Property Case Reviewer 1

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Property Case Reviewer

Prof. E.A. Labitag
1 semester AY 2010-2011
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Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

Case Title Quick Facts Held/Ratio/Doctrine
Davao Sawmill v. Castillo A lessee placed machinery in a building erected on land belonging to The machinery unit must be classified as a personal property.
August 7, 1935 another, with the understanding that the machinery was not included in Machinery which is movable in its nature becomes immobilized when
Malcolm, J. the improvements which would pass on the lessor on the expiration of placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when
the lease. placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a
Lessee also treated the machinery as personal property by executing temporary right, unless such person acted as an agent of the owner.
chattel mortgages in favor of 3rd persons
Berkenkotter v. Cu Unjieng e Hijos Mabalacat Sugar Co. obtained from D a loan secured by a 1st mortgage on The installation of a machinery and equipment in a mortgaged sugar
July 31, 1935 2 parcels of land “with all its buildings, improvements, mill, steel central constitutes a permanent improvement, which subjects said
Villa-Real, J. reailway, telephone line, apparatus, utensils and whatever forms part or machinery and equipment to the mortgage constituted thereon.
is a necessary complement of said […] or that may in the future exist
in said lots.”
After some months, MSC bought additional machinery and equipment to
increase its capacity.
Petitioner advanced the amount for the addt’l equipment, with promise
to be reimbursed.
Lopez v. Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatre, Inc. Orosa proposed to Lopez to invest in a theatre business, which would be Appellant’s contention that the lien executed in favor of the furnisher of
February 28, 1958 erected on O’s land. Lopez refused, but agreed to supply the lumber the materials used for the construction, repair or refection of a building
Felix, J. necessary for the construction. Payment, as agreed, would be upon is also extended to land on which it was constructed is without merit,
demand and not COD. Lopez was paid only a portion of the amount. because while it is true generally that real estate connotes the land and
As Lopez was demanding payment, O obtained a bank loan by the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the
mortgaging the theatre to pay for the balance due L. However, the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what
theater was already mortgaged to PNB constitutes real property, could mean only one thing: that a building is
by itself an immovable property
Associated Ins. & Surety Co. v. Iya Sps. Valino owned and possessed a house of strong materials In Grace A building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said
May 30, 1958 Park Subd, Caloocan, which they purchased on installment from PRC. structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same
Felix, J. Wife purchased rice with AISC as surety, and as counter-guaranty, owner. It cannot be divested of its character of a realty by the fact that
executed a chattel mortgage on their house. At that time, the land was the land on which it was constructed belongs to another.
still in PRC’s name. As personal properties could only be the subject of a chattel mortgage,
After completion of payment of purchase price, TCT in Valino’s name the execution of a CM on a building is invalid and a nullity, the
was secured. Then, to secure an indebtedness, executed a REM over the registration of the chattel notwithstanding.
lot and house in favor of Iya.
Tumalad v. Vicencio Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the Certain deviations from the rule in Lopez and Iya, however, have been
Tumalads over their house of strong materials located at 550 Int. 3, allowed for various reasons.
Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, over Lot 6-B and 7-B, Block 2554, Hence, if a house belonging to a person stands on a rented land
which were being rented from Madrigal & Company, Inc. belonging to another person, it may be mortgaged as a personal
property as so stipulated in the document of mortgage. It should be
When Vicencio and Simeon defaulted in paying, the mortgage was noted, however that the principle is predicated on statements by the
extrajudicially foreclosed, and on 27 March 1956, the house was sold at owner declaring his house to be a chattel, a conduct that may
public auction pursuant to the said contract. As highest bidder, the conceivably estop him from subsequently claiming otherwise.
Tumalads were issued the corresponding certificate of sale.
Unlike in the Iya cases, Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatreand Leung
Yee vs. F. L. Strong Machinery and Williamson, wherein third persons
On 18 April 1956, the Tumalads commenced Civil Case 43073 in the assailed the validity of the chattel mortgage, it is the defendants-
municipal court of Manila, praying, among other things, that the house appellants themselves, as debtors-mortgagors, who are attacking the
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be vacated and its possession surrendered to them, and for Vicencio and validity of the chattel mortgage in this case. The doctrine of estoppel
Simeon to pay rent of P200.00 monthly from 27 March 1956 up to the therefore applies to the herein defendants-appellants, having treated the
time the possession is surrendered. MC ruled in favor of Tumalad subject house as personalty.
Nearly a year after the foreclosure sale the mortgaged house had been
demolished on 14 and 15 January 1957 by virtue of a decision obtained
by the lessor of the land on which the house stood.
Makati Leasing and Finance Corp v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. To be able to secure financial accommodations from the petitioner, There is no logical justification to exclude the rule out that the
May 16, 1983 the private respondent discounted and assigned several receivables machinery may be considered as personal property, and subject to
De Castro, J. under a Receivable Purchase Agreement. To secure the a chattel mortgage. If a house may be considered as personal property
collection of the receivables, a chattel mortgage was executed for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage, what more a machinery,
over machinery found in the factory of the private respondent. which is movable by nature and
becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be
As the private respondent failed to pay, the mortgage was likewise treated as such.
extrajudicially foreclosed. Nonetheless, the sheriff was unable to
seize the machinery. This prompted petitioner to file an action for Tumalad doctrine applies.
replevin.
The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the return
of the drive motor, after ruling that the machinery may not be the
subject of a chattel mortgage, given that it was an immovable under the
provisions of Article 415. The same was attached to the ground by
means of bolts and the only way to remove it from the plant would be to
drill the ground.
Board of Assessment Appeals v. Manila Electric Co. The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 484 which authorized the The SC ruled that Meralco's steel towers were considered poles within
January 31, 1964. Municipal Board of Manila to grant a franchise to construct, maintain the meaning of paragraph 9 of its franchise which exempts its poles from
Paredes, J. and operate an electric street railway and electric light, heat and power taxation. The steel towers were considered personality because they
system in the City of Manila. were removable and merely attached to square metal frames by means
of bolts and could be moved from place to place when unscrewed and
Meralco's electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant located dismantled. Furthermore, they are not attached to an immovable in a
at Botocan Falls, Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material
means of electric transmission wires, running from the province of or causing deterioration upon the object to which they are attached.
Laguna to the said City.
These electric transmission wires which carry high voltage current, are
fastened to
insulators attached on steel towers constructed by respondent at
intervals, from its hydroelectric
plant in the province of Laguna to the
City of Manila. The respondent Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel
towers within Quezon City, on land belonging to it.
The City Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel towers for
real property tax under Tax.
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Meralco Securities Industrial Corporation v. CBAA Pursuant to a pipeline concession issued under the Petroleum Act of The Court ordered that CBAA did not with grave abuse and discretion
May 31, 1982. 1949, Republic Act No. 387, Meralco Securities installed from Batangas and acted within its jurisdiction in sustaining the holding of the
Aquino, J. to Manila a pipeline system consisting of cylindrical steel pipes joined provincial assessor that Meralco Securities Pipeline System in Laguna is
together and buried not less than one meter below the surface along the subject to a realty tax for the following reasons that the pipes are
shoulder of the public highway. machinery or improvements and regarded as realty because they are
The pipes are embedded in the soil while the valves are welded to the constructions adhered to the soil. It is attached to the land in such a way
pipes so as to make the pipeline system one single piece of property that it cannot be separated therefrom
from end to end. without dismantling the steel pipes which are welded to the pipeline. In
Pursuant to the Assessment Law, so far as the pipeline
Commonwealth Act No. 470, the provincial assessor of Laguna treated uses valves, pumps and control devices to maintain the flow of the oil, it
the pipeline as real property and issued Tax Declarations. is in a sense a machinery within the meaning of the Real Property Tax
Code.
Meralco v. CBAA This case is about the imposition of the realty tax on two oil storage The SC ruled that while the two storage tanks are not embedded in the
May 31, 1982 tanks installed in 1969 by land, they may, nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the
Aquino, J. Manila Electric Company on a lot in San Pascual, Batangas which it land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is
leased in 1968 from undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of
Caltex (Phil.), Inc. permanence as receptacles for the
The storage tanks are made of steel plates welded and assembled on the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations.
spot. Their
bottoms rest on a foundation consisting of compacted earth as the Thus, the two tanks should be held subject to realty tax because they
outermost layer. The tank is not attached to its foundation. It is not were considered real property.
anchored or welded to the concrete circular wall. Its bottom plate is not
attached to any part
of the foundation by bolts, screws or similar devices. The tank merely
sits on its foundation.
Pipelines were installed on the sides of each tank and are connected to
the pipelines of the
Manila Enterprises Industrial Corporation.
The Board concludes that while the tanks rest or sit on their foundation,
the foundation itself and the walls, dikes and steps, which are integral
parts of the tanks, are affixed to the land while the pipelines are attached
to the tanks and required Meralco to pay realty taxes on the two tanks.
Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. CBAA This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment installed The Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due "on real
May 31, 1982 by Caltex (Philippines) Inc. in its gas stations located on leased land. property, including land, buildings, machinery, and other
Aquino, J. The machines and equipment consists of underground tanks, elevated improvements".
tank, elevated water tanks, water tanks, gasoline pumps, SC hold that the said equipment and
computing pumps, water pumps, car washer, car hoists, truck hoists, air machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned
compressors and tireflators. by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are
The building or shed, the elevated water tank, the car hoist under a necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas
separate shed, the air compressor, the underground gasoline tank, station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed
neon lights signboard, concrete fence and pavement and the lot where permanently to the gas station site or
they are all placed or erected, all of them used in the pursuance of the embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the
gasoline service station business formed meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
the entire gasoline service-station.
The lessor of the land, where the gas station is located, does not become
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the owner of the machines and equipment installed therein.
Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of the lease.
Benguet Corp. v. CBAA Benguet Provincial Assessor: Assessed real property tax on the (1) The provisions of Sec. 52 of the Mineral Resources Dev’t Decree of
January 29, 1993 bunkhouses of petitioner Benguet Corporation occupied for residential 1974 (PD 463) and Sec. 5 (m) of the Local Tax Code are mere limitations
Cruz, J. purposes by its rank and file employees under Tax Declaration Nos. on the taxing power of LGUs; they are not pertinent to the issue before
8471 (1985) and 10454 (1986). The tax exemptions of bunkhouses the SC. They cannot affect the imposition of the real property tax by the
under Sec. 3 of PD 745 was withdrawn by PD 1955. national government.
Benguet Corp.: Appealed the decision to the LBAA of Benguet. Although LGUs are charged with fixing the rates of real property tax, it
CBAA: held that the bldgs of petitioner used as dwellings were exempt does not follow that they also have the authority to determine WON they
from real property tax pursuant to PD 745. can impose the tax.
LBAA: affirmed taxability of the bunkhouses. On appeal, CBAA held the It is the national government that levies real property tax. When LGUs
exemption was withdrawn so petitioner should have applied for are required to fix the rates, they are merely constituted as agents of the
restoration of the exemption with the Fiscal Incentives Review Board. national government in the enforcement of the real property tax code.
Benguet: LGUs don’t have any authority to levy realty taxes on mines The delegation of taxing power is not even involved since the tax has
pursuant to Sec. 52 of PD 463 and Sec. 5 (m) of the Local Tax Code. already been imposed and the LGUs are just mandated to enforce it.
Sol Gen: Benguet is estopped from raising the question of lack of If the SC were to sanction the interpretation of Benguet, then necessarily
authority as it was never raised before. all real properties exempt by any law would be covered, and
there would be no need for congress to specify “Real Property Tax Code,
as amended” instead of stating clearly realty tax exemption laws. The
intention is to limit the application of the “exception clause” only to
those given by the Real Property Tax Code.
La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to “enter
the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act into agreements with foreign owned corporations.” On the other hand,
of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of
Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the Financial and Technical “every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional]
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the provision within thirty days from its execution.” In contrast to this
government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. express mandate of the President and Congress in the exploration,
(WMCP). On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of
Decision, granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should
certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this
executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty
that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately
The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of control over the
contracts,[9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, EDU of our natural resources.
were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of
sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal
control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of and coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself
the Filipino nation. The Decision quoted several legal scholars and from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and
authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and
foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding
including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment
control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered opportunities in the country. “The judiciary is loath to interfere with the
control over the disposition and sale of the products due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official
discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the functions.” As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George
point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic resources.
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According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article Malcolm, “Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional
XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of
Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence
[DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic
[MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC Act.” Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of
(Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. the political branches of government. And let not the Court interfere
inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the
supreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and
hopes of all the people.
The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should

not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow,
parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President
and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable
them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure
for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace.
The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal B’laan and other
tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities.
However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise
constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the
nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court
believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of
discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of
such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing
required for large-scale mining operations, the complicated technology
needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the
State’s need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve
and enhance our country’s competitiveness in world markets. On the
basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of
the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations --
insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements -- as well as
the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).
Chavez v. PEA This petition asked the Court to legitimize a government contract that Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of
conveyed to a private entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands the State’s inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property
along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila at the negotiated price of P1,200 of public dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of
per square meter. However, published reports place the market price of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of
land near that area at that time at a high of P90,000 per square meter. submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution
The difference in price is a staggering P140.16 billion, equivalent to the as it violates Section 2, Article XII. In the instant case, the bulk of the
budget of the entire Judiciary for seventeen years and more than three lands subject of the Amended JVA are still submerged lands even to this
times the Marcos Swiss deposits that this Court forfeited in favor of the very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of
government. the 750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or 78% of
Public Estates Authority (PEA), under the JVA, obligated itself to convey the total area are still submerged, permanently under the waters of
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title and possession over the Property, consisting of approximately One Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the
Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred Forty One submerged lands even before their actual reclamation, although the
(1,578,441) Square Meters for a total consideration of One Billion Eight documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of
Hundred Ninety Four Million One Hundred Twenty Nine Thousand Two title would be made only after actual reclamation. This Resolution does
Hundred (P1,894,129,200.00) Pesos, or a price of One Thousand Two not prejudice any innocent third party purchaser of the reclaimed lands
Hundred (P1,200.00) Pesos per square meter. covered by the Amended JVA. Neither the PEA nor Amari has sold any
portion of the reclaimed lands to third parties. Title to the reclaimed
lands remains with the PEA. As held in the 9 July 2002 Decision, the
Amended JVA "violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Usero v. CA Respondents build a concrete fence between their property and the The mere fact that there are water lilies on the space filled with water
property of the petitioners. proves that there is a permanent stream of water or a creek there.
Petitioners assailed the building of the The petitioners also failed to prove their claim of ownership.
said fence on the ground that the property was theirs. Art.420 – The phrase "others of similar
character" includes a creek which is a
recess or an arm of a river. It is property belonging to the public domain
which is not susceptible to private ownership. Being public water, a
creek cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any
individual.
Accordingly, the petitioners may utilize the rip-rapped portion of the
creek to prevent the erosion of their property.
Viuda de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo Municipal council of Iloilo failed to pay Tantoco the purchase price of 2 The property of a municipality, whether real or personal, necessary for
March 25, 1926 strips of land, which it appropriated for road widening. By virtue of a governmental purposes cannot be attached and sold at a public auction
Villamor, J. writ of execution, the sheriff attached “two autotrucks used for street to satisfy a judgment against the municipality
sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, the police stations on Mabini
St., and other structures, plus the market
Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga RA 39 converted municipality of Zamboanga to a city, and provided that Validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and
March 28, 1868 bldgs. And properties abandoned shall be paid for by the City at a price bldgs thereon – If the property is owned by the municipality in its public
Bengzon, J.P., J. fixed by the AG (PhP 1,294,244) and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has
absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or
RA 711: del Norte/del Sur  funds, assets, and other properties shall be proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute
divided equitable between the 2. AG apportioned assets: 54.39% to control.
Norte, 45.61% to Sur
The capacity in which the property is held is dependent on the use
ExecSec then issued a ruling holding that Norte had a vested right as which it is intended and devoted.
owner of the properties given to the City and is entitled to the price
thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. Finance Sec authorized CIR to
deduct 25% from City’s IRA to be credited to Norte.
RA3039  all bldgs, etc, belonging to the former province and located
within the City, free of charge, in favor of the City.
Salas v. Jarencio On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila, presided by then In the absence of a deed or title to any land claimed by the City as its
August 30, 1972 Vice-Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, adopted a resolution requesting the own, showing that it was acquired with its private or corporate funds,
Esguerra, J. President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the presumption is that such land came from the State upon the creation
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the City property bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska of the municipality. Such property is held in trust for the benefit of its
Streets containing a total area of 7,450 square meters as a inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purpose.
patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of
reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. RA 4118 was RA 4118 was never intended to expropriate the property involved but
passed which subdivided said lot for resale by the Land Authority to merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and
bona fide applicants. to make it available for disposition by the National Government. It
- The City of Manila made a complete turn-about. The City Mayor of was enacted upon formal written petition of the Municipal Board of
Manila and the City of Manila as a duly organized public corporation Manila in the form of a legally approved resolution. The foregoing
brought an action for injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary sequence of events clearly indicates a pattern of regularity and
injunction to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the herein appellants, observance of due process in the reversion of the property to the
particularly the Governor of the Land Authority and the Register of National Government. All such acts were done in recognition by the City
Deeds of Manila, from further implementing RA 4118, and praying for of Manila of the right and power of the Congress to dispose of the land
the declaration of RA 4118 as unconstitutional. involved. Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything
it owns, either under the due process clause or under the eminent
domain provisions of the Constitution. If it failed to get from the
Congress the concession it sought of having the land involved given to it
as its patrimonial property, the Courts possess no power to grant that
relief.
Cebu Oxygen & Acytelene Co. v. Bercilles The land sought to be registered in this case was formerly a part The portion of the city street subject to petitioner’s application for
August 29, 1975 of a street. Through a resolution, it was declared to be an abandoned registration of title was withdrawn from public use. Then it
Concepcion, Jr. J. road and not part of the City development plan. Thereafter, it was sold follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property
through a public bidding and petitioner was the highest bidder. He of the State. It is also very clear from the Charter that property thus
then sought to register said land but his application was dismissed. withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be
lawfully used or conveyed.
Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez In a civil case, petitioner was held liable to private respondents. Alias Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and
June 25, 1984 writ of execution was granted on the funds of the municipality in the execution. A corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance by
Relova, J. hands of the treasurers. the SB is needed before any money of the municipality may be paid out.
Government of the Phil. Islands v. Cabangis Lots 36, 39 and 40, block 3035 of cadastral proceeding 71 of the City of Article 5 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that “lands reclaimed
March 27, 1929 Manila, GLRO. Record 373, were formerly a part of a large parcel of land from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the
Villa-real J. belonging to the predecessor of Cabangis. From the year 1896 said land provinces, pueblos, or private persons, with proper permission, shall
began to wear away, due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay, until become the property of the party constructing such works, unless
the year 1901 when the said lots became completely submerged in otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." The fact that
water in ordinary tides, and remained in such a state until 1912 when from 1912 some fishermen had been drying their fishing nets and
the Government undertook the dredging of Vitas Estuary in order to depositing their bancas on lots 36, 39 and 40, by permission of Tomas
facilitate navigation, depositing all the sand and silt taken from the bed Cabangis, does not confer on the latter or his successors the ownership
of the estuary on the low lands which were completely covered with of said lots, because, as they were converted into public land, no private
water, surrounding that belonging to the Philippine Manufacturing person could acquire title thereto except in the form and manner
Company, thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots, the subject established by the law.
matter of the proceeding. Up to the month of February 1927 nobody had
declared lot 39 for the purposes of taxation, and it was only in the year
1926 that Dr. Pedro Gil, in behalf of Cabangis, declared lot 40 for such
purpose.
Hilario v. Salvador Defendant allegedly constructed a house on the plaintiff’s land. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery
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April 29, 2005 Defendant refused to vacate the property in Romblon, Romblon. of possession over the real property as owner while an accion publiciana
Callejo, Sr. J. is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess – it is also
referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year
after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty. In this case, it was an accion
publiciana. The action of the petitioners does not involve a claim of
ownership over the property. They alleged that they are co-owners
thereof, and are entitled to possession.
Sampayan v. CA Vasquez siblings filed a complaint for forcible entry against Sampayan In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in
January 14, 2005 for allegedly having entered and occupied a parcel of land and built a prior possession of the land or building and that he was deprived
Garcia, J. house thereon without their knowledge, consent or authority, the entry thereof by means, force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
having been supposedly effected through strategy and stealth. The lot
was allegedly owned and possessed by the Vasquez’s deceased mother
[Cristita Quita]. – Bayugan and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur
Sampayan: Maria Ybanez, the overseer of Sps. Terrado [lot’s true
owners], gave him permission to enter subject lot.
Santos v. Ayon Davao City: Ruben Santos filed a complaint for illegal detainer against A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the
May 6, 2005 sps. Ayon. withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. Santos is the registered owner of 3 lots situated at Lanzona Subd, Ayons without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
are registered owners of adjacent land. Previous occupant of the
property built a building which straddled both the lots. Ayons using the Possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful
building as a warehouse. Santos informed respondents that the building when the possessor by tolerance refuses tp vacate upon demand made
occupies portion of his lot, but he let them use it. by the owner.
Ganila v. CA Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment complaints before MCTC (Jordan, In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not
June 28, 2005 Guimaras). H alleged that she owns the lot (inherited from parents) and necessary – it is enough that plaintiff has a better right or possession; in
Qusiumbing, J. that she only tolerated petitioners to construct houses therein. When forcible entry, defendants, by force intimidation, threat, strategy or
she demanded that they leave, they refused. stealth, deprive the plaintiff or the prior physical possessor of
possession.
What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from an accion

publiciana and from an accion reinvindicatoria is that UD is limited to
the question of possession de facto. A UD suit together with forcible
entry are the 2 forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover
possession of real property
Ross Rica Sales Center v. Ong Petitioners bought land from Mandaue Prime, which bought the same The phrase “unlawful withholding” has been held to imply possession on
August 16, 2005 from respondent Ong. the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other
Tinga, J. MTC granted petitioners’ ejectment suit and ordered respondent to source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a
vacate the premises. right and is being withheld by defendant.
The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership

of real property. This differs from accion publiciana where the issure is
the better right of possession [possession de jure], and accion interdictal
where the issue is material possession [possession de facto]. In an action
for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial while the
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issue of ownership is generally unessential.
Peralta-Labrador v. Buarin San Felipe, Zambales Forcible entry is a quieting process, and the restrictive time bar is
August 25, 2005 Petitioner alleges that she is the owner of a lot, having purchased it from prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. Indeed
Ynares-Santiago, J. Sps. Pronto. In 1990, DPWH constructed a road, thereby separating a the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
portion from the rest of P’s lot. Sometime in 1994, respondent Bugarin generally counted from the date of actual entry into the land.
forcibly took possession of the small portion and refused to vacate the
same. Thus, she instituted a complaint for recovery of possession and
ownership.
Respondent: He has been in possession since 1955.

Seriña v. Caballero Sps Seriña filed a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession In order that an action for recovery of possession may prosper, it is
August 17, 2004 and damages against Caballero and his tenants Sps. Donela (Cagayan de indispensable that he who brings the action fully proves not only his
Callejo Sr., J. Oro City). P alleged that they are the absolute owners and have been in ownership but also the identity of the property claimed, by describing
actual possession for 35 years of a parcel of land. Sometime in 1982, the location, area and boundaries thereof.
they allegedly discovered that C was caliming ownership over the land
and offering it for sale or mortgage. Boundaries set forth in complaint not the same as in the Deed of Sale
Perez v. Mendoza Felisa Montalbo inherited land from her father, which she exchanged Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the
July 28, 1975 with that of her aunt, Andrea. After the exchange, A donated half the possessor goes the presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of
Muñoz-Palma, J. land to daughter Margarita. Margarita and husband occupied the land ownership. Perezes dialed to prove ownership of land.
continuously in the concept of owners. When Nicolas sought the transfer
of property in their names, he submitted the deed of exchange. Perezes
then accused sps. Nicolas and Andrea of falsifying the deed of exchange
Dizon v. CA Galang spouses owned 2 lots, which they mortgaged. Their son Dionisio The properties belonged solely to Dionisio and not in co-ownership with
January 6, 1993. redeemed the lot in his own name despite that fact that the funds came his sisters. Dionisio’s ownership had been judicially confirmed by the
Padilla, J. from his 5 sisters. After a cadastral survey of the lots, CFI ordered the CGI, which involved a proceeding in rem and hence, “binding on the
issuance of OCTs solely in Dionisio’s name. the heirs of D’s sisters claim whole world.”
that the 6 Galang siblings partitioned the lots in an unnotarized affidavit
Moreover, the sisters objected only 61 years after the issuance of the
OCT.
US v. Causby Thomas Lee Causby owned a chicken farm outside of Greensboro, North Violation of the 5th amendment. The Court concluded that the ancient
May 27, 1946 Carolina. The farm was located near an airport used regularly by the common law doctrine "has no place in the modern world." Justice
Douglas, J. United States military. According to Causby, noise from the airport Douglas noted that, were the Court to accept the doctrine as valid,
regularly frightened the animals on his farm, resulting in the deaths of "every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
several chickens. The problem became so severe that Causby was forced trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea."
to abandon his business.
However, while the Court rejected the unlimited reach above and below
Under an ancient doctrine of the common law, land ownership extended the earth described in the common law doctrine, it also ruled that, "if the
to the space above and below the earth. Using this doctrine as a basis, landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive
Causby sued the United States, arguing that he owned the airspace control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere."
above his farm. By flying planes in this airspace, he argued, the Without defining a specific limit, the Court stated that flights over the
government had confiscated his property without compensation, thus land could be considered a violation of the Takings Clause if they led to
violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. "a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
land." Given the damage caused by the particularly low, frequent flights
over his farm, the Court determined that the government had violated
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The United States Court of Claims accepted Causby's argument, and Causby's rights, and he was entitled to compensation.
ordered the government to pay compensation.
Lunod v. Meneses Plaintiffs own farmlands situated near a lake. Meneses owns a fishpond Meneses cannot block the flow of water. Art. 552 (A637, NCC): Lower
11 Phil. 128 and piece of land between the lake and a river. The plaintiffs claim the estates must receive the waters which naturally and without
existence, in favor of their rice fields, of a statutory easement permitting intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the
the flow of water over Meneses’ land. This allowed water collected upon stone or earth which they carry with them. Neither may the owner of the
their land and the lake to flow through Meneses’ land and into the river. lower estate construct works preventing this easement, nor one of the
Plaintiffs’ lands were flooded and their plantations destroyed. higher estates works increasing this burden. In addition, under the land
of waters, Meneses had no right to construct the works which blocks the
passage through his land and the outlet to the river. Having done so, to
the detriment of the easement charged on his estate, he violated the law.
Bachrach v. Seifert The deceased Emil Maurice Bachrach left no forced heir except his Article 471 of the Civil Code provides that the usufructuary shall be
October 12, 1950 widow Mary McDonald Bachrach. In his last will and testament made entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the
Ozaeta, J. varius legacies in cash and willed all the fruits and usufruct the property in usufruct. Further, Articles 474 provides that " Civil fruits are
remainder of his estate (after payment of legacies, bequests and gifts) to deemed to accrue day by day, and belong to the usufructuary in
his wife’s enjoyment. The will further provided that upon the death of proportion to the time the usufruct may last.” Article 475, on the other
Mary McDonald Bachrach, one-half of all his estate shall be divided hand, provides that “When a usufruct is created on the right to receive
share and share alike by and betweenhis legal heirs, to the exclusion of an income or periodical revenue, either in money or fruits, or the
his brothers. interest on bonds or securities payable to bearer, each matured payment
shall be considered as the proceeds or fruits of such right. When it
The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the consists of the enjoyment of the benefits arising from an interest in an
Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000 shares industrial or commercial enterprise, the profits of which are not
representing 50% stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On 10 June distributed at fixed periods, such profits shall have the same
1948, Mary McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the consideration. In either case they shall be distributed as civil fruits, and
estate, petitioned the lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and shall be applied in accordance with the rules prescribed by the next
Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to preceding article."
transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and
delivering to her the corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that A dividend, whether in the from of cash or stock, is income or fruit and
said dividend, although paid out in the form of stock, is fruit or income consequently should go to the usufructuary rather than the owner of the
and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant. Sophie shares of stock in usufruct. Dividend is declared only out of the profits of
Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said a corporation and not out of its capital.
petition on the ground that the stock dividend in question was not
income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the
usufructuary but to the remainderman. The lower court granted the
petition and overruled their objection. Siefer and Elianoff appealed.
Bachrach v. Talisay-Silay Sugar planters of TS mortgaged their lands in order to secure the debts A bonus paid by the mortgage-debtor to another who had mortgaged his
September 17, 1931 of TS against PNB. As compensation for the risk the planters took, TS land to secure the payment of the debtor’s obligation to a bank is not a
Romualdez, J. undertook to give them a bonus equal to 2% of the debt secured. civil fruit of the mortgaged property. Such bonus bears no immediate,
but only a remote and accidental relation to the land. It is not income
Bachrach filed a case against TS, asking for Ledesma’s credit bonus as a delivered from the property but a compensation granted for the risk
payment for the latter’s debt to Bachrach. TS answered that Ledesma’s assumed by the owner of the property.
credit bonus had been purchased by another. PNB alleged that it had
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preferential right to the bonus because such bonus would be civil fruits
of the land that Ledesma mortgaged.
Bernardo v. Bataclan Bernardo bought a parcel of land only to discover that Bataclan is When Bernardo opted to sell the land to Bataclan, he lost his right to
November 28, 1938 possessing the same. LC held Bataclan to be a possessor in good faith retention over the said property.
Laurel, J. and thus entitled to reimbursement with right of retention subject to
Bernardo’s 2 options whether to sell the land to Bataclan, but Bataclan When, in the face of a conflict between the rights of an owner and a BPS
was unable to pay and so the land was sold at a public auction. The court in good faith, the owner opts to sell the land to the BPS who is
removed Bataclan’s right of retention. subsequently unable to pay, the BPS loses his right of retention.
Ignacio v. Hilario Lower court rendered judgment holding Hilario as the legal owner of a Since the option to remove or demolish improvement is given to the LO
April 30, 1946. property, but ceded to Ignacio the ownership of the improvements he and it is limited to paying for the improvement or selling his land to the
Moran, C.J. built on the same land. Hilario was given the option to reimburse Ignacio BPS, he cannot refuse to exercise his right of choice and compel the
for the improvements or to sell the land to Ignacio. Hilario exercised builder to remove or demolish the improvement. He is entitled to such
neither option. removal only when after choosing to sell his land, the other party fails to
pay for the same.
Sarmiento v. Agana Spouses Valentino were told by mother of wife to construct a Sps. Valentino may not be ejected from the land, because they were
April 30, 1984 residentioal house only to find out later that the land did not belong to builders in GF. The owner of a building erected in GF on a land owned by
Melencio-Herrera, J. the mother but to the Santos sps. Who sold the same to Sarmiento. another is entitled to retain possession of the land until he is paid the
value of the building.
Depra v. Dumlao Dumlao’s kitchen encroached on 34sq.m. of Depra’s property. Depra The municipal court has no authority to impose a “forced lease.”
May 16, 1985 filed an unlawful detainer. LC found Dumlao to be a builder in GF, and
Melencio-Herrera, J. ordered a forced lease on the parties. Depra, instead of accepting rentals, The owner of the land on which the improvement was built by another
filed for quieting of title in GF is entitled to removal of improvement only after LO has opted to
sell the land and the builder refused to pay for the same.
Tecnogas Phil. Mfg. Corp. v. CA Tecnogas discovered that portions of its buildings and wall were There is no question that when P purchased the land from Pariz Ind., the
February 10, 1997 occupying Uy’s land. The wall was presumably erected by the former buildings and other structures were already in existence. As such, the
Panganiban, J. owners. Tecnogas offered to buy the land by Uy refused. Uy then caused supervening awareness of the encroachment by petitioner does not
canal to be dug along the wall, causing it to collapse. militate against its right to claim the status of a builder in GF.
Ortiz v. Kayanan Homestead Application Lot belonged to Dolorico II, Ortiz’s ward located petitioner is NOT entitled to fruits while Comintan and Zamora have yet
July 30, 1979 in Barrio Cabuluan, Calauag, Quezon. Dolorico II named as successor and to pay the indemnity due him.
Antonio, J. heir his uncle Dolorico, then died. All this time Ortiz was in possession
and cultivation of the property.
Before possession is legally interrupted, possessor in good faith is
Dolorico relinquished rights over property in favour of Comintan and entitled to fruits. This right ceases upon defects being known. This is
Zamora. known as a right to retention, for the creditor to obtain payment of a
Court found Ortiz to be in good faith, but held the public bidding to be debt.
valid. If petitioner was not found to be the winner, Comintan and
Zamora are to reimburse him for P13,632. Ortiz is to retain possession Also we must consider that tolls were collected from portions with no
until the amount is paid. improvements of petitioner,
therefore he really has no right to said fruits
Respondent Judge discovered that after the decision of the lower courts,
Ortiz collected tolls on portion of the land even if he had not introduced
any improvements on said portions estimated to amount to
P25,000.
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Petitioner contends that he is entitled to the fruits of the property while

the P13,632 has yet to be paid, this being considered as civil fruits.
Geminiano v. CA Lot originally owned by G’s mom. On one portion of the lot stood G’s Private respondents cannot be considered possessors nor builders in GF
July 24, 1996 unfinished house, which they sold to PR. Then, G’s mom executed a – being mere lessees, they knew that their occupation was temporary.
Davide, Jr. J. contract of lease a portion of the lot, including the portion on which the
house stands.
Pleasantville Dev’t Corp v. CA Edith Robillo purchased a parcel of land, Lot 9, from Pleasantville Dev’t Kee = builder in GF
February 1, 1996 Corporation in Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. Eldred Jardinico
Panganiban, J. bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant. The roots of the controversy can be traced in the errors committed by
· Upon completing all payments and securing a TCT in his name, CTTEI when it pointed the wrong lot to Kee.
Jardinico discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 · Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is
by Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof. building on is his and he is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. And
· It appears that Kee bought on installment Lot 8 from CT Torres as good faith is presumed, Pleasantville has the burden of proving bad
Enterprises Inc (CTTEI), the real estate agent of Pleasantville. faith on the part of Kee.
· Under the Contract to Sell, Kee could and did possess the lot even · At the time he built the improvements on Lot 9, Kee believed that the
before the completion of payments. said lot was the one he bought. He was not aware that the lot delivered
· Zenaida Octaviano, CTTEI’s employee, was the one who mistakenly to him was not Lot 8. Pleasantville failed to prove otherwise.
pointed out Lot 9 (instead of Lot 8) to Kee’s wife. Thereafter, Kee built · Violation of the Contract of Sale on Installment may not be the basis to
his residence, a store, an auto repair shop, and other improvements on negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith. Such
the lot. violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in
· Jardinico confronted Kee after discovering that the latter was good faith, that is, on his state of mind at the time he built the
occupying Lot 9. Kee refused to vacate, hence Jardinico filed an improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations may give rise to
ejectment suit with damages. petitioner’s cause of action against Kee under the said contract
RTC: Kee is a builder in bad faith. Assuming arguendo that Kee was (contractual breach) but may not be bases to negate the presumption
acting in good faith, he was nonetheless guilty of unlawfully usurping that Kee was a builder in good faith.
the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served
with
notice to vacate said lot, and was thus liable for rental.
CA: Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the “mix-up”
when he began construction of the improvements. The erroneous
delivery was due to the fault of CTTEI and thus imputable to
Pleasantville, the principal.
Felices v. Iriole Felices was the grantee of a homestead over 8has. He conveyed in The rule of A453 invoked by I cannot be applied to the instant case for
May 26, 1995 conditional sale to Iriole a portion of his homestead of more than 4has. the reason that the improvements in question were made on the
The conveyance expressly stipulates that after the lapse of 5 years or as premises only after F had tried to recover the land in question from him,
soon as may be allowed by law, the vendor or his successors would and even during pendency of this action in the lower court. Hence, he
execute in vendee’s favor a deed of absolute sale over the land in built the improvement in BF.
question.
2 years after the sale, F tried to recover from I, but the latter refused to
allow it unless he was paid the alleged value of improvements he had
introduce therein.
Nuquid v. CA Pedro Pecson owned a commercial lot in Kamias and built a four-door Pecson is a builder in good faith. Nuguid is the landowner.
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two-storey apartment building. He failed to pay realty taxes, so the LOT · Art. 448, NCC entitles landowner (Nuguid) to either appropriate the
was sold at public auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno, and later to the Sps. building upon payment of indemnity or sell the land. Nuguid sought
Juan and Erlinda Nuguid. appropriation.
Case 1: Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale. SC: Sps. · Art. 546, NCC entitles the BPS to full reimbursement for all the
Nuguid owned the lot, while Pecson still owned the building (May 5, necessary and useful expenses, and the right of retention until full
1993). reimbursement is made.
Case 2: Nuguids sought delivery of possession of the lot and apartment · However, until the payment of indemnity is full, the BPS (Pecson) has a
building, i.e., they want to acquire the building. RIGHT of RETENTION (which includes the right to the expenses and the
SC (Nov. 15, 1993): right to the fruits) as a builder in good faith. Thus, he cannot be
1. Art. 448, NCC: Case is apposite as when the landowner is the BPS who compelled to pay rentals during the period of retention nor be disturbed
then later loses ownership through in his possession by ordering him to vacate.
sale; The landowner is prohibited from offsetting or compensating the
2. Current market value of the building should be the basis of the necessary and useful expenses with the fruits received by the BPS in
indemnity; good faith.
3. Pecson entitled to retain ownership of the building and the income
therefrom;
4. CA erred in upholding TC’s determination of indemnity (P53,000.00
construction cost) and in also ordering Pecson to account for rent.
5. Remanded to TC for determination of CMV.
Case 3 (Case at bar): CMV = P400,000. Pecson already received

P300,000 from Sps. Nuguid; balance of P100,000
paid thereafter. TC directed Sps. Nuguid to also pay P1.34 million for
rentals from Nov. 1993 to Dec. 1997 (@ P28K/mo.) Thus, petition.
Republic v. CA The Republic opposed the registration of lots adjacent to the property of What R claims as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the
October 12, 1984 R on the ground that they merely transferred their dikes further down river by reclamation caused by their having transferred their dikes
Gutierrez Jr., J. the Meycauayan river bed, such that if there is any accretion to speak of, towards the river bed. Being a portion of the bed of said river, the lots
it was man-made and artificial and not the result of gradual and are of the public dominion and not registerable under the LRA.
imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.
A457 requisites: concurrence of (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of
the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent
to the banks of the rivers. -- #2 is indispensable. This includes all
deposits caused by human intervention.
Grande v. CA Grande siblings are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of The accretion does not ipso facto become registered like the land to
June 30, 1962 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, Magsaysay (formerly which it is attached. Ownership of land is different from registration.
Barrera, J. Tumauini), Isabela by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Ownership is governed by the civil code while the imprescriptibility
Angui who in turn inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana of registered land is governed by the Land Registration and Cadastral
Lopez, in whose name the land is registered. When it was surveyed for Acts. To obtain the protection of imprescriptibility, the land must
purposes of registration, sometime in 1930, its northeastern be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein
boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then, and for many years certain judicial procedures must be observed. The fact remains that
thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by the Grandes have not sought registration of the alluvial property in
action of the said river, so much, so that by 1958, the bank thereof had dispute up to the time they filed an action against respondents. Because
receded t a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an of this, said accretion is not protected by imprescriptibility.
alluvial deposite of 19,964 sq. meters more or less had been added to
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Prof. E.A. Labitag
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the registered land. On Jan. 25, 1958, the siblings instituted a case to The Court of Appeals have acquired evidence that respondent Calalungs
quiet title against private respondent Calalungs and alleged that they were in open and continuous possession of the accretion since 1933 or
were in former peaceful possession of said alluvial deposit when 1934 up to the time the action against them was filed. The prescriptive
respondents encroached the land claiming ownership. period in this applied in this case is 10 years and not 30 since the law
– The trial court ruled in favor of the Grandes ratiocinating that, by applicable is Act 190 and not the Civil Code. Respondents’ possession
accession the land in question pertains to the original estate, and since started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code
the original estate is registered, the accretion consequently is were not yet in force.
automatically registered too. There can also be no acquisitive
prescription in favor of the Calalungs since the land is already
registered. The action to claim land by the owners which is registered is
imprescriptible. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of
the trial court thus this appeal by the Grandes.
Meneses v. CA Darum issued to Meneses OCTs and free patents over lots, which were found by the court to be accretion lands forming parts of the bigger accretion
July 14, 1995 land owned by Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing.
Quiason, J.
Navarro v. IAC Pascual claimed ownership to a parcel of land claiming that it was an The property is foreshore land, hence part of public domain. The
1997 accretion to his property. Navarro opposed saying that such property property is an accretion of on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or
has always been part of public property. Subject property is situated arm of the sea, as such, the disputed property is, under Art.4 of 1886
between 2 rivers and is fronted by the Manila Bay. If the land in dispute Spanish Law of Waters, public domain
was formed by the action of the 2 rivers, then it is an accretion, hence
owned by Pascual. If it were formed by the action of Manila Bay, then it Riparian owners, are strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the
is foreshore land, hence part of public domain latter being owners of lands bordering seashore or lake or other tidal
waves.
The alluvium, by mandate of A457, is automatically owned by the

riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen but ut is
not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition
through prescription by 3rd person.
Baes v. CA The government dug a canal on a protion of land owned by Baes to B’s contention is impressed with merit. The law speaks of the natural
July 6, 1993 streamline the Tripa der Callina creek. In exchange for such portion, B change in the course of the stram, and of the ripoarian owner is entitled
Cruz, J. was given a lot with an equal area. When B had his lots resurveyed and to compensation for damge to or loss of property due to natural causes,
subdivided, the area of the old creek bed was included such that his there’s all the more reason to compensate him when the change in the
landholdings increased. Upon petition by the gov’t TC ordered status qui course of the river is effected through artificial means. BUT, since he has
prior to resurvey. However, B contends that under A461, the area of the been given an equivalent lot, he is no longer entitled under the principle
old creek should belong to him because it says that once the river bed of unjust enrichment.
has been abandoned, the owners of the land invaded by the river’s new
course automatically become the owner of the abandoned bed.
Binalay v. Manalo Judge Taccad owned a parcel of land—on the west, bordering on According to the Law of Waters, the natural bed or channel of a creek or
the Cagayan River, on the east, the national road. The western portion river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods.
would occasionally go under the waters and reappear during the
dry season. Manalo purchased the land. A relocation survey was This being the case, the subject land couldn't have been sold to
conducted during the rainy season, so the survey didn't cover the Manalo, being part of the public domain.
submerged land. The sketch would show that the river branches
through the west and east, leaving a strip of land. The land was then
surveyed into two 2 lots. One of these is being claimed by Manalo
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Prof. E.A. Labitag
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through accretion.
Siari Valley Estates v. Lucasan SVE sought to recover 200 heads of cattle that were driven or wandered Lucasan willfully caused the commixtion such that A383 (now $73) he
from its pasture lands into the adjoining lands of Lucasan. Lucasan will be held to forfeit his own cattle. No actual evidence that the 823
himself admitted such commixtion although he says that SVE had missing cattle were taken by Lucasan, but in view of the proof that his
already retrieved its animals. Which belongs to whom can no longer be men, on 2 occasions, drove away more than 30 heads, it may be
determined. presumed that the others must have also been driven away subsequent
or prior occasions.
One who has stole a part of the stolen money must have taken the larger
sum lost by the offended party.
If the commingling of two things is made in bad faith, the one

responsible for it will lose his share.
Santos v. Bernabe Urbano Santos (778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay) and Pablo Tiongson Art 381 of the CC prescribes that “if by will of their owners, two things of
November 6, 1929 (1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay) both deposited in the warehouse of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs
Villa-real, J. Jose Bernabe palay with the same grade and quality. However, it does accidentally, if in the later case the things cannot be separated without
not appear which sack belongs to Santos and which is owned by injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to
Tiongson. There were no marks or signs, nor were they separated from the part belonging to him, according o the value of the things mixed or
each other. commingled.”
· Tiongson filed a case against Bernabe for the recovery of the palay he In the present case, since the number of kilos in a cavan has not been
deposited in his warehouse. The writ of attachment for the said palay determined, only of the 924 cavans of palay which were attached and
was granted and the attachable property of Bernabe including the 924 sold shall be distributed proportionately between Santos (398.49
cavans and 31.5 kilos palay found in his warehouse were attached, sold cavans) and Tiongson (525.52 cavans) or the value thereof at the rate of
in public auction and the proceeds delivered to Tiongson. P3/cavan.
· Santos then intervened contending that Tiongson cannot claim the
924c & 31.5k palay because by asking for the attachment thereof, he
impliedly acknowledged that the same belonged to Bernabe and not to
Tiongson. Also because, some of these palay could be those deposited by
Santos.
Olviga v. CA Olviga was able to register a title of a parcel of land in his name. Glor sps. An action for reconveyance:
Filed an action for reconveyance since they had previously purchased (a) Prescribes in 10 years if the plaintiff is not in possession of the
the land and were the real and actual occupants of the land. CA ruled property and if the action for reconveyance is based on an
that action by Glor sps is one for quieting of title that does not prescribe. implied or constructive trust. The point of reference is the date
of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the
title over the property.
(b) Is IMPRESCRIPTIBLE if the person claiming to be an owner is
in actual possession of the property. Here, the right to seek
reconvenyance in effect seeks to quiet title.
Pingol v. CA Petitioner Vicente Pingol is the owner of Lot No. 3223 of the Cadastral Although the private respondents’ complaint before the trial court was
September 6, 1993 Survey of Caloocan, with an area of 549 square meters, located at denominated as one for specific performance, it is in effect an action to
Davide, Jr. J. Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City and more particularly described in quiet title. That a cloud has been cast on the title of the private
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7435 of the Registry of Deeds of respondents is indubitable. Despite the fact that the title had been
Caloocan City. On 17 February 1969, he executed a “DEED OF ABSOLUTE transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery
SALE OF ONE-HALF OF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A of the object of the contract, the petitioners adamantly refused to accept
PARCEL OF LAND” in favor of Francisco N. Donasco which was the tender of payment by the private respondents and steadfastly
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acknowledged before a notary public. Pursuant to the contract, Donasco insisted that their obligation to transfer title had been rendered
paid P2,000.00 to Pingol. The one-half portion, designated as Lot No. ineffective. A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made
3223-A, was then segregated from the mother lot, and the parties part payment thereof, entered upon the land and had made valuable
prepared a subdivision plan which was approved by the Land improvements thereon, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against
Registration Commission. Francisco immediately took possession of the the vendor who had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not
subject lot and constructed a house thereon. In January 1970, he started necessary that the vendee has an absolute title, an equitable title being
paying the monthly installments but was able to pay only up to 1972.On sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.
13 July 1984, Francisco Donasco died. At the time of his demise, he had
paid P8,369.00, plus the P2,000.00 advance payment, leaving a balance
of P10,161.00 on the contract price. Lot No. 3223-A remained in the
possession of Donasco’s heirs. On 19 October 1988, the heirs of
Francisco Donasco filed an action for “Specific Performance and
Damages, with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction” against the
spouses Vicente and Lourdes Pingol (petitioners herein) before the RTC
of Caloocan City.
Titong v. CA The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Under A476, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record,
March 6, 1998 Mario Titong. The Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44 claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud,
Romero, J. ruled in of private respondents, Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real
adjudging them the true and lawful owners of the disputed land. property. The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title
Affirmed on appeal to the Court, of Appeals, petitioner comes to us for a must therefore be “an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
favorable reversal. proceeding.” Under the maxim expresio mius est exclusio alterius, these
grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of
Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action.
with an area of 3.2800 hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918,
and declared for taxation purposes in his name. He claims that on three
separate occasions in September 1983, private respondents, with their
hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an area
of approximately two (2) hectares; and began plowing the same under
pretext of ownership. Private respondents denied this allegation, and
averred that the disputed property formed part of the 5.5-hectare
agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-
interest, Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981.
Portic v. Cristobal In 1968, spouses Portic acquired a parcel of land with a 3 door Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem.
April 22, 2005 apartment from Sps. Alcantara even though they’re aware that the land Technically, they are neither in rem nor in personam. In an action quasi
Panganiban, J. was mortgaged to the SSS. Portic defaulted in paying SSS. The Portics in rem, an individual is named as defendant. However, unlike suits in
then executed a contract with Cristobal and the latter agreed to buy the rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties.
said property for P200k. Cristobal’s down payment was P45k and she
also agreed to pay SSS. The contract between them states:
That while the balance of P155,000.00 has not yet been fully paid the
FIRST PARTY OWNERS shall retain the ownership of the above
described parcel of land together with its improvements but the
SECOND PARTY BUYER shall have the right to collect the monthly
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rentals due on the first door (13-A) of the said apartment; (payment is
due 22 May 1985, if Cristobal will not be able to pay Portic will
reimburse)
A transfer certificate was executed in favor of Cristobal. Cristobal was
not able to pay on the due date. A suit ensued to lift the cloud on the title.
Pardell v. Bartolome Case among co-owners, used to be three, but the survivor were Each coöwner or tenant in common of undivided realty has the same
November 18, 1912 strongest were two women, male did not survive. He died. They were rights therein as the others; he may use and enjoy the same without
Torres, J. quarrelling over their inheritance, among which is a house, in the same other limitation except that he must not prejudice the rights of his
heritage city or village part of vigan. See how a house owned in common coöwners, but until a division is effected, the respective parts belonging
was to be used. One sister was asking for accounting of fruits of the to each cannot be determined; each coöwner exercises joint dominion
house. and is entitled to joint use.
For the use and enjoyment of a particular portion of the lower part of a
house, not used as living quarters, a coöwner must, in strict justice, pay
rent, in like manner as other people pay for similar space in the house;
he has no right to the free use and enjoyment of such space which, if
rented to a third party, would produce income.
Until a cause instituted to determine the liability of the rest of the
coöwners for repairs and improvements made by one of their number is
finally decided and the amount due is fixed, the persons alleged to be
liable cannot be considered in default as to interest, because interest is
only due from the date of the decision fixing the principal liability.
Gatchalian v. CIR 15 individuals made contributions to purchase a sweepstakes ticket If the plaintiff formed a partnership, they are liable for the payment of
April 29, 1939 registered in Gatchalian’s name. the ticket won 3rd prize. G was then the IT; whereas of there was merely a community of property, they are
Imperial, J. required to file the corresponding ITR covering the prize. They failed to exempt. According to the facts, the plaintiffs organized a partnership fo
pay. CIR issued a warrant of distraint and levy, to avoid embarrassment civil nature because each of them put up money to buy a sweepstakes
the 15 paid under protest. This happened a 2nd time for the balance. The ticket for the sole purpose of dividing equally the prize which they may
15 then demanded refund. win.
Punsalan v. Boon Liat 22 fishermen agreed to be the sole owners of 2 ½ sacks of ambergris Sale not valid. The A was undivided common property of the plaintiffs
January 10, 1923 found in the belly of a whale and they agreed that none could sell and one of the defs. This common ownership was acquired by
Avanceña, J. without the others’ consent. Teck, who knew of the ambergris proposed occupancy. None of them had any right to sell, there being an express
the seizure of contraband opium, which was actually the ambergris. The agreement to the contrary. Sale having been made without others’
ambergris having been seized and loaded and brought to Zamboanga consent, the same shall have no effect except as to the portion pertaining
along with Ahmad, who was left in charge. Teck then proceeded to offer to those who made them.
to purchase the A to which Ahmad refused but was later on convinced as
he was promised protection from his co-owners.
Twin Towers Condo v. CA TTCC filed a complaint with the SEC against ALS and Litonjua praying Petitioner’s Master Deed provides that a member of the Condominium
February 27, 2003 that the latter be ordered to pay solidarilty the unpaid condominium corporation shall share in the common expenses of the condominium
Carpio, J. assessments and dues with interests and penalties covering the 4 project. This obligation does not depend on the use or non-use by the
quearters of 1986 & 1987 and the first qtr of ’88. member of the common areas and facilities of the Condominium.
Whether or not a member uses the common areas or facilities, these
areas and facilities will have to be maintained. Expenditures must be
made to maintain the common areas and facilities whether a member
uses them frequently, infrequently or never at all.
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Resuena v. CA A co-owner may bring an action to exercise and protect the rights of all.
March 28, 2005 When the action is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a
Tinga, J. favorable decision will benefit them, but an adverse decision cannot
prejudice their rights. Resp’s action for ejectment against petitioners is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property
since the petitioners weren’t able to prove that they are authorized to
occupy the same.
Cruz v. CA Adoracion + children filed a case against Summit + Arnel (sib). They Co-ownership is terminated upon judicial or e-judicial partition of the
April 15, 2005 alleged that they are co-owners of a parcel of land, albeit it was only in properties owned in common; partition is the separation, division and
Tinga, J. Arnel’s name. They actually already partitioned thae property, as shown assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may
by deed. belong.
To be considered a co-owner, one “must have a spiritual part of a thing

which is not physically divided, or each of them is an owner of the
whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is
at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.
Lavadia v. Cosme 6 pious women (A, B, C, D, E, F) bought jewelry from the Image of Our Plaintiffs have such right. With the amount of individual contribution
May 9, 1941 Lady of Guadalupe. D had initial custody, then E, then the various undetermined, the law presumes that all of them contributed
Diaz, J. descendants of E, and finally C. C wanted to make the Bishop of Lipa proportionately. Simple majority rule.
custodian, the plaintiffs (F and the heirs of A, B, C) objected and
designated F as the custodian thereof.
TC: inasmuch as the plaintiff are the owners of 4/6 parts pro indiviso of
the jewels, and defendants (heirs of D & E), only 2/6, they have the right
to determine who should be entrusted with the custody.
Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay After the death of the owner of land in Q, his widow and 3 of his children In this case only a small majority of the co-owners executed the lease
November 1, 1930 executed a contract of lease of the land in favor of the predecessor-in- here in Q.
Ostrand, J. interest of DTL. The term was for 20 years, extendible for a like period at
lessee’s option. Further stipulated that at the termination of the original
period or its extension, lessors might purchase all the buildings on the
land at a price to be fixed by experts, but if the lessors should fail to do
that, the lease would continue for another 20.
The lease contract was not signed by 2 of the co-heirs. In 1920, the heirs
made an EJ partition of the inheritance, and among other things, the land
here in Q fell to the share of plaintiffs.
The co-heirs that didn’t sign the lease contract brought this action to
recover possession.
Tuason v. Tuason Angela, Nieves and Antonio co-owned a parcel of land. They entered into The MoA, far from violating the legal prohibition that forbids a CO from
April 2, 1951 a MoA that no CO shall sell, alienate, or dispose of his co-ownership being obliged to remain a party to the community, precisely has for its
Montemayor, J. without first giving preference to the other CO. Angela asked that the purpose and object the dissolution of CO and of the community by
contract be rescinded and the property be partitioned stating the at MoA selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds among the
is void CO. the obligation imposed in the MoA to preserve the CO until all lots
shall have been sold is a mere incident to the main object.
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Mariano v. CA Gosengfiao owned a parcel of land. During his lifetime, he obtained a 1. The right to redeem is not lost in the absence of any written notice of
May 28, 1993 loan secured by a REM over the land. Upon his death, he was survived by the sale by the vendors. The 30-day period has not begin to run.
Nocon, J. his wife and children. The loan was unpaid and thus, the REM was 2. The redemption of a co-owner inures to the benefit of all co-owners.
foreclosed. The land was redeemed by the mother and later sold the
same, together with the other children. Grace knew of the sale and
sought annulment of the sale.
Verdad v. CA ZV is the buyer of the questioned lot. PR Socorro seeks to legally redeem The written notice of sale is mandatory for the tolling of the 30-day
April 29, 1996 the property and traces her title to her late mom-in-law redemption period. Notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner,
Vitug, J the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in
order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and
conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
Ramirez v. Ramirez Plaintiff brought this action against defendants for the partition of a Where, as in this case, no evidence was introduced to support the claim
September 29, 1967 parcel of land situated at the Northwestern corner of Escolta street and that a physical division of the property will cause inestimable damage to
Concepcion, CJ Plaza Sta. Cruz, manila – 1/6 to the plaintiff and 5/6 to the defendants the interest of the co-owners thereof, a court order requiring it decision
was proper.
Manuel Uy & Sons expressed its conformity to the partition, “if the same
can be done without great prejudice to the interests of the parties”. Since the segregation of the property in question inured to the benefit
Defendant Butte agreed to the partition prayed for. The other not only of P but also of D, both parties must defray the incidental
defendants objected to the physical partition of the property in question, expenses.
upon the theory that said partition is “materially and legally” impossible
and “would work great harm and prejudice to the co-owners.
Aguilar v. CA P and D are brothers. They bought a house for their father. Deed of sale No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership and that
October 26, 1993 and title was only in D;s name, because P was disqualified from each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in
Bellosillo, J. obtaining SSS loan. After dad died, P wanted to sell the property and common insofar as his share is concerned
divide the proceeds to themselves. D refused.
Vda. de Ape v. CA Fortunato De Ape—1 of the 11 heirs of deceased—allegedly sold his part Although a partition might have been informal, it is of no moment for
April 15, 2005 of the inherited land to one Lumayno as evidenced by a RECEIPT. even an oral agreement of partition is valid and binding upon the parties
Chico-Nazario, J. Lumayno wanted to register the claimed sale transaction, she demanded
that Fortunato execute the corresponding deed of sale and to receive the
balance of the consideration.
Fortunato denied Lumayno’s claim and insisted that what they had was
an EXPIRED contract of LEASE. He never sold his share in Lot-A to
Lumayno and that his signature appearing on the purported receipt was
forged.
Halili v. CA Guzman, an American citizen, died and left some real properties to his Halili cannot exercise LR. The subject land is urban in character. H has
March 12, 1998 widow and son (both American citizens( the widow then assigned all no right to invoke LR since A1621 presupposes that the land sought to
Panganiban, J. her rights to her son over her share in the 6 parcels of land. The son then be redeemed is rural.
sold them to Cataniag (Filipino). Halili, the owner of the adjoining lot,
questioned the constitutionality of the transfers of property and claimed
ownership based on A1621.
Francisco v. Boiser Petitioners were the original owners of four parcels of land on which Art. 1623 requires that the written notification should come from the
May 31, 2000 stands the Ten Commandments Building. On Aug 6, 1979, they sold 1/5 vendor or prospective vendor, not from any other person. It is the
Mendoza, J. of their undiided shares to their mother, Adela Blas, who in turn sold her notification from the seller, which can remove all doubts as to the fact of
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1/5 share to Zenaida Boiser, another sister of petitioners. the sale, its perfection, and its validity, for in a contract of sale, the seller
is in the best position to confirm whether consent to the essential
On August 5, 1992, petitioner received a summons issued by the court obligation of selling the property and transferring ownership thereof to
based on a civil case filed by the respondent where the latter is the vendee has been given.
demanding for her share in the rentals being collected from the tenants
of the building.
Maintaining that the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun to
run because the vendor never informed her and her co-owners about
the sale to the respondent, petitioner now seeks to exercise her right to
redemption.
Respondent counters by saying that petitioner knew about the sale as

early as May 30, 1992, because on that date, she wrote a letter to the
petitioner informing her of the sale.
Carvajal v. CA Sale of lots to Carvajal were made while the petition for partition filed by Unless the partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over
February 25, 1982 Ecaristo was still pending the definite portion and cannot dispose. Upon death of a person, each of
Teehankee, J. his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate. He cannot
alienate a specific part of the thing in common to the exclusion of other
co-owners because his right over the thing is represented by an ideal
portion. Co-owner cannot adjudicate to himself a definite portion
owned in common until partition by agreement or by judicial decree.
Before partition, co-heir can only sell his successional rights.
Pamplona v. Moreto Sps. Flaviano Moreta and Monica Maniega acquired adjacent lots Nos. After his wife’s death, the husband became entitled to ½ of the entire
March 31, 1980 1495-1496. during their marriage, they begot six children. More than 6 property, with only ½ belonging to the heirs. They hold the property as
Guerrero, J. years after the death of his wife, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of co-owners.
the heirs of his deceased wife and before any liquidation of the conjugal
partnership could be effected executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, At the time of the sale, the conjugal partnership was already dissolved
married to Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale covering lot No. and therefore, the estate became a co-ownership between Flaviano, the
1495. After the death of Flaviano Moreto, plaintiffs-heirs of Monica surviving husband and the heirs of his deceased wife. Aticle 493 of the
Maniega demanded on the defendant-spouses to vacate the premises on NCC is square in point. Hence, at the time of the sale, the co-ownership
the ground that Flaviano had no right to sell the lot as it belongs to the constituted or covered the three lots adjacent to each other. And since
conjugal partnership and Monica was already dead when the sale was Flaviano was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area, he
executed without the consent of the plaintiffs-heirs. had a perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of his share to the
Pamplona spouses.
Castro v. Atienza Brothers Tomas de Castro and Arsenio de Castro, Sr., leased to plaintiff a Art 493 of the NCC allows the alienation of the co-owner of his part in
October 17, 1973 fishpond containing an area of 26 hectares situated in Polo, Bulacan and the co-ownership. The effect of such alienation or mortgage shall be
Teehankee, J. forming part of a bigger parcel of land. The lessors are co-owners in limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
equal shares of the leased property. the termination of the co-ownership In short, a co-owner can enter into
a contract of lease insofar as to his interest. Therefore, he can also
In the meantime, Tomas de Castro died. Later on, plaintiff as lessee and cancel such lease without the consent from the other co-owner.
defendant Arsenio de Castro, Sr. as one of the lessors, agreed to set aside
and annul the contract of lease and for this purpose an agreement was
signed by them, Exhibit A as signed by plaintiff and defendant shows
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that Felisa Cruz Vda. De Castro, widow of Tomas de Castro, was intended
to be made a party thereof in her capacity as representative of the heirs
of Tomas de Castro.
Felisa Cruz Vda. De Castro refused to sign. Defendant did not pay
P2,500.00 which he should have paid on December for payment was
made by plaintiff’s counsel on January 7, 1957 but to no avail, hence the
present action.
There was conflicting contentions between the parties as to who

between them would attend to securing the signature of Mrs. Felisa Cruz
Vda. de Castro to the agreement of cancellation of the lease with
respondent Atienza.
Estoque v. Pajimula Lot 802 of the Cadastral survey of Rosario, covered by OCT RO-2720 The lower court held that the deeds of sale show that the lot acquired by
July 15, 1968 (N.A.), was originally owned by the late spouses Rosendo Perez and Estoque was different from that of the Pajimula; hence they never
Reyes, JBL, J. Fortunata Bernal, who were survived by their children namely, Crispina became co-owners, and the alleged right of legal redemption was not
Perez, Lorenzo Perez and Ricardo Perez. Ricardo Perez is also now dead. proper. Article 1620, which provides that “A co-owner of a thing may
On 28 October 1951, Crispina P. Vda. de Aquitania sold her right and exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-
participation in Lot 802 consisting of 1/3 portion with an area of 640 owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
square meters to Leonora Estoque. On 29 October 1951, Lorenzo Perez, alienation is grossly excessive the redemptioner shall pay only a
Crispina Perez and Emilia P. Posadas, widow of her deceased husband, reasonable one. Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the
Ricardo Perez, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they
Gumersindo, Raquel, Emilio and Ricardo, Jr., executed a deed of may respectively have in the thing owned in common,” does not apply.
extrajudicial settlement wherein Lorenzo Perez, Emilia P. Posadas and
her minor children assigned all their right, interest and participation in
Lot 802 to Crispina Perez. On 30 December 1959, Crispina Perez and her
children, Rosita Aquitania Belmonte, Remedios Aquitania Misa, Manuel
Aquitania, Sergio Aquitania and Aurora Aquitania sold to Elena Pajimula
(and Ciriaco Pajimula), the remaining 2/3 western portion of Lot 802
with an area of 958 square meters.
Leonora Estoque based her complaint for legal redemption on a claim

that she is a co-owner of lot 802, for having purchased 1/3 portion
thereof, containing an area of 640 square meters as evidenced by a deed
of sale, which was executed on 28 October 1951 by Crispina Perez de
Aquitania, one of the co-owners, in her favor.
Diversified Credit v. Rosado The case had its origin in the Municipal Court of Bacolod City, when the Since the share of the wife, Luz Jayme, was at no time physically
December 24, 1968 Diversified Credit Corporation filed an action to compel the spouses determined, it cannot be validly claimed that the house constructed by
Reyes, JBL, J. Felipe Rosado and Luz Jayme Rosado to vacate and restore possession of her husband was built on land belonging to her, and Article 158 of the
a parcel of land in the City of Bacolod (Lot 62-B of Subdivision plan LRC- Civil Code can not apply. Certainly, on her 1/13 ideal or abstract
Psd-33823) that forms part of Lot No. 62 of the Bacolod Cadastre, and is undivided share, no house could be erected. Necessarily, the claim of
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27083 in the name of conversion of the wife’s share from paraphernal to conjugal in character
plaintiff. After answer, claiming that the lot was defendants’ conjugal as a result of the construction must be rejected for lack of factual or legal
property, the Municipal Court ordered defendants to surrender and basis.
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vacate the land in litigation; to pay P100.00 a month from the filing of
the complaint up to the actual vacating of the premises; to pay P500.00
attorneys’ fees and costs.
PNB v. CA After the death of her husband, Rosa mortgaged the entire property to After husband’s death, the property is supposed to be under co-
June 25, 1980 PNB. The title to this property was still under proceedings but was ownership of Rosa and children. She is entitled therefore to only half. By
Guerrero, J. subsequently awarded to the spouses a year after the mortgage. The herself alone, she can’t mortgage the whole property.
mortgage to PNB, however, was not annotated. Meanwhile, she
defaulted with her obligation to Manila Trading, and her share was sold
at a public auction.
Sunset View Condominium v. Judge Campos Petitioner filed for the collection of assessment and insurance premiums Section 5 of the Condominium Act expressly provides that the
April 27, 1981 against private respondent. The latter aver that every purhcaser of a shareholding in the Condominium Corporation will be conveyed only in
Fernandez, J. condo unit, even if not yet fully paid, is a holder of separate interest and a proper case. Not every purchaser of a condominium unit is a
is automatically a shareholder. shareholder of the condominium corporation. The Condominium Act
leaves to the Master Deed the determination of when the shareholding
will be transferred to the purchaser of a unit, as clearly provided in the
deed in this case. Ownership of a unit, therefore, is a condition sine qua
non to being a shareholder in the condominium corporation By
necessary implication, the "separate interest" in a condominium, which
entitles the holder to become automatically a share holder in the
condominium corporation, as provided in Section 2 of the Condominium
Act, can be no other than ownership of a unit. The private respondents,
consequently, who have not fully paid the purchase price of their units
and are not owners of their units nor members or shareholders of the
petitioner condominium corporation.
Capitle v. de Gaban Fabian inherited from his dad 2 parcels of land. F died inteste in 1919, The adverse possession by Julian and his successors-in-interest as
June 8, 2004 survived by 4 sons, J, Z, Fr, and M. After F’s death, J occupied and exclusive owner of the property having entailed a period of about 67
Carpio-Morales, J. cultivated the property until his death in 1950. years at the time of the filing of the case at bar, ownership by
prescription had vested in them.
Petitioners (heirs of other brothers) now filed for partition.
Ramos v. Dir. Of Lands Ramos was a holder of a possession information title which he later The occupancy of a part of the land with an instrument giving color of
November 19, 1918 conveyed to Romero. Romero applied for the registration of the land. title is sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land. The general rule
Malcolm, J. is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under
a claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, IF the
remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. Possession in the
eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
Director v. CA A land was occupied by 40 tenants during the Spanish regime. They The rule on constructive possession does not apply when the major
June 29, 1984 were granted homestead applications. Bruno died during the Spanish portion of the disputed property has been in the adverse possession of
Aquino, J. regime and was survived by 7 children. Bruno’s nephew obtained a tax homesteaders and their heirs. It is still part of the public domain until
declaration for the land. Judge issued a decree for registration of land in the patents are issued.
name of Bruno’s heirs.
Kasilag v. Roque Emiliana Ambrosio was issued a homestead patent. A TCT was A person is deemed a possessor in BF when he knows that there is a flaw
December 7, 1939 subsequently issued. It is prohibited to sell or encumber a land obtained in his title or in the manner of acquisition by which it is invalidated.
Imperial, J. through homestead 5 years from its issuance. K entered into a contract Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of good
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loan wherein she mortgaged the improvement on the lands as security. faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. Kasilag is not
conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. It can be concluded
2nd agreement: verbal whereby EA conveyed to K the possession of the therefore that Kasilag’s ignorance of Sec 116 is excusable and may be a
land. basis of good faith.
Banco Español Filipino v. Peterson To secure payment of loan, Reyes mortgaged to the bank several pieces There was a perfect contract of pledge and the depositary was placed in
February 6, 1907 of property and pledged part of his property. The latter goods were the possession of the goods after the symbolic transfer by means of
Torres, J. delivered to the depository. Garcia obtained a favorable judgment delivery to him of the keys to the warehouse where the goods were kept.
against Reyes’ property. Garcia requested the sheriff to seiz the goods The sheriff, then, could not have legally levied upon the property.
from the warehouse.
Macasaet v. Macasaet Children were invited by the parents to occupy the latter’s 2 lots. The portion requiring Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet to
September 30, 2004 Unfortunately, an unresolved conflict terminated this situation. Out of reimburse one half of the value of the useful improvements, amounting
Panganiban, J. pique, the parents asked them to vacate the premises. Thus, the children to P475,000, and the right of Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet to
lost their right to remain on the property. They have the right, however, remove those improvements (if the former refuses to reimburse) is
to be indemnified for the useful improvements that they constructed deleted. The case is remanded to the court of origin for further
thereon in good faith and with the consent of the parents. In short, proceedings to determine the facts essential to the proper application of
Article 448 of the Civil Code applies. Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
Cuaycong v. Benedicto 2 roads :One of these roads is referred to in the proceedings as the If owner of a tract of land, to accommodate the public, permits them to
March 13, 1918 Nanca-Victorias road and the other as the Dacuman- Toreno road cross his property, it is not his intention to divest himself of ownership
Fisher, J. or to establish an easement. Such possession is not affected by acts of
The allegations in the complaint with respect to the Nanca-Victorias possessory character which are merely tolerated.
road are that the appellees, Eduardo Cuaycong, Lino Cuaycong, and
Eulalio Dolor, are the owners of a group of haciendas situated between
the southern boundary of the Hacienda Toreno and the barrio of Nanca
That more than twenty years the appellees and their predecessors in
interest have made use of the Nanca- Victorias road, which crosses the
Hacienda Toreno, openly, publicly, and continiously, with the knowledge
of the owners of the said hacienda
That on the fifteenth day of November, 1912, the defendants closed the
road in question
Defendants in their answer averred that the road crossing the Hacienda
Toreno, over which plaintiffs claim the right of passage, is the private
property of defendants
That they have not refused plaintiffs permission to pass over this road
but have required them to pay toll for the privilege of doing so
The court held that it was a public highway over which the public had
acquired a right of use by immemorial prescription
It was only in 1911-1913 that toll was being collected; apparently done
to raise funds for its repair
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Astudillo v. PHHC Mitra bought a lot from PHHC in 1961. The said lot gas been occupied by As a squatter, she has no possessory rights over the disputed lot. The
Spetember 22, 1976 Astudillo uninterruptedly since 1957. PHHC ignored her requests for the State’s solicitude from the destitutes and the have-nots does not mean
Aquino, J. cancellation of the title in favor of Mitra and for the resale to her. that it should tolerate usurpations pf property, public or private.
Peran v. CFI Jose Evasco owns an unregistered land. He executed an EJ partition of it Possession by tolerance is lawful, but this becomes illegal when, upon
October 13, 1983 among his 5 heirs, incl. Alejandro. He allowed and tolerated his niece demand to vacate by the owner, the possessor refuses to comply with
Melencio-Herrera, J. Encarnacion to erect a house on a portion of his lot. In ’72, Alejandro such demand. A possessor by mere tolerance is necessarily bound by an
sold the lot. Encarnacion refused to vacate. implied promise to vacate upon demand.
Yu v. Honrado Marcelo Steel Corp sold 42 metric tons of scrap engine blocks to The acquirer and possessor in good faith of a chattel or movable
August 21, 1980 Refuerzo, an alleged swindler. The latter then sold them to the Yu property is entitled to be respected and protected in his possession as if
Aquino, J. spouses. The purchase was in GF. Court then issued warrant for seizure he were the true owner, until a competent court rules otherwise. Such
of the goods. possession in good faith is equivalent to title and every possessor has a
right to be respected in his possession (Arts 539 and 559)
Cordero v. Cabral Felipa and her children filed a complaint that a portion of the land they Good faith ceases when they were served with summons to answer the
July 25, 1983 inherited from husband was illegally possessed by Victoria et al. complaint. As possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons,
Abad-Santos, J. they shall reimburse the fruits received.
Fabie v. Gutierrez-David Petitioner Josefa is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses in A usufructuary of the rents, as a corollary to the right to all rents, to
December 12, 1945 Binondo and Ongpin, under the ninth clause of the will of deceased choose the tenant and to fix the amount of the rent, necessarily has the
Ozaeta, J. Rosario. right to choose himself as the tenant, provided that the obligations he
has assumed towards the owner of the property are fulfilled.
Board of Assessment Appeals of Zamboanga del Sur v. Samar As the mining claims and the mill of Samar are located inland and at a It is well settled that a real tax, being a burden upon the capital, should
Mining Co., Inc. great distance from the loading pt/pier site, it devided to construct a be paid by the LO and not by a usufructuary.
February 27, 1971 gravel road; Samar then filed with Bureau of Lands & of Forestry misc.
Zaldivar, J. lease app’n for a road right of way; given temporary permit; however,
execution of the lease contracts have been held in abeyance by CTA
Baluran v. Navarro Spouses Domingo Paraiso and Fidela Q. Paraiso were the owners of a The use of the term “barter” in describing the agreement of February 2,
September 30, 1977 residential lot of around 480 square meters. On or about February 2, 1964, is not controlling. The stipulations in said document are clear
Munoz-Palma, J. 1964, the Paraisos executed an agreement entitled “BARTER” whereby enough to indicate that there was no intention at all on the part of the
as party of the first part they agreed to “barter and exchange” with signatories thereto to convey the ownership of their respective
spouses Avelino and Benilda Baluran their residential lot with the properties; all that was intended, and it was so provided in the
latter’s unirrigated riceland, of approximately 223 square meters agreement, was to transfer the material possession thereof. With the
without any permanent improvements. On May 6, 1975 Antonio material ion being the only one transferred, all that the parties acquired
Obendencio filed a complaint to recover the above-mentioned was the right of usufruct which in essence is the right to enjoy the
residential lot from Avelino Baluran claiming that he is the rightful property of another. A resolutory condition is one which extinguishes
owner of said residential lot having acquired the same from his mother, rights and obligations already existing. The right of “material
Natividad Paraiso Obedencio, and that he needed the property for possession” granted in the agreement of February 2, 1964, ends if and
purposes of constructing his house thereon inasmuch as he had taken when any of the children of Natividad Paraiso, Obedencio would reside
residence in his native town, Sarrat. Obedencio accordingly prayed that in the municipality and build his house on the property. Inasmuch as the
he be declared owner of the residential lot and that defendant Baluran condition opposed is not dependent solely on the will of one of the
be ordered to vacate the same forfeiting his (Obedencio) favor the parties to the contract the spouses Paraiso but is part dependent on the
improvements defendant Baluran had built in bad faith. At the pre-trial, will of third persons, Natividad Obedencio and any of her children, the
the parties agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of their same is valid. the plaintiff or respondent Obedencio could not demand
stipulation of facts. It was likewise admitted that the aforementioned for the recovery of possession of the residential lot in question, not until
residential lot was donated on October 4, 1974 by Natividad Obedencio he acquired that right from his mother, Natividad Obedencio, and which
to her son Antonio Obedencio, and that since the execution of the he did acquire when his mother donated to him the residential lot on
agreement of February 2, 1964 Avelino Baluran was in possession of the October 4, 1974. In view of the ruling that the “barter agreement” of
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residential lot, paid the taxes of the property, and constructed a house February 2, 1964, did not transfer the ownership of the respective
thereon with an value of P250.00. On November 8, 1975, the trial Judge properties mentioned therein, it follows that petitioner Baluran remains
Ricardo Y. Navarro rendered a decision. the owner of the unirrigated riceland and is now entitled to its
Possession. With the happening of the resolutory condition provided for
in the agreement, the right of usufruct of the parties is extinguished and
each is entitled to a return of his property.
NHA v. CA Proc. 481 set aside a portion of land in QC owned by NHA as reserved A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term and under such
April 13, 2005 property for the NGC. conditions as the parties may deem convenient subject to the legal
Carpio, J. provision on usufruct; a usufructuary may lease the object held in
Proc. 1670 removed a 7-hectare portion from the NGC and gave MSBF usufruct.
usufructuary rights over this 7has.
A usufructuary has the duty to protect the owner’s interests – a usufruct
MSBF occupied the land, but exceeded from the 7 has. Then, MSBF gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of
leased a portion of the area to BGC preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the
law otherwise provides
North Negros v. Hidalgo Across its properties, NNSC constructed a road connecting the mill site The road is clearly a servitude voluntarily constituted in favor of the
October 31, 1936 with the provincial highwat. NNSC made the road accessible to the community under Art. 531. Having been devoted by NNSC to the use of
Recto, J. public, a toll fee being charge in case of motor vehicles, free for the public in general, the road is charged with public interest. And while
pedestrians. H owns a tuba saloon in an adjoining hacienda, and so devoted. NNSC may not establish discriminatory exceptions against
likeother people, he used to pass through connecting road. Because any private persons.
NNSCs worker’s usually got drunk from H’s saloon, NNSC sought to
enjoin H from using the road.
Municipality of Dumangas v. Bishop of Jaro The municipality applied for registration of parcels of land claiming that Since the construction of the church, there had been a side door in the
March 29, 1916 there were owners since time immemorial. Bishop opposed saying that wall through which the worshippers attending mass enter and leave,
Torres, J. the church had been in possession also since time immemorial passing and entering the land in question. As this use of the land has
been continuous, it is evident that the church has acquired a right to
such use by prescription, in view of the time that has elapsed since the
church was built and dedicated to religious worship, during which
period the Municipality has not prohibited the passage over the land by
persons who attend services held by the church.
Amor v. Florentino Maria Florentino owned a house and camarin. The house had on the Easement of light and view go together. Acquisition of easements is by
October 11, 1943 north side 3 widnows on the upper story and a 4th on the ground flr. title or by prescription. The visible and permanent sign of an easement
Bocobo, J. Through these windows, the house receives light and air from the lot is the title that characterizes its existence. Existence of the apparent sign
where the camarin stands. Maria made a will devising the house and lot had the same effect as a title of acquisition of the easement of the light
to Gabriel and Jose, then the camarin to Ma. Encarnacion. ME sold the lot and view upon death of original owner.
and warehouse to Amor. A destrotyed the warehouse and built a 2-
storey house
Ronquillo v. Roco Plaintiffs alleged that they have been in the continuous and An easement of right of way though it may be apparent is, nevertheless,
uninterrupted use of a road or passage way which traversed the land of discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired
the defendants and their predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad through prescription, but only by virtue of a title. Under the New
Street and the market place of Naga City, from their residential land and Civil Code, easements may be continuous discontinuous (intermittent),
back, for more than 20 years. Plaintiffs further claim that defendants apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or
have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of road less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man (Articles 615).
right of way of the former. On May 12, 1953, the defendants and their Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either, by title or
men constructed a chapel in the middle of the said right of way which, prescription, continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous
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Prof. E.A. Labitag
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accordingly has impeded, obstructed and disturbed the continuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title
exercise of the rights of the (Articles 620 and 622)
plaintiffs over said right of way. On July 10, 1954 defendants planted Under the provisions of the Civil Code, particularly the articles thereof
wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermitically the road aforecited, it would therefore appear that the easement of right of way
passage way and their right of way against the plaintiff’s protests and may not be acquired through prescription. Even Article 1959 of the Old
opposition. This prevented them from going to or coming from their Civil Code providing for prescription of ownership and other real rights
homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of the City of Naga. in real property, excludes therefrom the exception established by Article
539, referring to discontinuous easements, such as, easement of right of
way.
Encarnacion v. CA Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the The Court finds that petitioner has sufficiently established his claim for
March 11, 1991 late Aniceta Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent an additional easement of right of way, holding that where a private
estates situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas. Petitioner owns the property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over
dominant estate while respondent owns the servient estate which adjacent servient estates as a matter of law.
stands between the dominant estate and the national road. Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement
When the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the
persons going to the national highway just crossed the servient estate at dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time."
no particular point. However, in 1960 when private respondents This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant
constructed a fence around the servient estate, a roadpath measuring 25 property which ultimately determine the width of the passage. And
meters long and about a meter wide was constituted to provide access these needs may vary from time to time.
to the highway. One- half meter width of the path was taken from the When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his
servient estate and the other one-half meter portion was taken from family could easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the
another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No compensation was asked national highway. But the business grew and with it the need for the use
and none was given for the portions constituting the pathway. of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of plants
It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become extremely
business on his land where he also had his abode. He would use said cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his
pathway as passage to the highway for his family and for his customers. jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft
Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished simply because it could not pass
and with that, it became more and more difficult for petitioner to haul through the improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of
the plants and garden soil to and from the nursery and the highway with the servient estate and can only be counter-productive for all the people
the use of pushcarts. In January, 1984, petitioner was able to buy an concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough
owner-type jeep which he could use for transporting his plants. to accommodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary
However, that jeep could not pass through the roadpath and so he aspect of the plant nursery business.
approached the servient estate owners and requested that they sell to
him one and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property to be added to the
existing pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney. The request was
turned down by the two widows and further
attempts at negotiation proved futile.
Petitioner then instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas, to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way
over an additional width of at least two (2) meters over the De Saguns'
405-square-meter parcel of land. During the trial, the attention of the
lower courtwas called to the existence of another exit to the highway,
only eighty (80) meters away from the dominant estate, hence,
dismissing petitioner's complaint.
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Valderrama v. North Negros V. et al executed a contract with Miguel Osorio where O afreed to install 1. In a contract establishing an easement of way in favor of a sugar
December 18, 1925 a sugar central of minimum capacity of 300 tons for grinding and milling company for the construction of a railroad for the transportation of
Villamor, J. a sugar cane grown by V. et al who in turn bound themselves to furnish sugar cane from the servient estates to the mill, it is contrary to the
the central all cane they might produce. A railroad was constructed on V nature of the contract to pretend that only sugar cane grown in the
et al’s land to transport the sugarcane. But V’s harvest fell short. servient estates can be transported on said railroad, because it is a well-
settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and
not by easement. That an easement being established in favor of the
sugar company, the owners of the servient estates cannot limit its use to
the transportation of their cane, there being no express stipulation to
that effect.
2. An easement of way is not more burdensome by causing to pass

hereon wagons carrying goods pertaining to persons who aren’t wners
of the servient estates and at all time the person entitled o the easement
may please, for in such case the easement ontinues to be the same.
Ongsiaco v. Ongsiaco Hacienda Esperanza Tercea de Pare was dissolved and partitioned The dikes are continuous easements since it does depend upon the act of
among the Ongsiaco heirs (4/9) and the Santos heirs (5/9). man, but is due to gravity. Being such, it is subject to the extinction to
the non-user (20 years in the Old Code and 10 years in the New Code).
O through notarial deed stated that S had been constructing dikes Since, it was admittedly built in 1937 or 1938, the action is barred by
obstructing the natural flow of water to the prejudice of the co-owners. prescription
Quimen v. CA The classic battle of an avocado tree and a sarisari store of strong Where the easement may be established on any of the several tenements
May 29, 1996 materials. surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and
Bellosillo, J. Yolanda’s property behind A&S’s. at first, Y uses A’s property to get to will cause the least damage should be chosen but if these two
the municipal road. Later on, she was barred. Eventually, S provided her circumstances don’t concur in a single interest, the way which will cause
with a passageway. Unfortunately, S’s property is a sari-sari store –long least damage should be used, even if it will not be shortest.
story short, ang haba ng tatahakin niyang daan [naks]para makarating
sa municipal road. Hence, she filed an action for right of way through A’s
property. The only obstruction in the proposed RoW is an avocado tree.
David-Chan v. CA Pacita D-C owns a 635sw.m. lot located in San Fernando, Pampanga David-Chan not entitled to a RoW through PR’s property.
February 26, 1997 ehich is almost completely surrounded by other immovables and cut off
Panganiban, J. from the highway:
N, W: business establishments
S: Pineda’s land
ENE: Phil. Rabbit  lies between chan and highway
She used to have a passageway from Pineda’s but she fenced it off.
La Vista v. CA Mangyan Road is the boundary between the La Vista Subdivision on one A legal easement is that which is constituted by law for public use and
September 5, 1997 side and Ateneo and Maryknoll (Miriam) on the other. The road extends interest. A voluntary easement is constituted simply by will or
Bellosillo, J. to the entrance gate of Loyola Grand Villas. The area comprising the 15- agreement of the parties.
meter wide roadway was originally part of a vast tract of land owned by
the Tuasons. The Tuasons sold to Philippine Building Corporation a A voluntary easement of right of way could be extinguished only by
portion of their landholdings. The Philippine Building Corporation mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant
transferred, with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land estate. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish
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Prof. E.A. Labitag
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to Ateneo. The Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements.
portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation into La Vista
Subdivision.
La Vista seeks the issuance of a writ of injunction to finally enjoin
private respondents Solid Homes, Inc., developers of Loyola Grand Villas
Subdivision, the latter’s predecessor-in- interest, Ateneo, and the
residents of the said subdivision from enjoying an easement of right-of-
way over Mangyan Road.
La Vista contends that “mere convenience for the dominant estate is not
enough to serve as its (the easement of right-of-way) basis. To justify the
imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or
artificial, necessity for it”
Vda. de Baltazar v. CA Panganiban’s property was surrounded by Baltazar’s in front, and Requisites that has to be complied with before the grant of a compulsory
June 27, 1995 Calimon’s and Legazpi’s on the left and right, respectively. It was easement of right of way—
Romero, J. Baltazar’s property which fronts the national road. Panganiban sought
the right of way through Baltazar’s. It was discovered that he was ed 1. The property is surrounded by estate of others and there is no
access through Legazpi and Calimon’s property when Baltazar closed his adequate outlet to a public highway
property. 2. It must be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest
3. There must be payment of the proper indemnity
4. The isolation should not be due to the proprietor’s own acts
An easement of right of way can be established through continued use.

This doctrine was enunciated in Ronquillo v Roco which held that an
easement of right of way is discontinuous in nature since the dominant
estate cannot be continually crossing the servient estate but can do so
only at intervals.
Sps. Dela Cruz v. Ramiscal The subject matter of this case is a 1.10m wide by 12.6m long strip of An easement or servitude is a real right constituted on the corporeal
February 4, 2005 lnd owned by Ramiscal which is being used by petitioners as their immovable property f another, by virtue of which the owner has to
Chico-Nazario, J. pathway to and from 19th Ave., the nearest public highway from their refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do, something in his
property. Petitioners had enclosed the same with a gate, fence and roof. property, for the benefit of another thing or person. In CAB, petitioners
failed to show by competent evidence that a voluntary easement was
made.
Floro v. Llenado Floro was the owner of a subdivision. Here comes Llenado who bought The use of the road lots by the Llenados during the month of March was
the adjoining subdivision lot, which was formerly Emmanuel Homes. A by mere tolerance of Floro pending the negotiation of the terms &
creek separates the property of Llenado from Floro. On the west side of conditions of the right of way. Although such use was in anticipation of
Llenado’s property was a rice land. On the subdivision plan of Llenado’s a voluntary easement, no such contract was validly entered into by
property, there was a plan to construct an access road to McArthur reason of the failure of the parties to agree on its terms & conditions.
Highway but no construction was made. With the two subdivisions, it The burden of proving the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim
was Floro’s which only had an access road. Floro ed usage of his access a compulsory right of way lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
road pending negotiations but later on closed the property.
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Lagazo v. CA Catalina was the grantee of the Monserrat estate. She had to leave for The donation is simple and pure. There is no showing of any acceptance
March 5, 1998 Canada to become a permanent resident therein and she appointed from Lagazo and thus, there has been no perfected donation.
Panganiban, J. Espanol to be her attorney-in-fact to fix the requirements needed.
Failing to accomplish what he ought to do, Catalina appointed Lagazo as
her new attorney-in-fact. The grant was subsequently given and later,
the land was donated to Lagazo. Lagazo then sought to remove Cabanlit
from the property. The latter claims ownership over the land by virtue
of a deed of sale executed in favor of him by Espanol.
Bonsato v. CA Respondents sought the annulment of the deeds of donation on the If there has been no badge that it is a donation mortis causa, it should be
July 30, 1954 ground that it wasn’t in compliance with the formalities of a will. The considered as a donation inter vivos.
Reyes, JBL, J. petitioners on the other hand claim that they are valid donations and
that they were not donations mortis causa.
Gestopa v. CA Spouses Gestopa previously issued a deed of donation mortis cause in The existence of an acceptance clause in the deed shows that the
October 5, 2000 favor of Mercedes but subsequently, they issued another deed, now inter donation is of inter vivos. There is no acceptance needed when it comes
Quisumbing, J. vivos, still in favor of Mercedes. Mercedes now seeks the donated to donations mortis causa.
property but the Gestopas claimed that she isn’t entitled to such, the
donation being mortis causa.
Austria-Magat v. CA Comerciante had 5 children. She then bought a residential house and lot The act of selling the subject property to petitioner herein cannot be
February 1, 2002 which she donated to her children. The deed contained an acceptance considered as a valid act of revocation of the deed of donation for the
De Leon Jr., J. and irrevocability clause. Thereafter she executed a deed of absolute reason that a formal case to revoke must be filed in court.
sale in favor of Apolinaria.
Vitug v. CA Romarico and Dolores had a joint account with Bank of American NOT A CONVEYANCE MORTIS CAUSA = WILL - because the property
March 29, 1990 National Trust and Savings Assn. and a SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENT conveyed is not exclusively owned by DOLORES
Sarmiento, J. wherein it was agreed that upon death of one of them, the surviving
spouse would own the proceeds of the account. Romarico withdrew the NOT A DONATION INTER VIVOS
said funds and used it to pay for estate tax, and now wants to acquire a. It would take effect after death of one
authority to dispose of other properties of his wife’s estate for b. No conveyance of exclusive property of one spouse to the other
reimbursement of the “advance” he made. The oppositor alleged that he
is not entitled to the said reimbursement as the funds used, i.e. the funds
of the Joint account, was part of the conjugal property. The Court upheld
the SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENT.
Hemedes v. CA Kausapin argues that the deed of conveyance in favor of stepdaughter Mere preponderance of evidence is not sufficient to overthrow a
Oct. 8, 1999 Maxima was in English and that it was not explained to her. certificate of a notary public to the effect that the grantor executed a
Gonzaga-Reyes, J. certain document and acknowledged the fact of its execution before him.
Sumipat v. Banga The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat, who are childless, A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a gratuitous disposition of
August 13, 2004 acquired three parcels of land. Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five property — a donation — although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon the
Tinga, J. illegitimate children out of an extra-marital affair with Pedra Dacola, petitioners the condition that he and his wife, Placida, shall be entitled to
namely: herein defendants-appellees Lydia, Laurito, Alicia, Alejandro one-half (1/2) of all the fruits or produce of the parcels of land for their
and Lirafe, all surnamed Sumipat. subsistence and support.
On January 5, 1983, Lauro Sumipat executed a document denominated
"DEED OF ABSOLUTE TRANSFER AND/OR QUIT- CLAIM OVER REAL In this case, the donees’ acceptance of the donation is not manifested
PROPERTIES" (the assailed document) in favor of defendants-appellees either in the deed itself or in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an
covering the three parcels of land (the properties). instrument of donation is patently void.
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It appears that on January 5, 1983 when the assailed document was
executed, Lauro Sumipat was already very sick and bedridden; that
upon defendant-appellee Lydia’s request, their neighbor Benjamin
Rivera lifted the body of Lauro Sumipat whereupon Lydia guided his
(Lauro Sumipat’s) hand in affixing his signature on the assailed
document which she had brought; that Lydia thereafter left but later
returned on the same day and requested Lauro’s unlettered wife Placida
to sign on the assailed document, as she did in haste, even without the
latter getting a responsive answer to her query on what it was all about.
After Lauro Sumipat’s death,his wife Placida, and defendants- appellees
jointly administered the properties 50% of the produce of which went to
plaintiff-appellant. But as Placida’s share in the produce of the
properties dwindled until she no longer received any and learning that
the titles to the properties in question were already transferred/made in
favor of the defendants-appellees, she filed a complaint for declaration
of nullity of titles, contracts, partition, recovery of ownership now the
subject of the present appeal.
Calicdan v. Cendana The instant controversy involves a 760 square meter parcel of Donation void. Notwithstanding, we find that respondent has become
February 5, 2004 unregistered land located in Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
Ynares-Santiago, J. land was formerly owned by Sixto Calicdan, who died intestate on
November 4, 1941. He was survived by his wife, Fermina, and three Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real
children, namely, petitioner Soledad, Jose and Benigno, all surnamed rights over immovable property. It is concerned with lapse of time in
Calicdan. the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the
possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
On August 25, 1947, Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary
whereby she conveyed the land to respondent Silverio Cendaña, who or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession
immediately entered into possession of the land, built a fence around the in good faith and with just title for ten years. In extraordinary
land and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon sometime prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property
in 1949, where he resided until his death in 1998. are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for
thirty years without need of title or of good faith.
On June 29, 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe
Castillo, filed a complaint for “Recovery of Ownership, Possession and The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the
Damages” against the respondent, alleging that the donation was void; person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and
that respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the could transmit his ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just
land; and that she merely tolerated respondent’s possession of the land title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
as well as the construction of his house thereon. through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or
could not transmit any right.
Shopper’s Paradise Realty v. Roque In 1993, petitioner entered into a 25-year lease with deceased Dr. Roque The registration of a deed of donation does not affect its validity. As
January 13, 2004 over a parcel of land. When Dr. died, son Efren contended that dad had being itself a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an
Vitug, J. no authority to enter into agreements with petitioner because the effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the done.
properties had long been given to him by his parents through a DIV – In donations of immovable property, the law requires for its validity that
duly notarized, but remained in Dr’s name. it should be contained in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the done must
31
Prof. E.A. Labitag
st

satisfy.
It is enough between the parties to a donation of an immpvable that the
donation be made in a public document, but in order to vind third
persons, the donation must be registered in the registry of Property.
Eduarte v. CA Pedro Calapine wants to revoke the donation he made to his nicece in The Supreme Court ruled that all crimes which offend the
February 9, 1996 1984. Niece committed falsification of public document. donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation.
Francisco, J.
Sps. Eduarte contends that the crime is neither one against the person
nor property of the donor but against public interest.
Noceda v. CA Directo together with her nephew and another, extrajudicially The acts of Noceda are acts of usurpation which is an offense against the
September 2, 1999 partitioned the land donated to them. On the same date, she donated in property of Directo and considered an act of ingratitude of a donee
Gonzaga-Reyes, J. favor of Noceda a part of her land. On her share of the land, she fenced it against a donor. The law doesn’t require conviction of the donee, it is
and constructed three huts therein. On a later date, Noceda removed the enough that his offense is proved in the action for revocation.
fence, entered the premises and used the three lots. Despite demands for
him to vacate, he refused to do so, prompting Directo to file a case
against him and revoke the donation made by her.
Yulo and Sons v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo 1977: petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land in Calamba. Considering that the donee’s act did not detract from the very purpose
March 31, 2005 Deed of donation also bears acceptance of done. for which the donation was made but precisely to achieve such
Garcia, J. purposed, a lack of prior written consent of the donor would only
Condition that it be used for the building of an institution for the constitute casual breach, which will not warrant revocation
homeless.
1980: for the purpose of generating funds for the erection of building,
leased the donated property to Gonez wuth prior consent from donor.
1986: leased again to Jose Bostre, who used it as a ranch.
In 1990, petitioners seek revocation.

Chua v. Victorio Respondent Mutya Victorio is the owner of the property in Panganiban The compromise agreement executed in 1991 is without moment as to
May 18, 2004 Street, Santiago, Isabela where petitioners Chua and Yong Tian are petitioner’s claim.
Ynares-Santiago, J. lessees. Accordingly, in 1994, the juridical relation between the parties was
severed when the CA ordered ejectment of the petitioners. The lessor’s
In 1990, Victorio effected an ejectment suit against the petitioners who acceptance of the increased rentals in 1996 did not have the effect of
were not fulfilling their obligations as lessees, but a compromise reviving the earlier contract of lease. Upon the moment of acquiescence
agreement supervened this. In 1994, Victorio raised the rentals and by respondents to the increased amount, an entirely new contract of
petitioners did not comply with such payments. She then again moved lease was entered into, forging an entirely new juridical relation. Since
for an ejectment suit. The RTC and CA ordered respondents to vacate the payment of rent was made on a monthly basis, and pursuant to Article
property. But this did not happen because respondents agreed as to the 1687 of the Civil Code, the period of this lease contract was monthly.
new rentals and there again continued occupation of the property. Upon the expiration of every month, the lessor could increase the rents
and demand that the lessee vacate the premises upon non-compliance
with increased terms.
32
Prof. E.A. Labitag
st

In 1998, Victorio wanted to increase again the rentals. They again failed
to pay such rents and respondent filed again for ejectment suit.
The right of rescission is statutorily recognized in reciprocal obligations,
Petitioners impugn such raises in rents, invoking the provisions of the such as contracts of lease. In addition to the general remedy of
compromise agreement that the two parties executed sometime in 1991. rescission granted under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, there is an
They contend that there can be no increase of more than 25% in a span independent provision granting the remedy of rescission for breach of
of 4 years. any of the lessor or lessee’s statutory obligations. Under Article 1659 of
the Civil Code, the aggrieved party may, at his option, ask for (1) the
rescission of the contract; (2) rescission and indemnification for
damages; or (3) only indemnification for damages, allowing the contract
to remain in force.
Payment of the rent is one of a lessee’s statutory obligations. The law

grants the lessor the option of extrajudicially terminating the contract of
lease by simply serving a written notice upon the lessee. This
extrajudicial termination has the same effect as rescission. Rescission of
lease contracts under Article 1659 of the Civil Code does not require an
independent action, unlike resolution of reciprocal obligations under
Article 1191 of said Code.
33
Prof. E.A. Labitag
st

Credits
[special mega super duper thank you po. Without you, I wouldn’t have been able to cram for my property written exam. :D]
Block D2008 Magic Notes

ADAPT 2009 Property Notes
http://www.scribd.com/doc/34161383/Case-Digest-on-Property-Law
http://berneguerrero.com/node/416
http://www.scribd.com/doc/37272797/Property-Digest
http://karissafaye.blogspot.com/2010/05/art-xi-sec2-ombudsman-vs.html
http://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-law/property/1131-cebu-oxygen-and-acetylene-co-v-bercilles-66-scra-431.html
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1949/1945/1945_630
http://www.scribd.com/doc/24634704/PROPERTY-Rights-of-Accession
http://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-law/property/1167-binalay-v-manalo-195-scra-374.html
http://www.oflodor.com/property-case-digest-sps-pingol-v-court-of-appeals/
http://www.oflodor.com/case-digest-titong-v-court-of-appeals/
http://www.scribd.com/doc/38004170/Portic-vs-Anastacia-Cristobal
http://www.scribd.com/doc/24634697/PROPERTY-Labitag-Lectures-1st-Sem-AY-09-10
http://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-law/jurisprudence/1202-mariano-v-ca-222-scra-736.html
http://www.oflodor.com/property-case-digest-ramirez-v-ramirez/
http://www.oflodor.com/property-case-digest-pamplona-v-moreto/
http://www.oflodor.com/property-case-digest-vda-de-castro-v-atienza/
http://berneguerrero.co-ph.com/2003/09/12/haystack-estoque-vs-pajimula-gr-l-24419-15-july-1968/
http://www.oflodor.com/case-digest-diversified-credit-corporation-v-felipe-rosado-and-luz-jayme-rosado/
http://www.oflodor.com/case-digest-macasaet-v-macasaet/
http://www.oflodor.com/property-case-digest-avelino-baluran-v-hon-ricardo-navarro/
http://www.scribd.com/doc/35170032/Property-Case-Digest
http://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-law/property/1251-valderama-v-north-negros-sugar-central-48-phil-492-easements.html
http://www.batasnatin.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1267:quimen-v-ca-257-scra-163&catid=60:civil-law-jurisprudence&Itemid=113
http://www.scribd.com/doc/36645269/La-Vista-Association-v-CA-et-Al-Digest
http://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-law/property/1278-vda-de-baltazar-v-ca-245-scra-333-compulsory-easement-right-of-way.html
http://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-law/property/1264-floro-v-llenado-244-scra-713-easement-right-of-way.html
http://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-law/property/1329-lagazo-v-ca-287-scra-18-simple-and-pure-donation.html
http://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-law/obligations-and-contracts/1324-bonsato-v-ca-95-phil-481.html
http://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-law/property/1327-gestopa-v-ca-342-scra-105.html
http://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-law/property/1347-austria-magat-v-ca-375-scra-556.html
http://www.scribd.com/doc/28672706/Specpro-Reviewer-Cha
http://www.scribd.com/doc/34836402/SUMIPAT-vs-BANGA
http://www.familymatters.org.ph/New%20Civil%20Code/Civil%20Code%20Usufruct.htm
http://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-law/property/1349-noceda-v-ca-313-scra-504.html
http://thestraydecision.wordpress.com/2010/07/13/chua-vs-victorio/

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Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

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The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should

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What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from an accion

The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership

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Respondent: He has been in possession since 1955.

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Petitioner contends that he is entitled to the fruits of the property while

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Case 3 (Case at bar): CMV = P400,000. Pecson already received

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

The alluvium, by mandate of A457, is automatically owned by the

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

If the commingling of two things is made in bad faith, the one

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

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To be considered a co-owner, one “must have a spiritual part of a thing

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Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

Respondent counters by saying that petitioner knew about the sale as

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

There was conflicting contentions between the parties as to who

Leonora Estoque based her complaint for legal redemption on a claim

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Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

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2. An easement of way is not more burdensome by causing to pass

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An easement of right of way can be established through continued use.

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

1986: leased again to Jose Bostre, who used it as a ranch.

In 1990, petitioners seek revocation.

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

Payment of the rent is one of a lessee’s statutory obligations. The law

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

Block D2008 Magic Notes

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