The Big Questions of Public Management

Author(s): Robert D. Behn

Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 1995), pp. 313-324
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/977122 .
Accessed: 10/12/2013 13:58

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Wiley and American Society for Public Administration are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to Public Administration Review.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 200.0.176.44 on Tue, 10 Dec 2013 13:58:27 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 I I ~ ~ ~ ~ ''

The
Big of Mng
Questions
Public
Robert
D. Behn,
Duke
University

Whatarethebigquestions
thatscholars
ofpublic
management
WhT~enever physicists theydiscuss
gettogether,
shouldbe attempting-through
theirresearch-toanswer?Robert
XYSi / thebigquestions
ofphysics. have
Physicists
D. Behnsuggests
threeconsciously
prescriptive
questions: vYv bigquestions aboutthe universe:
How did
(1) The micromanagement
questionaskshowpublic managers
can theuniverse begin(Weinberg,1993)? Whendidthe
breakthemicromanagement
cycleofprocedural
rules,whichpre- universe begin?Howbigis theuniverse(whichis the
ventpublicagenciesfrom
producingresults,
whichleadsto more samequestion as howoldis theuniverse)
(Flamsteed,
proceduralrules,which... (2) The motivation
questionaskshow 1992)?Willtheuniversecontinuetoexpandforever,or
public managerscan motivate
peopleto workenergetically
and willit eventually
stopexpandingandthenstartcon-
intelligently
towardsachievingpublicpurposes.
(3) The measure- tracting(Weinberg,
1993;37;Ferris,
1988;354)?
mentquestionaskshowpublic managerscan measuretheachieve-
Physicists
alsohavebigquestions
aboutthecomposi-
mentsoftheiragenciesin waysthathelpto increasethoseachieve-
tionofmatter.Whatarethemostbasicbuildingblocks
ments.Moreover,Behnargues,ifthestudyofpublicmanagement is
orelementary from
particles whichallphysicalobjects
"
to become"scientific,
it needstofocuson theseand otherbigques-
areconstructed? Howdo thesebuildingblocksinter-
tions.
act?Thatis,whataretheforces
thatholdtheseelemen-
taryparticles orpushthemapart(Adair,
together 1987;
208-229;Ferris,1988;285-299;Rohrlich,
1987;196-
201)?
inphysics,
Indeed, there arenumerousbigquestions.
Forexample, NobelPrizewinnerStevenWeinberg
(1993;75) writes,"Thetheory oftheformation of
is oneofthegreatoutstanding
galaxies problems of
astrophysics."
"Theformation ofgalaxies
providesone
ofthethorniest problems in cosmology,"observes
MichaelRowan-Robinson (1977;60). "Despiteinten-
sivework,no solutionhasbeenproduced whichdoes
notamount tosaying:
a galaxyformsbecausetheinitial
conditionsoftheuniverse preordained
thatitwould."
all knowwhatthesebigquestions
Physicists are,what
alternative
answersexist,andhowdifferent peopleare
attemptingtosortoutthesealternatives,
tocreatenew
alternatives,
andanswerthequestions.

Public
Administration
Review* July/August
1995,
VoL55,No.4 313

This content downloaded from 200.0.176.44 on Tue, 10 Dec 2013 13:58:27 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Geta groupofpaleontologists andthey,
together, too,will
begindiscussing
dinosaurs
thebigquestions
dieout?Whendidhumans
oftheir
field:Whydidthe
gettotheAmerican con-
I \e,
ought
too, tohave our ownbig that
questions
tinentsl 1992)?Oneofthebigquestions
(Gutin, forpaleontol- we discuss
and debatewhen we gettogether.
ogistsandpaleoanthropologists
is: Howdidhuman lifeevolve?
At themoment, therearetwocompeting theories (Gutin,
particles
(Weinberg,1993; 88), physicists
generally
agreeupon
1992). Thereis theregional theory:Homoerectus
continuity
a standardmodelforthestructure oftruly
elementaryparticles:
leftAfricaabouta million
yearsagoandevolvedindependently 24 bosons(includingphotons),6 leptons(includingtheelec-
intothree different,
modern populationsofhomo sapiensorigi- tronand theneutrino), and quarks. Baryons(includingpro-
nallybasedinEurope,Asia,andtheMiddleEastandAfrica (Li
tonsandneutrons) areeachmadeup of3 quarks, whilemesons
andEtler, 1992).ThereisalsotheoutofAfricatheory: weare
consistof 1 quarkand 1 anti-quark.Thereare 18 different
all thedirectdescendantsofa singlehomosapien, a woman
kindsof quarks:Theycome in 6 flavors(up, down,strange,
calledEve,wholivedinAfrica only200,000years ago(Cann, charm,top,and
bottom)as wellas in 3 different
colors(red,
Stoneking, andWilson,1987).
green,and blue) (Adair,1987; 347; Ferris,1988; 292-298;
StephenJayGould,theprolific describes
paleontologist, how Rohrlich, 1987; 196-201).
therevisionofthehistoryofevolution forgedbythefossils
No physicist,however, hasseena quark.Indeed,theoretical
foundintheBurgessShaleofBritish
Columbia 'posestwogreat physicssuggeststhatfreequarkscannotexist(Rohrlich, 1987;
problemsaboutthehistory oflife."First,
whydidmodern,
198;Weinberg, 1993; 141, 164-165). Thus,a bigquestionfor
lifeeruptin theCambrian
multicell explosionofdiversity
experimentalphysicsis: Do quarksexist?Weinberg(1993;
rather
thanevolveslowlyandcontinuously? Second, whydid 142), an
elementary-particle writes:"The puzzleof
physicist,
someofthecreaturescreatedbytheCambrian sur-
explosion the nonexistence of isolatedfreequarksis one of the most
viveandevolvewhileothersdisappeared
(Gould,1989;55-60,
important problemsfacingtheoretical physicsat thepresent
227-233)?
moment."
In July1900,at theInternational ofMathemati-
Congress
Some of us maythinkthatthesebig questionsarenot all
ciansin Paris,themathematicianDavidHilbert(1902) set
thatimportant.Wouldit reallyhavebeenworthtenbillion
forthwhathe thought werethe23 mostimportant unsolved
dollarsto builda 54-milesubatomicracetrack
in Texasthat
problemsin mathematics-theonesthathethought hisdisci-
couldcrashtwobeamsof protonsintoeach otherhopingto
plineshouldaddressinthenextcentury. a century
Nearly later,
smashthemapartintotheirmostelementary,component parti-
mathematicians continue
toworkon someofHilbert's prob-
cles,thatis, quarks?Theoretical
physicists what
predict these
lems(Browder,1974).
elementary are. Experimental
particles needhigh-
physicists
Getanygroupofscientists fromanybranchofscience speedacceleratorsto breakdownstableparticlesintothesepre-
together,
andthey willstarttalking
aboutthebigquestions
in dictedelementary so thattheycan be observed
particles (orso
their thelatest
field, researchpublished
aboutthosequestions,thatsome phenomenapredictedby theirexistencecan be
andhowthey, through theirownresearch,areattempting
to observed)andthusverified.In thistimeofbudgetdeficits,
a lot
tackle
thosesamebigquestions.2Anyfield
ofscience
isdefinedofus,and particularly
thoseofus in theU.S. HouseofRepre-
bythebigquestions
itasks. didnotthinkthatanswering
sentatives, thisquestionwarranted
the
ofpublicmanage-building Superconducting
The sameoughtto be trueforscholars Supercollider.That does not
ment.We,too,oughttohaveourownbigquestions mean that the question is nota bigone forphysics.It simply
thatwe
discuss
anddebate means that the nonphysicistsofthecountrywouldrather spend
whenwegettogether. Thesearetheques-
tionsonwhichweoughttofocusourresearch. $10 billion on answering some otherquestion,or perhaps on
Thesearethe
weoughttoseekdataanddeviseclever
questions actingon the basisof some questionto which (we think)we
methodolo-
havetheanswer.
giestoanswer.
Thesebigquestionsoughttodefine of already
thefield
publicmanagement.
TheScientific
Methodand
TheBigQuestions
andScience theBigQuestions
Thebigquestions aboutphysics
arewhatmakeita science. How do scientistsanswertheirbig questions? Success
Physicsalwayshasa number ofbigquestionsit is trying
to involvesmultipleingredients: wisdom,hardwork,and,some-
answer,andit hasa senseofhowthosequestions shouldbe times,luck. In science,observeNathanSpielbergandBryonD.
answered.Forsomeofthebigquestions,physicists
havesatis- Anderson(1987; 12), "Oftendumbluck,sometimescalled
fiedthemselves
thatthey
havetheanswers.Thebig-bang theo- serendipity,
playsa roleeitherin revealing
a keypieceofinfor-
ryofthebeginningoftheuniverse
issowidely
accepted bycos- mationor in revealinga particularly
simplesolution."Some-
mologists,thatit is called"thestandardmodel"(Weinberg, times,suchserendipity helpsscientists
discover
theanswerto a
1993; 4). Althougheverysix monthstheBerkeley Lawrence questionthattheydid notknowtheyweresupposedto be ask-
Laboratorypublishesa listof literally
hundreds
of subatomic ing. In an effort
to answer
one bigquestion,theymayendup

314 Public
Administration
Review* July/August
Vol.55,No.4
1995,

This content downloaded from 200.0.176.44 on Tue, 10 Dec 2013 13:58:27 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 I cientists
donot
Scientists
start
start
with
with
ormethods.
data
questions.
endeavorscientific.
questions
uponthequestion
methodologies
It is an effort
ina systematic
to answer
major,
way.Whatsystematic
anduponthetype
thatareavailable
important
means

to helpanswer
depends
ofdataandcorresponding
thequestion.
The workis driven bythequestion, notbythedataor the
answering another.Forexample,in 1826,Otto Unverdorbenmethodology. Thescientist doesnotask: Whatquestiondoes
was attempting to producea synthetic formof indigobut mydatahelpmeanswer? Nordoesthescientist
ask: What
insteaddiscovered moleculein thechemi- question
aniline,an important canmymethodology helpmeanswer? thesci-
Rather,
cal andpharmaceutical
industries
(Messadie,1991;2, 18). asks:Whatdataandmethodology
entist wouldbemosthelpful
in answering
myfield's questions? Andtheleadingscientists
strikes
Serendipity a lot morefrequently,
however, thansci-
it. Thatis,mostofthetimetheluckyobserva-
ask: What dataand methodologies would be most
helpfulin
entistsrecognize
answeringmy field's
bigquestions?
tionofsome data no in
revealing produces increase knowledge;
thosewhowereblessedwiththeserendipitous datadid notrec- Scientists
do notstart
withdataormethods.Scientists
start
ognizeits implications.Afterall, how manypeopleoverthe with questions.
millenniawereboppedon theheadby a fallingapplebefore
Isaac Newtondiscovered gravity?Everyancestorof Newton
had watchedobjectsfall;yethe was thefirst one,buildingon Three inPublic
BigQuestions Management
theideasofKeplerandGalileo,whodiscovered thelawofgrav-
Doesthefieldofpublicmanagementhave23 bigquestions
ity. It takesa prepared
scientist-someonewhoknowswhatthe
forthenextcentury?Somescholarsmay arguethatthere
are
big questionsare-to recognize whenan answerto an unan-
fewertruly somemaythink
bigquestions; aremore.Here
there
sweredquestionfortuitously presentsitself.Forserendipity
to
aremynominations forthreebigquestions
(concerningthe
reallyworkin science,theluckyscientist mustsimultaneously
fundamentalmanagement dilemmasof micromanagement,
recognize boththeanswer andthequestion.
andmeasurement)
motivation, thatcertainly inthetop
belong
JosephH. Taylor, Jr.,andRussellA. Hulsewereawardedthe ten.
1993 Nobel Prizeforphysicsfordiscovering a binarypulsar.
1. Micromanagement: Howcanpublicmanagers breakthe
Pulsarsarecollapsed, rotatingstarsthatemitbeaconsofelectro-
magneticradiation,muchas a lighthouse
micromanagement cycle-an excess
of procedural rules,
emitsa beaconof
whichpreventspublic from
agencies producing results,
light. Moreover, therotational frequency of thepulsar,and
whichleadstomoreprocedural which
rules, leadsto...?
thusthetiming between theirbeaconsofradiation is extremely
constant.TaylorandHulse,however, discovereda pulsarwhose 2. Motivation:Howcanpublicmanagers motivate people
frequencywasmodulated.This,obviously, waspureluck.Even (public aswellasthose
employees outsidetheformalauthor-
discoveringa newpulsaris luck;youjusthappento pointyour ityofgovernment)to workenergetically
andintelligently
radiotelescopein itsdirection. towardsachieving
publicpurposes?
Recognizing theimplications luckis notluck. 3. Measurement:
of scientific Howcan publicmanagers measurethe
Taylorand Hulserecognized:(1) thatfrequency ofthepulsar's achievements oftheiragenciesinwaysthathelptoincrease
beamvariedbecauseitwasrotating in orbitwithanother pulsar those
achievements?
(whosebeamwasnotpointedtowards earth),(2) thatthispair
of orbitingpulsarsshouldemit,according
Allthree ofthesequestionsaremanagement questions-pre-
to Einstein's
theory
ofgeneralrelativity,
gravity
waves,andthus(3) thatthispairof scriptive
questions. Each asks"How canpublic managers...?"
pulsarscould be used to testthetheoryof generalrelativity.
Each question asks how publicmanagers might accomplish
Taylorand HulsewontheNobelPrizenotforfinding a pulsar
something-how theymight best dealwith a fundamental
witha beaconwhosefrequency modulated butforrecognizing
dilemmathatconfronts most(ifnotall)publicmanagers.Each
theimplicationsofthatmodulation and usingthatimplication
is
question based on theassumptionthat thejob ofthepublic
to testone ofthebigquestions of20th-century physics:Is the
manager-and public-management scholars-isnotonlyto
theory ofgeneralrelativity
correct? understandthebehavior of public
agenciesbutalsotoimprove
theperformance
oftheseagencies.
Thereareother,
social-sci-
As scholarsofpublicmanagement aspireto maketheirfield enceversionsofthesequestions
thataredescriptive
(e.g.,What
a science,they,too,needto focuson bigquestions.Unfortu- motivates people?)thatmayhelpanswer thesemanagement
nately,theeffortto createa scienceofadministration-to make questions.Nevertheless, thesethreebigquestions arecon-
management lookmorelikephysics (or,at least,morelikeeco- sciouslyprescriptive.
Thepurpose,forexample, is notmerely
nomics)-has led to an emphasison methodology, on the tostudy motivation
buttounderstand howourexisting knowl-
manipulation of data. Afterall, realscientistsworkwithreal edgeaboutwhatmotivates peoplecombined withnewinsights
data,thatis, numbers(preferably numbers withmanysignifi- canactually beusedbypublicmanagers toimprovegovernment
cantdigits).Too often, theresultis methodologically sophisti- performance.
catedresearchthataddress small,trivialissues.
If public-managementscholarscould answerthesethree
A reverenceformethodology is not,however, whatmakesan questions,theywouldmakea significant contribution
to the

The BigQuestions
ofPublicManagement 315

This content downloaded from 200.0.176.44 on Tue, 10 Dec 2013 13:58:27 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
IHlow can
the andexecutive
legislative agency
maycondudethesamething:Ifallthe
Thelegislature
cando isfollow
rulesright
wehadbetter
rules, writethose
so thattheydon'thaveanyopportunity
to
learn
totrust
branches each
other? therules
misinterpret andmakeanevenbigger
mess.3
Allthismight
be reducedtoa succinct
question:
ofpublicmanagers
ability to gettheir topro-
publicagencies
duceresults.
Indeed, wouldalsomakea significant
they contri- Themicromanagementquestion:How canpublicmanagers
butiontoproducing
these
results. cydeofdistrust,
breakthemicromanagement rules,poorper-
morerules,more...?
moredistrust,
formance,
oftheproblem
Thisdescription suggests thatthelegislature
TheMicromanagement
Question is thecauseoftheproblem.4Indeed,merely callingtheprob-
Scholars,
journalists,publicmanagers, andpubliccommis-lemone ofmicromanagement impliesthatthelegislature
is the
sionshaveidentifiedmicromanagement as a majorproblemin badguy.I suspectmanyofthosewhoarepartofthemovement
thepublicsector."Congressis commonly criticized
for'micro-to deregulategovernment (Dilulio, 1994) maythinkprecisely
managing' government agencies,"writes JamesQ. Wilson that.
(1989;241);'it does,andalways has.""[Tlherearefactors
that
leadthegovernment toattempt tomicromanage (viz.,monitorThe TrustQuestion
and controlin exacting detail),"writeRobertAustinand Yet,theproblem'scausalarrowdoesnotjustrunin onedirec-
PatrickLarkey (1992;4), andthis"micromanagementisexpen- tion. thelegislativebranchdistruststheexecutive
Certainly
sive."TheNational Commission ontheStateandLocalPublic branch;thatis,infact,
whyitimposes so manyrules.Atthesame
Service(1993;2)-The Winter Commission-sought to"move time,however, theexecutive
alsodistrusts
thelegislature
(National
usawayfrom an encrusted andoutmoded ofcommandAcademy
system of PublicAdministration,1992). In fact(although it
andcontrol anditsrule-bound management thatemphasizeswouldrequire ofthealliteration
somesacrifice advantage),thisbig
constraintsandprocess."The National PerformanceReview questionmight bebetterdefinedas oneoftrust:Howcantheleg-
(1993;p. iii)soughttoeliminate "thestructures
ofovercontrolislative
and executivebranches learnto trusteachother? Thus,
andmicromanagement thatnowbindthefederal government." anotherstatementofthisbigquestion be:
might
taleisoldandfamiliar.
Themicromanagement Thetrustquestion:How can publicmanagers reducethe
branch
Thelegislative is,forsome reason, with
unhappy distrustthat appears to be inherentin the relationship
thewayanexecutive-branch agencyisbehaving;
sothe betweenthe legislativeand executivebranchesof govern-
legislators
impose somerulesontheagency.(This ment-and thatalso inhibitstheperformanceofgovernment
unhappiness often outofa scandal
arises oroutofsome agencies?
errorthatistransformed intoa scandal.)Thesenew Of course,thelegislatureand theexecutive arenottheonly
rulesprevent, oratleastconstrain, theagencyfrom twounitsofgovernment thatfailto trusteachother.The polit-
doing whatthelegislaturedislikes. these
Unfortunately, ical managers of publicagenciesfrequently distrust
thecareer
rulesalsoconstrain theagency from producingthe
employees of thatagency(Heclo, 1977; 181-190;Kaufman,
for
results which itisresponsible.Therulesmaymerely
1981; 192). This is particularlytruewhenthepoliticalman-
impose opportunitycosts ontheagency, requiring
itto
agershavejusttakenovertheir jobs;itis doublytruewhenthey
devotesomeofitslimited resources
tocomplying
with
havejusttakenovertheirjobs frompoliticalmanagers of the
therules(oratleastfilling outthepaperworktoshow
oppositeparty.Nevertheless, evenwhenpoliticalmanagers
thatitcomplied withtherules). Ortherulesmayactu-
havebeenin thejob fora while(although, toooften,"a while"
allypreventitfrom taking anintelligent
anduseful
step
neverlastsverylong), theyoftendo not trusttheircareer
toproduce thedesired results.
Inanycase,theagency's
employees.Consequently (according to Newton'sthirdlaw of
productivity
doesnotmatch expectations.
politics:"To everypoliticalactionthereis alwaysopposedan
Thismakesthelegislature
unhappy-again.
Clearlythe equalreaction"),thecareeremployees reactbynottrusting their
agencyisnotbeing
managed Thelegisla-
intelligently. politicalmanagers.Similarly,ofcourse,thestaff and oversight
tors,
however,cannotmanagetheagency
directly.
They agenciesdo not trustthelineagencies(and viceversa). The
canonlydoit indirectly
byimposingsomeadditional question abouttrust,
therefore,might be broadened:
rules
tohelptheagency
better
understand
what
itissup-
Thetrustquestion(modified):How can publicmanagers
posedtodo. Theagency's
productivity
declines
stillfur-
reducethedistrust
thatappearsto be inherent
in therelation-
which
ther, reinforces
thelegislature's
viewthatthe
shipbetweendifferentunitsof government-and thatconse-
agencyisbadly
managed.Soitimposes
still
more rules.
quentlyinhibits
theperformance ofgovernmentagencies?
Soon,theagencyisdevoting
a significant
portion
ofits
resources
tocomplying
with
allthese
rules.Indeed,
the Whetheryoucallitthemicromanagement questionor thetrust
agency
mayconclude
thatitsonlyrealpurpose
isto fol- question,
thequestionis certainly
a bigone thatis clearly
wor-
lowtherules. thyofseriousthought
andresearch.

316 Public
Administration
Review* July/August
1995,
Vol.55,No.4

This content downloaded from 200.0.176.44 on Tue, 10 Dec 2013 13:58:27 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Indeed, a varietyofrecommendations havebeenoffered to
dealwiththistrust
example,
problem. TheWinter
callsfor"anewwayofoperating"
Commission,
inthepublic
for
sector,
The
cleandivision
oflabor between and
politics
"which istobuildtrust andlead."TheNational Performanceadministration isanappealing conceptthatis,
Review (1993;14)concluded: "Wecannot empower employ-
eestogiveustheir bestwork unless
weeliminate much ofthe unfortunately,completelyunconnectedtoreality
redtapethat nowprevents it."
Thetheoretical andempirical supportforsuchrecommen- quently,"theexecution ofthesepolicies" involves
necessarily
dationsmay not, however,beasstrong aswe,ortheiradvocates, choicesamong Askedtopursue
policies. wondrous policies
yet
would like.Todevelop specific recommendations
policy that givenonlylimited resources,publicmanagers mustchoosethe
address thebigquestion abouttrust, wemust first
answer a policieson whichto concentrate thoseresources. Whenan
number ofsmaller butstillimportanttheoretical
andempirical agency manager makes suchchoices, heorsheis alsochoosing
questionsabout trust: withwhichkeylegislators (orpolitical to disagree.
executives)
* What These policy makers may then reactquicklyto establish
their
exactlyisthesource ofthedistrust
between theleg-
islative supremacy. Thatiswhen agencymanagers scream "microman-
andexecutive branches?5
agement.
* Whatexamples existofthatdistrust
being significantlyThecleandivision
reduced? oflaborbetween andadministra-
politics
tionis an appealingconcept thatis,unfortunately,
completely
* Howwasthat distrustreduced? Whotookwhat criticalunconnected toreality.
Thus,thegovernance offers
perspective
actions? Whatspecial circumstances
contributedtothis another waytoframe thisbigquestion:
reduction indistrust? Canthoseactions andcircum-
stances bereproduced inother Ifso,what
settings? does The governance
how
question:Howcanpublicmanagers help
ittake todothat? clarify legislators,
political and
executives, careercivil
ser-
vantsshouldshareresponsibilities forpolicy-making and
* Arethere otherwaystoreduce distrust? implementation?

TheGovernance Question The Entrepreneurship Question

Insomeways, thesebigquestionsabout micromanagement In thinking
aboutthetasksofpolicymakingandimplemen-
andtrustaresimplya reformulation
oftheoldquestionabout tation,
ColinS. Diver(1982)hasdefinedtwomodelsofpublic
Howshould
"governance." government function?
Howshouldmanagement: theengineeringmodelandtheentrepreneurial
wedecidewhat government willdo?Howshould responsibili-
model.The engineer merelysupervisese]
theexecutionofa
tiesbedividedbetween thelegislative
andexecutive
branches?previously
defined governmentalpolicy;"theentrepreneur
Howshould responsibilities
bedivided betweenpolitical
execu-"definesratherthanacceptsgoals."Eachmodelhasitsown
tivesandcareercivilservants? To whatextentshouldone advantagesanddrawbacks.
branchbeabletocheck theother?Afterall,James
Madison did The
notbelieve
intrust. entrepreneurial
modeloffers
a gooddescription
ofreali-
tybutcreatesan ethical
problem:It is in "apparent conflict
In articulating
hisdichotomybetweenpolitics
andadminis-withdemocratic theory."
This,writesDiver,createsa dilemma:
tration, Woodrow Wilsonsought toanswerthisgovernance "Theentrepreneurial
modelseems, to manyat least,themore
question. AsFrank J.Goodnow (1900)summarizedit,"Poli- faithful
imageofreality,
yetit is morallyunacceptable. The
ticshastodo withpolicies orexpressions
ofthestatewill. engineeringmodelis ethically
preferable,butunrealistic." To
Administrationhastodowith theexecution
ofthesepolicies."resolve
thisdilemma,Diveralsoofferstwoapproaches: "Make
Thepoliticalleaderswouldmake thepolitical
decisions
about theengineeringmodelmorerealizableorrehabilitatetheethical
public then
policy; thecareer
officials
wouldsimplyfigure
out status ofentrepreneurship."
Mostoftheeffort hasgoneinto
themost efficient
waytoimplement these
policies.
Woodrowthefirst strategy,
whosesuccess,notesDriver,is "severely
limit-
Wilson (1887)wrote:
"this
discrimination
betweenadministra- ed bysomerather intractable
realities."
Thus,hesuggests that
tionandpoliticsis now,happily,
tooobviousto needfurtherit mightbe better"to elevatetheethicalstatusof the
discussion." entrepreneurial
strategy."
Unhappily,
thissimpledivision
oflaborismuch harder
to Butthetaskisnotmerely
toimprove thereputation
ofpub-
implement
thantoassert.Thelegislature's
(orexecutive's)
poli- licentrepreneurship.
Rather,
to resolve
thedilemmabetween
cystatements
arerarely
soexplicit
astoleaveonly
thetechnical andentrepreneurship,
engineering we mustdetermine what
details
ofimplementation
tobeworkedoutbytheadministrat-kindofentrepreneurship
is acceptable
anddesirable.
Whom
ingagency.
Indeed,thetask
ofenacting
legislation-of
negoti-willwepermit tobe entrepreneurs?
Whomdo wewanttobe
atingan agreement amonga majorityof legislators-often entrepreneurs? What are the ethical boundarieson
requires
thatthese"expressions
of thestatewill"be indefinite,entrepreneurship?
What is our politicalphilosophyabout
unclear,ambiguous,confusing,
or evencontradictory.Conse- entrepreneurship
bypublicmanagers?

TheBigQuestions
ofPublic
Management 317

This content downloaded from 200.0.176.44 on Tue, 10 Dec 2013 13:58:27 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Theentrepreneurship Howcanpublicmanagers
question:
dfineanddevelop
agement
an entrepreneurial
thatisnotonlynecessary
approachtopublicman-
butalsolegitimate
andethical?
Indeed,the
for public economists
sector, have
Thesearenottheonlydefinitionsofthebigquestionabout transformed
the big questionabout into
motivation a
micromanagement ortrust orgovernanceorentrepreneurship.
Therearea variety
ofother waystoframe thesameorsimilar question aboutcontrol.
andnotmuchwillbe gained
questions,6 bydebatingtheexact
formulation
ofthequestion. theissueiswhether
Rather, thisis The motivationquestion(pincipal-agentversion):How
a bigquestion-worthy ofserious
research-and,ifso,what canthelegislature andhowcanpolitical
controltheexecutive,
approaches
might bebestforanswering thequestion.7
Beforea managerscontrolcivilservants?
majorresearch is launched
effort toanswer thequestion,how-
This principal-agentversionof themotivational
question
weoughtto agreethatit is indeed,
ever, oneofthebigques-
involves,
however,severalimplicit The first
assumptions. is that
tionsofpublicmanagement.
the principalwantsto "control" the behaviorof the
agent.
Behindthisassumption of "control"
is an evenmorebasicand
subtler
assumption: The principalknowswhathe orshewants
TheMotivation
Question theagentto do. That is whytheproblemreducesto one of
Publicmanagers
frequently abouttheir
complain to control.Becausetheprincipal
inability knowswhatshouldbe done,the
motivate
their "Howcanyoumotivate
subordinates: anyonein onlyremaining taskis to gettheagentto do it.
thepublicsector? is protected
Everyone rules.
bycivil-service In fact,however,
theprincipaloftendoes not knowwhat
Wecan'tfireanyone.Wecan'treward
anyone.Howcanthey shouldbe doneto
goalorwhatgoalshould
pursuea particular
ustogetanything
expect done?"
is so vague.Congress
be pursued.Thatiswhylegislation is not
Sucha recitationofthemotivational impotence ofpublic justone,single,unifiedprincipal or,in GrahamAllison'sterms
managers is,implicitly
though basedonthecarrot-and-
dearly, (1971), a single"rational actor."Rather,Congressis multiple
sticktheory ofmotivation. Thistheory is-againimplicitly, principalswithdiffering views(Wilson,1989;254-256). How
althoughagainjustas clearly-based on theassumption that canthequestionbe "howcanthelegislature forcetheexecutive
you motivate a person thesameway youthat motivatea don- to its
accomplish goal?" when the does not know
legislature
key. Eitheryou holda carrot infrontofthe donkey/personto what goal itwants accomplished? Moreover,even ifthelegisla-
motivateitforward; oryouhitthedonkey/person witha stick turecould,somehow, agreeon whatitwantedtheexecutive to
to do thesamething.Frederick Herzberg (1968)dividesthis do, it couldhardlythinkthroughexactlyhow it wantedthe
"kick-him" approach intothe"negative KITA,"the executive
physical todo it.8
"negative
psychological KITA,"andthe"positive KITA."Harry
Although hierarchicalorganizationsthatemphasize control
Levinson(1973)simply callsit"theGreatJackassFallacy."
havesomeobviousadvantages,
organization
theorists
haveiden-
In schoolsofpublicpolicy
(perhapsnotso muchinschools tifiedalternatives.
For example,overthreedecadesago,Tom
ofpublicadministration),
thiscarrot-and-stick iswidely Burnsand G. M. Stalker(1961) defined(fromtheirstudiesof
theory
employed as theprimarybasisforthinking
aboutmotivation.Scottishand Englishfirms)two"divergent ofmanage-
systems
Itiscalledeconomics. mentpractice."Forthetraditional "mechanistic
management
and tasksare narrowly
The thinkingaboutmotivationin publicpolicyschoolsis system,"responsibilities and explicitly
defined. In contrast,their form
"organic" is characterized
by
dominated bytheeconomicperspective, in part,because
economists jobs that"haveto be redefined
continually,"
by individuals
who
dominatethesefaculties.
Psychologists
alsoworry
out
aboutmotivation on thesubject.Theyeven carry theirresponsibilities
anddo research using"theirknowledge of the
tasksof thefirmas a whole,"and by communications that
write
textbookstied: Motivation
(Beck,1990;Mook,1987).
Yethowmany schools
ofpublicadministration "resemble lateral
consultationratherthan vertical
command"
orpublicpolicy
havea single
psychologist
on thefacultywhodoesresearch or (pp.5-6,119-122).Indeed,managers (particularly
managers in
teaches
a course the privatesector aboutwhich economistshave traditionally
onmotivationinpublicsector
organizations?
beenmostinterested)
havelongbeenexperimenting
withnon-
inrecent
Moreover, years,
economistshavebeenparticularlyhierarchical
forms oforganization
andwithstylesofleadership
entrepreneurial-broadening
theapplication
oftheirfavoriteand management based on humanrelationshipsotherthan
paradigmsfromthebehavior ofmarkets to thebehaviorof commandandcontrol(Womack, Jones,andRoos,1990).
organizations.
Specifically,
economistshavedefinedthecentral
problemofbehaviorwithinorganizations at a timewhenmuchof thethinking
as therelationship Ironically, and explo-
between
principals
andtheiragents rationby publicsectormanagersis focusing
on how to avoid
(Moe,1984). Thecentral
problemofthisrelationship the problemscreatedby command-and-control hierarchies
is notoneofmeremotivation but
oneofcontrol (Osborneand Gaebler,1992; chap.9)-to movebeyondwhat
Michael Barzelay(1992; chap. 1) calls "the bureaucratic
Indeed,forthepublicsector,
economistshavetransformedparadigm"-principal-agent modelshavebecomethepublic-
thebigquestion
aboutmotivation
intoa question
aboutcontrol: policyscholar's
favorite
(perhaps
evendominant) wayofthink-

318 Public
Administration
Review* Jul/AugustVol.55,No.4
1995,

This content downloaded from 200.0.176.44 on Tue, 10 Dec 2013 13:58:27 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 The
knowsmore(Moe, 1984; 754-757). Ratherthanaskhowthe
measurement How
question: canpublic principal mighttakeadvantage of theadditionalinformation
thattheagentmighthave,principal-agent theorists
askhowit
measure
managers the oftheir
accomplishments might be neutralized. The National Performance Review
(1993; 3) described thismentalitywell: "We assumethatwe
agencies
andofthemselves? can'ttrustemployees so wespelloutin detail
to makedecisions,
how theymustdo virtually everything,thenauditthemto
ensurethattheyhaveobeyedeveryrule." In contrast to this
ingaboutmotivation.
Tocontemporary
economists,theprinci-
viewis VicePresident Gore'sassumption that"Thepeoplewho
pal-agent is howcantheprincipals
"problem" "control
the work
closestto theproblem knowthemostabouthowto solve
behavior"
oftheagents
(Moe,1984;755).9 To contemporary
theproblem" (NationalPerformanceReview,1993;9).
managers,
the
principal-agent
problemishowcanwe
avoidthe
behavior
dysfunctional thatresults
whentheprincipals
tryto
control
theagents.
TheMeasurement
Question
One moreassumption behind theprincipal-agentformula-
How do weknowifa publicagencyis doinga goodjob?
tionofthemotivationquestion is thatpeoplepreferleisure
to
work.Thisassumption is supported bynumerous bumper Muchhasbeenwritten aboutthetechnical(Suchman, 1967;
stickersthatproclaim:"I'drather be sailing";
"I'drather
be Weiss,1972) andpolitical(Wildavsky,
1972) problems ofeval-
golfing."Mostofuswould,indeed, prefertospendtheafter-uatingpublicprograms, and publicmanagers.
publicagencies,
noonattheballparkthanintheoffice. Or,ifforsomeperverseIndeed,themeasurement questioncanbe askedfroma number
reasonyouwouldrather be pounding awayonyourkeyboardof different perspectives:How can publicmanagers knowif
thanwatching JuniorGriffey go up against RogerClemens, I theyaredoinga goodjob? How can publicagenciesknowif
amsurethatyoucanthink ofsomeother youwould theyaredoinga good job? How can legislators
activity and citizens
prefer
toeitherofthose.Formostpeople, thething wegetpaid knowwhether theiragenciesand managers are doinga good
todo is notthenumber-one itemon ourlistofwaystospend job? To answerthesequestions, we mustdefineand measure
theday. whataccomplishmentsmightcontributeto a goodjob. Thus,
the
big question about
measurement appearsto be relatively
Still,psychologists
(althoughnoteconomists)tellus that
straightforward:
meaningful workcanbe motivating(Herzberg,1968;Maslow,
1943;McGregor, 1957). In thepublicsector,
thiscanbe par- The measurement question: How can public managers
ticularlytrue.Peopledo notenterthefield
ofsocialservice
to measuretheaccomplishments of theiragenciesand of them-
maximize income;theyhopetodo meaningfulwork.1O Iflegis- selves?
orpolitical
lators, orcareer
executives, executives
canfindsome
wayto exploitthatdesireto do meaningful The usualansweris to measureoutcomesor impacts,not
work-totake
ofthebeneficial inputs or outputs.Considera public-health program designed
advantage self-selection"
thatleadspeopleto
choosepublicsector to assist
pregnant women and their
futurechildren.
jobs-theymaygainhelpnotmerely in
carrying outstandard operatingprocedures
to achieve goals, * Inputmeasures includethenumberofpublic-health clinics
andnotmerely infiguring outhowbesttoachievethosegoals, providing thisservice,thenumberof public-health nurses
butalsoindetermining whatgoalsarebothworth pursuingand working in theseclinics,and thedollarsspenton thepro-
pursuable. gram.
Thus,thebigquestion
aboutmotivation
mightbe defined* Outputmeasuresincludethenumber ofwomenwhopartic-
as: ipatedin theprogram, thenumberof visitsthesewomen
Themotivation
question: madeto theclinics,and theprenatal
instructions
thatthey
Howcanpublicmanagersmoti-
vatepublicemployees
(andcitizens
too)topursue followed.
important
publicpurposes
withintelligence
andenergy? * Outcomemeasuresincludethe numberof healthy(and
Oneassumption behind
thisphrasingofthequestion isthat unhealthy)
babiesbornto womenwho participated
in the
publicmanagers do notnecessarily
knowhowbestto achieve program.
publicobjectives.A secondassumption is thatthemanagers* Impactmeasures includethedifference
betweenthenumber
maynotevenknow whatobjectives
should bepursued (particu- of healthybabiesbornto womenwho participatedin the
larlygiventhatsomeobjectiveswillbe easierto achieve
than program and thenumberofhealthy babieswhowouldhave
others).A thirdassumption
isthata lotofpeoplewithin (and beenbornto thesewomenhad theynotparticipatedin the
outside)
anypublicagency havea lottocontribute notonlyto program.
achieving
suchobjectives
butalsoinchoosing among objectives
anddecidinghowbesttoachieve them.12 Given thatthe real objectiveof thisprogramis not to
employnursesor rentclinicspace-nor to havewomenvisit
Principal-agent
theory
is alsobasedon theassumptionofan clinics-butto actually
improve thehealthof theinfants
born
asymmetry of information,
and theassumption thattheagent to thesewomen,theinputand outputmeasures do notreveal

The BigQuestions
ofPublicManagement 319

This content downloaded from 200.0.176.44 on Tue, 10 Dec 2013 13:58:27 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 The onlywayto do thatis
whatwe havereallyaccomplished.
to examinetheoutcomeandimpactmeasures. The isa
excuse
we-don't-control-everything
Unfortunately,whether a measureis an outputor an out-
come is not alwaysobvious. Take theexampleof thebirth- common tooutcome
response measurement:
weightofthenew-born babies.Lowbirthweights arebad;they
areassociatedwithall sortsofshort-term and long-term health "You canhold our
usaccountablefor outputs,
problems.Thus,one outcomemeasure traditionallyemployed
forprenatalprograms is thepercentageof babieswho weigh butwedon't our
control outcomes.
"
morethan2,500 grams(or approximately 5.5 pounds),13and
one impactmeasureis how manymorebabiesweighedover
Ifweacceptthewe-don't-control-everything howev-
excuse,
2,500 gramsthanwould havewithouttheprogram.But is
er,wewillnever Fornopublicagency
haveanyaccountability.
birthweight an outcomeor an outputmeasure?After all,how
(orprivate controls
firm) alltheinputs toproduce
necessary the
mucha babyweighsat birthis not,itself,ourrealconcern.The
desiredoutcomes. Evensucha simple,
service-delivery
program
onlyreasonwe wantto increase birthweightsis becausedoing
as-prenatal
servicesforpregnantwomen thisexcuse.
canoffer
so decreasesa variety
ofotherproblems.Nevertheless, because
After oftheprogram
all,theeffectiveness dependsbothonthe
thecorrelationbetween andotherhealthprob-
lowbirthweights
willingness
ofthewomen tovisittheclinics
andtofollowthe
lemsis so high,thebirthweight ofbabiesis traditionally
usedas
adviceofferedbyitsnurses.Thus,themeasurement is
question
an outcomemeasure forprenatal programs.
a question
actually aboutresponsibility.
This examplemakesthemeasurement questionlooktrivial.
Themeasurement/responsibility Howcanpublic
question:
There is not muchpoliticaldisagreement aboutwantingto
managershelp define
citizens mea-
appropriate realistic
and
makebabies healthy(althoughthereoftenis disagreement
thatthemanagers
suresofaccomplishments andtheiragen-
abouthow muchoughtto be spentto raiseone baby'sbirth-
forachieving?
beresponsible
ciesshould
weightbyonepound). Moreover, thereis no scientific
disagree-
mentaboutthevalueofincreasing birthweights. Mostofthecurrentdebatein elementaryandsecondary
education onthisquestion.
focuses thequestions
Traditionally,
Otherpublic-policy efforts,
however,arenotso straightfor-
in educationhavebeen: Whatdo wewantourchildren to
ward.How do youmeasure thevalueofa defense program,ofa
learn?Andwhatkindsoftestsshouldwe useto measure,
diplomaticinitiative,or of an automobiledrivers'-license
against
theseeducational theaccomplishments
objectives, of
bureau?Suchquestionsaredifficult to answerunlessyoucan
students, school
schools, andstates?
districts,
definetheobjectivesthatthesepublicpoliciesaresupposedto
accomplish-andunlessyoucandetermine howmuchthepoli- Thus,thekindsoftestsweusetomeasure areimpor-
results
cy actuallycontributed to the objective. For example,the tant.Theyneedto reflect whatwewantschoolchildren to
objectiveof a defense
program mightbe to deteran attackon learn.Andoften itis noteasytodesign thatcan,infact,
tests
theUnitedStates,and theoutcomemightbe thatforthepast measure whether childrenhavelearnedwhatweweretrying to
fiveyearstherehas,in fact,beenno suchattack.Butwhathas teach.
beentheimpact?Has thisdefense policyreallymadeanydif-
a further
Thiscreates problem. Ifteachers
aregoingtobe
ference?Or wouldtherehavebeenno attackduringthepast
evaluatedbyhowwelltheir studentsdo ona test, will
teachers
fiveyearsevenwithout thepolicy?Andhowwouldyouknow?
teachwhattheir needto knowto passthistest.In
students
Further, thisdefense whenteachers,
policyis nottheonlyinitiative-public fact, principals, andother
superintendents, edu-
or private-designed to preventan attackon theUnitedStates. cators
createtests
andassert orimply thattheyareresponsible
This is a blessing
to thepolicy'smanagers-provided thatthere forhowtheir students
perform onthesetests,
they influence-
is no attack;theycan benefit fromtheseadditionaleffortsand more powerfullythandoanyprofessed objectives-
educational
takecreditfortheirimpact.If an attackoccurs,however, the whatstudentsaretaught.
managersof thisdefensepolicywill immediately claim: "It
wasn'tourfault.A lotofotherpeoplecontributed
Thereis,however, onemorecomplication to thismeasure-
to thisprob-
lem. We didn'tcontrolall theincompetent diplomaticworkof
ment question:What level
of test
results
should teachers,
prin-
theDepartment ofState.Andthatspeechthepresident gaveat
and
cipals, school
superintendents
be for
responsible achieving?
theU.N.-it all butinvited an attack."
Afterall,teachers,
principals, do
andschoolsuperintendents
notcontrol all thefactorsthatgo intowhata childlearns.
The we-don't-control-everything excuse is a common Indeed,parents aremuchmoreimportant thanteachers,
and
responseto outcomemeasurement: "Youcan holdus account- thehomeis muchmoreimportant thanschool.So evenifa
ableforouroutputs, butwe don'tcontrolouroutcomes."One testcouldbedesigned,
perfect evenifitcouldmeasureprecisely
of thebasicreasonsformeasuring howwella publicagencyis howmuchofwhatwe wantedtaught thestudents actually
doingis to hold theagencyand itsmanagers accountable
for it is stillnotobvious
learned, whether theschoolsshouldbe
theirwork.Andpeopledo notlikebeingheldaccountable for heldresponsibleforgetting
their
students levels
toparticular on
thingsthattheydo notcontrol. thosetests.Whatcan a teacher
do iftheparents
do notgivea
damnabouttheirown children's education?And yet,if the

320 PublicAdministration
Review* July/August
1995,
Vol.55,No.4

This content downloaded from 200.0.176.44 on Tue, 10 Dec 2013 13:58:27 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 to improve
surements performance.Thus,forpublicmanagers,
Even know
ifwe what
exactlywewant
to themeasurementquestionbecomes:
Themeasurement question:How can publicmanagersuse
doweknow
accomplish, actions
any byanyone of publicagenciesto produce
measuresof the achievements
evengreater
achievements?
that
will
help
accomplish
it?

excuseis accepted,Micromanagement,
ofthewe-don't-control-everything
validity Measurement,
boththeresponsibility
oftheschools
andtheefficacyoftheir andMotivation
workarerejected.
Mythreebigquestions
are,ofcourse,alllinked.The micro-
Ofcourse,someteachers,someprincipals,
andsomeschools management questionis clearlyconnectedto theone about
havenotexploitedthisknowledgeoftheimportance ofparentsmotivation:Whenlegislators, or staffand
politicalexecutives,
as an excuse.Instead,
theyhaveexploited thisknowledge to oversight
agenciesdo not knowhow to motivate line-agency
change their
educational Ifparents
strategy: aremoreimpor- employees to achieveparticular
goals,theyresort
to microman-
tantthanteachers,thenoneofthekeyjobsofteachers is to agement.Thus,answering themotivation questionmighthelp
makesurethatparents areinvolvedin theirchildren's
educa- answertheoneaboutmicromanagement. Moreover,answering
tion. themeasurement questionmayhelpanswerboththemicro-
In someways,theeducational management and motivation questions.As I havearguedelse-
exampleis easytoo. We
knowthatgovernment where (Behn,1992), effective
measurement oftheconsequence
actionisnottheprimarycontributor
to
ofa publicagency'sefforts
can motivate the peopleworkingin
thedesired Thisis notan uncommon
objective. condition.
thatagencyto do a better
job and can,at the sametime,pro-
in education,
Fortunately, wealsoknowwhata primary con-
tributor
is. Acting videtheevidence necessary
tobuildtrust in theagencyandthus
on thisknowledge
doesrequireanimagina-
tiveredefinition break themicromanagement cycle.
ofwhata teacherandprincipaldo.
Contrary
towhattheyweretaught
intheir
educational themost
training,
effective
thing Motivationand Micromanagement
thatteachers
maydo toimprovethelearning
of
their
students
maynottakeplacein theclassroom.Teachers' If we couldanswerthebig questionaboutmotivation, we
workwithparents
maybemuchmoresignificantthanteachers'mightnotneedto devoteas muchtimeto answering theone
workwithstudents.
Oncethatinsight
isaccepted, it aboutmicromanagement.
however, Therearemanyreasonsbehindthe
maynotbe unreasonable
toholdteachers
responsible
forsome proliferation
of rulesand regulations.One is thatwe do not
measurable
outcomes. knowhow to motivate peopleto do something right.So we
Forotherpublicagencies,
however, wemayknowmuchless resortto a second-best approach:constrain themfromdoing
aboutthelinkagebetween anything wrong. (Unfortunately, constrainingpeople from
objectivesandactions.Evenifwe
knowexactly whatwewantto accomplish, doing anything wrong often simultaneously constrainsthem
do weknowany
actions
byanyone thatwillhelpaccomplish from doing anything right.)But iftheyknew more about how
it? Ifwedo know
somethingaboutsomelinkages, to motivate people,some legislators,
political
executives,
and
isit reasonable
toexpect those
whoworkina publicagency staffand oversight
agencies might not feelso greata need to
tobe abletoactivate thoselink-
ages?Canweholda policechief engage inmicromanagement.
responsibleforthelevelofvio-
lentcrime?Canweholdtheadministrator oftheEnvironmen-
talProtection
Agency responsible
forthequality oftheairwe Measurementand Motivation
breathe?Canweholdthedirector oftheU.S.Weather Bureau Beingableto answerthemeasurement questionwouldhelp
responsible
fortheweather?Whatexactly arethemeasures of to answerthemotivation question.Afterall,ifwe can some-
accomplishments
thatweshould holdpublicagencies andtheir howmeasure howwellwe aredoing,we havean important tool
managersresponsible
forachieving? formotivating peopleand organizations to achievethosemea-
Following
theexampleofHilbert (1902),Howard Wainer sures(Beh.n,1991b; chap.4; Lockeand Latham,1984). In
(1993)hasdefined16 problemsin educational
measurement,fact,thepublicsectormaychooseto useartificial, performance
suchas "Howdo wecorrectforself-selection?"
and"Howcan evaluationsin a futileeffort
to motivatepublicemployees pre-
we combine response
timewithothermeasures ofquality ciselybecause they lack the moreuseful motivational tool of
of
response?"Themeasurementproblem inpublicmanagement, clear,
realizablegoals.
however,concerns
morethantheaccuracy ofthemeasurement
oreventheutility
ofthemeasurements formakinggooddeci- Measurementand Micromanagement
sions.Rather,
ourmeasurementproblem concernstheperfor- Beingableto answerthemeasurement questionwouldhelp
manceofpublicagencies;
accuratedataandvalidmetricsare answerthemicromanagement questionas well. If thedesired
notenough. Evenusefull
datathatfacilitates
decisionmaking outcomescouldbe measured, legislatures
mightbe muchmore
arenotenough.We needto understand
howto usethesemea- willingto trusttheexecutive
branch;afterall,theywouldthen

TheBigQuestions
ofPublicManagement
321

This content downloaded from 200.0.176.44 on Tue, 10 Dec 2013 13:58:27 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Asearchfor
havetheability
todetermine
whether
ornottheexecutivewas,
infact,
actually whatever
achieving objectives
thelegislature
(or answers
tothese
(orother)
big
questions
of
individuallegislators)
had laid out.'4 Legislatures
imposeso
many rules,
inpartbecausetheycannotmeasure andin
results, public will
make
management noone rich
instantaneously
partbecause
theydo notknowwhatresults theywanttomea-
sure.Iftheycannotdeterminewhethertheexecutive
haspro- But
the
orfamous. accumulative
work scholars
ofmany
ducedtheright
outcome,theycanatleastdetermine
iftheexec-
utive
haspursuedthatoutcomeintherightway. some worthwhile
answers-worthwhile
mayprovidetruly
ThomasPeters andRobert Waterman (1982;chap.12)have
argued thatexcellent businesseshave"simultaneous loose-tight asscience aspublic
andworthwhilemanagement.
properties." Theyaretight aboutwhatthey expect theirman-
agerstoachieve, buttheyarelooseabouthowthesemanagers
canachieve it. Thatis,theygivetheirmanagers firm, clear doesnotmeanthattheyarenotworth asking.Itjustmeans
objectives,butthendelegate tothesemanagers a lotofdiscre- thatthey willhavedifferent kindsofanswers andthusmustbe
tioninhowtoachieve them. answered indifferent ways.Itmeans thatthequestions willbe
answered onlythrough anaccumulation ofevidence.15 Forthe
In government, unfortunately, thesituation is exactlythe answers to thesequestions areas muchpolitical as theyare
reverse. Government hassimultaneous tight-loose properties.intellectual. An answer to themeasurement questionthat
Legislaturesarevery looseaboutwhatthey wanttheir managersappears elegant totheoreticians butisincomprehensible topub-
toachieve, buttheyarequitetight aboutthemeansthatman- licmanagers makes littleprogress.Ananswer tothemotivation
agerscanusetoachieve thoselooseobjectives. Answering the question thatconvinces scholarsbutrankles politicalexecutives
bigquestions aboutmicromanagement, motivation, and mea- willaccomplish little.An answer to themicromanagement
surement mayhelpconvert government fromitstraditionalquestion thatsatisfies academics butfailstopersuade legislators
reliance on tight-loose properties to a willingness to employ isnoanswer atall.
those simultaneous loose-tightproperties thatcancontribute to
excellence. Atthesametime, a partialanswer tothequestion mayprove
quitehelpful.An answer to themeasurement question that
revealshowto measure howwellsocial-service agencies are
TheFutile Search forTheSolution doing(andthuscanmotivate thosewhoworkin suchsocial-
serviceagencies)willbe quitevaluable, evenifthatanswer has
Thesebigquestions ofpublicmanagement willnotbe absolutely novalidity whenapplied todefense orenvironmental
answered witha shoutof"Eureka"-one suddeninsight, one agencies.
clever experiment, onebrilliant paperthatfinally proves Fer-
mat'sLastTheorem (Wiles,forthcoming). No single pieceof Thus,a search foranswers tothese(orother) bigquestions
public-management will
research offer thekindofbreakthrough ofpublic management willmake no one instantaneously richor
thatwinsa NobelPrize.Thebigquestions ofpublicmanage- famous. But the accumulative work of many scholars may pro-
ment do nothavea single answer-or evena single answer plus vide some trulyworthwhile answers-worthwhile as science
or minus10 percent."Scientific management" mayhavelost andworthwhile aspublic management.
muchofitsintellectual stature,butitslegacy liveson;people
stillsearchforthe"onebestway."AsBurns andStalker wrote,
however, "Thebeginning ofadministrative wisdomis the TheSearch fortheBigQuestions
awareness thatthere is no oneoptimum typeofmanagement I amnotarguing thatthese aretheonlythree researchques-
system" (1961;125). tionsforpublicmanagement scholars.I amnotevenarguing
Indeed, anyoneofthethree questions abovecanhavemulti- thatthesearethethree mostimportant research questions in
ple answers.Finding onesolution to themicromanagement publicmanagement. I am arguing thatthese threeareamong
question doesnotpreclude findingother solutions. (Norwillit themostimportant research questions. Eachoneissignificant
be possible to provethatonlyonesolution existsorthatno and worthy of seriousattention andstudy.
solution exists.)Further, no singlesolution isapttobe inher- Other public-management scholarsmayfindother questions
ently superior to another (although somesolutions, orat least moreimportant. Great!Myobjective is notto dictatea
theiradvocates, maybe moreelegant thanothers).Differentresearch agenda forthefield.Rather, mypurpose is togetthe
solutions willbe moreorlesseffective indifferent contexts, or fieldthinking aboutwhatquestions ought tobeatthevery top
whenemployed bydifferent managers withdifferent skills. ofitsresearchagenda.
Answering themotivation questionforCalifornia doesnot
guarantee thatyouhaveanswered itforColorado, orConnecti- So letthedebatebegin.Whatquestions arereallyimpor-
cut,orColumbia, orCameroon, orCambodia. tant?Whatquestions shouldbe thefocusofpublic-manage-
mentresearch? I hopethatmanyscholars willdeveloptheir
Justbecausethebig questionsof publicmanagement will ownlistsofthebigquestions ofpublicmanagement.We ought
nothavethesamekindofanswers as physics,
or paleontology,to circulate,
argue,defend,
modify,
andrearguethesequestions.

322 Public
Administration
Review* July/August
1995,
Vol.55,No.4

This content downloaded from 200.0.176.44 on Tue, 10 Dec 2013 13:58:27 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Weought tothink notjustaboutdataandmethodol- Robert
seriously D. Behnisprofessorofpublicpolicy
at DukeUni-
ogybutalsoaboutquestions-big questions.We oughtto versity'sTerrySanford ofPublicPolicy
Institute anddirectorof
decidewhattheyare,answer
someofthem, andrevisethelist. itsGovernorsCenter.He is constantly
worrying aboutbig
Weought toalwaysbefocusing
ourattention
onthese bigques- questions
ofscienceandsociety,theBIGGESTofwhichis:
tions.Then,whenpublic-managementscholarsgettogether,"Whyhaven't theBostonRedSoxwontheWorldSeries since
wetoowillbe discussing
"TheBigQuestionsofPublicMan- 1918?"
agement.

Notes
In preparing I benefited
thisarticle, from withMarkAbram-
conversations mental performance...." Foranexample ofthefirst twokinds ofstudies,
son,AlanAltshuler,
andSanford Borins.I alsoreceived
valuablecommentson seeBehn(199lb).
an early
draft
from Borins,HaleChampion, RobertHartman,MarcZegans, 8. Fora firm, these underlying assumptions maynotbeasweak.Thestock-
PeterZimmerman,andtwothoughtfulreferees. Theyshouldnot,however,
be holders knowwhatthey wantthefirm's managers to do: makemoney.
heldaccountable
formyinability,
whilestanding indeepleft
obviously to
field, Thestockholders do notcareaboutvision, orempowerment, orwellness
understand
thattheywereallscreaming
inunison formetostealhome. programs, oranyother nicethings thatmight makeanorganization pro-
ductive-except to theextent thatthesethings helpachieve their single
I To someofthese questions,wehavethe"answer." Schoolchildren know objective ofmaking money.The relationship between stockholders and
thathumans firstcametotheNorth American continentacrosstheland managers isnotcomplicated bythesubtleties ofunknown orill-formulat-
bridge from Asiawhere theBering Strait nowlies;butwedo notknow edobjectives. Andthestockholders donotreally careaboutmeans.They
whenthey cameandwhether they cameinoneora fewmajor waves orin invested inthefirm foronlyonereason:tomakemoney.
a largenumber ofmuchsmaller migrations (Gutin,1992). Thereis a Andyet,eventhisassumption isnotquitetrue.Somecranks invest in
growing beliefthatthedinosaurs (andapproximately two-thirds ofthe a firm (buya fewshares ofstock)nottomakemoney atall,buttoforce
other, existing species)werewipedoutbya kindoflong"nuclear winter" thefirm to pursuea broader setofobjectives, or to pursuethesingle
thatenveloped theearth after a largemeteor struck theYucatan peninsula objective ofmaking inparticular
money (andpresumably socially desir-
about65 million yearsago(Sharpton etal, 1993).Others, however, have able)ways.Somepeopleevenmakemoney organizing mutual funds from
different theories (Kerr, 1993;Morell, 1993). stocksoffirms thatpursueexplicit socialobjectives beyondmaking
2. Foronecompilation ofsuchbigquestions invarious ofscience-
fields money.
from "Is SpaceCurved?" to"WhyArethere BloodGroups?"-see Dun- 9. Economists arenottheonlysocialscientists whoemphasize control.
canandWeston-Smith (1977). HughHeclo(1977;5, 1),a political writes
scientist, about"theproblems
3. TheNational Performance Review (1993,Introduction) offersa similar ofpolitical control ofthebureaucracy," of"thestruggle to control the
story.TheNPR'sversion, curiously butpredictably, almostnever men- bureaucracy" by"thePresident, hisappointees, andhigh-ranking bureau-
tionstheroleofCongress. It isas ifsomehow allthe"redtape"and"the crats.
systems ofovercontrol andmicromanagement" (p. 13)werecreated with- 10.I know, youcanalways addanother dimension tothesocial-worker's util-
outanyinvolvement byrealpeople. ityfunction-the do-good dimension-and thenmodelthatindividual's
4. Others (Lowi,1969)argue thatthebiggest problem createdbylegislatures behavior usingthisnewutility function withall theproper coefficients.
comesnotfrom theirmicromanagement butfrom theirfailure
tosetforth Thisability tocontinually addnewdimensions to the utilityfunction is
cleargoals-notfrom their failureto givetoodetailed instructions but whatmakes economics so"powerful" andsimultaneously sotrivial.
rather from their failuretoprovide instructions thatarespecific enough. 11.Economists worry about"adverse [self-]selection"byemployees. But
Thismight, indeed, bea problem forliberal democracy, butitislessofa there canbe "beneficial [self-]selection" too. Foranexample, seeKatzen-
"management" problem. Whenconfronted withmultiple orconflicting bachandSmith
(1993;33).
goals,thepublicmanager canchoose onwhich ofthese goalstofocus the 12.Another assumption behind thisbigquestion aboutmotivation is that,if
agency's energies (Behn,199lb; 203-206).Indeed, whenconfronted with peoplehavea rolein deciding what goals to pursue and how to pursue
ambiguous legislativedirectives, publicmanagers havean obligation to them, they willwork harder topursue thesegoals.
choose goals(Herring, 1936;Behn,1992).Thatiscalledleadership.
13.Oregon usesas oneofitsbenchmarks forhealthy babiesandtoddlers the
5. Actually, I think thatsomepretty goodexplanations ofthereasons behind
theinherent percentage ofchildren bornwithbirthweights over2,500grams.Ore-
distrust
exist(Behn,1991a).I justdo notknowofa single,
gon'sobjective is toincrease thispercentage from 95 percent in 1992to
succinct theoretical explanation ofthesources. Itwillnottakelong, I sus-
97 percent in2000and98 percent in2010. Oregon alsokeepstrack of
pect,before severalpeoplewilltellmeoftheir favoriteexplanation. Can- the"percentage of babies whose mothers received adequate prenatal care
didates include Wilson's chapter on"Congress" (1989;235-253).
6. (beginning inthefirst trimester)" andseeksto increase thisoutput mea-
Therearestillother waystodescribe thisquestion aboutmicromanage- sure
ment ortrust orgovernance: from 77 percent in 1992 to 97 percent in 2000 and 98 percent in
Theriskquestion:Howcanpublicexecutives 2010 (OregonProgress Board,1992;27). As oneofthe"Minnesota
beencouraged totake
riskstoachieve Milestones" that"Minnesotans willbe healthy," thisstateusestheper-
policy objectives rather thantoplayitsafetoavoidcriti-
cismformaking centage of low birthweight babies (under 2,500 grams). Minnesota seeks
a mistake (Sylvester, 1992)?
to reduce thisfrom 5.1 percent in 1990to 3.5 percent in 2000 and 2.5
Thereform question: Howcanwebalance theconflict between polit-
ical reform percent in 2020 (Minnesota Planning, 1992; 20).
(designed to prevent corruption) and managerial reform 14.
Thisassumes, ofcourse, thata majority oflegislators canagreeon what
(designed toencourage creative actions toachieve policyobjectives)?
7. To answer theentrepreneur objectivesthey want the agency to accomplish. If not,they stillmight be
variant ofthisquestion, Diver(1982)sug- ableto agreeon howtheagency shouldaccomplish anyobjectives, and
gests:"Wemuststudy entrepreneurial publicmanagers-not asengineers
whohavesomehow thusthey stillmight micromanage.
gonewrong, butas self-conscious entrepreneurs....
15.Okay,thatishowithappens inphysics, too(Kuhn,1970). Anditalso
[WMe need case studies that illuminate the skillsuniquely required for
entrepreneurship.... holds true for paleontology. Gould (1989; 79) writes:"[I]ntellectual
[WMe needstudies thatexplore thesocialconse-
quencesofentrepreneurial transformations often remain underthesurface. Theyoozeanddiffuse
behavior-the connection between personal
reward andsocialoutcome, intoscientific consciousness, and people may slowly movefrom onepole
theimpact ofentrepreneurship on govern-
toanother, having never heard thecalltoarms."

TheBigQuestions
ofPublic
Management 323

This content downloaded from 200.0.176.44 on Tue, 10 Dec 2013 13:58:27 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 References
Adair,Robert K, 1987. TheGreat Design:Particles, Fields, andCreation.Locke,EdwinA. andGaryP. Latham, 1984. GoalSetting: A Motivational
NewYork:Oxford UniversityPress. Technique thatWorks. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ:Prentice-Hall.
Allison,Graham T., 1971. Essence ofDecision: Explaining theCubanMissile Lowi,Theodore J.,1969. TheEndofLiberalism NewYork:W.W.Norton
Crisis.
Boston:Little, Brown. & Company.
Austin, Robert andPatrick Larkey, 1992."TheUnintended Consequences of Maslow,Abraham, 1943. "ATheory ofHumanMotivation." Psychological
Micromanagement: The CaseofProcuring Mission CriticalComputer Review,
vol.50 (uly),pp.370-396.
Resources." Policy vol.25,no.1 (February),
Sciences, pp.3-28. McGregor, Douglas,1960. TheHumanSideofManagement. NewYork:
Barzelay,Michael, 1992. Breaking Through Bureaucracy: A NewVision for McGraw-Hill.
Managing inGovernment. Berkeley,CA: University ofCalifornia Press. Messadie, Gerald,1991. GreatScientific Discoveries.
Edinburgh, England:
Beck,Robert C., 1990. Motivation: TheoriesandPrinciples, 3rded. Engle- Chambers.
woodCliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall. MinnesotaPlanning, 1992.Minnesota Milestones:A ReportfortheFuture. St.
Behn,Robert D., 199la. "Innovation andPublic Values:Mistakes, Flexibili- Paul,MN: Minnesota Planning.
ty,Purpose, Equity, CostControl, andTrust."Paperpresented ata con- Moe,Terry M., 1984. "TheNewEconomics ofOrganization." American
ferenceon TheFundamental Questions ofInnovation, DukeUniversity, Journal ofPoliticalScience,vol.28,no.4 (November), pp.739-777.
Durham, NC (May3-4). Mook,DouglasG., 1987. Motivation: TheOrganization ofAction.New
, 1991b.Leadership Counts: LessonsforPublic Managers from the York: W.W.Norton.
Massachusetts Welfare,Training, andEmployment Program. Cambridge,Morell, Virginia,1993. "HowLethalWastheK-T Impact."Science, vol.
MA: Harvard UniversityPress. 261,no.5128(September 17),pp.1518-1519.
, 1992. "Bottom-Line Government." Paperpresented at the National
Academy ofPublic Administration, 1992.Beyond Distrust:
Building
Thirteenth Annual Meeting oftheAssociation forPublicPolicy Analysis Bridges Between CongressandtheExecutive. Washington, DC: National
andManagement, Denver, October 30. Academy ofPublic Administration.
Browder, F., 1974. "Mathematical Developments Arising from theHilbert National Commission on theStateandLocalPublicService, 1993. Hard
Problems." Symposia inPureMathematics, vol.28. Truths/Tough Choices:AnAgenda forState andLocalReform Albany, NY:
Burns, TomandG.M.Stalker, 1961. TheManagement ofInnovation. Lon- TheNelson A. Rockefeller ofGovernment.
Institute
don:Tavistock Publications. NationalPerformance Review, 1993. FromRedTapetoResults: Creatinga
Cann,Rebecca L.,MarkStoneking, andAllanC. Wilson, 1987."Mitochon- Government thatWorks Better andCosts Less.Washington, DC: U.S.
drialDNA andHumanEvolution." Nature, vol.325,no.6099 January Government PrintingOffice.
1),pp.31-36. Oregon Progress Board,1992. Oregon Benchmarks: StandardsforMeasuring
DiIulio,John J.,Jr.,ed.,1994. Deregulating thePublic Service: CanGovern- Statewide ProgressandGovernment Performance. Salem,OR: Oregon
ment BeImproved? Washington, DC: TheBrookings Institution. Board.
Progress
Diver, ColinS., 1982."Engineers andEntrepreneurs: TheDilemma ofPub- Osborne, DavidandTedGaebler, 1992. Reinventing Government: Howthe
licManagement." Journal ofPolicyAnalysisandManagement, vol.1,no.3 EntrepreneurialSpiritIs Transforming thePublicSector.Reading, MA:
(Spring),pp.402-406. Addison-Wesley.
Duncan,RonaldandMiranda Weston-Smith, eds.,1977. TheEncyclopaedia Peters,
Thomas J.andRobert H. Waterman, Jr.,1982.InSearch ofExcellence:
ofIgnorance. Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press. LessonsfromAmerica'sBest-Run Companies. NewYork:Harper & Row.
Ferris,Timothy, 1988. Coming ofAge intheMilky Way.NewYork:William Rohrlich, Fritz,1987. FromParadox toReality:OurBasicConcepts ofthe
Morrow. WorldCambridge:
Physical Cambridge UniversityPress.
Flamsteed, Sam,1992. "HowBigIs theUniverse?" Discover, vol.13,no.11 Rowan-Robinson, Michael, 1977. "Galaxies, QuasarsandtheUniverse." In
(November), pp.48-53. RonaldDuncanandMiranda Weston-Smith, eds.,TheEncyclopaedia of
Goodnow, Frank J.,1900. PoliticsandAdministration: A Study in Govern- Ignorance. Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press,pp.56-57.
ment.NewYork:Russell & Russell. Sharpton,
VirgilL.,Kevin Burke, Antonio Camargo-Zanoguera, StuartA. Hall,
Gould,Stephen Jay,1989. Wonderful Life:TheBurgess ShaleandtheNature D. ScottLee,LuisE. Marin, Gerado Suarez-Reynoso,JuanManuel Queza-
offHistogy.NewYork:W.W.Norton. da-Mufieton,PaulD. Spudis, Jaime Urrutia-Fucugauchi,1993."Chicxulub
Gutin, JoAnnC., 1992. "WhoPeopled thePlanet?"Discover, vol.13,no. MultiringImpact Basin:SizeandOther Characteristics
Derivedfrom Gravi-
11(November), pp.108-113. tyAnalysis." vol.261,no.5128(September
Science, 17),pp.1564-1567.
Heclo,Hugh,1977. A Government ofStrangers: Executive Politicsin Wash- Spielberg,
Nathan andBryon D. Anderson, 1987. SevenIdeasThatShook the
ington.Washington, DC: TheBrookings Institution. Universe.NewYorkJohn Wiley & Sons.
Herring, E. Pendleton, 1936. Public Administration andthePublicInterest.Suchman, Edward,1967. Evaluative Research. NewYork: RussellSage
NewYork:McGraw-Hill. Foundation.
Herzberg, Frederick, 1968. "One MoreTime: How Do You Motivate Sylvester, Kathleen, 1982. "RiskandtheCulture ofInnovation." Governing
Employees?" Harvard BusinessReview,vol.46, no. 1 (anuary-February), (October), pp.46-50.
pp.53-62. Wainer,Howard,1993. "Measurement Problems." Journal ofEducational
Hilbert, David,1902. "Mathematical Problems." Bulletin oftheAmerican Measurement, vol.30,no.1 (Spring), pp.1-21.
Mathematical Society,vol.8,pp.437-479. Weinberg,Steven, 1993. TheFirstThree Minutes: A Modern View oftheOri-
Kaufman, Herbert, 1981. TheAdministrative Behavior ofFederal Bureau ginofthe Universe, updated ed. NewYork:BasicBooks.
Chiefs.Washington, DC: TheBrookings Institution. Weiss,Carol,1972.Evaluation Research:MethodsforAssessingProgram Effec-
Katzenbach, JonR. andDouglasK. Smith,1993. TheWisdom ofTeams. tiveness.
Englewood Cliffs,
NJ:Prentice-Hall.
Boston:Harvard Business SchoolPress. Wildavsky,Aaron,1972. "TheSelf-Evaluating Organization." Public
Kerr, Richard A., 1993. "ABigger DeathKnellfortheDinosaurs?" Science, Administration Review,vol.32.no.5 (September/October), pp.509-520.
vol.261,no.5128(September 17),pp.1518-1519. Wiles,Andrew, forthcoming. "Modular Forms, Elliptic
Curves andGalois
Kuhn,ThomasS., 1970. TheStructure ofScientificRevolutions. Chicago: Representations." TheAnnals ofMathematics.
UniversityofChicago Press. Wilson,James Q., 1989. Bureaucracy: WhatGovernment AgenciesDo and
Levinson, Harry, 1973. TheGreatJackass Fallay. Boston:Harvard Univer- Why They Do It. NewYork:BasicBooks.
sityGraduate SchoolofBusiness Administration. Wilson,Woodrow, 1887. "TheStudy ofAdministration." Political
Science
Li Tianyuan andDennisA. Etler,1992. "NewMiddlePleistocene Hominid vol.2 (une 1887).
Quarterly,
Craniafrom Yunian inChina."Nature, vol.357,no.6377 June4), pp. Womack, James P.,DanielT. Jones, andDanielRoos,1990. TheMachine
404-407. ThatChanged theWorldNewYork:Rawson Associates.

324 Public
Administration
Review* July/August
1995,
Vol.55,No.4

This content downloaded from 200.0.176.44 on Tue, 10 Dec 2013 13:58:27 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions