POLITICAL LAW

1. Definition: Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the
organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of
the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It
may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations,
administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of
the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it
regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in
business: hence, political in essence.

 Macariola vs Asuncion

By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a
conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives
of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July
10, 1899).

While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign
continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do
not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are
not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the
conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress
in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of
American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief
Justice Marshall said:

On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants
with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new
relations are created between them and the government which has acquired their territory. The same
act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which
may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and
general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly- created power of the State.

Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle
of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are
totally abrogated. "

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision
of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to
the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and
binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides
that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is
prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.

Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing
that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in
which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The
business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as
Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of
the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly
becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not
enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he
has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or
transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40
O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).

It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in
its business operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation
benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was
no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation
was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola,
plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E
from the aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on
November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when
respondent Judge was no longer connected with the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein
on January 31, 1967.

Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting
members of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.

It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948,
does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law,
municipal judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law after office
hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.

Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as
heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
America, because it is political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by
judges of a property in litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties,
cannot apply to respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the
finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of partition;
hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation.

RULING

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not
violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in
engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities,
because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but
must always be above suspicion.

WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED
TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.

SO ORDERED.

2. CO-EQUAL BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

 IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL
AUTONOMY MOVEMENT v. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND
REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY.

This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund1 and replacing it with
the “Judiciary Support Fund.” Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support Fund shall be
remitted to the national treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds will be
used.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this
court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of
Congress.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This matter was raised to this court through the letter4 dated August 27, 2014, signed by Mijares and
addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. The letter is
captioned:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petition for Mandamus with Manifestation to invoke the Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy as
mandated under the Constitution5

The entire budget for the judiciary, however, does not only come from the national government. The
Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the judiciary to maintain its independence.61 In Bengzon v.
Drilon:62
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express
mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.63
Courts, therefore, must also be accountable with their own budget. The Judiciary Development Fund,
used to augment the expenses of the judiciary, is regularly accounted for by this court on a quarterly
basis. The financial reports are readily available at the Supreme Court
website.64chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

These funds, however, are still not enough to meet the expenses of lower courts and guarantee credible
compensation for their personnel. The reality is that halls of justice exist because we rely on the
generosity of local government units that provide additional subsidy to our judges.65 If not, the budget
for the construction, repair, and rehabilitation of halls of justice is with the Department of
Justice.66chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As a result, our fiscal autonomy and judicial independence are often undermined by low levels of
budgetary outlay, the lack of provision for maintenance and operating expenses, and the reliance on
local government units and the Department of Justice.

“Courts are not constitutionally built to do political lobbying. By constitutional design, it is a co-equal
department to the Congress and the Executive. By temperament, our arguments are legal, not political.
We are best when we lay down all our premises in the finding of facts, interpretation of the law and
understanding of precedents. We are not trained to produce a political statement or a media
release.”67chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Because of the nature of courts, that is – that it has to decide in favor of one party, we may not have a
political base. Certainly, we should not even consider building a political base. All we have is an abiding
faith that we should do what we could to ensure that the Rule of Law prevails. It seems that we have no
champions when it comes to ensuring the material basis for fiscal autonomy or judicial
independence.”68chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For this reason, we appreciate petitioner’s concern for the judiciary. It is often only through the vigilance
of private citizens that issues relating to the judiciary can be discussed in the political sphere.
Unfortunately, the remedy he seeks cannot be granted by this court. But his crusade is not a lost cause.
Considering that what he seeks to be struck down is a proposed bill, it would be better for him to air his
concerns by lobbying in Congress. There, he may discover the representatives and senators who may
have a similar enthusiastic response to truly making the needed investments in the Rule of Law.

3. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN RELATION TO THE JUDICIAL BRANCH

SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE POWER

A. Scope of executive power

  Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 669, G.R. No. 88211 (1989)
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Though the right to return to one's country is not constitutionally protected, it is a generally accepted
principle of international law, and thus a part of domestic law. It is not, however, an absolute right.
Public interest grounds may limit it.

The petitioner, former president Ferdinand E. Marcos, was deposed. Near death, he wished to return to
the Philippines. The new president, Corazon C. Aquino, refused. The Supreme Court considered the
petitioner's petition for mandamus. The petitioner argued it was unconstitutional to forbid him from
returning under the guarantees of due process, the liberty of abode, and the right to travel. The
petitioner also argued that his right to return to the Philippines was guaranteed under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The
government argued that the right of the State to national security trumped individual rights. The Court
said, "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct
right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat
the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country,
and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights.

The Court allowed the government’s ban on Marcos’ and his family’s return. Both the majority and
dissenting opinions cited the UDHR.

 Marcos v. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211) October 27, 1989 | 177 SCRA 668

Ferdinand Marcos, et al., petitioners

Hon. Raul Manglapus, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, et al., respondents

FACTS:

On September 15, 1989, the SC voted 8-7 to dismiss the petition of the Marcos family to allow the
return of former President Ferdinand Marcos from Honolulu, Hawaii to the Philippines. The Court held
that President Corazon Aquino did not act arbitrarily with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present
circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare.

The decision affirmed the constitutionality of President Corazon Aquino's prior refusal, fearing the
instability and security issues that may arise once the remains of former President Marcos were to be
brought back to the country. In a statement, she said:

"In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately
conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E.
Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under
this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide."
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not President Aquino has the power to deny the return of Marcos' remains.
2. Whether or not President Aquino's refusal to allow the return of Marcos' remains is tantamount to
dictatorship.

HELD:

1. Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive
power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive
power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The
powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.

EN BANC:

In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the
petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to
the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a
statement, President Aquino said:

In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately
conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E.
Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under
this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1;
Rollo, p, 443.]

On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following major
arguments:

1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them
not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the
Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;

2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it
arbitrarily; and

3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus,
petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the necessary travel
documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M.
Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and enjoin respondents
from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the
other petitioners, to the Philippines.

Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for
reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the
'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label 'return
of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide the
Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays
that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.

We deny the motion for reconsideration.

1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the
movants, petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the
Court.

2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the Court is of
the view that no compelling reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration
of the Court's decision.

The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the
factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to
which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to
have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused by the
return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision to bar their return when she
called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal"
President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the
world." [Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]

3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive
power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department
and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to
the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the
President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the
general grant of executive power.

That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This
is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of
governmental powers among three (3) separate branches.

Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely accepted view, this statement cannot be read as
mere shorthand for the specific executive authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton
stressed the difference between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the conditional
language of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States . . ." Hamilton submitted that "[t]he [article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought
therefore to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition
of execution power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in
confomity with other parts of the Constitution...

In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court — accepted Hamilton's proposition, concluding that the
federal executive, unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as
not forbidden by the constitutional text: the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened
by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions
where limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the
constitutional concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather, the concept
suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution are themselves exhausted by internal
enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is
implied unless there or elsewhere expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159
(1978).]

And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual
powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained
analogy, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the
power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6 which
provides:

Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat
or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly
fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters
of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land,

There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the
power of the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all,
Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers
to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation.

4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath
of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the
return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under
present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that
she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court
will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."

B. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
  Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers G.R. No. 180643, March 25,
2008

Petitioner: Romulo L. Neri

Respondents: Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Senate

Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security

Facts:

Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA), was invited by the respondent Senate Committees to attend their joint investigation on the
alleged anomalies in the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project. This project was contracted by the
Philippine Government with the Chinese firm Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), which
involved the amount of US$329,481,290. When he testified before the Senate Committees, he disclosed
that then Commission on Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him P200
million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the questions on 1.) whether
or not the President followed up the NBN Project, 2.) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and 3.) whether or not she directed him to approve it.

Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to
appear and testify on 20 November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter
dated 15 November to the Committees requesting them to dispense with Neri’s testimony on the
ground of executive privilege. Ermita invoked the privilege on the ground that “the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of
China,” and given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President,
Neri “cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the
very thing the privilege is designed to protect.” Thus, on 20 November, Neri did not appear before the
respondent Committees.

On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring him to show cause why he
should not be cited for contempt for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20 November. On 29
November, Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and explained that he did not intend to snub the
Senate hearing, and requested that if there be new matters that were not yet taken up during his first
appearance, he be informed in advance so he can prepare himself. He added that his non-appearance
was upon the order of the President, and that his conversation with her dealt with delicate and sensitive
national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high
government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines. Respondents found the explanation unsatisfactory, and later on issued an Order citing Neri
in contempt and consequently ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-
Arms until he appears and gives his testimony.

Neri filed the petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show Cause Letter and the Contempt Order
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
stressed that his refusal to answer the three questions was anchored on a valid claim to executive
privilege in accordance with the ruling in the landmark case of Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, 20
April 2006). For its part, the Senate Committees argued that they did not exceed their authority in
issuing the assailed orders because there is no valid justification for Neri’s claim to executive privilege. In
addition, they claimed that the refusal of petitioner to answer the three questions violates the people’s
right to public information, and that the executive is using the concept of executive privilege as a means
to conceal the criminal act of bribery in the highest levels of government.

Issue:

Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were covered by executive
privilege, making the arrest order issued by the respondent Senate Committees void.

Discussion:

Citing the case of United States vs. Nixon (418 U.S. 683), the Court laid out the three elements needed
to be complied with in order for the claim to executive privilege to be valid. These are: 1.) the protected
communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power; 2.) it must be
authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial
test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President; and, 3.) it may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence,” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege on the argument that the
communications elicited by the three questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between
the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process,” and
that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations
with the People’s Republic of China.” It is clear then that the basis of the claim is a matter related to the
quintessential and non-delegable presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relations.

As to the second element, the communications were received by a close advisor of the President. Under
the “operational proximity” test, petitioner Neri can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
the President’s Cabinet.

And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority. Presidential communications are presumptive privilege and that the
presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to
such conversations. In the present case, respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or critical
need for the answers to the three questions in the enactment of any law under Sec. 21, Art. VI. Instead,
the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI.
As ruled in Senate vs. Ermita, “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.”

Neri’s refusal to answer based on the claim of executive privilege does not violate the people’s right to
information on matters of public concern simply because Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution itself
provides that this right is “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”
Held:

The divided Supreme Court (voting 9-6) was convinced that the three questions are covered by
presidential communications privilege, and that this privilege has been validly claimed by the executive
department, enough to shield petitioner Neri from any arrest order the Senate may issue against him for
not answering such questions.

The petition was granted. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner in contempt of the
Senate Committee and directing his arrest and detention was nullified.

C. IMMUNITY OF THE PRESIDENT FROM SUIT

“Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,may not be
sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive
branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important
duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.”

The main reason for this absolute immunity is that itwill degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President if he can be dragged into court litigations. Moreover, it is important that he be freed from any
form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions as head of state.

 SOLIVEN, petitioner VS. JUDGE MAKASIAR, respondent

167 SCRA 393

FACTS:

This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against
them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary
of Justice and, subsequently by the President
Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were violated when respondent RTC
judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if
any, to determine probable clause
Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit
DECISION:

Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions.

The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc is LIFTED.

RATIO:

Background of the first issue

MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice
MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice
MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary
Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.

-This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a “Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed”, in effect, waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-
affidavits.

Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-
affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the
respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

Second issue

This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest:

Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrests.

-However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witness.
Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall: (1) Personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause (and on the
basis, thereof, issue a warrant of arrest); or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of probable cause.

Third issue

Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the President’s filing of her complaint-
affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial
court’s jurisdiction. àThis would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by
testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

-This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf.

-The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a
decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person (And there is nothing in our laws
that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege).

Additional Issue:

Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the
publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on
press freedom.

-Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the “chilling
effect” point.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION Guitierrez, Jr., J.

Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves around the three principal issues. With regard to
whether or not the libel case would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom, Gutierrez believes that
this particular issue is the most important and should be resolved now rather than later.

Quotable quotes: “Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be
assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.” –United States v. Bustos

“No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the
citizen must speak of him only with bated breath.” –People v. Perfecto

 David v. Arroyo May 24, 2018

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Powers of the President.
David v. Arroyo GR No. 171396; May 3, 2006
FACTS:

President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case covers the seven
consolidated petitions for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of PP1017 and General Order No. 5
implementing the former. it is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed
grave abuse of discretion and that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to
defend and preserve democratic institutions are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed
and protected by the constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional

HELD:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
decrees. legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that “the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives”. To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to
“laws”, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws such as customs laws, laws
governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only
order the military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertaining to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

D. IMPEACHMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES

Impeachment in the Philippines is an expressed power of the Congress of the Philippines to formally
charge a serving government official with an impeachable offense. After being impeached by the House
of Representatives, the official is then tried in the Senate. If convicted, the official is either removed
from office or censured.

Impeachment followed by conviction is often the only way to forcibly remove a sitting official. While
"impeachment" is often used to refer to the entire process of removing an official from office, it only
formally refers to the indictment stage in the House of Representatives, not the trial stage in the Senate.
Under the current Constitution, an official can be impeached if one third of the House of
Representatives votes in favor. Since it takes only a simple majority to set the agenda or to adjourn the
House, it can be difficult for a minority of one third to bring a vote and impeach an official

 Estrada v. Desierto
JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO (D) G.R. No. 146710, Mar. 2, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
elected Vice-President.
Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused
the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more
than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political
convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate
President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.
Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their oath as judges
with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the 2nd envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under
the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In
disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the
EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the 11 senators.
January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-km line
of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala
Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's
resignation.
January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. Petitioner agreed to the
holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of National
Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to
the EDSA Shrine. General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000
strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this
government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service
commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.
January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines. Petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.
January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the
powers the duties of the Presidency.
February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further
proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted."
February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment
"confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution."

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.
Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting
President.

HELD:
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The
validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal
effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he
evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and
omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall
be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President xxx.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability
of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he
is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has
been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by
a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH IN RELATION TO THE JUDICIAL BRANCH

A. Legislative and Police Power

 SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, NATIONAL TREASURER, and DIRECTOR
OF PRINTING, respondents. G.R. No. L-52265 January 28, 1980

Occeña Law Office for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

ANTONIO, J.:

Petition for prohibition seeking to restrain respondents from implementing Batas Pambansa Big.
51 (providing for the elective and/or appointive positions in various local governments), 52
(governing the election of local government officials scheduled on January 30, 1980), 53
(defining the rights and privileges of accredited parties), and 54 (providing for a plebiscite,
simultaneously with the election of local officials on January 30, 1980, regarding the proposed
amendment of Article X, Section 7, of the 1973 Constitution). The constitutional issues raised
are: (1) whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to authorize the holding
of local elections; (2) assuming it has such power, whether it can authorize said elections
without enacting a local government code; (3) as g it may validly perform the foregoing,
whether it can schedule such elections less than ninety, (90) days from the passage of the
enabling law; and; (4), assuming further that the proposed amendment to Article X, Section 7 of
the Constitution is valid, whether the plebiscite con be legally held together with the local
elections. The thrust of Petitioner's arguments is that these issues should be resolved in the
negative.

After deliberating on the memoranda and arguments adduced by both parties at the hearing as
January 15, 1980, the Court finds no merit in the petition.

1. The leguslative power granted by Section 1, Artcle VIII of the Constitution to the
National Assembly has been explicitly vested during the period of transition on the Interim
Batasang Pambansa by Amendment No. 2 to the constitution. The only station is that it shall not
exercise its treaty ratification powers provided in Article VIII, Section 14(1) of the Constitution.
The legislative power has described generally as being a power to make, alter and laws. 1 It is
the peculiar province of the legislature to probe general rules for the government of society. The
e of the legislative function is the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and
promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct. 2 It is a recognized principle in
constitutional law that the legislative body possesses Plenary power for all purposes of civil
government The 1egislative power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is, therefore, Complete,
subject only to the limitation that the interim Batasang Pambansa shall not exercise the power
of the National Assembly in the ratification of treaties. 3 The power to regulate the manner of
conducting elections, to Prescribe the form of the official ballot, and to provide for the Manner
in which candidates shall be chosen is inherently and historically legislative. Petitioner has. not
cited any provision of the Constitution, as amended by the Amendments of 1976, which
expressly or by implication deny to the Interim Batasang Pambansa the authority to call for local
elections. It is a well established rule that where no exception is made in terms, none will be
made by mere implication or construction. The wordings of a constitutional provision do not
have a narrow or contracted meaning, but are used in a broad sense, with a view of covering all
contingencies. Petitioner's invocation of the Report of the Committee on Transitory Provisions
of October 13, 1972 does not. support his contention that the Interim Batasang Pambansa has
no power to call local elections. The purported report refers to the interim National Assembly in
Article XVII, the convening of which was rejected by the Filipino people. As We stated in Peralta
v. Commission on Elections: 4

It should be recalled that under the terms of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, the
membership of the interim National Assembly would consist of the Incumbent President and
Vice-President, the Senators and the Representatives of the old Congress and the Delegates to
the Constitutional Convention who have opted to serve therein. The Filipino people rejected the
convening of the interim National Assembly, and for a perfectly justifiable reason.

By September of 1976, the consensus had emerged for a referendum partaking of the character
of a plebiscite which would be held to establish the solid foundation for the next step towards
normalizing the political process. By the will of the people, as expressed overwhelmingly in the
plebiscite of October 15 and 16, 1976, Amendments Nos. 1 to 9 were approved, abolishing the
interim National Assembly and creating in its stead an interim Batasang Pambansa. This was
intended as a preparatory and experimental step toward the establishment of full parliamentary
government as provided for in the Constitution. (at p. 61).

In the search for the meaning of the language of the Constitution, reference may be made to the
historical basis of the provisions. The historical events and circumstances which led to the
ratification of Amendments Nos. I to 9 of the constitution show the manifest intent and desire
 of the people to establish, during the period of transition, a government that can effectively
provide for the nation's peaceful and orderly transition from a crisis to a full parliament system
of government.

2. Neither can We find in Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution any requirement that the
enactment of a local government code is a condition sine qua non for the calling of the local
elections by the Interim Batasang Pambansa. Indeed, the holding of local elections does not, in
any manner, preclude the enactment of a local government code by the Batasang Pambansa at
some later period. There cannot be any doubt that our local governments are basic and
fundamental units in our democratic institutions, To strengthen these institutions, the election
of local officials should be periodically held. 5 Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to adopt
such a technical or strained construction as will unduly impair the efficiency of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa in meeting the challenges and discharging its responsibilities in response to
the problems arising in a modernizing and dynamic society. The legislative decision to call for
local elections in order to enable the Filipino people to exercise their sovereign right to choose
their local officials cannot, therefore, be faulted as a violation of the Constitution.

3. Section 6 of Article XII of the Constitution does not fix an unalterable period of ninety
(90) days for an election campaign. This provision must be construed in relation to Section 5 of
Article XII thereof which grants to the Commission on Elections the power to supervise or
regulate the operation of transportation public utilities, media of communication, etc. during
the "election period". Section 6 fixes the "election period" by stating that unless fixed by the
Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety (90) days before the day
of election and shall end thirty (30) days thereafter. In Peralta v. Commission on Elections,
supra, We resolved, in effect, this issue by holding that the forty-five day period of campaign
prescribed in Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code was not violative of Section 6 of Article XII of
the Constitution.

4. Considering that the proposed amendment to Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution

extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from
sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the
1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are
unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

 Philippine Association of Service Exporters v Drilon; G.R. No. L-81958; 30 Jun 1988; 163 SCRA
386

FACTS:
The Department of Labor and Employment issued Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, for
the temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers. The
 Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) challenges said order for being
discriminatory against domestic helpers and women of similar skills.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the assailed department order violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

HELD:
NO. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to “female contract
workers,” but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. There is
strong evidence that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances.
Such is not the case for male workers.

Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to “enhance the

protection for Filipino female overseas workers.” This Court has no quarrel that in the midst of
the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be
for their own good and welfare.

Petition is DISMISSED.

B. Law-making Body vs Rule-making authority

 ARANETA vs. GATMAITAN G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, April 30, 1957 (101 Phil 328)

Facts: Sometime in 1950, trawl operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to this
region most of them settling at Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for the purpose of using this
particular method of fishing in said bay. On account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that the
operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a
general clamor among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of
trawls in San Miguel Bay. In response to these pleas, the President issued Executive Order prohibiting
the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay.

A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint for injunction and/or
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance praying that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive order; to declare the same null and void, and for such
other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises. The CFI declared the Executive Order invalid;
the injunction prayed for is ordered to issue;

Issue: Whether the EO Executive Orders are valid and does not encroach the authority of the Legislature
in the said Prohibition.

Held: Yes, EO Executive Orders are valid for having been issued by authority of the Constitution, the
Revised Administrative Code and the Fisheries Act. The opinion of the SC that with or without said
Executive Orders, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come, under the
law, within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who in compliance with
his duties may even cause the criminal prosecution of those who in violation of his instructions,
regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls in the Philippine waters.

Under the law the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has authority to regulate or ban the
fishing by trawl which, it is claimed. The President of the Philippines exercise that same power and
authority according to Section 10(1), Article VII of the Constitution of the Philippines which states that
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercises general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed, and according to Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code which states that
Administrative acts and commands of the President of the Philippines touching the organization or
mode of operation of the Government or rearranging or readjusting any of the district, divisions, parts
or ports of the Philippines, and all acts and commands governing the general performance of duties by
public employees or disposing of issues of general concern shall be made in executive orders, and
Section 74 of the Revised Administrative Code also provides that all executive functions of the
government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be directly under the Executive Departments subject
to the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines in matters of general policy. The
Departments are established for the proper distribution of the work of the Executive, for the
performance of the functions expressly assigned to them by law, and in order that each branch of the
administration may have a chief responsible for its direction and policy. Each Department Secretary shall
assume the burden of, and responsibility for, all activities of the Government under his control and
supervision.

For administrative purposes the President of the Philippines shall be considered the Department Head
of the Executive Office.

THE POWER TO DELEGATE. — The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act
No. 2868 is a law unto itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make
rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation
of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not
complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is
vested in the Governor-General, the act is delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

C. Improper Delegation of Legislative Power

 GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation,
Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be
charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and
other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by
Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking
that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which
provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary
Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto
are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a)
separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d)
accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be
confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring
of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT
INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE
PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared
unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR
ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT
SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES
THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot
be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered
by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)

Application.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled
in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand
what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular
Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a
certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF
Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a)
how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in
Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does
not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court
hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which
contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

3. Checks and Balances.

a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.

The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does
not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of
the various departments of the government.203

D. Bill of Rights as Protection from the Government

 People v. Marti G.R. No. 81561; 18 January 1991

FACTS:
On 14 August 1987, appellant Andre Marti and his common-law wife went to the booth of the Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders to send four (4) packages to a fiend in Zurich, Switzerland. When asked if
the packages could be examined and inspected, appellant refused, assuring that they were simply gifts
of books cigars, and gloves. The packages were then placed in a box and was sealed with masking tape
for shipment.

As a standard operating procedure before delivering packages to the Bureau of Customs and/or Burueau
of Posts, the proprietor of the forwarding agency opened the box for final inspection. A peculiar odor
emitted therefrom and he found dried leaves inside. He brought samples to NBI, and informed them
that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Agents of the NBI went to his office and found the
shipment containing bricks of dried marijuana leaves, some of which were packed inside the gloves and
neatly stocked underneath tabacalera cigars. Thereafter, an information was filed against the appellant
in violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), for which he was found guilty. Appellant assailed the
decision, claiming that the evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, and further, that the court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally
searched and seized packages.

ISSUE:
May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights be invoked
against the State?

HELD:
No. As the Court held in several other cases, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State in the absence of governmental interference. This constitutional right (against
unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from
interference by government; and the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and
its agents, not upon private individuals. In the present case, it was the proprietor of the forwarding
agency who made search/inspection of the packages and the contraband came into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing appellant’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure.
The NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one. Thus, the alleged act of the private
individual in violation of a constitutional right cannot be invoked against the State.

NB:
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is
to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Reference:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.