A CRITICAL ANALYSIS TO BRING OUT MAJOR SHORTCOMINGS OF

THE INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

By

Major Manoj Kumar Pandey

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for

the ‘psc’ and award of M.Sc., (Defence and Strategic Studies) Degree at
the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, affiliated to
The University of Madras.

February 2002
 II

CONTENTS

Chapter

No Chapter Heading Page(s)

I Introduction 1–5

II Methodology 6 – 10

III The Historical Perspective of Indian Foreign Policy 11 – 15

IV Basic Determinants Of Foreign Policy. 16 – 29

V Lessons From The Indian past 30 – 38

VI Measures To Achieve A Pragmatic Foreign Policy. 39 – 48

VII Conclusion 49 – 53

Bibliography 54 – 57
 INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

“Foreign policy is the system of activities evolved by communities (read nations) for
changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to
the international environment. Within it two types of activities may be singled out for
special attention: the inputs flowing into it and the output it produces. The
foremost task of foreign policy analysis must be to throw light on the ways in
which states attempt to change, and succeed in changing the behaviour of
other states”
George Modelski1

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. During the past two decades large volume of literature regarding India's

foreign relations has emerged. However, most of these studies are historical and

descriptive in nature and rarely analytical or theoretical. This factor becomes rather

critical when we look at the growing complexity in India's relations with the world in

general and her neighbours in particular. Equally important is the fact that, in the

years to come, India's international responsibilities and involvement are likely to

grow rather than diminish. In order to meet these challenges, the nation and its

government must not only continuously reassess their foreign policy attitudes but

also re-evaluate the effectiveness of the decision and policy-making structure and
1
Modelski George. A Theory of Foreign Policy, London Pall Mall Press, 1962 p6.
 2

system in terms of their capabilities and commitment. In other words, are the

decision and policymakers pursuing a defined and conscious long term/strategic

goal and, if so, are they making the necessary resource commitment to develop the

desired capability necessary to achieve this goal? This study of Indian foreign policy

pursues the line of critical inquiry, in order to present this complex material within

certain theoretical framework.

2. India's foreign policy, like her economic and defence policies, has been facing

continuous adverse criticism which she deserves; without well defined national

interests and national aim as also bereft of an articulate doctrine to support these,

she has ended up with a variety of vague and blurred goals. Besides, it has

remained geared (although only ostensibly) to the doctrine of nonalignment - a

philosophy based on wishful thinking, idealism and self-righteousness, a convenient

substitute for hard thinking and decisions. For e.g., India’s dealing with the Kargil

situation and the coup in Seychelles, left much to be desired in terms of a

formidable foreign policy and national interest. It is necessary to understand that the

foreign policy should be consistent in strategy and flexible in tactics. According to

international-relations theory, history is shaped by impersonal forces, including the

perceived interests of a nation. But in practice, it is also According to international-

relations theory, history is shaped by impersonal forces, including the perceived

interests of a nation. But in practice, it is the role of personalities, including their

personal strengths and weaknesses, their idiosyncrasies and their hobbyhorses,

that determines history. History is replete with instances of powerful empires

unravelled by weak leaders and weak states made powerful by visionary rulers. If

the home to one-sixth of the human race, India, is still searching for a role in
 3

international affairs, it is because of the shortcomings of the individuals who have

led it since independence. Any nation’s capabilities, strategies, and ambitions

cannot be judged in isolation of the abilities, goals and aspirations of the men and

women who have ruled its destiny. Leaders who think small can turn a large nation

small, and those who think big can turn a small nation large 2. The role of

personalities, including their personal strengths and weaknesses, their

idiosyncrasies and their hobbyhorses, that determines history. History is replete with

instances of powerful empires unravelled by weak leaders and weak states made

powerful by visionary rulers. If the home to one-sixth of the human race, India, is still

searching for a role in international affairs, it is because of the shortcomings of the

individuals who have led it since independence. Any nation’s capabilities, strategies

and ambitions cannot be judged in isolation of the abilities, goals and aspirations of

the men and women who have ruled its destiny.

3. General K Sundarji, PVSM, former Indian Chief of The Army Staff, quotes

American strategist George Tandem on the Indian track record on strategic thinking

says “Indians have not been great strategic thinkers or developers of strategy

although they have been profound thinkers in many other fields. (Their) view of life

as... Unpredictable, did not lead Indians to see the need for strategy and even if

they had, they would have been unlikely to proceed because if the future is

unknown and unknowable, why plan! ” India having pursued a doggedly reactive

foreign policy, Indian rulers and their diplomatic advisors may find it difficult to

reorient their oriental equanimity to a more pro-active methodology of an in-depth

analysis and perspective planning in foreign policy formulations. As a rule, our

diplomatic overtures in real terms have been confined to routine pronouncements of

2
Fatal Attraction, Brahma Chellaney, Hindustan Times August 22, 2001
 4

“technically correct” statements on insipid international issues and thereafter

muddling through crises in the absence of clear strategic foresight. The case in point

is well highlighted in this excerpt from an essay entitled “Indian Foreign Policy

Options in the 1990s” published in the USI journal Apr-Jan 1992. “Ironically, while

major changes in the worlds scenario call for alert, concrete, rapid and concerted

foreign policy projection, Indian responses have been seemingly confused, dictated

often by internal rhetoric. We are perhaps the only major country to have gone

through the world wide turmoil of the Gulf War when even a full time cabinet

minister for USA is bitter pills which the country has had to swallow”. 3

4. From its inception during the immediate post-independence years, Indian

foreign policy has remained fairly steady barring a few basic postulates enshrined by

its founding fathers that perhaps were wholly or partially correct at that point in

history. However, to continue to base contemporary diplomacy on archaism

templates and expect dividends may seem farfetched especially keeping in view the

constantly changing, dynamic, realignments of power politics in the international fora.

Hence we need a total re-think on the entire gamut of our strategic thought, the

national interests, our current foreign policy principles and issues thereof to arrive at

a pragmatic framework for action in this regard. Selective shift in our methodology

would perhaps be in order, since our established policy of “fence sitting” on

international issues in the hope that such issues, if avoided for sufficient lengths of

time, would disappear by themselves, does not seem to be effective. Should we

continue to dodge issues by clever use of ineffectual rhetoric or should we seize

such controversies by their contention horns and attempt to join the fray in the new

3
Kumar Rajiv, India’s Foreign Policy Options in The 1990, USI Journal Apr-Jun 1992.
 5

emerging world order? If our dismal tract record in matters related to go by, we need

to do the latter and do it quietly.

 6

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Statement of the Problem

5. India the second most populous country in the world, even after five decades

of achieving independence has not been able to find its rightful place in the world

politics. Even during the cold war era she was confined to the fringes of world

interest due to her indecisiveness and lack of strategic vision though developments

in India were viewed with interest by both the superpowers. In view of the above this

dissertation aims to critically analyse the handling of Foreign Policy of India since

independence to bring out the shortcomings and suggest remedial measures for the

same without going into organisational changes.

Justification for the Study

6. India, the second largest country in terms of human resource, even after 50

yrs of independence has not been able to claim its rightful place in international

politics. After 50 years of independence, we have ended up creating a hostile

neighbourhood all around us, apart from the fact that we are still searching for our

rightful place in world politics. This deficiency can principally be attributed to the lack

of vision in our leaders to identify our national interests, frame a realistic foreign

policy to achieve this aim and develop the requisite capabilities to exercise it. India's
 7

preoccupation with its geographical integrity (deeply impressed in the collective

consciousness of India by the partition of British India into Republic of India and

Pakistan) came to haunt and guide Indian foreign policy in a major way leaving little

scope for broadening the horizon/scope of the policy.

7. While it is understood that foreign policy of a country is not a written

document or a rule like the constitution, it is generally enshrined within the

constitution, however the world community views it by previous actions taken by the

country in similar circumstances. For example if we take the case of USA it is a well

known fact that the country will pursue offenders of its laws anywhere in the world

and bring them to book at any cost. Some may claim that this is possible due to its

economic and military might, which it has used without any inhibition whenever

required. Now let us compare the same with Israel. Israel also follows the same

policy when it comes to offenders of its laws and is very particular about it especially

with the terrorists. However contrary to USA, Israel does not have the economic or

military might to achieve the same but makes use of its specialisation in covert

operations as also its proximity to the United States of America to achieve the same.

UK, in a similar vein, despite its size has a finger in each pie to maintain its position

of importance in the world politics, especially where its economic interests lie or

where it perceives economic gains.

8. While India boasts of maintaining its territorial integrity at all costs and has

the capability to achieve the same our decision makers are gripped of a strange fear

of the consequences in terms of the outcome and world opinion. This fear of our

country is well known to the world and is exploited to disastrous extents by all.Mr
 8

Subramaniam in the Kargil study brought it out, that Pakistani planners had quite

correctly appreciated that India would hesitate in escalating the situation, which

would have been disastrous for Pakistan which was on the verge of an economic

bankruptcy, and would not have been able to afford a near war situation. Taking our

attention to the present crisis after bombing of the World Trade Centre and the blast

outside the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly. India made all sorts of noise of

cooperating or not cooperating with USA, on the grounds that Kashmir terrorists

were not being targeted. It was very naïve on our part to expect some other country

to fight our war, when we ourselves are shying away from it. This was well realised

by Indian leaders after the blasts in front of Parliament. For USA there was no doubt

that it would use all the weapons in its arsenal and cosy up with any country in the

world if it helped in achieving the aim.

9. In the world where countries have been placing their national interests first and

friendships later, the very concept of looking for permanent friends as India has

been doing, amounts to neglecting the nation’s interests and goes against the very

basic concept of Geopolitics which says ‘there are no permanent friends or

enemies, only permanent national interests’. The need is to shift from a

contemplative and idealistic, wishful policy to a pragmatic and realistic approach in

our foreign policy dealings.

10. Past performance. In the past, India's foreign relations and dealings have

suffered from a personality fixation along with habitual secrecy, with the result that

80% of India's population was unaware of what the country’s foreign policy was or

should be and what objectives we were trying to achieve. The politicians were
 9

conveniently recycling and dishing out the Nehruvian doctrine of nonalignment

oblivious of a changed world. 4 The policy has also suffered from a number of

lingering illusions like the delusion of erstwhile USSR providing all essential and

durable support in international affairs along with armaments forever.

11. In contrast, China has a foreign policy which is based on hard realism, with

strong military backing and a long-term vision, whereas up to 1961, Nehru’s

idealism and personality dominated India's foreign policy. 5 And as stated before,

India's China policy had no military backing worth the name.

12. Another important failing which needs to be rectified is that the Armed Forces

must know about those foreign policy objectives for which the nation will be willing to

make a military commitment.6

Scope

13. Considering the vastness of the subject, it is proposed to restrict the scope

of the study as under: -

(a) Study the conditions under which the present Nehruvian model of

Panchsheel was formulated.

(b) The present international situation and its role in shaping the foreign

policies of countries.

(c) India’s neighborhood and her approach towards them.

4
S C Gangal, “India’s Foreign Policy”, Youth Asia Publications,1996 p52.
5
Hafeez Malik, “Dilemmas Of National Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan”,St Martin’s Press,
pp128-130.
6
S C Gangal, “India’s Foreign Policy”, Youth Asia Publications,1996 p134.
 10

(d) The present structure of foreign policy mechanism and changes

required in the same.

(e) India’s suggested approach towards foreign policy.

Methods of Data Collection

14. Most of the information for the study has been gathered from various books,

newspaper articles and the Internet. A bibliography of the various sources is

appended at the end.

Organisation of the Dissertation

15. It is proposed to study the subject under the following chapters: -

(a) Chapter III - The Historical Perspective of Indian Foreign

Policy.

(b) Chapter IV - Basic Determinants Of Foreign Policy.

(b) Chapter V - Lessons From The Indian past

(e) Chapter VI - Measures To Achieve A Pragmatic Foreign

Policy.

(f) Chapter VII - Conclusion

 11

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Background

16. Indian foreign policy in real terms came to being with the advent of

independence in 1947. Till then, the nation, as a satellite of the British Empire, had

no diplomatic identity and eschewed those postulates of foreign policy as were

dictated by the erstwhile rules. India’s role in the First World War and the

subsequent course of its rudimentary diplomatic overtures were constrained by the

prevailing British influence.

17. However, within the restrictive parameters, there were a few noteworthy

pioneers of independent thought and action on the diplomatic front. Netaji Subash

Chandra Bose’s armed struggle for independence and his negotiated tie-up with

Japan for military and material assistance was perhaps one of the first instance,

though due to Japan’s defeat in II World unimportant for a student of the history, of

Indian foreign policy.

18. The second such instance was the series of deliberations between Mahatma

Gandhi and the erstwhile British government for the deployment of Indian Army in

support of the Allies at the beginning of the II World War and their continued
 12

allegiance against the Axis. Mahatma Gandhi at that point of time, being the

custodian of the national psyche, could dictate such terms to the British. Bungling

negotiations not withstanding, the Indian National congress under the aegis of its

stalwart leaders, did manage to wangle independence for India as a result of these

parleys. They also chose pragmatically to avoid future criticism on the issue of

support to the Allies against Hitler.

19. A fair idea of the ambiance that prevailed at the time of independence can be

had from an excerpt of an address by Pandit Jawarlal Nehru 7as the Vice Chairman

of the Viceroy’s Executive Council (A precursor to self governance) of 07 Sep 1946

who said,

“We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of

groups aligned against one another which have led to two world wars and which

may again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale We seek no dominion over

others and we claim no privileged position over other people.” However, much one

may appreciate the idealistic intent of such a policy of peaceful coexistence bereft of

narrow alignments, and however desirable be such a policy of peaceful laissez-faire,

this basic postulate had an inherent flaw in it. Humanity is by nature gregarious and

given to alignments of convenience for subjective interests. To maintain and nurture

an attitude of oriental detachment amidst this ambiance was, and is, a tall order.

Political rhetoric aside, a pragmatic approach would have been to resort to a

cautious alignment with one of the power blocs primarily for regional security and

stability. Needless to say, such a tie-up at that point in history would have required

a deep understanding of the power equations prevalent. In hindsight, it is evident

7
Nehru Jawaharlal : Excerpt of address as quoted by Pant KC, Non-Provocative Defense. pp
273
 13

that India did realize the flaw in its initial foreign policy structure after the 1962

Chinese debacle when it had to appeal to the USA for assistance. The course of

foreign policy in India and the major events that shaped it makes an interesting

study.

20. The preponderance of political leaders and philosophers in the ruling elite of

India in the immediate post-independence era such as Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,

Dr.S Radhakrishnan, Sradar Vallabhbhai Patel and Mahatma Gandhi brought an

element of thought and idealism into our polity. Criticism not- withstanding the early

years of our freedom saw the formative state of all our policies on international

understanding and diplomacy with “laissez-faire” as the bulwark. The principles of

Panchsheel and non-alignment with power blocks, as expounded by Nehru and

espoused by Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Joseph Bronz Tito of Yugoslavia,

later went on to become the mainstay of our relations with nations at least in theory.

While most young independent nations started to drift towards one of the major

powers seeking economic sustenance and a security umbrella against potential

enemies, India remained resolute in its quest for ideological and strategic

independence. It is a moot issue in hindsight to debate whether this line of thinking

was the beginning of a process of, to coin a term; neither sell ourselves with existing

power blocs nor develop a viable strategy, to pursue for ourselves, or in short “pure

indecisiveness”. These years of diplomatic vacillations and ambiguity were

characterised by a general unwillingness to address foreign policy issues in

perspective and with pragmatic foresight and resort rather to benevolent idealism in

any scenario. The one noteworthy occasion when this utopian garb was laid

temporarily aside for practical considerations was during the period of the accession
 14

of Kashmir probably due to Nehru’s sentimental attachment with it and Sardar

Patel’s hard realism. Faced with a Pakistan’s invasion of Kashmir, a recalcitrant

local populace and a vacillator and weak monarch, India ably led by that indomitable

trouble-shooter, Sardar Patel decided to send in the Army to stalemate the Pak

ambitions for Kashmir and at least partially retrieve some of that lost paradise. In a

slow battle of attrition the Indian Army based on a negotiated instrument of

accession from Maharaja Hari Singh, managed to push back the Pakistani raiders to

the present borders of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) by Oct 1948. Nehru

possibly deluded by a concept of an exalted Indian stature in the international forum

decided to halt the military counter- offensive against all advice and took the issue to

the UNO. Possibly at that point in history if the armed forces had been utilised in full

measure as an instrument of coercive diplomacy, the bogey of Kashmir looming so

large today would not have come to be. But then those were the years of a gentle,

languorous India, obsessed with “Ahimsa”, “Rama Rajya” and “Panchsheel” where

diplomatic machinations of “realpolitik” had no relevance. Thus in our first major

diplomatic endeavor we managed to only agree to a cease-fire on as-is where-is

basis and got straddled with a UNO military observer group for enforcement of this

brokered peace when in all justification the very least we could have hoped for was

a withdrawal of Pak forces to the delineated International Border.

21. The Power Block. At this point, it is pertinent to analyse the various options

open to India in terms of the erstwhile power blocs besides its then preferred option

of non-alignment for a fuller understanding of the prevalent equation. The II World

War saw the fall of the German and Japanese war machines and the gradual

marginalisation of the British Empire. Simultaneously, out of this rose the new
 15

power brokers of the world namely the USA and USSR based on ideology,

economic aspirations and geo-strategic compulsions. Both these power blocks,

who in more ways than one had divided spoils amongst themselves after the II

World War, aligned against one another and sought to recruit satellite countries to

their respective camps in return for economic and security backup to these nations.

India at that time was faced with a Hobson’s choice between capitalism and

socialism, and true to its colors decided to tread the middle path of non alignment.

22. Indian foreign policy history largely has been uneventful and to an extent

direction-less in a bi-polar cold war era where in spite of all our pronouncements of

non-alignment, we were firmly aligned behind the USSR. At best, our foreign policy

could stake a claim to react mercurially when we addressed a situation thrust upon

us with relative resoluteness of purpose and logic. At worst, Indian diplomacy could

claim the dubious distinction of doddering indecisiveness and gross miscalculations

in the face of momentous events.

 16

CHAPTER IV

BASIC DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

“ In the interests of the prosperity of the country, a king should be diligent in

foreseeing the possibility of calamities, try to avert them before they arise, overcome

those which happen, remove all obstructions to economic activity and prevent loss

of revenue to the state.”

- Kautilya

“ In the modern age a country’s power is manifested more in its ability to develop

and use advanced technologies and ensuring a high level of well being of its people

than in its military strength.”

- Vladimir Putin- Russian President8

23. The foreign policy of a country, unlike the Constitution is a dynamic policy

which keeps changing based on a set of basic policy statements depending on the

international situations obtained at any particular time. However continuity in the

foreign policy is maintained by an unchangeable national aim or objective and the

nation's approach towards this national objective. Therefore it is of utmost

importance that due consideration be given to formulation of the national objectives.

8
C Raja Mohan ‘The Russian Idea- Lenin to Peter the Great’ The Hindu, 27 Sept 2000.
 17

Apart from the national aim foreign policy is never uniquely determined by any one

factor, but is a result of the interplay of a large number of factors that affect the

formulation of policy in different ways in different circumstances. Some of these

factors are relatively stable and should be regarded as more basic or unchangeable

determinants of foreign policy than others; but the more variable institutional factors

and even the personal role of the decision-makers are no less important in the

process of decision-making than the basic determinants. The basic determinants

can be broadly listed as under:-

(a ) National Interests

(b) Geography

(c) Economy

(d) National Character

(e) Military Strength

(f) Leadership

(g) Security environment

National Interest and Foreign Policy

24. The formulation of foreign policy is essentially an exercise of ends and

means on part of a nation state in an international setting. It is therefore necessary,

first of all, to formulate a broad aim or goal based on national interests, which will

give a sense of purpose and direction to the foreign policy. This aim need not, and in

fact must not, be static in content, but be a conceptually long term goal to which
 18

immediate objectives, and the short term policies pertaining to them, can be related.

In case of any conflict in the short term goals the long term goal will indicate the

direction of choice. The long term goal should be clear without any ambiguities and

based on the present as well as predicted capabilities of the nation state in the

absence of which it will not be possible to formulate any goal oriented clear policies,

short-term or long-term, and the foreign policy may degenerate into a futile exercise

in woolly thinking, frivolous talk and frequent shift of emphasis from one thing to

another. Even after identification of the long term objective, it is necessary to identify

the short term objectives in a pragmatic manner, as it would be at this time that a

critical appraisal of the achievements would require to be done and mid course

corrections carried out if necessary. India has lacked this pragmatic identification of

the short term goals and has shied away from taking up any exercise in mid course

correction which became necessary due to the changing economic environment as

well as the security environment around the world.

25. Once the long term goals have been decided upon, it is the task of the

makers of the foreign policy to test the rationality of every short term objective in the

light of this goal, and choose the most efficient alternative out of the various

alternatives available for achievement of the same. The long term goal can only be

the cumulative result of a series of short term objectives; and unless the later are

consistent with the long term goal, we may find the country going on a tangent as

has happened with India despite having most of the qualities required of a major

player in international affairs. The long term goals of foreign policy and the short

term objectives consistent with it, as well as the choice of means open to the

makers of the foreign policy depend on a variety of basic determinants listed above.
 19

Geography.

26. The geography indisputably is one of the most important aspects which

dictate the long term goals as also the means of achieving them. It would not be

prudent for a country like Japan to vie to be a major military power to achieve its

national interests as the lack of depth and dependence for all the raw materials

would be a major drawback in achievement of its aims. Japan realised very early

that economic might would easily overshadow military power and turned this

restriction into its advantage. Geography includes location, size, topography, state

boundaries, population, climate etc. We shall discuss some of these in brief in

relation to India.

27. Location. The history of international relations shows that location has

always been an important determinant of the foreign relations of a state. The

strategic location of Britain at the entrance to Europe forced her to develop a strong

Navy which eventually helped her in her colonial conquests as also the industrial

revolution. India is strategically located at a position commanding the Indian Ocean,

a major shipping route connecting Africa or West Asia to be exact with the East Asia.

This logically made her the bastion of British Empire in the East, from Aden to Hong

Kong. The independence of India inevitably meant, as Winston Churchill had

realised, the end of the British Empire. Today the same strategic location could give

India a central position in Asian and world politics. All the major sea and air routes of

the world pass through India. India and the Indian Ocean are an indispensable link

in world trade and commercial intercourse. India is in a sense a major connecting

 20

link among the geographical areas called West Asia, Southeast Asia and the Far

East. Any major happening in India would affect the rest of Asia and vice versa. This

is a major reason why both the super powers, the United States of America and the

USSR have attempted, almost ever since independence of the subcontinent in

1947, to program India into their respective global strategy, and to influence the

national development and foreign policy in terms of their own perceptions of the

global strategic environment. India's geographical location has also made it

inevitable that political, commercial and cultural relations should be based primarily

on oceanic intercourse considering the fact that India is separated from North and

East by the mighty Himalayas and the dense jungles and from West by a hostile

country. However India failed to develop strong blue water Navy and merchant

shipping industry primarily due to her major military engagements in the North and

West as also short sightedness on the part of Indian leaders. This major drawback

isolated India from the rest of the world till very late and restricted the economic

development of the country.

28. Size. A large territory generally means relatively large stock of natural

resources. It is partly for this reason that the Soviet Union and the USA, the two

largest states of the world are also the richest in natural resources; and this fact also

partly explains why they are also the only super powers of the contemporary world.

However the same should be studied in the light of the fact that small states such as

Britain, Portugal and the Netherlands have played a major role in international

relations, while vast countries such as China and India have hardly been an

independent factor in the past. This has been explained by the French geographer

Camille Vallaux as, ‘the Amsterdam trader with worldwide trade connections has
 21

much greater “space consciousness” than that of a French peasant who lives in a

much bigger country’. Hence more than the physical size it is important for a country

to develop space consciousness and have depth and spread in its dealings; military,

economic, cultural or diplomatic. India has woken up to this reality now and started

spreading its tentacles far and wide, however she is too late to make an impact and

has to compete with other lesser countries for the attention. Also any nation’s

capabilities, strategies and ambitions cannot be judged in isolation of the abilities,

goals and aspirations of the men and women who have ruled its destiny. Leaders

who think small can turn a large nation small, and those who think big can turn a

small nation large9.

29. Boundries. Countries with which a nation shares its boundaries play

an important role in shaping its foreign policy. For example USA which does not

have any hostile countries sharing its boundaries resulted in its development of a

global foreign policy and reaching out to nearly all parts of the world, while on the

contrary India sharing its borders with hostile countries resulted in a localised

foreign policy and prevented her from looking far beyond her borders. India’s foreign

policy is more centred towards its hostile neighbours, leaving little scope for thinking

globally.

30. Population. Population in right measure is an asset for a nation. However a

large population like India’s, much beyond the capacity of the land resources if not

controlled at an opportune time can well be a drain on a nation’s resources. Also this

population if not coordinated well can be a security concern especially in a country

9
Fatal attraction by Brahma Chellaney, August 22, 2001 HT
 22

with varied religious, ethnic and regional diversities, having suffered a trauma of

partition over religion, like India. However a large population if coordinated and

organised properly like in China can well prove to be an asset beyond proportion.

One thing is quite true; superpower status includes ability to project the forces of a

state by it economic, defence or even demography across her shores. In the case of

demography, India in Diasporas has elicited attention. Indians in Africa, in Great

Britain, and the US, have made consistent progress in the economic life of these

various regions. Take a place like the US, a BBC report on the Silicon Valley of the

US- San Francisco, states that 60,000 Indians in the IT field can boast of assets to

the tune of Three hundred and twenty six billion dollars, what a wealth! The

multiplier effect of this on economy of US is unimaginable, yet it has a

commensurate effect on the economy of India as well. Israni et al, in their book-

‘India, a superpower? A complete blueprint for making India a superpower by AD

2000’, states that “for a country to become a superpower, it has to satisfy three

basic requirements which are: Three right ingredients (a rich resources, big land

areas and large but optimum population), Right people in the seats of political

power, and Right approaches” 10 Projections across ones borders include also the

Foreign Policy thrust to be in complement. To this end India, has to do a thorough

revamp.

10
Israni Kimat and Israni Haku, India-A Superpower?- A complete blueprint for making India a superpower by
AD 2000, New Delhi, Lancer International, 1989.
 23

Economy

31. With the passage of time economy is acquiring an increased importance in

the foreign policy as also security concerns of a nation. Most of the recent

campaigns like Iraq and to some extent even Afghanistan can be attributed to

economic compulsions of select few. Economy has been and will be a major lever

for execution of foreign policy. In a developing state, whose actual economic

strength is not too strong, the rate of economic growth largely determines the power

potential, defined in material terms. Some realists even regard it as the only factor of

significance; it is near impossible to acquire military power with out economic power

as today military power is more technology intensive instead of manpower intensive.

The rate of growth determines how soon, and if at all, a developing state can hope

to become a major power from the economic point of view; it determines whether

and after what period of time the state can develop a military capability adequate for

its own security; it indicates, to a considerable extent, the viability or otherwise of the

political system over a period of time. 11 The economy also has various types like

export driven, service driven, consumer driven etc. A country has to drive a right

balance between these to achieve a stable economy. The recent economic turmoil

of the East Asian Economies is a case in point.

National Character

32. The national character of a nation plays a very important role in shaping the

perceptions of other nations. India which was and still is considered one of the most

11
J Bandyopadhyaya “The Making of India’s Foreign Policy”, Allied Publishers, 1970, pp43.
 24

corrupt nations of the world was not taken very seriously in the international

scenario. Moreover the idealist nature of non violent independence struggle led to

an expectation of false sense of morality in the international relations, wherein India

expected other countries to be highly moralistic in their dealings, which was never to

be. This moralistic approach led to formation of NAM which is in shambles today

and led the country away from both the superpowers instead of remaining close to

both.

33. Indian character as perceived by the world has generally been defensive and

reactive. Though we have agreed that Kashmir is a major problem facing us, there

does not appear to be any policy or strategy on dealing with this problem. Till date

all our political leadership without any exception has been wishing that this problem

would die its own death. However when this does not happen and the problem

flares up due to a war or insurgency or even a diplomatic initiative by Pakistan, the

country starts discussing this afresh resulting in knee jerk reaction on all fronts

including military. There is a need, first for India to identify a solution which is

acceptable to her and then create conditions which would make the other country

not to refuse this proposal. We have fought two wars after occupation of part of

Kashmir by Pakistan. Both the times there was no will or plan on the part of India to

attempt to recapture the lost territory rather we traded off captured territory for

nothing in return. According to international-relations theory, history is shaped by

impersonal forces, including the perceived interests of a nation. But in practice, it is

the role of personalities, including their personal strengths and weaknesses, their

idiosyncrasies and their hobbyhorses, that determines history. History is replete with

instances of powerful empires unravelled by weak leaders and weak states made
 25

powerful by visionary rulers. If the home to one-sixth of the human race, India, is still

searching for a role in international affairs, it is because of the shortcomings of the

individuals who have led it since independence. Any nation’s capabilities, strategies

and ambitions cannot be judged in isolation of the abilities, goals and aspirations of

the men and women who have ruled its destiny. Leaders who think small can turn a
12
large nation small, and those who think big can turn a small nation large.

Military strength

34. The economy, geography and national character together make up the

military strength (or weaknesses) of a nation, which further determines the foreign

policy. Indian defence preparedness, despite a great deal of indigenisation has been

dependent on imports from a few countries. Despite having fought four major wars

we have paid scanty attention to this aspect, though presently cost of defence

preparedness has forced us towards greater indigenisation and diversifying our

sources of procurement. Apart from procurements, defence pacts/agreements add

up to a nation’s visible strength. India was in an ideal situation to formulate defence

pacts with its smaller neighbours like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal etc. This would

have removed minor irritants between India and these countries apart from

preventing them from working against Indian interests in any sphere. Such pacts

would also have enhanced the economy of all including India by sale and purchase

of arms and reciprocal efforts by India to balance the trade. In terms of military

strength India can be equated to a regional military power in South Asia. In order to

consolidate this position it is important that the smaller neighbours of India feel

12
Fatal attraction by Brahma Chellaney, August 22, 2001 HT
 26

confident that India would not be stepping on its toes in the process, and there is no

better way than creating relationships based on defence and economic pacts similar

to that of USA and Canada as also USA and Mexico.

Security Concerns.

35. Ensuring security transcends strategic and military factors and involves

political, economy, social, technological, even environmental considerations. These

are the ingredients in India's changing defence and foreign policy orientations.

Indian policies were oriented towards development concerns and national

considerations. A ramification of this was India articulating views on colonialism,

apartheid, racial discrimination, nuclear and general disarmament, the Palestinian

question and so forth, which generated doubts, if not antagonist feelings about India

in the US and its allies. As a consequence, Western powers were responsive to

Indian requests for heavy industry, defence technology and for a wide variety of

defence supplies.13 Two developments in the sub continent since the mid-Seventies

affected Indian security. First was the increase in size of Pakistan’s armed forces,

modernisation of its weapon systems, increase in its indigenous defence production

capabilities, and acquisition of nuclear weapons and missile strike capacities.

Secondly, Pakistan took advantage of internal dissensions in Indian polity and

actively encouraged separatist movements and communal tensions in India. Other

events influencing India’s security environment negatively were Russian intervention

in Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution, and revival of the Pakistan-United States

defence relationship which increased in range and content. Actions by Sri Lanka,

namely, intensification of its intelligence and security relations with the US, offering
13
Maj Gen VK Madhok, “Re-powering National Security”, Aditya Prakashan,1998, pp 98-105.
 27

the latter a foothold at Trincomalee and broadcasting facilities to the Voice of

America on the western coast of the island, increased Indian concerns. 14 In fact

Indian neighbours have developed a strange antagonism towards India mainly

because of an improper mixture of diplomacy and coercion. These countries take

maximum advantage of our foreign policy which pursues the route of negotiation to

avoid conflict. It is difficult to imagine what negotiations are required if a country like

Bangladesh fully knowing the consequences creates trouble on India’s eastern

borders be it patrol clashes or providing shelter to militant organisations. India’s first

security concern is to cope with a more complex and competitive international

situation. Now, without the leverage of a stable political equation with one of the

superpowers, new political relationships have to be established. The threat to, and

restrictions on, India, as well as other developing countries, is the new danger of

dual use technologies falling into the hands of irresponsible states. India has faced

problems in this respect about importing a number of items for industrial and

research purposes, with USA, from UK and Germany. India’s space exploration

activities and technologies have also been viewed with suspicion and reservation.

India reached levels of self reliance and self-sufficiency in these technologies by the

early 90s, which generated both commercial and security apprehensions among

India’s Western partners. India’s missile development programme has also been

under increasing pressure.15 Linked with this is the continuing pressure on India to

adhere to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, or to accept the discriminatory non-

proliferation arrangements inherent in this treaty by some other arrangement.

14
Kanti Bajpai and Stephen P Cohen, “Cooperative Security and S. Asian Insecurity”, The Brookings Institute,
1994, Chapter IV.
15
Kanti Bajpai and Stephen P Cohen, op cit., Chapter V.
 28

36. It is unrealistic therefore to expect India to unilaterally adhere to any

discriminatory non-proliferation regime. Since 1991, India has been adjusting to the

rapidly changing international and internal security environment, the main elements

of which are:-

(a) Pakistan remains a primary threat, with its nuclear weapons capacities

and belligerent pronouncements along with its claims on Kashmir.

(b) China's nuclear weapons capabilities, the deployment of tactical

nuclear weapons in Tibet, the still unresolved boundary dispute, and Sino-

Pakistani defence cooperation are a matter of concern to India.

(c) Pan Islamic equations and policy initiatives engineered by Pakistan

have an abiding anti Indian bias.

(d) India is deeply interested in the former republics of the Soviet Union in

Central Asia remaining modern secular states.

(e) Chinese military doctrines, force deployment postures, economic

interests in the South Eastern Asian region and the south western reaches of

the Pacific are a matter of interest to India.

(f) Inability of the South Asian region in forging regional solidarity when

the world around is progressing regional and sub-regional cooperation.

 29

(g) The continuing ethnic conflict between the Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri

Lanka poses danger to India.

(h) Similarly, the issue of the Nepalese migration from Bhutan to Nepal

since 1992 and the resultant tensions between Bhutan and Nepal directly

affect the region.

(j) Conceptually, Sino- Nepalese and Sino-Bhutanese relations will

remain a matter of security interest to India.

(k) Bangladesh remains a critical factor affecting Indian security in the

North-East and in the Bay of Bengal.

(l) Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan are being used as sanctuaries by

Indian secessionist groups and terrorists.

(m) Political conditionality governing investment, technology transfers and

developmental assistance, affect the economic security concerns of India.

(n) Given the quantitative levels and sophistication of arms deployed

around India, stretching from the Gulf to East India, upgrading the weapon

systems of the Indian armed forces will remain a major focus of attention of

Indian defence policy planners for the coming decade or two. 16

16
George Perkovich, “A Nuclear Third War in S. Asia”,Foreign Policy,1998.
 30

CHAPTER V

LESSONS FROM THE PAST

37. Indian foreign policy history largely has been uneventful and to an extent

direction-less in a bi-polar cold war era where in spite of all our pronouncements of

non-alignment, we were firmly aligned behind the USSR. At best, our foreign policy

could stake a claim to reactive mercurially where we addressed a situation thrust

upon us with relative resoluteness of purpose and logic. At worst, Indian diplomacy

could claim the dubious distinction of doddering indecisiveness and gross

miscalculations in the face of momentous events. Relating to Nehru’s vision of 50

years ago, when he looked at India as a possible global player, Salman Haidar in an

article said that vision was now slowly being actualised. Paradoxically, he said, this

very fact has affected good neighbourly relations with Pakistan and even other

neighbouring countries who perceive India as an emerging regional power. Perhaps,

we are pursuing a larger role for ourselves with a narrower vision. 17 India offers an

excellent example of how poor nations, full of ambitions and pretensions to

leadership, wanted to manipulate the world around them in their terms by assuming

moralistic positions and how these failed miserably in a world of power politics. India

was soon seen to be a staunch apologist for former Soviet Union. Whereas China

with its communist label still intact was and is able to sail smoothly with the nations

of the democratic West, India continues to be at a disadvantage, proving the point

17
India’s Foreign Policy - Growing Ambitions, Salman Haider, Times of India, Chandigarh Edition, 05 Nov 01.
 31

that similarity in the nature of political systems does not necessarily guarantee

success in foreign relations. India is trying to make amends for its "faults" of the past

through a sweeping and dramatic economic turn in its foreign policy content. Will

this foreign turn in economics result also in a real change in the rest of its foreign

policy? This only time wil tell. A few miscalculations in Indian diplomatic overtures

due to lack of expert advice in the past are enumerated below:-

(a) Handling of the 1947 Pak Aggression. Faced with a major

invasion by Pakistan in 1947, a dithering Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir and

an increasingly alienated local populace, the Indian armed forces did manage

to retrieve the military, situation and oust the Pakistani invaders from all key

areas. Having achieved moral ascendancy, the military commanders advised

strongly that their impending recapture of all areas upto the delineated

international border, should be gone through with speed and alacrity.

However, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in a fit of righteous indignation against all

things military, and an exalted view of his abilities as an international

statesman of standing, halted the counter- offensive on the plea that he could

get Pakistan to vacate POK (Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir) through

international diplomatic pressure. Today’s’ persistent J&K problem, and the

continued existence of POK are testimonies to a failed Indian diplomatic

initiative and indecisiveness at that point in history.

(b) The 1962 Chinese Debacle. A blind belief in non-alignment as a

panacea to all evils of international polity had blunted Indian diplomatic

capabilities in the fifties and Non violence and Panchasheel had further stifled
 32

the pragmatists of the day in their quest for military and strategic

preparedness for unforeseen eventualities. 18 Thus, faced with the Chinese

intrusions, invasion and all out war against India, our foreign policy literally

went to pieces much the same way as our ill prepared Indian Army. The

problem still remains unresolved till date.

(c) 1971 - Mrs Indira Gandhi’s Year of Diplomatic Reckoning. Faced

with a fait accompli of the ten million East Pakistani refugees in India and the

continuing genocide in that country by Pakistani Army, Mrs Gandhi and her

military advisors decided early that a military solution to the problem was

inevitable. Hence, having initiated military measures such as preparation and

mobilisation for war including training of the Mukti Bahini by mid - 1971, Mrs

Gandhi commenced her diplomatic pilgrimage in support of her intended

military intervention in East Pakistan. Firstly, she reaffirmed the support of

USSR and documented the same in a twenty-year treaty of friendship signed

in Aug 1971. Thereafter she went on a visit to US, UK, France and other

nations to present India’s and by default, East Pakistan’s case for a

peaceful/brokered solution to the problem and also to temper their expected

criticism in the event of Indian military intervention. Her powerful rhetoric and

resoluteness in the international media resulted in a total isolation of the

conflict area with no international interference while the Indian Army carved

out Bangladesh. No other nation dared interfere in the imbroglio because Mrs

Gandhi’s coupd’etat had given the Indian intervention in East Pakistan an

almost crusade - like image in the international forum. Thus then was

18
Nehru Jawaharlal : Excerpt of address as quoted by Pant KC, Non-Provocative Defense. pp 273
 33

concluded the finest and possibly, the only major triumph of Indian foreign

policy. However the positive aspects of the 1971 war ended here. India did

not take this opportunity to broker permanent peace on our western border

and did a basic mistake that is to accept verbal assurances to let a

democratic government continue in Pakistan which was undone very soon.

The present not so good relations with Bangladesh are a testimony to lack of

vision and timing in formulating a suitable treaty similar to that with Nepal

when the public opinion in Bangladesh was in India’s favour. India after

liberation of Bangladesh was so engrossed in gloating in the glory that it lost

sight of its long term interests, i.e. to develop a friendly neighbourhood, not a

submissive one.

(d) Regional Miscalculations. It speaks volumes for Indian diplomacy

that India is a country with common borders with one of the largest number of

nations in the world and yet has some axe to grind in the bilateral relations

with each one of them. Afghanistan (though with no common borders with

India) and Nepal have all at some point or the other had serious and not-so-

serious, differences of opinion on foreign policy issues with India. It is a

failure of our policies that after all these decades of freedom we have not

been able to create a regional ambience of trust and mutual cooperation with

our immediate neighbours. Indian intervention in Sri Lanka and the earlier

annexation of Sikkim perhaps sounds signals of a belligerent bully about

India to its smaller neighbours who perhaps feel insecure about India’s

regional intention. What we need at this stage is a serious regional

confidence building exercise to placate regional egos and ameliorate the

 34

situation without seen to be bending too low. It is a paradox in itself that we

continue to nurture global aspirations while making no efforts to secure our

home base.

(e) Handling of the Kuwait War. Perhaps one of the lowest points of

Indian foreign policy initiatives was our misguided handling of the Kuwaiti

invasion by Iraq. We deemed it in our national interests to condone and

support the Iraqi invasion to the extent that the then Indian Minister of State

for External Affairs personally made a pilgrimage to exhort Indian NRIs in the

region to support Iraq. Having made this grave error of judgment India then

had to do an expeditious volte-face to recover from the shock of having bet

on the wrong horse and that too an international pariah condemned by the

entire world in the aftermath of the war.

(f) Handling of Events after Sep 11. The events of Sep 11 and its

aftermath left Indian leaders baffled. While criticism for the terrorist attack

was forthcoming, the response to USA’s reaction in Afghanistan was

confusing. The reaction varied from outright criticism of US action to offering

full support in all fields without USA even asking for it. Every one in the

government was offering comments at times at variance to each other; and

this was despite having learnt a lesson during Kargil on media management

and appointed an official spokesperson and the mechanism to deal with the

same problem. It would have been better to take more time for deliberations

and seek advice of experts before issuing statements which had to be denied

later.
 35

38. India’s history of masterly inactivity belies the hope of its willingness to act

coherently and decisively at times of strategic need. India appears to be caught in a

time-warp in which its psychological tussle of delinking from its past and stepping

into a cathartic present appear too onerous a task for its leaders and statesmen.

They would do well to take their lessons in heralding positive change from Mikhail

Gorbachov who hastened the severance of the ties of his country with the

communist past with profound wisdom and sensitively, to redeem a USSR living on

tons of worthless paper money in a inflation-ridden economy and took it on a road to

progress even at the expense of initial setbacks. It would be pertinent to quote here

V.S Naipaul 19 who said:-

“The crisis in India is not political. Dictatorship or rule by the military will

achieve nothing. Nor is the crisis economic. These are only aspects of the larger

crisis, which is that of a decaying civilisation where the only hope lies in further swift

decay. The past has to be seen to be dead; or the past will kill.”

39. While personal characteristics and foibles have defined India’s shifting

foreign policy, it is noteworthy that the public figures were never called to account for

their actions even when they committed blunders. Take the case of Jawaharlal

Nehru, who bequeathed the Pakistan and China problems to the future Indian

generations. Nehru ran foreign policy like private policy, brushing aside advice from

level-headed colleagues like Sardar Patel and top professionals like G.S. Bajpai. A

classic example of Nehru’s naiveté is the following top-secret note he recorded in

19
V.S Naipaul from his book - “A wounded Civilisation”-
 36

July 1949 to close an internal debate on Tibet when the communist victory appeared

imminent in China: “Whatever may be the ultimate fate of Tibet in relation to China, I

think there is practically no chance of any military danger to India arising from any

change in Tibet. Geographically, this is very difficult and practically it would be a

foolish adventure. If India is to be influenced or an attempt made to bring pressure

on her, Tibet is not the route for it. I do not think there is any necessity for our

defence ministry, or any part of it, to consider possible military repercussions on the

India-Tibetan frontier. The event is remote and may not arise at all.” What Nehru

credulously saw as a “foolish adventure” was mounted within months by the

Chinese, who gobbled up Tibet and began exerting military pressure on India. What

Nehru averred was geographically impracticable became a geopolitical reality that

has impacted on Indian security like no other development and created a common

land corridor to nurture the Sino-Pak axis.

40. Decades later, has Indian policy-making changed? The present prime

minister Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Pakistan policy has taken India on a roller-coaster

ride for the past three years. The ride has left the country shaken up, bruised and

bewildered. The same questions arise as during the Nehru years, raising concerns

over the extent to which policy is developed through personal whims and fancies,

and even more serious concerns regarding long-term costs and, ultimately,

accountability. Do citizens have no recourse when their elected leaders blunder at

national cost? To err is human, but to repeat mistakes is unforgivable. Vajpayee’s

foreign policy, from Lahore to Agra, via Kargil and Kandahar, has been a chronicle of

disasters. Compounding Vajpayee’s failures is the exclusion of professionals in the

deliberation stage. Policy is now shaped entirely by the personal predilections of a

 37

few, with consistency and rationality in short supply. While the personality is a major

factor affecting foreign policy of a country, it is always backed by professional

advice.

41. Vajpayee should have sculpted his foreign policy on the basis of his 1977-79

experiences as foreign minister, especially his insalubrious dealings with the

previous Pakistani military dictator, Zia ul-Haq, and his botched visit to China.

Vajpayee, however, seeks out luck and divine intervention whenever gambling with

the supreme national interests. Unfortunately for India, providence has not been on

Vajpayee’s side in such gambles. Increasingly, India’s Pakistan policy has become a

mirror image of Islamabad’s India policy. Pakistan’s neurotic obsession with India is

matched by Vajpayee’s irrational fixation on Pakistan. Neither Pervez Musharraf nor

Vajpayee can speak about Indo-Pak relations without bringing in Kashmir. This was

evident in Vajpayee’s Rajya Sabha speech, which sounded more like a justification

of his Kashmir policy than a reply to the debate on Agra. Not surprisingly, the key

questions about Agra went unanswered.

42. During the United Front Government under Mr Deve Gowda the Vatican

applied to enter the World Trade Organisation. The city state, which is the

headquarters of the Roman Catholic Church, did not want to become a full member.

All it sought was the status of an observer. There was only one country which

opposed it; India. No one in the government, neither in the commerce ministry nor in

South Block, is able to give a convincing explanation for this opposition. After India's

complete isolation on this issue was starkly brought into focus before the entire

WTO membership, the Vatican was admitted overruling Indian opposition. No one in
 38

the UF government seemed to be even considering whether it was worthwhile to put

India in such a spot within the international trade body when New Delhi was already

having problems with the WTO as a result of the government's inability to come up

with an internationally acceptable package on reducing import restrictions.

43. Take, for instance, Gujral's much-publicised visit to South Africa after

becoming the PM. The PM, steeped in Gandhian sentimentality, made his visit a

pilgrimage in honour of the Father of the Nation. By the end of the visit it put off

South Africans, a people who have just emerged from apartheid and are in a hurry

to join the modern world which has left them behind because of an antiquated

system. No doubt, the South Africans respect Gandhi, but by labouring on Gandhian

sentimentality during the visit, Gujral did more harm to Gandhism in South Africa.

Deputy President Thabo Mbeki told Gujral as much at one bilateral meeting when

he interrupted the PM who was going on and on about Gandhi: "We must go beyond

sentiments," he said. "We need to look at the future." It clearly brought out the fact

that these visits generally are not planned and lack expert advice on the country

being visited and the agenda. The mindset at work in such negative initiatives is the

same one that took Gujral on a disastrous trip seven years ago to Baghdad and

Kuwait after Iraq occupied the tiny Gulf emirate. India risked global isolation as a

result of that trip, but was salvaged by the timely exit of the V P Singh government

and a return of normalcy and logic to South Block. This time round, it may not be as

easy as in 1991 to restore equilibrium to a derailed foreign policy.

 39

CHAPTER VI

MEASURES TO ACHIEVE A PRAGMATIC FOREIGN POLICY

44. Over the past decade India has realised the importance of foreign affairs in

all aspects of governance and has taken steps towards improvement. To take an

example the post of secretary (economic relations) in the ministry of external affairs

was revived and he became the coordinating centre for all the economic activity in

the government which had an external angle. It was considered imperative in an era

where trade and investment determined foreign policy and strategic interests. There

is still scope for major changes in the organisational structure for conduct of foreign

policy. There is a need for a dedicated body of specialists in international affairs to

provide advise to the government as also act as a think tank in foreign affairs.

India's national interests and its national goals can no longer remain foggy and

obscure. These can be broadly defined as: -

(a) To protect, and guard the freedom, democracy and territorial integrity of a

sovereign secular nation to include national interests in foreign territories.

(b) To develop a high rate of socio-economic growth in a stable and peaceful

environment.
 40

(c) To promote regional cooperation, peace and security within a framework

of good bilateral relations with her neighbors.

(d) To promote international peace and security.

(e) To achieve and maintain a position in world affairs wherein India is

consulted before taking any major decisions having worldwide effects by

international bodies or groupings.

45. In essence, these amount to the maintenance of its sovereignty which is

badly threatened from external and internal forces - both military and non-military.

India needs internal stability - political as well as good law and order for its

economic development and social progress. To do that, for the next ten years,

India’s aim should be "to retain its sovereignty by ensuring self reliance,

reunification of its territories, internal stability and economic development of

its people". The doctrine which should guide its polity, diplomats and soldiers in

case of territorial conflict should be "meaningful engagement based on

reciprocity supported by a strong military capability to secure national

interests and in due course, an offensive capability to unite its territories”.20

46. Before setting out on a fresh course, the following facts should be kept in

mind: One: Nonalignment as a philosophy behind India's foreign policy has failed.

Two: without a strong military backing, foreign and economic policies cannot

20

HC Shukul, “India’s Foreign Policy – The Strategy of Non-Alignment”,Chanakya Publications, Delhi,1994,

Chapter VI and Surjit Mansingh, Surjeet Mansingh, "India's Search for Power", New Delhi, Sage Publications,
1984, Chapter IV.
 41

succeed. If India is afraid of China, it is because of its military might today and

certainly not its economic power. Three: a nation’s vital interests can also lie outside

its geographical boundaries which need to be thought of well in advance and

protected. Four: only a holistic response to include economy, diplomacy and military

will work in a changing world environment and compartmentalization won't. Five: the

Nation needs to be educated regarding its vital interests and the philosophy behind

its foreign policy including its goals. There is no dearth of means to do so in this age

of information and communication technology. 21

47. Finally, keeping India's national interests steadily in view and in full belief in

the proposed doctrine, our Foreign Policy planners should set about taking

initiatives at least ten years ahead on the various issues, some of which are listed

as follows:-

(a) To formulate and announce a pragmatic policy on India's nuclear

plans, Kashmir and towards those countries which are supplying arms to

militants, or supporting proxy wars or other irregular warfare in such a way,

that it shows India's will to preempt such moves instead of being caught off

guard.

(b) To establish workable relations, agreements and plans for the

procurement of oil and gas from Turkmenistan, Iran, Bangladesh, Myanmar

and Thailand in addition to what India is getting now.

21
Shukul, op cit., Chapter VI.
 42

(c) To forestall likely Chinese initiative in the Bay of Bengal and in the

Indian Ocean and enter into maritime agreements with Bangladesh, Sri

Lanka and Myanmar to neutralise the likely Chinese influence.

(d) To negotiate from a strong bargaining position with Beijing in such a

way that every Chinese move which threatens India's security is balanced

with a counter move.

(e) To initiate diplomatic moves which will keep the US, China and Russia

away from interfering when and if India uses force to have its territory back

from Pakistan.

(f) To launch a drive to educate India's citizenry as well as those in

outside countries - particularly the US and other countries in the West - to

remove their ignorance about India and its policies.

(g) To take diplomatic measures to ensure India’s neighbors do not get

involved in any alliances and pacts prejudicial to India's security and national

interests.

(h) To re-examine and redraft existing treaties with Nepal, Bhutan, Sri

Lanka and Bangladesh, so that foreign powers cannot use these countries

against India's interests in the future.

 43

(j) To engage Pakistan in a serious and meaningful dialogue over

resolution of Kashmir problem till there is no option left for India, but to use

force.22

(k) To formulate a mechanism to ensure that firstly, decisions concerning

foreign policy are taken in time and secondly these decisions are implemental

in case of not achieving the desired results by other means.

48. Today, India’s image both within the country and abroad is that of a weak,

dependent country which seeks aid and production from outside, a country which

has high ideas and values, but low vigour to implement these, a country which has

only adhoc foreign and defence policies. No wonder, no one listens to India any

longer because the country has nothing to give except markets and cheap labour.

And if that image is to change, then the country will need a foreign policy based on

hard realism, strength and protection of its vital interests, which may also include the

restoration of its original geographical boundaries as these were on 15 August 1947.

49. A bold beginning had been made by India in conducting five nuclear tests in

May 1998 against all kinds of international opposition. This action has launched the

country on a well charted course to change its image, provided this is followed up

with fresh initiatives. India’s foreign policy has been handicapped by a tendency to

be strident in speech and feeble in action 23. The present threat of military offensive

22

Foreign Service Institute, "India's Foreign Policy-Agenda for the 21st century, Vol I", New Delhi, Konark
Publishers Pvt Ltd, 1999, Chapter VII.
23
India Today, 22 June 1998,” The Bomb, The Budget And The BJP” Reflections on the First Quarter by
Kaushik Basu
 44

against Pakistan in response to the terrorist strike on the parliament is a step in the

right direction. However it should be understood that India has always possessed

conventional superiority over Pakistan, what we did not have was the capability to

take a tough decision or execute that decision. This capability to take decisions still

appears to be lacking as we have termed this threat of military action as a

diplomatic offensive to enable backing off if required. A threat can be termed as a

potent threat only if the adversary or the international community knows or believes

that it is being implemented and not just dangled to scare as is generally the case

with India.

50. Similarly it is very important to reorganise own intelligence agencies as they

are one of the most cost effective agencies to enforce or implement the foreign

policy of a nation, be it in the realms of economy, diplomacy or even an armed

conflict. While India has understood the need for a strong and centralised

intelligence agency, it is still undecided on the scope of these agencies in relation to

foreign affairs. Their scope can well be judged by the fact that these agencies have

been used to change unfavourable governments even by small countries, like

Pakistan in Afghanistan. Britain is known to employ its intelligence agencies to

protect its economic interests in the African countries quite frequently. In contrast ex

PM Morarji Desai in his fit of righteousness compromised Indian intelligence

agencies in Pakistan when he was informed of Pakistan’s nuclear plants coming up

in the country.

51. Another important aspect of India’s foreign policy which requires a rethink is

keeping the defence forces out of the planning and execution apparatus in all the
 45

fields. The Sri Lanka fiasco was a result of not keeping the armed forces informed of

the line of the line of thought being followed by the government and not having

adequate military intelligence on the country. Apart from the fact that the armed

forces have an inbuilt characteristic to analyse any issue in relation to national

security and national interest, the following points also merit consideration: -

(a) Though the military is no longer the exclusive tool for ensuring national

security, it is and would remain the most potent and final instrument for

fighting external aggression and imposing a decision on an adversary.

(b) Owing to the growing complexity and the wide range of issues

concerning security, there is an inescapable requirement for far more

interaction amongst various components of the security mechanism.

(c) The management of defence having become too intricate, it is not

possible for a single agency like the MOD to manage it, constituted as it is at

present.24 Hence it is necessary that all arms of a country become involved in

this process.

52. Thus, there is an inescapable need for constituting/restructuring accountable

defence agencies like a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), a National Intelligence

Agency (NIA) and an NSA to advise the Cabinet and to make them available for

consultation with the NSC as and when required. India does not have such

24

Foreign Service Institute, “India’s Foreign Policy – Agenda for the 21st Century Vol I” Konark Publishers, New
Delhi,1999, Chapter II and IV
 46

institutions even as of now and those available are more for the show window. It is

also necessary to have an expert body to continuously update itself to the rapidly

changing world scenario and suggest modifications in the foreign policy to adapt to

these changed scenarios. However the country should guard against creating

mammoth organizations like the present NSC for this purpose as it would defeat the

very purpose of forming these organizations i.e. to make available updated and

comprehensive expert advice in a very short time frame. Even the institutions on

international affairs have not been organized in a manner to carry out research in

areas of interest to the country. Students sponsored for studies in foreign countries

on the subject are forgotten on arrival or even at times on departure from the

country. The country has unnecessarily deprived itself of expert advice.

Assignments in diplomatic missions are more of a means to reward or punish

officials rather than being based on the capabilities of individuals for national

interests.

53. While it is agreed that, the main purpose of a nation's defence policy is to

ensure protection against external aggression and security from internal

insurrection, one has to take into account the developments which have taken place

in military technology and the means and methods of warfare. External threats have

taken many surreptitious forms instead of direct military threats. Today, as

mentioned earlier, threats are made to loom large over the country without actually

invading it, thus avoiding direct confrontation. These threats can vary from merely

positioning nuclear and chemical weapons, as the Chinese have done in Tibet, to

supporting a proxy war from a base or bases from a hostile country, as is happening

in J&K. Defence policy as such has to take into account plans to counter such
 47

contingencies including commitments outside the country in support of the UN

missions after taking a holistic view. Thus a defence policy cannot be segregated

from foreign policy. Also as defence policy is primarily to dissuade a foreign country,

there is an urgent need to have inter-ministry coordination (not just dialogue) on

both, the foreign policy as well as defence policy.

54. Our Constitution gives unfettered powers to the government to use the armed

forces anywhere in the world for any duration they like. In the US, the President can

employ the armed forces for six days under the Powers Act and no more, after

which, he must seek Congressional approval. Therefore, it is time that we in India

too thought of similar restrictions and the need for Parliamentary endorsement by at

least two-thirds majority when the government wants to continue the employment of

armed forces beyond six days, or the country would continue to have cases like the

induction of IPKF in Sri Lanka without any restraints. Hence, a volatile strategic

environment in which the Indian region is placed today needs long-term strategy. 25

Another important failing which needs to be rectified is that the Armed Forces must

know about those foreign policy objectives for which the nation will be willing to

make a military commitment.26 It would not be going too far to say that the armed

forces should be involved in the planning, formulation and execution phase of the

foreign policy. This can be best achieved by taking in a considerable number of

officers from the armed forces on deputation to man the specific desks of countries

which constitute or are likely to constitute a military threat to the country in near

future or even in times to come. Members of the armed forces should also be

25

Kiran Karnik, “The Emerging Communication Scenario”,Vikram Sarabhai Foundation Lecture, New Delhi,
1996.
26
S C Gangal, “India’s Foreign Policy”, Youth Asia Publications,1996 p134.
 48

integrated in the diplomatic missions in non military assignments to enable them to

understand the inter relationship between various facets of a diplomatic mission

which would broaden his horizon with respect to foreign policy and international

affairs.

55. Development of Indian Diplomatic Capabilities. In today’s scenario the

Ministry for External Affairs (MEA) is the sole controlling body of the external affairs

and foreign policy of the nation and the MEA vested with such powers and

responsibilities is woefully inadequate to discharge its duties efficiently. Although

there exists the apex Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs (CCPA) under, the

Prime Minister comprising the MEA, the MOD, MHA and the Finance Ministry, this

body needs to be more articulate and clearer in its role. The MEA and the MOD

especially, need to work in tandem and close interaction and not in glorious isolation

as is the case at present on strategic subjects. A strong bond of mutual interaction

needs to be established between the purveyors of our foreign, domestic and

security policies. There is also the requirement to bring in independent and original

ideas on such issues by incorporating think tank bodies comprising academician,

strategists, economist’s etc. Such a body would be able to provide objective views

on contemporary issues to assist the government in formulating its policies and

responses.
 49

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

“With so many forecasts of a multipolar world, it should have been clear

that India would have a significant place in it. But little analytical work has been
done on the emerging poles and even less on the potential relations among them.
From a strategic standpoint, however, this is a crucial issue…like nature abhors
vacuum: Soviet empire’s disappearance inevitably had further consequences. …But
China will not stand unchallenged on the Asian stage. The clearest challenge was
not issued by China’s potential rival Japan, which is experiencing an alarming-
hopefully temporary-decline on the international scene. It came from India, still poor
and weak. If the fall of the Berlin Wall signalled the end of an era, the India tests
could be an Early Warning of the new times at hand. The twenty-first century has
begun”.

-Therese Delpech 27

56. Pragmatism and empiricism which is so essential for success in human

affairs are even more essential for the conduct of a successful foreign policy,

because of the nature of present international society. It is a highly complex and

competitive society of sovereign nation states. These states, with their diverse and

conflicting ambitions, vagaries and varieties of tradition, are constantly striving for

their own highly individual vitals national interests (apart from the common interest

of all to survive as sovereign, independent nations). In spite of the great many rules

of international law and organisation and diplomatic conduct, it is not easy to predict

and control the behaviour of states or the kind of international situations that might

27
Therese Delpech, Nuclear Weapons and the ‘New World Order’:Early Warning from Asia, Survival , vol 40,
no 4,Winter 1998-99, pp.57-76.
 50

come to pass. In the circumstances, it is at best unwise, and at worst dangerous, for

any state to talk and behave self-righteously, or to rely only on the self executing

goodness of theoretical principles, however sound, or to proclaim in advance what it

would do or would not do in a certain contingency, or rule out any particular course

of action. Any state that does any of these things is bound, sooner or later, to have

to swallow its words and pride, and act contrary to its previously proclaimed

positions, thereby face humiliation and ridicule from its critics and friends alike.

Therefore, the prudent thing to do is to retain as much freedom of action as possible

(consistent with the respect for the rules of international law, and organisation and

diplomacy) so that it can speak and act appropriately to the occasion. All this is not a

lesson in opportunism; on the contrary, it would be sheer opportunism to proclaim

one thing in advance and go back on it later. 28

57. India despite being a major country in the world politics has not been able to

achieve its rightful place; amply brought out by the fact that we are running pillar to

post to ensure a place in the reconstituted Security Council as a permanent

member. India is a developing country with wide spread poverty: this could in part

be attributed to lack of social and economic development over the past 50 years.

Social and economical developments are India’s urgent needs. The aim of India’s

foreign policy should therefore, be to achieve rapid economic growth with honour.

India potentially possesses all the currency of world power and over a decade of

successful economic performance clouded only by China, i.e. a suitable location,

size, population as well as a GNP increasing in the vicinity of 5 to 8 percent

annually, and considering India’s technological base, India can well be the ‘strategic

dark horse’ in the early 21st century. This is not possible unless India continuously
28
Studies on India’s Foreign Policy, M S Rajan, ABC Publishing House, N Delhi, p75
 51

remains abreast to changes occurring around the globe and take appropriate steps

with ultimate objectives in view. India should also not try to keep her armed forces

out of the gambit of foreign policy, but try to integrate them along with economic

analysts as military threat from Pakistan and China is for real and cannot be wished

away. India’s response to this threat is and will be watched by the world with

interest.

58. Although the United States looms large on Indian foreign policy, the

prospects for greater Indian autonomy, rests on revitalisation of relations with the

other great powers – Russia, European Union, China and Japan. The basic Indian

objective should be to, maximising room for manoeuvre in international politics. The

search for greater political space for itself in a unipolar world has also raised the

prospects of alliances. One possibility is to look at a grand coalition between India,

Russia and China (some throw in Iran as well) to balance the overwhelming

preponderance of the United States. The other option is to jump onto the U.S.

bandwagon to maximise India’s capabilities. Neither of these options is likely to

become a viable one for India’s foreign policy. India, China, Russia and Iran all need

and are seeking cooperation with the United States to advance their own national

development despite having innumerable political problems with the United States.

India also knows that as permanent members of the UN Security Council and as the

self-appointed guardians of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Washington,

Moscow and Beijing have many common interests, some of which may run counter

to New Delhi’s. After the Pokharan tests, India has also deepened its dialogue with

the European Union – France in particular – and Russia, and is in the process of

mending ties with Japan. Slowly but steadily, India is moving towards a realistic
 52

foreign policy framework that sheds some of its past emphases on ideology and

political first principles. India is beginning to break out of its traditional defensive

mindset and putting across a more self-confident and outward looking approach

which needs to be continued.29

59. The socialist legacies of the Nehru era are impediments to India’s realizing its

full potential as a major and dynamic economic power. The conflict with Pakistan is

a core issue and the difference with China a handicap. India’s neighbours tend to

view her as over-armed, over-weaning and hegemonic. Anxious to project itself on

the World State, India appeared irritated at regional hurdles in her aspirations to

prominence. With its present foreign policy, India finds itself sans a set of useful

friendships in her own immediate neighbourhood. Analysts contrast India’s

supercilious attitude to regional neighbours with Indonesia’s finesse in handling

smaller neighbours in South East Asia. Similarly India’s potential is tied primarily to

its neighbourhood, but instead of realizing this potential, India has frightened all its

neighbours.

60. India has generally seen itself as a world power in the making, and

conducted its regional and international relations on this basis since the early 90s.

The result has been insignificance abroad, suspicion in the region and turbulence at

home. It would be better advised to revere this process. Stability and prosperity at

home and in the region will enhance its international status and give credibility to its

claims to international pre-eminence apart from a structured approach towards

foreign policy involving all the ministries and departments.

29
C Raja Mohan, in Looking East, a symposium on the need to refocus our foreign policy in Mar 2000.
 53

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

1. A Theory of Foreign Policy by Modelski George., London Pall Mall Press,

1962.

2. Studies on India’s Foreign Policy by M S Rajan, ABC Publishing House, N

Delhi, 1993.

3. India’s Foreign Policy by S C Gangal, Youth Asia Publications,1996.

4. Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan by

Hafeez Malik, St Martin’s Press.

5. The Making of India’s Foreign Policy by J Bandyopadhyaya, Allied

Publishers, 1970.

6. Re-powering National Security, Maj Gen VK Madhok, Aditya

Prakashan,1998.

7. Cooperative Security and S. Asian Insecurity, Kanti Bajpai and Stephen P

Cohen, The Brookings Institute, 1994.

8. A wounded Civilisation, V.S Naipaul.

9. India’s Foreign Policy – The Strategy of Non-Alignment, HC Shukul,

Chanakya Publications, Delhi,1994
 54

10. India's Search for Power, Surjeet Mansingh, Sage Publications, New Delhi,
1984.

11. India's Foreign Policy-Agenda for the 21st century, Foreign Service Institute,
New Delhi, Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd, 1999.
12. Non-Provocative Defense by Pant KC.
13. India-A Superpower?- A complete blueprint for making India a superpower by
AD 2000, Israni Kimat and Israni Haku, New Delhi, Lancer International, 1989.

Magazines and News Papers

13. The Hindu

14. The Times of India
15. Indian Express
16. The Hindustan Times
17. India Today
18. Outlook
19. Survival
20. USI Journal
21. NEWSWEEK

Internet Sites

22. www.meadv.gov.in/
23. www.meadv.nic.in/
24. www.indianembassy.org
25. www.hinduonnet.com
26. www.rand.org
27. www.afpc.org
28. www.fsc-mea.org
29. www.asiasociety.org
30. www.tehelka.com
31. www.irs.org.pk
 55

32. www.ipcs.org
33. www.capitalismmagazine.com

Kiran Karnik, “The Emerging Communication Scenario”,Vikram Sarabhai

Foundation Lecture, New Delhi, 1996.
C Raja Mohan, in Looking East, a symposium on the need to refocus our foreign
policy in Mar 2000.

(l) Israni Kimat and Israni Haku, India-A Superpower?- A complete blueprint for
making India a superpower by AD 2000,New Delhi, Lancer International, 1989.