54. RUBIN V.

COORS BREWING
TITLE RUBIN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY V. COORS
BREWING CO.

GR NUMBER 93-1631

DATE APRIL 19, 1996

PONENTE Thomas, J.

NATURE/KEYWORDS
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit

FACTS Coors Brewing Co. (Coors) applied to the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for an approval of
proposed labels. The approval was rejected
because it violated the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act’s (FAAA) prohibition of
disclosing the alcohol content on beer labels or
advertisements. Coors filed a claim arguing the
regulation violated the First Amendment’s
protection of commercial speech. The government
argued the regulation was necessary to prevent
“strength wars” among brewers, which in this case,
refers to breweries competing on the basis of the
potency of their alcohol.
The District Court found in favor of Coors, but the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed
the judgment and remanded the case back to the
district court. The District Court subsequently
upheld the ban of alcohol content in advertising,
but not on labels. The government appealed, and
the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the
lower court by concluding that the label ban did not
prevent strength wars.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the Federal Alcohol Administration
Act’s prohibition of displaying alcohol content on
beer labels violate the First Amendment’s
protection of commercial speech?

RULING(S) The Court held that for the government to regulate

commercial speech, the government must have a
substantial interest that the regulation directly
affects. In this case, the interest the government
intended to protect by banning the display of
alcohol content on beer labels was to limit the
“strength wars” of competing beer companies,
which could lead to greater alcoholism. However,
the Court concluded that this interest was not
substantial enough, since there was no reason to
believe that banning the alcoholic content on beer
labels would prevent such social harms. The
regulation also does not directly advance the
suppression of strength wars, especially since
other provisions of the FAAA directly counteract its
effects. Finally, the Court held the regulation was
more extensive than necessary, since there were
available and effective alternatives that would not
violate the First Amendment.