THE UNITED STATES VS EUSEBIO CLARIN Issue: Whether or not the charge for estafa will

prosper
Doctrine: The failure on the part of the industrial
partners to return to the capitalist partner the Ruling : No.
capital brought into the partnership by the latter is
1. When two or more persons bind themselves to
not an act constituting the crime of estafa as
contribute money property, industry to a
defined under the Revised Penal Code.
common fund with the intention of dividing
Facts profits among themselves a contract of
partnership is formed
1. Pedro Larin delivered to Pedro Tarung
2. When Larin put P172 Into the partnership he
P172.00 in order that the latter, in company
invested his capital in the risk or benefits of the
with Clarin and De Guzman might sell
business of the purchase and sale of mangoes
mangoes an d believing that he could
and even though he had reserved the capital
make some money in this business, Larin
and conveyed only the usufruct of his money,
made an agreement with the three men (
it would not devolve upon one of his three
TARUNG,CLARIN, DE GUZMAN) that profits
partners to return the capital to him but upon
were to be divided between them equally.
the partnership in which he himself formed
2. TARUNG, CLARIN, DE GUZMAN obtained a
part or if it were to be done by one of the
profit of P203 from the business, but they
three it would be TARUG who according to
did not comply with the terms of the
evidence was the person who received the
contract by delivering to LARIN his share of
partnership.
the profits, neither did they render him any
3. As stated under NO 5 Article 535 OF THE
accounting to that effect
PENAL CODE, those guilty of estafa are those
3. LARIN Charged the partners with ESTAFA
who to the prejudice of another shall
for failing to give his share of profits from
appropriate or misapply any money, goods or
the partnership
any kind of personal property which they may
have received, this does not include money
 received for partnership otherwise the result
would be that if the partnership instead of
obtaining profits suffered losses as it could not
be held liable civilly for the share of the
capitalist partner who reserved the ownership
of the money brought in by him it would have
to answer to the charge of estafa.
TAI TONG CHUACHE AND CO VS THE INSURANCE
COMMISSION AND TRAVELLERS MULTI INDEMNITY
CORPORATION
DOCTRINE:
1. Partnership- the petitioner being a
partnership may sue and be sued in its
name or by its duly authorized
representative.
FACTS
1. Complainants (PALOMO) acquired from
Rolando Gonzales a parcel of land and a
building located at San Rafael Davao City.
The complainants assumed the mortgage of
the building in favor of SSS which the building
was insured with respondent SSS Accredited
Group of INSURER for P25,000
2. On April 19,1975, Palomo obtained a loan
from Tai Tong Chuache in the amount of
P100,000. To secure the loan , a mortgage
was executed over the land and the building
in favor of Tai Tong Chuache and Co
3. On April 25, 1975 Arsenio Chua representative
of Thai Tong Chuache insured the company’s
interest for P100,000 ( 70,000 for the building
and P30,000 for the contents).
4. Palomo secured a fire insurance policy
covering the building for P50,000 with Zenith
Inusrance Corporation
5. On July 16, 1975, another fire insurance policy
was procured from respondent Philippine
Bristish Assurance Company covering the
same building for P50,000 and the contents
thereof for P70,000
6. On July 31, 1075 the building and the contents
were totally razed by fire.
7. Based on the losses Zenith insurance, Phil
British Assurance and SSS Accredited Group of
Insurer paid their corresponding share on the
loses.
8. A demand was made from the respondent
Travellers Multi Indemnity for his share on the
loss but the same was refused
 9. Hence, the balance of each share in the loss 1. Yes. The petitioner being a partnership may
was demanded from Zenith, Phil British, SSS ( sue and be sued in its name or by its duly
excluding Travelers) the same was refused authorized representative. The fact that
hence this action. Arsenio Lopez Chua is the representative of
10. RESPONDENT insurance commission later Tai tong Chuache is of no question. Chua as
absolved respondent insurance company the managing partner of the partnership may
from liability on the basis of a certification execute all acts of administration including
issued by the court of first instance that in a the right to sue debtors of the partnership in
certain civil action against the PALOMOS, case of their failure to pay their obligations
ARSENIO Chua stands as the complainant when it became due and demandable.
and not Tai Tong CHUACHE. From the said Chua being a partner of petitioner Tai Tong
evidence respondent commission inferred Chuang is an agent of the partnership, being
that the credit extended by the petitioner to an agent means that he acted on behalf of
the PALOMOS secured by the insured the firm. Hence, the civil case that CHUA Filed
property must have been paid. ( respondent was on behalf of the company and not that
argued that CHUA filing a case in his personal of in his personal capacity with him being a
capacity extinguished the claim) partner of the firm
2. Yes. The respondent insurance company
ISSUE:
having issued a policy in favor of petitioner
1. Whether or not the case will prosper even which policy was a legal force and effect at
though it was Arsenio Chua is the real party in the time of the fire. It is bound by its terms and
interest and not Tai Tong Chuache. conditions.
2. Whether or not respondent insurance
M. TEAGUE VS H. MARTIN J. T MADDY
(TRAVELERS) should be liable for payment
DOCTRINE di ko mahanap doctrine sorry 
HELD:
FACTS:
1. M Teague alleges that about December 232,
1926 he and defendant Martin J Maddy and
L.H Golucke formed a partnership for the
operation of a fish business and similar
commercial transaction( MALANGPAYA FISH
CO)
2. The capital of the partnership was 25,000 (
Martin Contributed 5,000 and Golucke P2,500)
3. In such partnership they agreedto share in the
profits and losses of the business in proportion
to the amount of capital which each
contributed.
4. M. Teague was the general manager to take
charge of the business with full power to do
and perform all acts necessary to cary out the
partnership.( there was no agreement as to
the duration of the partnership)
5. Exhibit A – shows that the partnership
purchased and now owns a lighter called
lapu lapu and a motorship called the
Barracuda and other properties
6. The lighter an the motorship was in the
possession of the defendants who having
used the said materials prejudiced the
plaintiff’s rights over the same
ISSUE
7. Plaintiff prays for the dissolution of the
partnership and that the Philippine Trust
Company be appointed receiver.
8. In “ plans for formation of a limited
partnership”- it was stated that Captain
Maddy would have charge Barracuda and its
navigation with the salary of P300 per month
and that Martin would have charge of the
Soutern station, cold stores, commissary and
procuring fish with a salary of P300 per month
and that the plaintiff would have charge of
selling fish in Manila and purchasing supplies
without the salary until such time as the
business is in paying basis.
9. Cfi Ruling: The barge Lapu Lapu as well as the
Ford truck and adding machine belongs
exclusively to the plaintiff M Teague, but there
should be reimbursement to the partnership
P14,032,26 taken from its funds for the
purchase of equipment of the said Lapu lapu
AND Also return the sum of P1,230 and P228
used in the buying of the ford truck and
adding machine
10. Plaintiff concede that he does not own the
properties because it was bought using the
profits of the partnership.
 1. Whether or not the plaintiff is the manager in
the partnership
2. Whether or not the properties are owned by
the partnership
RULING:
1. Yes. All the three partners are general
managers of the partnership. The powers of
Maddy Martin and the plaintiff are specifically
defined- each of them are general manager
in his particular partnership Maddy’s power
and duties are confined and limited to the
charge of the Barracuda and its navigation
and Martin’s to the southeren station cold
stores and commissary and that the plaintiff’s
powers are confined and limited to selling fish
in Manila and purchase of supplies
2. No. Though the properties were bought from
the profits of the partnership, the plaintiff’s
own conduct ( taking the title in his own
name, he is now estopped to claim or assert
that they are not his property or that they are
property of the company.)
3. Though the plaintiff’s authority is confined with
“selling of fish in Manila and the purchase of
supplies. It is conceded that the power to sell
fish does not include the power to purchase
the Lapu Lapu food truch or additing
Machine. He has no authority to purchase the
same and hence it cannot be considered as
supplies for the partnership business.
4. * The plaintiff should be compensated by the
partnership from the use of the properties.
ISLAND SALES INC VS UNITED PIONEERS GENERAL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
DOCTRINES
1. 1868- All partners including industrial ones shall
be liable pro rata with all their property and
after all the partnership assets have been
exhausted, for the contracts which may be
entered into in the name and for the account
of partnership , under its signature and by a
person authorized to act for the partnership.
However, any partner may enter into a
separate obligation to perform a partnership
contract.
FACTS:
1. United Pioneers General Construction ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint
Company, a general partnership purchased to favor one of the general partners of a partnership
from Island Sales a motor vehicle on increases the joint and subsidiary liability of each of
installment basus and for this purpose the remaining partners for the obligations of the
executed a promissory note for P9,440 partnership.
payable in twelve equal monthly installment
RULING: No. In this case, there were five general
of P786.63 the first installment payable on or
partners when the promissory note in question was
before May 22, 1961 and the subsequent
executed for and in behalf of the partnership. Since
installemnets on the 22nd day of every month-
the liability of the partners is pro rata, the liability of
failure to pay installment would make the
the complainant Benjamin Daco shall be limited to
obligation due and demandable
one fifth of the obligation of the defendant
2. Haxing failed to receive the installmet due on
company. The fact that the complaint against the
July 22, 1961 the plaintiff sued the defendant
defendant Romulo Lumauig was dismissed upon the
company for the unpaid balance amounting
motion of the plaintiff does not unmake the said
to P7,119.07. Benjamin Daco, Daniel Guizona,
Lumauig as a general partner in the defendant
Noel Sim and Romulo Lumauig and Augusto
company. The dismissal of Lumaig is merely a
Palisoc were included as co defendants in
condonation on the part of the plaintiff.
their capacity as general partners
3. The complaint was dismissed on Romulo J Tiosejo Investment Corp vs Spouses Benjamin And
Lumauig has been concerned Eleanor Ang
4. The trial court rendered a decision increasing
the joint and subsidiary liability of each of the Doctrine:
remaining partners for the obligation of the
1. 1824- All partners are solidarily liable with the
partnership. – DACO filed a complaint
partnership including loss or injury caused to
alleging that his liability must be limited to and
a third person or penalties incurred due to any
not exceed 1/5th of the partnership obligation wrongful act or omission of any partner acting
in the ordinary course of the business of the
 partnership or with the authority of his co
partners. Whether innocent or guilty all the
partners are solidarily liable with the
partnership itself
Facts
1. J. Tiojeco entered into a joint venture
agreement with Prime Town PROPERTY group
inc for the development of a residential
condominium project to be known as The
Meditel on the former’s 9,502 square meter
property along Samat St Highway Hills
Mandaluyong City.
2. J Tiojeco contributed the same property to
the joint venture and PPGI undertaking to
develop the condominium the JVA PROVIDED
AMONG other terms and conditions that the
developed units shall be shared by the former
to the latter at the ratio of 17-83 percent
respectively
3. While both parties were allowed at their own
responsibility to pre sell the units pertaining to
them, PPGI undertook to use all proceeds
from the pre selling of its saleable units for the
completion of the Condominium Project.
4. On June 17, 1966, the housing and land
regulatory board (hlurb) Issued a license to sell
in favor or petitioner and PPGI as project
owners. By virtue of the said license, PPGI
executed a contract to sell with Spouses
Benjamin and Eleanor Ang on February 5,
1997
5. On the same date, PPGI and the respondent
also executed a Contract to Sell over the 12.5
square meter parking space
6. On July 21, 1999 respondents filed against
petitioner and PPGI the complaint for the
rescission of the aforesaid contracts..
7. The respondents were contending that they
were assured by the petitioner and PPGI that
the subject condominium unit and parking
space will be available for turn over and
occupancy in December 1998, in view of the
non compliance, respondent instructed the
petitioner and PPGI to stop depositing the
check they issued in connection with the
contract to sell.
8. That despite demands from the respondent,
the petitioner and PPGI had failed and
refused to refund the amount
9. Petitioner J.Tiosejo argued that it was not a
party to the contract to sell hence t should
not be held liable.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner J Tiojeco can Doctrine:
avoid liability by claiming that it was not in any way
1. In a particular partnership , the death of the
privy to the contact to sell executed by the
partner extinguishes the partnership without
respondent and PPGI.
any stipulation to that effect.
Ruling: No. J Tiojeo cannot avoid liability.
FACTS:
1. JVA cannot avoid liability by claiming that it
1. In the year 1903, Balbino Dequilla and
was not in any way a privy to the contract to
Perpetua Bearnaza formed a partnership for
sell executed by PPGI and the respondents.
the purpose of exploiting a fish pond situated
2. A JOINT venture is considered as a form of
in the barrio of Talisay.
partnership and is accordingly governed by
2. Perpetua obligating herself to contribute to
the rules of partnership.
the payment of the expenses of the business
3. In this case what was entered into by PPGI
which obligation she made good and both
And JVA ( Tiojeo) was a joint venture
agreeing to divide the profits between
4. Under 1824- all partners are solidarily liable
themselves which they had been doing until
with the partnership for everything
the death of Perpetua
chargeable to the partnership, including the
3. The deceased left a will in one of the clauses
losso r injury caused to third person or
of which she appointed Domingo Bearnez the
penalties incurred due to any wrongful act or
plaintiff as heir heir to succeed to all her rights
omission of any partner acting in the ordinary
and interest in the fish pond in question.
course of the business of the partnership or
4. Demand having been made upon Dequilla
with the authority of his co partners. Whether
by Bearneza for the delivery of part of the fish
innocent or guilty all partners are solidarily
pond belonging to his decedent Perpetua
liable with the partnership itself.
and delivery having been refused, Bearneza
bought this action to recover the fish pond
belonging to Perpetua and the delivery
DOMINGO BEARNEZA VS BALBINO DE QUILLA
ghaving been refused
 5. Bearneza brought this action to recover said
part of his fish pond and one half of the profits
received by the defendant from the fishpond.
6. Defendant(DEQUILLA) argues that the
formation of the supposed partnership
between the plaintiff(BEARNEZA) and the
defendant for the exploitation of the fishpond
was not that of carried into effect on account
of the plaintiff having refused to defray the
expenses of the fish pond.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of Perpetua
dissolved the partnership between her and Dequilla.
RULING: Yes.
land that the fishpond was constructed did
not constitute a part of the subject matter of
the partnership.
4. The partnership was merely limited to the
exploitation of the fish pond it did not
constitute a part of the subject matter of the
partnership
5. Since the partnership in question was not
organized in the form of a mercantile
partnership, it is dissolved by the death of
BEARNEZA The partnership did not survive with
the death of BEARNEZA because there is no
stipulation to that effect.

1. The partnership formed between Bearneza

and Dequilla as to existence was a civil
nature.
2. It was particular partnership as defined in
article 1678 of Civil Code, it having had for its
subject matter a specified thing which is the
exploitation of the fish pond.
3. Although as the trial court says in its decision
the defendant in his letters to Perpetua or her
husband makes reference to the fish pond
calling it “ our “ or “fish pond” was built. It has
not been proven that Perpetua Bearneza
participated in the ownership of the land.-