Hypatia, Inc.

War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence

Author(s): Chris J. Cuomo
Source: Hypatia, Vol. 11, No. 4, Women and Violence (Autumn, 1996), pp. 30-45
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Hypatia, Inc.
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WarIsNot Justan Event:
Reflectionson the Significanceof
EverydayViolence
CHRIS J. CUOMO

Althoughmypositionis in basicagreement withthenotionthatwarandmilitarism

arefeministissues,I arguethatapproachesto theethicsof war andpeacewhichdo
not consider"peacetime" militaryviolenceare inadequateforfeministandenviron-
mentalistconcerns.Becausemuch of the militaryviolencedone to women and
ecosystemshappensoutsidethe boundariesof declaredwars,feministand environ-
mentalphilosophersoughtto emphasizethesignificanceof everydaymilitaryviolence.

Philosophicalattention to war has typicallyappearedin the formof justifi-

cations for enteringinto war, and over appropriateactivities withinwar. The
spatial metaphorsused to referto war as a separate,bounded sphere indicate
assumptionsthat waris a realmof human activity vastlyremovedfromnormal
life, or a sort of happeningthat is appropriatelyconceived apartfromeveryday
events in peacefultimes. Not surprisingly,most discussionsof the political and
ethical dimensions of war discuss war solely as an event-an occurrence, or
collection of occurrences,having clear beginnings and endings that are typi-
cally markedby formal, institutional declarations.As happenings,wars and
militaryactivities can be seen as motivated by identifiable,if complex, inten-
tions, and directly enacted by individualand collective decision-makersand
agents of states. But many of the questions about war that are of interest to
feminists-including how large-scale,state-sponsoredviolence affectswomen
and membersof other oppressedgroups;how military violence shapes gen-
dered,raced,and nationalisticpolitical realitiesand moralimaginations;what
such violence consists of and why it persists; how it is related to other
oppressive and violent institutions and hegemonies-cannot be adequately
pursuedby focusingon events. These issuesare not merelya matterof good or
bad intentions and identifiabledecisions.

Hypatiavol. 11, no. 4 (Fall 1996) ? by ChrisJ. Cuomo

 ChrisJ. Cuomo 31

In "Genderand 'Postmoder' War,"Robin Schott introducessome of the

ways in which war is currentlybest seen not as an event but as a presence
(Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodem understandingsof persons,
states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary
warfareand the preponderanceof civil and nationalist wars,renderan event-
based conception of war inadequate,especiallyinsofaras gender is taken into
account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that
accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverishedin a number of
ways, and thereforefeminist considerationof the political, ethical, and onto-
logical dimensions of war and the possibilitiesfor resistancedemand a much
more complicatedapproach.I take Schott'scharacterizationof waras presence
as a point of departure,though I am not committed to the idea that the
constancyof militarism,the fact of its omnipresencein humanexperience,and
the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary
postmodernor postcolonial circumstances.1
Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of
militarismcannot representor addressthe depth and specificityof the every-
day effects of militarismon women, on people living in occupiedterritories,on
membersof military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are
relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and
institutions help construct genderedand national identity, and because they
justifythe destructionof naturalnonhuman entities and communitiesduring
peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or
preventing militaryviolence in an extremely technologized world results in
theory that cannot accommodatethe connections among the constant pres-
ence of militarism,declaredwars,and other closely relatedsocial phenomena,
such as nationalisticglorificationsof motherhood,mediaviolence, and current
ideological gravitationsto militarysolutions for social problems.
Ethical approachesthat do not attend to the ways in which warfareand
militarypracticesare woven into the very fabricof life in twenty-firstcentury
technological states lead to crisis-basedpolitics and analyses.Forany feminism
that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political
options, crisis-basedethics and politics are problematicbecause they distract
attention fromthe need forsustainedresistanceto the enmeshed,omnipresent
systemsof dominationand oppressionthat so often function as givens in most
people'slives. Neglecting the omnipresenceof militarismallowsthe falsebelief
that the absenceof declaredarmedconflicts is peace, the polaroppositeof war.
It is particularlyeasy forthose whose lives are shapedby the safetyof privilege,
and who do not regularlyencounter the realitiesof militarism,to maintainthis
false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only
regardingarmed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarismthat are
merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistanceis then mobilizedwhen
the "real"violence finally occurs,or when the stability of privilege is directly
32 Hypatia

threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respondin ways that make
resistersdrop all other political priorities.Crisis-drivenattention to declara-
tions of war might actuallykeep resisterscomplacent about and complicitous
in the generalpresenceof global militarism.Seeing war as necessarilyembed-
ded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific,
state-sponsoredviolence is happeningnearlyall over, all of the time, and that
it is perpetratedby military institutions and other militaristic agents of the
state.
Moving awayfromcrisis-drivenpolitics and ontologies concerning warand
militaryviolence also enables considerationof relationshipsamongseemingly
disparatephenomena, and thereforecan shape more nuanced theoretical and
practicalformsof resistance.Forexample, investigatingthe waysin which war
is partof a presenceallowsconsiderationof the relationshipsamongthe events
of war and the following:how militarismis a foundationaltrope in the social
and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of
soldiers/warriors/patriotsshape meaningsof gender;the ways in which threats
of state-sponsoredviolence are a sometimesinvisible/sometimesbold agent of
racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of
communities, cities, and nations are currentlyin the midst of excruciatingly
violent circumstances.It also providesa lens for consideringthe relationships
among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war."Given current
Americanobsessionswith nationalism,guns,and militias,and growinghunger
for the death penalty, prisons,and a more powerfulpolice state, one cannot
underestimatethe need for philosophical and political attention to connec-
tions among phenomena like the "waron drugs,"the "waron crime," and
other state-fundedmilitaristiccampaigns.
I proposethat the constancy of militarismand its effects on social realitybe
reintroducedas a crucial locus of contemporaryfeminist attentions, and that
feministsemphasizehow warsareeruptionsand manifestationsof omnipresent
militarismthat is a product and tool of multiply oppressive,corporate,tech-
nocraticstates.2Feministsshouldbe particularlyinterestedin makingthis shift
because it better allows considerationof the effects of war and militarismon
women, subjugatedpeoples, and environments.While giving attention to the
constancy of militarismin contemporarylife we need not neglect the impor-
tance of addressingthe specificqualitiesof direct, large-scale,declaredmilitary
conflicts. But the dramaticnatureof declared,large-scaleconflicts should not
obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in
increasinglytechnologically sophisticatedways and the significance of mili-
tary institutions and everydaypractices in shaping reality.Philosophicaldis-
cussionsthat focus only on the ethics of declaringand fighting warsmiss these
connections, and also miss the ways in which even declaredmilitaryconflicts
are often experienced as omnipresent horrors.These approachesalso leave
 ChrisJ. Cuomo 33

unquestionedtendencies to suspendor distortmoraljudgementin the face of

what appearsto be the inevitabilityof warand militarism.
Just-wartheory is a prominent example of a philosophical approachthat
rests on the assumptionthat wars are isolated from everydaylife and ethics.
Such theory, as developed by St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo
Grotius, and as articulatedin contemporarydialoguesby many philosophers,
includingMichael Walzer(1977), ThomasNagel (1974), and Sheldon Cohen
(1989), take the primaryquestion concerningthe ethics of warfareto be about
when to enter into militaryconflicts againstother states. They thereforetake
as a given the notion that war is an isolated, definable event with clear
boundaries. These boundaries are significant because they distinguish the
circumstancesin which standardmoral rules and constraints, such as rules
against murderand unprovokedviolence, no longer apply.Just-wartheory
assumesthat waris a separatesphereof human activity having its own ethical
constraintsand criteriaand in doing so it begs the question of whether or not
war is a special kind of event, or part of a pervasive presence in nearly all
contemporarylife.
Becausethe applicationof just-warprinciplesis a matterof properdecision-
makingon the partof agents of the state, beforewarsoccur,and beforemilitary
strikesare made, they assume that military initiatives are distinct events. In
fact, declarationsof war are generallyoverdeterminedescalationsof preexist-
ing conditions. Just-warcriteria cannot help evaluate military and related
institutions, including their peacetime practices and how these relate to
wartimeactivities, so they cannot addressthe ways in which armedconflicts
between and among states emerge from omnipresent, often violent, state
militarism.The remarkableresemblancesin some sectors between states of
peace and states of warremaincompletelyuntouchedby theoriesthat areonly
able to discuss the ethics of starting and ending direct military conflicts
between and among states.
Applications of just-warcriteria actually help create the illusion that the
"problemof war" is being addressedwhen the only considerationsare the
ethics of declaring wars and of military violence within the boundariesof
declarationsof warand peace. Though just-warconsiderationsmight theoret-
ically help decision-makersavoid specific grosseruptionsof militaryviolence,
the aspectsof warwhich requirethe underlyingpresenceof militarismand the
direct effects of the omnipresenceof militarismremainuntouched.There may
be importantdecisions to be made aboutwhen and how to fight war,but these
must be considered in terms of the many other aspects of contemporarywar
and militarismthat are significantto nonmilitarypersonnel,includingwomen
and nonhumans.
34 Hypatia

FEMINISTAPPROACHES
TO WAR AND MILITARY
VIOLENCE

In a recent Hypatiaarticle,LucindaPeach arguesthat just-wartheory,which

she takes to be more realistic and useful than pacifism,can be strengthened
with feminist insights and analyses.Drawingprimarilyon the work of Sara
Ruddick and Jean Bethke Elshtain, she reconstructs feminist responses to
traditional just-warapproaches,and illustrates how a more thorough appli-
cation of feminist principles might lead to "a more careful and considered
appraisalof when the use of armedforce is morally justified" (Peach 1994,
167). Though she agrees with their criticisms of traditional just-war
approaches, Peach finds Elshtain's and Ruddick's alternatives practically
and theoretically lacking. Nonetheless, her'faith in just-war theorizing is
unwavering:
The feminist criticisms discussed do not suggest a need to
develop radically new or different criteria for assessing the
moralityor engagementin armedconflict fromthose offeredby
traditionaljust-wartheory ... feminist criticismsand counter-
proposalssuggesta numberof specific proposalsfor modifying
the practice more than the theory of the just-warapproachto
armedconflict. (Peach 1994, 164)
Peach states that one of the problemswith nonfeminist critiquesof war is
their failureto addressthe fact that "womenremainlargelyabsentfromethical
and policy debates regardingwhen to go to war, how to fight a war, and
whether resorting to war is morally justifiable"(Peach 1994, 152). But a
just-warapproachcannot successfullytheorize women'sroles in these events
because formal, declared wars depend upon underlyingmilitaristic assump-
tions and constructionsof gender that make women'sparticipationas leaders
nearly impossible.
The limitations of Peach'sanalysismake clear some aspectsof the relation-
ships between peacetime militarism and armed conflicts that cannot be
addressedby even feminist just-warprinciples.Her five criticismsof just-war
theory,discussedbelow, are intended to both echo and revise appraisalsmade
by other feminists. But each fails to successfullyaddressthe complexity of
feminist concerns.
1) Peach finds just-war theory's reliance on realism, the notion that
human nature makes war inevitable and unavoidable,to be problem-
atic. She believes just-wartheory should not be premisedon realist
assumptions, and that it should also avoid "unduly unrealistic
appraisals"of human and female nature,as found in Ruddick'swork.
Peach rightly identifies the pessimism,sexism, essentialism,and universal-
ism at work in just-wartheorists'conceptions of human nature.Nonetheless,
 ChrisJ. Cuomo 35

she fails to see that just-wartheoristsemployossifiedconcepts of both "human

nature"and "war."Any interrogationof the relationshipsbetween war and
"humannature,"or more benignly, understandingsand enactments of what
it means to be diverse human agents in various contexts, will be terribly
limited insofar as they consider wars to be isolated events. Questions
concerning the relationships between war and "human nature"become far
more complex if we reject a conception of war that focuses only on events,
and abandon any pretense of arrivingat universalist conceptions of human
or female "nature."
Feministethical questionsaboutwararenot reducibleto wonderinghow to
avoid large-scalemilitaryconflict despite human tendencies towardviolence.
Instead, the central questions concern the omnipresence of militarism,the
possibilitiesof making its presencevisible, and the potential for resistanceto
its physical and hegemonic force. Like "solutions"to the preponderanceof
violence perpetratedby men againstwomen that fail to analyzeand articulate
relationships between everyday violence and institutionalized or invisible
systemsof patriarchal,racist,and economic oppression,analysesthat charac-
terize eruptionsof militaryviolence as isolated, persistentevents, are practi-
cally and theoreticallyinsufficient.
2) Peachfaultsjust-wartheoryfor its failureto consideralternativesto war,
statingthat "thefailureof mostjust-wartheoriststo seriouslycontemplate
alternativesto waris... radicallydeficientfromthe perspectivesof pacifist
feminist and others opposed to knee-jerkmilitaristicresponseto civil
strife"(Peach 1994, 158). She arguesthat feminist just-wartheorists,
includingElshtain,shouldalsopaymoreattentionto pacifistarguments.
When Peach discusses "alternativesto war," she is clearly referringto
alternatives to entering into war, or to participating in "the escalation of
conflicts."The avoidance of eruptionsof militaryviolence is certainlyimpor-
tant, and Peach is correctthat feminist insightsaboutconflict resolutioncould
present significant recommendationsin this regard.However,feminist moral
imaginationcannot end there. In thinking of alternativesto war,we need to
continue to imagine alternativesto militaristiceconomies, symbolicsystems,
values, and political institutions.The task of constructingsuch alternativesis
far more daunting and comprehensivethan creatingalternativesto a specific
event or kind of event.
Pacifistwritersas diverse as Gandhi, Martin LutherKing, Jr.,and Barbara
Deming have emphasizedthe fact that pacifismentails a critiqueof pervasive,
systematichuman violence. Despite its reductionisttendencies, there is much
to learnfromthe ways in which pacifistsconceive of waras a presence,as well
as the pacifistrefusalto let go of the ideal of peace. Characterizingpacifismas
motivatedby the desireto avoid specificevents disregardsthe extent to which
pacifismaims to criticizethe preconditionsunderlyingevents of war.
36 Hypatia

3) Following several influential moves in feminist philosophy, Peach

rejects just-wartheory'sreliance on abstraction-of the realities, or
"horrors,"of war;of enemies as one-dimensionalevil, killable Others;
and of the ethical responsesneeded to addressthe moralityof war,such
as a privileging of justice and rights over love and caring. Following
Elshtain,she believes that feminist just-warprinciplesshould be more
particularized,contextualized,and individualized.
But the abstractionof the particularitiesof war depends on an abstraction
of war itself. The distance of such abstractionis created in partby willingness
to think of war without consideringthe presence of war in "peaceful"times.
Wars becomes conceptual entities-objects for consideration-rather than
diverse, historically loaded exemplifications of the contexts in which they
occur.In orderto notice the particularand individualrealitiesof war,attention
must be given to the particular,individual, and contextualized causes and
effects of pervasivemilitarism,as well as the patternsand connections among
them.

4) Like other feminists, Peach criticizes the dualisms and dichotomies

that underliewar and the other evils of patriarchy,including

dichotomies between male and female, combatant and non-

combatant, soldier and citizen, ally and enemy and state and
individual which have dominated just-war thinking. Rather
than relyingon traditionaldichotomies, a feminist application
of just-warcriteriashould emphasizethe effects of going to war
on the lives of particularindividualswho would be involved,
whether soldier or civilian, enemy or ally, male or female.
(Peach 1994, 166)
As should now be obvious, though Peach rejects several relevant dualistic
hierarchies,a stark ontological distinction between war and peace remains
basicallyintact.3Thus Peach'srejection of dualismsis underminedby her own
failure to question a starkontological distinction between war and peace. In
considering the ways in which violence shapes women's realities, feminists
might be better served by analyses of war as part of enmeshed continua or
spectraof state-sponsoredand other systemicpatriarchaland racistviolence.
5) Peach believes just-wartheory privilegesstate authorityand the good
of the state over individual autonomy and well-being. Instead, she
states that just-wartheory should include "reformulatedunderstand-
ings of the properrelationshipsbetween the individualand the state,"
considering "both the impact of war on individuals as well as the
obligations of both men and women to defend the nation" (Peach
1994, 167).
 ChrisJ. Cuomo 37

In raisingquestionsabout the relationshipsbetween individualsand states,

Peach fails to question liberal,modernistconceptions of either. But if individ-
ual personsare socially constituted, often in conflicting ways,how can mem-
bership,or appropriateloyalties,be determined?If the state is alwaysinevitably
a military,patriarchal,racist state, how ought alternative collectivities that
will promote the well-being of individualsbe conceived without creating or
relyingon militarypresence?Feministsconcernedwith resistancesto warneed
to consider how the pervasivenessof militarismin the construction of the
contemporarystate implies the need to questionnationalismwhen theorizing
criticallyabout war.
To give one very clear example of the waysin which just-warevaluationsof
warsas events fail to addressfeminist questionsabout militarism,considerthe
widespreadinfluence of foreignmilitarybaseson genderednational identities
and interactions. In Bananas, Beachesand Bases: MakingFeministSense of
InternationalPolitics(1990), Cynthia Enloe illustrateshow, while decision-
makingand economic powerareheld primarilyby men, internationalrelations
and politics are inevitably played out on women's bodies in myriad ways,
propagatingracist,nationalist, and colonialist conceptions of femininity.One
chapter,"BaseWomen,"is devoted to a discussionof the ways in which local
and global sexual politics shape and are shapedthroughthe constant presence
of thousands of military bases worldwide-in the symbol of the soldier, the
introductionof foreignconceptions of masculinityand femininity,the repro-
duction of familystructureson militarybases,and throughsystemsof prostitu-
tion that universallycoexist alongsidemilitarybases.
Enloe writes, "militarypolitics, which occupy such a largepart of interna-
tional politics today,requiremilitarybases.Basesare artificialsocieties created
out of unequal relations between men and women of different races and
classes"and, one might add, differentnations (Enloe 1990, 2). The constant,
global presence of these bases is an example of the mundane givenness and
subtle omnipresenceof militaryviolence.
Most bases have managed to slip into the daily lives of the
nearby community. A military base, even one controlled by
soldiersof another country,can become politically invisible if
its waysof doing businessand seeing the worldinsinuatethem-
selves into a community'sschools, consumer tastes, housing
patterns, children's games, adults' friendships,jobs and gos-
sip.... Most have drapedthemselves with the camouflageof
normalcy. . .. Rumors of a base closing can send shivers of
economic alarmthrough a civilian community that has come
to dependon basejobs and soldiers'spending.(Enloe 1990, 66)
Just-wartheory-even feminist just-war theory-cannot bring to light the
ways in which the politics of militarybases are related to the waging of war,
38 Hypatia

how militarismconstructs masculinity and femininity, or how international

politics are shaped by the microcosmicimpactsof militarybases. It therefore
cannot addresssome of the most pressingways in which militarismand war
involve and affect women.

JUSTWAR AND ENVIRONMENTAL

ETHICS

I turn now to a discussion of the environmental effects of war, because I

believe these effectsto be significantto feministsfortwo basicreasons.Though
women are no more essentially connected to nature than any other organic
beings,culturalconstructionsassociatewomenwith natureand help justifythe
mistreatmentof both. Many feministsand ecological feministshave discussed
these problematicconceptual connections as createdor fueled by the dichot-
omous thinking discussed above (Griffin 1989; King 1990; Warren 1990;
Cuomo 1992; Plumwood1993). Others, includingVandanaShiva and Maria
Mies (1993), focuson the practical,or materialconnections between environ-
mental degradation and women's oppression. In any case, if women's
oppression is connected to the unjustified destruction of nature, or if, as
Karen Warren argues, feminists must be against oppression in any form,
including the oppression of nature, it is arguablethat the ecological effects
of war and militarism are feminist issues. Because military ecological
destruction occurs primarily "during peacetime," and because it is so
directly tied to other forms of ecological and social violence, attention to
the ecological impacts of war further illustrates the limitations of only
thinking of war in terms of events.
In "The MilitaryCommander'sResponsibilityfor the Environment,"Merrit
Drucker,a majorin the U.S. Army and philosophy instructorat the United
States Military Academy at West Point, utilizes an expanded application of
just-warprinciplesto arguethat militarycommandersought to protectnatural
environmentsduringpeace and warfare.The commander'speacetime respon-
sibilities
are founded on the commander'sprofessionalresponsibilityas
an agent of the state. Wartime responsibilitiesstem from the
well-establishedprohibitionsagainst harmingnoncombatants
and destroyingworksof art and objects of historicalor cultural
value. (Drucker1989, 136)
Drucker'sanalysisrests primarilyon a sharpdistinction between peace and
war, and a broad interpretationof the just-warprinciple of noncombatant
immunity.This principlerequiresmilitarydiscriminationbetween combatants
and noncombatantsand statesthat it is justifiableto intentionallykill only the
former.In essence, Druckerbelieves militarycommandersought to protect the
environment duringwar because, like noncombatantsand culturalartifacts,
 ChrisJ. Cuomo 39

naturalentities are inherentlyvaluable,morallyinappropriatetargetsof mili-

taryaggression.Druckerarguesfromanalogythat because "the environment"
(which he representsas a unified, self-evident entity) is free of intention and
cannot wage or fight in war, it is an innocent noncombatant in the realm of
human affairs.If a just-warmustbe fought without intended or excessive harm
to noncombatants,justice requiresthat warsalso be fought without intended
or excessiveharmto environments.In fact, he believes restraintis due not only
because of nature'slack of intention, but also becauseof its functions:
The environment is remarkablylike a special groupof soldiers
who are considered to be noncombatants. Just as [medical
personneland religiousprofessionals]protectand fosterlife, the
environment, if treated properly,makes possible and sustains
life in the most basic way imaginable . . . [and] should be
accorded the considerations we grant human nurturersand
healers. (Drucker1989, 147)

Despite his characterizationof the rule of noncombatant immunity as "an

establishedpartof our moraltraditionand internationallaw,"Druckerhimself
admitsthat it is often violated (1989, 146).
Drucker'sargumentpresupposesthe just-warprinciple of proportionality,
which requiresthat the benefits of going to war,and of particularstrategiesor
missions within war, must outweigh its harms. The proportionalityrequire-
ment, like a principle of utility, allows him to consider ecological damage
without necessarilytaking an absolutist stance against any military activity
that resultsin ecological harmor manipulation.In other words,proportional-
ity enables a step back from strict observance of noncombatant immunity.
Drucker concludes that military ecological damage (damage to nonhuman
noncombatants) must be weighed as one of a number of significant factors
determining the justifiabilityof a military action, but that it is ultimately
allowable and reasonableto cause damageto the environment in the service
of just ends. Summingup his position, he writes:
If we accept the view that the environmentand its inhabitants
all have inherent worth, then we need to give genuine consid-
eration to the well-being of all-plants, animals,and persons.
In addition to exercising due care I think commandersshould
take at least minimal riskswith their soldiers'lives to protect
the environment. (Drucker1989, 151)
Like Peach, Druckerbelieves that amendedjust-warcriteria are adequateto
criticallyassessthe ethics of war.
A telling aspect of Drucker'sargumentis his illustrationof environmentally
sound warfare,which I'll quote extensively to provide a sense of his goals
concerning militaryimpact on the environment:
40 Hypatia

The German army in World War II serves as an excellent

historical precedent for the compatibility of highly effective
trainingand realprotection of the environment.The Germans
used garrisontrainingareasnear towns for as much individual
training as possible. Their largertraining areas, used for unit
maneuvers,were carefullymanaged.They were usuallylocated
on land unsuitablefor agriculture;however, much of the land
had to be cultivatedto preventfood shortages.These cultivated
areashelped make the trainingmore realistic. ... Largetrain-
ing exercises were held in the fall to prevent damageto crops
and soil erosion. Becausethey were forcedto train a very large
army in a very small area, the Germans developed training
methods which were gentle on the land. (Drucker1989, 142)
Druckercompletely abstractsspecific martialdecisions and events fromother
aspectsof the Nazi militarycampaignin WorldWarII, includingits underlying
xenophobic, hypemationalist,and imperialistcore. He thereforesees German
militarypracticesas environmentalist,ratherthan as pragmatic,logical exten-
sions of a near-religiousglorification of the Fatherland,implemented by an
efficient and extraordinarilydestructivemilitary.But thinking of warthrough
environmental ethics is not a matter of conceiving of militarypracticesthat
are less destructive to a nation's own land and economy. How does the
blitzkriegfit into the ethos Druckerdescribesabove?
Drucker'sisolation of German militarydecisions and events in his ethical
assessmentis enabledby the complete abstractionof these decisionsfromtheir
contexts, and the ways in which they were shaped by pervasiveNazi milita-
rism.An obvious dangerof this approachto the ethics of war is the fact that
one can arguefavorablyfor ecologically sound warfare-clean wars-without
attention to the connections among the technologies of war,the motivations
for war, and the social contexts of war. Connections between Nazi
"environmentalism," and contemporaneous German implementation of
eugenic and "population-control"measuresthat includedgenocide shouldnot
be passed over lightly in efforts to construct an environmental ethic that
promotesthe flourishingof human, as well as nonhuman, life.
Drucker'sview depends on sharp distinctions: between combatants and
noncombatants, between war and peace. But both human and nonhuman
noncombatantsare alwaysharmedor otherwise affected by militarism,even
when they are not directlyharmedin battles. This simple truth was captured
in a popularVietnamWareraantiwarposterthat read,"Waris not healthy for
children and other living things."Becausenaturalnoncombatantsare every-
where; their destructionis necessaryfor war and for the existence of military
institutions, even when wars are not explicitly being fought. The ecological
realitiesof war,and of what it takesto be preparedforwarin the contemporary
 ChrisJ. Cuomo 41

world,aremind-boggling.To take natureat all seriouslyentails acknowledging

the effects of combat as well as the severe harm caused by everydaymilitary
practices.

OFWAR
IMPACTS
THEECOLOGICAL

In ScorchedEarth: The Military'sAssault on the Environment,William

Thomas, a U.S. Navy veteran, illustratesthe extent to which the peacetime
practicesof militaryinstitutionsdamagenaturalenvironmentsand communi-
ties. Thomas arguesthat even "peace"entails a dramaticand widespreadwar
on nature, or as Joni Seager puts it, "The environmental costs of militarized
peace bear suspiciousresemblanceto the costs of war"(Thomas 1995, xi).
All told, includingpeacetime activities as well as the immensedestruction
caused by combat, military institutions probablypresent the most dramatic
threat to ecological well-being on the planet. The military is the largest
generatorof hazardouswaste in the United States, creating nearly a ton of
toxic pollution every minute, and military analyst Jillian Skeel claims that,
"Globalmilitaryactivity may be the largestworldwidepolluter and consumer
of preciousresources"(quoted in Thomas 1995, 5). A conventionallypowered
aircraftcarrierconsumes 150,000 gallons of fuel a day. In less than an hour's
flight, a single jet launched from its flight deck consumes as much fuel as a
North American motorist bums in two years. One F-16 jet engine requires
nearly four and a half tons of scarce titanium, nickel, chromium,cobalt, and
energy-intensivealuminum(Thomas 1995, 5), and nine percentof all the iron
and steel used by humans is consumedby the global military (Thomas 1995,
16). The United States Department of Defense generates 500,000 tons of
toxins annually,more than the world'stop five chemical companiescombined.
The military is the biggest single source of environmental pollution in the
United States. Of 338 citations issued by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency in 1989, three-quarterswent to military installations
(Thomas 1995, 17).
The feminization,commodification,and devaluationof naturehelps create
a reality in which its destructionin warfareis easily justified.In imaginingan
ethic that addressesthese realities, feminists cannot neglect the extent to
which militaryecocide is connected, conceptuallyand practically,to transna-
tional capitalism and other forms of human oppression and exploitation.
Virtuallyall of the world'sthirty-fivenuclear bomb test sites, as well as most
radioactive dumpsand uraniummines, occupy Native lands (Thomas 1995,
6). Six multinationalscontrol one-quarterof all United States defense con-
tracts (Thomas 1995, 10), and two million dollarsper minute is spent on the
global military (Thomas 1995, 7). One could go on for volumes about the
effects of chemical and nuclear testing, military-industrialdevelopment and
42 Hypatia

waste, and the disruptionof wildlife, habitats,communities,and lifestylesthat

are inescapablylinked to militarypractices.
There are many conceptual and practical connections between military
practicesin which humansaim to kill and harmeach other for some declared
"greatergood," and nonmilitary practices in which we displace, destroy,or
seriouslymodifynonhumancommunities,species,and ecosystemsin the name
of human interests. An early illustrationof these connections was made by
Rachel Carson in the first few pages of The SilentSpring(1962), in which she
describedinsecticides as the inadvertent offspringof WorldWar II chemical
weaponsresearch.We can now also traceways in which insecticideswere part
of the Western-definedglobal corporatizationof agriculturethat helped kill off
the small family farm and made the worldwide system of food production
dependent on the likes of Dow Chemical and Monsanto.
Militarypracticesare no differentfromother human practicesthat damage
and irreparablymodifynature.They are often a resultof cost-benefit analyses
that pretend to weigh all likely outcomes yet do not consider nonhuman
entities except in termsof their use value for humans and they nearly always
create unforeseeableeffectsforhumansand nonhumans.In addition,everyday
military peacetime practices are actually more destructive than most other
human activities, they are directly enacted by state power,and, becausethey
function as unquestioned "givens,"they enjoy a unique near-immunityto
enactmentsof moralreproach.It is worthnoting the extent to which everyday
military activities remain largely unscrutinizedby environmentalists,espe-
cially American environmentalists,largelybecausefear allows us to be fooled
into thinking that "national security"is an adequate excuse for "ecological
militarymayhem"(Thomas 1995, 16).
If environmentaldestructionis a necessaryaspect of warand the peacetime
practices of military institutions, an analysis of war which includes its
embeddednessin peacetimemilitarismis necessaryto addressthe environmen-
tal effects of war.Such a perspectivemust pay adequateattention to what is
requiredto preparefor war in a technological age, and how women and other
Others are affected by the realities of contemporarymilitaryinstitutions and
practices.

CONCLUSIONSAND CAUTIONS

Emphasizingthe ways in which war is a presence, a constant undertone,

white noise in the backgroundof social existence, moving sometimescloser to
the foregroundof collective consciousness in the form of direct combat yet
remaining mostly as an unconsidered given, allows for several promising
analyses. To conclude, I will summarizefour distinct benefits of feminist
philosophicalattention to the constancyof militarypresencein most everyday
contemporarylife.
 ChrisJ. Cuomo 43

1) By considering the presence of war and militarism,philosophers and

activists are able to engage in a more effective, local, textured,multiplicitous
discussion of specific examples and issues of militarism, especially during
"peacetime"(when most military activities occur). These include environ-
mental effects,such as the recent Frenchdecision to engage in nucleartesting;
and effects on conceptions of gender and on the lives of women, such as the
twelve-year-oldJapanesegirl who was recently raped by American soldiers
stationed in Okinawa.
2) Expandingthe field of vision when consideringthe ethical issuesof war
allows us to better perceive and reflect upon the connections among various
effects and causes of militarism,and between aspects of everydaymilitarism
and militaryactivitiesthat generallyoccurbetween declarationsof warand the
signing of peace treaties.
3) As Robin Schott emphasizes,focusingon the presence of war is particu-
larly necessary given current realities of war, in an age in which military
technology makeswar less temporally,conceptually,and physicallybounded,
and in which civil conflict, guerillawars,ethnic wars,and urbanviolence in
responseto worseningsocial conditions are the most common formsof large-
scale violence.
4) Finally,to returnto a point which I raisedearlier,it is my hope that a more
presence-basedanalysis of war can be a tool for noticing and understanding
other political and ethical issuesas presences,and not just events. In a recent
article in The New Yorker,Henry LouisGates relaysthe following:
"You'vegot to start with the families,"[Colin Powell] says of
the crisisin the inner cities, "andthen you've got to fix educa-
tion so these little bright-eyedfive-year-olds,who are innocent
as the day is long and who know rightfromwrong,have all the
education they need. And you have to do both these things
simultaneously.It's like being able to support two military
conflicts simultaneously."Military metaphors, the worn cur-
rency of political discoursein this country,take on a certain
vitality when he deploys them. (Indeed, there are those who
argue that much of the General'sallure stems from a sort of
transpositionof realms."Ithink people arehungryfora military
solution to inner-city problems,"the black law professorand
activist PatriciaWilliams says.) (Gates 1995, 77)
How (where?when?why?)are institutionsof law enforcementlike military
institutions? How is the presumed constant need for personal protection
experienced by some constructedsimilarlyto the necessity of national secu-
rity? How does the constancy of militarism induce complacency toward or
collaborationwith authoritativeviolence? Looking at these questions might
help interestedpartiesfigureout how to create and sustainmovementsthat are
44 Hypatia

attentive to local realities and particularitiesabout war,about violence, and

about the enmeshment of varioussystemsof oppression.
It is of coursecrucialthat the analysisI recommendhere notice similarities,
patterns,and connections without collapsing all formsand instances of mili-
tarismor of state-sponsoredviolence into one neat picture.It is also important
to emphasizethat an expanded conception of war is meant to disruptcrisis-
basedpolitics that distractattention frommundane,everydayviolence that is
rooted in injustice.Seeing the constant presenceof militarismdoes not require
that middle-classand other privilegedAmericanssuddenlysee themselves as
constantly under siege. It does requirethe development of abilities to notice
the extent to which people and ecosystems can be severely under siege by
militaryinstitutionsand values, even when peace seems present.

NOTES

I would like to thank Bat-Ami Bar On, Claudia Card, Robin Schott, and other
participantsof the InternationalAssociation of Women Philosophers'Symposiumon
War in Vienna, Austria,for their helpful comments on an earlierversion of this paper.
Thank you also to MariaLugones,whose incrediblyhelpful face-to-faceconversations
with me concerning the ideas in this paper made me realizewhat a tragedyit is that
philosophydepartmentsseldom house more than one feminist philosopher.
1. I certainlybelieve that the presence of war and armedconflicts varies greatly
acrosshistoryand space. I also think that an expansive conception of war as presence
might shed light on many differentexamplesof warfareand militarysocieties, and on
the ways in which war is experienced as a presenceby soldiersas well as "noncomba-
tants."
2. Of course,warsmight be other things too, and they certainlyresultfromother
kinds of circumstances,ideologies,and institutions.My point here is that consideration
of militaryconflict cannot neglect the variousformsand aspectsof oppressionembed-
ded in warand militarism.
3. Peach does acknowledgethat "Elshtainalso criticizesthe way just-wartheory
dichotomizes war and peace because it leads to a conception of peace as simply the
absence of war ratherthan a 'chastenedpatriotism'which would restrainthinking in
warist terms" (1994, 161). Note that this particularquestioning of the dichotomy
between warand peace does little to unsettle assumptionsthat war is merelyan event.

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