I.

Q: Pursuant to a buy-bust operation conducted by the police, apparent illegal drugs in

plastic sachets and paraphernalia were seized from respondent A. After the seizure,
they were marked, brought to the police station, made the subject of a Request for
Examination and then turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The report of the
forensic chemist showed that the plastic sachets and the strip of aluminum foil
contained shabu. However, there was no testimony offered as to the marking of said
aluminum foil. The records also do not show what happened after the seized items were
brought to the police station and after the same were tested at the forensic laboratory.
A was then adjudged guilty of violating the RA 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002. Was the chain of custody suffering from incompleteness due to the
non-presentation of the witness who can attest to an unbroken chain of evidence, and
therefore cannot sustain a conviction?

A: Yes, the non-presentation of witness in this case failed to establish the elements of
the offense. One of the essential elements in a prosecution for sale of illegal drugs is:
(1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration. The identity
of the subject substance is established by showing the chain of custody. The chain of
custody requirements that must be met in proving that the seized drugs are the same
ones presented in court are: (1) testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence; and (2) witnesses
should describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the item. Although the non-presentation of some of the witnesses who
can attest to an unbroken chain of evidence may in some instances be excused
provided there is a justifying factor, here, however, no explanation was proffered as to
why key individuals who had custody over the drugs at certain periods were not
identified and/or not presented as witnesses. Uncertainty, therefore, arises if the drugs
and paraphernalia seized during the buy-bust operation were the same specimens
presented in court. Given the failure of the prosecution to identify the continuous
whereabouts of such fungible pieces of evidence, it cannot be concluded that all
elements of the crime have been established beyond reasonable doubt.

II.
Q: W was adjudged guilty by the trial court of raping AAA. The prosecution presented as
witness AAA who testified that she was awakened by the pain she felt between her legs
and that someone whose voice she recognized as belonging to W was on top of her,
undressing and molesting her. W then proceeded to insert his finger into AAA’s vagina
after the penile penetration. W also questions the credibility of the witness arguing that it
is not believable for him to insert his finger into AAA’s vagina after already succeeding
in inserting his penis, and that it is illogical for AAA not to have awakened while
somebody was undressing her. Are the issues raised by W merit a reversal of the
conviction? Decide.

A: No, the issues are inconsequential and with little bearing on the finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In a prosecution for rape, an accused’s conviction or acquittal
depends on the credibility of prosecution’s witnesses. The credibility of a rape victim is
not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony. Such
inconsistencies are inconsequential when they refer to minor details that have nothing
to do with the essential fact of the commission of the crime––carnal knowledge through
force and intimidation. The testimony of a minor rape victim is given full weight and
credence as no young woman would plausibly concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a
public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong
committed against her. Youth and immaturity are badges of truth. AAA’s testimony as to
being at the receiving end of W’s act of molestation was positive and credible and
hence, sufficient to convict the accused.

III.
Q: In relation to the above problem, W denied the accusation against him, claiming to
have gone to bed at midnight when the incident occurred and presented his siblings, N
and D to testify for him. Will the same merit a reversal of the conviction of the accused?

A: No. positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and
without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails
over alibi and denial. In the instant case, considering that alibis are easy to fabricate
with the aid of immediate family members or relatives, they assume no importance in
the face of positive identification by the victim herself.

IV.
Q: M was charged with rape by private complainant AAA, M’s daughter who is suffering
from mental retardation. M asserts that AAA’s mental retardation affects her ability to
convey her experience, thus, making her testimony unreliable, specifically to the inability
of AAA to state with certainty the dates when the alleged acts of rape happened and
claiming that it was against human experience to forget such a harrowing experience.
Does AAA’s mental retardation disqualify her from testifying?

A: No, anyone who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known such perception to
others, may be a witness. By itself, mental retardation does not disqualify a person from
testifying. What is essential is the quality of perception, and the manner in which this
perception is made known to the court. AAA testified in a straightforward and
categorical manner that her father had raped her, even demonstrating before the court
their relative positions during the molestations. And even during cross-examination, she
remained consistent with her statement that her father had raped her. Thus, her conduct
before the court shows that AAA can very well perceive, is perceiving and can make
known her perception to other and therefore, may be a witness.

V.
Q: In the above problem, M raised denial and alibi claiming that it was impossible for
him to rape his daughter because he was at the river about 50 meters away from their
house during the times that the alleged rape took place. Decide.
A: Accused’s attempt to exculpate himself through alibi must fail. For the defense of alibi
to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time
the crime was committed, but that it was likewise impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis at the time of the alleged crime. It was not physically impossible for accused to
be at the crime scene as the distance between the two places was merely 50 meters.
Moreover, positive identification of an eyewitness prevails over the defense of alibi.

VI.
Q: The police officers used entrapment to nab C in the act of selling shabu. A
confidential informant made initial contact with C and introduced SPO2 D as buyer.
SPO2 D then asked to buy PhP 200 worth of shabu and paid using the previously
marked money. C then gave SPO2 D a plastic sachet containing what turned out to be
shabu. Then, upon the sending out of the pre-set signal, C was arrested. After SPO2 D
confiscated the shabu in question, as well as the marked money. The seized sachet
was without delay brought to the police station and marked. Immediately thereafter, the
same was referred to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Per report, the
specimen contained methamphetamine hydrochloride. The examining officer duly
marked the sachet with his initials. The contents of the seized plastic sachet had been
found to be the same substance identified and marked previously and adduced in
evidence in court.

C alleges that he was a victim of a frame-up, implying the illegality of the buy-bust
operation. Was C correct?

A: No, buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment that is resorted to for trapping and
capturing felons who are pre-disposed to commit crimes. The operation is legal and has
been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due
regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken. In upholding the validity of a
buy-bust operation, the details of the purported transaction during the buy-bust
operation must be clearly and adequately shown, i.e., the initial contact between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, and the promise or payment of the
consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug
subject of the sale.

In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the police officers used entrapment
to nab C in the act of selling shabu. The established sequence of events categorically
shows a typical buy-bust operation as a form of entrapment. The police officers’ conduct
was within the acceptable standard of fair and honorable administration of justice.

VII.
Q: Petitioner A and respondent B entered into a contract whereby A undertook to
construct the foundation of the Alfaro’s Peak building project. By virtue of a certificate of
completion and acceptance of work B issued, the foundation was deemed completed on
October 31, 1997 and as stated therein, the one-year defect liability period would end
on October 31, 1998. As A claimed, there was an unpaid balance in the amount of
P30M. B filed a petition for declaration of a state of suspension of payments which the
SEC granted. A filed with the RTC a petition for the annotation of contractor’s lien on a
TCT registered in the name of B, said title covering the site of Alfaro’s Peak. Annotation
was directed. B withdrew its petition before the SEC, prompting A to demand payment
of the unpaid balance. B proposed to pay A Php1,000,000.00 a year for at least next
three years and larger payments afterwards. A refused and filed a suit in the RTC for
sum of money and recovery of Php39,765,956.53 plus interests, attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses. B denied A’s averment and by way of affirmative defenses to
support its counterclaim, B alleged serious defects in the construction. A moved for
summary judgment, alleging that there is no valid defense to its complaint and argued
that respondent’s counterclaim has already prescribed. Was summary judgment in this
case proper?

A: No. Summary or accelerated judgment is proper only when, based on the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, and after hearing, it is shown that save as to the
amount of damages, there is no veritable issue regarding any material fact in the action
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Conversely, where the
pleadings tender an issue, that is, an issue of fact the resolution of which calls for a
presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is sham or contrived,
summary judgment is not proper.

In this case, genuine issues exist. Parties herein have conflicting postures on the issues
of estoppel, prescription, and A’s liability and B’s corollary right for damages arising
from the alleged mal-execution of the construction works. The only way to ascertain
whose position jibes with facts on the ground is obviously through the presentation of
evidence by the parties in a full blown trial on the merits.

VIII.
Q: A, the surviving spouse of B, filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the latter. During the pendency of the case, C filed a petition to remove A as
administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator. RTC granted
the petition and appointed C as administrator for which a Motion for Reconsideration
was filed by N but was subsequently denied. The RTC issued an Omnibus Order
affirming its Order denying N’s Motion for Reconsideration, ordering C to immediately
exercise his duties as administrator and directing N to vacate a property which is part of
the estate. N, instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and a Record on Appeal filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. N thereafter filed her Notice of
Appeal and Record on Appeal.

The RTC denied the appeal on two grounds: (1) that the appeal was against an order
denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court and (2) that N’s record on appeal was filed beyond the reglementary
period to file an appeal under Sec. 3, Rule 41. N filed a petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with the CA. CA ruled that the notice of appeal was filed within the
reglementary period provided by the Rules applying the “fresh rule period” enunciated
by the Court in Neypes vs. CA.

Was the subject order an interlocutory one and therefore, not subject to appeal?
A: Yes, it is an interlocutory order not subject to appeal. A final order is one that
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of
the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. It is only after a
judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of the
interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The
interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only
when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.

In the instant case, N appealed the Order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered her
to vacate the premises of the property. On that aspect the order is not a final
determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the
estate or their rights therein, and hence cannot be the subject of an appeal.

IX.
Q: At the trial of A for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the prosecution offers in
evidence a photocopy of the marked bills used in the buy-bust operation. A objects to
the introduction of the photocopy on the ground that the best evidence rule prohibits the
introduction of secondary evidence in lieu of the original. Is the photocopy admissible in
evidence?

A: Yes. The photocopy of the bills, being object evidence, is admissible in evidence
without violation of the best evidence rule. The rule applies only to documentary
evidence and not to object evidence.

X.
Q: When A loaned a sum of money to B, A typed a single copy of the promissory note,
which they both signed. A made two photocopies of the promissory note, giving one
copy to B and retaining the other copy. A entrusted the typewritten copy to his counsel
for safekeeping. The copy with A’s counsel was destroyed when the law office was
burned. As counsel for A, how will you prove the loan given by A to B?

A: The loan may be proved by the photocopy as long as A lays the foundation or lays
the basis for the introduction of the secondary evidence, to wit: (i) the existence and due
execution of the original; and (ii) loss of the original without bad faith on his part (Sec. 5,
Rule 130, Rules of Court)

XI.
Q: Is a printout of a facsimile transmission an electronic data message or electronic
document?

A: No. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssanyong Corporation, the Supreme
Court concluded that the terms electronic data message and electronic document as
defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 do not include a facsimile
transmission and cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional
equivalent of an original under the best evidence rule and therefore, not admissible as
electronic evidence.

XII.
Q: X was hired by P corporation as General Manager for its oil exploration venture in
Cebu. The employment contract expressly provided that X was to receive a salary of
P10,000.00 a month plus representation and traveling expenses of P5,000.00 a month.
P failed to pay and so X filed an action for specific performance of the employment
contract. At the trial, P attempted to prove, by oral testimony, that the payment of salary
to X was subject to the condition that P’s exploration in Cebu was already successful. Is
such oral testimony admissible? Reasons.

A: No, the oral testimony is not admissible. Under the parol evidence rule, no evidence
of the terms of a writing are admissible other than the contents of the written agreement.
Such contents cannot be modified, altered or explained by extrinsic or parol evidence
like oral testimony. In the instant case, since there was a written agreement in the form
of an employment contract, no evidence shall be admissible other than the said
employment contract itself.

XIII.
Q: H and W are legally married. H is charged in court with the crime of serious physical
injuries committed against S, son of W, step-son of H. W witnessed the infliction of the
injuries on S by H. The public prosecutor called W to the witness stand and offered her
testimony as eyewitness. Counsel for H objected on the ground of the marital
disqualification rule under the Rules of Court. Is the objection valid?

A: No, the objection is not valid. While the rule provides that neither the husband not the
wife may testify for or against each other without the consent of the affected spouse, the
prohibition is merely the general rule. Said rule is subject to certain exception, one of
which is in a criminal case committed by one against the direct descendant of the other.
H is accused of committing a crime against S, son of W and the latter’s direct
descendant. Therefore, the instant case falls under one of the exceptions. Objection is
not valid.

XIV.
Q: C is the child of the spouses H and W. H sued his wife for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. In the trial, C testified over the
objection of W on the ground of the doctrine on parental privilege. Rule on W’s
objection.

A: W cannot invoke the privilege. Said privilege belongs to the child. C may testify if he
wants to although he may not be compelled to do so under Sec.25, Rule 130, Rules of
Court.