1.

People vs Pomar
46 Phil 440, November 3, 1924

FACTS: Julio Pomar, manager and person in charge of a tobacco company La Flor de la Isabela,
employed Macaria Fajardo as cigar-maker and granted her vacation leave, by reason of her
pregnancy. A case was filed against the defendant on the ground of failure to pay Fajardo her
regular wages of eighty pesos corresponding to thirty days before and after her delivery, in
accordance with Act No. 3071. The lower court found him guilty of the offense. The defendant
demurred alleging that the facts therein contained did not constitute an offense.

ISSUE: Whether or the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 are reasonable and lawful
exercise of police power of the state.

HELD: Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional. Such Act violates the right to enter into a lawful contract,
which is one of the liberties of the State. As a right, it should not be interfered with as it
constitutes imprisonment under the Constitution. While it is contended that such Act is within
the police power of the State, such cannot be exercised in contradiction with the Constitution.
Anyone cannot be compelled to provide employment to another nor can anyone be employed
against his will.

2. US vs Serapio
G.R. No. 7557, December 7, 1912

FACTS: On December 1907, the accused wrote, published and sent by mail anonymous
communications in the municipality of Santa Maria, province of Bulacan, addressed to the
Executive Secretary, attacking, reviling, and exposing to public hatred and scorn the good name,
virtue and reputation of Bonifacio Morales. The defendant alleged that the facts in the complaint
do not constitute a crime and if there were a crime, it would have been prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of the Penal Code with respect to prescription of crimes is
applicable to the crimes punishable by special laws.

HELD: The provision of the Penal code in the matter of prescription of crimes is not applicable to
the crimes created and punished by special laws promulgated by the Philippine Commission or
the Philippine Legislature. For purposes of criminal law, a special law is one which is not
amendatory of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code but which defines and punishes offenses
not covered by the latter.

3. Lacson vs. Sandiganbayan, Executive Secretary, et al.

G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999

FACTS: Panfilo Lacson was among the implicated police authorities for multiple murder of alleged
members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. The case was presented before the Sandiganbayan. All
the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan asserting
that the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Among other issues, the
accused assailed that multiple murder falls under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which
requires that the offense charged, whether simple or complex offenses or felonies, must be
committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have
jurisdiction over the case. Hence, a petition for the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection of Lacson, et. al was violated because of the
enactment of R.A. 8249

HELD: The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal protection. No
concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act
of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department as unconstitutional. For failure to show in the amended informations that the charge
of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP
officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.

4. People vs Quijada
G.R. Nos. 115008-09, July 24, 1996

FACTS: On December 25, 1992, a benefit dance was held in Dauis, Bohol where a fist fight
occurred between Diosdado Iroy and appellant Daniel Quijada as the latter was continuously
pestering Iroy’s sister. On December 30 of the same year, same event took place. Iroy’s sister
witnessed that Quijada fired his .38 caliber at her brother, which resulted to the death of the
latter. Said event was reported to the police station, and search operations followed but the
appellant was unable to locate. It was found out that the firearm used by the appellant was not
licensed. He was convicted by the lower court of two separate offenses of murder and aggravated
illegal possession of firearm.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be convicted separately of two crimes.

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court finding the accused guilty of
the crime of murder and of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form. The unequivocal
intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 is to respect and preserve homicide
or murder as a distinct offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code and to increase the
penalty for illegal possession of firearm where such a firearm is used in killing a person.

5. Magno vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992
FACTS: Oriel Magno lacked funds in putting up a car repair shop. He approached Corazon Teng of
Mancor Industries, who referred him to LS Finance and Management Corporation. A deal was
made between said parties in a condition that Magno would deposit 30% as warranty. Unable to
produce the amount, Teng advanced for the deposit in consideration of a 3% interest. Magno
and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement. Due to failure to pay rentals, the LS pulled out
the equipment. Four of the six postdated checks issued by the petitioner bounced. He was
convicted by the lower court of violation of B.P. No. 22. The Court of Appeals affirmed this
decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Magno is guilty of violating B.P. 22 and whether or not post-dated checks
were issued to apply on account or for values as required under Section 1 of B.P. 22.

HELD: The Supreme Court acquitted Magno of violation of Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22 when he
acted without malice. The wrongdoer is not Magno but the lessor who deposited the checks. He
should have returned the checks to Magno when he pulled out the equipment. To convict the
accused would defeat the noble objective of the law and the law would be tainted with
materialism and opportunism.

6. Cruz vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 108738, June 17, 1994

FACTS: Andrea Mayor is a businesswoman engaged in granting interest-bearing loans and

rediscounting checks, while Roberto Cruz was engaged in selling ready-to-wear clothes at the
Pasay Commercial Center. The latter was a frequent borrower from the former. On March 15,
1989, Cruz borrowed from Mayor P176,000, which was personally delivered to him on April 6,
1989 in said establishment. Cruz, for his part, issued a Premiere bank postdated check April 20,
1989 for the same amount. When the check matured, Mayor presented it to the bank but was
dishonored by reason of “account closed”. Upon notification of the dishonor, the petitioner
promised to pay his obligation in cash, but no payment was made. Thus, violation of B.P. 22 was
filed against the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether Cruz violates B.P. 22 even on the ground that the check was issued to serve a
mere evidence of indebtedness and not for circulation or negotiation.

HELD: A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for payment,
has the same effect of an ordinary check, hence, falls within the ambit of B.P. 22. It is presumed
that the drawee bank generally accepts the check regardless of its purpose. However, issuance
of a bouncing check is punishable by law and it is therefore classified as malum prohibitum.

7. Dela Torre vs Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996
FACTS: Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti,
Laguna in 1995 elections under the Local Government Code of 1991, due to his conviction for
violating Section 40 of the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioner asserted that said law does not apply to
him because he was granted probation by the Metropolitan Trial Court, which suspended the
execution of the judgment of conviction. An instant petition for certiorari was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude and whether or not a grant
of probation affects Section 40’s applicability.

HELD: It was established that actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property received
is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that
which animated the robbery or theft which, by their nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. On
the second issue, suffice it to say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the
execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing which are declared as a crime of
moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40, subsists
and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.

8. Loney vs. People

G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006

FACTS: Petitioners worked for Marcopper Mining Corporation engaged in mining in the province
of Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing mine tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque. These mine tailings passed through a drainage tunnel and were discharged
into nearby rivers, thus causing pollution. The lower court charged Marcopper with violation of
three special laws and reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. They appealed to
Court of Appeals but failed.

ISSUE: Are crimes mala in se absorbed in crimes mala prohibita?

HELD: No. Crimes mala in se are not absorbed in crimes mala prohibita.

Distinctions of mala inse (MI) vs mala prohibita (MP):

*my mnemonics are PEGVIMC*

1. AS TO PERFORMANCE

MI-taken into consideration

MP- not taken into consideration

2. AS TO EXECUTION
MI-taken into consideration

MP-not taken into consideration

3. AS TO GOOD FAITH

MI-it is a valid defense

MP-not a valid defense

4. AS TO VIOLATION

MI-it is a violation of the RPC

MP-it is a violation of the special laws

5. AS TO INTENT

MI-intent is material

MP-intent is not material

6. AS TO MORAL

MI- involves moral turpitude

MP- does not involve moral tupitude

7. AS TO CIRCUMSTANCES

MI- taken into consideration

MP-not taken into consideration

7. People vs Astorga
G.R. No. 110097, December 22, 1997

FACTS: On December 29, 1991, the accused, with deliberate intent, kidnapped an 8-year old by
means of force. He was charged by the lower court with violation of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code or the kidnap and detention of a minor. He appealed the court’s decision, contending
that there was no motive to kidnap the 8-year old. Likewise, he did not detain nor lock up the
minor, which is one essential element in kidnapping.
ISSUES: Whether or not the absence of motive is necessary for the court’s decision

It has been held that motive is not an element of the crime. It is totally irrelevant when ample
direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the
identity of appellant is not in question. He himself admitted having taken Traya to Maco
Elementary School.

8. People vs Nuñez
G.R. No. 112092, March 1, 2001

FACTS: On March 6, 1992, appellant fired upon four persons while they were passing at the gate
of his family’s compound, which resulted to the death of one person. He was charged by the trial
court with homicide, two counts of frustrated homicide and illegal possession of firearms, but
was only sentenced of illegal possession of firearm.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant should be convicted only for the crime of illegal possession.

HELD: In accordance with Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294, if homicide or murder is committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as
an aggravating circumstance. Hence, appellant should only be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms. The decision of the trial court was affirmed.

9. People vs Ladjaalam
G.R. Nos. 136149-51, September 19, 2000

FACTS: On about September 24, 1997 in Zamboanga City, Ladjaalam together with his wife and
Ahmad Sailabbi maintained a house as drug den. When the policemen were about to enter their
house to serve search warrant, the appellant fired at them using an M14 rifle. The trial court
charged the appellant with direct assault with multiple counts of attempted homicide and a
separate offense of illegal possession of firearms.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused could be separately convicted of illegal possession of firearms
and direct assault with multiple attempted murder.

HELD: The appellant was found guilty only of two offenses: 1) direct assault and multiple
attempted homicide with the use of a weapon and 2) maintaining a drug den. He can be convicted
of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that “no other crime was committed by the
person arrested.” The law is clear that if the “other crime” is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes
merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed
in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.

10. People vs Macatanda

G.R. No. L-51368, November 6, 1981

FACTS: On 25 December 1976, complainant left his two carabaos near his house in Sapad, Lanao
del Norte. The following day he found out that they were missing and were in the po ssession of
four persons including appellant Macatanda. Macatanda was convicted by the lower court of the
crime of Cattle Rustling penalized. The accused contended that his lack of instruction and
education and his being a Moslem as part of a cultural minority sufficed to mitigate his liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the articles from the Revised Penal Code could be applied to special laws.

HELD: While the P.D. No. 533 falls under the special law, it was held that a statute punishing an
act which is also a crime under the Revised Penal Code provides a penalty as prescribed in the
said code, such statute is not a special law but an amendment by implication.

The Supreme Court affirmed that courts may and should, even in cases of theft and robbery, take
into consideration the lack of instruction and education of the offender, and that P.D. 533, being
a special law, is not entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. The intent
seems clear that such PD shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with
respect to the offense of theft of large cattle.

11. People vs Ferrer (48 S 382)

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, 27 December 1972

FACTS: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-
Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. On 10 March 1970, a prima facie case was filed
against Feliciano Co for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act. He was accused of being
an officer or a ranked leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Co moved to quash on
the ground that said Act is a bill of attainder. On 25 May 1970, same case was filed in the same
court against the alleged leaders of the New People’s Army Nilo Tayag and five others, which case
was moved to quash on the same reason stated by Co. The lower court declared the statute void
on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder. The government appealed it to the Supreme Court as
a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder

HELD: The Supreme Court held the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act. A bill of attainder is solely
a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial
determination to a legislative determination of guilt.

12. People vs Carillo

G.R. No. L-2043, February 28, 1950
FACTS: On June 4, 1947 between 8 and 9pm in Manila, Emma and Marcelino were held up and
robbed of their personal belongings by Carillo and Raquenio. After robbing, Carillo attempted to
rape Emma in a secluded place and shot her to death, while Marcelino was able to escape. Both
robbers were apprehended and investigated on the crime of robbery with homicide. Carillo was
sentenced by the lower court for the crime of robbery with homicide without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, while Raquenio for the crime of robbery without any mitigating
aggravating circumstance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in not considering the aggravating circumstances which
facilitated the commission of the offense.

HELD: The SC held that the trial court erred in not considering the aggravating circumstances: 1)
recidivism, said appellant was convicted twice of robbery; 2) nocturnity; and 3) abuse of superior
strength, considering his sex and the weapon used. That said, the sentence of the trial court was
modified, imposing the penalty of death upon said appellant.

13. Que vs People

154 S 160, September 21, 1987

FACTS: The petitioner deliberately issued checks to cover accounts, but the checks were
dishonored upon presentment. He was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of violating Batasang
Pambansa Blg. 22 on two counts, which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
petitioner contented that he issued the checks in question merely to guarantee the payment of
the purchases by Powerhouse Supply Inc., of which he is the manager. He then filed a motion for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether dishonored checks issued merely to guarantee payment constitute violation of
B.P. Blg. 22.

HELD: It is now settled that BP Blg. 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued
merely in form of deposit or a guarantee. The enactment does not make any distinction as to
whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to
guarantee said obligation. Under the new Circular, a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is covered by BP 22. However, consistent with the principle of
prospectivity, the new doctrine should not apply to parties who had relied on the old Circular and
acted on the faith thereof.

14. Himagan vs People

237 S 538
FACTS: Petitioner, a Davao City policeman, was charged for the murder of Benjamin and for the
attempted murder of Bernabe. In accordance with Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which provides suspension
from office until the case is terminated to police officers who committed grave felonies, he was
suspended. He filed a motion to lift said suspension pursuant to the Civil Service Decree, limiting
suspension to 90 days. He asserted that suspension of over 90 days contradicts his constitutional
right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 47 of RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the
Constitution.

HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. It gives no meaning than the suspension from office of the member of the PNP
charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the
termination of the case. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the
other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the
rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of
the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought
out in the legislative discussions. Hence, the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days
under such Act does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.

15. Bayot vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. L-61776 to L-61861, March 23, 1984

FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with estafa thru falsification of public
documents. He was elected mayor of Amadeo, Cavite in January 1980. On May 30, 1980, the
Sandiganbayan convicted him of said crime. He was suspended upon the passage of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195 as amendment to section 13 of republic act no. 3019, suspending any
incumbent officer from office involved in fraud of public funds. On motion for reconsideration,
he argued that B.P. 195 violates constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post facto
law.

ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. 195 violates constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post
facto law.

HELD: Pursuant to Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code, suspension from public office during the
trial shall not be considered as penalty. Thus, suspension of petitioner from office does not
violate the constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post facto law.

Tavera vs Valdez
1 P 468

FACTS:
In the case of Tavera vs. Valdez (1 Phil. Rep., 468) we decided, in discussing article 22, that said
article has no application where the later law is expressly made inapplicable to pending actions
or existing causes of action. In said Act No. 2126 there was no provision made for the
continuance in force of the former law (Act No. 1189) as to pending actions or existing causes
of action. In other words, Act No. 2126 took effect upon its passage and was applicable,
certainly to all cases arising after the date of its enactment.

In the case of United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil. Rep., 241) this court expressly reserved its opinion
as to whether article 22 of the Penal Code was applicable to Acts of the Philippine Commission
or Legislature so as to require the imposition of the penalty provided in the repealing Act in
case such penalty should be more favorable to the accused than that prescribed in the former
Act. The Act of the Commission involved in this case was less favorable to the accused than the
Act which it repealed.

That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict therewith, and
that the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title
X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects of calumny and insults, must have been
particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia
Valdez ([1902], 1. Phil., 468), the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as " reforming the
preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injuria." Recently, specific attention was
given to the effect of the Libel Law on the provisions of the Penal Code, dealing with calumny and
insults, and it was found that those provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and
insults in which the elements of writing an publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law.
(People vs. Castro [1922], p. 842, ante.)

DE JOYA vs. THE JAIL WARDEN OF BATANGAS CITY

G.R. Nos. 159418-19, December 10, 2003

FACTS: The petitioner issued postdated checks separately to Flor and Resurreccion
despite the fact that she did not have funds with the Solid Bank. The checks were
dishonored upon presentment. She was charged separately with two counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Municipa l Trial Court in Batangas
City. Despite her conviction, the petitioner remained at large until her arrest five
years later. Prior to her arrest, the trial court issued the Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000, which established a rule of preference in the application of the penal
provisions of BP 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender
clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition
of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. De Joya filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court after her urgent motion with the
Municipal Trial Court was denied, asking it to apply the said administrative circular retroactively
pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Admin. Circular No. 12-2000, as modified by SC Admin Circular No.
13-2001, removed the penalty of imprisonment for violation of BP Blg. 22.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law,
hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those
cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by
final judgment. Such circular merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the
penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative
intent behind the law. The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is
not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in
the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

Facts:
The petitioner was charged and convicted separately with violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
before the Municipal TrialCourt in Batangas City. Despite conviction in the two separate criminal
cases filed against her, petitioner remained at large.In the meantime, the Court issued Supreme
Court Admin. Circular No. 12-2000. After five years, the petitioner was finallyarrested while
applying for an NBI clearance. She was forthwith detained at the Batangas City Jail. She filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court after her urgent motion with the
Municipal Trial Court was denied, asking it to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively
pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

Arguments:
Petitioner: Her detention was illegal. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 deleted the penalty of
imprisonment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and allows only the imposition of a fine. The trial court
was mandated to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000retroactively conformably with Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code.Respondent: The two (2) judgments of conviction against the
petitioner had long attained finality and could no longer bemodified. The SC Admin. Circular No.
12-2000 as modified Admin. Circular No. 13-2000 did not delete the penalty of imprisonment in
BP 22 cases.
Issue:
WON Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by Admin. No 13-2001 deleted the penalty of
imprisonment for violation of BP Blg. 22
Held:
No. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law, hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its
effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment. The clear tenor and intention
of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternativepenalty,
but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg.
22.Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application
of the penal provisions of B.P.Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and
the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistakeof fact without taint of negligence, the
imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.Needless to
say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone
rests solely upon the Judge

People vs Genosa
G.R. No. 135981, September 29, 2000

FACTS: On 15 November 1996 in Isabel, Leyte, appellant attacked and wounded his husband with
the use of a hard deadly weapon, which ultimately led to his death. The trial court found the
appellant guilty of the crime of parricide with treachery as aggravating circumstance. Marivic
presented an Urgent Omnibus Motion, praying for her examination by expert psychologists and
psychiatrist and the reception of latter's reports to prove her claim of self-defense on the theory
of a battered woman syndrome. The Supreme Court partly granted the motion to seek the aid of
specialists, who proved that appellant was suffering from such syndrome.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant acted in self-defense on the theory of a battered woman
syndrome.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-
defense arising from battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence
must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and
her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm
from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life.
Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable--not necessarily
immediate and actual--grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated
by the former against the latter.

People v. Genosa

G.R. No. 135981, 29 September 2000

FACTS:

Marivic Genosa was convicted of Parricide for killing his legitimate husband Ben Genosa
and with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, she was meted the penalty of death. The
case was elevated to the SC for automatic review.

Appellant subsequently filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for her examination by
expert psychologists and psychiatrist and the reception of latter's reports to prove her claim of
self-defense on the theory of battered woman syndrome.
 The SC remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of expert
psychological/psychiatric opinion on the plea of battered woman syndrome.

Marivic Genosa was examined by Dra. Natividad A. Dayan, a clinical psychologist, who
testified that Marivic "fits the profile of a battered woman" and by Dr. Alfredo Parajillo, a
psychiatrist, who "explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relieves the beating or trauma
as if it were real, although she is not actually beaten at that time" and that at the time Marivic
killed her husband, her "mental condition was that she was "re-experiencing the trauma.' That
the "re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes x x x."

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.

2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

HELD:

1) The SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising
from battered woman syndrome, to wit:

a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least
two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.

b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in
the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest
belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life.

c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable--not necessarily immediate
and actual--grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the
former against the latter.

2) The SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or

argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant's
aggression.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995, attacked and wounded his
husband, which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant she did not provoke her
husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. The
Appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure
she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal
Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born
prematurely on December 1, 1995.

The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five
(5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The Apellant said that
the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy
about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.

The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from
Battered Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found
guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked
while asleep.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be held
liable for the aggravating circumstance of treachery?

No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant
has been shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of
the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-
defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient
time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She
had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's
bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even
the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression does
not warrant complete or incomplete self-defense.

No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that
the offended party might make.

The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced
from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel,
treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said
to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.

In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally chose
a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any
retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun
occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the
absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by
which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the doubt should be resolved in
her favor.

HELD:

The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there
being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her
commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

ADDENDUM:

When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be appreciated?

Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical
assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a
predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before
she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.' Still,
impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to
the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can
satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of
BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.

Ang Beng, et al. vs The Commissioner of Immigration

G.R. No. L-9621, January 30, 1957

FACTS: The petitioners, Chinese nationals, were convicted by the Court of First
Instance of Manila (CFI) for violation of the Import Control Law (Republic Act No.
650), and were charged before the Deportation Board. Pending their appeal in the
Court of Appeals, said law expired, thus dismissing the case. The Deportation
Board presented its findings on said case to the President, which the latter
recommended petitioner’s deportation. On March 1, 1995, the petitioners filed
with the CFI a petition for prohibition and certiorari, praying that the President’s
order of deportation be declared illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s order of deportation be set aside on the
ground that the Import Control Law, of which the petitioners’ crime was based,
had already expired.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that while the power to deport is lodged in the
President of the Philippines, there is no law upholding the proposition that the
expiration of the Import Control Law deletes the conviction of the petitioners. The
benefit of retroactivity and liberal construction accrues when penal laws are
repealed. In the case at bar, there is no subsequent repealing law because the
law violated expired in virtue of its own force. Hence, the decision of the lower
court was affirmed.

Eustaquio Lagrimas vs The Director of Prisons

G.R. No. 38046, September 24, 1932

FACTS: The petitioner was charged and sentenced by the Court of First Instance
of Samar for the crime of assault for slapping and using offensive language to a
public school teacher in Laoang, Samar, pursuant to article 251 of the old Penal
Code. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner prayed the application of
Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes a lesser penalty for said
crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, who was sentenced by virtue of a provision
of the former Penal Code, may be set at liberty on the ground that the Revised
Penal Code provides no penalty for the crime committed under the former Code.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that in pursuant to Article 366 of the Revised
Penal Code: “Without prejudice to the provisions in Article 22 of this Code,
felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this
Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time
of their commission.” The intention of the Legislature in embodying this provision
in the Revised Penal Code was to insure that the elimination from this Code of
certain crimes penalized by former acts before the enforcement of this Code
should not have the effect of pardoning guilty persons who were serving their
sentences for the commission of such crimes.

People of the Philippines vs Romeo Barros

G.R. Nos. 101107-08, June 27, 1995

FACTS: The accused was the first councilman of Tubao, La Union. He had the intent to
exterminate the Vice-Mayor of Tubao. On May 14, 1984, he proceeded twice on the same day to
the Vice-Mayor’s house and fired his unlicensed .38 caliber to challenge the latter to come out,
while shouting invectives against the vice-mayor. On the first three shots towards said residence,
Barros was dissuaded by Gonzales who had foreknowledge of his intent. On the second three
shots, the accused hit the Vice-Mayor’s son which resulted to his death while on the way to the
hospital. The trial court separately charged Barros with murder and illegal possession of firearm.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be convicted of two separate offenses.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled, in light of the dissenting opinion of Justice Regalado, that the
accused cannot be convicted of two separate offenses, but only of that of illegal possession of
firearm in its aggravated form under Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866. Dividing the single offense
into two would be an invalid act of treating the original offense as a single integrated crime,
because the creation of another offense would just be an element of the former.

The consequential murder or homicide is an integral component since without the accompanying
death, the crime would merely be simple illegal possession of firearm.

The United States vs El Chino Cuna

G.R. No. 4504, December 15, 1908

FACTS: On June 30, 1907, Chinaman Cuna sold a small quantity of opium to a
Filipino woman in Echague, Isabela, and was charged by the Court of First
Instance of Isabela with the violation of Act No. 1461 or the Opium Law. During
the pendency of the case, said Act was repealed by Act No. 1761. Cuna
contended that he must not be penalized for the offense due to the repeal. The
lower court dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty for violation of the Opium Law, which was
repealed by Act No. 1461 during the pendency of the case, should be
extinguished.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that a repealed penal statute loses none of its
force and effect as a law defining and penalizing certain acts committed prior to
its repeal, and the courts may and should find in the repealed statute the rule
whereby to determine whether penalties have been incurred thereunder, and
the nature and extent of such penalties as may have been incurred. Thus, the
judgment of the lower court was reversed.

this court expressly reserved its opinion as to whether article 22 of the Penal Code was
applicable to Acts of the Philippine Commission or Legislature so as to require the imposition of
the penalty provided in the repealing Act in case such penalty should be more favorable to the
accused than that prescribed in the former Act. The Act of the Commission involved in this case
was less favorable to the accused than the Act which it repealed.

The People of the Philippine Islands vs Crisanto Tamayo

G.R. No. 41423, March 19, 1935

FACTS: Appellant was convicted in the justice of the peace court of Magsingal,
Ilocos Sur of a violation of section 2, of its municipal ordinance. Upon appeal to
the Court of First Instance of said province, conviction resulted. While the
appeal was pending, the municipal council repealed section 2 as approved by
the provincial board, and the act complained of became legal in the municipality.
Appellant moved for a dismissal of the action against him on account of said
repeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case filed against appellant should be dismissed on
the ground of an absolute repeal of the act for which he was complained of.

HELD: It was held that repeal was absolute, and not a reenactment and repeal
by implication. Nor there was any saving clause. The legislative intent as shown
by the action of the municipal council is that such conduct, formerly denounced,
is no longer deemed criminal, and it would be illogical for this court to attempt to
sentence appellant for an offense that no longer exists.

Liang vs People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 125865, March 26, 2001

FACTS: Petitioner, employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank

(ADB), was charged by an ADB staff with grave oral defamation. On April 13,
1994, he was charged with slander by the Metropolitan trial court (MTC), but
was dismissed in pursuant to the advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs
that petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes. On a petition for
certiorari and mandamus, the Regional Trial Court annulled the decision of the
MTC. Petitioner filed a petition for review.

ISSUES: Whether or not the accused can be sued in this jurisdiction.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the immunity granted to officers and staff
of the ADB is not absolute, and it is limited to acts performed in an official
capacity. The immunity cannot cover the commission of a crime such as slander
or oral defamation in the name of official duty. Likewise, the slander of a person,
by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the
immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. Slander cannot be considered
as an act performed in an official capacity.

Schneckenburger vs Moran
G.R. No. 44896, July 31, 1936

FACTS: Schneckenburger, who was an honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila,

was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila (CFI) with the
crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to this on the ground
that under the US and Philippine Constitution, the CFI had no jurisdiction to try
him, but said objection was overruled. He filed a petition for a writ of prohibition
to prevent the CFI from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against
him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try
the accused.
Whether or not the original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
consuls, et al., is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the
Philippines.

HELD: A consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador

or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he
is accredited. Moreover, “The Supreme Court shall have original and appellate
jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.” According to Sec. 17
of Act No. 136 and by virtue of it, jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto,
certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus was also conferred on the
CFI’s. As a result, the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the
Supreme Court of the Philippines at the time the Constitution was adopted was
not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the CFI’s. The original jurisdiction
conferred to SC by the Constitution was not an exclusive jurisdiction.

Raquiza vs Bradford
G.R. No. L-44, September 13, 1945

FACTS: The petitioners were detained for espionage activity for Japanese,
active collaboration with the enemy, and active collaboration with the Japanese.
This was in pursuance of the proclamation of the Commander in Chief of the
United States Army. On August 30, 1945, they filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, because they were being “confined, restrained and deprived” of their
liberty in the Correctional Institution for Women. They prayed that officers
Bradford and Twindle of US Army appear before the Court to produce the
bodies of petitioners and to explain why they were not set at liberty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine Court could take cognizance of the case.

HELD: The power of the Commander in Chief of the United States Army to issue
the foregoing proclamation cannot be seriously questioned. In the case of the
United States Army of liberation, not only has the Commonwealth Government
asked, and the United States Government agreed, that it come and be stationed
in the Philippines, but it is here for the very realization of the overruling and
vehement desire of the Filipino to be freed from Japanese tyranny. In the case at
bar, the Philippine court took no side of the issue since the purpose of the US
Army was to liberate the country. The petition was dismissed.

Tavera vs Valdez
G.R. No. 922, November 8, 1902

FACTS: The defendant was charged with the crime of injurias graves under
Articles 457 and 458 of the Penal Code for publishing in the “Miau” injurious
matters against the complainant. He charged the private prosecutor, who had
been then recently appointed a member of the United States Philippine
Commission, with having displayed cowardice at the time of the murder of his
mother and sister, and with having subsequently entered into intimate political
relations with the assassin.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be punished under the law existing
during the commission of the act or under the new law which is more favorable
to the accused.

HELD: Section 13 of Act No. 277 of the United States Philippine Commission
defining the law of libel provides: “All laws and parts of laws now in force, so far
as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed: Provided, That
nothing herein contained shall operate as a repeal of existing laws in so far as
they are applicable to pending actions or existing causes of action, but as to such
causes of action or pending actions existing laws shall remain in full force and
effect.” Although the penal code in art. 22 provides that Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a crime of
misdemeanor,” etc., still, the Proviso in the new law is clear.

The United States vs William Fowler, et al.

G.R. No. 496, December 31, 1902

FACTS: On August 12, 1901, two defendants were accused of the theft of sixteen
bottles of champagne found in the cargo while on board the transport Lawton.
The accused requested for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the
crime was committed on the high seas, and not in Manila or upon the seas within
the 3-mile limit to which the jurisdiction of the court extends. This was opposed
by the prosecuting attorney, alleging that the court has original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases in which the penalty exceeds six month’s imprisonment or a fine
of over $100. The judge ruled in favor of the accused, to which the prosecuting
attorney appealed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine Courts of Justice has jurisdiction over
criminal cases committed on the high seas.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in accordance with the Act No.136 of the
organic law, as well as Act No. 186 passed by the Civil Commission, and which
repealed the former law, Act No. 76, do not expressly confer jurisdiction or
authority upon this court to take cognizance of all crimes committed on board
vessels on the high seas. While the provisions of the law are clear and precise
with respect to civil admiralty or maritime cases, this is not true with respect to
criminal cases. The transport Lawton not being a registered or licensed vessel
in the Philippine Islands, our courts are without jurisdiction to take cognizance
of a crime committed on board the same.

Llamoso vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 63408 and 64026, August 7, 1985

FACTS: Petitioners worked for the district engineer’s office, which undertook
the repair of drainage canals and sidewalks at Sta. Rosa Street, E. Villanueva.
On March 10, 1981, Cagais complained that he had not been paid his wages of
P130 for ten working days due to failure to include him in the payroll. To resolve
the issue, Jumamoy listed Aninipo as substitute for Cagais with Guigue’s
approval for the period of March 16-31, 1981. The anomaly was discovered
when the paymaster as the sole prosecution witness gave P130 to Aninipo, but
Aninipo demanded a P156 for his actual work, to which the paymaster refused.
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioners as conspirators in the crime of
falsification of public documents. The accused appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are criminally liable for the crime of
falsification of public documents.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the accused are not criminally liable
because they had no criminal intent. Making no concealment or evasion, they
admitted that there was a false entry and they acted in good. They may be
disciplined administratively for the irregularity but their inclusion of Aninipo in
the payroll is outside the pale of criminal law. The inclusion of Aninipo was for
Cagais to receive his compensation which he needed very badly.

People vs William Montinola

G.R. Nos. 131856-57

FACTS: On November 18, 1996, the accused armed with unlicensed .380 caliber
pistol, while boarded on a passenger jeepney, took the money of a passenger
and shot him to death. He was charged separately by the trial court with robbery
with homicide and illegal possession of firearm. He appealed to the Court of
Appeals, contending that the use of an unlicensed firearm in the crime of murder
or homicide should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance and not as a
separate offense pursuant to R.A. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearm as punishable by death penalty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused could be prosecuted for the separate crimes
of robbery with homicide and illegal possession of firearms.
HELD: Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, use of an unlicensed firearm is a special
aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. Even assuming
that the aggravating circumstances present in the commission of homicide or
murder may be counted in the determination of the penalty for robbery with
homicide, in the case at bar, the special aggravating circumstance of use of an
unlicensed firearm cannot be appreciated. Such law was not yet enacted when
the crime was committed by the accused, it cannot, therefore, be given
retroactive effect for being unfavorable to him.

People vs Uy Jui Pio

G.R. No. L-11489, December 23, 1957

FACTS: The appellant was charged in the municipal court of Manila with a
violation of Commonwealth Act No. 142 for adopting the name “Juanito Uy”
when he was already named Uy Jui Pio in his country. He admitted that he had
known since childhood by the name of Uy Jui Pio alias Juanito Uy, even the
records of the Bureau of Immigration from 1946 would also bear such name. He
appealed to the Court of First Instance but failed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant violated Commonwealth Act No. 42.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in accordance with Commonwealth Act No.
42, the appellant had the right to use the name “Juanito Uy” because he has
since childhood been known by that name. Such Act as a penal statute should
be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.

Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

FACTS: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo, when they were confiscated by the police for
violation of Executive Order No. 626, which prohibits the interprovincial
movement of carabaos. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos and declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order as
raised by the petitioner, which was subsequently upheld by the Intermediate
Appellate Court. The petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the due process was violated.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that due process was violated because the
owner of the property confiscated was denied the right to be heard in his
defense and was immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, E.O. No. 626-A was declared
unconstitutional.

People vs Jalosjos
G.R. Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

FACTS: Romeo Jalosjos, a full-fledged re-elected member of Congress, was

convicted with statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six
counts. He filed a motion to be allowed to discharge his duties as a
congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his conviction. He argued that on several occasions the
Regional Trial Court allowed him to temporarily leave his cell for official or
medical reasons. The lower court denied his petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection of the accused was violated
despite the fact that he is a member of the Congress.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that election to the position of Congressman is
not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply
to all those belonging to the same class. Hence, the instant motion was denied.

Dunlao vs The Honorable Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 111343, August 22, 1996

FACTS: On about October 25, 1986, the accused purchased and received
dismantled farrowing crates made of GI pipes worth P20,000, which were stolen
from Lourdes Farms. The property was found in the premises of the accused
upon the owner’s verification at his residence. The accused voluntarily
surrendered the items and were taken to the police station. He was charged by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) with violation of Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 or
Presidential Decree 1612(P.D. 1612). He appealed to the Court of Appeals but
the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be convicted of violating Anti-
Fencing Law despite his lack of intent to gain the stolen items.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the intent to gain need not be proved in
crimes punishable by a special law such as P.D. 1612. While the acts mala in se
requires intent, in acts mala prohibita with or without intent, mere violation
sufficed. Hence, the judgments of the lower courts were affirmed.

People vs Sunico

People vs. Sunico, et al (C.A., 50 o.g. 5880)

Facts:
The accused were election inspectors and poll clerks whose duty among others was
to transfer the names of excess voters in other precincts to the list of a newly created precinct.
S e v e r a l v o t e r s w e r e o m i t t e d i n t h e l i s t . Because their names were
not in the list, some of them were not allowed to vote. The accusedwere prosecuted for
violation of Secs. 101
and1 0 3 o f t h e R e v i s e d E l e c t i o n C o d e . T h e accused claimed that
they made the omission in good faith.
The trial court seemed to believe
thatn o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e f a c t t h a t t h e a c c u s e d c o m m i t t e d i n g o o d f a i t
h t h e s e r i o u s o f f e n s e charged, the latter are criminally
responsiblet h e r e f o r , b e c a u s e s u c h o f f e n s e i s m a l u m p r o h i b i t u m , a
n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e a c t constituting the same need not be
committedwith malice or criminal intent to be punishable.
Held:
T h e a c t s o f t h e a c c u s e d c a n n o t b e merely mala prohibita - they are
mala per se .

SPL NOTES
The omission or failure to include a voter’sname in the registry list of
v o t e r s i s n o t o n l y wrong because it is prohibited; it is wrong
pers e b e c a u s e i t d i s e n f r a n c h i s e s a v o t e r a n d violates one of his
fundamental rights. Hence,for such act to be punishable, it must be shownthat it has
been committed with malice. Thereis no clear showing in the instant case that
theaccused intentionally, willfully and maliciouslyomitted or failed to include in the
registry list ofvoters the names of those voters. They cannotbe punished criminally.
*
the Revised Election Code, as far as its penalprovisions are concerned, is a special law,
itbeing not a part of the RPC or its amendments.

People v. Echegaray (CRIM1)

People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo, Defendant Appellant

Per Curiam
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Date: February 7, 1997
Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting collectively & anonymously.

Facts:

 The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-
appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter.
 The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-
appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
 The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the
sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation
of rape against the accused. The motion was dismissed as the SC found no substantial arguments
on the said motion that can disturb the verdict.
 On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug,
and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group
of the Philippines. (FLAG)
 A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-
appellant aiming for the reversal of the death sentence.
 In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed
factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of
accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7659.
Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional

Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration are
denied for lack of merit.

Ratio:
 Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state,
however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.
 The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness
pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the
sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the
death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused who is
meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to determine
whether or not to impose the death penalty.
 Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per
se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did
so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was
uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not
altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the
part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
 accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the
taking of life.
 In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in
terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with
murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by
another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another
person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and
normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is
unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such,
does not take human life"
 The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds:
 first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a
proper punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to
include rape in their new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman;
 Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could
have any bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
 second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a
woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking
of life.
 Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of
whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the
circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the
biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth".
 The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in
specified crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had
entered our legal system through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish
Penal Code of 1870.
 Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason,
correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide,
kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons
resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death.
 The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question
of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in
violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
 Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor
excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that
'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is
not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
 People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe
that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that
penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in
certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private
opinions,"
 Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision
imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of
a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the
suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be
resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in
society
 what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order
and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes,
finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes.
 Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in
which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent
disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose
essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society
and hence, shock the moral self of a people.
 The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of
society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or
her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological,
material and social preferences and needs.
 Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to
dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or
resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more than three
days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the
victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and
carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which
are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
 SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:
 the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so
deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national
efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a
disciplined and honest citizenry
 they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the
society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the
survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so
 People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person.
It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and
moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim
for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not
only the victim but the society itself.

Harden vs. Director of Prisons (Crim1)

Harden vs. Director of Prisons (81 Phil. 741)

Facts:
On July 12, 1941 Fred M. Harden was involved in a civil case with Mrs. Harden concerning conjugal
partnership, payment of alimony and accounting. A preliminary injunction was issued restraining Mr.
Harden from transferring or alienating, except with consideration and consent of the court, all assets
(money, shares of stock, property, real, personal, whether in his name, her name or both) in the
partnership with Mrs. Harden. During 1946 however, Mr. Harden transferred drafts and cash in
overseas accounts. In the course of two years, he received orders from the SC to return the
amounts but Mr. Harden kept filing for extensions. On March 24, 1948, he was committed to jail
because of contempt (failure to comply with the court’s orders of producing the amounts) and held
there until he can produce said amounts.

Issue:
Relevant: WoN the imprisonment sentence for Mr. Harden is excessive punishment.

Irrelevant: WoN the property moved into foreign jurisdiction is still covered by Philippine jurisdiction

Held and Ratio:

Relevant: No. Mr. Harden has “the keys to his prison” and his detainment is something that he
himself can end at any time. (Sec. 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court: When the contempt consists in
the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned
by order of a superior court until he performs it)
Irrelevant: Yes. “While a court cannot give its receiver authority to act in another state without the
assistance of the courts thereof (53 C. J., 390-391) yet it may act directly upon the parties before it
with respect to the property beyond the limits of its territorial jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt if
they resist the court’s orders with reference to its custody or disposition.”

Decision: Petition is denied.

Separate Opinion: Perfecto, J.

He believes that it is indeed an excessive penalty because of Mr. Harden’s claims that it is beyond
his power to comply with the court order and would thus result in life imprisonment for Mr. Harden.

EN BANC
 [G.R. No. 117472. June 25, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO

ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Amidst the endless debates on whether or not the reimposition of the death
penalty is indeed a deterrent as far as the commission of heinous crimes is
concerned and while the attendant details pertaining to the execution of a death
sentence remain as yet another burning issue, we are tasked with providing a
clear-cut resolution of whether or not the herein accused-appellant deserves to
forfeit his place in human society for the infliction of the primitive and bestial act
of incestuous lust on his own blood.
Before us for automatic review is the judgment of conviction, dated
September 7, 1994, for the crime of Rape, rendered after marathon hearing by
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused LEO ECHEGARAY Y

PILO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE as charged in the
complaint, aggravated by the fact that the same was committed by the accused who is
the father/stepfather of the complainant, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
DEATH, as provided for under RA. No. 7659; to pay the complainant Rodessa
Echegaray the sum of P50,000.00 as damages, plus all the accessory penalties
provided by law, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs."
[1]

We note, however, that the charge had been formulated in this manner:

"C O M P L A I N T

The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime of RAPE,

committed as follows:

That on or about the month of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant his
daughter, a minor, 10 years of age, all against her will and without her consent, to her
damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW." [2]

Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the accused-appellant, assisted

by his counsel de oficio, entered the plea of "not guilty."
These are the pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor-
General in his brief:

"This is a case of rape by the father of his ten-year old daughter.

Complainant RODESSA ECHEGARAY is a ten-year old girl and a fifth-grader, born

on September 11, 1983. Rodessa is the eldest of five siblings. She has three brothers
aged 6, 5 and 2, respectively, and a 3-month old baby sister. Her parents are Rosalie
and Leo Echegaray, the latter being the accused-appellant himself. The victim lives
with her family in a small house located at No. 199 Fernandez St., Barangay San
Antonio, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City (pp. 5-9, Aug. 9, 1994, TSN).

Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking after her three
brothers in their house as her mother attended a gambling session in another place, she
heard her father, the accused-appellant in this case, order her brothers to go out of the
house (pp. 10-11, ibid.). As soon as her brothers left, accused-appellant Leo
Echegaray approached Rodessa and suddenly dragged her inside the room (p.
12, ibid). Before she could question the appellant, the latter immediately removed her
panty and made her lie on the floor (p. 13, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant likewise
removed his underwear and immediately placed himself on top of
Rodessa. Subsequently, appellant forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's organ
causing her to suffer intense pain (pp. 14-15, ibid.). While appellant was pumping on
her, he even uttered: 'Masarap ba, masarap ba?' and to which Rodessa
answered: 'Tama na Papa, masakit' (p. 16, ibid.). Rodessa's plea proved futile as
appellant continued with his act. After satisfying his bestial instinct, appellant
threatened to kill her mother if she would divulge what had happened. Scared that her
mother would be killed by appellant, Rodessa kept to herself the ordeal she
suffered. She was very afraid of appellant because the latter, most of the time, was
high on drugs (pp. 17-18, ibid.). The same sexual assault happened up to the fifth
time and this usually took place when her mother was out of the house (p.
19, ibid.). However, after the fifth time, Rodessa decided to inform her grandmother,
Asuncion Rivera, who in turn told Rosalie, Rodessa's mother. Rodessa and her
mother proceeded to the Barangay Captain where Rodessa confided the sexual
assaults she suffered. Thereafter, Rodessa was brought to the precinct where she
executed an affidavit (p. 21, ibid.). From there, she was accompanied to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for medical examination (p. 22, ibid.).

Rodessa testified that the said sexual assaults happened only during the time when her
mother was pregnant. Rodessa added that at first, her mother was on her
side. However, when appellant was detained, her mother kept on telling her:
'Kawawa naman ang Tatay mo, nakakulong' (pp. 39-40, ibid.).

When Rodessa was examined by the medico-legal officer in the person of Dra. Ma.
Cristina B. Preyna, the complainant was described as physically on a non-virgin
[3]

state, as evidenced by the presence of laceration of the hymen of said complainant

(TSN., Aug. 22,1995, pp. 8-9)." [4]

On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief presents a different story:

"x x x the defense presented its first witness, Rosalie Echegaray. She asserted that the
RAPE charge against the accused was only the figment of her mother's dirty
mind. That her daughter's complaint was forced upon her by her grandma and the
answers in the sworn statement of Rodessa were coached. That the accusation of
RAPE was motivated by Rodessa's grandmother's greed over the lot situated at the
Madrigal Estate-NHA Project, Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City, which her grandmother's paramour, Conrado Alfonso gave to the
accused in order to persuade the latter to admit that Rodessa executed an affidavit of
desistance after it turned out that her complaint of attempted homicide was substituted
with the crime of RAPE at the instance of her mother. That when her mother came to
know about the affidavit of desistance, she placed her granddaughter under the
custody of the Barangay Captain. That her mother was never a real mother to her.

She stated that her complaint against accused was for attempted homicide as her
husband poured alcohol on her body and attempted to burn her. She identified the
certification issued by the NHA and Tag No. 87-0393 (Exh. 2). That the Certification
based on the Masterlist (Exh. 3) indicates that the property is co-owned by accused
and Conrado Alfonso. That Rodessa is her daughter sired by Conrado Alfonso, the
latter being the paramour of her mother. That Conrado Alfonso waived his right and
participation over the lot in favor of the accused in consideration of the latter's
accepting the fact that he is the father of Rodessa to simulate the love triangle and to
conceal the nauseating sex orgies from Conrado Alfonso's real Wife.

Accused testified in his behalf and stated that the grandmother of the complainant has
a very strong motive in implicating him to the crime of RAPE since she was interested
to become the sole owner of a property awarded to her live-in partner by the Madrigal
Estate-NHA Project. That he could not have committed the imputed crime because he
considers Rodessa as his own daughter. That he is a painter-contractor and on the
date of the alleged commission of the crime, he was painting the house of one Divina
Ang of Barangay Vitalis, Parañaque, Metro Manila (Exh 4). The travel time between
his work place to his residence is three (3) hours considering the condition of
traffic. That the painting contract is evidenced by a document denominated 'Contract
of Services' duly accomplished (see submarkings of Exh. 4). He asserted that he has a
big sexual organ which when used to a girl 11 years old like Rodessa, the said female
organ will be 'mawawarak.' That it is abnormal to report the imputed commission of
the crime to the grandmother of the victim.

Accused further stated that her(sic) mother-in-law trumped-up a charge of drug

pushing earlier and he pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of using drugs. The decretal
portion of the judgment of conviction ordering the accused to be confined at the
Bicutan Rehabilitation Center irked the grandmother of Rodessa because it was her
wish that accused should be meted the death penalty.

Accused remain steadfast in his testimony perorating the strong motive of Rodessa's
grandmother in implicating him in this heinous crime because of her greed to become
the sole owner of that piece of property at the National Housing Authority-Madrigal
Project, situated at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, notwithstanding rigid
cross-examination. He asserted that the imputed offense is far from his mind
considering that he treated Rodessa as his own daughter. He categorically testified
that he was in his painting job site on the date and time of the alleged commission of
the crime.

Mrs. Punzalan was presented as third defense witness. She said that she is the laundry
woman and part time baby sitter of the family of accused. That at one time, she saw
Rodessa reading sex books and the Bulgar newspaper. That while hanging washed
clothes on the vacant lot she saw Rodessa masturbating by tinkering her private
parts. The masturbation took sometime.

This sexual fling of Rodessa were corroborated by Silvestra Echegaray, the fourth and
last witness for the defense. She stated that she tried hard to correct the flirting
tendency of Rodessa and that she scolded her when she saw Rodessa viewing an X-
rated tape. Rodessa according to her was fond of going with friends of ill-
repute. That (sic) she corroborated the testimony of Mrs Punzalan by stating that she
herself saw Rodessa masturbating inside the room of her house." [5]

In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of rape, the lower court dismissed the defense of alibi and lent credence
to the straightforward testimony of the ten-year old victim to whom no ill motive
to testify falsely against accused-appellant can be attributed. The lower court
likewise regarded as inconsequential the defense of the accused-appellant that
the extraordinary size of his penis could not have insinuated itself into the
victim's vagina and that the accused is not the real father of the said victim.
The accused-appellant now reiterates his position in his attempt to seek a
reversal of the lower court's verdict through the following assignment of errors:
“1. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE SINISTER MOTIVE OF
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S GRANDMOTHER THAT PRECIPITATED THE FILING
OF THE CHARGE OF RAPE, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED GUILTY
AS CHARGED.
2. THE COURT BELOW OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE HEALED
LACERATIONS AT 3 AND 7 O'CLOCK COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE
PUMPING OF THE PENIS OF ACCUSED TO THE VAGINA OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED COMMITTED
THE CRIME CHARGED, NOTWITHSTANDING VEHEMENT DENIAL.
3. THE COURT A QUO WHIMSICALLY IGNORED THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI THAT
ACCUSED WAS IN PARAÑAQUE ON THE DATE AND TIME OF THE IMPUTED
CRIME HENCE, IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALIBI IS NOT SUSTAINABLE IN
THE CASE AT BAR."[6]

Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the reimposition of the death
penalty, requires a thorough and judicious examination of the circumstances
relating thereto, this Court remains guided by the following principles in
evaluating evidence in cases of this nature: (a) An accusation for rape can be
made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused though
innocent to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where
only two persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the prosecution must
stand and fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense." [7]

Anent the first assigned error, no amount of persuasion can convince this
Court to tilt the scales of justice in favor of the accused-appellant
notwithstanding that he cries foul insisting that the rape charge was merely
concocted and strongly motivated by greed over a certain lot situated at the
NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing Project, Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco
del Monte, Quezon City. The accused-appellant theorizes that prosecution
witness Asuncion Rivera, the maternal grandmother of the victim Rodessa,
concocted the charge of rape so that, in the event that the accused-appellant
shall be meted out a death sentence, title to the lot will be consolidated in her
favor. Indeed, the lot in question is co-owned by the accused-appellant and
Conrado Alfonso, the live-in partner of Asuncion Rivera, according to the
records of the National Housing Authority (Exh. "3"). The accused-appellant
would want us to believe that the rape charge was fabricated by Asuncion
Rivera in order to eliminate the accused-appellant from being a co-owner. So,
the live-in partners would have the property for their own. [8]

We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so

callous as to instigate her 10-year old granddaughter to file a rape case against
her own father simply on account of her alleged interest over the disputed lot. [9]

It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim

is credible where she has no motive to testify against the accused. [10]

We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year

old Rodessa which the trial court found convincing enough and unrebutted by
the defense. The trial court not surprisingly noted that Rodessa's narration in
detail of her father's monstrous acts had made her cry. Once again, we rule
[11]

that:

"x x x T\e testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time of the
rape as to the circumstances of the rape must be given weight for testimony of young
and immature rape victims are credible (People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64 [1993]). No
woman especially one of tender age, practically only a girl, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter expose herself to
a public trial, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished (People v. Guibao, supra)." [12]

The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies

of the prosecution witnesses in his attempt to bolster his claim that the rape
accusation against him is malicious and baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's testimony
that the accused-appellant was already naked when he dragged her inside the
room is inconsistent with her subsequent testimony that the said accused-
appellant was still wearing short pants when she was dragged inside the
room. Secondly, Rodessa's sworn statement before the police investigator
which indicated that, while the accused was executing pumping acts, he
utteredthe words "Masarap ba?", differ from her testimony in court wherein she
related that when the accused took out his penis from her vagina, the accused
said "Masarap, tapos na." Thirdly, the victim's grandmother, Asuncion Rivera,
recounted in her sworn statement that it was the accused who went to see her
to apprise her of the rape committed on her granddaughter. However, in her
testimony in court, Asuncion Rivera claimed that she was the one who invited
the accused-appellant to see her in her house so as to tell her a secret. These [13]

alleged discrepancies merely pertain to minor details which in no way pose

serious doubt as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Whether or not
the accused was naked when he dragged Rodessa inside the room where he
sexually assaulted her bears no significant effect on Rodessa's testimony that
she was actually raped by the accused-appellant. Moreover, a conflicting
account of whatever words were uttered by the accused-appellant after he
forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's private organ against her will cannot
impair the prosecution's evidence as a whole. A determination of which version
earmarks the truth as to how the victim's grandmother learned about the rape
is inconsequential to the judgment of conviction.
As we have pronounced in the case of People v. Jaymalin: [14]

"This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the narration of a
witness do not detract from its essential credibility as long as it is on the whole
coherent and intrinsically believable. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the
witness is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed as it is not to be expected that
he will be able to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total
recall."

After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's assessment of
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses deserves our utmost respect in the
absence of arbitrariness.
With respect to the second assigned error, the records of the instant case
are bereft of clear and concrete proof of the accused-appellant's claim as to the
size of his penis and that if that be the fact, it could not have merely caused
shallow healed lacerations at 3:00 and 7:00 o'clock. In his testimony, the
[15]

accused- appellant stated that he could not have raped Rodessa because of
the size of his penis which could have ruptured her vagina had he actually done
so. This Court gives no probative value on the accused-appellant's self-
[16]

serving statement in the light of our ruling in the case of People v.

Melivo, supra, that:
[17]

"The vaginal wall and the hymenal membrane are elastic organs capable of varying
degrees of distensibility. The degree of distensibility of the female reproductive organ
is normally limited only by the character and size of the pelvic inlet, other factors
being minor. The female reproductive canal being capable of allowing passage of a
regular fetus, there ought to be no difficulty allowing the entry of objects of much
lesser size, including the male reproductive organ, which even in its largest
dimensions, would still be considerably smaller than the full-term fetus.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bench, the presence of healed lacerations in various parts of the vaginal
wall, though not as extensive as appellant might have expected them to be, indicate
traumatic injury to the area within the period when the incidents were supposed to
have occurred." (At pp. 13-14, Italics supplied)

In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof. A mere [18]

knocking at the doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis

suffices to constitute the crime of rape as full entry into the victim's vagina is not
required to sustain a conviction. In the case, Dr. Freyra, the medico-legal
[19]

examiner, categorically testified that the healed lacerations of Rodessa on her

vagina were consistent with the date of the commission of the rape as narrated
by the victim to have taken place in April, 1994. [20]

Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-
appellant erroneously argues that the Contract of Services (Exhibit 4) offered
as evidence in support of the accused-appellant's defense of alibi need not be
corroborated because there is no law expressly requiring so. In view of our
[21]

finding that the prosecution witnesses have no motive to falsely testify against
the accused-appellant, the defense of alibi, in this case, uncorroborated by
other witnesses, should be completely disregarded. More importantly, the
[22]

defense of alibi which is inherently weak becomes even weaker in the face of
positive identification of the accused-appellant as perpetrator of the crime of
rape by his victim, Rodessa. [23]

The Contract of Services whereby the accused-appellant obligated himself

to do some painting Job at the house of one Divina Ang in Paranaque, Metro
Manila, within 25 days from April 4, 1994, is not proof of the whereabouts of the
accused-appellant at the time of the commission of the offense.
The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the
basis of the complaint, dated July 14, 1994. The gravamen of the said offense,
as stated in paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is the carnal
knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. Rodessa positively identified
[24]

his father accused-appellant, succeeded in consummating his grievous and

odious sexual assault on her is free from any substantial self-contradiction. It
is highly inconceivable that it is rehearsed and fabricated upon instructions from
Rodessa's maternal grandmother Asuncion Rivera as asserted by the accused-
appellant. The words of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the
Court, more than two decades ago, are relevant and worth reiterating, thus:

"x x x it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the offended parties are
young and immature girls like the victim in this case, (Cited cases omitted) there is
marked receptivity on its part to lend credence to their version of what transpired. It
is not to be wondered at. The state, as parens patria, is under the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of their minority, are as yet unable
to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its utmost
protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate
victim alone. The consternation it causes her family must also be taken into
account. It may reflect a failure to abide by the announced concern in the
fundamental law for such institution. There is all the more reason then for the
rigorous application of the penal law with its severe penalty for this offense, whenever
warranted. It has been aptly remarked that with the advance in civilization, the
disruption in public peace and order it represents defies explanation, much more so in
view of what currently appears to be a tendency for sexual permissiveness. Where the
prospects of relationship based on consent are hardly minimal, self-restraint should
even be more marked." [25]

Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred to as the Death
Penalty Law, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code was amended, to wit:

"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

xxx xxx xxx

(Italics supplied)

Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions the

penalty imposed by the trial court by declaring that he is neither a father,
stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa although he was a confirmed lover of
Rodessa's mother. On direct examination, he admitted that before the charge
[26]

of rape was filed against him, he had treated Rodessa as his real daughter and
had provided for her food, clothing, shelter and education. The Court notes
[27]

that Rodessa uses the surname of the accused-appellant, not Rivera (her
mother's maiden name) nor Alfonso (her grandmother's live-in
partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated during the cross-examination
that she, the accused-appellant and her five children, including Rodessa, had
been residing in one house only. At any rate, even if he were not the father,
[28]

stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot save him from the
abyss where perpetrators of heinous crimes ought to be, as mandated by
law. Considering that the accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of Rodessa's
mother, he falls squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty
[29]

Law under the term "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."
 The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as
"Papa" is reason enough to conclude that accused-appellant is either the father
or stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault perpetrated by the
accused on his young victim has become all the more repulsive and
perverse. The victim's tender age and the accused-appellant's moral
ascendancy and influence over her are factors which forced Rodessa to
succumb to the accused's selfish and bestial craving. The law has made it
inevitable under the circumstances of this case that the accused-appellant face
the supreme penalty of death.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Crisologo vs. People

G.R. No. L-6277, February 26, 1954

FACTS: Petitioner was accused of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. Prior to
said case, he was indicted for three charges before a military court for violating Commonwealth
Act No. 408 or the Articles of War. He was found innocent on first and third charges but guilty
on the second, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The treason case was transferred to
the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga upon dissolution of the People’s Court. Petitioner
presented a motion to quash since he was previously sentenced in the military court. Motion
was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the military court’s prosecution of the accused constitutes a bar for
further prosecution in the civil court for the same offense.

HELD: The sentence meted out by the military court should be a bar to petitioner’s further
prosecution in the civil court for the same offense, since both courts derive their powers from
one sovereignty.

People vs. Bon

G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006

FACTS: Alfredo Bon was convicted by the trial court of eight counts of rape of his two nieces.
Eight death sentences were imposed upon him on the ground that victims were minors and
were his nieces. The Court of Appeals downgraded said convictions in two cases to attempted
rape for failure of prosecution to prove penetration. However, upon the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of death penalty, the Court were not allowed to
uphold death sentences imposed by lower courts instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed when appropriate.

ISSUE: Whether or not, with the enactment of RA No. 934, the sentence of the accused should
be two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua.

HELD: Pursuant to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, death shall no longer form part of the
equation in the graduation of penalties. The determination of Bon’s penalty for attempted shall
be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua.

People vs. Mendoza

109 S 35, January 18, 1999

FACTS: On November 11, 1988 in Las Pinas, Manila, Octavio Mendoza shot with an unlicensed
.38 caliber revolver his wife, which resulted to the latter’s death. He was separately charged
with parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition despite his non-guilty plea. He
appealed contending that the lower court erred in convicting him.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be convicted separately of parricide and illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.

HELD: Accused-appellant should only be held liable for parricide with the special aggravating
circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm. Despite the presence of such aggravating
circumstance, the penalty imposed for the crime of parricide which is reclusion perpetua, may
no longer be increased. The death penalty cannot be imposed upon Mendoza since the killing
occurred in November 1988, when the imposition of the capital penalty was still proscribed.

Dimatulac vs. Villon

G.R. No. 127107, October 12, 1998

FACTS: On about November 2, 2005, SPO3 Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in
Masantol, Pampanga by several men under the leadership of Mayor Yabut. A preliminary
investigation was conducted and issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused followed for
murder. Murder was lowered to homicide upon reinvestigation. Upon the contention of the
Dimatulacs, the case was transferred to Judge Villon. Petitioners filed a manifestation informing
the latter of the cases pending before the Secretary of Justice and the prohibition case before
the Court of Appeals. However, Judge Villon ignored this and set the arraignment. Petitioners
filed a motion to defer arraignment of the accused but was denied. Hence, a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Villon erred in proceeding with the arraignment of the accused
and denying motion to set aside arraignment.
HELD: Judge Villon set arraignment of the accused almost immediately upon receiving the
records of the case from the former trial court judge. He thus committed grave abuse of
discretion in rushing the arraignment of the accused on the assailed information for homicide,
denying due process.

Wright vs CA
G.R. No. 113213, August 15, 1994

FACTS: Petitioner, an Australian citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for indictable
crimes in his country. Pursuant to the Extradition Treaty entered into in 1988 and concluded in
1990 between the Philippines and Australia, extradition proceedings were filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, which ordered the deportation of petitioner. On appeal,
petitioner contended that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition
treaty amounts to an ex post facto law. The trial court’s decision was sustained by the Court of
Appeals, hence petitioner filed a review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of the Extradition Treaty giving retroactive effect to the
treaty violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that while the Extradition Treaty concluded prior to the
extradition proceedings of the petitioner, its application did not violate the Constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws. The Treaty merely provides for the extradition of persons
wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed
or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified. In signing the Treaty, the government of
the Philippines has determined that it is within its interests to enter into agreement with the
government of Australia regarding the repatriation of persons wanted for criminal offenses in
either country.

Arula vs. Espino

G.R. No. L-28949, June 23, 1969

FACTS: Petitioner was recruited as soldier to undergo training in Corregidor Island, where a
shooting incident occurred. He suffered from serious physical injuries but was able to flee
Corregidor. He filed a criminal complaint with the fiscal of Cavite City for frustrated murder
against army personnel responsible for his injuries. Respondents initiated a pre-trial
investigation on said incident and convening of a court-martial followed. They claimed that the
court-martial has sole jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner filed for certiorari and prohibition
from said court-martial to take cognizance of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court-martial can take cognizance of the case despite the fact that
the offense was committed allegedly outside a military reservation.
HELD: The court-martial may take cognizance of the case in order to carry out a speedy trial,
which is a fundamental right accorded by the Constitution. In the presidential proclamation of
1948, Corregidor Island is part of the military reservation. The petitioner and the accused, being
part of the military, are subject to military law.

People vs. Bracamonte

G.R. No. 95939, June 17, 1996

FACTS: On about September 23, 1987 in Cavite City, appellants robbed and took personal
belongings of three victims inside the latter’s house, and attacked and wounded two of them,
which caused their death. The trial court charged appellants with the crime of robbery with
double homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be convicted of robbery with double homicide.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the accused should only be convicted of robbery with
homicide although two persons were killed, since the penalty prescribed in Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code is not affected by the number of killings accompanying robbery. While said
conviction falls under heinous crimes where capital punishment is imposed under Republic Act
No. 7659, such penalty cannot be imposed because it took effect prior to the commission of the
crime. This should be observed prospectively.

People vs. Echegaray

G.R. No. 117472, June 25, 1996

FACTS: The victim was 10 years old at the time of the commission of rape sometime in April
1994. The accused was the common law spouse of the victim’s mother. The victim was
allegedly raped five times by the accused while her mother was away in a gambling session. The
lower court found the accused guilty of the crime of statutory rape and sentenced him with the
penalty of death. However, the accused contended that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman
or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does
not involve the taking of life.

ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty sentence of the accused is cruel and inhuman for the crime
of rape.

HELD: Death penalty was imposed upon the accused because it was already in effect, and rape
was among those heinous crimes that were punished by death.
 SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:
 the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so
deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national
efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a
disciplined and honest citizenry
People vs. Velasco
G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000

FACTS: The town of San Ildefonso, Bulacan was shattered by gunshots which claimed the life of
a man, and two others were hit. The mayor of said town and his bodyguard were charged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos with homicide and two counts of frustrated
homicide. Said charges were withdrawn and a new set were filed upgrading the crimes to
murder, and included illegal possession of firearm on the mayor’s part. The cases were
transferred to the RTC of Quezon City. The trial court acquitted the mayor but convicted his
bodyguard of said charges. A petition on certiorari was filed, alleging that trial court judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the exculpation of the mayor from all criminal responsibility by
respondent judge constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

HELD: Contrary to petitioner’s assertions, evidence in the case at bar was subjected to scrutiny,
review, assessment and evaluation by respondent trial judge. By reason thereof, there cannot
be perceived grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to warrant issuance of the great
writ of certiorari. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was dismissed.

Arias vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 81563, December 19, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner, an auditor, was one of the six who was charged by the Sandiganbayan with
conspiracy through the irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds in connection
with the overpricing of land purchased by the Bureau of Public Works for the Mangahan
Floodway Project. Petitioner approved said project but insisted on his non-involvement since
the illegal transaction has already been consummated prior to his arrival in office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be convicted of conspiracy.

HELD: The Supreme Court acquitted the petitioner on grounds of reasonable doubt. insert Arias
doctrine

People vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 140651, February 19, 2001

FACTS:

Guevarra vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 138792-804, March 31, 2005
FACTS: The faculty members of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) filed a graft
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against the administrators of PUP headed by
Dante Guevarra. The Office of the Ombudsman charged the accused with 13 counts of violation
of Republic Act No. 3019. The Sandiganbayan dismissed said cases and gave the Special
Prosecutor 15 days for appeal or motion for reconsideration. When the Special Prosecutor
insisted on the reinstatement of the cases, petitioners contended that the decision was final
and executory due to absence of appeal for the given period. Hence, a petition for certiorari
was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was deprived of his due process. Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the criminal cases against the petitioners on
the basis of the motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution filed beyond the fifteen-day
reglementary period.

HELD: In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing the 13 criminal cases against the petitioners. By its
dismissal order, the respondent was deprived of its right to due process. Therefore, the
interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally
considered.

People vs. Smith

355 S 125

FACTS: Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, a member of the Armed Forces of the United States based
in the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City by virtue of the Visiting Forces Agreement
entered into the Governments of the Philippines and the United States, raped a Filipina inside
said territory on November 1, 2005.

ISSUE:

People vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 140615, February 19, 2001
Co vs CA
237 S 444, October 28, 1993

FACTS: Albino Co issued a check in payment of his share of the expenses to a salvage company,
but said check was dishonored by reason of account closed. In a complaint filed by the salvage
company, Co was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay of violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP Blg. 22). Pending his case, a Ministry Circular No. 4, which excludes guarantee
check from application of B.P. Blg. 22, was reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12. The later
circular ruled a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is covered
by B.P. Blg. 22. He appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the trial court’s
judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not, with the new circular, the guarantee check would still be a valid
defense.

HELD: It was ruled that the principle of prospectivity of statutes also applies to administrative
rulings and circulars. The new doctrine will therefore apply and should not be given
retrospective effect. Hence, the lower courts’ decisions were reversed.

People vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 140615, February 19, 2001

FACTS: The Sandiganbayan declared the private respondent the owner of 1/7 of the shares of
stock of Piedras Petroleum Co., Inc. without first requiring him to present evidence showing his
ownership over them, and awarded him 144.12 million pesos from a mere motion for execution
filed by said private respondent of a judgment on a Compromise Agreement to which private
respondent was not a party. Petitioner alleged that the owner of said shares was Imelda
Marcos who funded the paid-up subscriptions of all seven incorporators and
directors/subscribers for Piedras. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
Sandiganbayan denied it. Hence, a petition for certiorari on the ground that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it declared the private respondent owner of the shares even without
evidence of ownership.

HELD: The Supreme Court finds petitioner's contentions untenable. The Sandiganbayan gave
both the petitioner and the private respondent ample opportunity to present their respective
evidence on the issue of ownership of the 1/7 Piedras Shares. When petitioner submitted its
Opposition, petitioner was thereby given the chance to air its side which is the essence of due
process of law. Hence, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. The instant petition was dismissed.