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AVIVA GEVABUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEWOriginal Articles XXX0045-3609Malden, USA© 2008 Center for Business Ethics at Bentley CollegelAusiness and Society Reviewckwell PubliR hing Inc Three Models
of Corporate
Social Responsibility:
Interrelationships between
Theory, Research, and
Practice
AVIVA GEVA
Aviva Geva is with the Open University of Israel, Department of Management and Economics, Israel.
© 2008 Center for Business Ethics at Bentley College. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street,
Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.
to CSR theory and research by focusing on the core responsibilities that form the
trunk of the branching CSR tree. A comparative analysis of three recognized CSR
models—represented graphically as a pyramid,4 intersecting circles,5 and
concentric circles6—might help locate and clarify ambiguities through revealing
systematic differences in their underlying assumptions, conceptual structure,
methodological tools, and managerial implications.
In the following section I briefly review the evolution of the CSR concept and
its extensions. I next present the three CSR models beginning with a critical
analysis of Carroll’s CSR pyramid, a dominant model that has enjoyed wide
popularity among business and society scholars; I will then examine the
intersecting circles (IC) model, a CSR configuration representing overlapping
responsibility areas; I will conclude with the concentric circle (CON) model,
originally developed by the Committee for Economic Development (CED), and
reformulated here so as to adjust to recent developments in CSR thought. In each
section of the comparative analysis, I will first portray the general idea of the
model, and then discuss its theoretical assumptions and its implications for
research and practice. The last section discusses some of the implications of this
analysis for future CSR research and teaching.
i
For the sake of comparison, Figure 1b includes all four domains of responsibility. This
prototype model represents the general idea of intersecting circles, rather than trying to depict
every one of the resultant categories.
General Description
A leading model of CSR is Carroll’s four-part pyramid.21 The CSR pyramid was
framed to embrace the entire spectrum of society’s
TABLE 1 Comparison of Three CSR Models
CSR Pyramid Intersecting Circles Concentric Circles
General Description Hierarchy of separate Nonhierarchical set of intersecting Integration of responsibilities; all
responsibilities responsibilities sharing a central core
Theoretical Assumptions
Nature of CSR Normative restraints of Classification framework; no Incurred obligation to work for social
responsiveness normative guidance betterment
Scope of Responsibilities Narrow split Wide
Total CSR Conjunction Disjunction Integration
Order of importance Hierarchy; Economic No prima facie order Inclusion system; economic circle at
responsibility first the core
Role of Philanthropy “Icing on the cake” Subsumed under economic/ ethical Integral part of CSR
responsibilities
Research Implications
Operationalization Constant-sum method CSR portraits Representative range of measures
Theoretical Assumptions
The central assumptions underlying the CSR pyramid are presented below,
followed by a discussion of their theoretical implications (see summary in Table
1).
responsibility is restricted to the “letter” of the law, while the “spirit” of law is
reserved for the ethical domain.27 The ethical domain is further separated from
the legal domain using a negative definition: ethical responsibility relates to those
social expectations and norms not yet codified into law. In the same vein,
philanthropic responsibility designates those areas of voluntary social
involvement not specifically prohibited or demanded of companies because of
their economic, legal, and ethical responsibilities.
simultaneously fulfill all component parts of the CSR pyramid. But this “win-
win” outcome is not always possible. In daily life, where different corporate
responsibilities often come into conflict, the good corporate citizen, though
striving to fulfill all its responsibilities, will actually apply the proposed order of
priorities to resolve the conflict.34
The role of philanthropy The role of philanthropy has been discussed in the
context of the CSR pyramid from two perspectives: inwards—as compared to
other components of CSR, and outwards— as compared to other notions of CSR.
Inwards, the question arises whether the philanthropic category can be correctly
considered a responsibility in itself. To the extent that responsibility is conceived
as a normative restraint or an obligation it clearly contradicts the discretionary
nature of philanthropy. In an attempt to reconcile this difficulty, Carroll has
argued that in fact, “philanthropy is highly desired and prized but actually less
important than the other three categories of social responsibility.”35
Looking outwards, philanthropy is often regarded as the defining component
of CSR. Milton Friedman’s statement that management is to make as much
money as possible within the limits of the law and ethical custom embraces three
components of the CSR pyramid—economic, legal, and ethical.36 A central tenet
of presentday thinking on CSR is that businesses have a responsibility that goes
beyond the demands of law and common morality. Philanthropy, which is usually
understood as exceeding this minimum, appears to serve as the distinguishing
point between the neoclassical economic position and the new widely accepted
notion of corporate citizenship, which highlights the importance of corporate
giving.37 However, given the discretionary nature of philanthropy, its role as the
distinguishing component of CSR creates a boundary problem that, as shown
below, will lead to two different resolutions.
Research Implications
The pyramid model of CSR has served as a platform for some of the major
research developments in the field. As Clarkson claimed, “the strength of its
influence can best be judged by its longevity and that of its progeny.” 38 A
considerable number of empirical studies published in recent years have focused
first on operationalizing the framework, and then on developing and testing a set
of hypotheses regarding the determinants and consequences of CSR.
ethics and other ethical programs and initiatives; and discretionary responsibility
is defined in terms of the extent of the corporation’s philanthropic activities.44 The
fundamental problem with this method, besides problems of accessibility to
corporate data, is one of validity; namely, of determining the types of behavior
that can serve as valid indicators of, or surrogates for the corresponding
responsibilities. For example, is the absence of allegations a valid indicator of
legal responsibility? Is the existence of a corporate code of ethics a valid surrogate
for ethical responsibility?
Several researchers have used Aupperle’s constant-sum instrument to examine
the impact of different factors, especially demographics and social context, on
people’s orientation toward CSR45 and to investigate whether and how society’s
changing expectations affect priority in CSR orientations across cultures and over
time.46 Given the globalization of business activities, more and more
organizations need to gain insight into the nature of CSR orientations in different
countries and as public expectations put increasing demands on the business
community. Research in this important direction is still in its infancy.
show, different models tend to beget different research instruments and generate
different hypotheses on the CSR-CFP link (see summary in Table 1).
A critical implication of the pyramid model is the positive relationship between
CSR and CFP. There are numerous grounds for this claim. First, the four-part
definition of CSR emphasizes the importance of the economic component as the
foundation upon which all others rest. In other words, a company is defined as
socially responsible primarily if it is profitable. Because of the interrelationship
between profitability and being defined as socially responsible, it can be expected
that companies having a favorable (unfavorable) reputation for CSR have
favorable (unfavorable) financial results. Indeed, as reputation researchers have
shown, CSR can have a positive impact on CFP through its impact on reputation.
And conversely, the absence of CSR can damage CFP due to negative
reputational effects.49 Second, the CSR pyramid is presented as an expectations-
based model. There is a CSR premium that can be earned by meeting the
expectations of various stakeholders. According to the good management theory,
well-matched attention to CSR domains can increase the efficiency of the
company’s adaptation to internal and external demands.50 Resulting benefits such
as employees’ productivity, reputation for product quality, and consumer
satisfaction lead to better financial performance. Finally, the pyramidal structure
suggests that companies high in CSR ranking are high on financial performance
because only well-to-do companies can afford the luxury of above-average social
performance.
Unfortunately, the measures used to assess the relationship between CSR and
CFP in empirical studies to date are somewhat illusory. The wide range of existing
methods—including reputational surveys, content analysis of disclosure
documents, examination of implementation arrangements, accounting-like
auditing procedures, and even Aupperle’s constant-sum measure of the four-part
CSR construct—are all based on a presumed dichotomy between corporate
economic and social performance.51 In defiance of the four-part definition,
Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield claim that “[t]he social orientation of an
organization can be appropriately assessed through the importance it places on
the three noneconomic components compared to the economic.”52 Devoid of its
core component, it is doubtful whether this reduced yardstick can be considered
a valid measure of CSR. Studies using Aupperle’s constant-sum instrument did
not find any relationship between social responsibility and profitability. 53 An
ironical complementary result of these studies is the finding, which though not
reported can be logically inferred, that neither was there any relationship between
economic responsibility and profitability.54
AVIVA GEVA 13
The partitioning method deviates from the basic tenets of the pyramid model:
it excludes the core component from the measure of total CSR, it mandates trade-
off between social and economic responsibilities, it assumes a positive correlation
between social concern and total CSR and it ignores the hierarchical order of
priority. A more consistent measure of total CSR would embrace all its
components while allowing for more complex relationships among them and
between them and the total CSR. For example, a CSR function could be
developed that, for each possible bundle of the four responsibilities, would yield
a number representing the level of CSR provided by that bundle. The assumption
is, of course, that the raters are always able to rank each possible bundle in order
of preference. Their rankings could then be used to assess the correlation between
CSR and profitability.
Managerial Implications
In recent years, the friendship model of the relationship between financial and
social interests has gained growing acceptance premised on management’s belief
that “ethics pays.” The CSR pyramid dovetails well with this current trend among
corporate managements. While attempting to extend the neoclassical economic
paradigm to accommodate societal expectations and the effects of business
operations, the pyramid does emphasize that the fundamental responsibility of
business is economic. It suggests that it is in the financial interest of businesses
to comply with the law, to engage in ethical behavior, and to exercise
philanthropy. Stated differently, social responsibilities are accepted to the extent
that they can serve a part of the firm’s competitive strategy. The underlying
assumption of an expectations-based model such as the CSR pyramid is that
companies do not pursue their humane policies for altruistic reasons alone. They
do so because the nature of society is such that they could not behave any other
way and expect to survive as viable entities. The main problem with such a
responsive strategy is, of course, that it is highly contingent and thus may lead to
dual standards in the global market when dealing with stakeholders operating in
different sociopolitical contexts.55
A basic question regarding the provision of CSR is: precisely how much should
a firm spend on social responsibilities? Should it strive to maximize profits?
Given that philanthropy is a positive duty, should it assume a more-is-better
attitude toward this activity? The pyramid advances a proportionate allocation of
resources among the different kinds of responsibility. It implies that the firm must
achieve a critical level of profit; thereafter, priority is given to the fulfillment of
other social obligations in decreasing proportions: profit making gets the largest
14 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW
The intersecting circles (IC) model of CSR (Figure 1b) contrasts with the pyramid
model in two main aspects: (1) it recognizes the possibility of interrelationships
among CSR domains; and (2) rejects the hierarchical order of importance. The
distinctive features and implications of the IC model, as contrasted with the
pyramid model, are summarized in Table 1 and will become apparent as my
analysis proceeds.
General Description
A pyramid framework cannot fully capture the interpenetrating nature of the CSR
domains, nor does it denote all possible tension points among them. Such
mutuality has been recognized as an integral characteristic of CSR 58 and of such
fundamental importance that Schwartz and Carroll saw it necessary to propose an
alternative approach to CSR, one that includes the major domains of
responsibility and clearly depicts their interrelationships. 59 The IC model refutes
the notion that CSR is nothing but a collection of contingent, externally related
topics; it holds rather that the different responsibilities are in dynamic interplay
with each other, and it is the overall corporate responsibility to advance harmony
and resolve conflicts between them.
As Schwartz and Carroll claim, the primary idea behind the IC model is that
none of the CSR domains is prima facie more important or significant relative to
AVIVA GEVA 15
the others.60 In particular, the economic responsibility is not necessarily the most
fundamental. According to Davis’s Iron Law of Responsibility, 61 it is true that
corporations are designed for business, but before anything else they are social
creations whose very existence depends on the willingness of society to endure
and support them. In this view, the social responsibilities of the firm are not
necessarily less important than its economic undertakings.
Theoretical Assumptions
companies do, but irresponsible companies do not do. Even though such
connotations are common in the literature, they are misrepresentations of
CSP.67
specifying the order of priority among the various responsibilities; the concentric-
circle model (see below) offers a normative core of integration as another
solution. The IC model, in contrast, fails to provide any clear normative guidance
for managerial decision making. It leaves managers faced with competing
responsibilities with no way to make principled or purposeful decisions. As
Jensen has pointed out, “multiple objectives is no objective.” 71
Research Implications
Operationalization Under the assumption that none of the three CSR domains
is prima facie more important relative to the others, the immediate research
question concerns the assessment of the relative mix of economic, legal, and
ethical forces and orientations that pervade the business community. As Schwartz
and Carroll suggest, the model could be especially useful for the establishment of
“CSR portraits” for different entities (e.g., individuals, corporations,
stakeholders, industries, nations). Thus, for example, CSR portraits could be
established for stakeholder groups based on the domains they believe the
corporation is currently emphasizing or would prefer the corporation to operate
within. As yet, however, the IC model is in an early stage of development, still
waiting for the operationalization of the variables under consideration and the
creation of a valid and reliable data-gathering instrument. The most basic issue of
CSR research is: How do we measure better versus worse? Or, in terms of the IC
model, which portrait is better and which is worse: purely economic (EÒÂ) or
purely ethical (1M), legal and economic (ELÂ) or ethical and economic (EÒM)?
The IC framework, as a descriptive model of possible partnership between
corporate responsibilities, fails to provide a range of levels for evaluating CSR
portraits.
20 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW
Managerial Implications
The IC model draws managers’ attention to the overlapping nature of the CSR
domains and sets the running of the interrelationships among them as the central
issue of the CSR management agenda. As Schwartz and Carroll suggest, the
model could be useful in identifying and analyzing existing as well as anticipated
points of tension among the different domains. Considering that the different
responsibilities are in dynamic interplay with each other, the role of the manager
is not only to resolve existing conflicts or, better, to prevent them before they
develop, but to advance harmony and create opportunities for beneficial
partnerships.
From a managerial point of view, the most important advantage of the IC
model is its flexibility. Allowing for all sorts of interrelationship among the
different domains of responsibilities with no prima facie order of priority, the
model is open to a wide range of interpretations. In fact, its managerial
prescriptions and implications are nearly limitless. With such a breadth of
interpretation, it seems clear that this model can be attractive to all kinds of
managers and directors, socially responsible and opportunistic alike. Directing
managers to promote multiple responsibilities, while leaving them with no
principled criterion for decision making, plays into their hands by allowing them
to exercise their own preferences in spending the corporation’s resources.73 One
could make a case that the nonhierarchical nature of the IC model provides
unscrupulous managers with a ready excuse to act in their own self-interest. By
appealing to whichever responsibilities they like, opportunistic managers are able
to justify all but the most egregious self-serving behavior. Without specifying
what better is, the IC model effectively leaves managers unaccountable for the
effects of their decisions on the firm and on society at large.
The concentric-circle (CON) model (Figure 1c) is similar to the pyramid in that
it views the economic role of business as its core social responsibility, and similar
to the IC model in that it emphasizes the interrelationships among the different
AVIVA GEVA 21
General Description
The CON model is adapted from a notable statement issued in 1971 by the
Committee for Economic Development (CED), an American association of
influential business leaders. In this statement, CED advocated the notion that
social contracts for business firms are not only feasible but morally necessary,
and urged business to adopt a broader and more humane view of its function in
society. The original CED model consists of three concentric circles. The inner
circle represents the core responsibility of business in terms of CSR. It includes
the basic responsibilities for the efficient execution of the economic function—
products, jobs, and economic growth. The intermediate circle, which can be
viewed as the ethical circle, encompasses responsibility to exercise the economic
function with a sensitive awareness of basic ethical norms as well as changing
social values and priorities. The outer circle, equivalent to the philanthropic
circle, outlines newly emerging and still amorphous responsibilities that business
should assume in order to become more broadly involved in actively improving
the social environment.
Legal responsibilities are not explicitly presented in the original CED framework,
but rather subsumed under other corporate responsibilities. Thus, for example, the
economic function of business includes “cooperating with the government in
developing more effective measures to control inflation and achieve high levels
of employment” or “supporting fiscal and monetary policies for steady economic
growth.”74 The CON version presented here differs from the original model in
that, for clarity and to create a common basis for comparison between the three
CSR models, it places the corporate legal responsibilities in a particular circle,
between the economic and the ethical.
22 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW
For the sake of clarification, it should be noted that the structure of concentric
circles, as opposed to concentric rings, represents a system of inclusion relations
rather than a scheme of mutually exclusive domains. In a system of concentric
circles, every member of the inner circle is also a member of the wider, more
inclusive outer circle, but not vice versa. Thus, from a CSR perspective as
expressed in the CON model, all economic responsibilities also have legal and
ethical aspects.
Theoretical Assumptions
these broad definitions may be useful in clarifying the critical differences between
the contrasting CSR models.
The economic circle As we have seen, both the CSR pyramid and the seven-
category IC model adopt a narrow definition of economic responsibility that
focuses on the fundamental call on business to be a profit-making enterprise. In
the CON framework the scope of economic responsibility is much broader and
directly oriented toward the good of society. According to the CED statement, the
principal economic responsibility of the corporation in CSR terms is “to serve
constructively the needs of society—to the satisfaction of society.”79 Economic
responsibility, in this view, is not simply about wealth creation; it is about
generating wealth that improves the nation’s standard of living, supplying the
needs and wants of people for goods and services, and selling them at fair prices,
providing jobs and decent wages to the work force, expanding career
opportunities in all parts of society, and eliminating poverty. 80 Under this wide
definition, profitability is not the critical test for economic responsibility.
Contrary to the narrow focus on profit making, which represents the neoclassical
economics “IF” doctrine (if certain conditions are met, then if a firm concentrates
on profit making, it contributes to the common good), the CON model holds that
the CSR firm has direct responsibility to promote the quality of life, even at the
expense of profitability.81
The legal circle Christopher Stone distinguishes between two senses of legal
responsibility: responsibility 1, which emphasizes following the law, and
responsibility 2, which emphasizes deliberation with preparedness to give good
reasons for one’s actions in terms that admit for generalization.82 In more common
parlance we would say that responsibility 1 refers to the letter of law—i.e.,
observing the law per se, and responsibility 2 refers to the spirit of law—i.e.,
approaching law through socially appropriate considerations. The first type
demands obedience; the second, in a way almost diametrically opposed to the
first, puts a premium on autonomous choice. This distinction between the two
senses of legal responsibility has direct relevance to a comparative analysis of the
three CSR models. The pyramid and the seven-category IC models both limit the
legal responsibility to responsibility 1: obey the law. The narrow focus on
obedience reflects an external view of lawabiding behavior, and so breeds a cost–
benefit approach to the law. The legal system, in this view, is a burden that should
be avoided or, as there is no alternative, borne; the rationale for obedience being
to seek pleasurable consequences and avoid negative consequences. Under the
24 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW
title of CSR, this kind of legal responsibility includes such varieties as restrictive
compliance, opportunistic compliance, avoidance of civil litigation and
anticipation of changes in legislation;83 all of which are characterized by what
Stone has called “morality of duty,” namely the specification of minimum
standards of conduct (“I won’t do anything more than I am absolutely required to
do”), rather than “morality of aspiration” and exhortations to realize one’s fullest
potential.84
The CON model, in contrast, incorporates into the legal circle both notions of
responsibility: obedience (responsibility 1) and considered autonomy
(responsibility 2). When rules of corporate behavior are relatively unambiguous
and well established, legal responsibility demands nothing but observing the law;
however, when legal control over corporations is ineffective, and perhaps even
counterproductive, the responsibility that is needed is of the perceptive sort,
emphasizing considerations of the general good. Defined in terms of commitment
to the common good, legal responsibility represents an internal view of the
company’s behavior. The CSR company seeks to comply with legal obligations
not because of the threat of litigation, but rather because these obligations have
been internalized as guiding standards of behavior.85 Rather than seeking to
“outsmart the law by the law,”86 a CSR firm is required to help to define the point
at which regulation is not only necessary but desirable. This idea is directly
expressed in Thomas McCabe’s memorandum cited in the CED document:
The ethical circle The ethical domain in both the CSR pyramid and the IC
model refers to those standards and norms of business behavior that are expected
by stakeholders and society at large even though they are not codified into law.
As argued above, this negative definition creates an artificial separation between
intimately related domains of responsibility, and identifies ethical responsibility
with responsiveness to external expectations and social conventions, regardless
of the motivation for responding. In contrast, the CON model maintains that
ethical issues are an integral part of every business activity. Ethical responsibility
cannot be performed in a detached way that conforms to external constraints
without valuejudgments. In line with Wood’s argument, socially responsible
AVIVA GEVA 25
firms are guided by their inner sense of commitment, and thus “need not choose
between the demands of economics and the demands of ethics; nor is ethics
something that is tacked onto economics, as in the phrase ‘economics and ethics.’
Economics is ethics, though ethics is more than economics.” 88
Rather than expedient conformity, the CON model defines ethical
responsibility in terms of self-governance based on internal commitment to the
good of society. While responsivenessbased morality may prompt companies to
“act smart,” it does not necessarily induce them to act ethically; a company may
take advantage of ill-defined local norms and still be considered socially
responsible. In keeping with recent developments in CSR thought, the CON
model would judge the ethical corporation by the extent to which it upholds its
duty to seize the opportunity to be an active participant in contributing to greater
stability, prosperity, and sustainability, and by the extent to which it does not
exploit its power against those stakeholders who are not protected by well-
established ethical norms and customs.89 The CON model’s emphasis on the
active aspect of corporate ethical responsibility is largely connected with the
process of globalization. In the words of Sethi:
The large corporation, and especially the multinational corporation, must
become an active agent for social change. . . . As a dominant institution in
society, the corporation must assume its rightful place and contribute to
shaping the public agenda instead of simply reacting to policy choices
advocated by others.90
Total CSR The CON model regards CSR as a global concept whose parts are
bound together by means of a shared intrinsic content, which can be defined as a
commitment to operate in a way that promotes the good of society. 91 One can
argue that the notion of the “good of society” is too abstract to serve as a
benchmark for assessing CSR. However, despite, and perhaps owing to, the many
meanings of this notion, nearly all today’s large corporations have their mission
codes stated in terms of commitment to the good of society, and in most cases this
general commitment is further translated into a list of more practical goals.
Rather than a mere aggregation, CSR is conceived as an entity or system made
up of interrelated responsibilities, with mutual and reciprocal influence on each
other. In other words, the value of the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
Fulfillment of one responsibility will always affect the fulfillment of the others.
For example, fulfilling (avoiding) the economic responsibility to provide jobs and
good wages to the work force while earning a profit, directly affects the
fulfillment (avoidance) of the legal responsibility to pay for labor, the ethical
26 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW
of CSR, namely the obligation of the corporation to help in achieving the good of
the larger society. In contrast to the pyramid, where the actions of a company in
society are divorced from its operating practices, the CON model presents an all-
encompassing view that integrates citizenship both locally and globally with day-
to-day business functions. Good citizenship is no longer a sort of “icing on the
cake” but, to use Porter and Kramer’s terms, “a sine qua non of CSR,”93 and CSR
companies need to integrate social considerations into core business operations
and strategy.
In the broad sense of the CON model, corporate philanthropy is not simply
corporate contributions to other entities to further a particular cause, but the use
of the corporate special competencies and advantages to solve major social
problems. Implicit in this broad definition is the view, once expressed in the CED
document and currently becoming increasingly commonplace, that because large
corporations possess considerable resources and skills that could make a critical
difference in solving social problems, they “must take up the slack resulting from
inadequate performance of other institutions, notably government.” 94 A wider
spectrum of corporate philanthropic responsibility is all the more significant in
the global arena where serious market imperfections, absence of strong
background institutions, inadequate regulation, and ineffective enforcement place
multinational corporations in a unique position to help alleviate harsh living
conditions, especially in developing countries.95
Research Implications
case, the definitional system refers to the common core of all corporate social
responsibilities, while the latter lacks a common core. Thus, research tools that
have been developed to test the validity of the pyramid are inadequate in testing
the CON model. Let us take Aupperle’s aforementioned constant-sum instrument
as an example. Corresponding to the idea of interresponsibilities difference in
importance, respondents were instructed to distribute up to ten points to four
statements reflecting the pyramid’s four domains; and, corresponding to the view
of separate domains, the allocation of points among them had to be “based on
their relative importance and application to your firm.” 97 Note that reference is
made to the multifunctional target, “your firm,” and not to the more articulated
target, “your firm’s social responsibility.” A hypothesis on the correspondence
between this definitional system and the pyramidal structure of the resulting
observations is straightforward.
The CON model requires a different research tool. Since it maintains that all
corporate social responsibilities share a common core, a measurement method
ignoring this feature is irrelevant; and since it stands for intra-rather than
interresponsibilities order of importance, a measurement method based on
distribution of points among different domains of responsibility makes no sense.
One way to approach the research on the relationships between conceptual
definitions and empirical observations draws on facet analysis, which, with the
companion of multidimensional scaling (MDS) procedures, provides a powerful
set of tools for studying the content of and order relations between and within
facets (subsystems or components) of the construct of interest. 98 In the course of
gathering data for assessing the geometry of the CON model, respondents could
be instructed to evaluate a range of items—wide enough to represent thickly
populated responsibility circles—based on their relative importance in fulfilling
the corporate commitment to enhance the good of society. To the extent that the
set of items is representative, we might find essential as well as peripheral
responsibilities in each of the circles, whether economic, legal, ethical, or
philanthropic. For example, the duty of the firm to ensure that its operations do
not put people’s life in danger can be thought of as an item representing essential
ethical responsibility; and the requirement that managers take advantage of
opportunities to avoid paying taxes to increase profits—an item representing
peripheral legal responsibility, or, for that matter, perhaps economic
responsibility (a clear-cut distinction is not very important from a CON
perspective). Using the proposed methodology, we would expect that the
interrelationships among the resulting observations be structured in concentric
circles in the same order as that depicted in the CON model.
AVIVA GEVA 29
Managerial Implications
Both the pyramid and the IC models direct socially responsible managers to serve
“many masters” simultaneously (i.e., make profits, obey the law, and so forth),
with or without a fixed order of priorities. As Porter and Kramer claim:
30 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW
In the same vein, Jensen has argued that without the clarity of mission provided
by a single criterion, corporate executives facing multiple objectives will
experience managerial confusion, conflict, and inefficiency. 102 The CON model
solves the problems that arise from the multiple objectives that accompany the
other two models by giving managers wishing to be socially responsible a single
criterion by which to choose among alternative courses of action: the
improvement of social welfare. This criterion, which resides incontestably as the
implicit raison d’être of the economic institution, is made explicit in the CON
model. Rather than assuming that profit maximization leads to the maximization
of social welfare, managers are guided to directly consider the social value of
alternative policy options before making their decisions. In more general terms,
rather than pursuing each of the diverse corporate responsibilities per se hoping
that this, in turn, will enhance the good of society, the CON model guides
managers to consider each responsibility in direct relation to the overall objective
of social welfare.
The CON model prescribes a CSR strategy that could, perhaps, be best
described in terms of Paine’s notion of “integrity strategy,” which is characterized
by “a conception of ethics as a driving force of an enterprise. Ethical values shape
the search for opportunities, the design of organizational systems, and the
decision-making process used by individuals and groups.” 103 Managers who
regard CSR as nothing more than conformity to externally imposed standards
necessarily endorse a code of moral mediocrity for their companies. In contrast,
managers who adopt the commitment strategy no longer view CSR as a
burdensome constraint within which they have to operate, but as the governing
purpose of the firm, a purpose that incorporates all corporate social
responsibilities, unites members of different divisions and inspires corporate
excellence.
AVIVA GEVA 31
CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to add clarity to CSR theory and research by comparing
and contrasting the underlying assumptions, the conceptual structures, the
methodological tools, and the managerial implications of three basic CSR
models—the pyramid, the intersecting circles, and the concentric circles. The
four-part CSR pyramid dovetails well with the current trend among corporate
managements towards growing acceptance of a friendship model of the
relationship between the basic economic role of the firm and its extended social
obligations. The pyramid’s unique combination of simultaneity and hierarchy of
importance attempts to reconcile the changing social expectations of businesses
with the traditional emphasis on profit making, the ideal CSR behavior with the
pragmatic considerations of CSR management. Unfortunately, the supposed
alliance between social concerns and profit making depends to a large extent on
the surrounding cultural and institutional context. Where external stakeholders
fail at holding corporations to account for the social consequences of their
activities, the necessary condition that glues the economic and social
responsibilities together in a coherent framework is lost, and the ability of the
pyramid to guide companies to take actions that would support both their
communities and their business goals is undermined. The IC model contrasts with
the pyramid in two main aspects: it refutes the notion that CSR is a range of
externally related domains of responsibility, and it rejects the hierarchical order.
The radical idea behind the IC model is that the different domains of CSR are
interrelated and none of them is prima facie more important relative to the others.
This advantage is also the main difficulty of the IC model. Failing to provide any
clear normative guide, it leaves managers to face competing responsibilities with
no way to make principled decisions. The CON model combines considerations
of external constraints on corporate behavior with a self-binding commitment to
the common good. Like the pyramid, it views the economic role of business as its
core responsibility, but this core is embedded in, rather than separated from, the
broader responsibility to the good of society. The pyramidal view of CSR as a
range of separate responsibilities that must be simultaneously fulfilled is replaced
in the CON model with a framework of integrated responsibilities, all sharing a
common essence—the responsibility to promote the quality of life. According to
the CON model, every corporate decision must be considered through the lens of
social betterment. The main conclusion of the comparative analysis is that unless
we are willing to acknowledge that all corporate social responsibilities share a
common normative essence, there is little prospect of finding a way out of the
32 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW
NOTES
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11. Wood, “Corporate social performance revisited,” 693.
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14. Waddock, “Creating corporate accountability,” 313.
15. M. B. E. Clarkson, Principles of Stakeholder Management (Toronto:
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19. Carroll, “Corporate social responsibility.”
34 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW
“Empirical examination.”
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44. Clarkson, “Stakeholder framework.”
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171–179.
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47. For instance, J. J. Griffin and J. F. Mahon, “The corporate social performance
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50. Waddock and Graves, “Social performance-financial performance.”
51. Acar et al., “Empirical exploration.”
52. Aupperle et al., “Empirical examination,” 458.
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54. The constant sum method places social responsibility (SR) and economic
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36 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW
85. See one implementation of this idea in Caux Round Table, Principles for
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86. J. Aharony and A. Geva, “Moral implications of law in business: a case of tax
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87. CED, Social Responsibilities, 46.
88. D. Wood, “Toward improving corporate social performance,” Business Horizons
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89. Frederick, Corporation, Be Good!; Logsdon and Wood, “Business citizenship”;
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Journal of Business Ethics 43, 1(2003): 21–31.
90. S. P. Sethi, Setting Global Standards: Guidelines for Creating Codes of Conduct
in Multinational Corporations (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons 2003), 288.
91. CED, Social Responsibilities; see also W. C. Frederick, “Moving to CSR4: what
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92. CED, Social Responsibilities.
93. Porter and Kramer, “Strategy and society,” 85.
94. CED, Social Responsibilities, 16; S. A. Waddock, “Building successful social
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97. Aupperle, “Empirical measure,” 30.
98. S. Shye and D. Elizur, Introduction to Facet Theory: Content Design and
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99. Sethi, “Globalization.”
100. For instance, O’Neill et al., “Board members”; Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield,
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101. Porter and Kramer, “Strategy and society,” 83.
102. Jensen, “Value maximization.”
103. Paine, “Managing integrity,” 111.