4. Padua vs.

Robles 66 SCRA 485

Facts: The citation of the case was a negligent act, homicide through reckless imprudence filed to driver Romeo
Punzalan and defendants - appellees as subsidiary liable, which give rise to two separate liabilities, namely (1) the
civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil negligence or so called
culpa aquiliana.

Issue:Whether or not that negligent act of Punzalan gives rise to the two separate and independent liabilities.

Held: It is by now settled beyond all cavil as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a negligent act such
as that committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate and independent kinds of liabilities, (1) the civil
liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa
aquiliana. These two concepts of fault are so distinct from each other that exoneration from one does not result in
exoneration from the other. Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separately and independently of
each other, although Article 2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act
or omission, which means that should there be varying amounts awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may
recover, in effect, only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff has already been ordered paid an amount in
one case and in the other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second case only to the
excess over the one fixed in the first case, but if he has already been paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may
not recover anymore in the second case. Thus, in the case at bar, inasmuch as Punzalan had already been sentenced
to pay the herein petitioners the amounts above-stated, in the subsequent criminal case, he could not be adjudged to
pay a higher amount.

9. People v. De Los Santos, G.R. No. 131588, March 27, 2001

FACTS:
Glenn Delos Santos and his 3 friends went to Bukidnon on his Isuzu Elf truck. On their way, they decided to pass by
a restaurant where Glenn had 3 bottles of beer. On their way to Cagayan de Oro City from Bukidnon, Glenn’s truck,
hit, bumped, seriously wounded and claimed the lives of several members of the PNP who were undergoing an
endurance run on a highway wearing black shirts and shorts and green combat shoes. Twelve trainees were killed on
the spot, 12 were seriously wounded, 1 of whom eventually died and 10 sustained minor injuries. At the time of the
occurrence, the place of the incident was very dark as there was no moon. Neither were there lampposts that
illuminated the highway. The trial court convicted Glenn of the complex crime of multiple murders, multiple frustrated
murders and multiple attempted murders, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance.

HELD:
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless
driving, Glenn should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicides
with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.

The slight physical injuries caused by Glenn to the ten other victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they
been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should
be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed

14. Li v. Soliman, G.R. No. 165279, June 7, 2011

FACTS:
On July 7, 1993, respondents 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy of the mass located in her
lower extremity at the St. Lukes Medical Center (SLMC).Results showed that Angelica was suffering from bone
cancer which usually afflicts teenage children. Following this diagnosis and as primary intervention, Angelicas right
leg was amputated by Dr. Jaime Tamayo in order to remove the tumor.As adjuvant treatment to eliminate any
remaining cancer cells, and hence minimize the chances of recurrence and prevent the disease from spreading to other
parts of the patient’s body (metastasis), chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo. Dr. Tamayo referred Angelica
to another doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.
On August 18, 1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC.However, she died on September 1, 1993, just eleven (11) days
after the (intravenous) administration of the first cycle of the chemotherapy regimen. Because SLMC refused to release
a death certificate without full payment of their hospital bill, respondents brought the cadaver of Angelica to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for post-mortem examination. The Medico-Legal
Report issued by said institution indicated the cause of death as "Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple organ
hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation."

On February 21, 1994, respondents filed a damage suit against petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella, Mr. Jose Ledesma, a
certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents charged them with negligence and disregard of Angelicas safety, health
and welfare by their careless administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the essential
precautions in detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping early on the chemotherapy,
which bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that caused Angelicas untimely demise.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner committed medical malpractice.

HELD: No

There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed
consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed
those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she
otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment." The gravamen in an
informed consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment
which would have altered her decision to undergo it.

Examining the evidence on record, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the
chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelicas parents. Respondents could not have been unaware
in the course of initial treatment and amputation of Angelicas lower extremity, that her immune system was already
weak on account of the malignant tumor in her knee. When petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of the side
effects of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets,
possible kidney or heart damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor that the
respondents understood very well that the severity of these side effects will not be the same for all patients undergoing
the procedure.In other words, by the nature of the disease itself, each patients reaction to the chemical agents even
with pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined by the physician. That death can possibly result
from complications of the treatment or the underlying cancer itself, immediately or sometime after the administration
of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that cannot be ruled out, as with most other major medical procedures, but such
conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the general side effects of chemotherapy already disclosed.

As a physician, petitioner can reasonably expect the respondents to have considered the variables in the recommended
treatment for their daughter afflicted with a life-threatening illness. On the other hand, it is difficult to give credence
to respondents claim that petitioner told them of 95% chance of recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely for
doctors like petitioner who were dealing with grave conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured patients of
chemotherapys success rate. Besides, informed consent laws in other countries generally require only a reasonable
explanation of potential harms, so specific disclosures such as statistical data, may not be legally necessary.

The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in the proposed medical treatment cannot thus be reduced to one
simplistic formula applicable in all instances. Further, in a medical malpractice action based on lack of informed
consent, "the plaintiff must prove both the duty and the breach of that duty through expert testimony. Such expert
testimony must show the customary standard of care of physicians in the same practice as that of the defendant doctor.
PETITION DENIED.

19. Umali v. Bacani, G.R. No. L-40570, January 30, 1976

Facts: On May 14, 1972 a storm with strong rain hit Alcala, Pangasinan. During the storm banana plants standing
on an elevated ground along the barrio road near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown down
and fell on the electric wire. As a result the live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the
electric post and the other fell on the ground under the fallen banana plants. At about 9:00 o’clock the following
morning the barrio captain who was passing by saw the broken electric wire and he warned the people in the place
not to go near the wire for they might get hurt. He also told an employee of the electric plant of the broken line and
asked him to fix it. The employee replied that he could not do it but he was going to look for a lineman to fix it.
Manuel Saynes, a boy of 3 years and 8 months old whose house was just opposite the road, went to the place where
the broken line was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and subsequently died. Fidel Saynes father
of the boy brought an action for damages against Teodoro Umali the owner and manager of the electric plant.

One of Umali’s defenses was that as owner and manager of the electric plant he was not liable on a quasidelict or
tort because the boy’s death was not due to any negligence on his part but to a fortuitous event which was the storm
that caused the banana plants to fall and cut the electric line.

Held: “A careful examination of the record convinces Us that a series of negligence on the part of defendants’
employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. First, by the very
evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated
ground which were about 30 feet high and which were higher than electric post supporting the electric line, and yet
the employees of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that even in case of moderate
winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down, did not even take the necessary
precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line. Second, even after the employees of the Alcala
Electric Plant were already aware of the possible damage the storm of May 14, 1972 could have caused their electric
lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and property, they did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity
along the lines, an act they could have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut. Third,
employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the incident because even if he was already made
aware of the live cut wire, he did not even have the foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to life and
property, and that he should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the live wire;
instead Baldomero left the premises because what was foremost in his mind was the repair of the line, obviously
forgetting that if left unattended to it could endanger life and property.” Umali was therefore held liable in damages.

24. Cadiente vs. Macas, G.R. No. 161946, Nov. 14, 2008
FACTS: Bithuel Macas while standing on the shoulder of the road was bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera, driven
by Cimafranca which resulted to the amputation of both legs up to the groins of the victim. Records showed that the
Ford Fiera was registered in the name of Atty. Cadiente, who however, claimed that when the accident happened, he
was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera since he already sold it to Engr. Jalipa on March 28, 1994. The victim's
father, filed a complaint for torts and damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente before the RTC of Davao City.
Cadiente later filed a third-party complaint against Jalipa. Jalipa, however, filed a fourth-party complaint against
Abubakar, to whom Jalipa allegedly sold the vehicle on June 20, 1994.

The RTC rendered in favor of the plaintiff declaring Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente and Engr. Rogelio Jalipa jointly and
severally liable for damages to the plaintiff for their own negligence. The Court of Appeals denied their appeal and
subsequent motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:
1. Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, hence not entitled to recover damages.
2. Whether the petitioner and third-party defendant Jalipa are jointly and severally liable to the victim.

HELD:
1. NONE. Records show that when the accident happened, the victim was standing on the shoulder, which was the
uncemented portion of the highway. As noted by the trial court, the shoulder was intended for pedestrian use
alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as those loading or unloading passengers may use the shoulder. Running
vehicles are not supposed to pass through the said uncemented portion of the highway. However, the Ford Fiera
in this case, without so much as slowing down, took off from the cemented part of the highway, inexplicably
swerved to the shoulder, and recklessly bumped and ran over an innocent victim. The victim was just where he
should be when the unfortunate event transpired.

2. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had already sold it to someone else, is primarily responsible to
the public for whatever damage or injury the vehicle may cause. Registration is the easy identification of the
owner who can be held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle. This is so as not
to inconvenience or prejudice a third party injured by one whose identity cannot be secured. Therefore, since the
 Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner's name at the time when the misfortune took place, the petitioner
cannot escape liability for the permanent injury it caused the respondent, who had since stopped schooling and is
now forced to face life with nary but two remaining limbs.

29. Philippine National Railways v. Brunty, G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006
FACTS:
Rhonda Brunty, an American citizen and daughter of Ehtel Brunty, visited the Philippines. Before her departure, she
with her Filipino host, Juan Manuel Garcia, went to Baguio on board a Mercedez Benz driven by Mercelita, around
12 midnight. On the other hand, a PNR train bound for Tutuban, Manila left La Union station at 11pm. At around
2am, the Benz was approaching the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac. The car was running at a speed of 70km/hr
and had overtaken a vehicle when it collided with the PNR train. Brunty was rushed to the hospital, but was
pronounced dead 10 minutes after arrival, while Garcia suffered severe head injuries.

A demand letter was sent to PNR which did not respond. A complaint for damages was filed against it. PNR argues
that since there is freedom of control and greater maneuverability on the part of motor vehicles, it is obvious that in
railroad crossings, they have the last clear chance to prevent or avoid an unwanted accident from taking place.

ISSUE/S: WON the doctrine of last clear chance applies

RULING: NO. The proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence of PNR, the doctrine
finds no application in the instant case.

PNR was negligent because of its failure to provide the necessary safety device to ensure the safety of motorists in
crossing the railroad track: (1.) absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars; (2.) inadequacy of the installed warning
signals; and (3.) lack of proper lighting within the area.

Thus, even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed by PNR, it would still be impossible to know or see
that there is a railroad crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an approaching train from the Moncada side of the road
since one’s view would be blocked by a cockpit arena. A vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have difficulty
in knowing that there is an approaching train because of the slight curve, more so, at an unholy hour as 2:00 a.m. Thus,
it is imperative on the part of the PNR to provide adequate safety equipment in the area

This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal
light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the
public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment
be installed.

There was a contributory negligence on the part driver of the Mercedez Benz, Mercelita, as the place was not properly
illuminated; one’s view was blocked by a cockpit arena; and Mercelita was unfamiliar with the place, yet he drove at
70km/hr and had overtaken a vehicle before arriving at the railroad track. However, the effect of contributory
negligence on the mitigation of liability does not apply here. Both before the lower courts, no damages were awarded
to Mercelita and he did not appeal. There is neither proof as to the relationship between Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty.

34. Tamargo v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 518 (1992)

Facts:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing
injuries which resulted in her death. The natural parents of Tamargo filed a complaint for damages against the
natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.

In December 1981, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted
in November 1982 that is after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

Adelberto’s parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action
since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses
Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased by mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo’s petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by Adelberto.

Held:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: “Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in
their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defences provided by law.”

In the case at bar, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting
incident happened. It follows that the natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

Supreme Court held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting
parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of the
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when adopting parents had no
actual custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child.

39. Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768 (1918)

Jose Cangco was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the
province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to
the company’s office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which
entitled him to ride upon the company’s trains free of charge.

During his ride in the train he arose from his seat and makes his way to the exit while the train is still on travel.
When the train has proceeded a little farther Jose Cangco step down into the cement platform but unfortunately step
in to a sack of watermelon, fell down and rolled under the platform and was drawn under the moving car which
resulting to his arm to be crashed and lacerated. He was rushed to the hospital and sued the company and the
employee who put the sack of watermelon in the platform.

The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o’ clock on the dark night. It is that time of the year that may we considered
as season to harvest watermelon explaining why there are sacks of watermelon in the platform. The plaintiff
contends that it is the negligence of the Manila Railroad Co. on why they let their employees put a hindrance in the
platform that may cause serious accident. The defendant answered that it is the lack of diligence on behalf of the
plaintiff alone on why he did not wait for the train to stop before alighting the train.

ISSUE: Whether or not the company is liable or there is a contributory negligence on behalf of the plaintiff.

RULING: There is no contributory negligence on behalf of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court provides some test that
may find the contributory negligence of a person. Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff
at the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the
train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and
his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.

Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people are doing so every
day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky
for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He
was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the
place was dimly lit.

Article 1173, first paragraph: The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of that persons, of the time and of
the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Article 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
In the case the proximate cause of the accident is the lack of diligence of the company to inform their employees to
not put any hindrance in the platform like sacks of watermelon. The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff
carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its
trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance
could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant’s servants. Therefore, the company
is liable for damages against Cangco.

44. Martin v. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 591 (1992)

FACTS:
Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license plate No. NPA-930. At around 2 o’clock in the
morning of May 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric post on Valley
Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal. The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Meralco subsequently
demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him for damages in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging that he was liable to it as the employer of Nestor Martin. The petitioner’s
main defense was that Nestor Martin was not his employee. Meralco did not present any evidence to prove that
Nestor Martin was the employee of Ernesto Martin and Ernesto Martin did not rebut such allegation.

ISSUE: WON Ernesto Martin can be held liable.

HELD: NO. Meralco had the burden of proof, or the duty “to present evidence on the fact in issue necessary to
establish his claim” as required by Rule 131, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Failure to do this was fatal to
its action. As the employment relationship between Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not be presumed, it was
necessary for the plaintiff to establish it by evidence. It was enough for the defendant to deny the alleged
employment relationship, without more, for he was not under obligation to prove this negative averment. This Court
has consistently applied the rule that “if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action,
fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation
to prove his exception or defense.”
Petition was granted.

49. Universal Aquarius, Inc.,v. Q.C. Human Resources Management

Corporation, , G.R. No. 155990, September 12, 2007
FACTS: Universal Aquarius, Inc. (Universal) is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of chemical products in
Metro Manila. It operates a chemical plant in Antipolo City. Conchita Tan (Tan), as a proprietor under the name and
style of Marman Trading (Marman), is engaged in the trading, delivery and distribution of chemical products in Metro
Manila, with a depot in Antipolo City adjoining Universal's chemical plant. Q.C. Human Resources Management
Corporation (Resources) is engaged in supplying manpower to various establishments. It supplied Universal with
about seventy-four (74) temporary workers to assist Universal in the operation of its chemical plant in Antipolo City.

Rodolfo Capocyan, claiming to be the general counsel/national president of the labor organization called Obrero
Pilipino (Universal Aquarius Chapter) sent a Notice of Strike to Universal. Resources informed the Regional Office
of DOLE that the offiers and members of Obrero Pilipino are its employees and not employees of Universal. Five
days later, however, Copocyan and 36 other union members of Obrero picketed, barricaded and obstructed the entry
and exit of Universal's Antipolo City chemical plant and intercepted Universal's delivery trucks thereby disrupting its
business operations. Marman's depot, which adjoined Universal's plant, su ered a similar fate.

Universal and Tan led a Complaint against the strikers and Resources before the RTC of Antipolo for breach of
contract and damages suffered due to the disruption of their respective business operations. The strike ended after the
forging of an agreement between Universal and Obrero.

ISSUE: Whether or not Universal and Tan have a cause of action against QC Human Resources for damages

HELD:

The Court finds that she has no cause of action against Resources. A thorough reading of the allegations of the
Complaint reveals that Tan's claim for damages clearly springs from the strike e ected by the employees of Resources.
It is settled that an employer's liability for acts of its employees attaches only when the tortious conduct of the
employee relates to, or is in the course of, his employment. The question then is whether, at the time of the damage or
injury, the employee is engaged in the a airs or concerns of the employer or, independently, in that of his own. An
employer incurs no liability when an employee’s conduct, act or omission is beyond the range of employment.
Unquestionably, when Resources' employees staged a strike, they were acting on their own, beyond the range of their
employment. Thus, Resources cannot be held liable for damages caused by the strike staged by its employees.

54. Maranan v. Perez, G.R. No. L-22272, June 26, 1967

Facts:
Rogelio Corachea, a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez, was stabbed and killed by the driver,
Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela was found guilty for homicide by the Court of First Instance and was sentenced to
suffer Imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6000. While pending appeal, mother
of deceased filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela.
Defendant Perez claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable. The court a quo, after
trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant
Valenzuela was dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the former
asking for more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability. Defendant-appellant relied solely on the ruling
enunciated in Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad Co. that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees
upon the passengers.

Issue: Whether or not Perez should be held liable for the death of the passenger?

Held: Yes. The basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests on the principle
that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely. As between the carrier and the passenger, the
former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and
not the passengers, has power to select and remove them. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. The liability of the common
carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees. (Art. 1759)

The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar were very different. In the Gillaco case, the
passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. The Gillaco case was decided
under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common
carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against willfull assaults or negligent acts committed by their
employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier
from liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their exempting effect the case
where the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. The Civil Code provisions
on the subject of Common Carriers are new and were taken from Anglo-American Law. The basis of the carrier's
liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rested either on the doctrine of respondent superior or the
principle that it was the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely. Under the second view, upheld by the
majority and also by the later cases, it was enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty.
It was no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders.
The carrier's liability here was absolute in the sense that it practically secured the passengers from assaults committed
by its own employees.

59. Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 11154, March 21, 1916

The case is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of
the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.

Prior to this appeal, Plaintiff E. Meritt, a contractor, had a collision with the General Hospital Ambulance which
turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded any whistle or horn. Merrit was severely injured. His
condition had undergone depreciation and his efficiency as a contractor was affected. The plaintiff is seeking a
certain amount for permanent injuries and the loss of wages during he was incapacitated from pursuing his
occupation. In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized the
plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said suit.

Issues: Whether or not the Government is legally liable to the plaintiff by allowing a lawsuit to commence against
it.

Whether or not the ambulance driver is considered as an employee of the government.

Rulings:

By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to
its right to interpose any lawful defense.

In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a special
agent. Hence, there can be no liability from the government. As stated by Justice Story of United States “The
Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs,
since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest.”

64. Ylarde v. Aquino , G.R. No. L-33722, July 29, 1988

Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan. Defendant
Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. During that time, the school had several concrete blocks which were
remnants of the old school shop destroyed in World War II. Defendant decided to help clear the area so he gathered
18 of his male students and ordered them to dig beside a one ton concrete block in making a hole where the stone
can be buried. It was left unfinished so the following day he called 4 of the 18 students including the Novelito
Ylarde to complete the excavation. Defendant left the children to level the loose soil while he went to see Banez for
the key to the school workroom where he can get some rope. It was alleged that before leaving, he told the children
“not to touch the stone”. After he left, the children playfully jumped into the pit when suddenly the concrete block
slide down. Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned to the wall causing serious physical injuries which as a
consequence led to his death, 3 days thereafter. The parents of the victim, herein petitioners, filed a suit for damages
against both Aquino and Soriano.

ISSUE: WON both Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for damages.

HELD:

As held in Amadora vs CA, “it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable
for torts committed by their students”. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, this is the
general rule. However, in casea of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be
held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their
students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Hence, Soriano as principal cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and
he did not give any instruction regarding the digging.

A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his tudents should make sure that the children are protected from all harm.
The excavation instructed clearly exposed the students to risk and should not be placed under the category of Work
Education such as school gardening, planting trees etc. Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence where instead
of availing himself of adult manual laborers he instead utilized his students. Furthermore, the warning given is not
sufficient to cast away all serious danger that the concrete block adjacent to the excavation would present to the
children. He is therefore ordered to pay damages to the petitioners.