REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981. They were blessed with a with a son and
a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California.

He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the
same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision
of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Held:
Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code be
interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,one of them became naturalized as
a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree.

The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two
Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed, she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the US. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if
the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he was still barred
from remarrying.

1
Republic v. Manalo

G.R. No. 221029

April 24, 2018

Facts:

Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for

divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted.

Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to

be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is

thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino

spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law

Issues:

1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of

the foreign spouse?

2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?

Ruling:

1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into consideration.

According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the

amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse

even though the latter is no longer married to the former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad

and does not discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the

foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce

proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation since

doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.

2
In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if

Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will

cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally

protected by the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection clause. They

said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical

classification. The violation of the equal protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination

against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce

decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike,

and making a distinction between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would

give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family but

also to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse,

cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do this if the application of

paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by the

foreign spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute

divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et

thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that the decree is

valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law

on divorce must still be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of

evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

3
 Wild Valley Shipping Co. Ltd vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 119602 October 6, 2000

Facts: Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private
respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when
the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was
designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. He
was asked to pilot the said vessel on February 11, 1988 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m. The master (captain) of the
Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel’s third mate
(then the officer on watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left the port at 1:40 a.m. on February 12, 1988. Captain
Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way. The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it
entered the San Roque Channel at mile 172. The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer
that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel. Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again
experienced some vibrations.These occurred at 4:12 a.m.It was then that the watch officer called the master to the
bridge. The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that it was in the centre of the channel. He
then went to confirm, or set down, the position of the vessel on the chart. He ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer
of the President Roxas, to check all the double bottom tanks. At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground
in the Orinoco River,thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon,
a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that
day. Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III
against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas)
for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney’s fees,
costs, and expenses of litigation.

Issue: Whether or not the Venezuelan law should be applied.

Held: No. It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court.

The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta Oficial of the Republic of Venezuela. A
photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an official publication of the Republic of Venezuela.

The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in a book issued by the Ministerio de
Comunicaciones of Venezuela. Only a photocopy of the said rules was likewise presented as evidence.

Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public documents for they are the written
official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of
Venezuela.

For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested
by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by
a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer,
and with the seal of his office. The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full
faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country.

It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was
presented as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those
records made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office
accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found in the records of the case. With
respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best evidence. According to
the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly
authenticated copy of the statute.

4
MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, GR No. 196049, 2013-06-26

Facts:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay)
in the Philippines[2] on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to

Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from

Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.[3]

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on
the ground of bigamy.[4] On

14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and

Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;[5] and (3) for
the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of

Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition

The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.

The... petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines[11] on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.[12]

Issues:

Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

Ruling:

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to
know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on
the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to... the rules of evidence.

5
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce
law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully... consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages
are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment... in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.

Principles:
Civil Law

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to
know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on
the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to... the rules of evidence.

6
 ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

Facts:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by Pepito resulting
in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least five years exempts
them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead

Ruling:

(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without
the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of cohabitation as “husband
and wife” where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other
words, the five-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-
year period should be the years immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a period
of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five
years, and continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period
is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

7
Manzano v. Sanchez

A.M. No. MTJ-00- 1329, 8 March 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He was married to the respondent
but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of his wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.
Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that
the foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where respondent failed to submit any response. The RTC
denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this case was filed before the Court.

ISSUE:

WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction from the recognition
of a foreign divorce decree.

RULING:

No.Not all of the requirements are met by the couple making the said marriage null and void.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment
to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. Making the decision of the solemnizing officer questionable.

Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties
has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both “separated” is an impediment that would make
their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the
law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

8
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA

GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997

FACTS:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the
house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during their first night and same thing
happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but
Gina’s relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long
walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept
together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted
themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical
examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed.
There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the
country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he
loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their
relationship is still young, they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another
physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.

ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital obligations and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children
thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

9
Republic vs. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo
Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo
manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with
friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with
his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was
estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later,
Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity
is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties
must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some
psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would
comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her
husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence
nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

 burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

 root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations
of marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
 court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

10
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. MANUEL SIAYNGCO, GR No. 158896, 2004-10-27
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July
2003, reversing the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City,... dated 31
January 2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein
Judge Manuel Siayngco ("respondent Manuel").
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed
for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged
that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over... domineering and selfish attitude towards
him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal
home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry
his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was... respondent Manuel who was remiss in
his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his
philandering; that she was raised in a real h
In the pre-trial order,[3] the parties only stipulated on the following:
That they were married on 27 June 1973;
That they have one son who is already 20 years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand and elaborated on
the allegations in his petition.
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel's Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner Juanita seldom went to
respondent Manuel's office.[19] But when she was there, she would call witness to complain about the
curtains and the cleanliness of the... office.
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional
qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita.[23] From her psychiatric
evaluation,[24] Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital
collapse. There is a partner relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond
with love, support and understanding.
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuel's allegations. She insisted that they were a
normal couple who had their own share of fights; that they were happily married until respondent Manuel
started having extra-marital affairs[26] which... he had admitted to her
Even when he already filed the present case, she would still attend to his needs.[29] She remembered
that after the pre-trial, while they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to... give him a
chance to have a new family.[30]
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be psychologically... capacitated to
comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.[32
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuel's petition
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric
evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the case of
Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.

11
Issues:
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997,
THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME
OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT
WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON
GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its
factual milieu with the case at bar.
In our book, however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case
against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply... with the essential marital obligations
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of whether or not the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita
and/or respondent Manuel.
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties
and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to
fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.[49]Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that
petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with... the basic and essential obligations of
marriage.[54]
Dr. Garcia's report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew professionally during the marriage, who
pursued their... individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy
and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during his direct
examination
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the Court
of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and... effect. No costs.
Principles:
we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals[47] that the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage
belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of... the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity

12
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano

G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004

FACTS:

Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, left respondent Lolita Hamano and their daughter a month after the celebration
of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese
citizens. But except for 2 months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters the
respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand,
exerted all efforts to contact him, but to no avail.

Respondent filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, in
which the trial court rendered it so.

CA affirmed trial court’s decision contesting before the SC that the requirements in Molina and Santos were not
applicable for the case at bar involves a “mixed marriage,” the husband being a Japanese national.

ISSUES:

1) WON Toshio is psychologically incapacitated.

2) WON requirements in Molina and Santos applicable in mixed marriages.

RULING:

1) NO. The totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities. His act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged
nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.

As the Court ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some
kind of psychological illness.

2) YES. In proving psychological incapacity, no distinction must be made between an alien spouse and a Filipino
spouse. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies
of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any
person regardless of nationality.

In proving psychological incapacity, no distinction must be made between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. The
Court cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity
were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general.

Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality .

13
DAVID B. DEDEL v. CA, GR No. 151867, 2004-01-29
Facts:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel... and... the exchange of marital vows
before the City Court of
Pasay on September 28, 1966.
he civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and
mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a
Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a
Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical
psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with
the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and... with whom she had two
children.
Thereafter, on December 9, 1995,... Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two
children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition
seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in
Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 149.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that
Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity;
that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two
children of Mustafa
Ibrahim to live with petitioner.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General... appealed alleging that
ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS
NULL AND VOID.
LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN
ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.[11] Hence, the
instant petition.
Issues:
does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the... term
"psychological incapacity?"

14
Ruling:
In this case, respondent's sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such...
an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given a valid assumption thereof.
Respondent's sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court. We cannot deny the grief,
frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are
circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide... the specific answers to every
individual problem.[19] While we sympathize with petitioner's marital predicament, our first and foremost
duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No... costs.
Principles:
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article
46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility... of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.

15
Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995

FACTS:

Leouel, a First Lieutenant of the Philippine Army, married Julia in a municipal trial court and
thereafter, in a church. She gave birth to a baby boy and was named Leouel Jr. Occasionally, the
couple quarreled over a lot of things including the interference of Julia’s parents into their family
affairs.

Julia went to US to work as a nurse and promised husband that she will return once her contract will
have expired. She never did. Leouel tried to find her in the US but somehow failed to contact her or
get in touch with her.

Leouel filed a petition to have their marriage declared null and void, citing Article 36 of the Family
Code. He argued that Julia’s failure to return home and communicating with him for more than 5
years constitute psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING:

No. Julia’s failure to return to her husband and communication with him do not constitute
psychological incapacity.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) juridical antecedence, (b) gravity and (c)
incurability.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated.In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be
dismissed because the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife is not clearly shown by the
factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to the standard required to decree
a nullity of marriage.

16
Case Digest: Marcos v. Marcos (GR No. 136490)

Facts:

Petitioner and respondent were married and were both members of the Philippine Army. After the EDSA
revolution, they requested for separation from service. From the time they got separated from service,
Wilson never engaged in any gainful employment. He would beat her up whenever he is told to look for
some. He would also force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also beat their
children. They lived separately since 1992.

On October 16, 1994, they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want
him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that
she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who
came to her aid.

On August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in
Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the
reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even beat her driver.

Brenda filed a petition for nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity. Only her underwent a
psychological evaluation. During the trial, the petitioner presented the psychological report, the
testimonies of their children, her sister and social worker.

Brenda‘s petition was granted by the RTC but was reversed by the Court of Appeals, saying that
respondent‘s incapacity was not medically and clinically established. Hence, this petition.

In this petition, petitioner contends that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent
is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.

Issue:

Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough o sustain a finding of respondent‘s
psychological incapacity.

Ruling:

No. The totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity. The guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.

17
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa, petitioner vs
Bona J. Alano and Republic of the Philippines, respondents
G.R. No. 167459, January 26, 2011

Facts:
Bona’s illicit affairs with other men started at the onset of their marriage on October 27, 1973, when Jose
was assigned in various parts of the country as an officer in the AFP. She continued her infidelity even
when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City sometime in 1985, whenever Jose was out of their
living quarters.

In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for rebellion for the alleged participation of the failed coup
d’etat. He heard circulation of rumors of Bona getting caught having sex with his driver, Corporal Gagarin.

He got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona about the rumors, which she and Gagarin
admitted. Since then they were separated, and their foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona in
Basilan until 1994 to live with Jose.

Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and Bona
J. Alano, based on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations of marriage.

Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one of the witnesses, testified and submitted a psychological
evaluation report on Bona’s mental state. The interviews she had with Jose and two of his witnesses brought
her to the conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder, and it was traceable
to her family history.

On January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial court declared the marriage of Jose and Bona void
ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court finds that Bona’s illness exhibited gravity, antecedence, and incurability.

OSG appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA subsequently granted the appeal and reversed the
ruling of the trial court decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

18
Ruling:
No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects were already present at the inception of, or prior
to, the marriage. Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of
“juridical antecedence”. Her persistent sexual infidelity and abandonment are not badges of psychological
incapacity nor can’t it be traced to the inception of their marriage.

The psychiatrist’s conclusion about Bona’s HPD which made her prone to promiscuity and sexual infidelity
existed before her marriage to Jose, cannot be taken as credible proof of antecedence since the method
by which such an inference was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of
evidence required in determining psychological incapacity.

Dr. Rondain’s conclusion was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose. No other witness
testified to Bona’s family history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of their marriage. The two
witnesses only started to live with them in 1980 and 1986, respectively.

Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological condition directly from the information gathered solely
from Jose and his witnesses. These factual circumstances evoke the possibility that the information fed to
the psychiatrists is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration.

Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Article 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

19
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs.
KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO, Respondent

TIJAM, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision [1] dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012 Decision[2] rendered by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and
Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio.
Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Lawrence C. Tionglico (Lawrence) on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of mutual friends. After a brief courtship, they
entered into a relationship. When she got pregnant, the two panicked as both their parents were very strict
and conservative. Lawrence did not receive the news well as he was worried how it would affect his image
and how his parents would take the situation.[3] Nevertheless, they got married on July 22, 2000.[4]
Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred by bickering and quarrels. As early as their
honeymoon, they were fighting so much that they went their separate ways most of the time and Katrina
found herself wandering the streets of Hong Kong alone.[5]
Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until the birth of their child, Lanz Rafael
Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on December 30, 2000.[6] Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing their
child, saying he knew nothing about children and how to run a family. [7] Lawrence spent almost every night
out for late dinners, parties and drinking sprees.[8] Katrina noticed that Lawrence was alarmingly dependent
on his mother and suffered from a very high degree of immaturity. [9] Lawrence would repeatedly taunt
Katrina to fight with him and they lost all intimacy between them as he insisted to have a maid sleep in their
bedroom every night to see to the needs of Lanz.[10]
Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of Katrina's decisions - from the manner by which
she took care of Lanz, to the way she treated the household help. Most fights ended up in full blown
arguments, often in front of Lanz. One time, when Katrina remembered and missed her youngest brother
who was then committed in a substance rehabilitation center, Lawrence told her to stop crying or sleep in
the rehabilitation center if she will not stop.[11]
In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his parents' home and never to
come back. They have been separated in fact since then.[12]
Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano), who confirmed her beliefs on
Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano, based on the narrations of Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence
with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, that is characterized by a heightened sense of self-importance and
grandiose feelings that he is unique in some way. [13]
Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent, incurable, and deeply integrated within
his psyche;[14] and that it was present but repressed at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the
onset was in early adulthood. His maladaptive and irresponsible behaviors interfered in his capacity to
provide mutual love, fidelity, respect, mutual help, and support to his wife.[15]
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of Katrina and Lawrence as void ab initio. It
disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and
Lawrence C. Tionglico Ito (sic) as void ab initio. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement,
20
petitioner shall cease using the surname of her husband having lost the right over the same and so as to
avoid the misconception that she is still the legal wife of respondent. Custody over the couple's minor child
is awarded to petitioner, with reasonable visitation rights accorded to respondent, preferably Saturday and
Sunday, or as the parties may agree among themselves.
Furnish a copy of this decision the Office of the Solicitor-General, the National Statistics Office and the
Local Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite who, in turn shall endorse a copy of the same to the Local Civil Registrar
of Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, so that the appropriate amendment and/or cancellation of the parties'
marriage can be effected in its registry. Furnish, likewise, the parties and counsel.
SO ORDERED.[16]
The CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus,
Cavite, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. 4903-11 dated 8 May 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED.[17]

21