[ GR No.

L-23685, Apr 25, 1968 ]

CIRILA EMILIA v. EPIFANIO BADO +
SANCHEZ, J.:

The relief prayed for but denied in an order of the court below, now the subject of the present appeal, is that injunction issue to restrain defendants from continuing with the construction of a house of light materials on a 48-square meter area on the northern border of plaintiff's land.

The suit started on December 12, 1963 with the complaint, as amended,[1] that on or about December 1, 1962, defendants, confederating and helping one another, entered plaintiff's land and commenced the construction of a house of light materials on the northern boundary of her Lot 1131 in Iligan
City bordering the bank of Salabao Creek, covered by her Torrens Title 0-267; that the continuance of such act against the will of plaintiff would cause great and irreparable damage and injury and injustice to her; and that there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Whereupon, she prayed for preliminary and final injunction and damages. Preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte.

Plaintiff's said complaint was met by defendants' motion to dismiss upon the ground of lack of cause of action. They attached to their motion the sketch of a private land surveyor, Flordelito Aragon, and his affidavit, both of which were intended to convey the alleged fact that the new house being
constructed was inside defendant Glicerio Bado's Lot 2894 (covered by his Torrent Title 9-275) being held by him. They averred, too, that the house did not encroach upon the boundaries of plaintiff's adjoining property (Lot 1131).

Obviously of the belief that procedural niceties should not bar consideration of the equities of the case,[2] the trial court, on the face of the conflicting assertions of fact, called for a summary hearing.

On February 27, 1964, the trial court came out with an order sustaining the motion to dismiss. The court gave credence to the testimony of surveyor Flordelito Aragon (also a deputy public land surveyor) that the house under construction was within Glicerio Bado's Lot 2894 (Torrens Title 0-275) and
not on plaintiff's Lot 1131 (Torrens Title 0-267). The trial court took the position that to stop defendants from building a house within Clicerio Bado's lot "would be tantamount to depriving" the owner of the enjoyment of his lawful dominical rights; that even on the assumption that defendant Glicerio
Bado's title to Lot 2894 was obtained through fraud, as plaintiff avers, nonetheless, said title subsists until declared null and void by a competent court; and that these circumstances would tie up the hands of the court from granting the relief prayed for. Whereupon, the court dissolved the preliminary
injunction theretofore issued, and dismissed the complaint.

1. The procedural question presented asks of us a ruling as to whether injunction is the proper remedy in the premises.

Whether defendant Clicerio Bado's lot is registrable or not, because, as plaintiff avers, that land registered in the name of defendant Glicerio Bado is a creek - Salabao Creek - is beside the point here. Unless and until plaintiff succeeds in annulling the decree of registration in defendant's favor which
she has sought in the cadastral proceedings, that title subsists.[3] It is to be presumed that the judicial proceedings leading to the issuance of the decree are valid.

The pivotal facts that the record discloses may thus be summarized this way: Plaintiff claims that the house being built is on her land; defendants, on the other hand, say that that house is on the land of Glicerio Bado. Both hold Torrens titles. The lower court, prima facie at least, believes that there is
factual support for defendants' averment.

The remedy of injunction has been the subject of numerous judicial pronouncements. The court cannot now afford to depart from the well-ingrained precept that injunctions are not available to take property out of possession or control of one party and place it into that of another whose title has not
clearly been established. Instructive in this respect is the early 1909 decision in Devesa vs. Arbes, 13 Phil. 273, where injunction was sought to recover possession of real property. Mr. Justice Carson there pithily summed up[4] the limited concept of injunction which may not be availed of "'while the
rights between the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be done', which cannot be compensated in damages." To hold otherwise, Mr. Justice Carson continued to say, "would be to render practically of no effect the various provisions of the
code (of civil procedure) touching many if not most of the ordinary actions, and the enforcement of judgment in such actions; for it may well be supposed that if a complainant could secure relief by injunction in every case where 'the defendant is doing or threatens or is about to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights' and could enforce the judgment granting the injunction by the summary contempt proceedings authorized in section 172 of the code to punish violations of injunctions, he would seldom elect to enforce his rights in such cases by
the ordinary remedies, involving as they do the difficult and ofttimes fruitless labor of enforcing judgments obtained therein by execution."[5]

Long divorced from doubt is the doctrine that where legal title is disputed and the possessor asserts ownership over the land in controversy, no injunction can issue to dispossess him.[6] Reason for this is that before the issue of ownership is determined by evidence, justice and equity demand that the
parties be maintained in their status quo so that no advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the other.[7]

Given the fact that there is the debatable question of where the house was being erected, we say that adherence to the precept just enunciated is a forbidding obstacle to the grant of injunction.

2. To be sure, there are recognized exceptions to the rule, as where defendant is clearly a mere intruder,[8] or where the action seeks to prevent a purchaser at an auction sale from molesting the debtor's co-owners whose rights have not been affected by the sale.[9] But these, generally upon hearing
and not upon ex-parte application for injunction.[10]

3. Upon well-entrenched jurisprudence, plaintiff's principal suit for injunction cannot, at bottom, prosper because there is an adequate remedy in law open to her. It is elementary to the point of triteness that the special remedy of injunction may not issue where there is a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

It is in line with the principle just enunciated that in affirming Devesa vs. Arbes, supra, Palafox vs. Madamba, 19 Phil. 444, 446, declared in no uncertain terms that injunction is not the appropriate remedy where "there exists the ordinary remedy of action for property of possession, which may be either
plenary or summary, according to the method by which she may have been deprived of her alleged possession." A long line of cases has since then stabilized the principle.[11]

Under the present state of the law, there are three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) the summary action for forcible entry (where preliminary mandatory injunction may be sought within ten days from the filing of the complaint under Article 539 of the Civil Code) or
illegal detainer, which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one year in the municipal court; (b) the acción publiciana, which is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and (c) acción de
reivindicación, which seeks the recovery of ownership, which includes the jus utendi and the "jus fruendi, also brought in the Court of First Instance.[12]
Plaintiff Cirila Emilia claims ownership of a 48-square meter portion of land, which she avers is covered by Torrens title in her name. Defendant Clicerio Bado, on the other hand, also professes ownership over the same portion of land backed up, too, by a Torrens title in his name. From these two
directly opposing positions, a legitimate issue of ownership emerges. This guides us to no other conclusion than that plaintiff Cirila Emilia should have brought suit for ownership (acción de reivindicación). Correctly did the trial judge dissolve the preliminary injunction wrongfully issued and refuse the
grant of a perpetual injunction sought by her.

4. In a situation like the present, it was suggested in Devesa vs. Arbes, supra, that it would not be improper if the record were to be returned to the court of origin with instructions to further amend the complaint,[13] such that the question of ownership and possession (acción reivindicatoria) may bring
about a head-on contest between plaintiff and Glicerio Bado in the same injunction case. As we make an appraisal of the record before us, however, we are constrained to say that confusion may arise because of the so many pleadings filed and court actuations taken before this decision. With the
voluminous record, difficulty may arise in pinpointing the exact issue between the parties. Administration of justice could suffer thereby. And then, there is the continued pendency of this case which has been started since nearly five years ago. A final decision on the validity of Clicerio Bado's title in
the cadastral proceeding could yet prevent further controversy between the parties.

Upon the view we take of this case, we vote to affirm the order of February 27, 1964, dismissing the complaint.

With costs against plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Injunction; Recovery of possession of real property; Injunction as a remedy.—Injunctions are not available to take property out of possession or control of one party and place it into that of another whose title has not clearly been established. Where
injunction was sought to recover possession of real property, the limited concept of injunction may not be availed of while the rights between the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be
done which can not be compensated in damages. To hold otherwise, would be to render practically of no effect the various provisions of the code touching many if not most of the ordinary actions, and the enforcement of judgment in such actions. If
a complainant could secure relief by injunction in every case where the defendant is doing or threatens or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of plaintiff’s rights and could enforce the judgment
granting the injunction by the summary contempt proceedings authorized in section 172 of the code to punish violations of injunctions, he would seldom elect to enforce his rights in such cases by the ordinary remedies involving the difficult and
oftimes fruitless labor of enforcing judgment obtained therein by execution. (Citing Devesa v. Arbes, 13 Phil. 273).

Same; Same; When not available; Reasons.—Where legal title is disputed and the possessor asserts ownership over the land in controversy, no injunction can issue to dispossess him. Reason for this is that before the issue of ownership is
determined by evidence, justice and equity demand that the parties be maintained in their status quo so that no advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the other.

Same; Same; Same; Exceptions.—There are recognized exceptions to the rule, as where defendant is clearly a mere intruder, or where the action seeks to prevent a purchaser at an auction sale from molesting the debtor’s co-owners whose rights
have not been affected by the sale.

Actions; Recovery of possession of real property; Kinds of actions.—There are three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) the summary action for forcible entry (where preliminary mandatory injunction may be sought
within ten days from the filing of the complaint under article 539 of the Civil Code) or illegal detainer, which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one year in the municipal court; (b) the accion publiciana, which is f or
the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and (c) accion de reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership, which includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, also
brought in the Court of First Instance.
 G.R. No. 120961 October 17, 1996
DISTILLERIA WASHINGTON, INC. or WASHINGTON DISTILLERY, INC., petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LA TONDEÑA DISTILLERS, INC., respondents. VITUG, J.:p
The initiatory suit was instituted on 02 November 1987 with the trial court (docketed Civil Case No. 87-42639) for manual delivery with damages instituted by La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. ("LTDI"), against Distilleria Washington ("Washington"). LTDI, under a claim of ownership, sought to seize from Distilleria Washington
18,157 empty "350 c.c. white flint bottles" bearing the blown-in marks of "La Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel." The court, on application of LTDI, issued an order of replevin on 05 November 1987 for the seizure of the empty gin bottles from Washington. These bottles, it was averred, were being used by
Washington for its own "Gin Seven" products without the consent of LTDI.

LTDI asserted that, being the owner and registrant of the bottles, it was entitled to the protection so extended by Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 623, as amended, notwithstanding its sale of the Ginebra San Miguel gin product contained in said bottles.

Washington countered that R.A. No. 623, invoked by LTDI, should not apply to gin, an alcoholic beverage which is unlike that of "soda water, mineral or aerated water, ciders, milks, cream, or other lawful beverages" mentioned in the law, and that, in any case, ownership of the bottles should, considering the attendant
facts and circumstances, be held lawfully transferred to the buyers upon the sale of the gin and containers at a single price.

After hearing the parties, the trial court rendered its decision, dated 03 December 1991, holding against LTDI; viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED and plaintiff is ordered:
1. To return to defendant the 18,157 empty bottles seized by virtue of the writ for the Seizure of Personal Property issued by this Court on November 6, 1987;
2. In the event of failure to return said empty bottles, plaintiff is ordered to indemnify defendant in the amount of P18,157.00 representing the value of the bottles.
3. Costs against plaintiff. 1
LTDI appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 36971). The appellate court reversed the court a quo and ruled against Washington; thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The appellant, being the owner, is authorized to retain in its possession the 18,157 bottles registered in its name delivered to it by the sheriff following their seizure from the appellee pursuant to the writ of replevin
issued by the trial court on November 6, 1987. Costs against the appellee. 2
Washington is now before this Court assailing the reversal of the trial court's decision. In its petition, Washington points out that —
4.00.a. Under the undisputed facts, petitioner is the lawful owner of the personal properties (18,157 empty bottles) involved in the petition. Respondent LTDI is precluded by law from claiming the same;
4.00.b. The decision and resolution appealed from violate equity and applicable canons in the interpretation and construction of statutes; and
4.00.c. Liquor products are not covered by Republic Act. No. 623. The holding of the Court in Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 218 [1989] should be reviewed and reconsidered in light of the Constitution and House Bill No. 20585. 3
It is a fact that R.A. No. 623 extends trademark protection in the use of containers duly registered with the Philippine Patent Office. The pertinent provisions of R.A. 623, as amended, so reads:
Sec. 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the manufacture, bottling, or selling of soda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream or other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels, and other similar containers, or in the manufacture, compressing or selling of
gases such as oxygen, acetylene, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, ammonia, hydrogen, chloride, helium, sulphur dioxide, butane, propane, freon, methyl chloride or similar gases contained in steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators or similar containers, with their names or the names of their
principals or products, or other marks of ownership stamped or marked thereon, may register with the Philippine Patent Office a description of the names or marks, and the purpose for which the containers so marked are used by them, under the same conditions, rules, and regulations, made
applicable by law or regulation to the issuance of trademarks.

Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the manufacturer, bottler, or seller, who has successfully registered the marks of ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section, to fill such bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, steel cylinders, tanks,
flasks, accumulators, or other similar containers so marked or stamped, for the purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of, buy or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or not to use the same for drinking vessels or glasses or drain pipes, foundation pipes, for any other purpose than
that registered by the manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos or imprisonment of not more than one year or both.

Sec. 3. The use by any person other than the registered manufacturer, bottler or seller, without written permission of the latter of any such bottle, cask, barrel, keg, box, steel cylinders, tanks, flask, accumulators, or other similar containers, or the possession thereof without written permission of
the manufacturer, by any junk dealer or dealer in casks, barrels, kegs, boxes, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators or other similar containers, the same being duly marked or stamped and registered as herein provided, shall give rise to a prima facie presumption that such use or
possession is unlawful. 4

As the outset, the Court must state that is sees no cogent reason for either departing from or changing the basic rule it laid down in Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals. 5 The Court has there held:

The above-quoted provisions grant protection to a qualified manufacturer who successfully registered with the Philippine Patent Office its duly stamped or marked bottles, boxes, casks and other similar containers. The mere use of registered bottles or containers without the written consent of the
manufacturer is prohibited, the only exceptions being when they are used as containers for "sisi," "bagoong," "patis" and similar native products.

It is an admitted fact that herein petitioner Cagayan buys form junk dealers and retailers bottles which bear the marks or names "La Tondeña, Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel" and uses them as containers for its own liquor products. The contention of Cagayan that the aforementioned bottles
without the words "properly of" indicated thereon are not the registered bottles of LTI, since they do not conform with the statement or description in the supporting affidavits attached to the original registration certificate and renewal, is untenable.

Republic Act No. 623 which governs the registration of marked bottles and containers merely requires that the bottles, in order to be eligible for registration, must be stamped or marked with the names of the manufacturers or the names of their principals or products, or other marks of ownership.
No drawings or labels are required but, instead, two photographs of the container, duly signed by the applicant, showing clearly and legibly the names and other marks of ownership sought to be registered and a bottle showing the name or other mark or ownership, irremovably stamped or
marked, shall be submitted.

xxx xxx xxx

The claim of petitioner that hard liquor is not included under the term "other lawful beverages" as provided in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 623, as amended by Republic Act No. 5700, is without merit. The title of the law itself, which reads "An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked
Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers" clearly shows the legislative intent to give protection to all marked bottles and containers of all lawful beverages regardless of the nature of their contents. The words "other lawful beverages" is used in its general sense,
referring to all beverages not prohibited by law. Beverage is defined as a liquor or liquid for drinking. Hard liquor, although regulated, is not prohibited by law, hence it is within the purview and coverage of Republic Act No. 623, as amended. 6

Given the nature of the action in Cagayan, as well as its factual milieu, the Court indeed hardly has had a choice but to sustain the registrant's right to the injunctive writ against the unauthorized use of its containers. The case before us, however, goes beyond just seeking to have such use stopped but it so takes on even
the ownership issue as well. Parenthetically, petitioner is not here being charged with a violation of Section 2 of R.A. No. 623 or of the Trademark Law. The instant suit is one for replevin (manual delivery) where the claimant must be able to show convincingly that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession
of the object sought to be recovered. Replevin is a possessory action the gist of which focuses on the right of possession that, in turn, is dependent on a legal basis that, not infrequently, looks to the ownership of the object sought to be replevied.
It is to be pointed out that a trademark refers to a word, name, symbol, emblem, sign or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a merchant to identify, and distinguish from others, his goods of commerce. It is basically an intellectual creation that is susceptible to ownership 7 and, consistently therewith,
gives rise to its own elements of jus posidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, jus disponendi, and jus abutendi, along with the applicable jus lex, comprising that ownership. The incorporeal right, however, is distinct from the property in the material object subject to it. Ownership in one does not necessarily vest ownership in the
other. Thus, the transfer or assignment of the intellectual property will not necessarily constitute a conveyance of the thing it covers, nor would a conveyance of the latter imply the transfer or assignment of the intellectual right. 8

R.A. No. 623 evidently does not disallow the sale or transfer of ownership of the marked bottles or containers. In fact, the contrary is implicit in the law; thus —

Sec. 5. No action shall be brought under this Act against any person to whom the registered manufacturer, bottler or seller, has transferred by way of sale, any of the containers herein referred to, but the sale of the beverage contained in the said containers shall not include the sale of the
containers unless specifically so provided.
Sec. 6. The provisions of this Act shall not be interpreted as prohibiting the use of bottles as containers for "sisi," "bagoong," "patis," and similar native products.
Scarcely disputed are certain and specific industry practices in the sale of gin: The manufacturer sells the product in marked containers, through dealers, to the public in supermarkets, grocery shops, retail stores and other sales outlets. The buyer takes the item; he is neither required to return the bottle nor required to
make a deposit to assure its return to the seller. He could return the bottle and get a refund. A number of bottles at times find their way to commercial users. It cannot be gainsaid that ownership of the containers does pass on to the consumer albeit subject to the statutory limitation on the use of the registered containers
and to the trademark right of the registrant. The statement in Section 5 of R.A. 623 to the effect that the "sale of beverage contained in the said containers shall not include the sale of the containers unless specifically so provided" is not a rule of proscription. It is a rule of construction that, in keeping with the spirit and
intent of the law, establishes at best a presumption (of non-conveyance of the container) and which by no means can be taken to be either interdictive or conclusive in character. Upon the other hand, LTDI's sales invoice, stipulating that the "sale does not include the bottles with the blown-in marks of ownership of La
Tondeña Distillers," cannot affect those who are not privies thereto.

While it may be unwarranted then for LTDI to simply seize the empty containers, this Court finds it to be legally absurd, however, to still allow petitioner to recover the possession thereof. The fact of the matter is that R.A. 623, as amended, in affording trademark protection to the registrant, has additionally expressed a
prima facie presumption of illegal use by a possessor whenever such use or possession is without the written permission of the registered manufacturer, a provision that is neither arbitrary nor without appropriate rationale. Indeed, the appellate court itself has made a finding of such unauthorized use by petitioner. The
Court sees no other logical purpose for petitioner's insistence to keep the bottles, except for such continued use. The practical and feasible alternative is to merely require the payment of just compensation to petitioner for the bottles seized from it by LTDI. Conventional wisdom, along with equity and justice to both parties,
dictates it.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court is MODIFIED by ordering LTDI to pay petitioner just compensation for the seized bottles. Instead, however, of remanding the case to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence on, and thereafter resolve, the assessment thereof, this Court accepts and accordingly adopts
the quantification of P18,157.00 made by the trial court. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Facts:
La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. filed before the Regional Trial Court for the recovery, under its claim of ownership, of possession or replevin against Distilleria Washington, Inc. or Washington Distillery, Inc. of 18,157 empty “350 c.c. white flint bottles” bearing the blown-in
marks of “La Tondeña Inc.” and “Ginebra San Miguel,” averring that Distilleria Washington was using the bottles for its own “Gin Seven” products without the consent of Distilleria Washington in violation of Republic Act 623.
In the original decision, the court acknowledged that there was a valid transfer of the bottles to Distilleria Washington, except that its possession of the bottles without the written consent of La Tondeña gives rise to a prima facie presumption of illegal use under R.A. 623.
In seeking reconsideration of the decision, petitioner raises the issue that if petitioner became the owner over the bottles seized from it by replevin, then it has the right to their possession and use as attributes of ownership.
The instant case is one for replevin (manual delivery) where the claimant must be able to show convincingly that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered. Replevin is a possessory action. The gist of which focuses on
the right of possession that in turn, is dependent on a legal basis that, not infrequently, looks to the ownership of the object sought to be replevied.

Issue:
Since replevin as a possessory action is dependent upon ownership, it is relevant to ask: Whether or not there was a transfer ownership of La Tondeña Distillers’ marked bottles or containers when it sold its products in the market? Were the marked bottles or containers part
of the products sold to the public?

Held:
The manufacturer sells the product in marked containers, through dealers, to the public in supermarkets, grocery shops, retail stores and other sales outlets. The buyer takes the item; he is neither required to return the bottle nor required to make a deposit to assure its return
to the seller. He could return the bottle and get a refund. A number of bottles at times find their way to commercial users. It cannot be gainsaid that ownership of the containers does pass on the consumer albeit subject to the statutory limitations on the use of the registered
containers and to the trademark rights of the registrant.
In plain terms, therefore, La Tondeña not only sold its gin products but also the marked bottles or containers, as well. And when these products were transferred by way of sale, then ownership over the bottles and all its attributes (jus utendi, jus abutendi, just fruendi, jus
disponendi) passed to the buyer. It necessarily follows that the transferee has the right to possession of the bottles unless he uses them in violation of the original owner’s registered or incorporeal rights.
Furthermore, Sec. 5 of R.A. 623 states that when the bottles have been “transferred by way of sale,” there should not be any need of institution of any action included in the same act (where there is a need of the written consent of the manufacturer, bottler, or seller). Since
the Court has found that the bottles have been transferred by way of sale then, La Tondeña has relinquished all its proprietary rights over the bottles in favor of Distilleria Washington who has obtained them in due course. Now as owner, it can exercise all attributes of
ownership over the bottles.
The general rule on ownership, therefore, must apply and petitioner be allowed to enjoy all the rights of an owner in regard the bottles in question, to wit: the jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing what it produces; the jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing
by its use; the jus disponendi or the power of the owner to alienate, encumber, transform and even destroy the thing owned; and the jus vindicandi or the right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such
thing. What is proscribed is the use of the bottles in infringement of another’s trademark or incorporeal rights.
 SERVICEWIDE SPECIALISTS, INC. V CA
G.R. No. 110048 | November 19, 1999 | J. Purisima
FACTS:
1. Leticia Laus purchased on credit a Colt Galant xxx from Fortune Motors (Phils.) Corporation and executed a promissory note for the amount of P56,028.00, inclusive of 12% annual interest, payable within a period of 48 months. In case of default in the payment of any installment,
the total principal sum, together with the interest, shall become immediately due and payable.
2. As a security for the promissory note, a chattel mortgage was constituted over the said motor vehicle, with a deed of assignment incorporated therein such that the credit and mortgage rights were assigned by Fortune Motors Corp. in favor of Filinvest Credit Corporation with the
consent of the mortgagor-debtor Laus.
3. Filinvest in turn assigned the credit in favor of Servicewide Specialists, Inc.
4. Laus failed to pay the monthly installment for April 1977 and the succeeding 17 months. Servicewide demanded payment of the entire outstanding balance with interests but Laus failed to pay despite formal demands.
5. As a result of Laus’ failure to settle her obligation, or at least to surrender possession of the motor vehicle for foreclosure, Servicewide instituted a complaint for replevin, impleading Hilda Tee and John Dee in whose custody the vehicle was believed to be at the time of the filing of
the suit. Plaintiff alleged, among others, that it had superior lien over the mortgaged vehicle. The court approved the replevin bond.
6. Alberto Villafranca filed a third party claim contending that he is the absolute owner of the subject motor vehicle after purchasing it from a certain Remedios Yang free from all lien and emcumbrances; and that on July 1984, the said automobile was taken from his residence by
Deputy Sheriff Bernardo Bernabe pursuant to the seizure order issued by the court a quo.
7. Upon motion of the plaintiff below, Villafranca was substituted as defendant and summons was served upon him. Villafranca moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there is another action pending between the same parties before the Makati RTC. The court
granted the the motion but subsequently set aside the order of dismissal. For failure to file his Answer as required by the court a quo, Villafranca was declared in default and plaintiff’s evidence was received ex parte.
8. The lower court later on dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner appealed to CA on the ground that a suit for replevin aimed at the foreclosure of a chattel is an action quasi in rem, and does not require the
inclusion of the principal obligor in the Complaint.
9. CA affirmed the RTC decision. It also denied petitioner’s MR, hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
W/N a case for replevin may be pursued against the defendant, Alberto Villafranca, without impleading the absconding debtor-mortgagor

HELD:
No. Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that an applicant for replevin must show that he “is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof.” Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the specified property is so
conceded or evident, the action need only be maintained against him who so possesses the property. In rem action est per quam rem nostram quae ab alio possidetur petimus, et semper adversus eum est qui rem possidet.
However, in case the right of possession on the part of the plaintiff, or his authority to claim such possession or that of his principal, is put to great doubt (a contending party may contest the legal bases for plaintiff’s cause of action or an adverse and
independent claim of ownership or right of possession may be raised by that party), it could become essential to have other persons involved and impleaded for a complete determination and resolution of the controversy.
In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession must be established. The conditions essential for foreclosure of chattel mortgage would be to show, firstly, the existence of the chattel mortgage and, secondly, the default of the mortgagor. Since the mortgagee’s right of possession is
conditioned upon the actual fact of default which itself may be controverted, the inclusion of other parties, like the debtor or the mortgagor himself, may be required in order to allow a full and conclusive determination of the case. Laus, being an indispensable party, should have been
impleaded in the complaint for replevin and damages. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. Petition DENIED.
Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. 74553 June 8, 1989
The rule is settled that the chattel mortgagor continues to be the owner of the property, and therefore, has the power to alienate the same; however, he is obliged under pain of penal liability, to secure the written consent of the mortgagee. Thus, the instruments of mortgage are binding, while they subsist, not only upon
the parties executing them but also upon those who later, by purchase or otherwise, acquire the properties referred to therein

Facts: Galicano Siton purchased from Car Traders Philippines, Inc. a vehicle and paid a downpayment of the price. The remaining balance includes not only the remaining principal obligation but also advance interests and premiums for motor vehicle insurance policies. Siton executed a promissory note in favor of Car Traders Philippines, Inc.
expressly stipulating that the face value of the note shall “be payable, without need of notice of demand, in instalments. There are additional stipulations in the Promissory Note consisting of, among others, that if default is made in the payment of any of the installments or interest thereon, the total principal sum then remaining unpaid, together
with accrued interest thereon shall at once become due and demandable. As further security, Siton executed a Chattel Mortgage over the subject motor vehicle in favor of Car Traders Philippines, Inc. The credit covered by the promissory note and chattel mortgage executed by respondent Galicano Siton was first assigned by Car Traders
Philippines, Inc. in favor of Filinvest Credit Corporation.
Subsequently, Filinvest Credit Corporation likewise reassigned said credit in favor of petitioner Servicewide Specialists, Inc. Siton was advised of this second assignment. When Siton failed to pay, Servicewide Specialists filed this action against Galicano Siton and “John Doe.” After the service of summons, Justiniano de Dumo, identifying
himself as the “John Doe” in the Complaint, inasmuch as he is in possession of the subject vehicle, filed his Answer with Counterclaim and with Opposition to the prayer for a Writ of Replevin.
Siton alleged the fact that he has bought the motor vehicle from Galicano Siton; that de Dumo and Siton testified that, before the projected sale, they went to a certain. Atty. Villa of Filinvest Credit Corporation advising the latter of the intended sale and transfer. Siton and de Dumo were accordingly advised that the verbal information given to the
corporation would suffice, and that it would be tedious and impractical to effect a change of transfer of ownership as that would require a new credit investigation as to the capacity and worthiness of Atty. De Dumo, being the new debtor. The further suggestion given by Atty. Villa is that the account should be maintained in the name of Galicano
Siton.; that as such successor, he stepped into the rights and obligations of the seller; that he has religiously paid the installments as stipulated upon in the promissory note. He also manifested that the Answer he has filed in his behalf should likewise serve as a responsive pleading for his co-defendant Galicano Siton.

Issue: Whether or not the mortgagee is bound by the deed of sale by the mortgagor in favour of a third person, as neither the mortgagee nor its predecessors has given written or verbal consent thereto pursuant to the deed of Chattel Mortgage.

Held: The absence of the written consent of the mortgagee to the sale of the mortgaged property in favor of a third person, therefore, affects not the validity of the sale but only the penal liability of the mortgagor under the Revised Penal Code and the binding effect of such sale on the mortgagee under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage. The rule is
settled that the chattel mortgagor continues to be the owner of the property, and therefore, has the power to alienate the same; however, he is obliged under pain of penal liability, to secure the written consent of the mortgagee. Thus, the instruments of mortgage are binding, while they subsist, not only upon the parties executing them but also
upon those who later, by purchase or otherwise, acquire the properties referred to therein
There is no dispute that the Deed of Chattel Mortgage executed between Siton and the petitioner requires the written consent of the latter as mortgagee in the sale or transfer of the mortgaged vehicle. We cannot ignore the findings, however, that before the sale, prompt inquiries were made by private respondents with Filinvest Credit
Corporation regarding any possible future sale of the mortgaged property; and that it was upon the advice of the company’s credit lawyer that such a verbal notice is sufficient and that it would be convenient if the account would remain in the name of the mortgagor Siton.
Even the personal checks of de Dumo were accepted by petitioner as payment of some of the installments under the promissory note. If it is true that petitioner has not acquiesced in the sale, then, it should have inquired as to why de Dumo’s checks were being used to pay Siton’s obligations.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, VICENTE A. ROBLES and NESTOR GAPUZAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), Hon. BENIGNO T. DAYAW,as, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
80, JESUS SY and LILY FRANCISCO UY, respondents. [G.R. No. 93540. December 13, 1999] Case Digest

FACTS:

On August 9, 1988 two police officers of Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to
the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber.

What were declared in the documents were narra flitches, while the cargo of the truck consisted of narra lumber. In the documents, the plate numbers of the truck supposed to carry the cargo bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492 or NSN-267, while the plate of the truck apprehended is NVT-881.
Considering that the cargo is lumber, the transport should have been accompanied by a Certificate of Lumber Origin, scale sheet of said lumber and not by a Certificate of Timber Origin. The Log Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM Golden Cup International as the Seller and Bonamy
Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and not with Lily Francisco Lumber Hardware.

These are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10 which requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by the following documents:

1. Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by the District Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester;
2. Sales Invoice;
3. Delivery Receipt; and
4. Tally Sheets.

Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.
On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck
Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed the said order to the Office of the President. Consequently, the narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government and were later on advertised to be sold at a public auction on March 20, 1989.
On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated items, and to enjoin the panned auction sale of the subject narra lumber, respectively.
On the same day, the trial court issued an order directing the parties to desist from proceeding with the planned auction sale and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on March 27, 1989.
On March 20, 1989, private respondents filed and Ex-Parte motion for Release and Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin) supported by an Affidavit for Issuance of Writ of Replevin and Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court granted the writ of
replevin on the same day and directed the petitioners "to deliver the xxx [n]arra lumber, original documents and truck with plate no. NJT 881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their representatives x x x".
On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to comply therewith. Sheriff David G. Brodett of Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City, reported that the petitioners prevented him from removing the subject properties from the DENR compound and transferring
them to the Mobile Unit compound of the Quezon City Police Force. He then agreed to a constructive possession of the properties. On that same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation stating their intention to file a counterbond under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to stay the execution of the writ of
seizure and to post a cash bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court did not oblige the petitioners for they failed to serve a copy of the Manifestation on the private respondents. Petitioners then made immediately the required service and tendered the cash counterbond but it was refused,
petitioners' Manifestation having already been set for hearing on March 30, 1989.
On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond but was also denied for the same reason.
On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in contempt for disobeying the writ of seizure. The trial court gave petitioners 24 hours to answer the motion. Hearing was scheduled on March 30, 1989.
On March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the orders of the trial court dated March 20, 1989 and March 27, 1989.
On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the form of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P180,000.00.
On March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition. It declared that the complaint for replevin filed by the private respondents complied with the requirements of an affidavit and bond under Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court,
issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory.
As for the contempt charges against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals believed that the same were sufficiently based on a written charge by private respondents and the reports submitted by the Sheriff.
On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision but it was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated May 18, 1990.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC was correct in the issuance of a writ of replevin and the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition and lifting the preliminary injunction.
RULING:
Pursuant to Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705, all actions and decision of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of 30 days from the receipt by the aggrieved party of said
decision unless appealed to the President. The decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

It was observed by the Court that herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of the petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct
their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.

It was pointed out by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest land fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the DENR. It held that assumption of the trial court of a replevin
suit constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of preliminary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.

However, herein petitioners did not a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, it is deemed waived.
Nonetheless, the Court finds the petition impressed with merit.
First. A writ of replevin does not issue as a matter of course upon the applicant's filing of a bond and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Section 2 Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot
justify the issuance of a writ of replevin. Wrongful detention of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactory established. If only mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued.

In the case at bar, the taking of the subject property was within the administrative authority of the Secretary as provided by Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. Thus, it is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for by the private respondents.

Second. By virtue of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary, the subject properties of private respondents were held in custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of replevin. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. So basic is this doctrine that it found
inclusion in the 1997 amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Third. Petitioner Secretary's authority to confiscate forest products under SEction 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.

Fourth. SEction 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires the delivery of the seized forest products within six (6) hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Section 68 and not to
administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.

Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents' allegation that their right to due process was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to confiscation of their properties.

Finally. The writ or seizure and the writ of replevin was issued by the trial court in grave abuse of its discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto cannot constitute indirect contempt of court which presupposes that the court order thereby violated was valid and legal. Without a lawful order being issued, no
contempt of court could be committed.
The instant petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 1990 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1990 were set aside. Respondent presiding judge of the RTC of Quezon City was permanently enjoined from enforcing the Orders dated March 20, 1989 and March 22, 1989, or
if said orders had already been issued, said respondent judge was directed to render judgement of forfeiture of replevin bond filed by private respondents. Finally, the said respondent judge is hereby permanently enjoined from further acting on the Motion for Contempt filed by private respondents
against petitioners.

Remedial Law; Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Assumption by the trial court of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative.—The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and
convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. As to the application of this doctrine in cases involving violations of P.D. No.
705, our ruling in Paat v. Court of Appeals, is apropos: “Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very
nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

Same; Replevin; A writ of replevin does not just issue as a matter of course; Mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Section 2, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance thereof.—A writ of replevin does not just issue as a matter of course upon the applicant’s filing of a bond and
affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Sec. 2, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance of a writ of replevin.

Same; Same; Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily established; The taking of the subject properties is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for by private respondents.—Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an
action for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued. x x x As the petitioner Secretary’s administrative authority to confiscate is clearly provided by law, the taking of the subject properties is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed
for by private respondents.

Same; Same; Issuance of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary was a valid exercise of his power under Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705; When a thing is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to recover it.—Issuance of the confiscation order by
petitioner Secretary was a valid exercise of his power under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705. By virtue of said order, the narra lumber and six-wheeler truck of private respondents were held in custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of replevin. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. When a thing is in
official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to recover it. Otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the function of law had been performed as to the process under which the property was taken.

Same; Same; Secretary’s authority to confiscate forest products under Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 is distinct from and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action under Section 68.—Petitioner Secretary’s authority to confiscate forest products under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct from and
independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.

Same; Same; Delivery of the seized forest products within six (6) hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions.—Sec. 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within six (6) hours from the time of the seizure
to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not to administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.

Same; Contempt; The writ of seizure and the writ of replevin were issued by the trial court in grave abuse of its discretion; Without a lawful order having been issued, no contempt of court could be committed.—The writ of seizure and the writ of replevin were issued by the trial court in grave abuse of its discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto
cannot constitute indirect contempt of court which presupposes that the court order thereby violated was valid and legal. Without a lawful order having been issued, no contempt of court could be committed.

Constitutional Law; Due Process; It is settled that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.—Nothing in the records supports private respondents’ allegation that their right to
due process was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to the confiscation of their properties. On the contrary, by private respondents’ own admission, private respondent Sy who drove the six-wheeler truck was properly investigated by petitioner Atty. Robles at the PIC/SAID Office of the DENR. Thereafter, private respondent Sy and
his witnesses were given full opportunity to explain the deficiencies in the documents. Private respondents categorically stated that they made a “continuous and almost daily follow-up and plea x x x with the PIC for the return of the truck and lumber x x x.” Finally in a letter dated December 30, 1989, private respondent Lily Francisco Uy
requested petitioner Secretary for “immediate resolution and release of the impounded narra sawn lumber.” Undoubtedly, private respondents were afforded an opportunity to be heard before the order of confiscation was issued. There was no formal or trial type hearing but the same is not, in all instances, essential in administrative
proceedings. It is settled that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
 [G.R. No. 121939. October 4, 1999]
SPOUSES ROMAN & AMELITA T. CRUZ and SPOUSES SEVERINO & PRIMITIVA T. BAUTISTA, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ALFREDO & MELBA TORRES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 1622 ordering petitioners to surrender to respondents the lot described in TCT No. 42806 and remove petitioners house and other improvements
thereon, and to pay respondents P5,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals and which bind the parties in this appeal are the following:

x x x plaintiff Alfredo Torres is the elder brother of defendants Amelia Torres Cruz and Primitiva Torres Bautista. Their parents are the late Simplicio and Gregoria Castaeda Torres. In 1946, while in his youthful years, Alfredo worked as a mechanic for a US Army ambulance unit stationed at Manila.
From his earnings, he purchased by installments from Ortigas Madrigal Co., Inc. a parcel of land in Barangay Saniga, Mandaluyong, Rizal (now Mandaluyong City), with an area of 299 square meters. When his American employer left, he was employed as a municipal electrician in Mandaluyong. In
1956, he was issued the land title (T.C.T. No. 42806).

Meanwhile, the Torres family were being evicted from their residence. Alfredo allowed them to construct their dwelling on the lot. Eventually, Alfredos sisters married and left the house, except his sisters Amelia and Primitiva and their spouses.
On February 2, 1958, Alfredo and co-plaintiff Melba Baldeo were married. They lived with his parents and defendants-sisters but left after a year because the house was overcrowded and they wanted privacy.
Subsequently, Alfredo mortgaged the lot to finance his wifes medical board examinations and internship but redeemed it a year later.
In 1962, Alfredo verbally asked his sisters Amelia and Primitiva to vacate the premises because he needed the lot to construct a medical clinic for his wife. Amelia and Primitiva requested an extension and Alfredo agreed.
After the death of his father Simplicio in 1970, Alfredo again demanded from his sisters to vacate the place but the latter stubbornly refused and even claimed that their father is the real owner of the lot.
Despite the refusal of Amelia and Primitiva to vacate the premises, Alfredo continued paying the realty taxes on the lot. However, after 1982, he stopped paying the taxes for he realized that only his sisters are benefiting from the lot.
On September 2, 1987, Alfredo and Melba through counsel, sent Amelia and Primitiva a final letter of demand for them to vacate the lot.
The case was referred to the barangay which issued a certificate to file action when the parties failed to settle amicably. Thus, the instant complaint was filed on October 7, 1987.3
On December 18, 1990, the trial court rendered decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Alfredo and Melba Torres and against defendants spouses Roman and Amelia Cruz and spouses Severino and Primitiva Bautista, ordering the latter and all other persons claiming rights over them
to surrender the lot described in TCT No. 42806 to plaintiffs, and remove at their expense the house they are now occupying as well as additional constructions thereon; to pay the amount of P5,000.00 pesos as reasonable attorneys fees.

With costs against defendants.

SO ORDERED.

In due time, defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.4cräläwvirtualibräry

After due proceedings, on June 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming the appealed decision, with costs against appellants.
Hence, this appeal.5cräläwvirtualibräry
On March 20, 1996, the Court required private respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice.6cräläwvirtualibräry
On September 6, 1996, private respondents filed their belated comment.7 On October 30, 1996, petitioners filed a reply to the comment.8cräläwvirtualibräry
We deny the petition.
The sole issue raised is whether it is the regional trial court or the municipal trial court which has jurisdiction over the subject of the action or suit, petitioners contending that the action is one for unlawful detainer within the jurisdiction of a municipal trial court.
We find petitioners contention untenable.
The jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the court can not be made to depend upon the defenses
set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant.9

The present action, although termed as one for reconveyance of real property is actually one for recovery of the right to possess or accion publiciana. This is an action for recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a regional trial court to determine the
better right of possession of realty independently of the title.10 Accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion is also used to refer to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.11 In such case, the
regional trial court has jurisdiction.12 Here, the parties admit that the subject real property is registered in the name of respondent Alfredo Torres. In the regional trial court what respondent sought was to recover possession of the subject real property alleging that he owned the lot on which he had
allowed his father (now deceased) and sisters, petitioners herein, to erect their houses. Since the complaint alleged that respondent Alfredo Torres was the owner of the subject lot and that he merely allowed his father Simplicio Torres and his sisters Amelia and Primitiva to construct their houses
thereon, and that since 1972 respondent pleaded to petitioners to remove their houses and such additional constructions thereon as respondent needed the lot for his own use, the action is plainly one for recovery of possession of real property, or accion publiciana, filed on October 7, 1987, more than
one year after dispossession or when possession became unlawful, which is within the jurisdiction of a regional trial court.13 As heretofore stated, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint, not by the answer nor by the evidence adduced at the trial. Thus, the
jurisdiction of the lower court is not affected by the fact that petitioners asserted in their answer to the complaint that the subject lot was truly owned by the estate of their father, also the father of respondent, or that the last written demand to vacate was given on September 2, 1987, just more than a
month prior to the filing of the action. Since initial demand to vacate was made in 1972, petitioners occupancy became unlawful. Subsequent demands were merely in the nature of reminders or reiterations of the original demand, the one-year period to commence suit is counted from the first
demand.14 When the dispossession lasted beyond one year, the proper action is accion publiciana for recovery of possession of the subject property filed in the regional trial court.15cräläwvirtualibräry

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33757, promulgated on June 23, 1995, and its resolution adopted on September 7, 1995.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Natividad Nazareno and Maximo Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, et.al.
G.R. No. 138842, October 18, 2000
Mendoza, J.

FACTS
During their marriage, Maximino Nazarano, Sr. and Aurea Poblete acquired properties in Quezon City. After their death, Romeo, one of their children, filed an intestate case in the Court of First Instance of Cavite. He was thereafter appointed as the administrator. In the course of the intestate
proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents executed several deeds of sale in January 1970 conveying a number of real properties to his sister, Natividad. One of the properties involved six lots in Quezon City. By virtue of the said deed, transfer certificates of title were issued to Natividad. Among
the lots covered was Lot 3-B which was occupied by Romeo and his wife, and by his brother, Maximino, Jr.

Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B to Maximino, Jr. When he found out of the sale, Romeo and his wife locked Maximino, Jr. of of the house. As such, Maximino, Jr. filed an action for recovery of possession and damages. The trial court ruled in favor of Maximino, Jr. which the Court of
Appeals affirmed. On Jun 1988, Romeo in turn filed for the annulment of sale against Natividad and Maximino, Jr on the ground of lack of consideration. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. then filed a third-party complaint seeking the annulment of the transfer to Romeo and cancellation of his title.

During the trial, Romeo presented evidence to show that Maximino and Aurea never intended to sell the six lots to Natividad and Natividad was only to hold the said lots in trust for her siblings. He presented a Deed of Partition and Distribution dated June 1962. Further, Romeo testified that the deeds
were created for consideration, but they never really paid any amount for the supposed sale in order to avoid payment of inheritance taxes. On the other hand, Natividad and Maximino, Jr. claimed that she bought the properties because she was the one financially able to do so.

The trial court declared thereafter the nullity of the January 1970 Deed of Sale and ordered that the remaining properties were held in trust by Natividad in favor of his brother, Jose. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision in the sense that the titles of Lot 3 and Lot 3-B were canceled and
restored to the estate of Maximino, Sr.

Hence, the petitioner filed a case before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE Whether or not the Deed of Sale is valid, thus transferring ownership to Natividad.

HELD
NO. The Supreme Court held that the sale was simulated since there was lack of consideration. The ownership therefore never transferred to Natividad. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the intention of Maximino, Sr. and Aurea to transfer the subject properties to Natividad was present in order to
escape payment of inheritance taxes. If at all, there was an implied trust constituted under Art. 1449 of the Civil Code which states that there is implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no
beneficial interest or only a part thereof.

Further, Art. 1061 provides that every compulsory heirs who succeeds with other compulsory heirs must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way or donation or gratuituous title, for the determination of the
legitime of each hair.

Judgement of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

 [ GR No. 131641, Feb 23, 2000 ]
NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO v. CA BELLOSILLO, J.:
A writ of execution must conform to the judgment to be executed; it may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life, and in fact exceeds it, it
has pro tanto no validity. To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional provision against depriving a person of his property without due process of law.[1]

Adjudication of ownership necessarily includes delivery of possession. Indeed, it would be defeating the ends of justice should we require that for the parties to obtain possession of the property duly adjudged to be theirs from those who have no right to remain therein, they must submit to court
litigations anew.[2] An exception however exists where the actual possessor has shown a valid right over the property enforceable even against the owner thereof.[3]

On 15 March 1985 Natividad Nazareno filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Damages against spouses Romeo and Eliza Nazareno. Natividad avers in her complaint that she is the sole and absolute owner of a parcel of land located in Naic, Cavite, covered by TCT No. 51798 of the Registry of
Deeds of Cavite. Sometime in April 1981 Natividad's brother, Romeo, and his wife Eliza convinced Natividad to lend them TCT No. 51798 to be used as collateral to a loan the proceeds of which would be used in the completion of the construction of the Naic Cinema on the subject property. Natividad
agreed on the condition that title to her property would be returned within one (1) year from the completion of the construction of the cinema. Accordingly, Natividad executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of spouses Romeo and Eliza over the lot covered by TCT No. 51798. The sale, however, was
simulated because Natividad did not receive any consideration therefor.

The cinema was completed in November 1981 but despite several demands by Natividad, spouses Romeo and Eliza failed and refused to return Natividad's title to the property; instead, they had the property transferred in their name. Consequently, TCT No. T-118276 was issued in their name in lieu
of TCT No. 51798.

Spouses Romeo and Eliza denied that the property belonged to Natividad. On the contrary, they averred that it originally formed part of the estate of the late Maximino Nazareno, Jr., father of Romeo and Natividad. According to Romeo, the property was his share in their inheritance. As regards the
deed of sale, he explained that it was only resorted to for the purpose of carrying out and implementing the transfer of the property forming part of the estate of Maximino Nazareno Jr., the distribution of which was entrusted to Natividad.

The trial court found for the spouses Romeo and Eliza and ruled that although the Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated, the same could be treated as an adjudication and a conveyance to Romeo of his share in the estate of his father.

But the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise. It found that during pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Natividad and spouses Romeo and Eliza was simulated as there was in fact no money consideration. Consequently, the burden of proof was shifted to Romeo to prove
that the transfer was in reality a conveyance of his share in the estate of his father. But during trial, Romeo failed to prove this so-called conveyance of his share. On the other hand, Natividad satisfactorily showed that the property was previously sold to her by their late father. Romeo failed to disprove
this fact. Neither did he successfully cause the deed of sale executed by Maximino Nazareno Jr. in favor of Natividad to be declared null and void. Resultingly, its authenticity and validity remained unrebutted.

In short, the Court of Appeals did not sustain the trial court and set aside its Decision. The Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Natividad in favor of the spouses Romeo and Eliza as well as TCT No. 118276 was declared null and void. Hence, the Register of Deeds was ordered to restore TCT No.
51798 under the name of Natividad. The case was brought to us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari but we denied the petition after having ascertained that the appellate court committed no reversible error. Thus, the Court of Appeals' decision became final and executory on 13 June 1996.

On 7 November 1996 Natividad filed a Manifestation and Motion with the Regional Trial Court of Naic praying for the issuance of a writ of execution as well as a writ of possession. The spouses Romeo and Eliza filed an Opposition contending that in her Complaint Natividad never prayed that she be
placed in possession of the subject premises. Neither did the Court of Appeals order that petitioner be placed in possession of the property.

On 21 February 1997 the trial court granted the writ of execution prayed for but denied the issuance of a writ of possession as it was not included in the decision of the Court of Appeals. Natividad's Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Hence, recourse was made to the Court of Appeals.

On 9 September 1997 the Court of Appeals denied the petition thus -

Execution not in harmony with the judgment has no validity. It must conform more particularly to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision, as the only portion of the decision that becomes the subject of execution.

Therefore, to issue a writ of possession in favor of petitioner in this case where possession was never decreed in favor of petitioner, would be void x x x

Moreover, it is a settled rule that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from possession unless sought in connection with (1) a land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and
no third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales.

It is an undisputed fact that this case is for the annulment of a private sale made by petitioner to private respondent. This action is not a land registration case nor a foreclosure of mortgage whether judicially or extrajudicially nor was the subject property sold in execution. Petitioner sought for the
issuance of a writ of possession in connection with a decision in a civil action for annulment of a private sale and damages.[4]
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition.

Obviously, we have no choice but to deny the petition. Section 49 (c) of Rule 39 (now Sec. 47 (c) of Rule 39) of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 49. Effect of judgments. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:

xxxx

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
From the aforestated, it is clear that a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but also to those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.[5] Thus although the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 12856 provides -
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the Decision appealed from and another is hereby rendered as follows:

1. The "Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land" (Exhibit "B") and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 118276 (Exhibit "F") under the name of the appellees are hereby declared null and void;

2. The Register of Deeds is hereby ordered to restore Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51798 under the name of the appellant.[6]
it is clear that the same resulted from the adjudication of ownership over the disputed lot which is necessarily included in the discussion. Thus, as explained by the Court of Appeals -

In sum, then, Lot 504-A-3 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51798 was owned by the appellant in her own right as vendee and not appellee's share in the estate of their deceased father. Consequently, appellee's claim that the appellant executed the "Deed of Absolute Sale" (Exhibit "B") for
the purpose of conveying to the appellee the latter's share in the estate of their deceased father is utterly bereft of factual basis x x x

Evidently, the decision of the Court of Appeals required no writ of possession as the writ of execution would suffice to place Natividad in possession of Lot 504-A-3. A case in point is Perez v. Evite[7] wherein the lower court declared Evite as owner of the disputed land. When the judgment became final
and executory, Evite moved for the issuance of a writ of execution which the trial court granted. Perez moved to quash the writ arguing that the writ was at variance with the decision as the decision sought to be executed merely declared Evite owner of the property and did not order its delivery to him.
Perez argued citing the cases of Jabon v. Alo[8] and Talens v. Garcia[9] which held that adjudication of ownership of the land did not include possession thereof. In resolving in favor of Evite this Court held -
x x x Considering that herein plaintiff-appellants have no other claim to possession of the property apart from their claim of ownership which was rejected by the lower court and, consequently, has no right to remain thereon after such ownership was adjudged to defendant-appellees, the delivery of
possession of the land should be considered included in the decision. Indeed, it would be defeating the ends of justice should we require that for herein appellees to obtain possession of the property duly adjudged to be theirs, from those who have no right to remain therein, they must submit to court
litigations anew.
In the instant case, spouses Romeo and Eliza could not use Jabon v. Alo and Talens v. Garcia to support their contention that the adjudication of ownership over the land does not necessarily include possession. As already decreed in Perez v. Evite -
It may be observed that in both decisions (Jabon v. Alo and Talens v. Garcia), this Court underscored the possibility that the actual possessor has some rights which must be respected and defined. It is thus evident that the pronouncement was made having in mind cases wherein the actual possessor
has a valid right over the property enforceable even against the owner thereof. As example, we gave the cases of tenants and lessees. However, it is our view that that above doctrine may not be invoked in instances where no such right may be appreciated in favor of the possessor. In the instant case
there appears in the appealed order of June 30, 1959, the specific finding of the trial court that "the plaintiffs have not given any reason why they are retaining the possession of the property" x x x x This factual finding cannot be reviewed in this instance as the appeal has been taken to us directly on a
question of law x x x x
The same ruling would apply in the instant case. The Court of Appeals categorically declared that the claim of spouses Romeo and Eliza over the disputed lot has utterly no factual basis. Therefore, they have no reason to remain in possession of the property.

But the same could not be said of the Naic Cinema. The matter of ownership and possession of the Naic Cinema was never put in issue. Consequently, petitioner cannot ask for a writ of possession to place her in physical occupancy of the Naic Cinema. Being declared owner of subject lot does not
also mean that she is automatically entitled to possession of all the improvements therein. Otherwise, the actual possessor would be deprived of his property without due process of law.

Finally, petitioner cannot validly claim possession over the Naic Cinema since in her complaint and subsequent pleadings, she has admitted not being the owner thereof. On the contrary, she claims that the Naic Cinema belongs to the estate of her father. On the other hand, respondent spouses have
asserted dominion over the Naic Cinema. Plainly, petitioner cannot wrest possession of the moviehouse from respondent spouses through a mere writ of possession as she herself even disclaims being the owner thereof. Ownership over the Naic Cinema must be threshed out in a proper proceeding.
A mere prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession will not suffice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals denying the issuance of a writ of possession is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Nazareno vs. CA

Facts:
The husband and wife, in order to avoid paying estate tax, while they are alive, executed several Deeds of Sale in favor of their children. The sale was proven to be without consideration.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject properties of the Deeds of Sale are part of the estate of the deceased.

Held:
No, the children never acquired ownership because the sale was void for lack of consideration. The sale to a Natividad, one of the children, is deemed in trust for the other children of the deceased. The properties should be collated as part of the estate.

Remedial Law; Judgment; Execution; Adjudication of ownership necessarily includes delivery of possession; An exception exists where the actual possessor has shown a valid right over the property enforceable even
against the owner thereof.—–Adjudication of ownership necessarily includes delivery of possession. Indeed, it would be defeating the ends of justice should we require that for the parties to obtain possession of the
property duly adjudged to be theirs from those who have no right to remain therein, they must submit to court litigations anew. An exception however exists where the actual possessor has shown a valid right over the
property enforceable even against the owner thereof.

Same; Same; Same; A judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but also to those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.—–From the aforestated, it is clear that a judgment is not
confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but also to those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. x x x Evidently, the decision of the Court of Appeals required no writ of possession as the writ of
execution would suffice to place Natividad in possession of Lot 504-A-3. Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 338, G.R. No. 131641 February 23, 2000
 VILLARICO V. COURT OF APPEALS

309 SCRA 193

FACTS:
Spouses Villarico sought for the confirmation of title over a parcel of land to which they allege that they absolutely own the land. This was opposed to by a person who posed himself also to be
the rightful owner of the land, as well as by the Director of Forestry who said that the subject land is part of forest land and may not be appropriated. Trial and appellate court dismissed
application of petitioners.

HELD:
There has been no showing that a declassification has been made of the land in question as disposable or alienable. And the record indeed disclosed that applicants have not
introduced any evidence which would have led the court a quo to rule otherwise.

Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no matter how long doesn’t ripen to a registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant or
title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.
MANLAPAZ VA CA

REGALADO, J.:

Through this special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with a prayer for preliminary injunction, petitioners would have us reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] which affirmed the order of the former Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch VII, authorizing the immediate
execution of the judgment rendered by the former Municipal Court of Candaba, Pampanga in Civil Case No. 425 for ejectment.

On October 20, 1971, herein private respondents, as plaintiffs, filed an ejectment case in the Municipal Court of Candaba, Pampanga against herein petitioners as defendants, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 425, alleging that on or about September 1, 1971 herein petitioners, thru force, intimidation
and threats and with the use of guns, forciby ousted the private respondents from Lots 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41, Block 21 of Bahay Pare, Pampanga, which private respondents had been occupying and cultivating peacefully, notoriously and continually for more than ten (10) years.

Petitioners resisted the ejectment case alleging lack of jurisdiction due to the pendency of Civil Case No. 79371 in the then Court of First Instance of Manila, and denied all other material allegations in the complaint.

Thereafter, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts wherein they agreed that:

1. The lots under litigation are Lots 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of Block 21 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Candaba, Pampanga;
2. The said lots belong to the Land Authority;
3. Both parties had filed their respective applications to purchase said lots from the Government;
4. On May 20, 1968, the Land Authority rendered its decision dismissing the applications of petitioners;
5. On appeal to the Office of the President, the decision of the Land Authority was reversed and the awards in favor of private respondents were cancelled;
6. Private respondents seasonably petitioned for judicial review and for annulment of said decision of the Office of the President before the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 79371;
7. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 79371, the Land Authority issued Orders of Award to petitioners on September 21, 1970;
8. The ejectment case was filed by private respondents during the pendency of said Civil Case No. 79371 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
9. Private respondents have been regularly harvesting an average one hundred (100) cavans per hectare from the land in dispute; and
10. On September 1, 1971, private respondents discovered petitioners' intrusion over subject property;[2]

On February 27, 1974, the Municipal Court of Candaba rendered judgment in favor of private respondents, ordering petitioners to vacate the lots and restore possession thereof to private respondents, and to pay as rentals twenty-five (25) cavans per hectare for each year from May, 1971 until they
shall have vacated the controverted lots.[3]

Petitioners duly appealed the said decision to the Court of First Instance of Macabebe, Pampanga, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 73-70-M. During the pendency of said appeal, a motion for execution pending appeal was filed by private respondents for failure of petitioners to file a supersedeas
bond. On April 2, 1974, the Court of First Instance of Candaba, Pampanga issued an order granting the same.[4]

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. SP-02996, and obtained therefrom a writ of preliminary injunction on a cash bond of P2,000.00.[5] However, on June 3, 1974, respondent court rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads:

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, this Court is constrained to dismiss, as it now dismisses, and denies certiorari; with costs, and preliminary injunction issued by this Court on 30 April, 1974 is set aside.
IT IS SO ORDERED."[6]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which allegedly has not been resolved by respondent court and by reason of which the respondent lower courts issued a writ of execution,[7] hence the petition at bar.[8]

We find petitioners' present recourse devoid of merit.

The writ of execution was properly issued pending appeal in the case. Respondent judge had neither abused his discretion nor committed an error of judgment, but merely complied with his ministerial duty under the Rules of Court when he granted private respondents' motion for immediate execution
of the judgments in their favor for failure of petitioners to file a supersedeas bond.

Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides in part that:

"If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the justice of the peace or municipal court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First
Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the justice
of the peace or municipal court to exist. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period.
x x x."

Under this rule, to stay the immediate execution of judgment in an ejectment proceeding it is required that the defendant-appellant must (a) perfect his appeal, (b) file a supersedeas bond, and (c) periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal. Failure to comply with said
requirements is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment upon petition of the prevailing party.[9]

It has been repeatedly held that the requirement for the filing of a supersedeas bond is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with by the courts. When the supersedeas bond is not filed, the duty of the court to order the execution of the appealed decision is ministerial and imperative and the execution of
the judgment shall then issue immediately,[10] without prejudice to the appeal taking its course.[11]

In the instant case, petitioners' failure to file a supersedeas bond necessary to stay execution pending appeal made or rendered the original decision executory and gave private respondents the right to immediate execution of the judgment which the court is bound to grant and enforce.

The claim of petitioners that the order of execution is contrary to the doctrine laid down and reiterated in the cases of Rallon vs. Ruiz, Jr., et al.,[12] Realiza vs. Duarte,[13] and Hernandez, et al. vs. Clapis, et al.[14] is without merit.

The aforementioned cases stand on different factual settings, hence the common dictum therein is not applicable in the case at bar. In those cases, the order of the executive department, giving the defendant in the ejectment case preferential right over the land in dispute, was already final and
executory. The rights of the defendants therein over the property that they claimed were already settled and not contested by the adverse parties.

In the present case, the right of petitioners over the land in controversy is doubtful. The decision of the Office of the President giving petitioners preferential rights to own the questioned lots, setting aside the decision of the Land Authority awarding the same to private respondents, was questioned by
the latter before the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 79371. In fact, on November 17, 1972, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, upon learning of the pendency of said case, ordered the suspension of the processing of all papers relative to the disputed lots and the holding in abeyance
of further action on said papers until Civil Case No. 79371 shall have been terminated.[15] In addition, on August 10, 1977, private respondents submitted to the Court a copy of the decision in Civil Case No. 79371 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated April 28, 1977, declaring the letter decision
of the Office of the President dated October 4, 1968 and its letter order of February 27, 1970 as null and void, and declaring private respondents Hernando, Teodoro, Pablo, Renato, and Bonifacio, all surnamed Rivera, as qualified applicants of the questioned lots.[16]

Moreover, in the present case the decision is not yet final but became executory by reason of the very act of herein petitioners in not filing a supersedeas bond necessary to stay execution pending appeal as required by Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Herein petitioners could have prevented
the execution of said decision by simply complying with the rules but they opted not to do so, hence they have only themselves to blame.

On the issue of jurisdiction, it is the contention of petitioners that the Municipal Court of Candaba has no jurisdiction over the ejectment case for two reasons, namely, (1) a civil case for annulment of the decision of the Office of the President is still pending final determination in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, and (2) there was no compliance with Presidential Decree No. 316 requiring prior referral of the ejectment case to the Department of Agrarian Reform.

We reject these pretensions.

Firmly settled is the rule that a municipal court has jurisdiction over forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases even if the ownership of the property is in dispute.[17] A resume of the basic legal principles in point would be apropos.

In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is one of priority of possession. The legal right thereto is not essential to the possessor's cause of action, for no one may take law into his own hands and forcibly eject another or deprive him of his possession by stealth, even if his title thereto
were questionable or actually disputed in another case.[18] If the plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner, but on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and
detainer even if he should be the owner of the property.[19]

An action for recovery of possession is totally distinct and different from an action for recovery of title or ownership. In fact, a judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not that of ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affect
the ownership of the land or building.[20] Section 7 of Rule 70 expressly states that:

"The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building, nor
shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving possession."

We have held that in giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the
decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person who has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending this decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the possession of the
property which is the subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social order.

Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a piece of land and desires to vindicate his ownership against the party actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a court of competent jurisdiction; and he can not be permitted, by invading the
property and excluding the actual possessor to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to try the property right.[21] In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to
deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.[22] When a person is in possession of the land and has maintained that possession for years, he cannot be forcibly dispossessed thereof, even by the owner.[23]

Further, the authority given to the Bureau of Lands over the disposition of public lands does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the public character of the land notwithstanding. The exercise by the courts of such jurisdiction is not an interference with the alienation,
disposition and control of public lands.[24] The determination of the respective rights or rival claimants to public lands is different from the determination of who has the actual possession or occupation with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. A judgment of
the court ordering restitution of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or another illegal manner, can never be prejudicial interference with the disposition or alienation of public lands. On the contrary, if courts were deprived of
jurisdiction over the cases involving conflicts of possession, the threat of judicial action against breaches of peace committed on public lands would be eliminated, and a state of lawlessness would probably be produced between applicants, occupants, or squatters, where force or might, not right or
justice, would rule.[25]

It is, therefore, clear that the municipal court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case below as the complaint filed before it sufficiently avers that private respondents seek to recover possession of the lots from petitioners. The pendency of Civil Case No. 79371, wherein the question of ownership
was raised, is of no moment. Pending final adjudication of ownership, the municipal court has jurisdiction to determine in the meantime the right of possession over the land.[26]

Prior referral of this case to the Department of Agrarian Reform under the provisions of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 316, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 27, is not necessary. The said laws are not applicable to the case at bar. There is here no allegation in the pleadings nor any showing
in the records that a tenancy relation exists between petitioners and private respondents. Both groups are claiming a right of possession in the concept of an owner. The referral provisions of Presidential Decree No. 316 apply only in cases wherein the parties are landlords and tenants and not when
they are applicants of a public land claiming preferential right over it, as in this case.

As we ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[27]:

"x x x for the lands subject of the action to come under Operation Land Transfer under Pres. Decree No. 27, there must first be a showing that they are tenanted lands and for the action to come within the referral provisions of Pres. Decree Nos. 316 and 946, it must first be established that the action
involves tenants. The aforecited decrees specifically speak of 'tenant farmer', 'sharecrop or lease tenancy', 'tenant', and 'tenant tiller'."

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the writs prayed for are DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on May 16, 1975 is hereby lifted.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149118 February 16, 2006
FLAVIANA LIM CAJAYON and CARMELITA LIM CONSTANTINO, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES SANTIAGO and FORTUNATA BATUYONG, Respondents. TINGA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari challenges the two rulings of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP. No. 50952. The first decision dated 27 November 2000 1 upheld the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirming the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) order for ejectment, while the Resolution dated 5 July 2001 2 denied the motion for reconsideration.

First, the factual background of the case.

Flaviana Lim Cajayon and Carmelita Lim Constantino (petitioners) and Isagani P. Candelaria (Candelaria) were co-owners of a 260-square meter lot, then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-10870. On 1 February 1995, a partition agreement3 was entered into by petitioners and Candelaria, wherein Lot 6-A, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 100 square meters, more or less, was
adjudicated to Candelaria, while Lot 6-B, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 160 square meters, more or less, was given to petitioners. TCT No. C-10870 was cancelled and TCT No. 288500 was issued in the name of petitioners.

On 30 May 1995, Candelaria sold his property, including the improvements thereon, to Spouses Santiago and Fortunata Batuyong (respondents). TCT No. 294743 was issued in their names over the said parcel of land.4

On 21 May 1996, petitioners started the construction of a seven (7)-door bungalow-type building that allegedly intruded into the lot of Respondents. At the instance of respondents, petitioners were summoned by barangay officials to a meeting on the matter. It was then agreed upon that petitioners would defer the construction work pending the result of a relocation survey to be conducted by a
government surveyor.

A verification survey was conducted by Geodetic Engineer Florentina C. Valencia. She submitted a report dated 12 November 1996 which yielded the findings that Lot 6-A (Candelaria’s) and Lot 6-B (petitioners’) were not correctly positioned geographically on the ground with respect to TCT No. 294743. Thus, as per survey, sub-lot B with an area of 10.43 square meters serves as right of way of Lot 6-
B (petitioners’ lot) while sub-lot C with an area of 10.18 square meters was the portion of Lot 6-A (respondents’ lot) presently occupied by petitioners.5

Despite the delineation of said boundaries, petitioners proceeded with the forestalled construction, allegedly occupying at least 20.61 square meters of respondents’ lot, including the portion being used as right of way for petitioners’ tenants.

After respondents secured a permit from the barangay and the Caloocan City Building Official to fence their lot, they made demands to petitioners to vacate the encroached portion but to no avail. Respondents brought the matter to the barangay but no amicable settlement was reached. A Certificate to File Action was issued to them by the Barangay Lupon Tagapayapa. A final demand was made
through a letter dated 20 May 1997 upon petitioners to vacate the encroached premises. Petitioners, however, vehemently refused to vacate and surrender the premises.

On 14 April 1997, respondents filed an ejectment case against petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial Court 6 (MeTC) of Caloocan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 23359. In a Decision 7 dated 2 July 1998, the MeTC ordered petitioners to vacate and surrender possession of a portion of respondents’ lot and to pay ₱500.00 per month as fair rental value from May 1996 until the premises is finally
vacated, plus ₱5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.8

On appeal, the RTC9 affirmed the judgment of the MeTC.10 In doing so, the RTC debunked the three (3) arguments posed by petitioners. First, contrary to petitioners’ submission, the RTC ruled that the MeTC had jurisdiction over the instant complaint. The RTC noted that the issue of jurisdiction was never raised in the court a quo while on the other hand, petitioners actively participated in the
proceedings therein by filing their Answer and Position Paper. Evidently, petitioners raised the question of jurisdiction as a mere afterthought as he did so only after he obtained an adverse judgment. Second, the allegations of the complaint sufficiently averred a case for ejectment which the RTC found to be within the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Third, the trial court ruled that petitioners categorically
recognized the validity of the verification survey done by Engineer Valencia, as shown by the presence of petitioner Flaviana Cajayon during the verification survey and setting of monuments per survey report. 11

Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration but it was denied in an Order 12 dated 12 January 1999 of the RTC. They elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. On 27 November 2000, the appellate court rendered a Decision 13 dismissing the petition. Holding that the exclusive jurisdiction to try unlawful detainer cases is
vested with the MeTC, the appellate court ratiocinated, thus:

The complaint in the instant case establishes jurisdictional facts necessary to sustain the action for unlawful detainer and the remedy it seeks is merely to obtain possession of the controverted lot from Respondents. Specifically, it alleges that sometime on May 21, 1996, petitioners started construction works in the area which intruded into a portion of respondents’ property; that the parties eventually
agreed to stop the construction subject to the result of a survey to be conducted thereon; that a survey was conducted in the presence of the parties and a report was submitted by Engr. Valencia on November 12, 1996, showing an encroachment of about 20.61 square meters of respondents’ lot including that portion being used as a right of way for petitioners’ tenants; that even after the boundaries
had been verified, petitioners resumed the construction on the area; that despite verbal and written demands, the last of which was made on March 20, 1999, petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the encroached area. Surely, respondents’ resort to unlawful detainer when petitioners failed to leave the controverted premises upon demand is in order. 14

The appellate court also held that the fact that petitioners’ houses already stood on the controverted lot long before the purchase of the land by respondents failed to negate the case for ejectment. 15 The appellate court emphasized that prior physical possession is not a condition sine qua non in unlawful detainer cases. The court likewise sustained the RTC findings on the validity of the verification
survey conducted by Engineer Valencia that petitioners have encroached on a 20.61 square meter portion of respondents’ lot.

On 5 July 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution 16 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioners now come to us via the present petition, submitting as issues the question of jurisdiction and the weight to be accorded to the verification survey results.17

Petitioners anchor their petition on the court a quo’s lack of jurisdiction over the instant suit. The averments in the complaint do not make out a case for ejectment, they claim, as their entry into the disputed lot was not made by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Neither was their possession of the disputed property by virtue of the tolerance of respondents or the latter’s predecessor-in-
interest.

Respondents counter that the jurisdictional elements necessary to maintain an action for unlawful detainer clearly obtain in the case at bar, namely: (a) after the parties agreed to the conduct of a survey by a government surveyor and after the survey, it was determined that the structures introduced by herein petitioners have encroached a portion of herein respondents’ lot; (b) notices to vacate and
surrender of possession of the encroached portion were made to petitioners, the last being on March 20, 1997; and (c) the suit was instituted on April 11, 1997 or within one (1) year from date of last demand. 18

Respondents also stress that possession of the premises by petitioners took place more than one year before the filing of the complaint and the absence of an allegation in the complaint that such possession of the disputed portion was merely by virtue of respondents’ tolerance does not deprive the lower court of its original and exclusive jurisdiction nor will it negate respondents’ action for unlawful
detainer.19

It is settled that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.20

The Complaint21 filed by respondents (plaintiffs therein) alleged these material facts:1avvphil.net

2. That defendants and Isagani P. Candelaria were the former co-owners of a certain piece of land located in Maypajo, Caloocan City containing an area of 260 square meters, more or less, under TCT No. C-10870 issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City;
3. That on February 1, 1995, said co-owners subdivided this parcel of land by virtue of a Partition Agreement wherein Lot 6-A, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 100 square meters, more or less, was given to Isagani P. Candelaria, while Lot 6-B, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 160 square meters, more or less, was given to defendants. A copy of said Partition Agreement is
hereto attached as Annex "A";
xxx xxx xxx
5. That on May 30, 1995, Isagani P. Candelaria sold his share to the herein plaintiffs, including the improvements thereon, in the sum of ₱100,000.00, under a Deed of Absolute Sale x x x;
xxx xxx xxx
7. That sometime in May 21, 1996, defendants started construction works in the area and intruded into the lot owned by the plaintiffs causing the latter to protest and report the matter to the barangay authorities;
8. That on the same day, the parties were summoned to appear before the Barangay Chairman wherein defendants agreed to stop the construction works, and in a subsequent conference on June 7, 1996, they agreed to defer the matter pending the result of a survey to be conducted by a government surveyor;
xxx xxx xxx
 11. That the following day, September 5, 1996, Geodetic Engineer Florentina C. Valencia conducted a survey of the aforesaid property and placed the concrete monuments thereon in the presence of plaintiffs and defendants;
12. That on November 12, 1996, a verification survey report was submitted by Geodetic Engineer Florentina C. Valencia together with the survey verification plan xxx;
13. That despite defendants’ knowledge of the property boundary, and despite repeated serious objections from plaintiffs, defendants proceeded to construct a seven-door bungalow-type semi-concrete building, occupying at least 10.18 square meters and another 10.43 square meters for the right of way, thus encroaching upon at least 20.61 square meters of plaintiffs’ lot, and further
demolishing plaintiff’s wall.
xxx xxx xxx
20. That despite repeated and continuous demands made by plaintiffs upon defendants, both oral and written, the last being on March 20, 1997, defendants in manifest bad faith, wanton attitude, and in a malevolent and oppressive manner and in utter disregard of the property rights of plaintiffs, have failed and refused, and still fail and refuse to vacate the same up to the present time
x x x.22

From the above-quoted allegations taken in tandem with the textbook distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, it is clear that the complaint makes out a case for forcible entry, as opposed to unlawful detainer. The distinctions between the two forms of ejectment suits, are: first, in forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until he was
deprived thereof by the defendant, whereas, in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; second, in forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful but it
becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to the possession of the property under his contract with the plaintiff; third, in forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the defendant to vacate the premises, but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in nature. 23Respondents had been in prior physical possession of the property
in the concept of owner prior to petitioners’ intrusion on 21 May 1996. When petitioners encroached upon respondents’ lot and started construction works thereon the latter was dispossessed of the area involved. Despite various demands by respondents to vacate, petitioners obstinately refused to do so. Clearly, petitioners’ entry into the said property was illegal from the beginning, precluding an
action for unlawful detainer.On the other hand, to establish a case of forcible entry, the complaint must allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.24 It is not essential, however, that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law. It would be sufficient that facts are set
up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions. 25The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession thereof. To constitute the use of "force" as contemplated in the above-mentioned provision, the trespasser does not have
to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary that he use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.26 In the case at bar, petitioners’ encroachment into respondents’ property in an oppressive and malevolent manner,
coupled with their refusal to vacate the premises despite knowledge of the proper boundaries and heedless of respondents’ serious objections, indelibly connotes "force" within the meaning of the law.

Petitioners contend that while they concede they might have intruded on respondents’ property, the action is barred by prescription because it was filed more than one (1) year after the occurrence of the alleged intrusion. The contention is baseless. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff to bring an action in the proper inferior court for forcible entry or unlawful detainer within one (1)
year, respectively, after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. In forcible entry, the one-year period is counted from the date of actual entry on the land. 27

Records show that the ejectment suit was instituted on 11 April 1997. Petitioners’ actual entry into the property, according to the complaint, took place on 21 May 1996. Thus, the suit was filed well within the one (1)-year period mandated by law.
As a collateral issue, petitioners claim that they are at least entitled to the rights of a builder in good faith on the premise that they are not the owners of the property encroached upon.This contention is not tenable. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. 28 In the instant case, when the verification survey report
came to petitioners’ knowledge their good faith ceased. The survey report is a professional’s field confirmation of petitioners’ encroachment of respondents’ titled property. It is doctrinal in land registration law that possession of titled property adverse to the registered owner is necessarily tainted with bad faith. Thus, proceeding with the construction works on the disputed lot despite knowledge of
respondents’ ownership put petitioners in bad faith.

Now, the second issue. Petitioners question the evidentiary weight of the verification survey report. They point out that since the survey was a unilateral act of respondents, done as it was without their consent, they should not be bound by its findings. 29

In raising the issue, petitioners are in effect asking this Court to reassess the factual findings of the courts below, a task which is beyond this Court’s domain. Factual matters cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. This Court at this stage is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts.30 We find no ample reason to depart from this rule, more so in
this case where the Court of Appeals has affirmed the factual findings of the RTC and the MeTC.Moreover, there is a presumption that official duty is regularly performed,31 i.e., government officials who perform them are clothed with the presumption of regularity, 32 as the courts below pointed out.33 In this case, the verification survey was conducted by a government functionary.Even prescinding from
the presumption of regularity, what appears on record is that the verification survey was conducted with the agreement of both parties and in their presence. That was the finding made by the courts below and affirmed by the appellate court without any wrinkle. 34WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, this Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.1avvphil.net

SO ORDERED.

Actions; Ejectment; Pleadings and Practice; Jurisdictions.—It is settled that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.

Same; Same; Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer, Distinguished.—The distinctions between the two forms of ejectment suits, are: first, in forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant, whereas, in
unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; second, in forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, the
possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to the possession of the property under his contract with the plaintiff; third, in forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the defendant to vacate the premises, but in
unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in nature.

Same; Same; Forcible Entry; To establish a case of forcible entry, the complaint must allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; A person’s encroachment into another person’s
property in an oppressive and malevolent manner, coupled with their refusal to vacate the premises despite knowledge of the proper boundaries and heedless of the latter’s serious objections, indelibly connotes “force” within the meaning of the law.—To establish a case of forcible entry, the complaint
must allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not essential, however, that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law. It would be sufficient that facts are
set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions. The words “by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth” include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession thereof. To
constitute the use of “force” as contemplated in the above-mentioned provision, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary that he use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor
therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. In the case at bar, petitioners’ encroachment into respondents’ property in an oppressive and malevolent manner, coupled with their refusal to vacate the premises despite knowledge of the proper
boundaries and heedless of respondents’ serious objections, indelibly connotes “force” within the meaning of the law.

Same; Same; Same; In forcible entry, the one-year period is counted from the date of actual entry on the land.—Petitioners contend that while they concede they might have intruded on respondents’ property, the action is barred by prescription because it was filed more than one (1) year after the
occurrence of the alleged intrusion. The contention is baseless. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff to bring an action in the proper inferior court for forcible entry or unlawful detainer within one (1) year, respectively, after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. In
forcible entry, the one-year period is counted from the date of actual entry on the land. Records show that the ejectment suit was instituted on 11 April 1997. Petitioners’ actual entry into the property, according to the complaint, took place on 21 May 1996. Thus, the suit was filed well within the one (1)-
year period mandated by law.

Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; It is doctrinal in land registration law that possession of titled property adverse to the registered owner is necessarily tainted with bad faith.—Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his
title. In the instant case, when the verification survey report came to petitioners’ knowledge their good faith ceased. The survey report is a professional’s field confirmation of petitioners’ encroachment of respondents’ titled property. It is doctrinal in land registration law that possession of titled property
adverse to the registered owner is necessarily tainted with bad faith. Thus, proceeding with the construction works on the disputed lot despite knowledge of respondents’ ownership put petitioners in bad faith.

Same; Appeals; Factual matters cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari—the Supreme Court at this stage is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts.—In raising the issue, petitioners are in effect asking this Court to reassess the factual findings
of the courts below, a task which is beyond this Court’s domain. Factual matters cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. This Court at this stage is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. We find no ample reason to depart from this rule, more
so in this case where the Court of Appeals has affirmed the factual findings of the RTC and the MeTC.

Same; Land Titles; Verification Surveys; Presumption of Regularity; There is a presumption that official duty is regularly performed, i.e., government officials who perform them are clothed with the presumption of regularity, such as in the case of a verification survey conducted by a government
functionary.—There is a presumption that official duty is regularly performed, i.e., government officials who perform them are clothed with the presumption of regularity, as the courts below pointed out. In this case, the verification survey was conducted by a government functionary. Even prescinding
from the presumption of regularity, what appears on record is that the verification survey was conducted with the agreement of both parties and in their presence. That was the finding made by the courts below and affirmed by the appellate court without any wrinkle.