ESPIRITU VS CIPRIANO

FACTS:
For resolution is the problem of whether RA No. 6126 may be held applicable to the case
at bar. For convenience we reproduce the pertinent provisions of law in question:
“Section 1 – no lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another’s dwelling is located
shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed
between the lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not
exceed 300php a month.
Section 6- This At shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved June 17, 1970

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6126 will have retroactive effect at the case at bara

Held:
It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar
is covered by the aforecited law. We rule, otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that
the increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, while the law in
question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a half after the increase
in rentals had been effected.
Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may. Therefore given
retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being
remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction
therefore is in order. Article 4 of the civil code ordains that law shall have no retroactive effect
unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear. Our duty is equally plain. The law
being a temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation, it has limited period of
operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that “no lessor of a
dwelling unit or land shall during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly
rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this act.
Hence the provision against the increase in monthly rental was effective only from March
1970 up to March 1971. Outside and beyond that period the law did not by the express mandate
of the Act itself, operate. The said law did not, by express terms, purport to give retroactive effect.
We therefore rule that R.A. No. 6126 is not applicable at the case at bar. As the language
of the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly says.

Occena v. COMELEC

Occena v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
Fernando, C.J.

Facts:
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and
former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are
suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973
Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue:

What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how
may it be exercised? More specifically as to the latter, what is the extent of the changes that may
be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard
required for a proper submission?

Held:

The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent
it reads thus: “The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members
shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the
interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof.” One of
such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory
Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in
accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa,
upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body
its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied
in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner
Occena is concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose
amendments is not new. Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of
the Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior
courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement
provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that
our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.

Issue:

Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond
the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the
Interim National Assembly? Was there revision rather than amendment?

Held:

Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the

Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution
based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will
be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no
debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be
revised and replaced with a new one is no argument against the validity of the law because
‘amendment’ includes the ‘revision’ or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate,
whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become
immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.

Issue:

What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper
submission?

Held:

The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose

amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible
proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies
as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed.
That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement
either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to
propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth
votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1
proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign
country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to
5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the
National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the
amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.
Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the
question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before the
holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments having been called to
the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly
informed as to the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the
matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: “Any amendment to,
or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment
or revision.” The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date
of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the
Constitution.

Case Digest: Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta

Facts:

On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was
found violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First
Instance decided that from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void
and had been repealed by Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code

Issues:

1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void

2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.

Held:

1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general
rule, the later law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal order and a
national law must be ruled in favor of the statute.
2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. “Vehicular Traffic” is not
defined and no distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc.

Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.

lfredo T. Romualdez, petitioner, vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) and the People
of the Philippines, respondents.
_______________________________________________________________________

Facts: People of the Philippines, through PCGG, filed a petition charging the accused with
violation of Section 5, RA. 3019 as amended. Said petitioner, brother-in-law of former President
Marcos and therefore, related by affinity within the third civil degree, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-interested sic
and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard
and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation and the
Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks
of which is owned by former President Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and
conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and
facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and
semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops
including some of its equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte
needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00.
Issue: whether or not petitioner enjoys derivative immunity from suit.
Ruling: In Estrada vs. Desierto, the SC exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in
order to determine the extent of its applicability. Executive immunity applied only during the
incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution
for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. The reasoning of petitioner must therefore
fail, since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the
felonious acts of public officials and their close relatives are not acts of the State, and the officer
who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser.

Astorga vs. Villegas

on 7:00 AM in Case Digests, Political Law 0
G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974

Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress,
an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the Chief
Executive, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments
of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that
it was passed by Congress.
Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential
When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be
consulted.
FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives and then
sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion at the Senate, Senator Tolentino and Senator
Roxas recommended amendments thereto. Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment
that was approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal, when Senate
sent its certification of amendment to the House, only the Roxas amendment was included, not
the Tolentino amendment. Nevertheless, the House approved the same. Printed copies were then
certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the
Senate and the Senate President, and sent to the President of the Philippines who thereby
approved the same. The Bill thus was passed as RA 4065. However, when the error was
discovered, both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures.
ISSUES:
Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law
Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill
RULING:
Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate,
in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one
that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers,
to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus
attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill
that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President
has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries,
on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases
that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts
may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was
the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether
the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.

Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by
the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress
ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity
of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval
by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential.
When courts may turn to the journal
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled
bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted?
In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to
inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text
passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this
Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate
but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court
is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky
undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they
withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently
rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate
that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law
would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by
the law-making body.
Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.:

Facts:
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified
voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's
resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios
in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur.
This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato,
and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of
Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton
in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province —
Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title

YES. RA 4790 is null and void

1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress
is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title
of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive.
The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional
requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire
text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was
read from its introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application,
originated.

2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language
of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform
the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into
the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus,
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical
accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly
inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or
which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one
is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or
scope of the act, is bad.

4. The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" —
projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of
Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of
Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao
del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known
fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the
municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan,
both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato,
a province different from Lanao del Sur.

5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did
not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.