Climate offsets CP

1NC
 1NC CP
Warming is real, anthropogenic and causes extinction
Flournoy 12 -- Citing Feng Hsu, PhD NASA Scientist @ the Goddard Space Flight Center. Don Flournoy
is a PhD and MA from the University of Texas, Former Dean of the University College @ Ohio University,
Former Associate Dean @ State University of New York and Case Institute of Technology, Project
Manager for University/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, Currently Professor of
Telecommunications @ Scripps College of Communications @ Ohio University (Don, "Solar Power
Satellites," January, Springer Briefs in Space Development, Book, p. 10-11
In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront
of science of space and Earth, writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming ,” noting the potential for a
catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were engaged in
monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand
scientific information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After
discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global
temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity . No
matter whether these trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are
two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a) there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations
between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations
of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientific community is
in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans
continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into Earth’s biosphere,
humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence that
the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy
supply. “This,” he writes, “is because the
risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially the
extinction of human species, a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances” (Hsu 2010 )

Counterplan text: The United States federal government should use indirect offsets of
foreign military and/or direct commercial sales to [country] for climate financing.
The CP competes – offsets are an intrinsic component of sales which the plan ends
BIS 19 [The BIS is an agency of the United States Department of Commerce that deals with issues involving national security and high technology. It is the primary authority on offset agreements, 2019, Offset Definitions,
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/other-areas/strategic-industries-and-economic-security-sies/offsets-in-defense-trade/54-other-areas/strategic-industries-and-economic-security/181-offset-definitions]//Lex RA

Offsets: [are] Compensation practices required as a condition of purchase in either government-to-

government or commercial sales of Arms : (1) Defense articles and/or defense services as defined by the Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130); or
(2) Items controlled under an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) that has the numeral ‘‘6’’ as its third character in the Commerce Control List found in Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of this chapter other than semisubmersible and submersible vessels specially designed for cargo
transport and parts, components, accessories and attachments specially designed therefor controlled under ECCN 8A620.b; test, inspection and production equipment controlled in ECCN 8B620.b, software controlled in ECCN 8D620.b and technology controlled in ECCN 8E620.b. Military

Any offset as
Export Sales: Exports that are either Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or commercial (direct) sales of defense articles and/or defense services as defined by the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic Arms Regulations. Offset Agreement:

defined above that the U.S. firm agrees to in order to conclude a military export sales contract. This includes all offsets,

The agreement is normally reflected in a contract that specifies the

whether they are “best effort” agreements or are subject to penalty clauses.

percentage of the total defense-related export sale to be offset, the forms of industrial compensation
required, the duration of the offset agreement, and penalty clauses, if any. Offset Transaction: Any activity for which the U.S. firm claims credit for full or
partial fulfillment of an offset agreement. For the purpose of analysis, BIS divides offset transactions into nine different categories, which are defined in the “Types of Transaction” section below.
CP solves – increases security and solves climate change
Eckland 16 (Samuel H., 2017, THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIEW Vol.29:1852016, “Two Birds
with One F-16: How Economic Offsets from Foreign Defense Transactions Can Close Gaps in International
Climate Finance”, https://gielr.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/zsk00117000185.pdf, 7/1/19, SH)

Pursuing climate finance through indirect offsets to foreign military sales and direct commercial sales
would strengthen U.S. security in a number of ways This should make . , combined with the fact that it does not require any additional financial outlays,

climate finance through offsets [are] a politically-palatable solution for even the most formidable of
climate skeptics in Washington. First Obama and the D o D were outspoken about the , the administration epartment f efense

national security implications of climate change , including changes in maritime patterns affecting naval
operations and increased social unrest due to extreme weather and resulting floods. Although some members of Congress and the Trump

those focused on defense issues--will likely support a plan that not only equips
administration may discount these projections, others--particularly

our allies to defend themselves, but also [and] helps them to mitigate and adapt to potential
environmental and social instability the use of indirect offsets, in the form of financing for climate
. Second,

adaptation, mitigation, or technology transfer helps to secure critical U.S. supply chains from
vulnerabilities. Direct offsets in the form of co-production, licensed production, or technology transfer often require key elements of the defense product's manufacturing to be constructed abroad. For example, in the case of Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation's 2014

foreign
sale of Black Hawk helicopters to Turkey, Turkey required Sikorsky to build a co-production facility in Turkey. Yet, even if these items, constructed abroad, are not sold back into the U.S. defense supply chain (as in the case of Sikorsky's helicopters)

production of key defense components risks the misappropriation of transferred technology into non-
intended [*197] weapons systems or to non-intended third-parties. Any such risk is entirely negated
when the offset obligation can be met by non-defense investment such as clean energy development or
coastal adaptation projects. economic offsets already exist as a privately-funded pool worth billions of
Third,

dollars . Sellers are already contractually obligated to invest billions of dollars in purchasing countries and the U.S. government already helps to monitor and facilitate those sales agreements. Although it takes an official position against entering directly into, encouraging, or

the U.S. government can incentivize contractors already committed to providing offsets
committing contractors to offset agreements,

to negotiate climate adaptation or mitigation-related indirect offsets with purchasing countries The State .

Department, which already has a role in helping to coordinate the underlying FMS transaction, could use
its influence to leverage other federal resources for domestic companies doing business abroad , such as the Overseas

the State Department could help companies and their indirect offset
Private Investment Corporation or the Export-Import Bank to help finance the offset. Moreover,

providers to access international financing facilities , such as the World Bank's International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Global Environmental Facility, or the Green Climate Fund. By

the State Department could incentivize firms to partner with energy- or environment-
leveraging these financing resources,

related offset providers while remaining at arms-length in actual offset negotiations Meanwhile . ,

policymakers can still take credit for the billions of dollars in climate financing going to developing
countries at no increased cost to the federal government.
2NC
 2nc at can’t generate capital
CP Solves – offsets money would provide countries with an abundance of climate
mitigation capital
Eckland, Geogretown Lawn JD, 16 (Samuel H., 2017, THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIEW
Vol.29:1852016, “Two Birds with One F-16: How Economic Offsets from Foreign Defense Transactions
Can Close Gaps in International Climate Finance”,
https://gielr.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/zsk00117000185.pdf, 7/1/19, SH)

Economic offsets in the defense export market comprise a multibillion-dollar pool of capital that the
United States and other developed countries could use to help reach the $100 billion climate finance
pledge. From fiscal years 2008–2015, the United States averaged over $34 billion in annual FMS sales,
including a high of nearly $67 billion in fiscal year 2012.50 These FMS figures pale in comparison to DCS
sales, which generally exceed FMS sales by a ratio of nearly 3:1.51 Accordingly, it is likely that the U.S.
defense export market may regularly exceed $100billion in sales agreements annually .52 How much of
that market is reflected in economic offsets? The cost of these offsets varies by purchasing jurisdiction,
but can be anywhere from 30 to 100 percent of the contract price.53 Between2011 and 2015, the value
of reported offset agreements by U.S.-based contractors relative to their contract values averaged 47.5
percent, according to the annual report on the impact of offsets in defense trade that the Department of
Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security prepares for Congress; for the $66.3 billion in contracts
reported, firms entered into $31.5 billion in offset commitments.54 A conservative estimate puts U.S.
contractors alone on the hook for over $5 billion annually in economic offset commitments.55
Shareholder disclosures by contractors support this multibillion-dollar sum of annual offset costs.56 For
example, in its 2014Annual Report, Lockheed Martin explained that it had $13.1 billion in outstanding
offset obligations, some of which extend through 2027.57 Lockheed Martin is just one of dozens of
prime contractors engaged in foreign defense sales. Indeed, it is estimated that $214 billion in offset
commitments were signed worldwide from 2005–11, with that number expected to reach $500 billion in
total by 2016.58 Accordingly, tens of billions of dollars are annually obligated worldwide to support
investments in purchasing countries, many of whom are developing nations seeking climate assistance.
Even if contractors and countries agree to spend a fraction of that money on indirect offsets for climate
mitigation or adaptation, the United States and other developed nations would be billions of dollars
closer to reaching the aspirational $100 billion climate finance pledge without needing to authorize
additional public funds

CP is necessary to solve – current climate finance is insufficient

CPI, Climate Analyst Group, 18 (Climate Policy Initiative, November 2018, “Global Climate Finance:
An Updated View 2018,” https://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Global-
Climate-Finance-An-Updated-View-2018.pdf, date accessed 7/2/19)//SH

We find that climate finance has been steadily increasing, but more is needed. Climate finance flows
reached a record high of USD 472 billion in 2015, driven primarily by rising private investment in
renewables. This was followed by a drop in 2016 to USD 455 billion, caused by falling renewable energy
technology costs and fewer renewable energy capacity additions in some countries. Taking into account
annual fluctuations, the average flows across 2015/2016 were 27% higher than during 2013/2014,
although this is partially due to the availability of new data. Furthermore, there is evidence that this
overall increase will continue. Our preliminary estimates for global climate finance flows in 2017 range
from approximately USD 510 billion to USD 530 billion, based on early data showing steady renewable
energy investment, rising electric vehicle investment, and rising investment from development banks.
This range represents a 12-16% increase from 2016. While these increases are undoubtedly good news,
it is important to keep in mind that these figures represent a small share of the overall economic
transition required to address climate change , especially given investments in fossil fuel projects that
continue to surpass investments in low-emissions, climate resilient infrastructure.
 2nc at doesn’t solve climate
The CP provides billions to combat climate change, allowing states to meet Paris
Climate Accord Guidelines
Eckland, Geogretown Lawn JD, 16
[Samuel H., 2017, THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIEW Vol.29:1852016, “Two Birds with One F-16:
How Economic Offsets from Foreign Defense Transactions Can Close Gaps in International Climate
Finance”, 7/1/19, IS]

Economic off set packages from sales of defense goods to foreign governments stand as a multibillion-dollar
pool of capital and a bilateral mechanism that could help close the climate financing gap for developing
nations.This solution, which would involve U.S. government coordination but ultimately private sector leadership, would serve to enhance U.S. security
interests and help meet climate financing commitments with no additional cost to the federal government. As such,
the use of indirect offsets to foreign military sales could be an attractive alternative policy mechanism for traditional

climate financing detractors in Washington. A. UNITED STATES FOREIGN MILITARY SALES, DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES, AND ASSOCIATED ECONOMIC OFFSETS Foreign purchasers
are a large market for U.S. defense contractors. With the passage of the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”) in 1976, American defense contractors have been authorized to sell defense-related
goods and services to foreign countries and international organizations.34 The underlying purpose of the program is to “further the objective of applying agreed resources of each country to
programs and projects of cooperative exchange of data, research, development, production, procurement, and logistics support to achieve specific national defense requirements and
objectives of mutual concern.”35 Before any trade can occur, the president must assess the eligibility of a foreign country to receive exports of defense articles.36 In practice, the duty of
assessment has been delegated to the Defense Security CooperationAgency (“DSCA”) in the Department of Defense.37 In turn, the State Department must approve these sales.38 Since the
adoption of the AECA, foreign military sales (“FMS”) (which feature government-to-government negotiations on behalf of the contractor) and direct commercial sales (“DCS”) (in which the
contractor negotiates directly with the foreign purchaser) have become an increasingly significant market for military equipment.39 This includes the sale of aircraft equipment, weapons
systems, satellites, communications equipment, and electronics equipment, among other products accounting for tens of billions of dollars annually.40 In an era of sequestration and reduced
domestic defense spending, FMS and DCS have proven to be a critical method for U.S. firms to maintain sales, maintain market share, and to sustain capacity.41 As the defense export market

sellers of defense goods offer an economic offset

has grown, it has become common practice for purchasing countries to require that

package.42 The underlying theory of an offset is that purchasing countries allege harm to their domestic economies when
they buy materials from foreign producer s.43 Therefore, in exchange for an agreement to buy foreign
defense products, purchasing countries require that foreign suppliers provide additional economic support to offset
this alleged harm.These off sets may be either directly or indirectly related to the purchased product. Examples of direct economic offsetsincludeco-
productionofthepurchasedproductsorlicensedproductionof a product’s components.44 Indirect offset packages may include these same mechanisms to build capacity in areas unrelated to the
purchased product.45 Economic offset packages can also include features such as credit assistance, investment, technology transfer, and training.46
Becausetheeconomicoffsetis,ineffect,asweetener,theU.S.governmenthas taken the official stance that it is market distorting.47 Accordingly, the U.S. government does not enter directly into,
encourage, or commit contractors to offset contracts with purchasing countries.48 Nevertheless, the federal government is aware of the demand that offset agreements be included in defense

exports and has made efforts to study and mitigate those impacts to U.S. industry.49 B. ECONOMIC OFFSETS COMPRISE A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR POOL OF CAPITAL Economic
offsets in the defense export market comprise a multibillion-dollar pool of capital that the United States and other developed countries could
use to help reach the $100 billion climate finance pledge. From fiscal years 2008–2015, the United States averaged over $34 billion in annual

FMS sales, including a high of nearly $67 billion in fiscal year 2012.50 These FMS figures pale in comparison to DCS sales, which generally exceed FMS sales by a ratio of nearly 3:1.51
Accordingly,itislikelythattheU.S.defenseexportmarketmayregularlyexceed $100billioninsalesagreementsannually.52 Howmuchofthatmarketisreflected in economic offsets? The cost of these

the value of reported offset

offsets varies by purchasing jurisdiction, butcanbeanywherefrom30to100percentofthecontractprice.53 Between2011 and 2015,

agreements by U.S.-based contractors relative to their contract values averaged 47.5 percent , according to the annual report on the
impact of offsets in defense trade that the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security prepares for Congress; for the $66.3 billion in contracts reported, firms entered into

$31.5 billion in offset commitments.54AconservativeestimateputsU.S.contractorsaloneonthehookforover $5 billion annually in economic offset

commitments.55 Shareholder disclosures by contractors support this multibillion-dollar sum of annual offset costs.56 For example, in its 2014Annual Report, Lockheed Martin

explained that it had $13.1 billion in outstanding offset obligations, some of which extend through 2027.57 Lockheed Martin is just one of
dozens of prime contractors engaged in foreign defense sales. Indeed, it is estimated that $214 billion in offset commitments
were signed worldwide from 2005–11, with that number expected to reach $500 billion in total by 2016.58 Accordingly, tens of
billions of dollars are annually obligated worldwide to support investments in purchasing countries, many of whom are developing
nations seeking climate assistance. Even if contractors and countries agree to spend a fraction of that money o n indirect offsets for climate

mitigation or adaptation, the United States and other developed nations would be billions of dollars closer to
reaching the aspirational $100 billion climate finance pledge without needing to authorize additional public funds. C. THE FMS MODEL IS A PROVEN,
FLEXIBLE MECHANISM FOR BILATERAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT THAT CAN SERVE CLIMATE FINANCE Not only do economic offsets present a significant pool of capital for nationbuilding
 FMS and DCS negotiations process provides an existing bilateral channel through which climate offset
investments, but the

agreements may be pursued.As noted above, the fundamental purpose of the AECA is the “cooperative exchange of data, research, development, production,
procurement, and logisticssupporttoachievespecificnationaldefenserequirementsandobjectives of mutual concern.”59 This point is emphasized by the diversity of federal agencies involved: the
State Department, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Commerce (for analyzing the impact of economic offsets). Significantly,
 Climate funding solves
Climate funding is k2 prevent and adapt to warming
Nature Climate Change 17
[Nature Climate Change, 6-30-2017, Nature, "Money for climate",
https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate3343, 7-2-2019, IS]

A judicious use
of financial instruments today could protect the well-being of future societies but
investment and ambition needs to rapidly increase to achieve this outcome. Climate change is already causing
impacts through changes in the mean state and extremes — these require action to minimize the impacts to society. As a consequence,
scholars and policymakers recognized the need for an increased attention to financial instruments specifically
dedicated to actions and projects that should control climate change impacts. Climate finance — the set of
financial instruments and monetary flows that support mitigation and adaptation activities — is a key part of the Paris Agreement .
The Green Climate Fund, first proposed in 2009 at COP15 Copenhagen and in operation since 2014, is one key instrument
(www.greenclimate.fund). There are a variety of sources that can fund climate finance; the public ones include government-allocated funding
often derived from carbon taxes and the revenues of carbon markets. Carbon taxes are a market-based approach where a limited number of
permits are sold; companies and other economic actors are required to hold permits in an amount equal to their CO2 emissions. This
mechanism favours investments in low-emission technologies, in order to reduce spending on permits. As illustrated by Ottmar Edenhofer and
colleagues in a Commentary (page 463), carbon pricing is in place, or being considered, in many states and countries around the world.
However, it's not a perfect solution as low-income households may bear a higher burden because of disproportionate consumption of carbon-
intensive goods relative to income. Distributing the revenue of the carbon prices through social transfer could alleviate the problem. Climate
finance from public funds is projected to increase to US$66.8 billion by 2021 , with additional funding
expected to come from the private sector. At the April 2017 Green Climate Fund board meeting eight new projects were
approved valued at US$755 million, ranging from hydropower resilience in Tajikistan to ground water recharge and irrigation to ensure food
security in Odisha, India. This brings the total
projects to 43, with US$2.2 billion coming from the Green Climate
Fund, and additional funding from co-financing raises the total to US$7.3 billion. Co-financing is an essential
component of the Green Climate Fund, with a target of US$100 billion by 2020 — coming from public and private
sources. Private investment is important to climate finance — in May 2017 the World Bank announced a commitment to increase climate
finance to 28% of its portfolio by 2020; another example is the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a multilateral development
bank, with a 2020 target of 40%, up from 25% over the last 5 years. Multilateral development banks work with Climate Investment Funds
(www.climateinvestmentfunds.org) to support 72 developing countries working towards low-carbon, climate-resilient development. Recently,
Innovate4Climate (www.innovate4climate.com) was held in Barcelona, the first of what looks to become an annual event, bringing together
finance, markets and technology sectors to promote climate action. It was at this event that the Green Climate Fund launched a call for
proposals aimed at leveraging private investment (www.greenclimate.fund/500m). Green bonds are one way in which private markets finance
environmental initiatives. In early June 2017, Apple announced a US$1 billion bond, following from its US$1.5 billion first green bond in 2016.
2016 saw green bonds to the value of US$81 billion issued, a small proportion of the whole bond market but a doubling of those issued in 2015.
Topping the list was the Bank of China with a US$3 billion offering2, with strong increases from other Chinese banks. For 2017 it is estimated
US$150 billion worth of green bonds will be issued (www.climatebonds.net), providing essential climate funding. It is heartening to see the shift
in public and private commitment to green finance, but is it enough? Currently
climate finance focuses on adaptation and
mitigation; however, loss and damage is another climate change concept that has been overlooked in this
field. Cost estimates for loss and damage, specifically climate-change-related loss of land and culture or forced migration, total US$50 billion a
year by 20203 (and are rising rapidly with an estimated minimum of US$300 billion a year by 2030). These are in addition to the estimated costs
of mitigation and adaptation, indicating a rethink is needed on sourcing funds for climate finance. In 2013, the
World Economic Forum
estimated US$5.7 trillion will be needed annually by 2020 for green infrastructure4 . The report suggests that
public funds would need to increase to US$130 billion , an increase over the Green Climate Fund target of US$100 billion, to
leverage US$570 billion of private capital. Currently the Green Climate Fund has pledges of just over US$10 billion and United States withdrawal
may decrease this by US$2 billion, highlighting a gap between what is needed and what is currently happening. An alternative estimate5
suggests resilience investment in 2035 needs to be US$200 billion to avoid losses of US$1 trillion. Currently ,
a widening gap between
investment and climate damage costs suggests there will be a funding shortfall of US$130 billion . Progress
is being made in green bonds and climate finance, but as is the case with emissions pledges the current levels are not enough
to meet the aspirational targets. A shift in thinking and rapid action is need to close the gap between what is
happening now and what is needed to mitigate the impacts of climate change .

Failure to provide funding for developed country’s undermines Climate prevention

Glenmarec 10
[Yannick, 6/30/10, J. Reneewable Sustainable Energy 2, “Financing the transition to a low-carbon
society”, https://doi.org/10.1063/1.3459135, date accessed 7/7/19, IS]

However, 78% of global emissions from energy use do not equate with 78% of the solution to climate change management. Failure
to
provide fair access to climate finance to all developing countries would have severe political, financial,
and climate change implications. The most vulnerable countries to climate change are also those that have
contributed the least to the problem, and which have the lowest capacity to access new sources of finance to adapt to
it. The unfairness of this situation is untenable and would not only endanger a successful outcome of the
present climate change negotiations, but of all global governance negotiations. Furthermore, it would limit
the capacity of industries to capitalize on low cost opportunities in these countries to reduce GHG
emissions in a cost-effective manner. Negative or low cost effective energy efficiency and
afforestation/reforestation options will not be harvested . Last but not least, low income countries are currently
heavily investing in long-lived power generation and urban infrastructures. Limited access to green
financial flows would lock these countries into high-carbon development paths. This would ultimately
hinder their economic development as well as significantly constrain our capacity to limit world average
temperature increase to 2 °C in the second part of the century.
 Infrastructure key—generic
Infrastructure investment solves climate change – governmental action is a
prerequisite and spills over to industries and other nations
Qureshi 16 ,(Zia Qureshi, Director of Strategy and Operations, The World Bank, Project Syndicate, "Could infrastructure
investment help tackle climate change? | World Economic Forum" , 25 Feb
2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/02/could-infrastructure-investment-help-tackle-climate-change DD)

Infrastructure is a powerful driver of economic growth and inclusive development, capable of boosting
aggregate demand today and laying the foundations for future growth. It is also a key element of the
climate-change agenda. Done badly, infrastructure is a major part of the problem; done right, it is a major part of the
solution. Over the next 15 years, more than $90 trillion in infrastructure investment will be needed worldwide. That is more than twice the
value of the entire stock of infrastructure today, and requires total annual investment to increase more than twofold, from $2.5-3 trillion to
above $6 trillion. Around 75% of this investment will have to take place in the developing world, particularly middle-income countries, owing to
their growth needs, rapid urbanization, and already-large infrastructure backlogs. Closing the infrastructure gap will undoubtedly be challenging.
But it also represents a profound opportunity to create the underpinnings of a more sustainable future .
As it stands, more than 80% of the world’s primary energy supply and more than two-thirds of its electricity are derived from fossil fuels.
Infrastructure alone accounts for around 60% of global greenhouse-gas emissions . If the world follows the same
old approaches in building new infrastructure, it would lock in polluting, resource-intensive, and unsustainable pathways to growth. But
shifting to renewable energies and sustainable infrastructure can have the opposite impact, helping to
mitigate greenhouse-gas emissions while enhancing countries’ resilience to climate change . If climate
risks are factored into investment decisions, renewable energies, cleaner transport, efficient water
systems, and smarter, more resilient cities will emerge as the best bets. Fortunately, the political will to take action
to mitigate climate change has never been stronger. At last December’s United Nations climate conference in Paris, world leaders reached a
landmark agreement to work toward a more sustainable future, including by transforming the way infrastructure projects are developed,
financed, and implemented. But agenda setting is just the first step. Delivering sustainable infrastructure at scale will
require strong public policy leadership and responsive private-sector entrepreneurship. Policymakers
must clearly articulate overall strategies for sustainable infrastructure investment, and embed them in
comprehensive frameworks for sustainable growth and development . Here, the G20 countries can lead the way.
Only with such integrated strategies can policymakers offer the level of policy coherence needed not
just to maximize the effectiveness of each policy, but also to instill confidence in the private sector to
do its part. What precisely should those strategies entail? While specific policy actions and priorities must be tailored to individual
countries’ circumstances, the main elements of sustainable infrastructure agendas can broadly be captured under four “I”s: investment,
incentives, institutions, and innovation. For starters, policymakers will need to ensure a significant increase in total investment. This requires a
reversal of the broadly negative public-investment trend in the last couple of decades. Governments must allocate significantly more funds to
sustainable infrastructure. But, given severe fiscal constraints in many countries, public investment alone is not enough; the private sector will
still have to meet more than half of the total need. Efforts
to reduce policy risks and costs of doing business can help
spur the private sector to scale up investment considerably. To ensure that new investment is oriented toward
sustainable infrastructure, policymakers must also adjust market incentives. The elimination of fossil-fuel subsidies and the implementation of
carbon pricing are particularly important; with oil prices very low, now is the ideal time for countries to implement such reforms. Pricing reform
will also be needed in other industries, including water. By getting prices right and reforming regulation to correct distorted incentives,
governments can put markets to work in support of public-policy goals. But more investment alone is not enough. Strong institutions are
needed to ensure the feasibility, quality, and impact of that investment. Particularly
important is the capacity to develop
strong project pipelines and institutional frameworks for public-private partnerships. With around 70% of total
investment in sustainable infrastructure occurring in urban areas, close attention must also be paid to the quality of municipal institutions, as
well as cities’ fiscal capacities. For developing economies, multilateral development banks will be a key partner in building capacity and
catalyzing financing. Finally, there is the fourth “I”: innovation. On one hand, technological innovation will be needed to provide increasingly
efficient components of low-carbon, climate-resilient infrastructure. That
is why investment in research and development
– especially in renewable-energy technologies – must also increase significantly. On the other hand, fiscal and
financial innovation will be needed to capture the potential of new technologies. Specifically, the creative use of fiscal space will enable the
mobilization of more financing for sustainable infrastructure. And there will be more space as carbon taxes raise substantial revenue for
governments (and improve the tax structure). Meanwhile, new financial instruments and the resourceful use of development capital can
leverage more private finance and lower its cost. Promoting infrastructure as an asset class could help attract more
savings toward infrastructure. As it stands, assets under management by banks and institutional investors worldwide amount to
more than $120 trillion, of which infrastructure accounts for only about 5%. Today, both infrastructure investment and
climate action are urgently needed. With the right approach, we can achieve both goals
simultaneously, building a more prosperous and sustainable future.
 Infrastructure key—econ
Sustainable infrastructure is key to economic sustainability – growth, competitiveness,
poverty reduction, and food security
Bhattacharya, senior fellow at Brookings, grad at Princeton, et al. 16 (Amar, along with:
Joshua P. Meltzer, Jeremy Oppenheim, Zia Qureshi, and Nicolas Stern, December 23, 2016, “Delivering on
sustainable infrastructure for better development and better climate,”
https://www.brookings.edu/research/delivering-on-sustainable-infrastructure-for-better-development-
and-better-climate/, date accessed 7/5/19)//SH

2015 was a milestone year in which the world set clear and ambitious objectives through the Third International
Conference on Financing for Development in Addis in July; the UN Summit in September that adopted the Sustainable Development Goals and
the 2030 development agenda; and the COP21 in Paris in December that resulted in the milestone climate agreement. The
three central
challenges now facing the global community, as crystallized in 2015, are to reignite global growth, deliver
on the sustainable development goals (SDGs), and invest in the future of the planet through strong
climate action. At the heart of this new global agenda is the imperative to invest in sustainable
infrastructure. As an essential foundation for achieving inclusive growth, sustainable infrastructure
underpins all economic activity. Inadequate infrastructure remains one of the most pervasive
impediments to growth and sustainable development, and consequently in tackling poverty . Good
infrastructure unshackles and removes constraints on economic growth and helps increase output and
productivity. Investment in sustainable infrastructure can help generate employment, boost international
trade, industrial growth, and competitiveness while reducing inequalities within and among countries.
Sustainable infrastructure also holds the key to poverty reduction and societal well-being in part because
it enhances access to basic services and facilitates access to and knowledge about work opportunities,
thus boosting human capital and quality of life. Sustainable infrastructure helps reduce poverty and
extreme hunger, improve health and education levels, assist in attainment of gender equality, allows for
the provision of clean water and sanitation, and provides access to affordable energy for all. Sustainable
infrastructure promotes sustainable consumption, production, and resource utilization to ensure that
habitats and settlements are resilient, and that ecosystems and marine resources are used in a
sustainable manner. On the one hand, it enhances food security through more efficient resource use and
reduces vulnerability to environmental shocks. On the other, bad infrastructure can and does kill people on a
large scale mainly via air and other pollution, and puts pressure on land and natural resources to an extent
that may compromise the viability of future generations and create unsustainable economic burdens in the future. How
we undertake the massive investments that are needed will have an enduring impact on climate
resilience. The existing stock of infrastructure and its use accounts for more than 60 percent of the
world’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The scale of the new investments that must be made offer a
unique opportunity for accelerating the transition to an economy based on low-carbon energy , but, if not
done well, also pose a great danger of locking in capital, technology, and patterns of economic activity
that will last for decades and become progressively unsustainable. Ramping up ambition as well as spending on
sustainable infrastructure is particularly timely, given the global macroeconomic context and the slowdown in growth and declines in investment
in all regions, and when other policy instruments are highly constrained. First, monetary policy is reaching its limits. Second, fiscal policy is
constrained as well: those with fiscal space seem reluctant to use it and most do not have fiscal room for maneuver. Third, while supply-side
structural reforms are important, their effects take time. A fourth means of jumpstarting growth at this juncture is public-private investments in
sustainable infrastructure. In the near term, such spending can stimulate demand at a time when many countries have been hit by economic
contraction and the commodity slump. In the medium term, investment
in sustainable infrastructure can augment and
improve the efficiency of energy, mobility and logistics—thereby boosting productivity and
competitiveness in all sectors and spurring the domestic drivers of growth. It can also unlock waves of
innovation and creativity. And it underpins the only sustainable long-term growth path on offer.

Sustainable infrastructure is a pre-requisite to successful economies – it improves

every contributing factor
Bhattacharya, senior fellow at Brookings, grad at Princeton, et al. 16 (Amar, along with:
Joshua P. Meltzer, Jeremy Oppenheim, Zia Qureshi, and Nicolas Stern, December, 2016, “Delivering on
sustainable infrastructure for better development and better climate,” https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/global_122316_delivering-on-sustainable-infrastructure.pdf, date accessed
7/5/19)//SH

Sustainable infrastructure – interconnected physical networks in transport, communications, buildings,

energy, water and waste management – is an essential for achieving economic growth. Infrastructure is a
crucial determinant of economic growth. Increased investment in stock and flow of infrastructure
services can directly raise aggregate output, increase marginal productivity of other outputs, enhance
competitiveness, and multiply investments in other sectors. A comprehensive review of the linkages between
infrastructure and economic growth has been provided by Calderon and Serven (2014) and Romp and de Haan (2005). Infrastructure
influences economic growth primarily as an input to the aggregate production function, forming the
basis of all economic activity. The increased availability of physical capital as well as flow of infrastructure
services such as transportation, power supply and use, telecommunications and so on, can help lower
production costs and increase productivity (Barro 1990, Aschauer 2000, Torvik 2001, IMF 2014a). Infrastructure also
stimulates short run demand and supports economic growth during recessions 4 (IMF 2014a). To stimulate
aggregate demand and growth, infrastructure spending was hiked in both developing and advanced economies in the aftermath of the global
crisis of 2007-08. Itis estimated that advanced economies spent 21 percent of their fiscal stimulus on
infrastructure whereas developing countries spent approximately 40 percent to speed economic
recovery (ILO 2011). In China, which implemented the largest stimulus amongst major economies, most of the investment spending was
directed to infrastructure. Infrastructure also influences economic growth by raising total factor productivity
(TFP) (Agenor 2012, World Bank 2016a). Improvements in transportation, telecommunications and information,
communications and technology (ICT) can help expand the production function by raising TFP (Dugall et al.
1999, Hulten and Schwab 2000). As a result of infrastructure upgrades during the 1950s and 1960s, it is estimated
that the U.S. experienced a notable one-time boost in its productivity upon completion of its basic interstate network
(Fernald 1999). At the sub-national level, evidence points to inter-regional differences in TFP attributable to
infrastructure development (Duggal et al. 1999). In India, nearly half of observed TFP growth in Indian states
can be attributed to differences in infrastructure assets in transport and power sectors (ibid). A recent study
has found Vietnamese firms that use internet and e-commerce have 3.6 percent higher TFP growth (World Bank 2016a). Similarly, African firms
that use internet have been found to have 35 percent higher TFP than their non-user counterparts (ibid ).
Sustainable infrastructure,
in addition to providing these direct benefits, also helps unlock new patterns of economic activity and
growth. It fosters links between sectors and has important scale and network effects. While provision of
infrastructure can increase connectivity, both through physical accessibility as well as better integration of services (Schwab and Sala-i-Martín
2015, OECD 2012), sustainable infrastructure creates system-wide inter-linkages that allow economies of scale
and reduce transaction costs. For example, integrated transportation infrastructure can not only significantly
reduce trade costs and increase access to new markets, but it unlocks opportunities in other sectors in
the process. In turn, access to new markets can introduce more efficient management practices, improve
information flows between stakeholders, streamline production knowledge, and help secure property
rights. Ultimately, this contributes to more efficient resource allocation Sustainable infrastructure helps raise
competitiveness of firms, facilitating intra- and inter-regional trade through physical connectivity as well as through ‘soft’ infrastructure
that integrates services across sectors, helping move beyond closed economies (ibid). While increasing physical connectivity is important, it is
estimated that physical trade costs account for only 10-30 percent of total productivity costs (Schwab and Sala-i-Martín 2015,). Other
factors include the regulatory environment as well as availability of communication services and trade
procedures, all of which can benefit from sustainable infrastructure investments . There is significant
potential to target sustainable infrastructure investments to improve connectivity in some of the poorest
countries in the world. It is estimated that only 11 percent of trade in Africa is intra-regional , with over a
third of firms identifying transportation as a major constraint in doing business (World Bank 2015a). Improving
connectivity through improved cost-effective, efficient and resilient transportation infrastructure can
help lower trade costs for African firms. Furthermore, by improving the marginal productivity of other inputs
and changing their relative payoffs, sustainable infrastructure can have a direct effect on labor as well as
on public and private stock of capital, making an economy more competitive . This channel of influence has been
documented extensively for traditional infrastructure investments (Calderon et al. 2014, Canning and Pedroni 2008, OECD 2012) and can
reasonably be assumed to provide a lower estimate of the effect. There is evidence that unless infrastructure design takes into account system-
wide linkages, sustainable growth objectives will fall short. This is because the role of infrastructure in enhancing marginal productivity of inputs
is often subject to threshold and network effects (Estache and Fay 2007, Agenor 2012, Calderon and Serven 2014). For example, unless
construction of large scale public infrastructure such as regional highways connecting agricultural
markets is complemented with construction of rural 5 feeder roads, the benefits from increased rural
trade will not begin to accrue at the level intended (Agenor 2012). Similarly, benefits from telecommunications in raising
output are found to be higher with near universal coverage (Lars-Hendrik and Waverman 2001), in some cases peaking with infrastructure
network coverage at full development (Calderon and Serven 2014). This non-linear change in marginal productivity has significant implications
for countries with low infrastructure endowments to begin with. It requires achievement of a level of infrastructure accumulation before
productivity gains begin to be realized (Agenor 2012). More importantly, it highlights the need for an integrated design that takes into account
the inter-linkages and co-benefits from separate infrastructure investments.
 CP solves adaptation
Infrastructure is uniquely key to adaptation – other countries have different needs – CP
is the only way to solve
Bhattacharya, senior fellow at Brookings, grad at Princeton, et al. 16 (Amar, along with:
Joshua P. Meltzer, Jeremy Oppenheim, Zia Qureshi, and Nicolas Stern, December, 2016, “Delivering on
sustainable infrastructure for better development and better climate,” https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/global_122316_delivering-on-sustainable-infrastructure.pdf, page 16-19, date
accessed 7/5/19)//SH

Investments in sustainable infrastructure are a necessary condition for successful adaptation to the inevitable
impacts of climate change. At the same time, adaptation remains inextricably linked and endogenous to sustainable
development. Adaptation can be viewed as an adjustment, process or outcome in natural or human
systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects (IPCC 2014). Climate change will
not only result in extreme events that necessitate protective adaptation measures, but it will also
manifest in gradually altering temperatures, sea-levels as well as rainfall patterns . Such climate change
impacts will require adaptation through sustainable infrastructure that helps build resilience of
vulnerable communities and provides protection against exposure to extreme climate events, as well as
helps devise long term sustainable development pathways. Adaptation approaches can either be
incremental or transformational in nature, with different implications for long term development pathways. For example,
transformational adaption seeks to overhaul threatened systems, moving them to fundamentally new patterns, dynamics, and or locations (IPCC
2014). On the one hand, sustainable infrastructure solutions to help realize this transformative adaptation would rely heavily on stimulating
innovation, unlocking new opportunities in the process, and consequently altering current patterns of consumption and production. On the
other, incremental adaptation requires tweaking existing systems to make them resilient to climate change. For example, improved
telecommunications and upgraded physical infrastructure can help improve information flows particularly with regard to extreme climate
events, reduce uncertainty associated with climate change as well as provide physical security for the vulnerable. The
difference in
adaptation needs between and within different regions around the world means that adaptation
measures will involve a combination of incremental and transformational sustainable infrastructure
investments. In regions where climate-induced sea level rise is expected to inundate large swathes of
land, protection and resettlement of millions of people will require transformation of BAU infrastructure
investments with renewed emphasis on smart cities and integrated service provision. Similarly, in regions
where water resources are projected to become increasingly scarce, protection of agriculture-dependent
livelihoods will require investments in climate smart agricultural infrastructure. The following table summarizes
potential infrastructure interventions for adaptation (Table 1). As climate change impacts are projected to vary across the
globe, exposing some communities to greater risk than others, so will the adaptation of infrastructure
needs and management responses. Furthermore, the differences in preexisting levels of infrastructure vary
greatly between and within developed and developing countries. This will require different adaptation
approaches even when responding to similar exposures . For example, climate change is expected to increase
uncertainty and variability in water supply across the globe with some regions expected to witness
increased supplies whereas others will experience a drastic reduction. This high variability-uncertainty
scenario has significant implications for agricultural, industrial, as well as domestic water uses. To moderate
expected impact requires adaptation measures. Research indicates that most of the adaptation costs in the water supply sector (83-90 percent)
will be incurred in developing countries over the period 2010–2050 (Ward et al. 2010). Given the disproportionately greater exposure of the
poorest communities to climate change impacts (IPCC 2014, Granoff et al. 2015, Burke et al. 2015, Nakhooda and Watson 2015), sustainable
infrastructure investments in adaptation are crucial for preventing a reversal of the development gains
made thus far. Furthermore, such diversity in climate change impacts highlights the importance of targeting
adaptation infrastructure investments where needs are more urgent and potential gains high. Significant
progress has already been made in investing in infrastructure services that provide a basis for policymakers to make climate-adapted decisions,
particularly in resource-constrained environments. For example, information systems that provide accurate and timely meteorological data
enable improved and integrated resource management in areas with higher climate variability and exposure (World Bank 2016b). Similarly,
climate-proofing future infrastructure investments at inception can be both cost-effective and timely. Further
investments in
sustainable infrastructure to ensure long-term food security, protection of human habitats and entire
ecosystems are needed and should be undertaken in a holistic manner . This requires considering how each
investment affects poverty, growth, and sustainable development. Sustainable infrastructure that promotes climate-smart
land use can help achieve adaptation goals as well as sustainable food production and rural development
while contributing towards climate change mitigation (GEF 2016). Investments to protect high-carbon stock forests, improve
land management, and spur efficient agricultural production practices are key components of climate-smart land use and can help offset
emissions from fossil fuels (ibid). Such an integrated strategy can prevent the possibility of maladaptation where even small miscalculations at
planning stages can lock the world into unsustainable long-term development pathways (Nakhooda and Watson 2015). Fortunately, the
processes involved in undertaking infrastructure investments are conducive to considering and embedding adaptation requirements in their
design at an early stage (ibid). The following sections discuss in greater depth the estimated needs and means for sourcing such greening of
infrastructure.
 Climate Finance Key

Climate Finance in developing countries is k2 lower global emission.

Markandya, Basque Center for Climate Change, et al 15
[Anil, 2015, World Development Vol. 74, pp 93-107, “Analyzing Trade-offs in International Climate Policy
Options: The Case of the Green Climate Fund”, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.04.013,
accessed 7/7/19, IS]

(b) The 450 PPM scenario The emissions along this path and the implied reduction for each region relative to the baseline are
given in Table 3. Globally, emissions are now 50% lower than the baseline by 2035 , with most regions reducing
their emissions by between 31% (Rest of Asia) and 68% (Norway) compared with 2010 levels. A first remarkable result is that
developing countries are generally expected to make major contributions during this period. Such a
challenging target may be politically difficult to achieve without some form of support. This is exactly the reason behind
the deadlock in international negotiations and the very heart of the debate surrounding the CBDR – namely that developed countries
acting alone will be ineffective in stabilizing the global temperature but an active role played by developing
countries could imply unacceptable abatement costs, affecting substantially their economic development perspectives.
Therefore, it clearly emerges that the implementation of climate finance support mechanisms such as the GCF constitutes a key
policy strategy.
 Net Benefit—Nigeria
Solving climate change resolves Nigerian security concerns—that’s critical to global
stability
Campbell 17 (senior fellow for Africa policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, BA and MA in history
from the University of Virginia and a PhD in seventeenth-century English history from the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 17
(John, July 13, “National Security Implications of Climate Change,” https://www.cfr.org/blog/national-security-
implications-climate-change, date accessed 7/2/19)//SH

Climate change certainly has direct implications for the security of the United States, which other
participants are exploring this afternoon. But, we Americans must also be concerned about the security
of our close diplomatic partners. If our partners’ security is undermined, so too is our own, even if only
indirectly. Here, I would like to look at Nigeria as a case study, where climate change is already having a
negative impact on the security of a close partner of the United States. Arguably, Nigeria is the African
state of greatest strategic importance to the United States. It is home to about 20 percent of the people
living in Africa south of the Sahara. It has a population of more than 200 hundred million, and it is
already considerably larger than the Russian Federation. The population is growing rapidly. It has
increased by 17.35 percent over the past five years, far faster than the growth of Nigeria’s economy and
the development of basic infrastructure. Some agencies estimate that by mid-century, Nigeria’s
population will be about 450 million, displacing the United States as the third most populous country in
the world. Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy by conventional measures. It is usually Africa’s largest
producer of oil and natural gas, producing about 2 million barrels of oil a day, if production is not
disrupted by factors ranging from insurgencies to theft. While Nigeria is no longer a significant exporter
of petroleum to the United States, its level of oil production is an important factor in the world price of
energy. Ostensibly a civilian democracy since the end of military rule in 1999, the opposition came to
power through credible elections for the first time in 2015, when Muhammadu Buhari defeated
incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan. Shared democratic values and aspirations have become an
import bond between Nigeria and the U nited States. A regional leader, Nigeria was one of the founders
of the African Union and has been the linchpin of the Economic Community of West African States. It is
also active in the United Nations system. In the past, its government contributed large numbers of troops
to United Nations and other peacekeeping operations. More generally, Nigeria has long been a key
American partner on issues of mutual concern in Africa, ranging from peacemaking and peacekeeping to
responding to epidemics. There is a long history of close diplomatic consultation and cooperation
between Washington and Abuja. It is a two-way street. Notably, Nigeria played a crucial role in ending
the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone and in ending a cycle of West African military coups. To
demonstrate Nigeria’s solidarity with the United States, then-president Olusegun Obasanjo was the first
African chief of state to visit Washington in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the
Twin Towers and the Pentagon. But, Nigeria is currently under siege. Its security challenges include a radical,
Islamist insurrection in the northeast of the country called Boko Haram, restiveness in the Niger Delta,
the heartland of Nigeria’s petroleum-based wealth, and ethnic and religious conflict centered in the
middle belt but found elsewhere as well. Taken together, these are a serious challenge to the
continuation of Nigeria as a democratic, secular state, and diplomatic and strategic partner of the United
States. Already Nigeria plays a smaller role on the international stage than it did, so productively, in the
past. Moreover, with its continent-wide influence in a host of areas, Nigeria’s success as a democracy is
in the fundamental interest of its African neighbors, the United States, and the international community.
Nigeria’s present security challenges are related, directly and indirectly, to the consequences of climate
change. Here, I want to talk about only two manifestations of climate change in Nigeria: desertification
and rising sea levels. Both are the context for, and contribute to, the security challenges that undermine
the Nigerian state and thereby challenge U.S. security interests in Africa. Desertification is promoting
economic and social instability in northern Nigeria. It already results in higher levels of impoverishment
among herders and farmers, and thereby provides an opening for radical movements often hostile to the
United States as well as to the secular government in Abuja. Since 1900, the Sahara has moved north
and south a total of about 150 miles, and now covers an additional 3,750 square miles. Each year,
Nigeria loses thousands of acres of agricultural and grazing land to the advancing desert and periodic
drought. (According to the World Bank, average rainfall in Nigeria has decreased by 21% over the past
five years.) Lake Chad and its basin had been a vital source of freshwater in the northeast and it once was the center of an important fishing
industry. Between 1960 and 2000, however, its surface area was reduced by more than 90%. The reasons for this drastic reduction
in the lake are multifaceted and complex, but a significant factor has been the need for ever larger
amounts of water for irrigation to grow crops for an ever growing population. Over recent decades, more
water was taken from Lake Chad than could be naturally replenished. Less arable land, less water, and
more people are a recipe for a cycle of violence. Herdsmen and farmers, usually of different and often
rival ethnic groups and religions, compete for ever scarcer land and resources. To be more specific,
desertification and drought drives Muslim herdsmen south in search of pasturage for their cattle where
they collide with small Christian farmers of different ethnic groups. Attacks lead to counter attacks.
“Ethnic cleansing” follows. Federal and state governments lack the capacity to maintain security, even
with a significant pull-back from foreign peacekeeping commitments. That reality, in turn, undercuts
popular support for the Nigerian state. Pervasive violence and deepening poverty encourage the rise of
radical religious groups that seek to destroy Nigeria and are hostile to the United States, as was the case
with Boko Haram. Climate change contributes to too little water in the north and too much along
Nigeria’s coast. According to the World Bank, almost one third of West Africa’s population, responsible
for creating 56 percent of the region’s GDP, lives along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea. Because of global
warming, sea levels around the world are likely to rise by more than thirty inches by the end of the
century. Africa, the Gulf of Guinea in particular, is expected to be especially hard hi t: the number of
people in Africa living in areas subject to flooding is estimated to rise from 1 million a year in 1990 to 70
million a year by 2080. Lagos is now one of the largest cities in the world, and its population is exploding;
it grew from 5.3 million in 1991 to 16 million in 2006, and reached 21.3 million in 2015. (These figures
are estimates only.) Much of the Lagos metropolitan area is only slightly above sea level and several
neighborhoods consist entirely of shacks built on stilts in the lagoon. As sea levels rise, millions of
inhabitants and millions of dollars in assets will be threatened by flooding . Already in 2012, there was
devastating river and coastal flooding, ultimately affecting 32 of Nigeria’s 36 states. Flooding killed at
least 432, directly affected some 7 million, and resulted in 2.1 million internally displaced persons.
(These figures are estimates only.) The high level of casualties and property damage overwhelmed the
official relief agencies, undermining popular confidence in the institutions of the Nigerian state. The
flooding in 2012 also had a serious economic impact. It disrupted petroleum production in the Niger
Delta by about 500,000 barrels per day, causing a substantial loss in government revenue just when it
was most needed for humanitarian relief. Consideration of the social and political consequences of
climate change are often based on future projections. In the case of Nigeria, however, the effects of
climate change are already visible. It is an important contributing factor in ethnic and religious conflict,
quarrels over land use, and the disaffection of at least some Nigerians from their government. Moreover,
because of our close partnership, the effects of climate change in Nigeria have important consequences
for U.S. interests and security elsewhere in Africa.
 Net Benefit—Hegemony
Climate change turns heg – domestic military problems and causes Arctic ice melt
which gives Russia and China direct access to the U.S. Only the Counterplan’s
adaptation technologies can solve
Myers Jaffe, Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy
Security and Climate Change, taught energy policy, business, and sustainability courses at Rice University,
University of California, Davis, and Yale University, 19 (Amy, January 23, “Climate Change Is a Threat to
Military Security,” https://www.cfr.org/blog/climate-change-threat-military-security, date accessed
7/1/2019)//SH

the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) released a congressionally-mandated report detailing the
Earlier this month,

challenges climate change poses to the U.S. military. Citing increased exposure to recurrent flooding,
drought, desertification, wildfires, and thawing permafrost, the report highlights how climate change
affects U.S. military readiness to respond to national security emergencies . The report includes a list of selected events where mission related activities at

To quantify the extent to which the military is

military installations were compromised due to environmental vulnerabilities as well as a brief list of policies taken to mitigate future damages.

threatened by climate change, the report tracked seventy-nine priority American domestic installations
chosen by their critical operational roles. the public report did identify While was circumspect on details given the sensitive strategic nature of the subject, it

climate change as an important and tangible threat to the U.S. military . The report represents another in a series of public acknowledgements that spans four

In October Hurricane Michael thrashed the

administrations that the military is not immune to extreme weather. Last year, numerous concrete examples raised public awareness of the issue. , category four

Florida coast In its way was U.S. Air Force Base Tyndall which houses not
with winds reaching one hundred and thirty miles per hour on Florida’s panhandle. ,

only the headquarters of the Florida Air National Guard, but also the 325th Fighter Wing, a major
combat force of F-22 Raptors and a principle training center and testing site for their pilots, maintenance
crews, and equipment. The base, like surrounding civilian areas, was not able to regain a normal
operating status for almost a month forcing the fighter
. During the recovery period, critical training and maintenance schedules for the almost a third of the nation’s F-22s was disrupted,

jets to relocate to other regional airbases less able to run such a high volume of them. rebuilding has Additionally,

been costly and time consuming The situation starkly demonstrates how
, thereby diverting man-hours and resources that could have been spent on other matters.

a severe weather event can be tumultuous for critical but routine activities such as patrolling and
training. Of the seventy-nine installations analyzed in the report, 67 percent
Tyndall is not the only base exposed to weather related threats.

reported that they are currently facing problems from recurrent flooding, and 76 percent reported that
flooding has the potential to create vulnerabilities in the next twenty years. Acute extreme weather
events have a higher probability of occurring in the future due to climate change This means there
, like hurricanes, .

is possibly more stress that could come to Tyndall and other coastal bases in the future. California’s
wildfires have also taken their toll on nearby military bases The Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training .

Center was forced to evacuate in September of last year when wildfires got too close
, which is based near the Sierra Nevada, . According to

46 percent of the installations analyzed are now vulnerable to wildfires. This

the DoD report, is in addition to facility vulnerabilities from drought, which, in

increases the risk of fire in Western Regions of the country.

turn, Stressed water supplies from extended periods of drought can also require contingency planning for when bases are

protecting operational bases against severe weather events is not the only worry the
must be temporarily put out of commission. Of course,

military has in the face of climate change. The warming of the poles has also opened a new strategic
landscape which directly connects the United States and Canada to Russia and China via the Arctic
Ocean. As ice that used to cover the ocean melts and it becomes possible to move significant traffic
through the area, policing the region against China and Russia will become a critical, and expensive,
mission for the U.S. Navy. Arctic ice melt will also increase the extent to which foreign military vessels
have access to North American shores the DoD report mentions that the U.S. . Beyond direct U.S. military activities related to the homeland,
military carries out significant humanitarian and disaster relief efforts If , as directed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

climate change does lead to an increased severity of global natural disasters, the military may need to
expand its capacity to deal with traumatic events in different parts of the globe , on top of expanding requirements and strains at home.

Climate change also threatens increased destabilization in regions outside of the United States which ,

may put strain on deployed troops or even require U.S. military intervention Sea-level rise could threaten .

rapidly developing cities Any major displacement from

along the coast of Africa like Mogadishu, Djibouti City, and Mombasa with damaged infrastructure and compromised water supplies.

these major cities would be a geopolitical risk and put even more strain on the already stressed global
immigration channels . This could also cause an increase in piracy if economic conditions deteriorate around the Horn of Africa. With so many present and future challenges being exacerbated by changing global climate patterns, it is important that
military leadership internalize these threats and examine the entire military system to prepare for the challenges it will be facing. The DoD report lists some of the activities currently being undertaken by the military. Major initiatives include designing construction standards to better
withstand natural events and developing research programs to better understand facility risks from environmental vulnerabilities. However, the report was very limited in its scope as compared to the mission of the DoD. For example, it neglected to cover international installations or the
Marine Corps. It also did not provide congress with strategies to prioritize resources for mitigating future threats. Moving forward, the DoD should expand on the initial report to fill in missing gaps and provide congress with more actionable budget recommendations. Specifically, DoD
should develop and maintain a separate fund dedicated for research and systematic improvements to address these environmental vulnerabilities. The DoD should also commission robust studies for each Geographic Combatant Command to better understand how climate change may
impact each region of the world in which the United States has strategic or militaristic interests. This will be important for understanding how climate change could impair access or movements of deployed troops and equipment and allow the military to improve planning for future types

Contingency plans are needed for vulnerable bases that might need to be
of climate-related missions the military may have to conduct.

evacuated or otherwise go offline due to a natural disaster. Dangerous skepticism at the highest levels of political leadership can still limit the DoD’s ability to respond adequately to the
changing world. The report was sent directly to Senator Jim Inhofe, chairman of the Committee on Armed Forces, who is notable for his speeches on the Senate floor denying the existence of climate change. What Congress decides to do moving forward from this initial report could have
lasting implications for national security. Congress could call for more robust analytical reports and create new funding channels to drive research and preparation for environmental specific threats, or Congress could ignore the report, claiming satisfaction, and leave the military scrambling
to work on this important issue by diverting resources from other budgets and performing sub-par preparation. So far, little news has surfaced from Congress about the report, indicating that it may be business as usual for the DoD.

The US’s failure to fight for climate change undermines it’s hegemonic stance in the
world – turns case
Yarmuth 18 John Yarmuth, Ranking Democrat, House Budget Committee Democratic Staff , U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on the Budget, Democratic Caucus, "The Budgetary Impact of Climate Change | House Budget Committee
Democrats", Nov 27, 2018, https://budget.house.gov/publications/report/budgetary-impact-climate-change DD

In addition, the President’s budget eliminates funding for the Global Climate Change Initiative – a program to help
other countries face climate change – it cut funding for the State Department by 30 percent below the 2017 level,
hobbling a critical pillar of national security and international diplomacy . As of February 2018, 195
countries have signed the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. But the President has backed away from this agreement, in a move that is both irresponsible
and isolating. The Paris Agreement provides great flexibility for countries in setting and meeting goal s, and
U.S. participation in it was a strong symbol of our place in the international community . A global problem like

climate change requires international cooperation. Diminishing our role with a myopic “America First”
agenda undermines our status as a global leader. As a leader in the fight against climate change, America should be
spurring innovation, creating renewable resources, and spearheading efficiency research. We should be boosting
mitigation efforts to reduce losses from future natural disasters. We should be working with the international community to find
solutions to a warming planet. Instead this Administration backtracks on previous efforts to fight climate change, using denial, isolationism, and funding cuts to make
the problem worse – and far more expensive. Climate change will influence the nation’s economy, security, and budgetary bottom line. The longer we wait to act, the
more money we will spend responding to natural disasters and other climate-related challenges. Failing to fund climate research and promote clean energy will
result in lasting damage to the atmosphere and our fiscal outlook.
Ignoring diplomacy and our global partners exposes us to
climate change threats as well as military dangers. The Trump Administration could reduce the peril posed by climate change, but
instead is making all the wrong choices. “Climate change is a complex, interdisciplinary issue with the potential to affect nearly every sector and level of
governmental operations.” -Federal Climate Change Expenditures Report to Congress, August 2013.
 AT Perm
Permutation links to the DA—proves the counterplan alone is a superior strategy, and its severance—

The CP provides billions to combat climate change, allowing states to meet Paris
Climate Accord Guidelines
Eckland, Geogretown Lawn JD, 16
[Samuel H., 2017, THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIEW Vol.29:1852016, “Two Birds with One F-16:
How Economic Offsets from Foreign Defense Transactions Can Close Gaps in International Climate
Finance”, 7/1/19, IS]

Economic off set packages from sales of defense goods to foreign governments stand as a multibillion-dollar
pool of capital and a bilateral mechanism that could help close the climate financing gap for developing
nations.This solution, which would involve U.S. government coordination but ultimately private sector leadership, would serve to enhance U.S. security
interests and help meet climate financing commitments with no additional cost to the federal government. As such,
the use of indirect offsets to foreign military sales could be an attractive alternative policy mechanism for traditional

climate financing detractors in Washington. A. UNITED STATES FOREIGN MILITARY SALES, DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES, AND ASSOCIATED ECONOMIC OFFSETS Foreign purchasers
are a large market for U.S. defense contractors. With the passage of the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”) in 1976, American defense contractors have been authorized to sell defense-related
goods and services to foreign countries and international organizations.34 The underlying purpose of the program is to “further the objective of applying agreed resources of each country to
programs and projects of cooperative exchange of data, research, development, production, procurement, and logistics support to achieve specific national defense requirements and
objectives of mutual concern.”35 Before any trade can occur, the president must assess the eligibility of a foreign country to receive exports of defense articles.36 In practice, the duty of
assessment has been delegated to the Defense Security CooperationAgency (“DSCA”) in the Department of Defense.37 In turn, the State Department must approve these sales.38 Since the
adoption of the AECA, foreign military sales (“FMS”) (which feature government-to-government negotiations on behalf of the contractor) and direct commercial sales (“DCS”) (in which the
contractor negotiates directly with the foreign purchaser) have become an increasingly significant market for military equipment.39 This includes the sale of aircraft equipment, weapons
systems, satellites, communications equipment, and electronics equipment, among other products accounting for tens of billions of dollars annually.40 In an era of sequestration and reduced
domestic defense spending, FMS and DCS have proven to be a critical method for U.S. firms to maintain sales, maintain market share, and to sustain capacity.41 As the defense export market

sellers of defense goods offer an economic offset

has grown, it has become common practice for purchasing countries to require that

package.42 The underlying theory of an offset is that purchasing countries allege harm to their domestic economies when
they buy materials from foreign producer s.43 Therefore, in exchange for an agreement to buy foreign
defense products, purchasing countries require that foreign suppliers provide additional economic support to offset
this alleged harm.These off sets may be either directly or indirectly related to the purchased product. Examples of direct economic offsetsincludeco-
productionofthepurchasedproductsorlicensedproductionof a product’s components.44 Indirect offset packages may include these same mechanisms to build capacity in areas unrelated to the
purchased product.45 Economic offset packages can also include features such as credit assistance, investment, technology transfer, and training.46
Becausetheeconomicoffsetis,ineffect,asweetener,theU.S.governmenthas taken the official stance that it is market distorting.47 Accordingly, the U.S. government does not enter directly into,
encourage, or commit contractors to offset contracts with purchasing countries.48 Nevertheless, the federal government is aware of the demand that offset agreements be included in defense

exports and has made efforts to study and mitigate those impacts to U.S. industry.49 B. ECONOMIC OFFSETS COMPRISE A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR POOL OF CAPITAL Economic
offsets in the defense export market comprise a multibillion-dollar pool of capital that the United States and other developed countries could
use to help reach the $100 billion climate finance pledge. From fiscal years 2008–2015, the United States averaged over $34 billion in annual

FMS sales, including a high of nearly $67 billion in fiscal year 2012.50 These FMS figures pale in comparison to DCS sales, which generally exceed FMS sales by a ratio of nearly 3:1.51
Accordingly,itislikelythattheU.S.defenseexportmarketmayregularlyexceed $100billioninsalesagreementsannually.52 Howmuchofthatmarketisreflected in economic offsets? The cost of these

the value of reported offset

offsets varies by purchasing jurisdiction, butcanbeanywherefrom30to100percentofthecontractprice.53 Between2011 and 2015,

agreements by U.S.-based contractors relative to their contract values averaged 47.5 percent , according to the annual report on the
impact of offsets in defense trade that the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security prepares for Congress; for the $66.3 billion in contracts reported, firms entered into

$31.5 billion in offset commitments.54AconservativeestimateputsU.S.contractorsaloneonthehookforover $5 billion annually in economic offset

commitments.55 Shareholder disclosures by contractors support this multibillion-dollar sum of annual offset costs.56 For example, in its 2014Annual Report, Lockheed Martin

explained that it had $13.1 billion in outstanding offset obligations, some of which extend through 2027.57 Lockheed Martin is just one of
dozens of prime contractors engaged in foreign defense sales. Indeed, it is estimated that $214 billion in offset commitments
were signed worldwide from 2005–11, with that number expected to reach $500 billion in total by 2016.58 Accordingly, tens of
billions of dollars are annually obligated worldwide to support investments in purchasing countries, many of whom are developing
nations seeking climate assistance. Even if contractors and countries agree to spend a fraction of that money o n indirect offsets for climate

mitigation or adaptation, the United States and other developed nations would be billions of dollars closer to
reaching the aspirational $100 billion climate finance pledge without needing to authorize additional public funds. C. THE FMS MODEL IS A PROVEN,
FLEXIBLE MECHANISM FOR BILATERAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT THAT CAN SERVE CLIMATE FINANCE Not only do economic offsets present a significant pool of capital for nationbuilding

FMS and DCS negotiations process provides an existing bilateral channel through which climate offset
investments, but the

agreements may be pursued.As noted above, the fundamental purpose of the AECA is the “cooperative exchange of data, research, development, production,
procurement, and logisticssupporttoachievespecificnationaldefenserequirementsandobjectives of mutual concern.”59 This point is emphasized by the diversity of federal agencies involved: the
State Department, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Commerce (for analyzing the impact of economic offsets). Significantly,