The STATE
intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines (G.R.
Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, & 183962) (14 October 2008)
Facts:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP), represented by the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled
to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect
of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the authority and
jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro—
defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as well as the
municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the
2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power to build, develop, and maintain
its own institutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP and the
BJE as “associative,” characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It further
provides that its provisions requiring “amendments to the existing legal framework”
shall take effect upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact.
Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to
compel the respondents to disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies
of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to
information on matters of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to have the
City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the public respondents and
their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.
Issues and Ruling:
1. W/N the President has the power to pursue reforms that would require new
legislation and constitutional amendments.
YES. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually guarantees that
necessary changes shall be effected upon the legal framework of the GRP must be
struck down as unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the limits of the
President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments. Because although the
President’s power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers
as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, and, in the course of conducting peace
negotiations, may validly consider implementing even those policies that require
changes to the Constitution, she may not unilaterally implement them without the
assumed as a certainty.
2. W/N there is a violation of the people’s right to information on matters of
public concern (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution,
Art. II, Sec. 28), including public consultation under RA No. 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).
YES. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and
justify the exercise of the people’s right to be consulted on relevant matters
relating to the peace agenda:
a. EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP,
is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national
and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it
is the duty of the PAPP to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace
partners and concerned sectors of society;
b. RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations
before any project or program critical to the environment and human
ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group
of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is
one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership
of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment;
c. RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition
and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things,
the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP).
3. W/N the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the
pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No.
8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary, and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
4. W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional.
NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions, but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same
is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that
the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be
effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The
inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the
Memorandum of Instructions From The President addressed to the government
peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the
necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in
place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make
such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation
of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or
the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.
5. W/N the GRP can invoke executive privilege.
NO. Respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed
the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and
public scrutiny.
The people’s right to information on matters of public concern under Sec.
7, Art. III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Art. II
of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while the policy of public disclosure recognizes the duty of
officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise. An association is formed when two states of unequal power
voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate,
delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its
international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground
between integration and independence.
The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-
determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-
determination—a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural
development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-
determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a
right to unilateral secession) arises only in the most extreme of cases and, even
then, under carefully defined circumstances.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups
is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such
authority.
The President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed
amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these
changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and
revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional
act.
Public statements of a state representative may be construed as a
unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the
statements were clearly addressed to the international community, the state
intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give
legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of
international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar
circumstances.
Prof. Magallona, -vs- Ermita Exec.Sec.,
Facts:
RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the
demarcation lines of the baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This is in
consonance with UNCLOS I. RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical
errors and included Section 2 in which the government reserved the drawing of
baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.
RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments,
which are in compliance with UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the
signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the other and classifying
Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.
Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the
constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation
to the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime passage of vessels and
aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the economy, sovereignty, national
security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the classification of
Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional
Ruling: Petition is dismissed.
1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit,
since it is the citizens who will be directly injured and benefitted in affording relief
over the remedy sought.
2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522. First, RA 9522 did not
delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate
the country’s maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized
that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided under
the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time
negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles
from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said distances, it
is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in
accordance to the treaty—the role played by RA 9522. The contention of the
petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is
devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base points,
increased the Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.
Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of
Islands is consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the
islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III since it
categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical
miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country,
for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one
hand and on the other hand they had to consider that these are located at non-
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So,
the classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s
responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah,
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.
And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the
Constitution’s delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522
transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence
subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing
the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court
emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However,
sovereignty will not bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining
freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles of international law. It
can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is
deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a
customary international law, thus automatically incorporated thereto.
This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just
signifies concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all
waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the
Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines
the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in
strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS
III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound
by it.
The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative
to determine the passing of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment
was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on
the Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and
exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago
and it will weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine
maritime space.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and
continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and
our national interest.

Capitol Wireless, Inc. vs The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, The Provincial
Assessor of Batangas, The Municipal Treasurer and Assessor of Nasugbu, Batangas
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals that both denied the appeal of
petitioner against the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner, Capitol
Wireless, Inc. (CapWire), is a Philippine corporation in the business of providing
international telecommunication services. It has signed agreements with other local
and foreign telecommunications companies covering an international network of
submarine cable systems such as: the Asia Pacific Cable Network System (APCN),
the Brunei-Malaysia-Philippines Cable Network System (BMPCNS), the Philippines-
Italy (SEA-ME-WE-3 CNS), and the Guam Philippines (GP-CNS) systems. The
agreements provide for co-ownership and other rights among the parties over the
network. Petitioner claims that it is co-owner only of the so called “Wet Segment”
of the APCN, while the landing stations or terminals and Segment E of APCN located
in Nasugbu, Batangas are allegedly owned by PLDT.
Moreover, it alleges that the Wet Segment is laid in international, and not
Philippine waters. For loan restructuring purposes, petitioner engaged an appraiser
to assess the market value of the international submarine cable system and the cost
to CapWire. It then submitted a Sworn Statement of True Value of Real Properties
at the Provincial Treasurer’s Office in Batangas City, for the Wet Segment of the
system. Respondent Provincial Assessor of Batangas had determined that the
submarine cable systems described in CapWire’s Sworn Statement are taxable real
property. Petitioner contested this by reasoning that the cable system lies outside
of Philippine territory i.e. international waters. Petitioner received a Warrant of
Levy and a Notice of Auction Sale from respondent. Petitioner filed a Petition for
Prohibition and Declaration of Nullity of Warrant of Levy, Notice of Auction Sale
and/or Auction Sale with the RTC of Batangas City. RTC issued an order dismissing
the petition: (1) for failure to follow the requisite of payment under protest; as well
as (2) failure to appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA), as
provided for in Sections 206 and 226 of R.A. 7160 or the Local Government Code.
The Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the RTC – for petitioner failed to avail
of remedies before administrative bodies like the LBAA and the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals (CBAA). Petitioner claims that its petition raises purely legal
questions, but the C.A. noted that the case raises questions of fact, such as the
extent to which parts of the submarine cable system lie within the territorial
jurisdiction of the taxing authorities, the public respondents.
Issue:
WHETHER THE SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS CABLE BE CLASSIFIED AS
TAXABLE REAL PROPERTY BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS?
Held:
Yes. Submarine or undersea communication cables are akin to electric
transmission lines which this Court has recently declared in MERALCO vs City
Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena City, as no longer exempted from real
property tax and may qualify as “machinery” subject to real property tax under the
Local Government Code. The Court sees no reason to distinguish between
submarine cables used for communication and aerial or underground wires or lines
used for electric transmission, so that both pieces of property do not merit a
different treatment in the aspect of real property taxation. Both electric lines and
communication cables are not directly adhered to the soil but pass through posts,
relays or landing stations, but both may be classified as “machinery” under Article
415 (5), NCC for the simple reason that such pieces of equipment serve the owner’s
business or tend to meet the needs of his industry or works that are on real estate.
Petitioner also failed to prove that it is exempted from payment of real property
tax.
GP VS MONTE DE PIEDAD G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
Facts:
A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863.
Contributions amounting to $400,000 were collected during the Spanish regime for
the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left
untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more working
capital, petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad
to return the $80,000. The respondent bank declined to comply with this order
upon the ground that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not
the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement.
On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands,
through the Attorney-General, bring suit against the Monte de Piedad for a recover
of the $80,000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their
heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of
$80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest
from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause.
 The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the
defendant was to question the competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring
the action, contending that the suit could be instituted only by the intended
beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs.
Issues:
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint
against the respondent bank for the reimbursement of the money of the intended
beneficiaries?
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the
case as parens patriae in representation of the legitimate claimants. The legislature
or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities
of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public
interests, where no other person is entrusted with it. This prerogative of parens
patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is
lodged in a royal person or in the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and
often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention
of injury to those who cannot protect themselves. The beneficiaries of charities,
who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to
the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient
functions has not ceased to exist under the change of government from a monarchy
to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be
called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a
clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases
whatever.
In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being
the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to
enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been
entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has the
right to take back the money intended for the people.
MELCHORA CABANAS vs.FRANCISCO PILAPIL
Facts: Deceased Florentino Pilapil, the husband of Melchora Cabanas and the
father of Millian Pilapil, left an insurance having his child as the beneficiary and
authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughter’s
minority. The lower court decided to give the mother of the child the right to act as
trustee while her child is a minor citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code.
The welfare of the child is the paramount consideration here, and the mother
resides with the child so she is the rightful trustee. The judiciary pursuant to its role
as an agency of the State parens patriae, called for the mother to take
responsibility. The defendant appealed for the case. He claims the retention of the
amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful
trustee of the insurance policy.
Issue: Whether the mother or the uncle should be entitled to act as a trustee of a
minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy from her deceased father?
Whether the trial court erred in its decision to give the right to the mother?
Ruling:
The decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant. The
provisions of Article 320 and 321 of the Civil Code became the basis of the decision.
The former provides that “the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the
property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a
bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." The latter provides that
"The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his
work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in
usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and
whose company he lives; With the added circumstance that the child stays with the
mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision
arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is
supported by another cogent consideration. It is buttressed by its adherence to the
concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is
called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to
accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in
the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person
or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are
sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people
and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is this constitutional
provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall strengthen the family as a
basic social institution." 10 If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family
as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a
stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional
mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.
The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law,
is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor,
Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship
proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total
amount of P5,000.00."