of communist rule. This facilitated a process of gradual internal
reform, which ultimately enabled part of the leadership to accept the
opposition as a political counterpart and to engage in a negotiated
transfer of power.

5. Characteristics of transition

5. 1 ) Negotiations:

1 ) Central Europe played a special role. The first free elections took
place in these countries. The communists negotiated their »surrender«
through Round Tables with the opposition, which allowed for a peaceful
transition.

2 ) On the other hand, At the other extreme, there are cases like Romania
where the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu had to be toppled by force.

3 ) In between were the transitions dominated by factions of the

nomenklatura that were, in the best cases, reformist (Russia, Bulgaria)
and, in the worst cases, parties of power using new disguises to continue
their old rule (as in many parts of the former Soviet Union).

5. 2 ) three groups of key actors:

Political transition was shaped by three groups of key actors:

1 ) The opposition movements or dissidents:

Where the opposition movements (e. g. Solidarnosc under Lech Walesa, Civic
Forum with Vaclav Havel) were strong and principally democratically
motivated, they formed the nucleus of a civil society and a political
culture conducive to democracy.

2 ) The reformist communists (such as Aleksandr Dubcek, Miklós Németh)

were more concerned with economic, and occasionally, political reform.

These groups regularly transformed themselves into social-democratic

parties after 1990.

3 ) National communists (such as Ion Iliescu, Leonid Kuchma or Aleksandr

Lukashenko) wanted or used independence to strengthen their power, using
nationalist rhetoric in order to get popular support. Economic and
political reform has been subordinated to the preservation of power.

5. 3 ) resulting forms of govt

An overview of different governmental structures in Central and Eastern

Europe reveals two trends:

1 ) the more presidential and the less parliamentary that a systems are,
the more likely they are to become autocratic, and democratic by namesake.
In some cases, formal and real powers have been concentrated in the
presidency and the powers of parliament and judiciary have been limited
to such an extent that these systems hardly qualify as democracies. .

2 ) parliamentary and mixed systems are predominant among the countries

that are the most successful political and economic reformers
5. 4 ) constitutions

A ) Formally, democratic constitutions were adopted in most countries.

Sometimes new constitutions were designed, but more often existent ones
amended.

B ) With the exception of Bulgaria, it was not constituent assemblies,

but other state bodies, mostly parliaments, that formulated new
constitutions, which in many cases were then approved by a popular
referendum.

6. Post democratisation developments

6.1 -nationalism in post communist states

Within the new nation-states emerging from the disintegration of the

Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, issues of nation-building
were prominent on the political agenda and often complicated or delayed
democratisation.

A ) Citizenship, a core concept of any democracy, had to be defined anew.

This led to various problems with the minorities that were living in the
territory but did not belong to the titular nation.

- conflicts were ranging from mild protests, or the formation of parties

representing these minorities, to civil war. For chechnya against Russia

- It is not so much the presence of minorities per se. Rather, it was the
politicisation of the minorities issue is essential because only this
creates the ethnic nationalism that is at odds with democracy.

B ) The idea that democratisation is the best antidote available to

nationalist conflict is comforting but misleading. Under certain
conditions democratisation will rather stimulate than discourage
nationalist sentiments and conflicts, because it gives powerful groups
much more room to politicise and mobilise nationalist feelings

2 ) economic reform

A ) Economic transformation began in a situation of deep crisis. Between

1990 and 1993, average annual growth rates of GDP were negative in all
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

B ) On average, the most democratic countries showed a better economic

performance than the less democratic ones. Good democracies may not
automatically make good economic reformers, but in post-communist Europe
»the move toward the market is remarkably consistent with the move toward
democracy.

Rationale:

As Dani Rodrik argues on the basis of a statistical analysis, democracies

are better than autocratic regimes in adjusting to external shocks,
through better conflict resolution and compensation mechanisms.

C ) The transition itself has produced the cleavage between the winners
and the losers of economic transformation, in particular of privatisation.
Whereas the actual or potential losers want more political protection of
their social status, and thus opt for a more interventionist economic and
social policy, the winners embrace the new open market economy. This
cleavage will eventually transform itself into, or partially coincide
with, the wellknown capitalist cleavage between capitalists and labour
class

D ) However the risks remain.

Economic decline might eventually provoke authoritarian rule as it often

did in history. Discontent might strengthen less democratic forces

6. 3 ) -political system
A ) Almost no government succeeded in winning a second term. Fortunately,
the electorate chose democratic alternatives in most cases.

The first victims of the voters’ wrath were the anticommunist victors
of the founding elections. The importance of charismatic leaders proved
to be unstable: Alexander Dubcek in Slovakia, or Lech Walesa in Poland
lost much of their appeal in their own countries. Exceptional cases were
Boris Yeltsin’s re-election as president in 1996.

B ) changes in party structures: The electoral upheavals were prepared

and accompanied by big changes in the party structures.

New parties emerged, small parties turned big, big parties failed to get
seats in parliamentary elections.

The party landscape is highly fragmented. Parties are generally small,

isolated and centred around individuals. They suffer from a serious lack
of legitimacy.

C ) representation and voting:

Sometimes large parts of the electorate went unrepresented in parliament

as, for instance, in the Polish election of 1994, when several competing
conservative parties all failed to clear the threshold required to enter
the parliament.

Voter turn-out has been modest in many countries and indicates a general
low trust in parties and politics as confirmed by several polls.

D ) Development of civil society:

Even though non-governmental organisations have sprung up in many

countries, they are far more numerous in the more developed democracies
of Central Europe than elsewhere, notably Russia. Trade unions, which were
very imp under communism, are turning into independent, democratic
organisations of the labour force.

7-promoting dem/consolidation
A ) accession to the EU: The group of most developed and democratic
countries coincides with the group of those countries that are associated
with the EU and started negotiations for accession in 1998.

The next group of associated countries which only started negotiations

in 2000 is economically and politically less advanced. Both groups fulfil
the Copenhagen criteria.

Key point: Accession increased the adjustment pressures on them and

entailed severe distributive effects at the expense of those social groups
that already suffered most from the transition process.

B ) working on the economy: one common starting point is the economy. As

Larry Diamond puts it: »Poverty shorten the average life expectancy of
a democracy, especially in the absence of sustained economic growth.

C ) focus on target groups: Prime target groups are democratic parties,

civic organisations, social organisations such as trade unions or
employers organisations, education and research institutions, free media
etc.. Improving their legitimacy will possibly strengthen democracy
itself.

D ) international dialogue: International co-operation and dialogue that

integrates post comm countries into international networks (e. g.
national trade unions in European or international federations), will
force certain pressures of democratisation on these countries.

Case study:

Lilia Shevtsova describes Russia’s post-communist system as a »regime,

in which elements of democracy, authoritarianism, post-totalitarianism,
delegative democracy, bureaucratic-authoritarianism, oligarchic rule,
sultanism, and even monarchy are intertwined. State power is weak and
arbitrary. It is fragmented – vertically, between powerful interests at
the centre, and horizontally, between Moscow and the local leaderships
in the regions. Some regions are strong, more regions are weak, and most
of them have a dubious record in democracy and human rights. Political
and economic power seem even more closely connected than in the political
centre, the division of powers is generally weaker and the media are mostly
fully dependent on the local powers.

colonial

Intro-

Three waves

Transition

A ) reasons

B ) characteristics

Post transition dev

consolidation