DEFAMATION AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CASE SUMMARIES

1 Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer

Facts

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Limited produced a film in which a man named Rasputin

brought about the destruction of Russia but was subsequently murdered by Prince
Chegodieff and others. In the film, Princess Natasha had sexual relations with
Prince Chegodieff, one the murderers of Rasputin, but was also raped by
Rasputin. In real life, Princess Irina Youssoupoff was married to Prince
Youssoupoff, the man who assisted in the murder of Rasputin. The film was a
combination of both fiction and real life facts.

The imputation is that Princess Irina Youssoupoff was raped by Rasputin.

Issues

1. Lord Justice Scrutton: '[The defendants] say there was no evidence on

which a jury, properly directed, could find that reasonable people would
understand the Princess Natasha of the film to be Princess Irina, the
plaintiff.' (Page 582)
2. Lord Justice Scrutton: '[The defendants] say that if we are to take the
Princess Natasha of the film to be identified with Princess Irina, the
plaintiff, there was no evidence on which a jury, reasonably directed, could
find the film to be defamatory of the plaintiff.' (Page 582)
3. Lord Justice Scrutton: '[The defendants] say: "Assuming both of those
points are decided against us, the damages were excessive. They were such
as no jury, properly directed, could give in the cirumstances of the case."'
(Page 582)
 Ratio Decidendi

Principle: The imputation may be defamatory if it 'tends to make the plaintiff

shunned or avoided...'

Lord Justice Slesser stated at page 587:

...not only is a matter defamatory if it brings the plaintiff into hatred, ridicule, or

contempt, by reason of some moral discredit on her part, but also if it tends to make the

plaintiff shunned or avoided and without any moral discredit or her behalf.

Slesser applied the principle at page 587:

One may, I think, take judicial notice of the fact that a lady of whom it has been said that

she has been ravished, albeit against her will, has suffered in social reputation and

opportunities of receiving respectful consideration of the world.

Principle: For an imputation to be defamatory, it is irrelevant whether the

plaintiff was at fault or immoral.

2. D.P. CHOUDHARY AND

ORS. V. KUMARI MANJULATA
Facts
Kumari Manjulata is the daughter of Mohan Singh. She was aged about 17 years and
was living with her parents and brother. They are all educated and were regarded very
high because of it. Durga Prasad was the principal Editor of Dainik Navjyoti and the
Managing Editor and Publisher of the same worked under him. They are, responsible
for publication of false and defamatory news in the daily newspaper. On 18-12-77,
Dainik Navjyoti published a news regarding Manjulata with unfair comments and false
imputations. The news item was basically untrue and was published negligently with
utter irresponsibility and maliciously which created hatred against Manjulata and she
was ridiculed. The news item was published in order to dishonour Manjulata and her
family members. By publication of this news item Manjulata was defamed. It created
problems for arranging for her marriage. She was shocked and was ridiculed by
persons who knew her. She suffered from inferiority complex because of the
publication of this news. Parents of Manjulata also suffered disrespect in the society
as the news item was defamatory. A notice was given to the Editor but was unheeded.
A sum of Rs. 10,100/- was claimed as damages along with 12% interest. The
Newspaper authorities submitted their written statement alleging that they do not know
the plaintiff personally and the news was collected by its reporter. The news item was
correct and was collected from a reliable source. There was no intention to defame of
harass the plaintiff. Notice was denied. It was further averred in the written statement
that at the time of presentation of the suit, Manjulata was major. She did not exercise
her option; therefore, the suit was not maintainable. The appellant submitted that the
news item is based on correct facts and it is not false. He submitted that the
correspondent who is himself an advocate had not only received the information from
the police station but had verified from the mother of the plaintiff. He submitted that
there was no mala fide on the part of the newspaper or the correspondent. He sent
the report to the newspaper with the intention that in case the persons knowing
Manjulata would read the news, they would send her back to her parents. From the
evidence on record it is proved that the news was not verified from the mother of
Manjulata as was alleged by him. Also, he was never asked by anyone of the family
members of Manjulata to do so. The law as regards defamation is that if defamatory
words are published, they are presumed to be false and the burden to prove that they
are not so is upon the defendant. So from the evidence produced on behalf of the
defendant it is not so proved.

Judgment
Earlier in this case, the Additional District Judge he decreed the suit of defamation
awarding Rs. 10,000/- as damages to the respondent. The following judgment is the
result of a civil appeal against the Additional District judge’s decree. From the
statements of Manjulata, her mother and other witnesses it was borne out that the
news item published in the newspaper was false. Manjulata was cross-examined at
length and an attempt had been made to suggest in the cross-examination that the
news item did not relate to her but during the arguments no such attempt was made
before the High Court Judge or before the lower Court. The news was definitely related
to Manjulata, plaintiff respondent. Learned counsel for the appellant rightly did not
touch this point. If a false news item is published in a Newspaper, whosoever reads it
he has his own reservations about person about whom a false report is published. The
object of law of defamation is to protect an individual’s interest in his reputation. It is
no defence in a suit for defamation that the defendant did not intend to injure the
plaintiffs reputation, if, in fact, it has been injured. Even if the defendant bonafidely
believed in the truth of the words published, he will still be liable unless the defence of
privilege is raised.It is proved from the evidence of Manjulata and her witnesses that
her reputation has lowered down, marriage proposals were dropped, she underwent
mental tensions and her character was assassinated. The evidence led by plaintiff and
her witnesses was sufficient to lower down the prestige of Manjulata. It has been stated
on behalf of the appellant that there was no malice against the plaintiff respondent.
Needless to say that in such cases a man may be liable although he had not a particle
of malice against the person defamed. The intention or motive with which the words
were employed is, as a rule, immaterial.

The court below was right in deciding the case in favour of Manjulata. The appeal was
dismissed
3.Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1929]
2 KB 331
Libel; husband and wife; statement for per se defamatory

(226 words)

Facts

The claimant was known as the lawfully wedded wife of a famous race-horse owner
and former General of the Mexican Army. The claimant and her husband lived
separately but he often visited her at her workplace. The defendant newspaper
published a photograph of the claimant’s husband with a woman labelled as Miss X,
to whom – as alleged by the attached article – he was engaged.

Issue

The claimant argued that the publication caused damage to her in that it was
intended to imply that her husband was living with her immorally. The defendants
denied any such intention and even the possibility of their publication having such a
meaning. The defendants refused to admit, even after seeing evidence thereof, that
the claimant was married to the subject of the publication. The trial judge found that
in the circumstances of this case, the publication could be seen as having a
defamatory meaning. He directed the jury that what mattered was the perception of
the reasonably minded person who knew the circumstances of the case. The jury
found in favour of the claimant.

Held

The Court of Appeal held, affirming the lower court’s decision, that the publication in
question was capable of constituting defamation. It found that the jury was right to
find that the publication made the reasonably minded person believe that the
claimant’s moral character was questionable.
4.ARUMUGA MUDALIAR (VS) ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR.1

It was held by the madras high court that when two persons jointly wrote a letter containing
defamatory matter concerning the plaintiff and sent the same by the register post to the plaintiff
there was no publication between the one tortfeasor to the other as there could be no publication
between the joint tortfeasors, there be said to be publication when the register letter addressed
to the plaintiff gets into the hands of third person and he reads it out in the presence of various
other persons

5.M.C. VERGHESE v. T.J. PONNAN & ANR.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The first respondent wrote letters to his wife who is the daughter of the appellant. The
letters contained defamatory imputations concerning the appellant. The letters were
handed over to the appellant and he filed a complaint for defamation against the first
respondent. The Magistrate held that a communication between spouses of a matter
de (amatory of another did not amount to publication and that no evidence could be
given of it under s. 122 of the Evidence Act, 1872, against the first respondent,
and discharged him. The Court of Session set aside the order but the High Court
restored it. While the appeal against the order of discharge was pending in this Court
a decree of nullity of marriage was passed against the first respondent on the ground
of his impotency.

Rathi daughter of M.C. Verghese was married to T.J. Ponnan. On July 18, 1964, July
25, 1964 and July30, 1964, Ponnan wrote from Bombayletters to Rathi who was then
residing with her parents at Trivandrum which it is claimed contained defamatory
imputations concerning Verghese. Verghese then filed a complaint in the Court of the
District Magistrate, Trivandrum, against Ponnan charging him with offence of
defamation.

ISSUE RAISED

Ponnan submitted an application raising two preliminary contentions—

(1) that the letters which formed the sole basis of the complaint were inadmissible in
evidence as they were barred by law or expressly prohibited by law from disclosure;
and

(2) that uttering of a libel by a husband to his wife was not “publication” under the law
of India and hence cannot support a charge for defamation, and prayed for fan order
of discharge, and applied that he may be discharged.

JUDGEMENT
DISTRICT COURT

1
1966 2 M.L.J.223
The District Magistrate held that a communication by a husband to his wife or by a
wife to her husband of a matter defamatory of another’ person does not amount in law
to publication, since the husband and wife are one in the eye of the law.

In so holding, he relied upon the judgment in Wennhak v. Morgan and Wife(1). He also
held that the communication was privileged, and no evidence could be given in court
in relation to that communication. He accordingly ordered that Ponnan be discharged
under s. 253 (2) Code of Criminal Procedure.[1]

In a revision application filed by Verghese before the Court of Session, the order was
set aside and further enquiry into the complaint was directed. In the view of the learned
Sessions Judge the doctrine of the common law of England that a communication by
one spouse to another of a matter defamatory of another person does not amount to
publication has no application in India, and s. 122 of the Indian Evidence Act does not
prohibit proof in the Court by the complainant of the letters written by Ponnan to his
wife.

HIGH COURT

The case was then carried to the High Court of Kerala in revision. The High Court set
aside the order of the Court of Session and restored the order of the District Magistrate.
The High Court held that from the averments made in paragraphs 9 to 11 of the
complaint it was clear that the writing of defamatory matter by Ponnan to his wife Rathi
was not in law publication, and that “if the letters written by Ponnan to his wife cannot
be proved in court either by herself directly or through her father, in whose hands she
had voluntarily placed them, the imputations therein fell outside the court’s cognizance
and no charge under s. 500 Indian Penal Code could be deemed to be made out”.

ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT JUDGEMENT

It was assumed throughout these proceedings that the letters are defamatory of the
complainant. Under the Indian penal Code in order that an offence of defamation may
be committed there must be making or publication of any imputation concerning any
person by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible
representations, intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such
imputation will harm, the reputation of such person. To constitute the offence of
defamation there must therefore be making or publication of an imputation concerning
any person and the making or publication must be with intent to harm, or knowing or
having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person.
Unless there is publication there can be no offence of defamation committed. In
England the rule appears to be well settled that except in certain well defined matters.
the husband and wife ,are regarded as one and in an action for libel disclosure by the
husband of the libel to his wife is not publication. In Wennhak’s case(1) Manisty, J.,
observed: “ …… the maxim and principle acted on for centuries is still in existence
viz., that as regards this Case, husband and wife ‘are in point of law one person.” The
learned Judge examined the foundation of the rule and stated that it was, after, all, a
question of public policy or, social policy.

But the rule that husband and wife are one in the eye of law has not been adopted in
its full force under our system of law and certainly not in our criminal jurisprudence. In
Queen Empress v. Butch(2) it was held that there is no presumption of law that the
wife and husband constitute one person in India for the purpose of the criminal law. If
the wife, removing the husband’s property from his house, does so with dishonest
intention, she is guilty of theft. In Abdul Khadar v. Taib Begum(5) the Madras High
Court again held that there is no presumption of law in India that a wife and husband
constitute one person for the purpose of criminal law, and therefore the English
common law doctrine of absolute privilege cannot prevail in India.

Verghese has complained that he was defamed by the three letters which Ponnan
wrote to Rathi Ponnan, however, says that the letters addressed by him to his wife are
not–except with his consent–admissible in evidence by virtue of s. 122 of the Indian
Evidence Act, and since the only publication pleaded is publication to his wife and she
is prohibited by law from disclosing those letters. no offence of defamation could be
made out. So stated the proposition is in our judgment, not sustainable. Section 122
of the Indian Evidence Act falls in Ch. IX which deals with evidence of witnesses in
proceeding before the court. That section provides:

“No person who is or has been married shall be compelled to disclose any
communication made to him during marriage by any person to whom he is or has been
married; nor shall be permitted to disclose any such communication. unless the person
who made it, or his representative in interest, consents, except in suits between
married persons, or proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any
crime committed against the other.”

The section consists of two branches—

(1) that a married person shall not be compelled to disclose any communication made
to him during marriage by his spouse; and

(2) that the married person shall not except in two special classes of proceedings be
permitted to disclose by giving evidence in court the communication, unless the person
who made it, or his representative in interest, consents thereto.

When the letters were written by Ponnan to Rathi, they were husband and wife. The
bar to the admissibility in evidence of communications made during marriage attaches
at the time when the communication is made, and its admissibility will be adjudged in
the light of the status at the date and not the status at the date when evidence is sought
to be given in court.

Hence Appeal Allowed.

6.Knuppfer v London Express Newspapers

[1944] AC 116
Action by individual member regarding libel on a class

Facts
Knuppfer (K) was the head of the British branch of the Young Russia Party. The
respondents published a newspaper article in 1941 which alleged association
between Hitler and the Party. Whilst K was not named individually in the article,
witnesses at trial intimated that they understood the article as referring to K. K was
successful in his libel claim at trial.

Issue

The Court of Appeal held that the words could not be regarded as referring to K and
allowed the newspaper’s appeal. K appealed to the House of Lords. On appeal, K
submitted that when a defamatory statement is made of a class of persons, an
individual suit can be raised by those members of the class capable of being
defamed by the statement. K submitted that the article particularly reflected upon
him as a prominent member of the group in Britain.

Held

The House of Lords noted that it is an essential element of defamation that the
words complained of should be published “of the plaintiff.” Viscount Simon held that
the article, having regard to its language, could not be regarded, as a question of
law, as being capable of referring to K. The trial judge had erroneously relied upon a
question of fact i.e. the fact that K was capable of being identified by reasonable
people who knew him as a subject of the article. Similarly, Lord Atkin held that in libel
cases the key question was whether the words were published “of the plaintiff” as an
individual rather that whether they were spoken of a class. The appeal was therefore
dismissed.

7. Alexander v North Eastern Railway Co [1865]

6 B & S 340
No finding of libel regarding inaccurate publication of conviction

Facts

The plaintiff had been convicted of riding a train from Leeds without having
purchased a valid ticket. The penalty was a fine and a period of imprisonment of
fourteen days if he defaulted on the fine. However, following the conviction, the
defendant published a notice that the plaintiff was convicted and issued a fine or
three weeks imprisonment if in default.

Issue
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had committed libel by describing the
penalty issued to him inaccurately. The defendants argued that the conviction was
described with substantial and sufficient accuracy and the words so far as they
differed in their literal meaning from the words of the conviction were not libellous.

Held

Judgment was given in favour of the defendants. The gist of the libel was that the
plaintiff was sentenced to pay a sum of money and, in default of payment, to be
imprisoned. Blackburn J noted that the substance of the libel was true but the
question was whether what was stated inaccurately was the gist of the libel. The
difference between the conviction and the statement of it published by the
defendants did not make the latter in law libellous. The Court was not prepared to
say whether, as a matter of law, the notice published by the defendants was libellous
or that the inaccuracy regarding the term of imprisonment made a material
difference. The question of the effect on the public mind of the statement that the
period of potential imprisonment was longer than was actually issued was a question
for the jury.

269 words