FILAMER v IAC they heard a sound as if something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did
Persons Vicariously liable-Owners/Managers-When Applicable-Within the scope
of assigned tasks | Oct 16, 1990 | J. Fernan
Nature of Case: Petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Digest maker: Ned Estoesta
NOTE: Digest is for both the main case and its MR
SUMMARY: Kapunan suffered injuries after being hit by a jeep owned by Filamer
but was driven by Funtecha, who was not the authorized driver but a janitor of
the school and still learning to drive, after he persuaded Allan Masa, the actual
driver, to let him drive. Kapunan filed a criminal case against Funtecha wherein
he was found guilty. Kapunan, after reserving his right to file a civil suit, filed a
case for damages against Funtecha and Filamer. The TC found them both liable
which the CA affirmed. However, the SC did not find Filamer liable since they
found that there was no employee-employer relationship between them at the
time of the incident because Funtecha was not doing his task as he was only the
janitor and not the driver of the jeep.
ACT – Funtecha driving the jeep but not being the authorized driver
INJURY – Kapunan suffering serious injuries and being hospitalized for 20 days
NEGLGENCE – Main decision: Funtecha negligent for driving but Filamer not
negligent in selection
MR: Both negligent due to being an employer of Funtecha. They were negligent as
employer since the employee was in the scope of his assigned task at the time of
the incident.
CAUSATION – When Funtecha swerved to avoid a collision of the truck, he
swerved to the direction of Kapunan and hit him
DOCTRINE: The clause “within the scope of assigned tasks” for purposes of raising the
presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at
the time of the infliction of the injury or damage.
The existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the
question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act
in furtherance of his master's business
FACTS:
 Potenciano Kapunan while walking along Roxas Avenue in Roxas City, at 6:30
in the evening, was struck by a jeep owned by Filamer and driven by its
alleged employee Funtecha. Kapunan suffered serious injuries and was
hospitalized for 20 days.
 At the time of the incident, only 1 headlight of the jeep was working.
Funtecha was driving with only a student driver’s permit, and drove the
jeep after persuading the authorized driver Allan Masa to turn over the
wheel to him. (Funtecha was still learning how to drive)
 Allan Masa only gave the wheel to Funtecha only after driving down a road,
negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear.
According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit HOWEVER, in the MR filed by the heirs of Kapunan
them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving,
not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards Kapunan and hit
him.
 Kapunan filed a criminal case against Funtecha alone and reserved the right
to file an independent civil action. Funtecha was found guilty. Kapunan then
filed a civl case for damages and in the case, the defendants were Filamer
and Funtecha. Agustin Masa, director and president of Filamer Christian
Institute in his personal capacity as well since he personally authorized and
allowed Funtecha, his houseboy, to drive the vehicle despite knowing he
did not have a license to drive the vehicle. Allan Masa, Agustin’s son, was
not included.
 The TC rendered judgment finding Filamer and Funtecha liable but also
found Allan, a non-party liable as well.
 Agustin Masa, as director of Filamer was liable for failure to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in his supervision of his son, Allan but
absolved him in his personal capacity as he was not in the vehicle.
 Zenith Insurance Corp, as third party defendant failed to prove there was a
policy violation made by Filamer absolving them of liability under the insurance
policy. There was no violation since Funtecha was considered as the authorized
driver while driving the vehicle in accordance with the insurance policy and is
then liable to pay Filamer.
 Filamer and Zenith appealed but the CA affirmed the TC decision.
 Filamerr’s claim is that it cannot be liable for Funtecha as there is no existing
employer-employee relationship between them.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. W/N the term employer in art 2180 applies to Filamer.
RULING:
1. NO
 Filamer cannot be considered Funtecha’s employer. Funtecha belongs to a
special category of students who render service to the school in exchange
for free tuition. Funtecha is assigned to clean the school passageways; but he
is not included in the company payroll.
 The provision of Section 14 is obviously intended to eliminate an erstwhile
gray area in labor relations and seeks to define in categorical terms the precise
status of working scholars in relation to the learning institutions in which they
work for the privilege of a free education
 The primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to Filamer
for the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it has been satisfactorily
shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed
employment. His duty was to sweep the school passages for two hours every
morning before his regular classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from
the authorized driver and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner
resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not within
the ambit of his assigned tasks.
Funtecha then was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for
which he was employed and so Filamer cannot be held liable.
 The heirs of Kapunan claim that under Article 2180 an injured party shall have person "whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s)
recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for whom, at the time of the who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over (him).
incident, the servant was performing an act in furtherance of the interest and  Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment
for the benefit of the Filamer. Funtecha allegedly did not steal the school jeep for a driver's position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his
nor use it for a joy ride without the knowledge of the school authorities. grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the
 Funtecha is a working student as a part-time janitor. In relation to the school, he incident was for the benefit of the Filamer.
is an employee even if assigned to clean the school for only 2 hours.  The fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the
 Allan Masa, allowed Funtecha, to take over the vehicle while on his way home one scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting
late afternoon. Where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the
president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him.
allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute
 Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated October 16, 1990 is
petitioner-school. He further said that there was no specific time for him to be off- hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the trial
duty and that after driving the students home at 5:00pm he still had to go back to court decision is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED
school and then drive home using the same vehicle.
 Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where
both Allan Masa and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest
of the school. Masa has to drive home the school jeep so he can use it to
fetch students in the morning
 Since Funtecha was learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the
direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha
was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school. The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for
and in behalf of his employer for which act Filamer cannot deny any
responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial
duties. scope of their assigned tasks"
 The clause “within the scope of assigned tasks” for purposes of raising the
presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee,
in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the
employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage.
 the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by
answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the
accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business.
 Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which
the Filamer anchors its defense, was promulgated only for the purpose of
administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of
employment. In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the
substantive law on labor. Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the
decisive law in a civil suit for damages.
 The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment
between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought
by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person,
against both doer-employee and his employer.
 Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary
liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An
implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid
liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
 There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-
contractual obligation arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a