DE LOS REYES VS.

MUNICIPALITY OF KALIBO

FACTS:

Jose Peralta owns a land in Kalibo, which through accretion, land was added to the said lot. When he died, the lot together with
the supposed area of accretion was transferred to his son, Juanito Peralta. While the area of accretion was apportioned and registered
for tax declaration purposes under the names of siblings Juanito, Javier, Josephine, and Julius. On the other hand, the Municipality of
Kalibo, through its then Mayor Diego Luces and the member of its Sangguniang Bayan, sought to convert more or less four (4) hectares
of said area of accretion into a garbage dumpsite. Juanito, opposed said project in a letter. Despite his opposition, the Municipality of
Kalibo continued the project under the justification that the contested property is actually part of the public domain. The Peraltas filed a
complaint for quieting of title over the subject properties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject parcels of land are part of the public domain?

RULING:

In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property
which is the subject matter of the action. While legal title denotes registered ownership, equitable title means beneficial ownership. In the
absences of such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud to be prevented or removed. Likewise, the plaintiff must show that
the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud on their title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Art. 457 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, under which the Peraltas claim ownership over the disputed parcels of land, provides:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be:
(a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks
of rivers.

Here, Ignacio characterized the land in question as swampy and its increase in size as the effect of the change of the shoreline of the
Visayan Sea, and not through the gradual deposits of soil coming from the river or the sea. Also, Baltazar Gerardo, the Officer-in-Charge
of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Bureau of Lands, found upon inspection in 1987 that the subject area
was predominantly composed of sand rather than soil. One of the plaintiffs, Javier, also testified that in 1974 or 1976, the Visayan Sea
was around one (1) kilometer from the land in question, and in 2003, the distance already became around three (3) kilometers, giving the
impression that the increment was actually the result of additional area of sand deposits left by the sea when it had receded, and not by
gradual deposits of soil or sediment caused by the action of water. In addition, the DENR has remained firm and consistent in classifying
the area as land of the public domain for being part of either the Visayan Sea of the Sooc Riverbed and is reached by tide water. Further,
the Sheriff’s Report shows that when he conducted an ocular inspection of the area, part of it was reached by the tide. At around 11:30am,
he was able to measure the deepest portion of the high tide at around nineteen (19) inches, and its wideness at five (5) meters near the
concrete wall.

Indeed by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, administrative agencies, like the
DENR, are in a better position to pass judgment on the same, and their findings of fact are generally accorded great respect, if not finality,
by the courts. Such findings must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not
overwhelming or even preponderant. Hence, the questionable character of the land, which could most probably be part of the public
domain, indeed bars Jose from validly transferring the increment to any of his successors.

Indubitably, the plaintiffs are merely successors who derived their alleged right of ownership from tax declarations. But neither can they
validly rely on said tax declarations and the supposed actual, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property by
their predecessors-in-interest. Any person who claims ownership by virtue of tax declarations must also prove that he has been in actual
possession of the property. Thus, proof that the property involved had been declared for taxation purposes for a certain period of time,
does not constitute proof of possession, nor is it proof of ownership, in the absence of the claimant’s actual possession of said property.
In the case at bar, the Peraltas failed to adequately prove their possession and that of their predecessors-in-interest.

HEIRS OF NARVASA, SR. VS. IMBORNAL

FACTS:

Basilia owned a parcel of land (Sabangan property) which she conveyed to her three (3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina
(Imbornal sisters). Catalina's husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was granted a homestead patent over a 31,367-sq. m.
riparian land (Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San Fabian, Pangasinan

Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portion of the Motherland, while respondents occupied the southern portion. The
First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in area, adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. OCT No. P-318 was issued in the
name of respondent Victoriano, married to Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First Accretion.
The Second Accretion, which had an area of 32,307 sq. m., more or less, abutted the First Accretion on its southern portion.[19] On
November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names of all the respondents covering the Second Accretion. Claiming rights over
the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children of Alejandra and Balbina, filed an Amended Complaint for reconveyance, partition,
and/or damages against respondents

They anchored their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his wife Catalina, urged Balbina and Alejandra to sell the
Sabangan property, and that Ciriaco used the proceeds therefrom to fund his then-pending homestead patent application over the
Motherland. In return, Ciriaco agreed that once his homestead patent is approved, he will be deemed to be holding the Motherland which
now included both accretions in trust for the Imbornal sisters

Likewise, Francisco, et al. alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to
the First Accretion, and the respondents collectively, with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally registered the said... accretions in
their names, notwithstanding the fact that they were not the riparian owners

Francisco, et al. explained that they did not assert their inheritance, claims over the Motherland and the two (2) accretions because they
respected respondents' rights, until they discovered in 1983 that respondents have repudiated their (Francisco, et al.'s) shares thereon...
but also to the subsequent accretions. Francisco, et al. prayed for the reconveyance of said properties, or, in the alternative, the payment
of their value, as well as the award of moral damages in the... amount of P100,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P150,000.00,
including attorney's fees and other costs... the RTC rendered a Decision

(a) reconvey to Francisco, et al. their respective portions in the Motherland and in the accretions thereon, or their... pecuniary equivalent

The RTC found that the factual circumstances surrounding the present case showed that an implied trust existed between Ciriaco and
the Imbornal sisters with respect to the Motherland

It gave probative weight to Francisco, et al.'s allegation... that the Sabangan property, inherited by the Imbornal sisters from their mother,
Basilia, was sold in order to help Ciriaco raise funds for his then-pending homestead patent application.

In exchange therefor, Ciriaco agreed that he shall hold the Motherland in trust for them... once his homestead patent application had
been approved.As Ciriaco was only able to a... cquire the Motherland subject of the homestead patent through the proceeds realized
from the sale of the Sabangan property, the Imbornal sisters and, consequently, Francisco, et al.

With respect to the accretions that formed adjacent to the Motherland, the RTC ruled that the owner of the Motherland is likewise the
owner of the said accretions. Considering that the Imbornal sisters have become proportionate owners of the Motherland by virtue of the
implied... trust created between them and Ciriaco, they (Imbornal sisters) and their heirs are also entitled to the ownership of said
accretions despite the fact that respondents were able to register them in their names.

With respect to the Motherland, the CA found that Ciriaco alone was awarded a homestead patent, which later became the basis for the
issuance of a Torrens certificate of title in his name; as such, said certificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally through an action for...
reconveyance filed by his wife's (Catalina's) relatives (i.e., Francisco, et al. being the children of Alejandra and Balbina, who, in turn, are
the sisters of Catalina).

On the other hand, with regard to the disputed accretions, the CA ruled that respondents i.e., respondent Victoriano with respect to the
First Accretion, and all the respondents with respect to the Second Accretion need not be the owners of the Motherland in order to
acquire... them by acquisitive prescription.

In this case, the CA found... that respondents have acquired title to the subject accretions by prescription,[33] considering that they have
been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the First Accretion in the concept of an owner since 1949 (when the First Accretion was
formed),... which resulted in the issuance of a certificate of title in the name of respondent Victoriano covering the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the descendants of Pablo (respondents collectively) are the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion on the basis of the
following grounds: (a) prescription of the reconveyance action, which was duly raised as an affirmative defense in the Amended Answer,
and

(b) the existence of an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco.

RULING:

At the outset, the Court finds that the causes of action pertaining to the Motherland and the First Accretion are barred by prescription.

To recount, Francisco, et al. asserted co-ownership over the Motherland,... alleging that Ciriaco agreed to hold the same in trust for their
predecessors-in-interest Alejandra and Balbina upon issuance of the title in his name. Likewise, they alleged that respondents acquired
the First and Second Accretions by means of fraud and... deceit.

When property is registered in another's name, an implied or constructive trust is created by law in favor of the true owner.[38]Article
1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee... of an implied
trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years,
reckoned from the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the... property,[39] if the plaintiff is
not in possession.However, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the action is imprescriptible

When property is registered in another's name, an implied or constructive trust is created by law in favor of the true owner.[38]Article
1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee... of an implied
trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years,
reckoned from the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the... property,[39] if the plaintiff is
not in possession.However, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the action is imprescriptible.

An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference point of the 10-year prescriptive period is the
date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual... need to reconvey
the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.

Based on the foregoing, Francisco, et al. had then a period of ten (10) years from the registration of the respective titles covering the
disputed properties within which to file their action for reconveyance, taking into account the fact that they were never in... possession of
the said properties.

Hence, with respect to the Motherland covered by OCT No. 1462 issued on December 5, 1933 in the name of Ciriaco, an action for
reconveyance therefor should have been filed until December 5,1943; with respect to the First Accretion... covered by OCT No. P-318
issued on August 15, 1952 in the name of respondent Victoriano, an action of the same nature should have been filed until August 15,
1962; and, finally, with respect to the Second Accretion covered by OCT No. 21481issued on November 10,... 1978in the name of the
respondents, a suit for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until November 10, 1988.

A judicious perusal of the records, however, will show that the Amended Complaint[42]covering all three (3) disputed properties was filed
only on February 27, 1984. As such, it was filed way beyond the 10-year reglementary period within which to seek... the reconveyance
of two (2) of theseproperties, namely, the Motherland and the First Accretion, with only the reconveyance action with respect to the
Second Accretion having been seasonably filed.

Thus, considering that respondents raised prescription as a defense in their

Amended Answer,[43] the Amended Complaint with respect to the Motherland and the First Accretion ought to have been dismissed
based on the said ground, with only the cause of action pertaining to the Second Accretion surviving. As will be, however,... discussed
below, the entirety of the Amended Complaint, including the aforesaid surviving cause of action, would falter on its substantive merits
since the existence of the implied trust asserted in this case had not been established. In effect, the said complaint is completely...
dismissible.

The main thrust of Francisco, et al.'s Amended Complaint is that an implied trust had arisen between the Imbornal sisters, on the one
hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the Motherland. This implied trust is anchored on their allegation that the proceeds from...
the sale of the Sabangan property an inheritance of their predecessors, the Imbornal sisters were used for the then-pending homestead
application filed by Ciriaco over the Motherland. As such, Francisco, et al. claim that they are, effectively, co-owners of the Motherland...
together with Ciriaco's heirs.

The burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show
the existence of the trust and its elements.[45] While implied trusts may be proven by oral evidence, the evidence... must be trustworthy
and received by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy
evidence is required because oral evidence can easily be fabricated.[46]

In this case, it cannot be said, merely on the basis of the oral evidence offered by Francisco, et al., that the Motherland had been either
mistakenly or fraudulently registered in favor of Ciriaco. Accordingly, it cannot be said either that he was merely a trustee of an... implied
trust holding the Motherland for the benefit of the Imbornal sisters or their heirs.

As the CA had aptly pointed out,[47]a homestead patent award requires proof that the applicant meets the stringent conditions[48] set
forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which includes actual possession, cultivation, and... improvement of the
homestead. It must be presumed, therefore, that Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and duly satisfied the strict conditions necessary for
the grant of his homestead patent application.

As such, it is highly implausible that the Motherland had been acquired... and registered by mistake or through fraud as would create an
implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco, especially considering the dearth of evidence showing that the Imbornal sisters
entered into the possession of the Motherland, or a portion... thereof, or asserted any right over the same at any point during their lifetime

Hence, when OCT No. 1462 covering the Motherland was issued in his name pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 24991 on December
15, 1933, Ciriaco's title to the Motherland had become indefeasible. It... bears to stress that the proceedings for land registration that led
to the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 24991 and eventually, OCT No. 1462 in Ciriaco's name are presumptively regular and
proper,[49] which presumption has not been overcome by the... evidence presented by Francisco, et al.

In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners, are not the riparian owners of the Motherland to which the First
Accretion had attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership over the First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second
Accretion had merely attached to the First Accretion, they also have no right over the Second Accretion. Neither were they able to show
that they acquired these properties through prescription as it was not established that they were in possession of any of them. Therefore,...
whether through accretion or, independently, through prescription, the discernible conclusion is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners'
claim of title over the First and Second Accretions had not been substantiated, and, as a result, said properties cannot be... reconveyed
in their favor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

REPUBLIC VS. SANTOS III

FACTS:

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on
March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which
had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in the
Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the
Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the
latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open,
notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.

The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control
program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not
covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was
an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.3

On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos
and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio,
City of Parañaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-
000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Parañaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B

With this, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit.

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."

In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced that on the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio
Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application which was previously a part of the
Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned
by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased.

The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, and stated that it could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in
this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River
which became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which
was obtained by the latter from his mother

The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the
fact that respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Parañaque River.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription (section 14(1) of PD 1529)

RULING:

NO! (By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water- belongs to the owner
of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs
to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.)

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the merits of their application by a
preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in opposition
to it.11 They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its registration under the Torrens system only if they
established that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil
through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up
river bed of the Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously
part of the Parañaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."

Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of Lot 4 was issued in their mother’s name
in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the Parañaque River, the unavoidable
conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the Parañaque River,
resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.

The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the effects of the current of the river are not
the only cause of the formation of land along a river bank. There are several other causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The
drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not establish
at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems
to be highly improbable that the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had been
deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years – the span of time
intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in
existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents’ witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to have occupied
Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Parañaque
River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own testimony to the effect that the property was previously a part of the Parañaque
River that had dried up and become an orchard.

The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.

Xxxx

The Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously,
openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject
parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan
Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC –
Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and
that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

The RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed possession to be "more than thirty years" from the fact that "their
predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents
had performed showing their possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The decision
mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be made. That, to us, was not enough to
justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payor’s ownership of the land the
taxes were paid for,25 the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership;26 and, secondly, the causing of
surveys of the property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to make an express act of possession,
and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the
riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest27 has no applicability herein. This is
simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents’
predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a
positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of the
Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court.
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares
that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to
belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should
belong to some other person.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES
the application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045
square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively
belonging to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.

GALANG VS. REYES

FACTS:

Facts:

On September 4, 1997, spouses Conrado S. Reyes and Fe de Kastro Reyes... filed a case for the annulment of Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-928 against spouses Crispin and Caridad Galang... with the Regional Trial Court,... Antipolo

Reyeses alleged that they owned two properties: (1) a subdivision project known as Ponderosa Heights Subdivision (Ponderosa), and
(2) an adjoining property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 185252, with an... area of 1,201 sq.m.;... that the properties
were separated by the Marigman Creek, which dried up sometime in 1980 when it changed its course and passed through Ponderosa;
that the Galangs, by employing manipulation and fraud, were able to obtain a... certificate of title over the dried up creek bed from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources... that they discovered the existence of the certificate of title sometime in March 1997
when their caretaker, Federico Enteroso (Enteroso), informed them that the subject property had been fraudulently titled in the names of
the Galangs; that in

1984, prior to such discovery, Enteroso applied for the titling of the property, as he had been occupying it since 1968 and had built his...
house on it; that, later, Enteroso requested them to continue the application because of financial constraints on his part

The Galangs in their Answer[7] denied that the land subject of the complaint was part of a creek and countered that OCT No. P-928 was
issued to them after they had complied with the free patent requirements of the DENR,... that they and... their predecessor-in-interest had
been in possession, occupation, cultivation, and ownership of the land for quite some time; that the property described under TCT No.
185252 belonged to Apolonio Galang, their predecessor-in-interest, under OCT No. 3991; that the property was... transferred in the
names of the Reyeses through falsified document;[8] that assuming ex gratia argumenti that the creek had indeed changed its course
and passed through Ponderosa, the Reyeses had already claimed for themselves the portion of the... dried creek which adjoined and co-
existed with their property; that Enteroso... was able to occupy a portion of their land by means of force, coercion, machinations, and
stealth in 1981;

In its Decision,[9] dated July 16, 2004, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and for being an erroneous remedy.

In the case before the trial court, the Reyeses presented no evidence of fraud despite their allegations that the Galangs were not... in
possession of the property and that it was part of a dried creek. There being no evidence, these contentions remained allegations and
could not defeat the title of the Galangs

The fraud must be actual... not me... the evidence thereof must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant, because the
proceedings which are being assailed as having been fraudulent are judicial proceedings, which by law, are presumed to have been fair...
and regular.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and ordered the cancellation of OCT No. P-928 and the reconveyance of the land to the
Reyeses. The free patent covering the subject land, a private land, and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto, are null and void.[12]

The Galangs moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
IN NOT RESOLVING THAT THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, HAS THE SOLE
AUTHORITY TO FILE [CASES FOR] ANNULMENT OF TITLE INVOLVING

PUBLIC LAND.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE [A] CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONERS EVEN WITHOUT
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMED[IES].

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
IN DEVIATING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AND INTERPRETING ARTICLE 420 IN RELATION TO
ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BY SUBSTITUTING ITS
OWN OPINION BASED ON ASSUMPTION OF FACTS.

RULING:

Regarding the first issue, the Galangs state that the property was formerly a public land, titled in their names by virtue of Free Patent No.
045802-96-2847 issued by the DENR. Thus, they posit that the Reyeses do not have the personality and authority to institute any action...
for annulment of title because such authority is vested in the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General.

In this regard, the Galangs are mistaken. The action filed by the Reyeses seeks the transfer to their names of the title registered in the
names of the Galangs. In their Complaint, they alleged that: first, they are the owners of the land, being the owners of the properties...
through which the Marigman creek passed when it changed its course; and second, the Galangs illegally dispossessed them by having
the same property registered in their names. It was not an action for reversion which requires that the State be the one to initiate the
action in... order for it to prosper.

In this case... the complaint instituted by the Reyeses before the RTC was for the annulment of the title issued to the Galangs, and not
for reversion

Thus, the real party in interest here is not the State but the Reyeses who claim a right of ownership over the property in... question even
before the issuance of a title in favor of the Galangs.

Although the Reyeses have the right to file an action for reconveyance, they have failed to prove their case.

Court agrees with the RTC that the Reyeses failed to adduce... substantial evidence to establish their allegation that the Galangs had
fraudulently registered the subject property in their names.

Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of natural abandonment of the old course must be shown, that is, it must be proven
that the creek indeed changed its course without artificial or man-made intervention. Thus, the... claimant, in this case the Reyeses, must
prove three key elements by clear and convincing evidence. These are: (1) the old course of the creek, (2) the new course of the creek,
and (3) the change of course of the creek from the old location to the new location by... natural occurrence.

Reyeses failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove the old course, its natural abandonment and the new course.

performance

The bottom line here is that, fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of titl~, should never be
presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evi~ence, with mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a
question of... fact which must be proved.

MAYOR OF PARANAQUE VS. EBIO

FACTS:

Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land in Parañaque City covered by Tax in the name of respondent
Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek.

Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez, which was given to his son,
Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing
an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. He also paid taxes for the land.

Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio
secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the land. On April 21, 1987, Pedro
transferred his rights over the land in favor of Ebio.

On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking assistance
from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The
proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents.
Respondents immediately opposed and the project was suspended.

In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and the city planning office
proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot.

On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty
(30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a reply, asserting their claim over the subject property and
expressing intent for a further dialogue. The request remained unheeded.

Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the State may build on the land in question.

RULING:

NO! It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of
Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.

ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from
the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain
as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided
for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property
may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has
been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them
by prescription as against the State.

Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation
of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.

REGENT VS, TANJUATCO

FACTS:

Petitioner New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRSI) filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and
Damages against respondent Tanjuatco and the Register of Deeds of Calamba before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna. NRSI alleged that
in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition of two parcels of land
by virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name by paying P82,400.38 to the Bureau of Lands. On
January 2, 1995, Cuevas and his wife executed a Voting Trust Agreement over their shares of stock in the corporation. Then, pending
approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands, Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco for the sum of P85,000. On March 12, 1996,
the Director of Lands released an Order, which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco. Transfer Certificates of Title
were then issued in the name of Tanjuatco.

In his Answer with Counterclaim, Tanjuatco advanced the affirmative defense that the complaint stated no cause of action against him.
According to Tanjuatco, it was Cuevas who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation. He averred further that the complaint did not
charge him with knowledge of the agreement between Cuevas and NRSI. RTC dismissed the complaint of petitioner on demurrer to
evidence and held that Tanjuatco is an innocent purchaser for value.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NRSI was able to substantiate its claim of entitlement to ownership of the lands in Tanjuatco’s name

RULING:

NO! NRSI anchors its claim over the lands subjects of this case on the right of accretion. It submitted in evidence, titles to four parcels
of land, which allegedly adjoin the lots in the name of Tanjuatco.

But it must be stressed that accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the
following requisites:

(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;

(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.

Thus, it is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion must show
by preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law. Petitioner has notably failed in this regard as it did not offer
any evidence to prove that it has satisfied the foregoing requisites.

Further, it is undisputed that Tanjuatco derived his title to the lands from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines. Said parcels of land formed part of the Dried San Juan River Bed, which under Article 502 (1) of the
Civil Code rightly pertains to the public dominion. The Certification issued by Forester III Emiliano S. Leviste confirms that said lands
were verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable, certified and declared as such on September 28, 1981. Clearly, the Republic is
the entity which had every right to transfer ownership thereof to respondent.

Next, petitioner sought to establish fraudulent registration of the land in the name of Tanjuatco. NRSI presented before the trial court a
copy of the Voting Trust Agreement which the spouses Cuevas executed in favor of Pauline Co. However, nothing in said agreement
indicates that NRSI empowered Cuevas to apply for the registration of the subject lots on its behalf. Neither did petitioner adduce
evidence to prove that Cuevas was its President and Chairman. Even assuming that Cuevas was the president of NRSI, his powers are
confined only to those vested upon him by the board of directors or fixed in the by-laws. In truth, petitioner could have easily presented
its by-laws or a corporate resolution to show Cuevas’s authority to buy the lands on its behalf. But it did not.

Petitioner filed a complaint for rescission/declaration of nullity of contract, reconveyance and damages against respondents. An action
for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. In an action for
reconveyance, the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, specifically
the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one
with a better right.

To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur: (1) the action must be brought in the name of a person
claiming ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name of the defendant; (2) the registration of the land in the name
of the defendant was procured through fraud or other illegal means; (3) the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for
value; and (4) the action is filed after the certificate of title had already become final and incontrovertible but within four years from the
discovery of the fraud, or not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust. Petitioner failed to show the presence of these requisites.

NAZARENO VS. CA

FACTS:

The only issue involved in this petition is whether or not petitioners exhausted administrative remedies before having recourse to the
courts.

The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City. Said land was formed as a result
of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river.

Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one
Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of 1982, private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals.
As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4.
A decision was rendered against private respondents, which decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental,
Branch 20.

The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the same became final and executory. Private
respondents filed a case for annulment of judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 which dismissed the
same. Antonio Nazareno and petitioners again moved for execution of judgment but private respondents filed another case for certiorari
with prayer for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25 which
was likewise dismissed. The decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of
the subject lots they occupied..

Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571
with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the
applicant, however, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of Lands.

In compliance with the order of respondent District Land Officer Alberto M. Gillera, respondent Land Investigator Avelino G. Labis
conducted an investigation and rendered a report to the Regional Director recommending that Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-D
(equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file
appropriate public land applications.

Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands Roberto Hilario rendered a decision ordering the amendment
of the survey plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private respondents who, if
qualified, may file public land applications covering their respective portions.

Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent Rolleo Ignacio, Undersecretary of the Department of Natural
Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands who denied the motion. Respondent Director of Lands Abelardo Palad then
ordered him to vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove whatever improvements they have introduced thereon.
He also ordered that private respondents be placed in possession thereof.

Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia
Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC, Branch 22 for annulment of the following: order of investigation by respondent Gillera, report and
recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order by respondent Ignacio affirming the decision of respondent
Hilario and order of execution by respondent Palad. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
which resulted in the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint. Applying Section 4 of C.A. No. 141, as
amended, it contended that the approval of the survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of Lands. Hence, factual findings made by
the Metropolitan Trial Court respecting the subject land cannot be held to be controlling as the preparation and approval of said survey
plans belong to the Director of Lands and the same shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
resources. 1

Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion for reconsideration filed by Antonio Nazareno cannot be considered as an
appeal to the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as mandated by C.A. No. 141 inasmuch as the same had
been acted upon by respondent Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as Officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Lands and not as
Undersecretary acting for the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. For the failure of Antonio Nazareno to appeal to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the present case does not fall within the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. It also held that there was no showing of oppressiveness in the manner in which the orders were issued and
executed..

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners assign the following errors:

I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE PREVAILING FACTS AND THE LAW ON THE MATTER;

II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DISMISSING THE ORIGINAL CASE WHICH FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE EXECUTION
ORDER OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., DIRECTOR OF LANDS, MANILA, PRACTICALLY CHANGED THE
DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ROBERTO HILARIO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LANDS, REGION 10, THUS
MAKING THE CASE PROPER SUBJECT FOR ANNULMENT WELL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT.

The resolution of the above issues, however, hinges on the question of whether or not the subject land is public land. Petitioners claim
that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which provides:

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters.

In the case of Meneses v. CA, 2 this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires
the concurrence of these requisites : (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of
the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the
sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or
streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of waters.

For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the above-mentioned requisites must be present.
However, they admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas
Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. 3 It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and
other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and
the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of Manila, 4 this Court held that the word "current" indicates the participation of the body of water in
the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not having met the first and second requirements of the rules
on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.

In any case, this court agrees with private respondents that petitioners are estopped from denying the public character of the subject
land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application MSA
(G-6) 571. 5 The mere filing of said Application constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public land, having been the
subject of Survey Plan No. MSi-10-06-000571-D (Equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad-237) which was conducted as a consequence of
Antonio Nazareno's Miscellaneous Sales Application wherein said land was described as an orchard. Said description by Antonio
Nazareno was, however, controverted by respondent Labis in his investigation report to respondent Hilario based on the findings of his
ocular inspection that said land actually covers a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River. The
investigation report also states that, except for the swampy portion which is fully planted to nipa palms, the whole area is fully occupied
by a part of a big concrete bodega of petitioners and several residential houses made of light materials, including those of private
respondents which were erected by themselves sometime in the early part of 1978. 6

Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of sawdust in the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands. 7 This Court has
often enough held that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. 8 Again, when said factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
the same are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court. 9

It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made or artificial. In Republic v. CA, 10 this Court ruled that
the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the
Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco
v. Director of Lands, et al., 11 where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said
land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such,
part of the public domain.

In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its
sawmill
operations. 12 Even if this Court were to take into consideration petitioners' submission that the accretion site was the result of the late
Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan
River bounding his land, 13 the same would still be part of the public domain.

Having determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources have jurisdiction over the same in accordance with the Public Land Law. Accordingly, the court a quo dismissed
petitioners' complaint for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies which ruling the Court of Appeals affirmed.

However, this Court agrees with petitioners that administrative remedies have been exhausted. Petitioners could not have intended to
appeal to respondent Ignacio as an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. The decision being appealed from was the decision of
respondent Hilario who was the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands. Said decision was made "for and by authority of the Director
of Lands". 14 It would be incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands acting for the Director of the
Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands.

In any case, respondent Rolleo Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-Charge" of the Bureau of Lands. When he acted on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for
reconsideration by affirming or adopting respondent Hilario's decision, he was acting on said motion as an Undersecretary on behalf of
the Secretary of the Department. In the case of Hamoy v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 15 this Court held that the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may modify, adopt, or set aside the orders or decisions of the Director of Lands
with respect to questions involving public lands under the administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot, therefore, be said to have acted beyond the bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3,
4 and 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 16

As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted land is public land, being an artificial accretion of sawdust. As such, the
Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority and control over the same, as mandated under Sections 3 and 4 of the Public Land Law (C.A.
No. 141) which states, thus:

Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the exclusive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this
Act through the Director of Lands who shall act under his immediate control.

Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any
other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall
be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

In connection with the second issue, petitioners ascribe whim, arbitrariness or capriciousness in the execution order of public respondent
Abelardo G. Palad, the Director of Lands. This Court finds otherwise since said decision was based on the conclusive finding that the
subject land was public land. Thus, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Director of Lands acted within his rights when he
issued the assailed execution order, as mandated by the aforecited provisions.

Petitioners' allegation that respondent Palad's execution order directing them to vacate the subject land practically changed respondent
Hilario's decision is baseless. It is incorrect for petitioners to assume that respondent Palad awarded portions of the subject land to private
respondents Salasalans and Rabayas as they had not yet been issued patents or titles over the subject land. The execution order merely
directed the segregation of petitioners' titled lot from the subject land which was actually being occupied by private respondents before
they were ejected from it. Based on the finding that private respondents were actually in possession or were actually occupying the
subject land instead of petitioners, respondent Palad, being the Director of Lands and in the exercise of his administrative discretion,
directed petitioners to vacate the subject land on the ground that private respondents have a preferential right, being the occupants
thereof.

While private respondents may not have filed their application over the land occupied by them, they nevertheless filed their protest or
opposition to petitioners' Miscellaneous Sales Application, the same being preparatory to the filing of an application as they were in fact
directed to do so. In any case, respondent Palad's execution order merely implements respondent Hilario's order. It should be noted that
petitioners' own application still has to be given due course. 17

As Director of Lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control over any form of concession, disposition and
management of the lands of the public domain. 18 He may issue decisions and orders as he may see fit under the circumstances as long
as they are based on the findings of fact.

In the case of Calibo v. Ballesteros, 19 this Court held that where, in the disposition of public lands, the Director of Lands bases his
decision on the evidence thus presented, he clearly acts within his jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the error is one
of judgment, but not an act of grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari. Thus, except for the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, this Court finds no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 MENESES VS. CA

FACTS:

On March 1, 1977, Darum, then the District Land Officer of Los Baños, Laguna, issued to Pablito Meneses 2 Free Patent and 2 OCT
covering lots located in Los Baños, Laguna.

Pablito acquired said property from Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights executed in 1975 in consideration of
Bautista’s “love and affection” for and “some monetary obligations” in favor of Meneses. After the execution of said document, Meneses
took possession of the land, introduced improvements thereon, declared the land as his own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding
realty taxes. In turn, Bautista acquired the land from his aunt. He had been occupying the land since 1956.

On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of their land as far back as 1919 when their matriarch was issued an OCT
covering a lot, with the Laguna de Bay as its northwestern boundary. The same parcel of land was registered on 1973 under a TCT in
the names of her heirs, all surnamed Quisumbing.

The Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of title over an additional area which had gradually accrued to their property
by the natural action of the waters of Laguna de Bay. The CFI of Biñan confirmed the Quisumbings’ title thereto.

In 1979, the Quisumbings filed a case before the CFI of Calamba against Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Darum and Almendral for
nullification of the free patents and titles issued to Pablito Meneses. They alleged that Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of Los Baños,
using his brother Pablito as a “tool and dummy,” illegally occupied their “private accretion land” and confederating with District Land
Officer Darum and Land Inspector Almendral, obtained free patents and OCTs to the land.

In 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding that the lands registered by the Meneses brothers are accretion lands to which the
Quisumbings have a valid right as owners of the riparian land to which nature had gradually deposited the disputed lots. (The lots occupied
by Meneses, as found by the court, are to be accretion lands forming parts of the bigger accretion land owned by the Quisumbings. )

Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed the to the CA, which affirmed in toto the lower court’s decision.The defendants-
appellants filed two MRs of the CA decision but it was denied, hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lands in question were accretion lands and not lands of the public domain; and

Whether or not conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad faith attended the issuance of the free patent and titles to Pablito Meneses.

RULING:

YES! While the lots occupied by Villamor and Lanuzo may not be the very same lots petitioners are claiming here, the two cases refer to
the same accretion lands northwest of the original land owned by the Quisumbings.

The submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains “falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from
different sources.” Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due to “flux and reflux of tides” it cannot be considered a foreshore
land. The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director
of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a
registerable title.

Additionally, the provision of the law on waters will govern in determining the natural bed or basin of the lake. And accordingly, to Art. 84
of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:

Accretions deposited gradually upon land contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers and lakes by accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

As pointed out by the lower court, no act of appropriation is necessary in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation as the law
does not require the same.

2. As found by the CA, petitioners conspired in the approval and grant of the free patents heirs Quisumbing. Such fraud was confirmed
by this Court in Meneses v. People, which held the petitioners therein liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in the
issuance of the same free patents and titles. In due course, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the defendants guilty as
charged. The judgment of conviction was affirmed.

NOTES:

1. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of these requisites:

(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;

(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).
2. The task of fixing the amount of damages is primarily with the trial court. While it is the appellate court’s duty to review the same, a
reduction of the award of damages must pass the test of reasonableness. The CA can only modify or change the amount awarded as
damages when they are palpably or scandalously and reasonably excessive.

3. A public official is by law not immune from damages in his personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope
of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

POOLE-BLUNDEN VS. UBP

FACTS:

Poole-Blunden (petitioner) came across an advertisement for public auction of certain properties placed by Union Bank in the Manila
Bulletin sometime in March 2001. One of these properties was Unit 2-C of T-Tower Condominium located at Makati City. The
condominium unit was acquired by UnionBank through forclosure proceedings.

A week prior to the auction, petitioner visited the unit for inspection. He found that the unit had an irregular shape, but didn’t doubt the
unit’s area as advertised, the ceiling in a bad condition, and the unit needed substantial repairs to be habitable. On the day of the auction,
he also inspected the Master Title of the project owner to the condominium. Petitioner won the bid and he entered to a Contract to Sell
with UnionBank. He started occupying the unit in June 2001 and by July 2003, he was able to fully pay for the unit, paying a total amount
of P 3,257,142.49.00.

Petitioner decided to construct two additional bedrooms in the unit. He noticed apparent problems in its dimensions. He took a rough
measurement and found that the floor area was just 70 sqm, not 95 sqm as advertised. He got in touch with an officer of UnionBank to
raise the matter, but no action was taken. He then wrote to Unionbank to inform them of the discrepancy and asked for the rescission of
the Contract to Sell, along with the refund of the amounts he had paid. UnionBank replied that upon inquiring with HLURB, the
Homeowners’s Association of T-Tower, and its appraisers, the unit was confirmed to be 95 sqm inclusive of the terrace and the comon
areas surrounding it. The petitioner was not satisfied because according to the Master Title, “boundary of each unit are the interior
surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows and doors thereof." He hired an independent geodetic engineer, to survey the
unit and measure its actual floor. It was found out that the actual area was only 74.4 sqm and gave a copy of the certification to Unionbank.
UnionBank explained that the total area of the unit is based on the ratio allocation maintenance cost submitted by the developer to
HLURB is 98 square meters (60 square meters as unit area and 38 square meters as share on open space). On the other hand, the
actual area thereof based on the measurements made by its surveyor is 74.18 square meters which was much higher than the unit area
of 60 square meters that was approved by HLURB. The petitioner was dissatisfied with the said explanation.

Petitioner filed for the recission of the Contract to Sell with Damages with the RTC of Makati and said court dismissed the complaint. The
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC stating that the sale was made on a "as-is-where-is" basis as indicated in their contract. Thus, the
petitioner supposedly waived any errors in the bounds or description of the unit. With the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, he filed
for a petition to the Supreme Court stating that: there is a vitiation of his consent as to the object of the sale and he charges UnionBank
with fraud since it failed to disclose to him that the advertised 95 square meters was inclusive of common areas. Thus, the Contract to
Sell may be voided and that UnionBank is liable for breach of warranty despite the "as-is-where-is" clause in the Contract to Sell.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Union Bank committed such a degree of fraud as would entitle Joseph Harry Walter Poole-Blunden to the voiding of the
Contract to Sell the condominium unit identified as Unit 2C, T-Tower Condominium, Makati City.

RULING:

YES! Bank's insistence on how common spaces should be included in reckoning the Unit's total area runs afoul of how Republic Act No.
4726, otherwise known as the Condominium. Section 3(b) of the Condominium Act defines a condominium unit, as follows:

"Unit" means a part of the condominium project intended for any type of independent use or ownership, including one or more rooms or
spaces located in one or more floors (or part or parts of floors) in a building or buildings and such accessories as may be appended
thereto.

Section 6(a) of the Condominium Act specifies the reckoning of a condominium unit's bounds. It also specifies that areas of common use
"are not part of the unit":

The boundary of the unit granted are the interior surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows and doors thereof. The following
are not part of the unit bearing walls, columns, floors, roofs, foundations and other common structural elements of the building; lobbies,
stairways, hallways, and other areas of common use.

Thus, the unit sold to petitioner was deficient in relation to its advertised area. This advertisement having been made by respondent, it is
equally settled there was a falsity in the declarations made by respondent prior to, and with the intention of enticing buyers to the sale.

Petitioner's contention on how crucial the dimensions and area of the Unit are to his decision to proceed with the purchase is well-taken.
The significance of space and dimensions to any buyer of real property is plain to see. This is particularly significant to buyers of
condominium units in urban areas, and even more so in central business districts, where the scarcity of space drives vertical construction
and propels property values.

The defense of "as-is-where-is" terms of the purchase is untenable. First, a stipulation absolving a seller of liability for hidden defects can
only be invoked by a seller who has no knowledge of hidden defects. Respondent here knew that the Unit's area, as reckoned in
accordance with the Condominium Act, was not 95 square meters. Second, an as-is-where-is stipulation can only pertain to the readily
perceptible physical state of the object of a sale. It cannot encompass matters that require specialized scrutiny, as well as features and
traits that are immediately appreciable only by someone with technical competence.

Thus, the Court ordered that the Contract to Sell between petitioner and respondent be annulled, and petitioner be refunded all the
amounts he paid to respondent in respect of the purchase of the Unit plus damages.

GEÑORGA VS. HEIRS OF MELITON

FACTS:

Julian and other respondents all surnamed Meliton are the registered owners of identified as Lot No. 1095-C located in Concepcion
Pequeña, Naga City. During his lifetime, Julian sold a portion of the subject land to Geñorga who took possession and introduced
improvements on the portions respectively sold to them. However, Julian failed to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT which led
the petitioner to file a Petition for the surrender for the said copy.

The petitioner obtained a favorable decision from RTC of Naga City ordering the administratrix of the estate of Julian to surrender
possession thereof enter the deed of sale and to issue the corresponding certificates of title after compliance with the requirements of the
law. It further held that should the holder fail or refuse to comply with the court’s directive: (a) TCT No. 8027 shall be declared null and
void; and (b) the RD-Naga shall issue a new certificate of title in lieu thereof, enter the deeds of sale, and issue certificates of title in favor
of the buyers.

The administratix failed to comply. In an Order dated October 2, 2008, the RTC declared TCT No. 8027 null and void, resulting in the
issuance of a new one, bearing annotations of the buyers’ adverse claims. The new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 8027 (subject
owner’s duplicate title) was given to petitioner in 2009.

On April 22, 2013, respondents filed a Complaint against petitioner alleging that they are entitled to the possession thereof as registered
owners, and suffered damages as a consequence of its unlawful withholding, compelling them to secure the services of counsel to protect
their interests.

In her Answer, petitioner averred that she and the other buyers are in the process of completing all the requirements for the registration
of the sales in their favor, and have paid the estate taxes thereon. They had likewise caused the survey of the land but the first geodetic
engineer they hired to conduct the same failed to deliver his services, prompting them to file a complaint against him, and to hire another
geodetic engineer. Considering that their possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title was by virtue of a court decision, and for the
legitimate purpose of registering the sales in their favor and the issuance of titles in their names, they should be allowed to retain
possession until the completion of the requirements therefor. The said title was eventually submitted to the RD-Naga on September 13,
2013.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has the obligation to surrender and delivery of possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title to
respondents

RULING:

YES! Preliminarily, it is well to point out that the subject land was an undivided co-owned property when Julian sold different portions
thereof to various persons. However, a perusal of the pertinent deeds of absolute sale reveals that definite portions of the subject land
were eventually sold, and the buyers took possession and introduced improvements thereon, declared the same in their names, and paid
the realty taxes thereon, all without any objection from respondents who never disputed the sales in favor of the buyers. Consequently,
the Court finds that there is, in this case, a partial factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, which entitles the buyers to the
segregation of their respective portions, and the issuance of new certificates of title in their names upon compliance with the requirements
of law.

Records show that the subject owner’s duplicate title had already been surrendered to the RD-Naga on September 13, 2013, and some
of the buyers had secured Certificates Authorizing Registration and paid the corresponding fees for the registration of the sales in their
favor. Nonetheless, while the rights of the buyers over the portions respectively sold to them had already been recognized by the RTC of
Naga City in its July 17, 1998 Decision in Civil Case No. RTC ’96-3526 which had attained finality on September 10, 2006, there is no
showing that the other affected buyers have similarly complied with the necessary registration requirements.

Notably, from the time petitioner received possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title in 2009, a considerable amount of time had
passed until she submitted the same to the RD-Naga on September 13, 2013. But even up to the time she filed the instant petition before
the Court on May 6, 2016, she failed to show any sufficient justification for the continued failure of the concerned buyers to comply with
the requirements for the registration of their respective deeds of sale and the issuance of certificates of title in their names to warrant a
preferential right to the possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title as against respondents who undisputedly own the bigger portion
of the subject land. Consequently, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in affirming the RTC Decision directing petitioner
or the RD-Naga to deliver or surrender the subject owner’s duplicate title to respondents.

Moreover, it bears to stress that the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds is only ministerial in nature.
Thus, the RD-Naga cannot be expected to retain possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title longer than what is reasonable to
perform its duty. In the absence of a verified and approved subdivision plan and technical description duly submitted for registration on
TCT No. 8027, it must return the same to the presenter, in this case, petitioner who, as aforesaid, failed to establish a better right to the
possession of the said owner’s duplicate title as against respondents.

As a final point, it must, however, be clarified that the above-pronounced delivery or surrender is without prejudice to the rights of the
concerned buyers who would be able to subsequently complete the necessary registration requirements and thereupon, duly request the
surrender of the subject owner’s duplicate title anew to the RD-Naga.

BAUTISTA VS. BAUTISTA

DOCTRINE:

There is an implied trust when a property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the
purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property.

FACTS:

The Bautista siblings - Margarito, Manuel L. Bautista, Carmelita Bautista Sahagun (Carmelita), Aniano L. Bautista (Aniano ), Florencia
Bautista de Villa (Florencia), and Ester Bautista Cabrera (Ester) - established a lending business through a common fund from the
proceeds of the sale of a parcel of coconut land they inherited from their mother Consorcia Lantin Bautista.4 Margarito, Florencia, and
Ester managed the business with Reginald Sahagun, Carmelita's son, as credit investigator. Senen Cabrera, Ester's husband, prepared
the documents for mortgage and reported the status of the lending business to the Bautista siblings.6 Through the said lending business,
the siblings acquired several real properties in San Pablo City.

On March 2, 1998, Amelia V. Mendoza (Amelia) obtained a loan in the amount of P690,000.00 from Florencia, and secured the same
with a real estate mortgage over a 25,518-square-meter parcel of land she owned situated at Barangay Sta. Monica, San Pablo City,
denominated as Lot 2, Plan Psu-45117 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T- 2371 (Sta. Monica property).8 They later
extended the mmigage through a Kasulatan ng Pagdaragdag ng Sanla, for an additional loan of Pl 15,000.00 on April 6, 1998.

On May 13, 1998, Amelia and Florencia renewed the mortgage for Pl ,085,000.00 and cancelled the previous loan of P690,000.00 through
a "Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage." Subsequently, on April 12, 1999, Amelia and Florencia executed another Kasulatan ng
Pagdaragdag ng Sanla in the amount of P57,500.00. Florencia, thereafter, received the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T- 23 71,
which she, in turn, entrusted to Carmelita when she went overseas.

On November 28, 2002, Amelia allegedly sold the subject property to Margarito through a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan for P500,000.00
and, likewise, cancelled the Pl ,085,000.00 loan through another "Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage." On the same date, Florencia
filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Second Owner's Duplicate of TCT No. T-2371 before the RTC of San Pablo City, Branch 29. She
alleged that she was the mortgagee of the subject property, and that she could not locate, despite diligent search, the owner's duplicate
title in her possession, which she misplaced sometime in September 2002. Florencia also executed a SpecialPower of Attorney in favor
of Margarito to represent her in the proceedings.

Petitioners tried to oppose the issuance, 18 but on January 30, 2003, the RTC granted the petition and TCT No. T-59882 was later issued
in the name of Margarito. On January 12, 2004, petitioners registered an Adverse Claim over the Sta. Monica property, which was
annotated on TCT No. T- 59882.

Failing to settle their differences, petitioners subsequently instituted a Complaint for Partition and Accounting with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. SP-6064(04) before the RTC of San Pablo City, Branch
32, over several properties against herein respondent Margarito, the Spouses Marconi de Villa and Florencia Bautista, and the Spouses
Senen Cabrera and Ester Bautisa

On April 23, 2004, the parties filed a "Partial Settlement" manifesting that they have entered into an amicable settlement over the other
properties involved in the complaint. In a Decision dated April 28, 2004, the RTC approved the compromise agreement.

Since no settlement was reached as regards the Sta. Monica property, petitioners presented copies of their bank transactions with Far
East Bank to support their claim of co-ownership over the same. They also presented an undated, unnotarized, and without the name of
the vendee Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan (blank Kasulatan ), which Amelia purportedly executed and signed disposing the subject
property in favor of the Bautista siblings. Petitioner Carmelita also alleged that the duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2371 in the name of
Amelia was in her possession and was never lost.

For his part, Margarito asseverated that he exclusively owns the property in controversy since he used his personal funds in purchasing
the land. Margarito presented TCT No. T-59882 covering the Sta. Monica property, and the Tax Declaration and Receipts thereof.
On February 16, 2009, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and declared, among other things, that the Sta. Monica property was
commonly owned by the siblings. The RTC also ordered that the property bpartitioned among all of them and that an accounting of its
income be held.

On March 3, 2009, Margarito filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the RTC denied it in an Order32 dated April 2, 2009.

Aggrieved, Margarito elevated the case before the CA. In a Decision dated March 6, 2012, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC. CA ruled that the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-59882 under the name of defendant-
appellant Margarito L. Bautista is declared exclusively owned by defendant-appellant Margarito L. Bautista. CA concluded that petitioners
failed to establish that they are co-owners of the Sta. Monica property. It held that the TCT under Margarito's name was an indefeasible
and incontrovertible title to the property and has more probative weight than the blank Kasulatan adduced by the petitioners.
Consequently, petitioners' action for partition and accounting cannot be acted upon because they failed to prove that they are co-owners
of the Sta. Monica property.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the property was conveyed to the respondent.

2. Whether or not an implied trust was established in this case.

RULING:

1. NO! the property was not conveyed to the respondent. From the foregoing, petitioners established the manner in which they acquired
several properties through their business and have them registered under their names. Even the compromise agreement they entered
into, which was approved by the RTC, reflected their claim and admission that they co-owned the properties although titled to only one
of their siblings. It was, thus, logical for the RTC to conclude that it was through this practice that they also acquired the Sta. Monica
property.

Moreover, several other circumstances buttressed petitioners' claim, among which is that they have proven that their lending business
has the financial capacity to acquire the Sta. Monica property; that Florencia, who was co-manager of the business, entered into several
mortgage transactions with Amelia; and that the blank Kasulatan was in their possession. They even opposed the issuance of a second
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2371 since the original TCT was in their safekeeping and was not actually lost.

Based on the List of Exhibits, aside from his bare allegations and testimony, Margarito neither identified nor presented the deed of sale
during trial nor formally offered the same as his evidence. It is elementary that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mere allegation is not evidence. It appears that Margarito's evidence of exclusive ownership are the certificate of title, the tax declarations
pertaining thereto, his bank deposits, and other mortgage contracts involving different mortgagors. Despite all these, Margarito failed to
prove that Amelia conveyed the Sta. Monica property exclusively in his name. It is also quite intriguing why he did not even bother to
present the testimony of Amelia or of Florencia, who could have enlightened the court about their transactions. In addition, We find it
incredible that a property, which secured a loan roughly over a million pesos, would be sold for considerably less than that amount or for
only P550,000.00.

2. YES! the property was conveyed to the respondent Margarito, like in the case at bar, although a certificate of title is the best proof of
ownership of a piece of land, the mere issuance of the same in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other
parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. The principle that a trustee who puts a certificate
of registration in his name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on.

There is an implied trust when a property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the
purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property.54 This is sometimes referred to as a purchase money resulting trust, the elements
of which are: (a) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; and (b) such
consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trustthe registration is one of the well-known limitations upon a
title.

A trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially between families, does not lose that character
simply because of what appears in a legal document. 56 From the foregoing, this Court finds that an implied resulting trust existed among
the parties. The pieces of evidence presented demonstrate their intention to acquire the Sta. Monica property in the course of their
business, just like the other properties that were also the subjects of the partition case and the compromise agreement they entered into.
Although the Sta. Monica property was titled under the name of Margarito, the surrounding circumstances as to its acquisition speak of
the intent that the equitable or beneficial ownership of the property should belong to the Bautista siblings.

TABASONDRA VS. CONSTANTINO

FACTS:

The parties herein were the children of the late Cornelio Tabasondra from two marriages. The respondents Tarcila Tabasondra-
Constantino and the late Sebastian Tabasondra were the children of Cornelio by his first wife, Severina; the petitioners, namely: Arsenio
Tabasondra, Fernando Tabasondra, Cornelio Tabasondra, Jr., Mirasol Tabasondra-Mariano, Fausta Tabasondra-Tapacio, Myrasol
Tabasondra-Romero, Marlene Tabasondra-Maniquil, and Guillermo Tabasondra, were children of Cornelio by his second wife, Sotera.
Valentina, and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra. were siblings. They were also the registered owners of the three (3) parcels of land
located at Dalayap, Tarlac City, identified as Lot No. 2536, containing an area of seventy-seven thousand one hundred and forty-seven
(77,147) sq. m.; Lot No. 3155, with an area of thirteen thousand six hundred fifty-nine (13,659) sq. m.; and, Lot No. 3159, with an area of
nine thousand five hundred forty-six (9,546) sq. m., covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 106012.

Cornelio died on March 15, 1991, while Valentina and Valeriana both died single on August 19, 1990 and August 4, 1998, respectively.
They all died intestate and without partitioning the property covered by TCT No. 106012. Thus, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and the
Defendants-Appellants, as descendants of Cornelio, possessed and occupied the property.

On August 22, 2002, the Plaintiffs-Appellees filed the complaint below against the Defendants-Appellant claiming that the parcels of land
are owned in common by them and the Defendants-Appellants but the latter does not give them any share in the fruits thereof. Hence,
they asked for partition but the Defendants-Appellants refused without valid reasons.

In their Answer, the Defendants-Appellants averred that they do not object to a partition provided that the same should be made only with
respect to Cornelio' s share. They contended that they already own the shares of Valentina and Valeriana in the subject land by virtue of
the Deed of Absolute Sale that the said sisters executed in their favor on August 18, 1982.

The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintifft, ordering [the] partition of the three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT No. 16012
among the compulsory and legal heirs of Cornelio, Valentina[,] and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra.

On November 30, 2010, the CA promulgated the decision affirming the RTC with modification in that the partition and the accounting is
ordered to be made only with respect to a thirty-three thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66) sq.m. portion of the property.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA correctly ordered the partition and accounting with respect to only 33,450.66 square meters of the property registered
under TCT No. 10612.

RULING:

YES! There is no question that the total area of the three lots owned in common by Cornelio, Valentina and Valeriana was 100,352 square
meters; and that each of the co-owners had the right to one-third of such total area. It was established that Valentina and Valeriana
executed the Deed of Absolute Sale, whereby they specifically disposed of their shares in the property registered under TCT No. 10612
in favor of Sebastian Tabasondra and Tarcila Tabasondra.

The Court upheld the right of Valentina and Valeriana to thereby alienate .. their pro indiviso shares to Sebastian and Tarcila even without
the knowledge or consent of their co-owner Cornelio because the alienation covered the disposition of only their respective interests in
the common property. According to Article 493 of the Civil Code, each co-owner "shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved," but "the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership." Hence, the petitioners as the
successors-in-interest of Cornelio could not validly assail the alienation by Valentina and Valeriana of their shares in favor of the
respondents.

The SC affirmed the CA's ruling that there is no denying that the RTC erred in granting the complaint and ordering a partition without
qualifying that such should not include the shares previously pertaining to Valeria and Valentina. Simply put, since the aggregate area of
the subject property is one hundred thousand three hundred fifty-two (100,352) sq.m., it follows that Cornelio, Valentina, and Valeriana
each has a share equivalent to thirty-three thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66) sq. m. portion thereof. Accordingly, when
Valentina and Valeriana sold their shares, the Defendants-Appellants became co-owners with Cornelio. Perforce, upon Cornelia's death,
the only area that his heirs, that is, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and the Defendants-Appellants, are entitled to and which may be made subject
of partition is only a thirty three thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66) sq.m. portion of the property.

As a result of Valentina and Valeriana's alienation in favor of Sebastian and Tarcila of their pro indiviso shares in the three lots, Sebastian
and Tarcila became co-owners of the 100,352-square meter property with Cornelio (later on, with the petitioners who were the successors-
in-interest of Cornelio). In effect, Sebastian and Tarcila were co-owners of two-thirds of the property, with each of them having one-third
pro indiviso share in the three lots, while the remaining one-third was co-owned by the heirs of Cornelio, namely, Sebastian, Tarcila and
the petitioners.

Although the CA correctly identified the co-owners of the three lots, it did not segregate the 100,352-square meter property into
determinate portions among the several co-owners.

Accordingly, there is a need to remand the case to the court of origin for the purpose of identifying and segregating, by metes and bounds,
the specific portions of the three lots assigned to the co-owners, and to effect the physical partition of the property in the following
proportions: Tarcila, one-,, third; the heirs of Sebastian, one-third; and the petitioners (individually), along with Tarcila and the heirs of
Sebastian (collectively), one-third. That physical partition was required, but the RTC and the CA uncharacteristically did not require it.
Upon remand, therefore, the R TC should comply with the express terms of Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Should the parties be unable to agree on the partition, the next step for the R TC will be to appoint not more than three competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, and to command such commissioners to set off to each party in interest
the part and proportion of the property as directed in this decision.

DOMINGO VS. MOLINA

FACTS:

On June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided
portion over an 18, 164 square meter parcel of land which was annotated on the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16354.

Anastacio has been borrowing money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina all throughout his life. Ten years after the
death of Flora in 1978, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts. It was registered under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2729677 and the entire one-half undivided portion of the land was transferred to them.

One of the children of Anastacio and Flora filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership against the spouses
Molina when he learned of the transfer on May 17, 1999. Melecio claims that it is only to serve as collateral for the money that his father
has borrowed. He alleges that Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora’s consent, as she
was already dead at the time of the sale.

The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to the subject property to answer for his debts and told them that they
already own half of the land. They have been in possession of the subject property before the title was registered under their names and
have religiously paid the property’s real estate taxes. The adopted son of the spouses Molina, Cornelio Molina, substituted them when
they died during the pendency of the case.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the case because Melecio failed to establish his claim that his father did not sell the property
to the spouses Molina considering that Anastacio could dispose of conjugal property to answer for conjugal liabilities. Furthermore, it
denied Melecio’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC ruling and so he proceeded with his appeal to the CA.

The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. It held that Melecio failed to prove by preponderant evidence that there was fraud in the
conveyance of the property to the spouses Molina. It gave credence to the OCT annotation of the disputed property sale. It also held that
Flora’s death is immaterial because Anastacio only sold his rights over the lot to the spouses Molina, excluding Flora’s interest. Finally,
the CA held that Melecio’s action has prescribed because he failed to file the action within one year after entry of the decree of registration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora’s consent is valid and legal; and
2. Whether or not fraud attended the transfer of the subject property to the spouses Molina.

RULING:

The Supreme Court denied the petition. Melecio argues that the sale of the disputed property to the spouses Molina is void without Flora’s
consent. However, this argument is unmeritorious.

Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family Code’s effectivity which was on August 3, 1988 and so their property relation is
a conjugal partnership. It dissolved when Flora died in 1968, pursuant to now Article 126 (1) of the Family Code.

The heirs of Flora were governed by an implied co-ownership among the conjugal properties pending liquidation and partition. This will
also include Anastacio with respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal partnership. Anastacio being a co-owner, cannot claim title to any
specific portion of the conjugal properties without having done an actual partition first, either by agreement or by judicial decree. On the
other hand, Anastacio owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an undivided interest. As a
consequence, he had the right to freely sell and dispose his undivided interest in the subject property.

The spouses Molina became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio’s interest. Anastactio’s sale to the spouses
Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was not totally void, for his rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively
transferred. The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect of any portion that might belong
to the co-heirs after liquidation and partition. Melecio’s recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties is an action for PARTITION
under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.

On the issue of fraud, the lower courts found that there was no fraud in the sale of the disputed property to the spouses Molina. The
notarized deed of conveyance annotated on the OCT executed between Anastacio and the spouses Molina negated Melecio’s argument
that no document was executed for the sale of the disputed property. Furthermore, the petitioner’s belief that his father, Anastacio, could
not have sold the property without his knowledge cannot be considered as proof of fraud to invalidate the spouses Molina's registered
title over the subject property.