ARTICLE III

(BILL OF RIGHTS)

- True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice
and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in
administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will
invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any
pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim
the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the
position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law,
1996 ed., p. 64). (Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160, 186-
188, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc [Melo])

- Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052, February

13, 2008- Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to
property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced
[to] relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to
property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not.
When the state or [local government unit] LGU’s exercise of police
power clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the former
should prevail,”.

- Procedural Due Process- Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca Serano vs

NLRC, 323 SCRA 445- Due process clause of the constitution is a
limitation on government powers. It does not apply to the exercise of
private power, such as the termination of employment under the Labor
Code.

- Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs, et al., GR No. 196425, July 24, 2012- Pichay’s right to due
process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of
the administrative complaint against him. In administrative proceedings,
the filing of the charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process, which simply means having the
opportunity to explain one’s side.

- Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534- The license to carry firearm is
neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested
right. A permit to carry a firearm outside of one’s residence maybe
revoked at anytime.

- MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005- A license to

operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by
 the State, which may be suspended or revoked by the State in the
exercise of police power.

- Macias vs. Macias, September 3, 2003- Denial of due process suffices to

cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government the
impress of nullity.

INSTANCES WHEN HEARINGS ARE NOT NECESSARY:

1. When administrative agencies are exercising their quasi-legislative

functions;
2. Abatement of nuisance per se Art. (704, NCC);
3. Granting by courts of provisional remedies;
4. Preventive suspension; (Co. Vs. Barbers. Sec. 63 of LGC; BP 337);
5. Removal or replacement of temporary employees in the government
service;
6. Issuance of warrants of distraint and/or levy by the BIR Commissioner;
7. Cancellation of passport of a person charged with a crime;
8. Issuance of sequestration orders;
9. Judicial order which prevents an accused from traveling abroad;
10. Suspension of bank’s operations by the Monetary Board upon a
prima facie finding of liquidity problems in such bank.
11. Extradition proceedings ([evaluation stage]- Sec of Justice vs.
Lantion; Cuevas vs. Munoz, 2000);
12. Reinvestigation (criminal cases);
13. TPO (Garcia vs. Drilon, June 25, 2013);

- SP of Baguio City vs. Jadewell Parking Systems Corp., April 23,

2014- Prior notice and hearing, as elements of due pocess of law, are
only required in judicial or quasi judicial proceedings, not when the
government agency is engaged in the performance of quasi legislative or
administrative functions.

- Shu vs. Dee, April 23, 2014- The repondents cannot claim that they
were denied due process during the NBI Investigation. The functions of
the NBI are merely investigatory and informational in nature. The NBI
has no judicial or quasi-judicial power and is incapable of granting any
relief to any party, it cannot even determine probable cause.

- Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 212140-41, January

21, 2015- there is no law or rule that requires the Ombudsman to furnish
a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.

The Void-for-vagueness Doctrine

- The law should be declared void as it is vague, i.e., it lacks

comprehensible standards so that men of ordinary intelligence will
probably have to guess as to its meaning and differ in its application.
- Such vague law is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: one,
it violates due process as it fails to afford persons fair notice of the
conduct to avoid and; second, it gives law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out provisions and, therefore, in effect, it becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the government’s muscle.

- However, for this to be validly invoked, the act or law must be utterly
vague on its face that it cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
statutory construction.

Equal Protection of the Law

- The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or

things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.
The guarantee of equal protection secures every person within the State’s
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution
through the State’s duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal
justice under the law demands that the State governs impartially and not
to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.

- The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals

determined according to a valid classification. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. In
other words, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial
distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of
the class. (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters
Association, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc
[Bersamin])

The Three (3) Levels of Scrutiny to Determine the Propriety of the

Classification under the Equal Protection Clause

- To determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to three

levels of scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and
strict scrutiny.

- The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or
rational basis test) demands that the classification reasonably relate to
the legislative purpose. The rational basis test often applies in cases
 involving economics or social welfare, or to any other case not involving
a suspect class.

- When the classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage, it

will be treated under intermediate or heightened review. Classifications
based on gender or illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny. To
survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an
important governmental interest and be substantially related to that
interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine and
must not depend on broad generalizations.

- The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification

impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. The
Government carries the burden to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest. (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino
Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 189185,
August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin])

- In Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters

Association, Inc., et al., (G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc
[Bersamin]), the Court, applying the rational basis test, ruled that the
ordinance of Davao City prohibiting aerial spraying in all agricultural
entities therein as the practice produces pesticide drift causing
inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment,
violates the equal protection clause, hence, should be declared
unconstitutional.

- Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large farmholdings that

are the only ideal venues for the investment of machineries and
equipment capable of aerial spraying. It effectively denies the affected
individuals the technology aimed at efficient and cost-effective
operations and cultivation not only of banana but of other crops as well.
The prohibition against aerial spraying will seriously hamper the
operations of the banana plantations that depend on aerial technology to
arrest the spread of the Black Sigatoka disease and other menaces that
threaten their production and harvest. X x x the effect of the ban will not
be limited to Davao City in view of the significant contribution of
banana export trading to the country’s economy.

- The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive and

unreasonable in light of the existence and availability of more
permissible and practical alternatives that will not overburden the
respondents and those dependent on their operations as well as those
who stand to be affected by the ordinance. X x x
- Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice- The Supreme Court found the strict
scrutiny standard, an American constituted construct, useful in
determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of
things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification
that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantaged of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove
that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest
and it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. Later, the
strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing
with the regulation of speech, gender or race as well as other
fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier application to equal
protection. In the cases, the Supreme Court finds nothing in Section
4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since
no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is
essentially condemnable act- accessing the computer system of another
without right. It is universally condemned act.

- Biraogo vs the Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935,

December 7, 2010- the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a
class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008 Election to

Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement
as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.

- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Election to the position of a

Congressman is not reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

- USA vs. Puruganan, September 3, 2002- The position of Congressman

is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which
lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to
the same class.

- Fariñas vs. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503, December 10, 2003,
Substantive distinctions exist between elective officials and appointive
 officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
people while the latter hold their office by virtue of their designation by
an appointing authority.

Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures

- The right to security of a person- (Secretary of National Defense vs.

Manalo, GR No. 180908, October 7, 2008)-is a gurarantee of
protection of one’s rights by the government. In the context of the writ of
amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and
liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 constitution and the right to
security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Art. III, Sec. 2.

- Vivares, et al. vs. STC, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014- he
concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was
briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The
Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the three strands of the
right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2)
informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is
relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually
defined as the right of individuals to control information about
themselves.

- It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many Online

Social Network (OSN) users are said to have a subjective expectation
that only those to whom they grant access to their profile will view the
information they post or upload thereto. Utilization of these privacy
tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his
or her right to informational privacy.

- Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can
be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone
on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively
limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they
cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational
privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez is most
instructive:

- [A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to

forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly
under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ
protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the
Web page or the photograph itself.
- Also, United States v. Maxwell held that "[t]he more open the method
of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages
sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded
from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."

Is there a constitutional right to privacy?

- The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone.” In the 1965 case of
Griswold v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479, 14 L. ed. 2D 510 [1965]), the
United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy
when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that
there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments x x x. In the
1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc (22 SCRA 424, 444-445), we adopted the
Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional right to privacy x x x.

- Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of
privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our
Constitution. (Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, 444 [1968]; Cortes, The
Constitutional Foundations of Privacy, p. 18 [1970]). It is expressly
recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights x x x. Other facets of the
right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights
(viz: Secs. 1, 2, 6, 8, and 17. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23,
1998 [Puno])

What are the zones of privacy recognized and protected in our laws?

- The Civil Code provides that “[e]very person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons” and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of
meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any
violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the
privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal
Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation
of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of
privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law (R.A.
4200), the Secrecy of Bank Deposits (R.A. 1405) and the Intellectual
Property Code (R.A. 8293). The Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information
(Section 24, Rule 130[c], Revised Rules on Evidence). (Ople v. Torres,
G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 [Puno])

- Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al.,

G.R. No,. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014, En Banc (Abad) The right to privacy,
or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution
as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. But the Court acknowledged its existence as early
 as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the right to privacy exists
independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself fully
deserving of constitutional protection.

- Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known

as the “Zones of Privacy.” The Court explained in “In the Matter of the
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator
Gordon” the relevance of these zones to the right to privacy:

- Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these
zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and
in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we
accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right
to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued by
civilized men,” but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights which mandates that, “no one shall be subjected to
arbitrary interference with his privacy” and “everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”

- Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the
right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and
correspondence.

- In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into
these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.

- SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA, GR No. 157870,

November 3, 2008- Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office and persons accused of crimes. However, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the said RA insofar as random drug
testing for secondary and tertiary school students, as well as for officials
and employees of public and private offices is concerned. The need for
drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to
override the individual’s privacy interest under the premises.

- Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998- The right to privacy is
one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The
threats emanate from various sources — governments, journalists,
employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from
the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308
pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information
about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the
 government the power to compile a devastating dossier against
unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded
warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will
live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In
a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will
have lost its benign capacity to forget." Oblivious to this counsel, the
dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the right to
privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the
right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.

- KMU v. NEDA, G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006- On its face, EO 420
shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the
data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing
ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict
safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast
to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative
safeguards. The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable
ID systems by government entities. With the exception of the 8 specific
data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected and recorded
under EO 420 are treated as strictly confidential under Section 6(d) of
EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential but also personal
matters. The disclosure requirements under EO 420 are far benign and
cannot therefore constitute violation of the right to privacy. EO 420
requires disclosure of 14 personal data that are routine for ID purposes,
data that cannot possibly embarrass or humiliate anyone.

- EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID

systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under
existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any
power that they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast,
the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a
National Computerized Identification Reference System, a national ID
system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance.
Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it
creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where
none existed before.

- EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing
sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth
and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the
public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under
the Presidents constitutional power of control over government entities
in the Executive department, as well as under the Presidents
constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

- Del Castillo vs. People, GR No. 185128, January 30, 2012- The
confiscated items having been found in a place other than the one
described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid
 warrantless search. xxx Evidence obtained due to warrantless search
conducted by a barangay tanod is inadmissible in evidence since a
barangay tanod is an agent of a person in authority under the Revised
Penal Code

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCHES & SEIZURES:

1. Search incidental to lawful arrest (PP vs. Tiu Won Chua, 405 SCRA
280; PP vs. Estella, 395 SCRA 553);
2. search of a moving vehicle (PP vs. Tampis, 407 SCRA 582);
3. seizure in plain view (PP vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81, The counterfeit nature
of the seals and stamps was not apparent and established until after they
have been turned over to the Chinese embassy and the Bureau of
Immigration for verification. Hence, not considered as evidence in plain
view);
4. customs search (Salvador vs. PP, July 15, 2005);
5. waiver by the accused( 1. right to be waived exists; 2. person waiving
has knowledge of such right, actually or constructively; and 3. he/she
has actual intention to relinquish the right.) Silahis Int’l Hotel vs. Soluta,
Feb. 20, 2006; Valdez vs. People, 538 SCRA 611)- It is the State which
has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily
given;
6. stop& frisk (limited protective search); Terry Search – (Terry vs, Ohio,
1968; Malacatvs CA, Dec. 1, 1997) it is a stop of a person by law
enforcement officer based upon “reasonable suspicion” that a person
may have been engaged in criminal activity, whereas an arrest requires
“probable cause” that a suspect committed a criminal offense;
7. Armed conflict (war time);
8. Check points (limited to visual search; PP vs. Escaño, GR No. 129756-
58, January 28, 2000);
9. Exigent and emergency circumstances (PP vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA
716), where a warrantless search was allowed where there was a
prevailing general chaos and disorder because of an ongoing coup;
10. Conduct of “Area Target Zone” and “Saturation Drives” in the
exercise of military powers of the President (Guanzon vs. Villa, 181
SCRA 623);
11. Routine Airport Security Procedure (PP vs. Suzuki, October 23,
2003; PP vs. Johnson, GR No. 138881, December 18, 2000).

- Valmonte v. De Villa

For searches at checkpoints to be valid, the following must be observed:

1. The checkpoint must be pre-announced;

2. It must be stationary; and
3. The search at checkpoint must be limited to visual search only. An
intrusive search is not allowed

- People v. Doria

The requisites for the “plain view” doctrine to be validly invoked are:

1. The law enforcement officer must have a valid justification for an

intrusion, or is in a position where he can view a particular area;
2. The discovery of the evidence in plain view must be inadvertent; and
3. It is immediately apparent to him that the thing he sees is object of a
crime, contraband, or subject to seizure.

- It is clear that if the object is inside a closed container, “plain view”

may not be invoked. However, even if it inside a closed container but
if due to the configuration of the container, or due to its transparency,
it can still be seen from the outside what is inside, “plain view” may
still be invoked.

- Del Rosario vs. People, May 31, 2001- Seizure of evidence in plain
view is justified only when:

1. there is prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which

the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
2. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be there where they are;
3. the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
4. plain view justified the seizure without further search conducted-
Manalili vs. CA, 280 SCRA 400

WARRANTLESS ARREST

- Luz vs. People, GR No. 197788, February 29, 2012- Under the Rules, a
warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed
for an offense penalized by a fine only. As a corollary, neither can a
warrantless arrest be made for such an offense. xxx In this case, the officer’s
issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of
an arrest for the same violation.

HOT PURSUIT- Requisites:

1. The pursuit of the offender by the arresting officer must be continuous

from the time of the commission of the offense to the time of the
arrest.
2. There must be no supervening event which breaks the continuity of the
chase.
- Ladlad/Beltran, et al. vs. Gonzales/Velasco, June 1, 2007- Inquest
proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested
without warrant.

- PP vs. dela Cruz, 571 SCRA 469- arrest in flagrante delicto to be

availed, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing or is attempting to commit a crime. (2) such
commission of a crime must be done in the presence and within the view
of the arresting officer.

- PP vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, There must be a large measure of
immediacy between the time of the offense was committed and the time
of the warrantless arrest. If there was an appreaciable lapse of time
between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest
must be secured.

- Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law speaks of a crime
committed in the presence of an arresting officer, it is not limited to
actually seeing the commission of the crime. The requirement of the law
is complied where the arresting officer was within an earshot from the
scene although he did not personally witness the commission of the
crime.

- PP vs. Martin, 193 SCRA 57, The Bill of Rights is protection against
the State. The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government. Right applies only against the government and agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law.

- Only a judge may validly issue a warrant- EXCEPT: By

administrative authorities (CID; BOC) only for the purpose of
carrying out a final finding of violation of law.

- Jackson vs. Macalino, November 24, 2003- the Commissioner of the

Immigration can issue a warrant of arrest against a foreigner who has
been ordered to be deported.

- SCATTER SHOT WARRANT- is a warrant having been issued to

more than one offense.

- PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAIL AS TO THE PLACE TO BE

SEARCHED AND THINGS OR PERSONS TO BE SEIZED NOT
REQUIRED- the constitution does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to no room for
doubt on the part of the searching authorities; TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION IS NOT REQUIRED- It is only necessary that there be
 reasonable certainty or particularity as to the identity of the property to
be searched for and seized so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving
commission. THE TEST as would be as to what is to be taken, nothing
is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. VALLEJO
VS. CA, 427 SCRA 658, April 14, 2004.

Administrative Warrantless Arrest-Causes:

a. If you breach peace or if you are planning to do so, you can be

arrested but only if it is absolutely necessary to do so. You will be
freed as soon as you no longer represent a threat to public security.
b. If you disrupt a court hearing;
c. If you are in a drunken state on the public highway;
d. In case of brawling;
e. If you block traffic without authorization;
f. If you refuse to give your ID documents or if these are
questionable;
g. If you are in the country illegally.

Section 3- Privacy of communication & correspondence-

- In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Capt. G. Alejano, et al.

vs. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005- The letters alleged to
have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters
between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received
the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting
as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel when he
received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were
not confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the
letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between
the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read
the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of
the detainees. That a law is required before an executive officer could
intrude on a citizen’s privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only
to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned.
The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA
7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or
imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees
and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy
rights.

- Roxas vs. Zuzuarregei, June 12, 2007- To prevent liability from

attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his rights to free speech and
privacy of communication. The invocation of these rights will not,
however, free him from liability. As already stated, his letter contained
defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity of
 the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed against
the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such
right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be
disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to
impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect
therefor and confidence therein. Free expression must not be used as a
vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade
and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.

- Read: Ayer Productions vs. Capulong- The right of privacy or the right
to be let alone is not an absolute right where the person is a public figure
and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published
about him constitute matters of a public character.

- Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699- The only exception to the prohibition
in the constitution is if there is a “lawful order from a court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law”.

- A violation of the Anti Wire Tapping Law (R.A. 4200) which prohibits
not only the unauthorized taping of private conversations, but also: (a)
the possession of such tapes with the knowledge of their nature as illegal
wiretaps; (b) the replaying of the tapes to any person; and (c) to
communicate the contents thereof either verbally or in writing, such as
the provision of transcripts. The potential jail term, if convicted, ranges
from six months to six years.

- Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code

- RA No. 9372 (Human Security Act)- The provisions of RA 4200 to the

contrary notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and
members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals,
listen to intercept, and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or
type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and
tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means
for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion
or spoken or written words between members of a judicially declared
and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons or
any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism. Provided, that surveillance, interception
and recording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctors
and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business
correspondence shall not be authorized.
 Section 4- Freedom of expression-

Content-based restrictions on free speech, and content-neutral regulations

- Content-based restrictions are imposed because of the content of the

speech and are, therefore, subject to the clear-and-present danger test.
For example, a rule such as that involved in Sanidad v. Comelec,
prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from
campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have
compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict
scrutiny. These restrictions are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy
presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will be tested
for possible overbreadth and vagueness.

- Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, like Sec. 11(b) of R.A.

No. 6646, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air
time to political candidates during the campaign period, are not
concerned with the content of the speech. These regulations need only a
substantial governmental interest to support them. A deferential
standard of review will suffice to test their validity. The clear-and-
present danger rule is inappropriate as a test for determining the
constitutional validity of laws, like Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, which
are not concerned with the content of political ads but only with their
incidents. To apply the clear-and-present danger test to such regulatory
measures would be like using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a
regular hammer is all that is needed.

- The test for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of
speech is that content-based restrictions distort public debate, have
improper motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear of how
people will react to a particular speech. No such reasons underlie
content-neutral regulations, like regulation of time, place and manner of
holding public assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act
of 1985. (Osmena v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447, March 31, 1998
[Mendoza])

What is the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from

content-neutral regulations?

- The United States Supreme Court held in United States v. O’ Brien:

- [A] a governmental regulation is sufficiently justified (1) if it is within

the constitutional power of the government; (2) if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; (3) if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and (4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms (of speech, expression and press) is no greater
 than is essential to the furtherance of that interest (391 U.S. 367, 20 L.
Ed. 2df 692, 680 [1968] [bracketed numbers added])

- This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based

from content-neutral regulations and is said to have “become canonical
in the review of such laws.” (G. Gunther & K. Sullivan, Constitutional
Law 1217 [13th ed. 1997]). It is noteworthy that the O’ Brien test has
been applied by this Court in at least two cases (Adiong v. Comelec, 207
SCRA 712 [1992]; Osmena v. Comelec, supra.).

- Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial

governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental
interest is “not unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”
Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free
speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on
freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the
governmental purpose in question. (Social Weather Stations, Inc. v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, En Banc [Mendoza]) Chavez
v. Secretary Gonzales

- Content based and content neutral regulations- Regulations of speech

may either be content-based (the subject of the speech or utterance is
sought to be regulated) and content-neutral (it regulates only the conduct
associated with speech, such as the time, place and manner). To pass
constitutional muster, any content-based regulation must show that the
government has a compelling or overriding interest in the subject
regulation. A content neutral restriction, on the other hand, need only
show an important government interest, as long as it leaves open
alternative channels of communication.

- Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February 15, 2008-

The acts of the Secretary of Justice and the NTC in warning television
stations against playing the “Garci tapes” under pain of revocation of
their licenses, were content-based restrictions and should be subjected to
the “clear and present and danger test”.

- Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Dy, et al., GR No.

170270/GR No. 179411, April 2, 2009- The immediate implication of
the application of the “strict scrutiny” test is that the burden falls upon
respondents as agents of the government to prove that their actions do
not infringe upon petitioners’ constitutional rights. As content regulation
cannot be done in the absence of compelling reason to infringe the right
to free expression.

- The Diocese of Bacolod, Represented by the Most Rev. Bishop

Vicente M. Navarra, et al. v. COMELEC, GR No. 205728, January
21, 2015, En Banc (Leonen) This case defines the extent that our people
may shape the debates during elections. It is significant and of first
 impression. We are asked to decide whether the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) has the competence to limit expressions made by
the citizens – who are not candidates – during elections.

- All regulations will have a impact directly or indirectly on expression.

The prohibition against the abridgment of speech should not mean an
absolute prohibition against regulation. The primary and incidental
burden on speech must be weighed against a compelling state interest
clearly allowed in the Constitution. The test depends on the relevant
theory of speech implicit in the kind of society framed by our
Constitution.

- Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of expression,

separate and in addition to the freedom of speech and of the press
provided in the US Constitution. The word “expression” was added in
the 1987 Constitution x x x for having a wider scope x x x.

- Speech may be said to be inextricably linked to freedom itself as “[t]he

right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected
from the government because speech is the beginning of thought.”
(Freedom of Speech and Expression, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 272, 277 [2002],
quoting Justice Kennedy in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct.
1389, 1403 [2002])

- Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech.

Communication exists when “(1) a speaker, seeking to signal others,
uses conventional actions because he or she reasonably believes that
such actions will be taken by the audience in the manner intended; and
(2) the audience so takes the actions.” (Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in
Silence, 99 Yale L. J. 945, 954 [1990]) “[I]n communicative action[,] the
hearer may respond to the claims by x x x either accepting the speech
act’s claims or opposing them with criticism or requests for
justification.” (Hugh Baxter, System and Lifeworld in Haberma’s
Theory of Law, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 473, 499 [2002])

- Speech is not limited to vocal communication. “[C]onduct is treated as

a form of speech sometimes referred to as ‘symbolic speech[,]’ (Joshua
Waldman, Symbolic Speech and Social Meaning, 97 Colum. L. Rev.
1844, 1847 [1997]) such that “’when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements
are combined in the same course of conduct,’ the ‘communicative
element’ of the conduct may be ‘sufficient to bring into play the [right to
freedom of expression].’” (Id., citing US v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376
[1968])
- The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum
of speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction
itself as a symbolic manner of communication.

- Even before freedom “of expression” was included in Article III, Section
4 of the present Constitution, this court has applied its precedent version
to expressions other than verbal utterances.

- 1 Utak vs COMELEC, GR 206020 April 14 2015- The COMELEC

may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals. The posting of
election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on
transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an
act of ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to
operate the PUV or transport terminal.

- A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may

not be justified if the supposed “captive audience” may avoid exposure
to the otherwise intrusive speech. Here, the commuters are not forced or
compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and
transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the
messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they
may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive.
Hence, the doctrine is not applicable.

- It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of

speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals such as
the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals to express their
preference, through the posting of election campaign material in their
property, and convince others to agree with them.

- The prohibition under the certain provisions of RA 9615 are content-

neutral regulations since they merely control the place where election
campaign materials may be posted, but the prohibition is repugnant to
the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid
content-neutral regulation.

- The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals

is not necessary to a stated governmental interest. First, while
Resolution 9615 was promulgated by the COMELEC to implement the
provisions of Fair Elections Act, the prohibition on posting of election
campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals was not provided
for therein. Second, there are more than sufficient provisions in our
present election laws that would ensure equal time, space, and
opportunity to candidates in elections. Hence, one of the requisites of a
valid content-neutral regulation was not satisfied.
- Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- to prohibit the transmission of
unsolicited commercial ads; and the State cannot rob him of his right
without violating his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

- GMA Network vs. COMELEC, September 2, 2014- when the

COMELEC drastically reduced the airtime within which national
candidates and political parties may air political advertisements on
television and radio, it unduly restricted and constrained the ability of
candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the
people.

- Social Weather Stations vs. COMELEC, May 5, 2001- Election

surveys are covered by the protection to freedom of expression as they
refer to the measurement of opinions and perception of voters as regards
to a candidate’s popularity, qualifications, platforms or a matter of
public discussion in relation to the election, including the voter’s
preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the
campaign period.The prohibition imposed by Section 5.4 of RA 9006
(Fair Election Act) is invalid because: 1) it imposes prior restraint on the
freedom of expression; 2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category
of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period;
and 3) the government interest sought to be promoted can be achieved
by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.

- The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application

only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the
validity of penal statutes. The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth,
and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law.

- A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks

comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile,
decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms.

- As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine

assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and
will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.
- A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as-applied”
challenge. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only
on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.

- The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial

challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

- The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the

aim to avert the “chilling effect” on protected speech, the exercise of
which should not at all times be abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this
rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an “in
terrorem effect” in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or
dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.

- The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech,
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a
facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal
statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No
prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a
facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed,
would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an
existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be
appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at
best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to
consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my
opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes,
such a test will impair the State’s ability to deal with crime. If warranted,
there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the
State’s power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third
parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the
law is clear as applied to him.

- It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth

doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.

- By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial

type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably
 almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied
to the litigant.

- In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court,

in at least two cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not
recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment, and that claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks, it was held that rarely,
if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation
that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct.
Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the “transcendent value
to all society of constitutionally protected expression.”

- American jurisprudence instructs that “vagueness challenges that do not

involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific
facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial
validity.”

- In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the

due process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of
criminal statutes. In at least three cases, the Court brought the doctrine
into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of
municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable
under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision
under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners
in these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada
cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute,
unlike in the present case.

- From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3
of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender
commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws;
(2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition
of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace;
and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand.

- Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must
first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of
the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including
the coercion of the government to accede to an “unlawful demand.”
Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot
recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
- Read: Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- Commercial Speech vis-a-vis
Section 4©(3) of RA No. 10175- To prohibit the transmission of
unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even if
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a
separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of
protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression, but is nonetheless is entitled to protection. The State cannot
rob him of his right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitmate forms of
expression.

- ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000)- The prohibition of

publication of exit poll or electoral survey would be unreasonably
restrictive because it effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not only
for election day projections, but also for long term research.

- MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, et al., January 17, 2005- P.D. No. 1986 gives
petitioner “the power to screen, review and examine “all television
programs,” emphasizing the phrase “all television programs”. Thus,
when the law says “all television programs,” the word “all” covers all
television programs, whether religious, public affairs, news
documentary, etc. The principle assumes that the legislative body
made no qualification in the use of general word or expression. It then
follows that since “The Inside Story” is a television program, it is within
the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of review.

- Soriano v. Laguardia, GR No. 164785; Soriano v. MTRCB GR No.

165636, April 29, 2009-The Supreme Court said that Soriano’s
“statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average
child,” and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech.
Ang Dating Daan has earlier been given a “G” rating for general
viewership. The Supreme Court said the MTRCB suspension was
limited only to the show Ang Dating Daan, not Soriano, as the MTRCB
“may not suspend television personalities, for such would be beyond its
jurisdiction.”

- Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1, In order to maintain a libel suit, it is

essential that the victim is identifiable although it is not necessary that he
be named. It must also be shown that a third party could identify him as
the object of the libelous article. Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following:

- 1. private communication made by any person to another in

the performance of any legal, moral or social duty;
- 2. a fair and true report, made in good faith, without remarks,
of any judicial, legislative or other official proceeding which are
not confidential in nature including any statement made therein or
act performed by public officer.

- A privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged (those

which are not actionable or even if author acted in bad faith, e.g. speech
by member of Congress therein or any committee thereof) or qualified
privileged (those containing defamatory imputations which are not
actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or
justifiable motive, e.g., private communications and fair and true reports
without any comments/remarks).

- Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and

constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine
of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved.

Freedom of the Press

- Four (4) Aspects of Press Freedom

- Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935

Constitution, has recognized four aspects of freedom of the press. These
are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment
subsequent to publication; (3) freedom of access to information; and (4)
freedom of circulation. (Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales, et. al.,
G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, En Banc [Puno, CJ])

Freedom of Assembly

- The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and
petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of
constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a
functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected. (BAYAN, et al. v. Ermita, et al., G.R. No.
169838, April 25, 2006, En Banc [Azcuna])

Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 – The Public Assembly Act of 1985

- Meaning of Public Assembly- “Public assembly” means any rally,

demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or
concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a
lawful cause, or expressing an opinion to the general public on any
particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs
 whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the government
for redress of grievances.

- The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings

and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local
ordinances; Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as
provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.

- The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other
concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting
from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing
rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227. (Section
3[a], B.P. Blg. 880)

- Permit when required and when not required- A written permit shall be
required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public
assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the
public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance or in a private property, in which case
only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required, or in the campus of a government–owned and operated
educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations
of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during
any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by
this Act. (Section 4, B.P. Blg. 880)

- Freedom Parks- Every city and municipality in the country shall within
six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least
one suitable “freedom park” or mall in their respective jurisdictions
which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the
poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time
without the need of any prior permit. (Section 5, B.P. Blg. 880)

- Action to be taken on the application (Section 6, B.P. Blg. 880)

i. It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his

behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.

ii. The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the
application within two (2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application
for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant
 on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be
deemed to have been filed.

iii. If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or
modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.

iv. The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on

the applicant within twenty-four hours.

v. If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the

application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of
law.

- Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza,

G.R. No. 175241, 24 February 2010, 1st Div. (Carpio Morales)
Section 6(c) of the Public Assembly Act (BP 880) provides that “If the
mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he
shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the
matter.”

- In modifying the permit outright, Atienza gravely abused his discretion

when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been
heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. Atienza
failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the
permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which x x x
is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the
issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil, which “blank” denial or modification would, when granted
imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any
judicial scrutiny thereof.

- It is true that the licensing official is not devoid of discretion in

determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not,
however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a
realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may
probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption
– especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place
– is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. It smacks
of whim and caprice for Atienza to impose a change of venue for an
assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible
error for the appellate court not to have found such grave abuse of
discretion and, under specific statutory provision, not to have modified
the permit “in terms satisfactory to the applicant.”
- Meaning of Maximum Tolerance- “Maximum tolerance” means the
highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace
keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same. (Section 3[c], B.P. Blg. 880)

B.P. No. 880 is merely a “content-neutral” regulation

- It is very clear that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmena v. Comelec
(G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998, 288 SCRA 447), where the Court
referred to it as a “content-neutral” regulation of the time, place, and
manner of holding public assemblies (Ibid, p. 478).

- A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it
refers to all kinds of public assemblies (except picketing and other
concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from
a labor dispute, which are governed by the Labor Code and other labor
laws, political meeting or rallies held during election campaign period,
which are governed by the Election Code and other election related
laws, and public assemblies in the campus of a government-owned and
operated educational institution, which shall be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational institution [Sec. 3(a) and Sec. 4 of B.P.
No. 880]) that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause”
does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for
lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to
protection. Neither are the words “opinion,” “protesting” and
“influencing” in the definition of public assembly content-based, since
they can refer to any subject. The words “petitioning the government for
redress of grievances” come from the wording of the Constitution, so its
use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection
and benefits of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the
expressions in the rally.

- Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of
the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights x x x. (BAYAN, et
al. v. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, En Banc
[Azcuna])

The Calibrated Pre-emptive Response (CPR) Policy adopted by the

Arroyo Administration in dealing with public assemblies

- The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier, the
Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now be
 discontinued, since it does not mean anything other than the maximum
tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit
of respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, submitted by the
Solicitor General.

- At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance
mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the
same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something
else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated
by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance.

- In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the

fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of expression and
freedom of assembly.

- For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has
no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness
that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by
some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880
cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly
restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the
time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious,
“maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government.,
The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally “permits” is
valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear and present
danger” standard. (BAYAN, et al. v. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838,
April 25, 2006, En Banc [Azcuna])

Section 5- Freedom of Religion-

- Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

190582, 618 SCRA 32, April 8, 2010, En Banc (Del Castillo) The
decision of the COMELEC not to allow the Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party to
participate in party-list elections because its members are “immoral,”
citing verses from the Bible and the Koran, was ruled by the SC to be
tainted with grave abuse of discretion and, therefore, nullified, as it
violated the non-establishment clause of freedom of religion. In effect,
the COMELEC used religious standard in its decision by using verses
from the Bible and the Koran. The COMELEC, as a government
agency, is not supposed to be guided by religious standards in its
decisions and actions.

What is a purely ecclesiastical affair to which the State can not meddle
following the Separation of Church and State Doctrine?

- An ecclesiastical affair is “one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of

worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a
religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government
 of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations
those deemed not worthy of membership.” Based on this definition, an
ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its
members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and
governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-
called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are
proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers,
administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious
significance. (Pastor Dionisio V. Austria v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382,
Aug. 16, 1999, 1st Div. [Kapunan])

- Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals- Under the non-establishment

clause of freedom of religion, when it comes to religious differences, the
State enjoys no banquet of options – neutrality alone is its fixed and
immovable stance. It is not its task to defend one religion against an
attack by another religion. After all, the remedy against bad theology is
better theology. Let them duel in the market place of ideas. The
marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more
speech, for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas,
that can fan the embers of truth.

- James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR

No. 204819, April 8, 2014, En Banc (Mendoza) - Wherefore, THE
PETITIONS ARE partially granted. Accordingly, the Court declares
R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL, except with
respect to the following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

- 1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in RH-IRR insofar as

they: a) require private health facilities And non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer
patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act no. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modern methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

- 2) Section 23(a)(1) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,

particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his
or her religious beliefs;

- 3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR

insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo
reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
- 4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-
IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to
elective surgical procedures;

- 5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,

particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or
one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;

- 6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,

particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public
officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do
any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

- 7) Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR

regarding the rendering of pro bono reproductive health service in so far
as they affect the conscientious objector in securing Philhealth
accreditation; and

- 8) Section 3.01(a) and Section 3.01(j) of the RH-IRR, which added

the qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as
they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section
4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.

- Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256

- members of Jehovah’s witnesses may validly refuse participating in flag
ceremonies (singing the national anthem, saluting the flag, etc.) on
account of their religious beliefs.

- Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529- The exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated when it will bring about clear and present
danger of a substantive evil which the State has a duty to prevent.
However, criticism on certain catholic tenets and dogmas does not
constitute clear and present danger.

- Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 – Freedom of religion

does not prohibit imposition of a generally applicable sales and use tax
on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization. For the
purpose of defraying cost of registration.

- Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretary,

405 SCRA 497- Classifying a food product as halal is a religious
function because the standards are drawn from the Qur’an and Islamic
 beliefs. By giving the Office of the Muslim Affairs exclusive power to
classify food products as halal, E. O. No. 46 encroached on the religious
freedom of Muslim organization to interpret what food products are fit
for Muslim consumption. The State has in effect forced Muslim to
accept its own interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah on halal food.

- Citing Art. III, sec. 5 of the Constitution, the Court stressed that “[n]o
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.” Thus, it found a grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and Koran
to justify the exclusion of AngLadlad. The Court held that moral
disapproval “is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion
of homosexuals from participation in the party list system.” Upholding
equal protection, the Court ruled that from the standpoint of the political
process, LGBTs have the same interest in participating in the party-list
system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. As
such, laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party list system on the
same basis as other marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The
Court also found that there was a transgression of AngLadlad’s
fundamental right of freedom of expression since, by reason of the
COMELEC action, the former was precluded from publicly expressing
its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the
political process with other party-list candidates. (GR No. 190582, Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, April 8, 2010)

- Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC- The Supreme Court declared that

the COMELEC order to remove the tarpaulin did not violate freedom of
religion, It does not convey any religious doctrine of the catholic church.

- Imbong vs Ochoa- The Supreme Court is of the view that the obligation
to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner,
against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to
perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas
(Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise
clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.

- Taruc vs. Bishop dela Cruz, et al., GR No. 144801, March 10, 2005-
The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the
officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization.
 Section 6- Liberty of abode & Right to travel

- Read: Villavicencio vs. Lukban; Manotoc vs. CA; Silveriovs CA- Relate
to suspension of deployment of OFWs to SARs infected countries. In
relation to bail (Manotoc vs. CA; Santiago vs. Vasquez)- valid restriction
on his right to travel.

- Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 115132, August 9, 1995- The

person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the
very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. Whether the accused
should be permitted to leave the country for humanitarian reasons is a
matter addressed to the court’s discretion. (Yap vs. CA, GR No. 141529,
June 6, 2001).

- Art. 13 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights- provides that

everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.

- Art. 12 (4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- provides that no one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

- Office of the Administrative Service-OCA vs. Macarine, AM NO.

MTJ-10-1770-July 18, 2012- OCA Circular No. 49-2003- does not
restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by
judges and court [personnel, before they can go on leave to travel
abroad. To “restrict” is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing
something; to “regulate” is to govern or direct according to rule.

- Genuino vs. de Lima, et al., G.R. No. 199034, April 17, 2018- The
issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal basis. Under Sec 6, Art. 3
of the 1987 Constitution provides three considerations that may permit a
restriction on the right to travel: national security, public safety or public
health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit provision of
statutory law or the Rules of Court providing for the impairment.

- To begin with, there is no law particularly providing for the authority of

the secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of the right to travel. To be
clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative
enactment which underwent the scrutiny and concurrence of
lawmakers, and submitted to the President for approval. It is a mere
administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the
provisions of an enabling law which the former DOJ Secretary believed
to be Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987. It is, however, important to stress that
before there can even be a valid administrative issuance, there must first
be a showing that the delegation of legislative power is itself valid. It is
valid only if there is a law that (a) is complete in itself, setting forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
 delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.

- Without a law to justify its action, the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41
is an unauthorized act of the DOJ of empowering itself under the pretext
of dire exigency or urgent necessity.” Unlike the courts, the DOJ does
not have the inherent power “to restrict the right to travel in any way.”

- Precautionary Hold Departure Order (PHDO)- that bars individuals

facing criminal complaints from leaving the country. The High Court
said a prosecutor can file a PHDO application with “any regional trial
court within whose territorial jurisdiction the alleged crime was
committed.”

- “For compelling reasons, it may be filed with any regional trial court
within the region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known. The regional trial courts in the City
of Manila, Quezon City, Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City, and
Cagayan de Oro City shall also have authority to act on applications
filed by the prosecutor based on complaints instituted by the National
Bureau of Investigation, regardless of where the alleged crime was
committed,” it added.

- On the other hand, the SC assured that the issuance of a PHDO will not
affect any findings of probable cause in the preliminary investigations of
criminal complaints before the DOJ’s National Prosecution Service
(NPS) and its regional and city offices.

- “The preliminary finding of probable cause is solely based on the

complaint and is for the sole purpose of issuing PHDO and shall be
without the prejudice to the resolution by the prosecutor of any criminal
complaint during the preliminary investigation,” it said.

- The PHDO shall remain valid until recalled by the issuing court. “Once
issued, the PHDO may be lifted by a verified motion filed by the
respondent questioning the existence of probable cause or a showing that
she or he is not a flight risk. The PHDO may also be lifted to allow him
or her to leave the country upon posting of a bond in an amount to be
determined by the court,” it stated.

- The Court said the PHDO may be applied for in the same manner that a
search warrant may be issued, thus, a judge must first determine
probable cause upon personal examination of witnesses under oath or
affirmation.

-
 Section 7- Right to Information

- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- The constitutional

right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract is consummated. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and
should not cover recognized exceptions liked privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.

- Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN, June 13, 2012- Under Section
17, Art. XI has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a
matter of public concern and interest. In other words, a “duty to
disclose” sprang from the “right to know”. Both of constitutional origin,
the former is a command while the latter is a permission. Hence, there is
a duty on the part of members of the government to disclose their
SALNs to the public in the manner provided by law. xxx While public
officers in the custody or control of public records have the discretion to
regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or
copied by interested parties, such discretion does not carry with it the
authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the
records. After all, public office is a public trust.

- Legazpi vs. CSC; Valmonte vs. Belmonte; BARA vs. COMELEC

- Berdin vs. Mascarinas, 526 SCTA 592- While access to official records
may not be prohibited, it certainly may be regulated.

Section 8- Right to form Unions of public sector

- United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15-
Congress, via Art. 125 of the Labor Code, validly prohibited supervisors
from forming labor unions. the right to strike does form an integral part
of the Right to Association.

Section 9- Expropriation

- Republic vs. Gingoyon, December 19, 2005- Rule 67 outlines the

procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the
Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary
guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. For
example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the
exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain
through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974,
which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national
government infrastructure projects.
- Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more
favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in
instances when the national government expropriates property “for
national government infrastructure projects”.

- Republic vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp., 551 SCRA 303-
There are at least two crucial differences between the respective
procedure under RA No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the
government is required to make immediate payment to the property
owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of
possession, whereas Rule 67, the government is required only to make
an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary, and Rule
67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of
the property for purpose of taxation, unlike RA 8974 which provides, as
the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the
property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal
value of the BIR, whichever is higher, and the value of the
improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.

- LBP vs. Honeycomb Farms Corp., GR No. 169903, February 29, 2012-
When the State exercises the power of eminent domain in the
implementation of its agrarian program, the constitutional provision
which governs is Section 4 Article XIII of the constitution which
provides that the State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of the farmers and regular farm workers
who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in
the case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. Notably, the provision also imposes upon the State the
obligation of paying landowner compensation for the land taken, even if
it is for the government’s agrarian reform purposes. It pertains to the fair
and full price if the taken property.

- LBP vs. Eusebio, July 2, 2014- LBP, in this case, opened a trust account
to provisionally pay Eusebio for the property taken. In Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation,45 we struck down as
void the DAR administrative circular46 that provided for the opening of
the trust accounts in lieu ofthe deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated
in Section 16(e) of R.A. No. 6657.47 We pointedly declared that the
explicit words of Section 16(e) did not include "trust accounts," but only
cash or bonds, as valid modes of satisfying the government’s payment of
just compensation.

- Apo Fruits Corp vs. LBP, October 12, 2010- In the process, the Court
determined that the legal interest should be 12% after recognizing that
the just compensation due was effectively a forbearance on the part of
the government. Had the finality of the judgment been the critical factor,
then the 12% interest should have been imposed from the time the RTC
decision fixing just compensation became final. Instead, the 12% interest
 was imposed from the time that the Republic commenced condemnation
proceedings and took the property.

- LBP vs. Heirs of Alsua, GR No. 211351, February 4, 2015- the Court
has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there
is delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the
landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the
State. Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% interest p.a. from
the time of taking until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning
July 1, 2013 until fully paid, interest shall be at 6% p.a..

- Republic vs. Soriano, GR No. 211666, February 25, 2015- As often ruled
by this Court, the award of interest is imposed in the nature of damages
for delay in payment which, in effect, makes the obligation on the part of
the government one of forbearance to ensure prompt payment of the
value of the land and limit the opportunity loss of the owner. However,
when there is no delay in the payment of just compensation, the
Supreme Court has not hesitated in deleting the imposition of interest
thereon for the same is justified only in cases where delay has been
sufficiently established.

- Secretary of DPWH vs. Heracleo, GR 179334 Apr 21 2015- The

government’s failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings
prior to actual taking cannot simply invalidate the State’s exercise of its
eminent domain power, given that the property subject of expropriation
is indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy imposes upon the
public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. To
hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due process
would certainly diminish or weaken one of the State’s inherent powers,
the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good. Thus, the
non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the
return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is
the right of compensation.

- While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an

outdated valuation, the long-established rule is that the fair equivalent
of a property should be computed not at the time of payment, but at
the time of taking. This is because the purpose of ‘just compensation’
is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate
him for the loss thereof. The owner should be compensated only for
what he actually loses, and what he loses is the actual value of the
property at the time it is taken.

- The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty
is the application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation
being called for only when such literal application is impossible. To
entertain other formula for computing just compensation, contrary to
those established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying
 interpretation of economic policies – a matter which this Court has no
competence to take cognizance of. Equity and equitable principles only
come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.

- For purposes of “just” compensation, the value of the land should be

determined from the time the property owners filed the initiatory
complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold otherwise would
validate the State’s act as one of expropriation in spite of procedural
infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on its
part. To continue condoning such acts would be licensing the
government to continue dispensing with constitutional requirements in
taking private property.

- Discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2(a) of

Rule 39 simply does not apply to eminent domain proceedings. Since
PPAs monies, facilities and assets are government properties, they are
exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or pending
appeal.

- It is a universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the
claimant’s action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to
the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments. This is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by
the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law. (Commissioner of Public Highways vs San
Diego, 1970).

- The appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of the manner

of payment thereof and the initial compensation to the lot owners is a
substantive, not merely a procedural, matter. This is because the right of
the owner to receive just compensation prior to acquisition of possession
by the State of the property is a proprietary right. RA 8974, which
specifically prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of
just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government
infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the provisional value as
a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession, is a substantive law.
Further, there is nothing in RA No. 8974 which expressly provides that
it should have retroactive effect. Neither is retroactivity necessarily
implied from RA No. 8974 or in any of its provisions. Hence, it cannot
be applied retroactively in relation to this case.
- RA 8974 amended Rule 67 effective November 26, 2000, but only with
regard to the expropriation of right-of-way sites and locations for
national government infrastructure projects. On the other hand, in all
other expropriation cases outside of right-of-way sites or locations for
national government infrastructure projects, the provisions of Rule 67
of the Rules of Court shall still govern.

- Vda de Ouano vs. Republic, 168770, February 9, 2011- The twin

elements of just compensation and public purpose are, by themselves,
direct limitations to the exercise of eminent domain, arguing, in a way,
against the notion of fee simple title. The simple fee does not vest until
payment of just compensation. In esse, expropriation is forced private
property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance
to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in
expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will.
Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly
followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine
need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to
be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the complaint.
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an
expansive meaning to include any use that is of usefulness, utility, or
advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the public]. If the
genuine public necessity the very reason or condition as it were allowing,
at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or
disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the governments
retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold
if the government devotes the property to another public use very much
different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to
benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use by the
state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive
possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that
citizens own private gain, is offensive to our laws. A condemnor should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition
for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government
cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it
pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This
is not in keeping with the idea of fair play

- ATO vs. Tongoy, 551 SCRA 320- the right of the previous owners who
were able to prove the commitment of the government to allow them to
repurchase their land.

- Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA 59- The State,
through expropriation proceedings may take private property even if,
admittedly, it will transfer this property again to another private party as
long as there is public purpose to the taking.
- Tiongson vs. NHA, 558 SCRA 56- Where the initial taking of a property
subject to expropriation was by virtue of a law which was subsequently
declared unconstitutional, just compensation is to be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint, and not the earlier taking.

- MCWD vs. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., GR No. 175983, April 16, 2009 -
For MCWD to exercise its power of eminent domain, two requirements
should be met, namely: first, its board of directors passed a resolution
authorizing the expropriation, and second, the exercise of the power of
eminent domain was subjected to review by the LWUA.

- Republic vs. Lim, June 29, 2005- Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting
function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against
the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the
individual’s rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore
be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and
liberally in favor of the property owner.

- While the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just

compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from
the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property.
This is in consonance with the principle that “the government cannot
keep the property and dishonor the judgment.” To be sure, the five-year
period limitation will encourage the government to pay just
compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity.
After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property
from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just
compensation.

- Local government units possessed the delegated power of eminent

domain, subject to judicial review (City of Manila vs. Chinese
Community).

- Any property owned by a municipal corporation in its private capacity

(patrimonial), in any expropriation proceeding, must be paid just
compensation. If the property owned is public or otherwise held in trust
then no compensation need be paid (City of Baguio vs. NAWASA).

- To set just compensation is a judicial prerogative (EPZA vs. Dulay).

- GR No. 177056, Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land

Incorporated, September 18, 2009- The Court said that the total
prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from
persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National
 Building Code or its implementing rules and regulations. It added that
the State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking
police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents’
property without payment of just compensation.

- Cmsr. of IR vs. Central Luzon Drug Corp., GR No. 148512, June 26,
2006, Cmsr. of IR vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., GR No. 148083, July 21,
2006 – The tax credit given to commercial establishments for the
discount enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant to RA 7432 is a form of just
compensation for private property taken by the State for public use, since
the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly from the
State, but from private establishments concerned.

- Public use does not mean use by the public. As long as the purpose of
the taking is public, then power of eminent domain comes into play. It is
inconsequential that private entities may benefit as long as in the end,
public interest is served (Ardona vs. Reyes).

- Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494, Taking of

property for socialized housing is for public use.

- Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired n the following order: 1)

government lands; 2) alienable lands of the public domain; 3)
unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; 4) lands within the declared
areas for priority development, zonal improvement program sites, slum
improvement and resettlement sites which have not yet been acquired; 5)
BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and 6) privately-owned
lands (City of Mandaluyong vs. Aguilar, 350SCRA 487 2001).

Section 10- Non-impairment clause

- There is no impairment in the imposition of the VAT against real estate

transactions entered or perfected even prior to its imposition. The
contract clause is not a limitation on the exercise of the State’s power of
taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid
consideration. (Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance)

- The non-impairment clause includes prohibition on judicial acts that

impair contract. (Ganzon vs. Inserto, 123 SCRA 135)

- Goldenway Merchandising Corp. vs. Equitable PCI Bank, GR No.

195540, March 13, 2013- Section 47 of RA 8791 did not divest juridical
persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only
modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year
period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption period
commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon
registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure,
 whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the
new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation
those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall
retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.

Sections 11 & 12 – Custodial Investigation Rights

- Read: Miranda vs. Arizona, Gamboa vs. Cruz, Escobedo vs. Illinois.

- People vs. Lauga, GR No. 186228, March 15, 2010- Barangay based
organizatios in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of bantay
bayan, are recognized by local government unit to perform functions
relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level.
Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Banting and
the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay
bayan, particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation,
any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional
rights provided for under Article III, section 12 of the constitution. The
Supreme Court, therefore, finds the extra-judicial confession of Lauga
which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.

- Luz vs. People- roadside questioning does not fall under custodial
investigation, nor it can be considered a formal arrest, by the very nature
of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and
the length of time the procedure is conducted.

- Applies to preliminary investigation, PP vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624

- PP vs. Vallejo, May 9, 2002- To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need

not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The
presence of counsel to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false. Indeed counsel should not prevent an
accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

- PP vs. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1- RA 7438 has extended the

constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not
been formally arrested but has merely been “invited” for questioning.

- PP vs. Garcia, 400 SCRA 229, A confession made to a private person is

admission in evidence.

- PP vs. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494, An unwritten confession is

inadmissible.

- A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by

counsel (Ampong vs. CSC, 563 SCRA 293).
 - Van Luspo vs. People, GR No. 188487, February 14, 2011- The court
sustained the admissibility of the sworn statements of the other accused,
explaining that the investigations performed by the PNP were
administrative and not custodial in nature.

- Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532- While investigations by an

administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, a
party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondent’s
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish
the person being investigated with counsel.

Section 13- Bail

- In bail application where the accused is charged with a capital offense,

will it be proper for the judge to grant bail without conducting hearing if
the prosecutor interposes no objection to such application?

- Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the

required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands
charged with a capital offense. The absence of objection from the
prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the
judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is
doing on account of familiarity with the case. “Said reasoning is
tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial
discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong.
Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition
for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise
discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor.”

- Imposed in Baylon v. Sison was this mandatory duty to conduct a

hearing despite the prosecution's refusal to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. (Joselito V. Narciso v.
Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000, 3rd
Div. [Panganiban])

Is a condition in an application for bail that accused be first arraigned before

he could be granted bail valid?

- In the first place x x x in cases where it is authorized, bail should be

granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded
from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and
the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment
of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the
presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and
ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as
arraignment. Under Rule 114, Sec. 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that “the accused shall appear
 before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these
Rules,” while under Rule 116, Sec. 1(b) the presence of the accused at
the arraignment is required.

- On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his

arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose
between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail
because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment
cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that
he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s constitutional right not to be
put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to
charge him with a crime and his right to bail. (Lavides v. CA, 324
SCRA 321, Feb. 1, 2000, 2nd Div. [Mendoza])

Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Judge Olalia

- The decision of the SC in Government of the USA v. Judge Purganan

which says that “no bail rule applies in extradition since bail is available
only to one who had arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws” was re-examined and, after re-examination, the rule now
is that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail during the pendency of
an extradition proceeding. However, for him to be allowed to post bail,
still he must prove that (1) once granted bail he will not be a flight risk or
a danger to the community; and (2) that there exists special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances that will justify the grant of
bail to him, by a clear and convincing evidence.

- The reason why the Purganan ruling was re-examined is because of the
modern trend in public international law where an individual person is
no longer considered a mere object of international law but rather as a
subject thereof, and the primacy given to human rights, among which is
the right to liberty.

- Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (3rd Div.), G.R. No. 213847,

August 18, 2015, En Banc (Bersamin) A close reading of the ruling of
the SC in this case allowing former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to post
bail although he was charged of plunder, a non-bailable offense, was
because of the Olalia ruling.

- In this case, former Senator Enrile was shown not to be a flight risk or a
danger to the community (his voluntary surrender to the authorities and
his record of respect for court processes in earlier cases), and that there
exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances (his advanced
age, fragile state of health and medical predicament that will require the
services of doctors of his choice) that will justify the grant of bail to him.
After all, the main purpose of bail is to assure the presence of an accused
during the trial of the case as required by the court.
- “Bail for the provisional liberty to the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to
his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling hid health and life would not serve the true objective of
preventive incarceration during the trial.

- “It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will

then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and
better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice.
This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but,
more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.

- “On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish
before a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had
is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to
provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances
decisive of the issue of bail x x x that the courts can already consider in
resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. The
Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the
People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the
same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.”

- Where the accused was originally charged with a capital offense but later
convicted of non-capital and which he appeals, bail cannot be granted as
a matter right (Obosa vs. CA, 266 SCRA 281).

- The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal

proceedings. The right is not available in extradition proceedings that
are not criminal in nature. In the absence of any provision in the
constitution, the law or the treaty, adopting the practice of not granting
bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from
coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.

Section 14- Rights of accused

1. Presumption of innocence- as against presumption of law.

2. The right to be heard

- The vagueness doctrine merely requires reasonable degree of certainty

for the law to be upheld- not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude ( Estrada vs. Desierto, November 19, 2001).

- Despite the allegation of minority of the victim, an accused appellant

may not be sentenced to death under RA 7659 due to the failure of the
information to allege relationship to the victim. It would be a denial of
 the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and,
consequently, a denial of due process (PP vs. Sandoval, 348 SCRA 476).

- A person subject of an extradition request from another sovereign State

is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not
criminal proceeding which will call into operations all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The extraditee’s right to
notice and hearing is present only when the petition for extradition is
filed in court- it is only then when he has the opportunity to meet the
evidence against him (Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377,
2000).

- Political offense doctrine: Ocampo vs. Abando, February 11, 2014- the
burden of demonstrating political motivation is adduced during trial
where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence.

3. Right to public trial

- A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies

that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the
available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe trial (Sec
of Justice vs. Estrada, June 29, 2001).

- RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF

THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO
GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., [A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC
]- The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom
that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private
complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right
itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be
allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom.
Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent
limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent,
open and public trial. Thus, the Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTS
PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by television and radio of
the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject
to the guidelines outlined therein.

- Barcelona vs. Lim, GR No. 189171, June 3, 2014- the right to speedy
trial maybe waived except when otherwise expressly provided by law.
One's right to speedy disposition of his case must, therefore, be asserted.
Due to the failure of the petitioner to assert his right, he is considered to
have waived it.

4. Right to face to face confrontation

- The absence of cross-examination by the defense due to the supervening

death of plaintiff/witness does not necessarily render the deceased’s
 testimony inadmissible. Where no fault can be attributed to
plaintiff/witness, it would be a harsh measure to strike out all that has
been obtained in the direct examination (PP vs. Narca, 275 SCRA 696).

Section 16- Speedy disposition

- Where the case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was pending for
preliminary investigation with the Office of the Tanodbayan for 3 years
and it is indicated that the case is of simple nature and was prosecuted
for political reasons, it is held that there was violation of the accused’s
right to speedy disposition of case. Right to speedy disposition extends to
preliminary investigations. (Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70).

- N. B. Recent decision of the Supreme Court on the Inordinate delay

Doctrine (Cagang case)- The Supreme Court interpreted the reckoning
period for the right to ‘speedy disposition of…cases’ under Article III,
Section 16, to start from the preliminary investigation of cases, and
not before the preliminary investigation and not from the fact-finding
stage,”

Section 17- Against Self-incrimination

- It bears emphasis, however, that under the above-quoted provisions,

what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion
of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance
emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in
prosecution for acts of lasciviousness (US v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145
[1912]) and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also
be used as evidence against him (US v. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735
[1917]). Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair
samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for
forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence
against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion
or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
under duress. (People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383, 399-401, Dec. 9,
1999, En Banc [Per Curiam])

Does the right against self-incrimination extend to administrative

proceedings?

- In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we

held that the right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal
prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which possess a
criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a
 licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which could result in
his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court,
citing the earlier case of Cabal v. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]),
pointed out that the revocation of one’s license as a medical practitioner,
is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property. (Secretary of
Justice v. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160, 184, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc [Melo])

May the Right against Self-incrimination be validly invoked during

Inquiries in Aid of Legislation?

- [I]t has been held that “a congressional committee’s right to inquire is

‘subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on
governmental action,’ including ‘the relevant limitations of the Bill of
Rights’.”

- One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is

the right against self-incrimination. (Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, 203 SCRA 767, Nov. 20, 1991, En Banc [Padilla])

What are the two types of immunity statutes? Which has broader scope of
protection?

- Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States,

there are two types of statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are
the transactional immunity and the use-and-derivative-use immunity.
Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. By its
grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever
arising out of the act or transaction. In contrast, by the grant of use-and-
derivative-use immunity, a witness is only assured that his or her
particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used
against him or her in a subsequent prosecution. (Mapa, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 783, 797-798, April 26, 1994, En Banc
[Puno])

Is the grant of immunity to an accused willing to testify for the government

a special privilege and, therefore, must be strictly construed against the
accused?

- [W]e reject respondent court’s ruling that the grant of section 5

immunity must be strictly construed against the petitioners. It
simplistically characterized the grant as a special privilege, as if it was
gifted by the government, ex gratia. In taking this posture, it misread the
raison d’ etre and the long pedigree of the right against self-incrimination
vis-à-vis immunity statutes.

- The days of inquisition brought about the most despicable abuses against
human rights. Not the least of these abuses is the expert use of coerced
confessions to send to the guillotine even the guiltless. To guard against
 the recurrence of this totalitarian method, the right against self-
incrimination was ensconced in the fundamental laws of all civilized
countries. Over the years, however, came the need to assist government
in its task of containing crime for peace and order is a necessary matrix
of public welfare. To accommodate the need, the right against self-
incrimination was stripped of its absoluteness. Immunity statutes in
varying shapes were enacted which would allow government to compel
a witness to testify despite his plea of the right against self-incrimination.
To insulate these statutes from the virus of unconstitutionality, a witness
is given what has come to be known as transactional or a use-derivative-
use immunity x x x. Quite clearly, these immunity statutes are not a
bonanza from government. Those given the privilege of immunity paid
a high price for it – the surrender of their precious right to be silent. Our
hierarchy of values demands that the right against self-incrimination and
the right to be silent should be accorded greater respect and protection.
Laws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent rights must
necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual.
The government has a right to solve crimes but it must do it, rightly.
(Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 783, 805-806, April 26, 1994,
En Banc [Puno])

- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, 541 SCRA

456- The right against self incrimination is extended in an
administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are
analogous to criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently been
held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and all cases in
which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a
party of not.

- The right against self-incrimination is defeated by the public nature of

documents sought to be accessed (Almonte vs. Vasquez).

- In the recent case of PEOPLE vs. YATAR, G.R. No. 150224, May 19,
2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility and probative value
of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). Citing the first ever Supreme Court
decision on the admissibility of DNA evidence, i.e., People v. Vallejo,
G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192, 209, the Court, in Yatar,
held that in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts
should consider, inter alia, the following factors: “how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests”

- In Yatar, in an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant

contended “that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA
tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as
his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of
the Constitution”.
- The Court rejected the argument. It held that “the kernel of the right is
not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion”, citing
Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. 69401, 23 June 1987, 151 SCRA 279. It held
that “the right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal
process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt”
and that “it does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is
not an incrimination but as part of object evidence”.

- Citing People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, 9 December 1999, 320

SCRA 383, the Court held that “although accused-appellant insisted that
hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National
Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may
be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature
acquired from the accused under duress.”

- Hence, according to the Court, “a person may be compelled to submit to

fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no
testimonial compulsion involved”. It cited People v. Gallarde, G.R. No.
133025, 27 February 2000, 325 SCRA 835, where immediately after the
incident, “the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the
presence of counsel”. In that case, the Court ruled that “there was no
violation of the right against self-incrimination”. It further stated that
“the accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to
determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused”.

Section 18 – Involuntary servitude: (Article 272 of the Revised

Penal Code)

Exceptions:
1. Punishment for a crime;
2. service in defense of the state
3. naval enlistment;
4. posse comitatus;
5. return to work order;
6. patriapotestas

Section 19- Death penalty

- The death penalty is not a cruel punishment. There was no total

abolition of the death penalty. The ConCom had deemed it proper for
Congress to determine its reimposition because of compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes. (PP v, Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682).
 Section 20- Non-imprisonment for Debt

- The civil liability from a crime is not “debt” within the purview of the
constitutional provision against imprisonment for non payment of
“debt”.

- Vergara vs. Gedorio, 402 SCRA 520- Debt, as used in the Constitution,
refers to a civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. Clearly,
the non payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee
against imprisonment.

Section 21- Double Jeopardy

The Two (2) Kinds of Double Jeopardy:

- Our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first
sentence of Clause 20, Section 1(now Sec. 21), Article III of the
Constitution ordains that “no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.” The second sentence of said clause
provides that “if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.” Thus, the first sentence prohibits double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense whereas, the second
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under
the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the
same act, provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the
offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the
crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the
offense charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a
violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of statute. If the two
charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under
either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other.
Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain
the plea of double jeopardy of punishment or the same offense. So long
as jeopardy has been attached under one of the informations charging
said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the
same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in
either case.

- Elsewhere stated, where the offense charged are penalized either by

different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the
important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged. The
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where
an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent
offenses charged. The question of identity or lack of identity of offenses
is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two
offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative
 definitions of the offenses involved. (People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191,
July 24, 1996)

- To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be

proven: (1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2)
the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or
is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.

- Legal jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused. (Cuison v. CA, 289
SCRA 159, April 15, 1998 [Panganiban])

- As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it

places the accused under double jeopardy (Re MR in Lejano vs. People,
GR No. 176389, January 18, 2011).

- The impeachment proceedings against petitioner Estrada was not

concluded as a series of events prompted the Senate to declare the
impeachment functus officio- thus, he was neither acquitted nor was the
impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express consent. Neither
was there conviction/ It follows then that the claim of double jeopardy
must fail. (Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001).

- Under Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, a provisional dismissal of

a case becomes permanent after the lapse of one year for offenses
punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six years or a lapse of two
years for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six years.

- For this rule to bar the subsequent filing of a similar case against the
accused, the following must be established: 1) the provisional dismissal
had express consent of the accused; 2) the provisional dismissal was
ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; 3) the 1 yr. or 2-
yr. period to revive had lapsed; 4) there is no justification to file a
subsequent case beyond the period of one or two years. (PP vs. Lacson,
May 28, 2002).

- The order approving the plea of guilty to homicide was not a judgment
of conviction. It merely approved the agreement between the parties on
the plea to a lesser offense by the accused and the condition attached to
it. (PP vs. Romero, 399 SCRA 386)

- Disini vs. DOJ Secretary- online libel as to which charging the

offender under both section 4(c) of RA 10175 and Article 353 of RPC
is unconstitutional because it constitutes a violation of the
 proscription against double jeopardy. Same with charging the offender
under section 4(c)(2) of RA 10175 and RA 9775 (Anti Child
Pornography constitute double jeopardy.

- Braza vs. Sandiganbayan, February 20, 2013- there is double jeopardy if

the subsequent information charges the accused with different offense,
even if it arises from the same act or set of acts. Prosecution for the same
act is not proscribed; what is forbidden is prosecution for the same
offense.

Section 22- Ex post facto law/bill of attainder

What is a bill of attainder? Is P.D. 1866 a bill of attainder?

- [T]he Court, in People v. Ferrer, defined a bill of attainder as a

legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a
particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder
are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the
imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial
trial. This last element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding
of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the
most essential. P.D. No. 1866 does not possess the elements of a bill of
attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial.
Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a
corresponding punishment. What the decree does is to define the
offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the
qualifying circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There is no
encroachment on the power of the court to determine after due hearing
whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
offense of illegal possession of firearms has been committed and that the
qualifying circumstances attached to it has been established also beyond
reasonable doubt as the Constitution and judicial precedents require.
(Misolas v. Panga, 181 SCRA 648, 659-660, Jan. 30, 1990, En Banc
[Cortes])

What is an ex post facto law? Is R.A. No. 8249 an ex post facto law?

- Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.

R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction
which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide
for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law,
but clearly a procedural statute, i.e., one which prescribes rules of
procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
 administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of
R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

- Petitioner’s and intervenors’ contention that their right to a two-tiered

appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the
enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already
been rejected by the court several times considering that the right to
appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated
by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of
appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A.
8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an
amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law.
It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the
mode of trial. It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.

- At any rate, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused’s right to appeal to the
Supreme Court to review questions of law. On the removal of the
intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of
review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been
convincingly overcome. (Panfilo M. Lacson v. The Executive Secretary,
et. al., G.R. No. 128096, Jan. 20, 1999 [Martinez])

- RA 8249, an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan, is not penal law but a substantive law on jurisdiction
whose retroactive application is constitutional (Lacson vs. Exec.
Secretary, 301 SCRA 298).

- Nasi-Villar vs. People, 571 SCRA 202- A law can never be considered
ex-post facto law as long as it operates prospectively since its stricture
would cover only offenses committed after and not before its enactment.

- The prohibition of ex post facto laws and bill of attainder applies to court
doctrines pursuant to the maxim “legisinterpretatiolegis vim obtinet”-
the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law ( PP vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 602).

- The law making the use of an unlicensed firearm a qualifying

circumstance in murder cannot apply retroactively. (PP vs. Patoc, 398
SCRA 62).

- Re DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against accused being

unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto was tantamount to the
application of an ex-post facto law- Describing the argument as specious,
the Supreme Court held “no ex-post facto law was involved in the case
at bar”. It added that “the science of DNA typing involved the
admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the
Rules of Court”. Whereas, “an ex-post facto law referred primarily to a
question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the
probative weight of the evidence presented”. (PP vs. Yatar, May 19,
2004)