GAMBITO VS.

BACENA

FACTS:

The records show that before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Jose V. Gambito (Gambito) filed a complaint
for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of title, specific performance and damages over a parcel of land located in La Torre South,
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, against Adrian Oscar Z. Bacena (Bacena), one of the defendants therein.

Gambito alleged before the MTC that he is the true and registered owner of a certain parcel of land located in La Torre South, Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya containing an area of 8,601 square meters, more or less, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-149954. The said
parcel of land was acquired by him through a Deed of Donation executed on July 9, 2008 by his mother, Luz V. Gambito (Luz), who held
said property under TCT No. 92232. Her mother, Luz, acquired the same property from Dominga Pascual (Pascual) and her co-owner,
Rosalina Covita (Covita), through a Deed of Sale dated December 16, 1994 which finds its origin from Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. R-578 issued on March 30, 1916.4

Gambito claimed that through his efforts, he discovered that Bacena surreptitiously secured before the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), a patent title, Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Bilang P-21362 covering 4,259 sq m, more or less,
which was a part and portion of the same lot registered in Gambito's name under TCT No. T-149954. Gambito further alleged that he is
aware his parents filed a protest before the CENRO, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on August 31, 2007 against Bacena but the same was
later withdrawn by his parents upon realization that said office is not the proper forum and that the order of dismissal was issued on April
8, 2009 and thus there is a need to clear up the cloud cast by the title of Bacena over his ancient title.

Bacena, in his defense, alleged that the folder of Petronila Castriciones (Castriciones), survey claimant of Lot No. 1331, Cad 45, La Torre,
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, is supported by the records of the CENRO, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. The title OCT No. P-21362 was
regularly issued and was based on authentic documents.5 On the other hand, the title of Gambito's predecessor-in-interest is evidently
null and void ab initio because it was derived from a Deed of Sale, dated December 16, 1994 which supposedly signed by vendor Pascual
although she was already dead, having died on August 25, 1988 or after a period of seven years. Moreover, the signatory-vendor, Covita
denied that she ever signed the Deed of Sale which is supposedly that of her husband, Mariano G. Mateo, supposedly signifying his
conformity to the sale, is likewise a fake signature of her husband because he was already dead at the time of the execution of the
document having died on June 14, 1980.6

By way of counterclaim, Bacena prayed, among others, that Gambito's Title (TCT No. T-149954) and that of his predecessor-in-interest,
Luz, TCT No. T-92232 and the Deed of Sale, basis of TCT No. T-92232 as null and void; and to declare that title of Bacena, OCT No. P-
21262, valid and effective and be cleared/quieted of any cloud thereto.7

Ruling of the MTC

After the parties' presentation of evidence, the MTC rendered a Decision8 dated March 11, 2014 in favor of Gambito. The MTC considered
the defense's position as a collateral attack on Gambito's title.9 The MTC ruled that the issue on the validity of title, whether or not
fraudulently issued, can only be raised in action expressly instituted for that purpose.

Moreover, the MTC ruled that in successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or
interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest, and here, the origin of Gambito's title
was issued in 1916 and while Bacena's title was only issued on February 25, 1999.10

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Aggrieved, Bacena appealed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, which granted the appeal
in a Decision11 rendered on November 21, 2014.

In its ruling, the RTC laid that in an action for quieting of title, it is an indispensable requisite that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal
or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action, which is however wanting at the time Gambito filed his verified
Complaint.12

The RTC also noted that Gambito's title was derived through a certificate of title which was based on a falsified Deed of Sale which was
made to appear to have been signed by the parties who were long dead at the time of its execution.13

Moreover, the RTC found that Bacena's title has become indefeasible and incontrovertible as it has been possessed by Bacena and his
predecessors-in-interest and never been occupied by Gambito and his mother.

Contrary to the MTC's ruling, the RTC held that Bacena's counterclaim partakes of a direct attack on Gambito's title.

The RTC likewise found that the title in the name of Bacena was regularly issued as he and his predecessors have been in undisturbed
possession, occupation and utilization of Lot No. 1331 as early as October 1, 1913 when it was cadastrally surveyed and even before it;
has always been declared for taxation purposes with taxes thereof duly paid yearly; and that as private property, it is not within the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to grant it to public land application.14

The RTC awarded damages in favor of Bacena.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision15 dated April 8, 2016, affirmed the RTC's Decision dated November 21, 2014. The CA agreed with
the findings and ruling of the RTC.

Undaunted, Gambito filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision of the CA which was however denied in its Resolution16
dated July 19, 2016.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

In support of the petition, Gambito assails the decision of the CA claiming that it is not in consonance with law and jurisprudence. The
underlying issues presented by Gambito for resolution are as follows, viz.:

The decision did not properly address the important issue on laches;
The decision misapplied the concept of transferee in good faith; and
The decision misappreciated the objection on the award for damages.
Ruling of the Court

The petition is denied.

The decision of the CA is in consonance with law and jurisprudence

On the issue of laches, the decision of the CA properly addressed the important issue thereon and the CA correctly held that it should be
Bacena and not the Gambito who should invoke laches.

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.17

It should be noted that the CA found that Bacena has no reason to doubt his own ownership and possession of Lot No. 1331, as
established in this case obtained through the right of Castriciones. Moreover, it was Gambito who disturbed that open, continuous,
peaceful, adverse and notorious possession of Bacena and his predecessors-in-interest. Thus, Bacena is not expected to assert his right
for having possession and title to the land in dispute and the CA is correct when it found that Bacena has no reason to doubt his own
ownership and possession of Lot No. 1331. Hence, the Court is in accord with the CA when it held that laches cannot apply and it should
be Bacena and not Gambito who should invoke laches.

Private ownership of land—as when there is prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear
showing of open continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants—is not affected by the issuance of
a free patent over the same land.18

While Gambito assails both the RTC and CA on the principle of laches on the uninterrupted existence of OCT No. R-578 of 98 years, it
should be noted that the CA found, it was certain that when the cadastral survey was conducted in 1913 to 1914, there were already two
survey claimants, one of which is Castriciones. Thus, OCT No. R-578 should not have included Lot No. 1331, as there was already a
supervening event that transpired from the time it was applied for until the title was issued. Moreover, here it established that Castriciones
is the previous occupant with open continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession as above contemplated. Hence, OCT No. R-578
issued as a free patent, by application, cannot affect Castriciones' previous occupation with open continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession.

On the issue of transferee in good faith, the decision of the CA did not misapply the concept of transferee in good faith.

While Gambito argues that the CA misapplied the concept of transferee in good faith for the reason that bad faith has died when Pascual,
inherited the property from Venancio Pascual, We disagree.

Under Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree, in all cases of registration procured by
fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the
rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. After the entry of the decree of registration on the original petition or
application, any subsequent registration procured by the presentation of a forged duplicate certificate of title, or a forged deed or other
instrument, shall be null and void.

In this case, Gambito is not an innocent holder for value for the reason that he is a donee acquiring the property gratuitously by a Deed
of Donation and not by purchase. Hence, the concept of an innocent purchaser for value cannot apply to him.

Moreover, in Ingusan v. Heirs of Aureliano I. Reyes,19 the Court happened to pass upon falsified documents involving properties, thus:

There is no doubt that the deed of donation of titled property, cancellation of affidavit of loss and agreement of subdivision with sale, being
falsified documents, were null and void. It follows that TCT Nos. NT-241155, NT-241156, NT-239747 and NT-239748 which were issued
by virtue of these spurious documents were likewise null and void.20

In this case, it is an established fact that the fraud referred to by the CA is the fraud on the transfer of the property from Pascual and
Covita to Luz on the basis of fake signatures considering that the vendor signatories therein are all dead. As such, by applicability of the
foregoing jurisprudence, the deed is considered a forged deed and hence null and void. Thus, Luz's title is null and void which transferred
nothing by Deed of Donation to her son Gambito, the petitioner herein. Hence, the CA did not misapply the concept of transferee in good
faith by considering the fraud in the transfer of the property to Luz consequently ending up with Gambito.

On the issue that the CA decision misappreciated the objection on the award for damages, Gambito's argument that he cannot be in bad
faith deserves scant consideration.

Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances
which ought to put the holder upon inquiry;21 an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even
through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render the transaction
unconscientious."22

The CA in its resolve as to the award of damages referred to the RTC's basis of the awards. As can be gleaned from the CA's Resolution
dated July 19, 2016, viz.:

The trial court discussed the basis of the awards, yet petitioner, aside from his self-serving claim that there was no bad faith, failed to
discuss the lack of sufficient basis for the grant of awards.23

In this connection, the RTC in its Decision24 dated November 21, 2014, laid down its basis in concluding the award for damages finding
absence of good faith on the part of Gambito by taking a second hard look into the facts and circumstances obtaining on the manner by
which the appellee, who was the notary public who notarized the Last Will and Testament and who as expected fully knew the rights of
the appellant over the lot in question.25 Thus, it is evident that Gambito's state of mind had no honesty of intention and had no freedom
from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put him upon inquiry. Hence, Gambito's claim that the CA decision misappreciated the
objection on the award for damages is incorrect.

In sum, the Court finds that the decision of the CA is in consonance with law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED.

COOMBS VS. CASTANEDA

FACTS:

LRC Case No. 04-035... petitioner Mercedita C. Coombs... rendered declaring the lost owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title [No.] 6715 of the Registry of Deeds of Muntinlupa City as null and void.

owner of the real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 6715 situated on Apitong Street, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa City;... ometime in March 2005, when she tried to pay the real property tax due relative to the real property covered by TCT
No. 6715, she was told that said real property was no longer listed under her name... upon further verification, she came to know that
TCT No. 6715 had already been cancelled and had been replaced by TCT No. 14115 issued in the name of herein respondent Virgilio
Veloso Santos

TCT No. 6715 was ordered cancelled by the RTC in a Decision dated August 26, 2004 in LRC Case No. 04-035, entitled "In Re:
Petition for the Issuance of Second Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6715, [by] Mercedita C. Coombs,
represented by her Atty.-in-Fact Victoria C. Castañeda";... she neither authorized Victoria C. Castañeda (Castañeda) to file petition for
issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 sometime in 2004, nor asked her to sell the subject property to herein
respondent Santos; that Santos, in turn, sold the same to herein respondents Pancho and Edith Leviste (spouses Leviste); that the
spouses Leviste executed a real estate mortgage over the subject property in favor of herein respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands
Family Savings Bank (BPI Family).

the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment.

Obviously, the ground relied upon in the present action is extrinsic fraud. However, the petitioner failed to state the facts constituting
extrinsic fraud as a ground.

RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter in LRC Case No. 04-035 because the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715
was never lost.

the Court of Appeals denied the said motion and explained that the RTC has jurisdiction over all proceedings involving title to real
property and land registration cases.

Thus, it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of LRC Case No. 04-035.

petitioner Coombs maintains that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter in LRC Case No. 04-035 because the
owner's duplicate copy of the TCT sought to be annulled was never lost and had always been in her possession.[15]

ISSUES:

whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed outright petitioner Coombs' petition for annulment of judgment.
RULING:

the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by petitioner Coombs was clearly grounded on lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the
subject matter of the case, and not extrinsic fraud.

petitioner Coombs sought to annul the RTC Decision for being rendered without jurisdiction. According to her, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of LRC Case No. 04-035—one for the reconstitution of a lost certificate of title—because the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 was never lost in the first place, which argument has been upheld by the Court in a catena of cases
that she cited to support her assertion.

the above-stated allegations made out a prima facie case of annulment of judgment to warrant the Court of Appeals' favorable
consideration.

It is doctrinal that jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by law. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 26[22]
vests the RTC with jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution of a lost or destroyed owner's duplicate of the certificate of title. However,
the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the subject matter of LRC Case No. 04-035 was within the RTC's jurisdiction, being a court
of general jurisdiction.

In a long line of cases,[23] the Court has held that the RTC has no jurisdiction when the certificate sought to be reconstituted was never
lost or destroyed but is in fact in the possession of another person. In other words, the fact of loss of the duplicate certificate is
jurisdictional.

First, when a petition for annulment of judgment is grounded on lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner need not allege that the ordinary
remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the judgment sought to be annulled are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is
because a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is fundamentally void. Thus, it may be questioned any time unless laches has already
set in.[24]

Second, petitioner Coombs in fact was able to attach to her petition documents supporting her cause of action.

Verily, our ruling in Veneracion[25] required the petitioners to: (a) allege with particularity in their petition the facts and the law relied
upon for annulment as well as those supporting their cause of action, and (b) attach to the original copy of their petition the affidavits of
their witnesses and documents supporting their cause of action.

petitioner Coombs' Petition for Annulment of Judgment was grounded on lack of jurisdiction. Based on our review of the records, she
annexed to her petition the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 and the RTC Decision - which sufficiently support the petition's
cause of action. A copy of the TCT alleged (in LRC Case No. 04-035) to have been missing supports the claim that the same was never
lost. In the same vein, a copy of the RTC Decision, in conjunction with supporting jurisprudence, supports petitioner Coombs' averment
that said decision was rendered without jurisdiction. Her allegations coupled with the appropriate supporting documents give rise to a
prima facie case that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter in LRC Case No. 04-035. As we ruled in Tan Po Chu v.
Court of Appeals,[26] if allegations of this nature turned out to be true, the RTC Decision would be void and the Court of Appeals would
have been duty-bound to strike it down

REPUBLIC VS. SUSI

FACTS:

On September 27, 2005 Susi filed before the RTC a verified Petition 6 for reconstitution of TCT No. 118999 purportedly registered in her
name, Covering Lot 257 of plan Psu-32606 located m Barrio (now Barangay) Talanay, Quezon City (QC), with an area of 240,269 square
meters (subject land). She claimed that the original copy of TCT No. 118999 was destroyed by the fire that gutted the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City (RD-QC) on June 11, 1988;8 hence, the petition based on the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999,9 docketed as
LRC Case No. Q-20493(05).

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an Order10 dated October 13, 2005: (a) setting the case for
initial hearing on February 2, 2006; (b) directing that the concerned government offices be furnished a copy thereof; and (c) directing that
the said order be published in the Official Gazette once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks and posted at least thirty (30) days prior to
the scheduled hearing at the main entrance of the Quezon City Hall, the bulletin boards of the RTC, as well as the Sheriffs Office of the
R TC of QC, and the Barangay Hall of the barangay where the subject land is situated. 11 The notice was published in the December 19
and 26, 2005 issues of the Official Gazette (Vol. 101, Nos. 51 and 52), 12 and posted as required. 13

On January 16, 2006, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) filed with the RTC a Manifestation14 dated December 5, 2005 stating that
respondent filed similar petitions for reconstitution covering the subject land before Branches 88 and 220 of the same RTC, for which it
had previously issued Reports dated March 1, 1995 15 and December 12, 199 5, 16 respectively.

On February 2, 2006, Susi presented proof of the jurisdictional

requirements without any opposition. 17 The City Government of QC (QC Government) thereafter filed an Opposition18 dated February
3, 2006 on the ground of res judicata. 19However, the latter was subsequently declared to be without any locus standi to oppose the
reconstitution petition.20
After Susi was allowed to formally offer her evidence,21 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance in the case, and
manifested that it had deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor of QC to appear on its behalf, subject to its supervision and control.22

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision23 dated January 12, 2011 (January 12, 2011 Decision), the RTC granted Susi's petition, and directed the RD-QC to
reconstitute the lost/destroyed original copy of TCT No. 118999.24

The RTC ruled that the presentation of the owner's copy of TCT No. 11899925 and the Certification26 from the RD-QC that the original
of TCT No. 118999 was burned during the fire that razed the QC Hall on June 11, 1988 were sufficient to warrant the reconstitution
sought. It held that the subject petition was not barred by the dismissal by Branch 220 of the same RTC of a similar petition anchored on
her failure to: (a) comply with the technical requirements of the law, specifically, her omission to allege matters required under Sections
11 and 12 of Republic Act No. (RA) 26;27 and (b) convince the court that TCT No. 118999 sought to be reconstituted was valid and
existing at the time it was destroyed, holding that both objections have been sufficiently overcome in the present case.28

Dissatisfied, the QC Government filed a motion for reconsideration,29 while the Republic, through the OSG, filed its Notice of Appeal,30
which were both denied in an Order31 dated July 8, 2011. The QC Government's subsequent Notice of Appeal32 was also denied in an
Order33 dated September 15, 2011, on the grounds that (a) it has no authority to appear or to bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic; and (b) the appeal was belatedly filed, hence, not perfected.1âwphi1 The RTC likewise declared the January 12, 2011 Decision
as having attained finality.

On October 25, 2011, the Republic, through the OSG, filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment,34 insisting that the January 12, 2011 Decision
should be set aside and vacated on the ground of res judicata.35On March 8, 2012, Sunnyside Heights Homeowner's Association, Inc.
moved36to join the OSG's motion, claiming to be registered owners and occupants of various portions of the subject land.

Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011, the LRA filed a Manifestation37 (a) expressing its unwillingness to comply with the directive contained in
the January 12, 2011 Decision; and (b) praying that the RTC set aside the same and dismiss Susi's petition on the ground that her owner's
duplicate of TCT No. 118999 is of doubtful authenticity.38 Consequently, the LRA maintained that there was a need to comply with the
mandatory and jurisdictional requirements under Sections 3 (f), 12, and 13 of RA 26, without which the RTC did not have jurisdiction over
the subject petition.39

In an Order40 dated July 5, 2012 (July 5, 2012 Order), the RTC denied the Motion to Vacate Judgment, considering that the January 12,
2011 Decision had become final and executory after the Republic's appeal had been denied due course. Thereafter, the corresponding
Writ of Execution41 was issued on July 20, 2012.

Unperturbed, the Republic filed a Petition for certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction42
before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 127144.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision43 dated February 13, 2014, the CA found no reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
in granting the petition for reconstitution, considering that Susi was able to sufficiently establish that the certificate of title sought to be
reconstituted was valid and existing under her name at the time it was destroyed. 44

The CA found the principle of res judicata to be inapplicable to this case since the dismissal of the prior similar petition was based on
Susi's failure to comply with the technical requirements of the law. Hence, the latter was not precluded from filing another petition to prove
the necessary allegations for the reconstitution of the subject title, which the RTC correctly found to have been fully established. 45

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration,46 attaching therewith a copy of a Resolution 47 issued by the LRA en consulta, stating,
among others, that: (a) the subject land is also covered by subsisting titles and occupied by a number of persons;48 and (b) Susi has two
(2) uncertified reproduced owner's duplicate copies of TCT No. 118999, but bearing different serial numbers49 - i.e., a copy bearing serial
number 177563450 which was earlier presented before Branch 220, and another one with serial number 112195551 adduced in evidence
a quo.

In a Resolution52 dated June 25, 2014, the CA denied the said motion; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion
in: (a) issuing the Order dated July 5, 2012 denying the Republic's Motion to Vacate Judgment in LRC Case No. Q-20493(05); and (b)
upholding the January 12, 2011 Decision granting Susi's petition for reconstitution.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

A. The Republic is not estopped from assailing the propriety of the order of reconstitution.
At the outset, it is well to emphasize that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, absent
any showing that it had dealt capriciously or dishonorably with its citizens. 53 Thus, whether or not the OSG's motion to vacate was the
proper remedy under the Rules of Court (Rules) does not bar the Republic from assailing the propriety of the reconstitution ordered by
the RTC which it claimed to have acted without jurisdiction in hearing and, thereafter, resolving the case. Moreover, it bears to emphasize
that even assuming that no opposition was filed by the Republic or a private party, the person seeking reconstitution is not relieved of his
burden of proving not only the loss or destruction of the title sought to be reconstituted, but that also at that time, she was the registered
owner thereof. As such, the Republic is not estopped from assailing the decision granting the petition if, on the basis of the law and the
evidence on record, such petition has no merit. 54

B. Procedures and requirements for reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title; effect of non-compliance.

The judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title under RA 26 means the restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed
Torrens certificate attesting the title of a person to registered land. The purpose of the reconstitution is to enable, after observing the
procedures prescribed by law, the reproduction of the lost or destroyed Torrens certificate in the same form and in exactly the same way
it was at the time of the loss or destruction. 55

RA 26 provides two procedures and sets of requirements in the reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title depending on the
source of the petition for reconstitution. 56 Section 10 in relation to Section 9 provides the procedure and requirements for sources falling
under Sections 2 (a), 2 (b), 3 (a), 3 (b), and 4 (a). On the other hand, Sections 12 and 13 lay down the procedure and requirements for
sources falling under Sections 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f), 3 (c), 3 (d), 3 (e), and 3 (f).57 Thus, before the court can properly act, assume, and
acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for, petitioner must observe the above procedures
and requirements prescribed by the law. 58

In numerous cases, the Court has held that the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure and requirements deprives the trial court
of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case and, consequently, all its proceedings are rendered null and void. The rationale
underlying this rule concerns the nature of the conferment in the trial court of the authority to undertake reconstitution proceedings. In all
cases where the authority to proceed is conferred by a statute and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, the same must be
strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void. 59 As such, the court upon which the reconstitution petition is filed is duty-
bound to examine thoroughly the same, and review the record and the legal provisions laying down the germane jurisdictional
requirements. 60

C. The petition for reconstitution failed to comply with the applicable procedures and requirements for reconstitution.

The present reconstitution petition was anchored on a purported owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999 (questioned certificate) which
is a source for reconstitution of title under Section 3 (a)61 of RA 26, prompting Branch 77 to follow the procedure outlined in Sections 962
and 1063 of the said law.

However, records show that as early as January 16, 2006, the LRA, in a Manifestation64 dated December 5, 2005, had already called
the court's attention to its Report65 dated March 1, 1995 in the previous reconstitution petition before Branch 88, expressing serious
doubts on the authenticity of Susi's duplicate title, and informing it of the existence of other titles over the subject land.66

It is well to point out that trial courts hearing reconstitution petitions under RA 26 are duty-bound to take into account the LRA's report.67
Notably, both the RTC and the CA overlooked the fact that while the petition for reconstitution before Branch 77 was filed on the basis of
Susi's purported owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999 bearing Serial No. 1121955, Susi's prior reconstitution petitions, as stated in
the LRA's Report, were anchored on an owner's duplicate certificate bearing a different serial number, i.e., Serial No. 1775634. Indeed,
a perusal of the said certificates68 of title, which were attached to the Republic's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision dated
February 13, 2014, reveals that save for the serial number, all the entries therein are the same. The Court notes that Susi did not refute
the existence of the said certificates bearing different serial numbers in her comment69 to the said motion.

In cases where the LRA challenges the authenticity of the applicant's purported owner's duplicate certificate of title, the reconstitution
petition should be treated as falling under Section 3 (f)70 of RA 26, and the trial court should require compliance with the requisites under
Sections 1271 and 1372 of RA 26.73

In particular, the reconstitution petition and the published and posted notice of hearing in compliance with the October 13, 2005 Order
failed to show that notices were sent to the other occupants, possessors, and persons who may have an interest in, or who have buildings
or improvements on the land covered by the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted, as well as the owners of adjoining properties.
74

Jurisprudence is replete with cases underscoring the indispensability of actual and personal notice of the date of hearing of the
reconstitution petition to actual owners and possessors of the land involved in order to vest the trial court with jurisdiction thereon.75 If no
notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is
deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void. 76

Thus, in light of the LRA's report of the subsistence of other certificates of title over the subject land, it behooved the RTC to notify the
registered land owners of the reconstitution proceedings, in observance of diligence and prudence; 77 however, it failed to act accordingly.
But more than this, courts have the inherent power to correct fatal infirmities in its proceedings in order to maintain the integrity thereof.
78
In view of the failure to comply with the requirements of Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26, particularly, on the service of notices of hearing on
the registered owners and/or actual possessors of the land subject of the reconstitution case, the RTC, did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case, and all proceedings held thereon are null and void. That being said, the Court finds it unnecessary to delve on the other matters
raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

HEIRS OF NAYA VS. NAYA

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a complaint for quieting of title, reconveyance of ownership, damages, and attorney's fees against respondents involving
a parcel of land in Cebu City. Petitioners claim that they, together with respondent Orlando P. Naya, are the legitimate and compulsory
heirs of the late Spouses Andres and Gregoria Naya. Andres’ heirs executed an extra judicial adjudication and settlement of estate where
his surviving spouse, Gregoria, held all his properties in trust in favor of the other heirs and on the condition that she will assume all debts
and pay all the obligations of the estate. Gregoria failed to fulfill this condition. Despite such failure, Orlando allegedly sold the property,
under the name of his parents, to one Alfonso Uy .
Alfonso, after the property was in titled in his name then sold it to Orlando, who registered it in his name. Orlando sold the property to
respondent Honesimo C. Ruiz. The title, however, was transferred to Honesimo's name only in 2007. Petitioners alleged that they only
learned of Orlando's anomalous transactions in September 1974, prompting them to cause the annotation of an adverse claim to Orlando's
title. They stressed that Honesimo is not a buyer in good faith because he acquired the property after the notice of adverse claim had
already been annotated on Orlando's title.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and laches for only instituting the action after 45 years. The RTC
ruled that the assailed transactions were conducted through the deceit and fraudulent scheme of Orlando, yet, petitioners did not give
details of the same. The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the findings of the RTC that the complaint does not state a cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the petitioners have a cause of action.

RULING:

We grant the petition.

The action of petitioners is, aside from Quieting of Title, one for reconveyance on the ground that petitioners are its rightful owners by
succession and that the land was wrongfully registered in the names of Spouses Ruiz.

In Mendizabel v. Apao, where the case was one for annulment of titles, reconveyance and damages, we were also confronted with an
argument that the complaint must be dismissed because the circumstances constituting the allegations of fraud or mistake were not
stated with particularity. We ruled against this argument, holding that in an action for reconveyance, all that must be alleged in the
complaint are two facts which, admitting them to be true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) that
the plaintiff was the owner of the land or possessed the land in the concept of owner, and (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed
him of the land. The allegations in petitioners' complaint certainly measure up to the requisite statement of facts to constitute an action
for reconveyance based on an implied trust.

Under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it
as a mere trustee, and the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property On its face, therefore, the complaint
states a cause of action and raises issues of fact that can be properly settled only after a full-blown trial.

DELFIN VS. BACUD

FACTS:

On September 9, 1999, petitioners Delfin Tappa (Delfin)5 and Maria Tappa (Spouses Tappa) filed a complaint6 for Quieting of Title,
Recovery of Possession and Damages (Complaint) against respondents Jose Bacud (Bacud),7 Henry Calabazaron (Calabazaron), and
Vicente Malupeng (Malupeng).8 The property subject of the complaint is a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3341, Pls-793 with an area
of 21,879 square meters, located in Kongcong, Cabbo, Pefiablanca, Cagayan (Lot No. 3341).9

In their complaint, Spouses Tappa alleged that they are the registered owners of Lot No. 3341, having been issued an Original Certificate
of Title No. P-69103 (OCT No. P-69103) on September 18, 1992, by virtue of Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194. 10 Delfin allegedly
inherited Lot No. 3341 from his father, Lorenzo Tappa (Lorenzo). Spouses Tappa claimed that both Delfin and Lorenzo were in open,
continuous, notorious, exclusive possession of the lot since time immemorial. 11

In their Answer, 12 respondents Bacud, Calabazaron and Malupeng claimed that the original owner of Lot No. 3341 was Genaro Tappa
(Genaro) who had two children, Lorenzo and Irene. Upon Genaro's death, the property passed on to Lorenzo and Irene by operation of
law; and they became ipso facto co-owners of the property. As co-owners, Lorenzo and Irene each owned 10,939 square meters of the
lot as their respective shares. Lorenzo had children namely, Delfin, Primitiva, and Fermina. Upon the death of Irene, her share in tum
passed to her heirs, Demetria, Juanita, Pantaleon and Jose Bacud. 13
Respondents presented before the RTC a joint affidavit dated April 29, 1963 (1963 Affidavit) signed by Delfin, his sisters, Primitiva and
Fermina, and their mother, Modesta Angoluan. 14 The 1963 affidavit stated that Genaro originally owned Lot No. 3341. It further stated
that one-half (Yz) of the property was owned by Lorenzo; but that the whole property was declared as his, only for taxation purposes.

Calabazaron claimed that he became the owner of 2,520 square meters of Lot No. 3341 by virtue of two Deeds of Sale executed in his
favor, one dated October 12, 1970 executed by Demetria, and another dated August 22, 1971 executed by Juanita. 15 After the sale,
Calabazaron entered into possession of his portion and paid the real property taxes. 16 He remains in possession up to this date. 17

Malupeng, on the other hand, claimed that he became the owner of 210 square meters of Lot No. 3341 by virtue of a Deed of Sale
executed on November 30, 1970 by Pantaleon in his favor. 18 After the sale, Malupeng entered into possession of his porcion of propeny
and paid the real property taxes. 19 He remains in possession up to this date. 20

Bacud claimed ownership over 1,690 square meters of Lot No. 3341 in his own right as heir of Irene.21

Respondents started occupying their respective portions after the sale made to each of them. They continued to occupy them despite
several demands to vacate from Spouses Tappa.22

Spouses Tappa claimed that the 1963 Affidavit was executed through force and intimidation.23 Bacud and Malupeng denied this
allegation.24

The Ruling of the RTC

The RTC issued its Decision,25 the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and the Court hereby orders:

1. Plaintiffs to be the owners of Lot 3341, Pls 793 and unqualifiedly vests in them the full and untrammeled rights of ownership:

2. All the defendants must, if still in possession of portions of the lot in issue, convey the same to the plaintiffs;

3. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

The R TC ruled that the basic requirement of the law on quieting of title under Article 447 of the Civil Code was met, thus:

Delfin and Maria's title is clear and unequivocal, and its validity has never been assailed by the defendants – nor has any evidence been
adduced that successfully overcomes the presumption of validity and legality that the title of Delfin and Maria enjoys.27 (Emphasis in the
original.)

The RTC ruled that there was no document in the hands of respondents as strong and persuasive as the title in the name of the Spouses
Tappa that will support respondents' claim of ownership and Irene's antecedent ownership.28 The RTC stated that the 1963 Affidavit
contains nothing more than the allegations of the affiants and does not, by itself, constitute proof of ownership of land, especially as
against documents such as titles.29

Respondents appealed to the CA, raising the following arguments:

First, respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa fraudulently applied for, and were issued a free patent over Lot No. 3341, and eventually
OCT No. P-69103 dated September 18, 1992.30 They alleged that Spouses Tappa committed fraud because they were not in possession
of the lot since 1963, which possession was required for an applicant for a free patent under the law. 31

Second, respondents argued that the complaint should be dismissed because both extinctive and acquisitive prescription have already
set in.32 Respondents claimed that both ordinary acquisitive prescription of 10 years, and extraordinary acquisitive prescription of 30
years in claiming ownership of immovable property apply in the case.33 They argued that more than 30 years have already lapsed from
the time they entered possession of the subject lot in 1963 up to the filing of the complaint on September 9, 1999.34 They also pointed
out that Spouses Tappa admitted in their complaint that respondents were in possession of the lot since 1963. 35

Particularly, Calabazaron argued that the 10-year prescriptive period under Article 1134 of the Civil Code applies to him by virtue of the
two duly executed Deeds of Sale in his favor. 36 It was never alleged that he had any participation in the alleged duress, force and
intimidation in the execution of the 1963 Affidavit.37 Hence, he is a purchaser in good faith and for value. Calabazaron entered possession
of the lot after the sale to him in 1970, thus, the prescriptive period of l0 years had long lapsed. 38

Bacud and Malupeng claimed that, even assuming that the execution of the 1963 Affidavit was attended with force and intimidation, the
complaint against them should have been dismissed because the extraordinary acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years under Article
1137 of the Civil Code applies to them.39 They also argued that the action for quieting of title had already prescribed since the possession
of Bacud and Malupeng started in 1963, which fact was allegedly admitted by Spouses Tappa in their complaint.40 Thus, Spouses Tappa
had only until 1993 to file a complaint, which they failed to do.
All respondents claimed that from the start of their possession, they (1) have paid real taxes on the lot, (2) have planted crops, and (3)
have continued to possess the lot in the concept of owners. 41

Third, respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa failed to prove their right over the subject lot because they cannot rely on the certificate
of title issued to them on September 18, 1992 by virtue of a free patent.42 They asserted that Spouses Tappa fraudulently obtained the
free patent on Lot No. 3341 by concealing material facts; specifically the fact of not being in possession of the lot since 1963. 43

The Ruling of the CA

The CA set aside the decision of the RTC.44 The relevant dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision dated July 6, 2007 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint.

SO ORDERED.45

On the issue of prescription, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and explained that their possession over Lot No. 3341 already ripened
into ownership through acquisitive prescription.46 The CA noted that Spouses Tappa acknowledged in their complaint that they have not
been in possession of the lot, and that respondents have been continuously occupying portions of it since 1963. 47 It explained:

The substantial length of time between 1963, up to the time of filing of the present complaint on September 9, 1999, which is more than
30 years, should be considered against [S]pouses Tappa, and in favor of defendants-appellants. Settled is the rule that an uninterrupted
adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years could ripen into ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription, which is a
mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. Hence, appellants' possession of the land has ripened into
ownership by virtue of acquisitive prescription.48 (Citation omitted.)

On the merits of the case, the CA ruled that the two indispensable requisites for an action to quiet title under Articles 476 and 477 of the
Civil Code were not met. 49

The first requisite is absent because Spouses Tappa do not have a legal or an equitable title to or an interest in the property. The CA
explained that the free patent granted to Spouses Tappa produced no legal effect because Lot No. 3341 was a private land, thus:

As heretofore discussed, the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by appellants of the subject parcel of land within the
period prescribed by law has effectively converted it into a private land. Consequently, the registration in the name of Maria Tappa on
September 18, 1992 under OCT [No.] P-69103, by vi1iue of Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194, produces no legal effect. Private ownership
of land-as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants-is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over
the same land, becam,e the Public Land [L]aw applies only to lands of the public domain.50 (Citation omitted.)

The CA further stated that while Spouses Tappa were able to obtain a free patent over the property, and were able to register it under
the Torrens system, they have not become its owners. The CA said that "[r]egistration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership
over immovable prope1ty---it does not create title nor vest one but it simply confirms a title already vested, rendering it forever
indefeasible."51

The second requisite that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be shown to be in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity is likewise unavailing. The CA ruled that no other evidence (aside
from Delfin's own testimony) was presented to prove the allegation of fraud and intimidation, making the testimony self-serving.52 The
CA further noted that Delfin's own sister, Fermina, one of the signatories of the 1963 Affidavit, belied his testimony. Fermina testified that
they went to the house of one Atty. Carag to sign the affidavit and they did so, on their own. 53

Spouses Tappa filed a Motion for Reconsideration,54 which the CA denied.55

Hence, spouses Tappa filed a petition for review on certiorari before this court, raising the following issues:

I. Whether the CA erred in dismissing Spouses Tappa's complaint for quieting of title against respondents;56

II. Whether the CA erred in not finding that Spouses Tappa's certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked in this case;57 and

III. Whether the CA erred in finding that respondents have acquired the property through acquisitive prescription. 58

The Ruling of the Court

We affirm the decision of the CA.

The action for quieting of title

should not prosper.

The action filed by Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title and recovery of possession. In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 59 an
action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity, to wit:
x x x Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure"... an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse
to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger
of hostile claim." In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and
other claimants, "... not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not
disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated,
and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems
best. x x x. "60 (Emphasis in the original.)

In our jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Article 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, which state:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.

Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need
not be in possession of said property.

From the foregoing provisions, we reiterate the rule that for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the
deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.61

Spouses Tappa failed to meet these two requisites.

First, Spouses Tappa's claim of iegal title over Lot No. 3341 by virtue of the free patent and the certificate of title, OCT No. P-69103
issued in their name cannot stand. The certificate of title indjcates that it was issued by virtue of Patent No. 021519-92-3194. We agree
with the CA that at the time of the application for free patent, Lot No. 3341 had already become private land by virtue of the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341 had been removed from the coverage of the Public
Land Act,62 which governs public patent applications.

The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no legal effects. whatsoever.1awp++i1
Private ownership of land-as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear
showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants-is not affected by the issuance of a
free patent over the same land, because the Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no
authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in character and have passed to private ownership.63

In Magistrado v. Esplana, 64 we cancelled the titles issued pursuant to a free patent after finding that the lots involved were privately
owned since time immemorial. A free patent that purports to convey land to which the Government did not have any title at the time of its
issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner. 65

In this case, the parties were able to show that Lot No. 3341 was occupied by, and has been in possession of the Tappa family, even
before the 1963 Affidavit was executed. After the execution of the 1963 Affidavit, respondents occupied their respective portions of the
property. Delfin testified that before his father, Lorenzo, died in 1961, Lorenzo had been occupying the lot since before the war, and that
Delfin was born there in 1934.66

Records show that Lorenzo declared Lot No. 3341 for taxation purposes as early as 1948, and paid the real property taxes (evidenced
by real property tax payment receipts in the name of Lorenzo from 1952 until his death in 1961).67 Spouses Tappa were likewise shown
to pay the real property taxes from 1961 to 2000.68 Similarly, respondents also declared their respective portions of Lot No. 3341 for
taxation in their names in 1994, and paid real property taxes on those portions from 1967 to 2004.69 Although tax declarations or realty
tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. 70

Spouses Tappa also admitted in their complaint that sometime in 1963, Bacud and Malupeng started occupying portions of Lot No. 3341
and planted crops on the property, while Calabazaron did the same on another portion of the lot in the 1970's.71 The complaint stated
further that since 1963. the respondents "continuously occupied portion of the subject land." 72

In view of the foregoing circumstances that show open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 3341,
the property had been segregated from the public domain. 73 At the time the patent and the certificate of title were issued in 1992,
Spouses Tappa and their predecessors-in-interest were already in possession, at least to the half of the lot, since 1934; and respondents
were also in possession of the other half since 1963. Therefore, the free patent issued covers a land already segregated from the public
domain.

In Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago,74 we ruled, thus:

Considering the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land by respondents and their predecessors
in interests, they are deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued. The land was thus segregated from the public domain and the director of lands had no authority to issue a patent.
Hence, the free patent covering Lot 2344, a private land, and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto, are void.75

Records also show that Spouses Tappa were aware of respondents' possession of the disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. They even
admitted such possession (since 1963) by respondents in their complaint filed in 1999. Despite this, Spouses Tappa were able to obtain
a free patent of the whole property even if they were not in possession of some of its portions. Therefore, Free Patent No. 021519-92-
3194 and OCT No. P-69103 are void not only because it covers a private land, but also because they fraudulently included76 respondents'
portion of the property. In Avila v. Tapucar, 77 we held that "[i]f a person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by
mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become
the owner of the lands illegally included."78

In an action to quiet title, legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership. 79 As discussed, the
free patent and the certificate of title issued to Spouses Tappa could not be the source of their legal title.

The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise wanting. We find that although an instrument (the 1963 Affidavit) exists, and
which allegedly casts cloud on Spouses Tappa's title, it was not shown to be in fact invalid or ineffective against Spouses Tappa's rights
to the property.

A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is
apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished (or terminated)
or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title.80

The 1963 Affidavit it is no doubt an instrument, which appears to be valid. It is dated and appears to be executed and signed by Delfin,
his mother, and sisters. It is also notarized by a public notary. It states that Genaro originally owns the land described, and that one-half
(l/2) of which is actually owned by Irene as a co-heir. This is contrary to the claim of

Spouses Tappa that the property was solely Lorenzo's. Respondents' argue that this affidavit evidences the title of their predecessor-in-
interest over Lot No. 3341 and effectively, theirs.81

The 1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated)
or barred by extinctive prescription. The CA correctly found that Spouses Tappa's claim of force and intimidation in the execution of the
1963 Affidavit was "unsubstantiated."82 The CA pointed out that, "[a]side from the testimony of Delfin Tappa, no other evidence was
presented to prove the claim of force and intimidation, hence, it is at most, self-serving."53 Also, the 1963 Affidavit was duly notarized
and, as such, is considered a public document, and enjoys the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due execution.

Thus, we affirm the ruling of the CA that the requisites for an action to quiet title are wanting in this case.84

There is no collateral attack

on the Certificate of Title.

Spouses Tappa argue that respondents collaterally attacked the certificate of title of Lot No. 3441 when they raised the issue of its validity.
Spouses Tappa used the same argument against the CA when it declared the certificate of title to be without legal effect. 85

Spouses Tappa's argument is without merit. The certificate of title was not collaterally attacked. Section 48 of PD 1529,86 provides that
"[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law." This rule is not applicable in this case.

We reiterate our ruling in Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals,87 where we stated that, "[ w ]hat cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds x x x. By title, the law refers
to ownership which is represented by that document."88 Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter being only the best
proof of ownership of a piece of land. 89 Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence
of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.90

In Vda. de Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla, 91 citing Lacbayan v. Samay, Jr., 92 we reaffirm this ruling, and stated that:

Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-
ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired
interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle
of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership.93

In this case, what respondents dispute, as raised in their Answer, is Spouses Tappa's claim of sole ownership over Lot No. 3341. As
affirmative defense, respondents claimed that Spouses Tappa were owners of only one-half (1/2) of the lot since it was originally owned
by Genaro, the father of Lorenzo and Irene. 94 Respondents claim that Lorenzo and Irene became ipso facto co-owners of the lot. 95
Thus, respondents claim that, by virtue of a valid transfer from Irene's heirs, they now have ownership and title over portions of Lot No.
3341, and that they have been in continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of their occupied portions.96 Malupeng and
Calabazaron claim ownership and title over their respective portions by virtue of a valid sale. Bacud claims ownership and title by virtue
of succession. Therefore, it is the ownership and title of Spouses Tappa which respondents ultimately attack. OCT No. P-69103 only
serves as the document representing Spouses Tappas' title.

Respondents cannot likewise argue that the certificate of title of Spouses Tappa is indefeasible.97 We have already ruled that the one-
year prescriptive period does not apply when the person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the property.98
This is because the action partakes of a suit to quiet title, which is imprescriptible.99 In this case, respondents have been proved to be in
possession of the disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. Thus, their claim against Spouses Tappa cannot be barred by the one-year
prescriptive period.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.

SYJUCO VS. BONIFACIO

FACTS:

Petitioners Imelda, Leonardo, Fidelino, Azucena, Anita, and Syjuco discovered that the land in question, covered by their TCT No.T-
108530, was being sold by Respondent Bonifacio who claimed ownership over the latter through her own TCT No. 285313. Petitioners
therefore filed a petition praying for the declaration of nullity and cancellation of Respondent’s TCT as it was issued fraudulently and in
spite of the fact that they have been in continuous and open possession of the disputed land since 1926. Respondent in turn raised as a
defense that her title was valid as she had acquired it pursuant to a court order by another branch of the same RTC. The latter held in
favor of Respondent hence Petitioner appealed. On appeal, the CA affirmed on the ground that the petition was a collateral attack on
Respondent’s valid title in violation of Sec. 48 PD No. 1529. Being denied on appeal, petitioners appealed before the Court hence this
case. Petitioners maintain that the CA erred in its ruling as their undisturbed possession of the subject property gave them a continuing
right to seek the aid of the court. ISSUE:

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioners are prohibited by Sec. 48 of PD 1529 from attacking Respondent’s title.

RULING:

NO! Petitioners’ action is not a prohibited collateral attack on the TCT of Respondent over the disputed land as contemplated by Sec. 48
of PD 1529.

The Court held that an attack is direct when the object of an action is to annul a judgment or enjoin its enforcement. It is indirect when, in
an action obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Petitioners’ complaint for quieting
of title, they specifically prayed for the declaration of nullity of Respondent’s TCT No. 265778 over the subject land. The relief sought by
the action is feasible given that the objective of an action to quiet title was to remove, invalidate, and annul a cloud on title to real property
or any interest therein by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but
is in truth and in fact invalid.

Under land ownership disputes, it is well established that the filing of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the disputed real property
was in the possession of the plaintiff. One in actual possession, in the concept of an owner, may wait until his possession or title is
disturbed or attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. This is so because his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right
to seek the court’s aid.

MAYUGA VS. ATIENZA

FACTS:

On May 4, 2000, Araceli Mayuga, as plaintiff, instituted a petition for Cancellation and Recall of Free Patent Application and Reconveyance
against Antonio Atienza, representing the heirs of Armando Atienza, Benjamin Atienza, Jr., representing the heirs of Benjamin Atienza,
Sr., Community Environment and Natural Resource Officer and Register of Deeds of Romblon, as defendants in the RTC-Romblon.

In her Petition, Araceli, alleged, that [she, Benjamin A. Atienza, Sr. and Armando A. Atienza are the surviving legitimate, legal and forced
heirs of the late Perfecto Atienza who died intestate on June 1, 1978[7], and:

3.) That the said deceased Perfecto Atienza left estates located in Romblon

4.) That through manipulation and misrepresentation with intent to defraud a co-heir, respondent Antonio L. Atienza[, son of deceased
Armando Atienza,[8]] was able to secure Free [P]atent (NRDN-21) 11636 while respondent Benjamin A. Atienza was able to secure Free
Patent (NRDN- 21) 11637, both patents dated February 28, 1992.

5.) That Petitioner was not notified of the application filed with public respondent Community Environment & Natural Resource Officer nor
any notice of hearings of proceedings as required by law, being a co-heir and party- in-interest.

On August 18, 2000, the RTC issued an Order admitting the Reply to Bill of Particulars.
In their Answer, defendants denied the material allegations of the complaint, and by way of affirmative defenses, averred that, the petition
is moot and academic; the Free Patent Titles have become indefeasible after the lapse of one year from its issuance in 1992; fraud as a
ground for review of title under Section 38 of Act 496 is not applicable to a case where a certificate of title was issued in pursuance of a
patent application;

Defendant Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO, for short) also filed an Answer, alleging that, Free Patent
No. 045909-92-141P was issued by then Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO), Dionico F. Gabay on February
28, 1992 by virtue of the Free Patent Application No. (NRD-IV-21)-11636 filed by Antonio L. Atienza at the CENRO Office in Odiongan,
Romblon covering Lot No. 9819, Cad. 341-D, Odiongan Cadastre which is identical to Lot 61-A, Csd-04-008722-D; while Free Patent
Application No. (NRD-IV-21)11637 filed by Benjamin A. Atienza with the CENRO Office covering Lot 9820, Cad. 341-D, Odiongan
Cadastre which is identical to Lot 61-B, Csd-04-008722-D; it has no participation whatsoever in the processing and issuance of free
patents and/or titles in the names of Antonio L. Atienza and Benjamin A. Atienza. It also prayed that it be excluded as a defendant in the
case.

Defendants moved to dismiss the original petition for failure of the plaintiff’s counsels to state their IBP No. and P.T.R. No. and the
amended complaint for failure to attach a verification and certification against forum-shopping but on September 13, 2001, he RTC issued
an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

On April 27, 2010, the RTC ruled in favor of Plaintiff Araceli. It ruled that the application by the defendants for a Free Patent with the
CENRO is tainted with fraud because said application was processed without the plaintiff’s knowledge nor a notice of hearing of any
proceeding was sent to her. In fact, the defendants took advantage while the latter was in the United States. Moreover, the titling of the
fraudulently registered real property will not bar the action for reconveyance.

Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in the Order dated July 29, 2010.

Aggrieved, defendants interposed an appeal [before the Court of Appeals] assailing the decision of the RTC.[9]

The CA granted the appeal. It reversed and set aside the RTC Decision dated April 27, 2010, and dismissed the Amended Complaint for
Recall and Cancellation of Free Patent Application (FPA) No. 11636 and FPA No. 11637 and Action for Reconveyance.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC Decision and dismissing the amended complaint of the petitioner for cancellation of free
patent and reconveyance?

2.) W/o there is fraud according to the petitoner?

RULING:

NO!. An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action for reversion. The
difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an
action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land.

On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiffs
ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant's fraud or mistake;
as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the
nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow
and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio. The real party in interest is x x x the plaintiff who
alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant.

With respect to the purported cause of action for reconveyance, it is settled that in this kind of action the free patent and the certificate of
title are respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant's name. All that must be alleged in the complaint are two (2) facts which admitting
them to be true would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land and,
(2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the same.

Given the foregoing differences, an action for reconveyance and an action for declaration of nullity of the free patent cannot be pursued
simultaneously. The former recognizes the certificate of title issued pursuant to the free patent as indefeasible while the latter does not.
They may, however, be pursued alternatively pursuant to Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court on alternative causes of action or
defenses.

The action for declaration of nullity of the free patents issued in favor of the respondents must fail, as the CA correctly ruled.

2.) Regarding the petitioner's allegation of fraud, the CA correctly dismissed the same. The bottom line here is that, fraud and
misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence, with mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact which must be proved.
In this case, the allegations of fraud were never proven. There was no evidence at all specifically showing actual fraud or
misrepresentation (Lopez v CA).
 REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF CABRERA

FACTS:

Sometime in 1971, Meynardo filed an Application for Free Patent concerning an 8,0726 square-meter parcel of land situated in Pining,
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro.7 In said application, Meynardo alleged that he had been in possession of such parcel of land since 1936,
through his predecessor-in-interest Marcelo Cabrera.8

In the same year, the Bureau of Lands (BOL) issued Free Patent No. 516197 in favor of Meynardo, covering two (2) lots denominated
as: (i) Lot 1 with an area of 3,591 square meters, and (ii) Lot 2, with an area of 4,481 square meters.9 On the basis of said patent, the
ROD issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RP-132 (P-9193) covering both lots in Meynardo's name.10

Thereafter, a 2,445-square-meter portion of Lot 1 (Lot 1-A11 ) was transferred to Consolacion.12 Thus, on April 6, 1982, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16580 covering Lot 1-A was issued in Consolacion's name.13 Later still, Consolacion sold portions of Lot 1-
A to several purchasers namely: Dy, Agbayani, Soriano, Calma, and Liwanag.14

Learning of the issuance of TCT No. 16580, Jose and Leticia De Castro (De Castros), claiming to be the actual possessors of Lot 1-A,
filed before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) a petition urging DENR to conduct an investigation to
determine Lot 1-A's land classification status.15

Consequently, in the DENR Final Investigation Report16 (DENR Final Report) dated November 9, 1994 issued by Erwin D. Talento of
the DENR Land Management Office (LMO), Free Patent No. 516197, covering Lots 1, 1-A, and 2 (collectively, Roxas Properties), was
declared null and void for having been issued over land forming part of the public domain. The pertinent portions of the DENR Final
Report read:

Sensing that they don't have any chance in the court to prove their better right to occupy and possess [Lot 1-A] x xx the [De Castros]
addressed their petitions to the DENR basing their claim on the weight of a certification of [the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority (NAMRIA)] x x x. The [De Castros] are now seeking administrative remedies for the issue which they have already brought to
the attention of the court and wherein they have failed to prove their priority right to occupy and possess [Lot 1-A]. Granting that [the
Roxas Properties constitute] forest land and [Free Patent No. 516197] issued in favor of [Meynardo] be (sic) rendered null and void [ab]
initio, it (sic) doesn't warrant that they have better right to possess and occupy [Lot 1-A] because [Meynardo, through his predecessors-
in-interest] have entered [Lot 1-A] since the year 1943 and have exercised their ownership over the same x x x.

In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the petition of [the De Castros] be dismissed x x x and appropriate legal
action be instituted for the cancellation of Free Patent No. 516197 issued in favor of Meynardo x x x for the same covers land of the public
domain which is certified by the proper authority as public forest.17 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thereafter, Antonio G. Principe, the DENR Regional Executive Director of Region IV, issued an Order18 dated August 8, 1997 declaring
Free Patent No. 516197 null and void.

Later, on November 15, 1999, the Republic filed against the Respondents a complaint (Complaint) for the annulment and/or cancellation
of Free Patent No. 516197, OCT No. RP-132 (P-9193), and TCT No. 16580. The Complaint also prayed for the reversion of the Roxas
Properties in the State's favor.19

The Republic based its claim on the (i) DENR Final Report; and (ii) NAMRIA certifications dated January 31, 1994, February 1, 1994, and
October 3, 1994, all stating that the Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A) had been reclassified as forest land as early as November 24,
1949. The statements in these documents were, in turn, based on the inscriptions appearing on Land Classification Map No. 209 (LC
Map 209) dated March 6, 1924 covering the Roxas Properties. The Republic reasoned that while LC Map 209 indicates that the parcels
of land thereunder were classified as alienable and disposable at the time it was prepared, a subsequent annotation made thereon
indicates that they were reclassified as forest land sometime thereafter, and had thus become inalienable.20

In their respective answers, the Respondents averred, among others, that: (i) Lot 1-A forms part of the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, as evidenced by the original statements appearing on LC Map 209; (ii) the annotations appearing on LC Map 209 do
not serve as sufficient proof of reversion; and (iii) the land area which had been purportedly reclassified as forest land was not properly
identified since the Republic failed to present the technical description corresponding thereto.21 In addition to these common assertions,
respondents Dy, Agbayani, Soriano, and Liwanag further averred that they acquired portions of Lot 1-A from Consolacion in good faith,
and have, since then, been in actual, exclusive, open, and continuous possession of their respective portions as owners.22

On December 5, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant complaint for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.23

The RTC found that the Republic failed to present proof that the Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A) have been reclassified as forest
land. Citing Republic v. Animas,24 (Animas) the RTC held that in order to prove reversion of alienable and disposable land to forest land,
a positive government act evincing the same is necessary.25

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration (MR), which was denied in the RTC's Order dated October 18, 2011.26
CA Proceedings

Aggrieved, the Republic elevated the case to the CA via petition for review under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 98120 (Appeal).

In the Appeal, the Republic argued that the Court's ruling in Animas cannot be applied to the present case, since, in the former, the fact
sought to be established was the classification of forest land to alienable and disposable land, and not the other way around, as in this
case.27 Further, the Republic averred that fraud must have necessarily attended the issuance of Free Patent No. 516197, OCT No. RP-
132 and TCT No. 16580, owing to the status of the Roxas Properties as forest land.28

On July 18, 2014, the CA rendered the Assailed Decision dismissing the Appeal. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated December 5, 2005 of the [RTC] x x x is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.29

According to the CA, the Public Land Act vests the power to classify (and reclassify) lands of the public domain with the President. On
this score, the CA held that the annotations appearing on LC Map 209 anent the alleged reversion of the Roxas Properties deserve scant
consideration, as they do not appear to be based on any executive directive. Consequently, the NAMRIA certifications and DENR Final
Report relied upon by the Republic are insufficient to sustain its cause, as they are, in turn, based solely on said annotations.30

The Republic filed an MR, which was denied by the CA in its Assailed Resolution dated May 20, 2015. The Republic received a copy of
the Assailed Resolution on June 8, 2015.31

On June 19, 2015, the Republic filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, praying for an additional period of twenty-
five (25) days from June 23, 2015, or until July 18, 2015 within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. Subsequently, the Republic
filed a Second Motion for Extension, praying for a five (5)-day extension.32

Finally, on July 22, 2015, the Republic filed the present Petition, to which Respondents filed their Compliance and Comment dated
December 16, 2016.33

Thereafter, the Republic filed a Manifestation and Motion dated May 28, 2017, adopting the Petition as its reply to Respondents'
Compliance and Comment.34

The Issue

The Petition calls on the Court to determine whether the CA erred when it held that a positive act of government is necessary to evince
the reclassification of land from alienable and disposable to forest.

The Court's Ruling

In this Petition, the Republic maintains that the Court's ruling in Animas did not have the effect of making a positive executive act a
necessary requirement for the purpose of proving the reclassification of alienable and disposable land.35 Instead, the Republic posits
that Animas affirms its right to institute reversion proceedings in instances where portions of forest land are erroneously included within
the scope of land patents.36 Moreover, the Republic argues that in reversion proceedings, the State should not be made to bear the
burden of proving that the land in question constitutes public domain (i.e., forest land).37 In any case, the Republic posits that the
documentary and testimonial evidence it had presented sufficiently proved such fact.38

The Petition should be denied for lack of merit. The CA did not err when it affirmed the RTC Decision, as the Republic failed to establish
that the Roxas Properties were classified as forest land at the time Free Patent No. 516197 was issued.

The Republic's Petition and

Respondents ' Compliance and
Comment should be admitted in the
interest of substantial justice.

At the outset, the Court notes that the parties herein, albeit at different stages of the proceedings, have both prayed for the relaxation of
the Rules of Court (Rules).

For its part, the Republic filed two (2) motions which sought for an aggregate period of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the initial
thirty (30)-day period prescribed by the Rules for the filing of a petition for review on certiorari. The Respondents, on the other hand,
sought the admission of their Compliance and Comment, filed more than seven (7) months after the filing of the Petition.39

Considering the nature of the issues involved in the present Petition, and the lack of evidence showing that neither the Republic's nor the
Respondents' requests for accommodation had been impelled by any ill-motive, the Court resolves to admit in the interest of substantial
justice the Republic's Petition and the Respondents' Comment with Compliance.

The Court's ruling in Animas does not

apply to the present case.
The Republic's Petition primarily proceeds from the supposition that in ruling in favor of Respondents, the RTC and the CA erroneously
relied on Animas.

In Animas, the Republic filed an action for reversion against respondent therein, claiming that the Free Patent issued in the latter's favor
covered forest land.1âwphi1 The Court of First Instance dismissed the Republic's action on the ground that the original certificate of title
covering said land had become indefeasible, the same having been issued more than one (1) year prior to the filing of the Republic's
action. Hence, the issue brought before the Court in Animas was whether the lapse of said one (1)-year period had the effect of precluding
the State from initiating reversion proceedings to recover land which had been unlawfully registered, either through fraud or oversight.
Resolving the issue, the Court held that public land fraudulently or erroneously included in the scope of patents or certificates of title may
be recovered by the State through reversion proceedings, in accordance with the Public Land Act.

While the Animas ruling upholds the State's right to seek reversion with respect to fraudulently or erroneously registered lands, it does
not, in any manner, lay down the facts that must be established for an action for reversion to prosper. Undoubtedly, the RTC and CA's
reliance on the Animas ruling is misplaced.

Nevertheless, such erroneous reliance on Animas, as will be discussed below, does not advance the Republic's cause, since the principle
which serves as basis for the decisions of the RTC and CA remains correct, albeit attributed to the wrong case.

The power to classifY and reclassify

land lies solely with the Executive
Department.

The Regalian Doctrine has long been recognized as the basic foundation of the State's property regime,40 and has been consistently
adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions;41 it espouses that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that,
as a consequence thereof, any asserted right of ownership over land necessarily traces back to the State.42

At present, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into five (5) categories - forest lands,
agricultural lands, timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks. The Court's ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Palanca v. Republic,43
instructs that in the absence of any prior classification by the State, unclassified lands of the public domain assume the category of forest
lands not open to disposition.44

In turn, the classification of unclassified lands of the public domain, and the reclassification of those previously classified under any of the
categories set forth in the 1987 Constitution (such as the Roxas Properties), are governed by Commonwealth Act No. 14145 dated
November 7, 1936, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Sections 6 and 7 thereof provide:

SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the
lands of the public domain into -

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and
disposition.

SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act. (Emphasis supplied)

These provisions are clear and leave no room for interpretation - the classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest land is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department,46 and is exercised by the latter through the
President, or such other persons vested with authority to exercise the same on his behalf.47

Since the power to classify and reclassify land are executive in nature, such acts, effected without executive authority, are void, and
essentially ultra vires.

In reversion proceedings, the State

bears the burden of proving that the
property in question was inalienable
at the time it was decreed or
adjudicated in favor of the defendant.

A land registration proceeding is the manner through which an applicant confirms title to real property. In this proceeding, the applicant
bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership.48 Accordingly, the applicant is bound to establish, through
incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered had been declared alienable or disposable through a positive act of the
State.49
Conversely, reversion proceeding is the manner through which the State seeks to revert land to the mass of the public domain;50 it is
proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of in favor of private individuals or corporations,51 or when a person
obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system as they
form part of the public domain.52

Owing to the nature of reversion proceedings and the outcome which a favorable decision therein entails, the State bears the burden to
prove that the land previously decreed or adjudicated in favor of the defendant constitutes land which cannot be owned by private
individuals. The Court's ruling in Republic v. Development Resources Corporation53 is instructive:

Since a complaint for reversion can upset the stability of registered titles through the cancellation of the original title and the others that
emanate from it, the State bears a heavy burden of proving the ground for its action. x x x54 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in Republic v. Espinosa55 (Espinosa), the Court held that the dismissal of the Republic's action for reversion is proper since the
Republic failed to establish that the land subject thereof was classified as forest land at the time the cadastral decree in favor of the
defendant was issued:

[I]t is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N x x x. Having been granted
a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain. This means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the
property is alienable and disposable property in the cadastral proceedings.

xxxx

In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings and in the
issuance of the title in Espinosa's favor. The argument for the State is merely that the property was unlawfully included in the certificate
of title because it is of the public domain.

Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is on the State to prove that the property was classified
as timberland or forest land at the time it was decreed to Espinosa. To reiterate, there is no burden on [the present owner] to prove that
the property in question is alienable and disposable land. At this stage, it is reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom [the present
owner] derive[s] her title, had already established that the property is alienable and disposable land considering that she succeeded in
obtaining the OCT over it. In this reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of
the property in Espinosa's title because it was of public dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the burden of proof rests on the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue.56 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Hence, to resolve this Petition, the Court must determine whether the documentary and testimonial evidence offered by the Republic are
sufficient to sustain its cause.

The Complaint should be dismissed as

the Republic failed to show that the
Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A)
were classified as forest land at the
time Free Patent No. 516197 was
issued in Meynardo's favor.

To recall, the Republic presented the following pieces of evidence to support its complaint for reversion: (i) DENR Final Report; (ii)
NAMRIA certifications; and (iii) LC Map 209. However, these documents, whether taken individually or collectively, do not evince a positive
act of reclassification by the Executive Department. As aptly stated by the CA:

In this case, the Republic presented the [NAMRIA certifications], the [DENR Final Report] and [LC Map 209] dated March 6, 1924, with
an inscription that the [Roxas Properties] [were] reverted x x x to the category of forest land on November 24, 1949. However, it appears
that the findings of the CENRO and the NAMRIA are based solely on such mapping [LC Map 209] where eighteen (18) hectares, including
the location therein of the [Roxas Properties], [were] reclassified as forest land. Engineer [Mariano] Mendez57 testified that:

xxxx

Q: So you don't have the law or the order reverting that portion of land to forest land on November 24, 1949?

A: Except only that it is a swamp land. And it is shown here in our map, sir.

xxxx

PROS. MARCO:

x x x [W]hat is the basis, if any, of you (sic) in declaring that this portion of land was reverted back from timber land to forest land on
November 24, 1949?
A: Our files and records.

Q: What are these files and records?

A: As indicated in [LC Map 209].

Engineer Mendez admitted that there was no presidential order or act reverting the classification of the subject property from alienable
and disposable to forest land, thus:

Q: Did you prepare the basis of the reversion of the land from disposable to forest land on November 24, 1949?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What were the basis?

A: Yes, because when I studied that, I found out that the area was a swamp land?

Q: Aside from that, that the area was a swamp land, what are your other basis?

A: Nothing more, sir. As per records, that is the only basis.

Q: Did you not research any law, decree, presidential order or act as the basis of reverting this parcel of land to forest zone on November
24, 1949?

A: I have even decrees or law reverting certain area to forest land but not in this particular area.

Q: So, you know that before a certain parcel of land would be reverted from alienable and disposable to forest zone, there should be a
basis for the same, like proclamation or law. From your experience, presidential decrees?

A: Yes, sir. These are proclamation decrees regarding the reversion of certain land use. But in this particular area, the land is swamp
land.

Q: But in this particular case, did you encounter or did you see any law, executive order, presidential proclamation declaring this parcel
of land from alienable and disposable to forest zone?

A: I have not encountered any decree or presidential proclamation or order reverting this land to forest zone.x x x

Even Engineer Mendez of the NAMRIA agreed that a law or proclamation is required before a certain parcel of land is reclassified from
alienable and disposable to forest land. His insistence that because the land was (originally) swamp land that reclassification was made
(sic), is not supported by any presidential or legal pronouncement or by practice and tradition x x x Unfortunately, the Republic failed to
present any law, presidential proclamation, order or act to prove that the subject property was indeed within the area which is reclassified
as forest land. Even an administrative order from the Bureau of Forestry was not presented to show that the subject property had been
reclassified as forest land.58 (Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The foregoing testimony, culled from the Assailed Decision, confirms that the alleged reclassification of the Roxas Properties is bereft of
basis, as it was done by Engineer Mendez on his sole account, without any prior directive from the President, or a duly authorized officer
from the Executive Department. In fact, the annotation appearing on LC Map 209 upon which the Republic relies does not even state
upon whose authority the alleged reclassification had been made,59 placing the annotation's validity, veracity and worth in serious doubt.

Ultimately, the Republic failed to prove that the Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A) were classified as forest land when they were decreed
in Meynardo's favor in 1971. Thus, in accordance with the Court's ruling in Development Resources Corporation and Espinosa, the
present Petition must be, as it is hereby, denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.

REPUBLIC VS. ESPINOSA

FACTS:

Land Registration Proceedings. In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State
ownership.

Reversion of property. Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass
of the public domain.34 It is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations.35
There are also instances when we granted reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as when a “person obtains a title under the Public
Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not
have jurisdiction over the same because it is of the public domain
Remedial Law. The rules require that documentary evidence must be formally offered in evidence after the presentation of testimonial
evidence, and it may be done orally, or if allowed by the court, in writing.

FACTS:

A cadastral decree was issued in favor of Espinosa. The Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Espinosa who later sold
to Caliston which a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued.

The Sated through Regional Executive Director of the DENR filed a Complaint for annulment of title and reversion of land with the RTC
claiming the property is inalienable public land because it fell within the timberland area.

RTC ruled in favor of the State and ordered reversion of the property.

CA ruled in favor of Espinosa and found that the State failed to prove fraud or misrepresentation when she was issued the Original
Certificate of Title. It further ruled that the State failed to prove that the property is forest land. The lone piece of evidence consisting of
LC Map No, 2978 was not authenticated pursuant to Section 24 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It noted that the parties stipulated only
as to the existence of the map, but not as to genuineness of truthfulness of its content. Assuming that the map is admitted in evidence,
Espinosa’s rights over the property, which accrued in 1962, should not be prejudiced by a subsequent classification by the State done in
1986, or after 24 years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the State has sufficiently proved that the property is part of inalienable forest land at the time Espinosa was granted the
cadastral decree and issued a title.

RULING:

NO! The State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the time of the grant of the cadastral decree and issuance
of title to Espinosa.

In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership. It must establish,
through incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the
government.30 Since cadastral proceedings are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence, a cadastral decree
and a certificate of title are issued only after the applicant proves all the requisite jurisdictional facts-that they are entitled to the claimed
lot, that all parties are heard, and that evidence is considered. As such, the cadastral decree is a judgment which adjudicates ownership
after proving these jurisdictional facts.

Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N, the predecessor title
of Caliston’s TCT No. 91117. Having been granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome
the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.33 This means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was
able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and disposable property in the cadastral proceedings.

This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to recover the property if indeed it is part of the inalienable lands of the public
domain. The State may still do so through an action for reversion, as in the present case.

Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass of the public domain.34
It is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations.35 There are also instances
when we granted reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as when a “person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes,
by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the
same because it is of the public domain.”

In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings and in the
issuance of the title in Espinosa’s favor. The argument for the State is merely that the property was unlawfully included in the certificate
of title because it is of the public domain.

Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is on the State to prove that the property was classified
as timberland or forest land at the time it was decreed to Espinosa.37 To reiterate, there is no burden on Caliston to prove that the
property in question is alienable and disposable land.38 At this stage, it is reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom Caliston
derived her title, had already established that the property is alienable and disposable land considering that she succeeded in obtaining
the OCT over it.39 In this reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of the property
in Espinosa’s title because it was of public dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the burden of proof rests on the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue.

Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of evidence, the land classification map prepared in 1986. The records show,
however, that LC Map No. 2978 was not formally offered in evidence. The rules require that documentary evidence must be formally
offered in evidence after the presentation of testimonial evidence, and it may be done orally, or if allowed by the court, in writing.41 Due
process requires a formal offer of evidence for the benefit of the adverse party, the trial court, and the appellate courts.42 This gives the
adverse party the opportunity to examine and oppose the admissibility of the evidence.43 When evidence has notbeen formally offered,
it should not be considered by the court in arriving at its decision.44 Not having been offered formally, it was error for the trial court to
have considered the survey map. Consequently, it also erred in ordering the reversion of the property to the mass of the publ ic domain
on the basis of the same.

Moreover, even assuming that the survey can be admitted in evidence, this will not help to further the State’s cause. This is because the
only fact proved by the map is one already admitted by the State, that is, that the land was reclassified in 1986.45 This fact does not
address the presumption/ conclusion that Espinosa has, at the time of the cadastral proceedings conducted in 1955, proved that the land
is alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the decree issued in his favor in 1962.

At this juncture, we agree with the CA’s application of SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc.,50 which involved a complaint for annulment of title and
reversion of a lot covered by a free patent and original title. To support its claim that the lot was part of the timberland and forest reserve,
the State submitted as evidence a photocopy of a land classification map. This map also became the basis of the testimonies of City
Environment and Natural Resources Office officers declaring that the lot falls within the timberland or forest reserve. The State, however,
failed to submit either a certified true copy or an official publication of the map, prompting the trial court to deny its admission in evidence.
After proceedings, the trial court dismissed the complaint due to the State’s failure to show that the subject lot therein is part of the
timberland or forest reserve or has been classified as such before the issuance of the free patent and the original title. The CA, relying
on the map, reversed the trial court.

When the case was brought before this court, we reinstated the trial court’s decision. We held that the photocopy of the land classification
map cannot be considered in evidence because it is excluded under the best evidence rule. We emphasized that all parties, including the
Government, are bound by the rules of admissibility and must comply with it-

The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same rule holds true when the Government is one of the parties. The
Government, when it comes to court to litigate with one of its citizens, must submit to the rules of procedure and its rights and privileges
at every stage of the proceedings are substantially in every respect the same as those of its citizens; it cannot have a superior advantage.
This is so because when a [sovereign] submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court and participates therein, its claims and rights are
justiciable by every other principle and rule applicable to the claims and rights of the private parties under similar circumstances. Failure
to abide by the rules on admissibility renders the L.C. Map submitted by respondent inadmissible as proof to show that the subject lot is
part of the forest reserve.

he result would have been different had the State proved that the property was already classified as part of forest land at the time of the
cadastral proceedings and when title was decreed to Espinosa in 1962. However, it failed to discharge this burden; the grant of title which
carries with it the presumption that Espinosa had already proved the alienable character of the property in the cadastral proceedings
stands. To grant the reversion based on a subsequent reclassification, more so on lack of evidence, would amount to taking of private
property without just compensation and due process of law. This, however, is not what our Constitution envisions; fairness and due
process are paramount considerations that must still be observed.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

YABUT VS. ALCANTARA

FACTS:

Romeo Alcantara filed a Complaint of Reconveyance claiming that he is the true owner of parcel of agricultural- residential land located
in Balangasan, Pagadian City, known as Lots 6509-C and 6509-D, Pls- 119 with a combined area of 2.5 hectares more or less. He
claimed that he owns it since the time he bought the said lot in 1960 from Pantaleon Suazola. It was said that Tiburcio Ballesteros
purportedly employed fraud to have the said property. Ballesteros then sold the lots to his daughter, Fe B. Yabut. Ballesteros, applied for
a Sales Application (SA 10279) covering a total land area of 46.2930 hectares with the Bureau of Lands as far back December 9, 1927.
On July 31, 1928, Barbara Andoy filed a Sales Application (SA 10960) over a portion of the same land area applied by Ballesteros. On
April 10, 1930, the Assistant Director of Lands issued a Decision in the case S.A No. 10279, Tiburcio Ballesteros, Applicant and
Contestant, versus S.A . No. 10960, Barbara Andoy, Applicant and Respondent, the case was in favor for Ballesteros due to Andoy’s
entry was not made in good faith. In July 1931, SA 10279 was parceled into Lot Nos. 5862, 5863, 6576, 6586, 7098 and 6509.

Andoy’s heirs laid out their claims on portions of SA 10279: Faustino Andoy Jamisola on Lot No. 6509, Faustina Jamisola de Calivo on
Lot No. 6576, and Olivia Jamisola de Libutan on Lot Nos. 6586 and 7098. Bacause of this, Ballesteros was forced to file a case of forcible
entry against Jamisola siblings in 1938 before the local Municipal Justice of Peace. This was later elevated to the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga. Unfortunately, Ballesteros was imprisoned for three (3) years at the Capas, Tarlac concentration camp. During his
absence on August 20, 1946, Andoy’s son Faustino Andoy Jamisola, sold the said lot covered an area of six (6) hectares to Pantaleon
Suazola identified as Lot No. 6509-A.

When Ballesteros returned to Pagadian in 1946 he learned about the sale between the Faustino and Suazola. He then recognized the
said sale in an affidavit, despite the covered property being part of sa 10279 due to deference to Suazola’s son, who was his compadre.
On September 3, 1952, Suazola filed Free Patent Application No. V9352 (FPA No. V8352) over what he identified as Lot No. 4111, which
turned out to be whole 11.5 hectares of Lot No. 6509.Thus, Ballesteros filed a Letter Protest to the Director of Lands against Suazola’s
FPA No. V8352. On August 11,1953, the Director of Lands ruled the rejection of Andoy’s sales application and recognize Ballesteros
instead. The Jamisola siblings then appealed to the Secretary of Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR). In line with
the landless policy Ballesteros then filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the Jamisolas were not landless and they owned
several tracts of land. Through to the new evidence presented, the sales application of Ballesteros should be further given due course.
The Jamisola siblings filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of First Instance (CFI) but the same was dismissed. They elevated the
case to the Supreme Court Which was docketed as G. R No. L-17466.
On August 12 and September 12,1960, Alcantara bought Lot Nos. 6509-C and 6509-D from Suazola’s heirs and applied for a Free Patent
Lot No. 6509-C on October 15, 1960 and another over Lot No. 6509-Don April 25,1962.

On September 18,1965, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. L-17466 upheld the CFI’S dismissal of the petition filed by Jamisola Siblings as
well as September 3, 1955 ORDER of the DANR granting the MR of Ballesteros.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there is legal basis to support the reconveyance of the properties in question in favor of the Alcantaras.
2. Whether or not the CFI erred when it held that the Director of Lands and DANR had not acted with grave abuse of discretion in rejecting
Suazola’s free patent application.

RULING:

1. NO! the respondents miserably failed to prove that they are the actual owners of the parcel of land that they are claiming. They failed
to present adequate evidence pointing to any legal and valid source of a right over said lots.

2. NO! because the respondents failed to show that they, in fact the real owner of the Lots. It now becomes clear that before the registration
of title over the subject properties in the name of Ballesteros, the same had been public land as such, could have been possibly owned
by any private person with a judicially confirmed title over the same. To reiterate, Alcantara merely filed free patent applications, which
were, unfortunately, never granted.

It is settled that in an action for reconveyance, the free patent and the certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible. What is sought
instead is the transfer of the title to the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant’s name. All that is
needed to be alleged in the complaint are these two (2) crucial facts, namely, (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that
the defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the same. Therefore, the claimant/complainant has the burden to of proving ownership
over the registered land. Considering the overwhelming amount of evidence which include final decisions of no less than Court itself,
recognizing the standing claims of Ballesteros over Lots 6509-C and –D, the RTC and the CA undeniably committed a reversible error
when they ruled that respondents were able to overcome the burden of proof required of them. The Supreme Court, in G.R. No. L-17466,
upheld the cfi’s dismissal of the petition filed by Jamisola siblings as well as the September 3, 1955 Order of the DANR granting the MR
to Ballesteros. But still the Jamisolas refuse to vacate the said property.

The Courts, thus ORDERS the Alcantaras, their successors-in-interest, relatives, representatives, tenants, or anybody acting in their
behalf to vacate the premises and finally place petitioners in peaceful and exclusive possession of the same; and the respondents to pay
cost of the suit.

ANG VS. ESTATE OF SY SO

FACTS:

Sometime in the late 1930s, respondent Sy So, a Chinese citizen, was married to a certain Jose Ang.[4] Sy So maintained a sari-sari
store, while her husband maintained a foundry shop. Testimonial evidence showed that, by virtue of her business, she was financially
well-off on her own.[5]

The couple was childless. In 1941, when a woman approached respondent Sy So and offered a seven- or eight-month-old infant for
adoption, respondent immediately accepted the offer.[6] No formal adoption papers were processed, but the child was christened as Jose
Norberto Ang (Jose Norberto), the present petitioner.[7] Respondent subsequently "adopted" three other wards: Mary Ang, Tony Ang,
and Teresita Tan.[8]

Jose Ang died in 1943 during the Pacific War.[9] After his death, respondent Sy So maintained her store and engaged in cigarette
trading.[10]

Later, respondent Sy So acquired a property described as a 682.5 square meter lot located at 10th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City.
She registered it under TCT No. 73396 (the 10th Avenue lot) in the name of petitioner Jose Norberto, who was then three years old, in
keeping with the Chinese tradition of registering properties in the name of the eldest male son or ward. Respondent Sy So subsequently
acquired the other subject property with an area of 1,977 square meters, located at 11th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City and
registered under TCT No. 10425 (the 11th Avenue lot) on 24 July 1944, likewise under Jose Norberto's name.[11]

Between 1940 and 1950, a six-door apartment building on the 10th Avenue lot was constructed at respondent Sy So's expense.[12] Later
on, two more apartment doors were built on the property, bringing the total to eight apartment doors. For over 30 years, respondent Sy
So, along with petitioner and her other wards, lived there.[13]

Respondent Sy So alleged that she kept the titles to the two properties under lock and key and never showed them to anyone.[14]
However, she gave Jose Norberto a photocopy of TCT No. 10425, so that he could show it to prospective tenants.[15]
Unbeknownst to respondent Sy So, Jose Norberto filed Petitions for the Issuance of Second Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title for TCT
Nos. 73396 and 10425.[16] In 1971, he sold the 11th Avenue lot, which was covered by TCT No. 10425.[17]

On 5 April 1974, Jose Norberto's counsel wrote respondent Sy So, demanding a monthly payment of P500 as her contribution for real
estate taxes on the 10lh Avenue lot.[18]

On 14 March 1989, said counsel wrote another letter to respondent Sy So, formally demanding that she vacate the 10th Avenue lot within
a period of three months, and informing her that she would be charged ¥5,000 as monthly rent.[19]

On 25 July 1989, Jose Norberto filed an ejectment suit against respondent Sy So on the ground of nonpayment of rentals on the 10th
Avenue lot.[20] The ejectment case was dismissed on 30 October 1989 by the Metropolitan Trial Court.[21]

On 14 November 1996, Jose Norberto filed a second ejectment?case against respondent Sy So, but the case was dismissed by the MTC
on 30 October 1997. The dismissal was affirmed by this Court on 4 June 2001,[22]

Meanwhile, on 9 June 1993, respondent Sy So filed with the RTC a case for "Transfer of Trusteeship from the Defendant Jose Norberto
Ang to the New Trustee, Tony Ang, with Damages.[23] Citing Jose Norberto's gross ingratitude, disrespectfulness, dishonesty and breach
of trust, respondent Sy So argued that she had bought the two parcels of land and constructed the apartment doors thereon at her own
expense. Thus, she alleged that there was an implied trust over the properties in question.[24] She thereafter prayed for the following
reliefs:
[Orders be] issued to the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, ordering the removal or cancellation of the name of Jose Norberto Ang as
owner in TCT No. 73396 in the value of P375,000.00 more or less which includes improvements, and placing, instead, the name of Tony
Ang as the owner and trustee;

To declare null and void the fraudulent sale made to Benjamin Lee as per Annex "C" of the complaint;

Ordering the defendant to pay moral damages in the amount of at least P50,000.00;

Plaintiff prays for such other relief or reliefs as may be just, proper and equitable under the premises.[25]
In his Answer, Jose Norberto countered that respondent Sy So was a plain housewife; that the two subject parcels of land were acquired
through the money given to him by his foster father, Jose Ang; and that the apartments were built using funds derived from the sale of
the latter's other properties. Jose Norberto further alleged that when he came of age, he took possession of the properties and allowed
respondent Sy So to stay thereon without paying rent. However, he shouldered the real estate taxes on the land.[26]

THE RULING OF THE RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 23 May 2005 dismissing respondent Sy So's Complaint. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this Court hereby deems it proper to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint, as well as Defendant's
counterclaim, as the same are hereby DISMISSED for failure of the parties to prove their respective claims by preponderance of evidence.

Likewise, the titles under the name of the Defendants are hereby confirmed and affirmed with all the attributes of ownership.

SO ORDERED.[27]
In so ruling, the trial court found that there was no implied trust because, under Art. 1448 of the New Civil Code, "[tjhere is an implied
trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the
beneficial interest of the property." In this case, the trial court reasoned that respondent Sy So did not intend to have the beneficial interest
of the properties, but to make her wards the beneficiaries thereof.[28]

Moreover, the RTC cited Article 1448 of the New Civil Code which states: "[i]f the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate
or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor
of the child." Applying this provision to the present case, the trial court ruled that when Sy So gave the subject properties to Jose Norberto
- who was her child, though not legally adopted - no implied trust was created pursuant to law.[29]

Finally, the RTC ruled that the action was a collateral attack on Jose Norberto's Torrens title; and that, in any event, respondent Sy So's
cause of action was barred by laches, having been instituted 49 years after the titles had been issued in petitioner's name.[30]

THE RULING OF THE CA

Aggrieved by the trial court's Decision, respondent Sy So appealed to the CA.

In her Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief, Sy So argued that Jose Norberto could not be considered as her child in the absence of any formal
adoption proceedings.[31] This being so, under Article 1448 of the New Civil Code, there could be no disputable presumption that the
properties had been given to him as gifts.[32] She also argued that laches had not set in, because there is no prescriptive period for an
action to compel a trustee to convey the property registered in the latter's name for the benefit of the cestui que trust.[33] Furthermore,
she alleged that the trust was repudiated on 25 July 1989 when the first ejectment suit was filed by petitioner, and that when the present
case was instituted against him, only three years, 10 months and 14 days had elapsed.[34]

For his part, petitioner argued in his Appellee's Brief that Sy So had acknowledged that Jose Norberto was one of her wards or adopted
children; hence, Sy So could no longer claim that he was not her child.[35] He further argued that the instant case should have been
dismissed outright because respondent, being a Chinese citizen, could not own real property in the Philippines under the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits aliens from owning private lands save in cases of hereditary succession.[36] He alleged that the present case involved a
prohibited collateral attack against his title and claimed that, as the Complaint was filed almost 50 years after the issuance of the title in
his name, the action was already barred by laches.[37]

The appellate court partially granted respondent Sy So's appeal in a Decision dated 25 July 2007, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED in the sense that Appellant's claim for reimbursement of the
purchase price over the lot covered by TCT No. 10425 is DENIED on the ground of prescription whereas with respect to Appellant's action
re the subject property covered by TCT No. 73396, the Appellant is declared as the true, absolute and lawful owner of the property under
TCT No. 73396 and ordering the Appellee to RECONVEY said property to the Appellant within ten (10) days from notice and to pay the
costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.[38]
The CA upheld the applicability of Article 1448[39] of the New Civil Code and the existence of an implied trust.[40] Moreover, it found that
petitioner had not been legally adopted by respondent[41] and thus, there being no legal relationship between the parties, the disputable
presumption under Article 1448 did not arise.[42]

As to the issue of whether there was a collateral attack on Jose Norberto's title, the CA ruled that the legal doctrine of indefeasibility of a
Torrens title was inapplicable. It explained that respondent did not question the validity of petitioner's title, but merely prayed for the
transfer thereof, as the instant action was actually one of reconveyance.[43]

Finally, the CA found that laches had set in as regards the 11th Avenue lot covered by TCT No. 10425, but not with respect to the 10th
Avenue lot covered by TCT No. 73396. Since respondent Sy So was in possession of the 10th Avenue lot, the CA reasoned that the
action for reconveyance was imprescriptible.[44]

However, the CA did not pass upon petitioner's contention that under the Constitution, respondent Sy So was disqualified from owning
private lands in the Philippines.

After unsuccessfully praying for a reconsideration of the CA Decision,[45] Jose Norberto filed the instant Rule 45 petition for review before
this Court.

On 9 October 2008, We received notice of the death of Sy So pending the resolution of the instant case.[46] Counsel for respondent
likewise notified this Court that Tony Ang, one of the foster sons and allegedly the trustee-designate of the deceased, should substitute
in her stead.[47]

In a Reply dated 17 December 2008, petitioner Jose Norberto vehemently opposed the substitution. He argued that the original action
for transfer of trusteeship was an action in personam; thus, it was extinguished by the death of respondent.[48] Moreover, he contended
that Tony Ang had no legal personality to represent Sy So as her alleged trustee, because there was as yet no final judgment validating
the change of trusteeship between the parties.[49]

OUR RULING

We grant the Petition.

Respondent Sy So would have this Court declare that she is the true owner of the real properties in question and that as owner, she has
the right to have the land titles transferred from the name of Jose Norberto to that of Tony Ang, Sy So's trustee-designate. On the other
hand, petitioner Jose Norberto counters that reconveyance does not lie, because respondent Sy So is a Chinese citizen.

Sy So's Chinese citizenship is undisputedly shown by the records, and even supported by documentary evidence presented by the
representative of respondent Sy So herself.

The purchase of the subject parcels of land was made sometime in 1944,[50] during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. The relevant
sections of Article XIII thereof provide:
SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,
and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

XXXX

SECTION 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
As early as Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,[51] We have interpreted the foregoing to mean that, under the Constitution then in force, aliens
may not acquire residential lands: "One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution x x x is
'that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore,
be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity.'"

These provisions have been substantially carried over to the present Constitution, and jurisprudence confirms that aliens are disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain. In Ting Ho v. Teng Gui,[52] Muller v. Muller[53] Frenzel v. Catito,[54] and Cheesman v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[55] all cited in Matthews v. Sps. Taylor[56] We upheld the constitutional prohibition on aliens acquiring land
in the Philippines. We have consistently ruled thus in line with constitutional intent to preserve and conserve the national patrimony. Our
Constitution clearly reserves for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos the right
to acquire lands of the public domain.[57] The prohibition against aliens owning lands in the Philippines is subject only to limited
constitutional exceptions, and not even an implied trust can be permitted on equity considerations.[58]

Much as We sympathize with the plight of a mother who adopted an infant son, only to have her ungrateful ward eject her from her
property during her twilight years, We cannot grant her prayer. Applying the above rules to the present case, We find that she acquired
the subject parcels of land in violation of the constitutional prohibition against aliens owning real property in the Philippines. Axiomatically,
the properties in question cannot *be legally reconveyed to one who had no right to own them in the first place. This being the case, We
no longer find it necessary to pass upon the question of respondent Sy So's substitution in these proceedings.

The Solicitor General, however, may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State.[59] In sales of real estate to aliens
incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution, both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have
committed the constitutional violation. Being in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party. The proper party who could
assail the sale is the Solicitor General.[60]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is GRANTED.

DE GUZMAN JR VS. CA

FACTS:

The property subject of this case (property) is a 480-square meter lot that formed part of Lot No. 532 located at North Poblacion, Medina,
Misamis Oriental. Lot No. 532, which has a total area of 25,178 square meters, was acquired by Lamberto Bajao's (respondent) parent,
Leoncio Bajao,6 through Free Patent No. 4000877 issued on May 28, 1968.8

Petitioners acquired the property in two transactions. On May 24, 1969, Spouses Bajao sold 200 square meters of Lot No. 532 to them
for P1,000.9 On June 18, 1970, Spouses Bajao sold another 280 square meters of Lot No. 532 to petitioners for P1,400.10 Both
transactions were evidenced by separate Deeds of Absolute Sale.11 Spouses Bajao allegedly promised to segregate the property from
the remaining area of Lot No. 53212 and to deliver a separate title to petitioners covering it.13 However, because the promise was not
forthcoming, petitioner Lydia S. de Guzman executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim14 on April 21, 1980 covering the property. This was
annotated on the title covering Lot No. 532, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-6903, on April 25, 1980.15

On May 29, 1980, petitioners initiated the segregation of the property from Lot No. 532 through a survey.16 As a result of the survey,
petitioners acquired Lot 2-A, Psd-10-002692.17 They allegedly acquired possession over the land immediately, fenced the area,
introduced improvements, and planted it with fruit-bearing trees.18

On September 26, 1980,19 or after the death of Leoncio Bajao on February 1, 1972,20 respondent and Anastacia Bajao executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs21 (Extrajudicial Settlement), which subdivided Lot No. 532 into three parts.22 The property was
included in Lot No. 532-C, which was adjudicated in favor of respondent.23 The Extrajudicial Settlement was registered on December
10, 1980.24

On December 16, 1980, respondent caused the cancellation of petitioners' annotated adverse claim over the property and later obtained
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-7133 on February 13 and October 2, 1981.25 Petitioners thereafter requested respondent to
deliver TCT No. T-7133 so they could present it to the Register of Deeds, together with the two Deeds of Absolute Sale, for proper
annotation.26 Respondent, however, refused to heed their request.27cralawred

Thus, on January 21, 2000, petitioners filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages.28
They alleged that they were innocent purchasers for value who took possession of the property after the sale and religiously paid its real
property taxes.29 Petitioners also alleged that respondent was in bad faith since he knew about the sale of the property between them
and his parents, and the existing survey and segregation over the area, yet he fraudulently included the same in his share upon the
issuance of TCT No. T-7133.30

In his Answer with Defenses and Counterclaims,31 respondent argued that the action is time barred and there is no more trust to speak
of.32 He pointed out that more than 10 years have lapsed from the date of the registration of the Extrajudicial Settlement on December
10, 1980 and the registration of TCT No. T-7133 on February and October 1981, to the date of filing of the Complaint.33 Respondent
also countered that there was no mistake or fraud in including the property in TCT No. T-7133 since his rights arose from the Extrajudicial
Settlement.34

Ruling of the Trial Court

On October 22, 2004, the trial court promulgated its Decision,35 the decretal portion of which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, this Court finds for the plaintiffs and hereby orders
the defendant:

1. to reconvey to the plaintiffs the four hundred eighty square meter lot in question in accordance with the survey plan made by Engr.
Pedro Q. Gonzales which was approved by Acting Director of Lands Guillermo C. Ferraris as certified by the Office of the Regional
Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and to surrender TCT No. 7133 to the Register of Deeds of
Misamis Oriental for appropriate annotation;

2. to pay to plaintiffs the sum of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as moral damages; and

3. to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.36ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court found the two Deeds of Absolute Sale free from infirmities.37 It ruled that their execution was equivalent to the delivery of
the thing sold;38 registration not being necessary to make the contract of sale valid and effective as between the parties.39 Citing
Sanchez, et al. v. De la Cruz, et al.,40 and Philippine Suburban Development Corporation v. Auditor General,41 the trial court held that
as between the parties and their privies, an unrecorded deed of sale covering land registered under the Torrens system passes title of
ownership once the land is conveyed to the vendee. Failure of registration does not, at anytime after the sale, vitiate or annul the right of
ownership conferred to such sale.42

The trial court also found respondent in bad faith.43 Respondent admitted that he was aware of the adverse claim annotated at the back
of the title when he went to the Register of Deeds to register the Extrajudicial Settlement.44 The ultimate paragraph of the Extrajudicial
Settlement provides that what was being conveyed to respondent was the "remaining portion of Lot [No.] 532, Cad-347, under O.C.T. Bo,
P-6903." The trial court construed this provision to mean the remaining portion of Lot No. 532 after taking into consideration the 480-
square meter lot sold to petitioners.45

Respondent appealed to the CA.46 In his appellant's brief,47 he argued that: (1) petitioners' Complaint is already barred by the statute
of limitations, estoppel and laches;48 (2) the "remaining portion" in the Extrajudicial Settlement refers to Lot No. 532-C with an area of
10,178 square meters;49 and (3) the petitioners are not entitled to moral damages.50

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA granted the appeal of respondent. The decretal portion of its Decision51 reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and as a consequence,
the Complaint for Reconveyance with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA noted that an implied trust between the parties under Article 145653 of the Civil Code was created at the time Anastacia Bajao
and respondent executed the Extrajudicial Settlement on September 26, 1980, with respondent becoming the trustee who holds the
property in trust for the benefit of petitioners.54 The CA held that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10
years from the registration of title in the Office of the Register of Deeds.55 Thus, petitioners' action for reconveyance filed in January
2000 has already prescribed since more than 10 years have lapsed from October 1981, the date of registration of respondent's title.56

Further, the CA held that petitioners failed to prove their actual possession of the property by substantial evidence.57 It was only in the
1980s that they fenced the area in a furtive attempt to establish possession.58 The CA held them guilty of laches for failing to assert their
right to be placed in control and possession of the property after its sale in 1969 and 1970 and to have it registered.59

Finally, the CA held that the phrase "remaining portion of Lot No. 532, Cad-347 under OCT No. P-6903" found in the Extrajudicial
Settlement could also mean restricting respondent's share to the whole portion of Lot No. 532-C, which is the remaining portion of Lot
No. 532 after subdividing it into three parcels and giving Lot Nos. 532-A and 532-B to Anastacia Bajao as her share.60

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration61 of the Decision. They insisted that prescription and laches do not apply because
respondent was in bad faith.62 They maintained to be in possession of the property.63 Thus, their action for reconveyance partakes of a
suit to quiet title which is imprescriptible.64 The CA in its Resolution65 dated November 19, 2008 denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, this petition, which essentially raises the issue of whether the CA erred in dismissing the Complaint on the ground of prescription.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

It is undisputed that Leoncio Bajao obtained Lot No. 532 through Free Patent No. 40008766 granted and issued on May 28, 1968. Free
Patent No. 400087 was used as basis in the issuance of OCT No. P-6903 which was transcribed in the Registration Book of the Register
of Deeds of Misamis Oriental on August 4, 1970.67 Section 11868 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, prohibits the alienation or encumbrance of lands acquired under free patent or homestead within a period of five years from the date
of issuance of the patent.69 The parties, however, never raised this issue on prohibition, but this failure will not deter us from resolving
the issue. We have held that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We cannot turn a blind eye on glaring misapplications of the law or patently erroneous decisions or resolutions simply because the parties
failed to raise these errors before the court. Otherwise, we will be allowing injustice by reason of the mistakes of the parties' counsel and
condoning reckless and negligent acts of lawyers to the prejudice of the litigants. Failure to rule on these issues amounts to an abdication
of our duty to dispense justice to all parties.70ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We have explained the rationale behind this prohibition in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:71
The prohibition against the encumbrance — lease and mortgage included — of a homestead which, by analogy applies to a free patent,
is mandated by the rationale for the grant, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for
their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section
116) within five years after the grant of the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits alienation of the homestead; but in
line with the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his family the statute provides that such alienation or conveyance (Section
117) shall be subject to the right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs within five years. This Section 117 is undoubtedly
a complement of Section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State
had gratuitously given to him. It would, therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold, that the right to repurchase
exists not only when the original homesteader makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by his widow or heirs. This construction
is clearly deducible from the terms of the statute."72ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under Section 124 of the Public Land Act, any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation
of Sections 118 to 123 of the Public Land Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution. The violation shall also produce the
effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed actually or presumptively. The
violation shall also cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State. The contract executed in violation of these
sections being void, it is not susceptible of ratification, and the action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of such a contract is
imprescriptible.73

In this case, portions of Lot No. 532 were conveyed to petitioners by virtue of two Deeds of Absolute Sale executed on May 24, 1969 and
June 18, 1970, or after the grant and issuance of Free Patent No. 40008774 on May 28, 1968. Both Deeds of Absolute Sale were executed
within the prohibited period of five years. Consequently, following Section 124, these Deeds are null and void and produce no effect. They
did not convey any right from Spouses Bajao to petitioners on the property. The parties could not have claimed ignorance of the free
patent grant. We held in Beniga v. Bugas:75
Section 118 does not exempt patentees and their purported transferees who had no knowledge of the issuance of the patent from the
prohibition against alienation; for the law does not say that the five years are to be counted "from knowledge or notice of issuance" of the
patent or grant. The date of the issuance of the patent is documented and is a matter of government and official record. As such, it is
more reliable and precise than mere knowledge, with its inherent frailties. Indeed, the policy of the law, which is to give the patentee a
place where to live with his family so that he may become a happy citizen and a useful member of our society, would be defeated were
ignorance of the issuance of a patent a ground for the non-application of the prohibition.76ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Nonetheless, although Section 124 states that a violation of Section 118 causes the reversion of the property to the State, we have held
that a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of cancelling a free patent and
the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby will again form part of the
public domain, since only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so.77 Until then, respondent, as heir of the
vendors, has the better right to remain in possession of the property.78

The rule of pari delicto will not apply here in view of the nullity of the contracts of sale between the parties.79 To have it otherwise would
go against the public policy of preserving the grantee's right to the land under the homestead law.80 In Binayug v. Ugaddan,81 we
returned the properties which were acquired through a grant of a homestead patent to the heirs of the original owner after it was proven
that the properties were alienated within the five-year prohibition period under Section 118 of the Public Land Act. Citing De los Santos
v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, et al.,82 we explained:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In De los Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, a homestead patent covering a tract of land in Midsayap, Cotabato was granted
to Julio Sarabillo (Sarabillo) on December 9, 1938. (XT No. RP-269 was issued to Sarabillo on March 17, 1939. On December 31, 1940,
Sarabillo sold two hectares of land to the Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap (Church). Upon Sarabillo's death, Catalina de los Santos
(De los Santos) was appointed administratrix of his estate. In the course of her administration, De los Santos discovered that Sarabillo's
sale of land to the Church was in violation of Section 118 of the Public Land Act, prompting her to file an action for the annulment of said
sale. The Church raised as defense Section 124 of the Public Land Act, as well as the principle of pari delicto. The Court, in affirming the
CFI judgment favoring De los Santos, ratiocinated:

xxx

x x x Here [De Los Santos] desires to nullify a transaction which was done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto
would apply to her because her predecessor-in-interest has carried out the sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality, but because
the subject of the transaction is a piece of public land, public policy requires that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it
because it was given by law to her family for her home and cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead law is predicated. This
right cannot be waived. "It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve". We
are, therefore, constrained to hold that [De Los Santos] can maintain the present action it being in furtherance of this fundamental aim of
our homestead law.

xxx

Jurisprudence, therefore, supports the return of the subject properties to respondents as Gerardo's heirs following the declaration that
the Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 10, 1951 between Gorardo and Juan is void for being in violation of Section 118 of the Public Land
Act, as amended. That the subject properties should revert to the Slate under Section 124 of the Public Land Act, as amended, is a non-
issue, the State not even being a party herein.83ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
With respect to the purchase price of P2,400 which petitioners paid for the land, respondent should return it with interest.84 We similarly
ruled in the recent case of Tingalan v. Spouses Melliza85 which also involved the void sale of land covered by the Public Land Act, as
amended. We applied the rule that upon annulment of the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced to the purchase price and its interest.86

But, even on the assumption that there was no violation of Section 118 of the Public Land Act, the ruling of the CA that petitioners' action
has already prescribed would have been correct.

Petitioners allege that respondent fraudulently included the property in TCT No. T-7133, which was issued on February 13 and October
2, 1981.87 Article 145688 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through mistake or fraud becomes, by operation of
law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust
generally prescribes in 10 years, the reckoning point of which is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate
of title over the property.89 Thus, petitioners had 10 years from 1981 or until 1991 to file their complaint for reconveyance of property.
The Complaint, however, was filed only on January 21, 2000,90 or more than 10 years from the issuance of TCT No. T-7133. Hence, the
action is already barred by prescription.

The exception to the ten-year rule on prescription is when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed.91 In such case, the
action becomes one for quieting of title, which is imprescriptible.92 Here, petitioners allege that they were in juridical possession of the
property from the time they put up a fence on it until the filing of the Complaint.93 Respondent disputes this claim, countering that
petitioners are not in actual and material possession of the property.94 Whether petitioners have actual possession of the lot is a question
of fact.95 We have repeatedly ruled that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall raise only questions
of law and not questions of facts.96 When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding
on the parties and are not reviewable by us, unless the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions.97 Petitioners never raised any
of these exceptions. Assuming they did, none of the exceptions would apply.

We affirm the CA's finding that petitioners were not able to establish their actual possession of the lot except by bare allegations not
substantiated by evidence.98 It is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence.99 Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their
opponent.100

During trial, petitioners testified that they do not live on the property.101 They alleged putting up a fence alter they purchased the lot but
there was no evidence to support their allegations as to when this fence was constructed.102 Respondent presented pictures showing a
fence erected by petitioners only in 1996 and respondent contested such act through a letter sent to petitioners asking them to remove
the fence.103 Although there were mango trees and chico trees in the lot, it was unclear who planted them.104 The tax declaration of
Lot No. 532-C which respondent offered in evidence also shows that coconut trees were planted in the lot.105 Petitioners never alleged
having planted any coconut tree.

Further, petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that they have been paying real property taxes religiously from the time of the sale in
1969. They only formally offered in evidence official receipts issued for the period 2000 to 2002 showing payment of real property
taxes.106 No tax declaration of the lot was also formally offered107 in evidence, although petitioners attached one in their Complaint.108
Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.

Finally, the survey plan commissioned by petitioners does not prove their actual possession over the property. The survey plan merely
proves the identity of the property. It plots the location, the area and the boundaries of the property, but it hardly proves that petitioners
actually possessed the property.109

On the other hand, respondent offered in evidence the tax declaration110 of Lot No. 532-C under his name, as well as the tax
clearance111 and official receipts for payment of real property taxes for the period 2000 to 2003.112 We have held that although tax
declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession
in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession.113

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.

SOQUILLO VS. TORTOLA

FACTS:

On March 8 1966, a parcel of land lacated in Alubijid, Misamis Oriental originally owned by Lorenzo Coloso, Jr was sold to Ramon Jamis
through execution of notarized deed of conditional sale. The sale became definite the day after. Subsequently, Jamis sold the subject
property to Jorge Tortola (herein respondent).

Tortola took possession of the property, paid its realty taxes due from 1975-2002. However, the receipts for the payments still stated
Coloso, Jr.’s name, withthe exception of Tax Declaration Nos. 942443, indicating “Lorenzo Coloso, Jr. c/o Mr. Tortola” and 026083,
bearing the name of “Jorge Tortola” Tortola moved to Bukidnon and left the subject lot under the care of Godofredo Villaflores.

Later, Atty. Pacana was informed of the desire of the heirs of Coloso to recover the subject lot and notified Tortola through letter. Tortola
sent, in reply, copy of the notarized deed of definite sale executed between the latter and Jamis.
On September 22 1993, application for free patent was filed by the Colosos with Commnity of Environmental and Natural Resources in
Cagayan De Oro City to obtain title over the subject land. After survey was conducted, it was reported by the land investigator that the
Colosos had been in possession and cultivating the subject land Colosos were recommended to be issued free patent.

On December 14, 1994, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-20825 covering the disputed property was issued in favor of the Heirs
of Coloso, Jr. Colosos subsequently sold the land to Santiago Soquillo through execution of absolute deed of sale. Soquillo, knowing
there were other people in possession of the land, filed a complaint for illegal detainer against spouses Villaflores

MTC Ruling: For failure of Villaflores to file an answer, the case was decided in favor of Soquillo. Hence the former was ejected from the
subject land. Upon knowing of the ejectment, Tortola filed with the Regional Trial Court of Branch 44, Initao, Misamis Oriental a complaint
against Coloso, the Heirs ofColoso, Jr., Soquillo and the MTC of Alubijid, Misamis Oriental for annulment of title/sale/judgment with
prayers for the issuance of injunctive reliefs and award of damages

RTC Ruling: Santiago V. Soquillo versus Jorge P. Tortola (G.R. No. 192450), the trial court ruled in favor of Tortola. Accordingly, it can
be established that [Tortola] acquired a right over the subject parcel of land under a Deed of Definite Sale dated March 29, 1966, which
was registered on September 5, 2002 in the Registry of Deeds, and by the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 023086 by Tax Declaration
No.026083 in the name of Jorge Tortola.

Registration of the instrument in the Office of the Register of Deeds constitutes constructive notice to the parties of the transfer of
ownership over the subject property. The respondent occupied the said property and constructed his house and resided thereon until he
left for Maramag, Bukidnon sometime in the late 1960’s, leaving the occupation of the said property to Spouses Villaflores, with his
permission, continuously until 2002.

The ownership and possession of the land was admitted and acknowledged by the herein defendants Heirs of Coloso, Jr. in their letters
to [Tortola]. Likewise, defendant Soquillo, admitted the actual occupation of the land by Spouses Villaflores by the fact of his filing a civil
action against them in court. Under the law, if the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for
reconveyance is still available. Defendant Soquillo cannot be considered as an innocent purchaser for value or that he acquired the
subject property through mistake and fraud.

He can only be considered a trustee by implication, for the benefit of Tortola, who is the true and lawful owner of the litigated land,
pursuant to Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Laches cannot prejudice the lawful right of Tortola in its ownership and possession of the
subject litigated property. There was no failure or neglect on the part of Tortola]in asserting his rights after knowing defendant’s conduct,
evidenced by all the letters sent to the defendants resulting to their knowledge of the actual ownership and occupation of the subject land.

The principle of indefeasibillity of title does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of title, as in this case. The settled rule is that a
free patent issued over aprivate land, which in this case the subject litigated land belonged to plaintiff Tortola, is null and void, and
produces no legal effects whatsoever (Heirs of Simplicio Santiago vs. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, 404 SCRA 193).

Soquillo appealed to Court of Appeals, averring that the RTC erred in not finding that Tortola’s complaint stated no cause of action. He
alleged that since Tortola sought the cancellation of a free patent, not him but the State, was the real party-in interest. He also argued
that he was a purchaser in good faith and for value, thus, the RTC’s order to reconvey the disputed property and award damages in
Tortola’s favor was improper.

Ruling of Court of Appeals: Santiago V. Soquillo versus Jorge P. Tortola (G.R. No. 192450). The appellate court denied the petition
According to the lower court, the defense that the Complaint failed to state a cause of action must be raised at the earliest possible time.

Petitioner cannot be considered a purchaser in good faith and for value because defendant Arthur Coloso as Attorney-in-fact of the heirs
of Lorenzo Boy Coloso did not have the right to sell the disputed land to the former. Knowledge that Villaflores was the agent of Tortola
serves as prior knowledge and despite that, Colosos still filed application for free patent made false declaration that they have been
cultivating and in possession thereof. Such false declarations in the Application, however, constituted concealment of material facts,
which amounted to fraud. This, therefore, inevitably resulted to the cancellation of title.

Public policy demands that one who obtains title to a public land through fraud should not be allowed to benefit therefrom. “Indeed, the
general rule is that a purchaser may rely on what appears on the face of a certificate of title. An exception to this rule is when there exist
important facts that would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man (and spur him) to go beyond the present title and to investigate
those that preceded it. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser
in good faith, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.” Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA erred in:

1. not finding that the complaint states no cause of action;
2. not finding that the petitioner is a purchaser in good faith and for value;
3. awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

RULING:
The Court DENIED the petition. Questions of law and not of facts are the proper subjects of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule45. In the case at bar, Soquillo raises factual questions which were already resolved in the proceedings below. Further, the factual
findings of the RTC and the CA were in accord with each other and were supported by substantial evidence.

Even if we were to resolve the first issue raised by Soquillo relative to the alleged lack of standing of Tortola as the real party-in-interest,
there is still no ground to dismiss the latter’s complaint. The action filed by Tortola was not for reversion, but for the declaration of nullity
of a free patent and a certificate of title.

The second and third issues raised by Soquillo were exhaustively discussed by the RTC and the CA. Soquillo was not a purchaser in
good faith. He and the heirs of Coloso, Jr. Santiago V. Soquillo versus Jorge P. Tortola (G.R. No. 192450) who were his predecessors-
in-interest knew about the sale made to Tortola and the possession of the disputed property by Villaflores. Besides, Tortola registered
the sale, albeit with much delay, in 2002. As of the time Tortola's complaint was filed, no registration was effected by Soquillo.

SN ABOITIZ VS. MUN. OF ALFONSO LISTA

FACTS:

Mun. of Alfonso Lista filed a declaration of nullity of Special Patent No. 3723 and OCT No. 0-1 against NPC (predecessor of SNAP)
because the same were void for failure to reflect the true location of the subject parcels of land as they were actually in Ifugao whereas
NPC made it appear that they were in Isabela. SC dismissed for failure to state a cause of action since one of the elements of a Declaration
of Nullity of Title Complaint is that the allegations contain assertions of ownership over the land, whereas the Municipality was not claiming
ownership over the property. As consolation, the Court said that the Municipality has a remedy to settle this boundary dispute—Sec 118
of the Local Government Code.

1. Municipality of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao (MUN) filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that the National Power Corporation (NPC)
fraudulently secured Special Patent No. 3723 by making it appear in the survey plans that certain parcels of land were located in Brgy
General Aguinaldo, Ramon, Isabela when these parcels of land were actually located in Brgy Sto. Domingo in Alfonso Lista, Ifugao.

2. MUN’s Allegation: That on the strength of such survey plans, NPC succeeded in having the Special Patent No. 3723 entered in
the registry of books of the Register of Deeds of Santiago City in 2004. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1 was
issued. Later on, NPC alienated such parcels of land in favor of Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM),
a GOCC, which in turn transferred the same to petitioner SN Aboitiz Power Magat, Inc (SNAP).

3. MUN prayed for the declaration of nullity of Special Patent No. 3723 and OCT No. 0-1 because the same were void for failure
to reflect the true location of the subject parcels of land. MUN averred that the Register of Deeds of Isabela, which registered the subject
patent, did not have the authority to do so because it had no jurisdiction over the parcels of land covered by the same. In the alternative,
MUN prayed that the wordings of Special Patent No. 3723 and the subsequent titles derived therefrom be amended to reflect the true
location of the subject parcels of land (Brgy. Sto. Domingo). MUN emphasized that it was asserting its right of. jurisdiction, not ownership,
over the land.

4. Instead of filing an Answer, SNAP, as successor-in-interest of NPC, filed a Motion to Dismiss (MtD) on the grounds of prescription
and failure to state a cause of action. SNAP maintained that it had a valid title to the subject property.

5. RTC denied the MtD. SNAP filed MR (denied).

6. SNAP filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA. CA denied. The issue of the validity of petitioner’s claim of title
over the subject property should be threshed out through the presentation of evidence and resolved after trial on the merits. SNAP filed
MR (denied).

ISSUE/HELD:

Whether or not the dismissal of the case is proper.

RULING:

YES! for not stating a cause of action.

1. Cause of Action (COA) Elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part
of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.
2. What Complaint for Action for Nullification of Title must state for Sufficiency of COA: (1) that the claimant is the owner of the
subject land prior to the issuance of the title to the defendant; and (2) that fraud or mistake was perpetrated in obtaining said title over the
subject land.
3. Sec 118(c), LocGov Code: Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled
amicably. To this end: xxx (c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred
for settlement to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned.

RATIO
1. [SEE RULES 1-2] Based on the amended complaint, MUN does not claim ownership over the property . The main thrust of
MUN’s claim rests on its allegations that fraud attended the securing of the subject patents and certificates of title and that such fraud
had the effect of depriving it of its territorial jurisdiction. Such deprivation hinges on MUN’s claim that the subject property is actually
situated within its territorial jurisdiction, and not in the Province of Isabela. On the other hand, SNAP strongly denied the allegations of
MUN and underlined the validity of its title over the subject property. As it is, MUN is claiming its territorial jurisdiction over the property
and its corollary right to collect taxes. Without the claim of ownership, there was no supposed right upon which MUN may anchor its claim
and which SNAP may violate. The amended complaint was insufficient for lack of COA.

2. Neither can an action to amend the subject title proceed. [SEE NOTES, provision not THAT important] Relief under said provision
can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in
interest, otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident
properly belongs. The issues are limited to those which are so patently insubstantial as not to be genuine issues. Proceedings under this
provision are summary in nature, contemplating insertions of mistakes which are only clerical, but certainly not controversial issues. Here,
the issues are controversial in nature and cannot be summarily disposed of. As aforementioned, the gist of respondent municipality's
amended complaint revolves around its territorial claim over the subject property. To allow this proceeding to take place and grant the
ultimate relief prayed for by respondent municipality is to allow not only the cancellation or amendment of the subject patent and title, but
also the alteration of territorial jurisdiction over the Province of Isabela, should a ruling be made in favor of respondent municipality.

3. The territorial dispute between Ifugao and Isabela has not yet been resolved though raised in the case of NPC v. Isabela when
NPC sought its exemption from payment of local taxes payable to the Isabela. Moreover, Ifugao impleaded Isabela when it filed the
amended complaint, maintaining its argument that the location of the subject parcels of land are within its territorial jurisdiction. However,
the latter failed to file its Answer. Thus, any relief granted in this action would preempt the proceedings which may later on take place
with respect to the territorial jurisdiction of both provinces.

4. MUN is not without remedy. If at all, any issue as to boundary dispute may be resolved by referring the same to the provinces '
respective Sangguniang Panlalawigan following Section 118 of the Local Government Code. MUN’s territorial claim can neither be
resolved in an action for nullification of title nor in an action to amend title.

GRANTED.

Sec 108, PD 1529 provides that proceeding for erasure, alteration or amendment of a certificate of title may be resorted to in 7 instances:
: (1.) when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (2.)
when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; (3.) when any error, omission or mistake was
made in entering a certificate of any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (4.). when the name of any person on the
certificate has been changed; (5.) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been
terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (6.) when a corporation, which owned registered land and
has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (7.) when there is reasonable ground for the
amendment or alteration of title.

PMO VS. QUESADA

FACTS:

On December 8, 2011, herein [respondents Edgardo V. Quesada, Ma. Gracia Quesada-Manalo, Elizabeth Quesada-Jose, Eugenio V.
Quesada, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact Eugenio v. Quesada (the Quesadas)] filed a Petition to Surrender [Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT)] No. 27090 pursuant to Section 107 of [Presidential Decree (P.D.)] No. 1529. The said petition was raffled to public respondent
Hon. Judge Rosa M. Samson of the [Regional Trial Court] of Quezon City, Branch 105 [(RTC)].

It was alleged in the Petition x x x that [the Quesadas] are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Quezon City under TCT No. 27090.
TCT No. 27090 was originally registered in the name of [the Quesadas'] predecessors-in-interest and it was donated to them sometime
in 1997 (See: Deed of Donation, Rollo, pp. 32-33). The original copy of TCT No. 27090, on file with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
was destroyed when the interior of the Quezon City Hall was gutted by fire in 1998. This prompted [the Quesadas'] predecessors-in-
interest to file a Petition for Reconstitution of Title under Civil Case No. Q-24149 (07).

The said original TCT, which has not been reconstructed, may be reconstituted on the basis of the [owner's] copy thereof. However, the
said owner's copy of the TCT is presently in the possession of x x x [PMO], the government agency that took over the functions of the
Asset Privatization Trust (APT), x x x PMO got hold of the said [owner's] copy of the TCT because it was delivered in 1983 to Golden
Country Farms, a defunct private corporation, to secure the performance by [the Quesadas'] predecessors-in-interest5 of their obligation
in a contract designated as Growership Agreement which [the Quesadas'] predecessors-in-interest had entered into with Golden Country
Farms. Golden Country Farms, however, was later considered a crony corporation and was sequestered by the APT.

[The Quesadas] also alleged that whatever obligation their predecessors-in-interest may have under the Growership Agreement, the
same had already been extinguished by prescription. Furthermore, under Civil Case No. 8438, the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 113 issued
a Decision dated August 23, 1999 x x x declaring that [the Quesadas'] predecessors-in-interest had no more liability to the corporation or
that whatever liability there may be cannot anymore be enforced.

[The Quesadas] alleged that as far as they know, the said TCT No. 27090 has not been delivered to any person or entity to secure the
payment or performance of any obligation whatsoever, nor any transaction or document relating to the same presented for or pending
registration in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Thus, in order that [the Quesadas] may transfer the ownership of the
property from their predecessors-in-interest to their name[s], they would need the duplicate certificate of title which is in the possession
of x x x PMO. Several demands were made to x x x PMO to surrender the said title but the same were not favorably acted upon by the
said office. [The Quesadas] were constrained to file the instant petition to surrender the withheld duplicate certificates pursuant to Section
107 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.

x x x PMO, through the Office of the Solicitor General [OSG], filed a Motion to Dismiss x x x on the following grounds: (i) the petition failed
to state a cause of action; (ii) the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the petition because it involves an adverse claim to the land or controversial
issue which should be properly threshed out in an ordinary case, and (iii) any action against the [APT] (now x x x PMO) is barred by res
judicata. [The Quesadas], in their [C]omment/Opposition, moved for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss and reiterated that there is no
annotation of the alleged right of x x x PMO on the subject title that would give it a right to hold the same. Neither did x x x PMO file an
Opposition to the Petition for Reconstitution filed by [the Quesadas] which was already decided with finality in their favor.

On July 3, 2013, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 105 issued an Order, [the] pertinent portion[s] of which are as follows:
"In this case, taking into account the allegations of the Oppositor in its Motion to Dismiss which raise serious objection to the claim of the
petitioners [the Quesadas], the issue becomes contentious, hence, there is a need for a full-blown trial whereby both parties are afforded
the opportunity to present their evidence proving their respective claims.

WHEREFORE, without necessarily giving due course to the petition and in order to avoid multiplicity of suit[s], the Motion to Dismiss filed
by the Oppositor is DENIED it being possible to convert this case into an ordinary civil action.

xxx xxx xxx." x x x

x x x PMO filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the Order dated July 3, 2013 and Motion to Suspend Pre-Trial x x x. [PMO], among
others, raised the question of whether or not the RTC sitting as land registration court should act on the instant petition taking into account
its opposition that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as the issue mainly involves one that affects ownership of the
property covered by TCT No. 27090.

On December 23, 2013, the RTC issued the x x x Order as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, finding merit to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the oppositor, the same is GRANTED.
The Order dated [July 3, 2013] is hereby reconsidered and set aside.

Accordingly, the instant petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction." x x x
[The Quesadas], for their part, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated December 23, 2013 x x x. x x x PMO move[d] for the
denial of the said Motion for Reconsideration x x x. However, in another x x x Order dated April 8, 2014, the RTC denied [the Quesadas']
Motion for Reconsideration ruling that the RTC indeed has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as the issue involved therein
must be threshed out in an ordinary proceeding.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing Orders, [the Quesadas] filed [a] Petition for Certiorari [with the CA], arguing[, among others, that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case contrary to its Order dated
July 3, 2013.

The CA granted the petition of the Quesadas in its Decision dated June 29, 2015, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated December 23, 2013 and April 8, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105, in LRC Case No. 32715 (11) are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss
filed by x x x PMO is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

The CA justified the jurisdiction of the RTC, as a land registration court, over the present petition to surrender title pursuant to Section
107 of P.D. No. 1529 despite the contentious issues raised by the parties in this wise:

[Section 2] has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court (Concepcion v. Concepcion, 448 SCRA 31, 38 [2005]). Under
the former law (Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act), all summary reliefs such as the instant action to compel surrender of owner's
duplicate of Title could only be filed with the RTC sitting as a land registration court only if there was unanimity among the parties or there
was no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest. Otherwise, if the case became contentious and controversial,
it should be threshed out in an ordinary action or in the case where the incident properly belonged. Under the amended law, the court is
now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-controversial cases but even the contentious and substantial issues (Averia, Jr. v.
Caguioa, 146 SCRA 459, 462 [1986]).

PMO filed a motion for reconsideration, raising as issues the propriety of a petition for certiorari as a remedy to question the denial of a
motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal and the failure of the Quesadas to state a cause of action.

The CA denied PMO's motion for reconsideration in its Resolution10 dated May 2, 2016. The CA pointed out that it was justified in giving
due course to the petition and treating the same as an ordinary appeal because it was filed within the prescribed 15-day period.11 It also
invoked the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and substantial justice to justify the granting of the petition for certiorari despite
acknowledging that a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction is a final decision.12 As to the issue on the alleged failure
of the original petition to state a cause of action, the CA stated that this issue was impliedly ruled upon when the CA proceeded to resolve
the petition.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Quesadas filed a Comment to the Petition14 dated
December 19, 2016.

Issues

Whether the CA erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari when it is not the proper remedy to seek a review from an order of
dismissal.

Whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC can take cognizance of the petition to surrender the duplicate copy of TCT No. 27090
pursuant to Section 10715 of P.D. No. 1529.16

The Court's Ruling

The petition is not impressed with merit. It is accordingly denied.

On the first issue, PMO insists that the RTC's Order denying the motion for the reconsideration of the Order dismissing the original petition
was a final order and the remedy available to the Quesadas would have been to appeal the questioned Order and not to resort to petition
for certiorari.17

The Quesadas contend that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed
the case, giving them the right to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.18

While the Court concedes, as did the CA, that the RTC's Order dismissing the original petition of the Quesadas on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction is a final order that is normally subject of an appeal, nevertheless the Court finds that the CA did not commit reversible error
when it gave due course to the petition for certiorari and treated the same as an ordinary appeal.19

The Court in China Banking Corp. v. Cebu Printing and Packaging Corp.20 cited the several instances when the Court has treated a
petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari and allowed the resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari despite the
availability of an appeal, viz.:
It is true that in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court has,
before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the
reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is
sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.
This Court was also liberal in its treatment of a wrong mode of appeal in Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA, wherein it was ruled that:
x x x However, there are cases where the [certiorari] writ may still issue even if the aggrieved party has a remedy of appeal in the ordinary
course of law. Thus, where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may not prove adequate either in
point of promptness or completeness so that a partial or total failure of justice may result, a [certiorari] writ may issue.
The same was also applied in Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. LEYECO IV Employees Union-ALU, thus:
In addition, while the settled rule is that an independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal, there are a
few significant exceptions when the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, namely:
(a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the
writs issued are null; and (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.21 (Citations omitted)
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court agrees with the CA that there is sufficient justification that would merit a deviation from the
strict rule of procedure that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is
available, as it was in this case.22 The petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file an appeal and
the broader interests of justice justifies the relaxation of the rules.23

On the second issue, PMO insists that the original petition failed to state a cause of action because the allegations therein do not fall
under the two circumstances contemplated in Section 107 of P.D. No. 1529,24 and that the summary proceedings under the said Section
do not empower the RTC to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.25

The Quesadas take the position that the CA was correct in declaring that the instant case could be converted into an ordinary action to
avoid multiplicity of suits.26

Section 107 of P.D. No. 1529 provides:

SEC. 107. Surrender of withhold duplicate certificates. — Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any
involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be
registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may
file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner
or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon
such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if not27 any reason the
outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of
a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of
the outstanding duplicate.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the RTC as a land registration court is provided in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529, viz.:
SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. — Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the
Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.
Courts of First Instance [now, Regional Trial Courts] shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title
to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration
Commission [now, Land Registration Authority] with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in
applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As correctly observed by PMO, Section 107 contemplates ONLY two situations when a petition for surrender of withheld duplicate
certificate of title may be availed of. These are: (1) where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary
instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his consent, and (2) where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered
by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title.

Clearly, the original petition before the RTC does not allege an involuntary instrument which intends to divest the title of the registered
owner against his consent. TCT No. 27090 is registered in the name of the Quesadas' predecessors-in-interest and the Quesadas are
not divesting the title of their predecessors-in-interest against the latter's will.

Rather, the Quesadas require the surrender of the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 27090 in the possession of PMO based on an alleged
deed of donation in their favor, viz.:

It was alleged in the Petition x x x that [the Quesadas] are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Quezon City under TCT No. 27090.
TCT No. 27090 was originally registered in the name of [the Quesadas'] predecessors-in-interest and it was donated to them sometime
in 1997 (See: Deed of Donation, Rollo, pp. 32-33). x x x.

xxxx

x x x Thus, in order that [the Quesadas] may transfer the ownership of the property from their predecessors-in-interest to their name[s],
they would need the duplicate certificate of title which is in the possession of x x x PMO.28 (Emphasis supplied)
Inasmuch as the original petition before the RTC seeks the surrender of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 27090 in the possession
of PMO so that a voluntary instrument — a Deed of Donation — can be registered but the registration cannot be made by reason of the
refusal of PMO, the holder, to surrender the same, a cause of action under Section 107 of P.D. No. 1529 has been sufficiently alleged in
the original petition. Thus, a dismissal of the said petition on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action is not warranted.
Consequently, the RTC, as a land registration court, has jurisdiction over the original petition.

With respect to the power of the RTC to hear and decide contentious and substantial issues, such as, whether the obligation of the
Quesadas' predecessors-in-interest under the Growership Agreement had already been extinguished by prescription and whether the
Decision dated August 23, 1999 of the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 113 in Civil Case No. 8438, declaring that the Quesadas' predecessors-
in-interest had no more liability to Golden Country Farms (now PMO) or that whatever liability there might be against them could no longer
be enforced,29 or those that affect the ownership of the property covered by TCT No. 27090,30 Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529 confers a
broad jurisdiction upon the RTC "with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such [petition]."

As pointed by the Court in Lozada v. Bracewell31 it is settled that:

x x x with the passage of PD 1529, the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction conferred
upon it as a cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs now have the power to hear and determine all questions, even contentious and
substantial ones, arising from applications for original registration of titles to lands and petitions filed after such registration. x x x [T]he
matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only
a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction x x x.32 (Emphasis in the original omitted; emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)
As explained by the Court in Ignacio v. CA,33
x x x This amendment was aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits and at expediting the disposition of cases. Regional Trial Courts now
have the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after the original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions. Indeed, the land registration court can
now hear and decide controversial and contentious cases and those involving substantial issues x x x.

In the instant case, the trial court, although sitting as a land registration court, took cognizance of the petition as an ordinary civil action
under its general jurisdiction. The court did not decide the case summarily, but afforded both petitioner and private respondents the
opportunity to present their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. Ordinary pleadings and memoranda were likewise filed.
The decision of the trial court squarely addressed all the issues raised by the parties and applied substantive law and jurisprudence.34
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The CA, thus, correctly ruled, to wit:
x x x Since P.D. No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the [RJegional [T]rial [C]ourt and the limited
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law [Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act] when acting merely as a cadastral court, then
public respondent RTC has overstepped its boundaries when it dismissed the instant petition for lack of jurisdiction. To echo the Supreme
Court:
"x x x doctrinal jurisprudence holds that the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), as a Land Registration Court, can hear
cases otherwise litigable only in ordinary civil actions, since the Court[s] of First Instance are at the same time, courts of general jurisdiction
and could entertain and dispose of the validity or invalidity of respondent's adverse claim, with a view to determining whether petitioner
is entitled or not to the relief that he seeks" (Concepcion v. Concepcion, 448 SCRA 31, 38 [2005]; cited case omitted).
Considering the serious objection raised by x x x PMO on [the Quesadas'] claim, the issue becomes contentious and the RTC albeit
sitting as a land registration court, has the authority not only to take cognizance of the said petition, but also to thresh out the issue in a
full-blown hearing, to receive evidence of both parties and to determine whether or not [the Quesadas] are indeed entitled to the relief
prayed for.35
Verily, after the parties have been duly heard in a full-blown hearing, the RTC, being a court of general jurisdiction, can squarely address
all the issues to be raised by the parties and resolve their conflicting claims, applying substantive law and jurisprudence. Indeed, this
matter is procedural and not jurisdictional.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

CABAÑEZ VS. SOLANO

FACTS:

Subject of the present controversy are two (2) parcels of land located in Alabang Hills, Muntinlupa, with land areas measuring 739 and
421 square meters, and are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 154626 and 154627, respectively. Appearing on the face of
these titles as the registered owner is herein respondent, "Maria Josephine S. Cabañez, of legal age, married to [herein petitioner]
Benjamin H. Cabañez x x x."

On February 12, 2007, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City a "Petition for Correction of the Name and
Marital Status of the Registered Owner of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No[s.] 154626 and 154627 of the Registry of Deeds for
Muntinlupa City."[3] The petition was docketed as LRC Case No. 07-007 and raffled to Branch 203. In the said petition, respondent
alleged as follows:
xxxx

1. Petitioner is of legal age, single and a resident of #21 Dona Ines St., Alabang Hills Village, Muntinlupa City;

2. Petitioner is the owner of two parcels of land situated in Alabang, Muntinlupa City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 154626
and 154627 issued by the Registry of Deed for Muntinlupa, though the same were issued under the name Ma Josephine S. Cabañez,
married to Benjamin H. Cabañez. x x x

3. Without knowing the legal implication, Petitioner erroneously made it appear that she is married to Mr. Benjamin when in truth and in
fact they are not married but merely living a common-law relationship

4. Mr. Benjamin H. Cabañez is actually married to a certain Leandra D. Cabañez who had previously filed a case against Petitioner,
questioning the ownership of the said properties which case however was terminated by virtue of a compromise approved by the court in
an Order dated November 23, 2000. xxx

5. Mr. Benjamin H. Cabañez has also declared that he is not actually married to the Petitioner and that he has no interest or share
whatsoever in the aforesaid properties as evidenced by the hereto attached copy of the Affidavit of Declaration Against Interest dated
January 22, 2007. x x x

6. No interests or rights will be affected by the correction of the name and status of Petitioner as registered owner of the said properties.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that Petitioner's name and marital status appearing in Transfer Certificates
of Title No. 154626 and 154627 be corrected to (sic) from "MA. JOSEPHINE S. CABAÑEZ, married to BENJAMIN H. CABAÑEZ" to
["]MARIE JOSEPHINE C. SOLANO, single" as it is the true and actual status of petitioner.

x x x x[4]
The RTC then conducted hearings where respondent presented her evidence ex parte.

On June 28, 2007, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 203, rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be well-founded and meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City is directed to cause the correction of the name and civil status of the registered
owner of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 154626 and 154627 from MA. JOSEPHINE S. CABAÑEZ, married to BENJAMIN H. CABAÑEZ,
to MARIE JOSEPHINE C. SOLANO, single.

SO ORDERED.[5]
The RTC held that from the evidence presented by herein respondent, it has been satisfactorily established that the subject properties
should indeed be in respondent's name and that her status should be "single".

On November 23, 2007, herein petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment[6] assailing the above Decision of the
RTC on the ground that the said trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because respondent's petition
was not published in a newspaper of general circulation and that petitioner and other persons who may have interest in the subject
properties were not served summons.

On January 27, 2011, the CA rendered a Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 June 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, in LRC Case No. 07-007, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA ruled, among others, that respondent's petition for correction of her name and marital status as appearing in the subject TCTs
should have been published in accordance with Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and that respondent failed to present sufficient evidence
to prove compliance with such requirement. The appellate court also held that respondent also failed to serve summons upon petitioner,
which is in violation of the latter's right to due process and of the principle of fair play.

Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration[8] contending, among others, that the provisions of PD 1529, and not Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, should be applied in the present case; posting of the notice of hearing of respondent's petition is deemed constructive
notice to the whole world, including petitioner; the petition filed by respondent is an action in rem where jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

After petitioner filed its Comment,[9] the CA rendered its presently assailed Amended Decision and disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 June 2007 of the Regional Trial Court or
Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, in LRC Case No. 07-007, is REINSTATED. Perforce, the Petition for Annulment of Judgment is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[10]
This time, the CA agreed with respondent and ruled that PD 1529 is the governing law and that there is nothing under the pertinent
provisions of the said law which states that publication is a requirement for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over respondent's petition. The
CA also ruled that petitioner failed to prove the existence of extrinsic fraud as a ground for annulment of the assailed judgment of the
RTC.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[11]

However, in its Resolution of January 10, 2012, the CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari based on the following grounds:
A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN AMENDING ITS ORIGINAL DECISION DATED
JANUARY 27, 2011 CONSIDERING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLICATION AND SUMMONS WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDING PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 108 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529 IS
SUMMARY IN NATURE ALBEIT THE EVIDENT PRESENCE. OF OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES THAT MAY BE AFFECTED BY THE
JUDGMENT AS A RESULT OF EX-PARTE PROCEEDINGS.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF CHAN V. COURT OF APPEALS (298
SCRA 713, 733) APPLIES IN THE INSTANT CASE WHERE IT WAS RULED THAT MERE NOTICE TO THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
WAS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE.

D.

WHETHER OR NOT AMENDMENT AND ALTERATION OF CERTIFICATES OF TITLE PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 108 OF PD
1529 IS AN IN REM PROCEEDINGS THAT REQUIRES STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT.

E.

WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT SUPPLETORILY APPLY TO THE PROCEEDINGS
PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 108 OF PD 1529 WHEREIN THE REQUIREMENT OF PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY.

F.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PHRASE "THE COURT MAY HEAR AND DETERMINE THE PETITION AFTER NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES
IN INTEREST" IN SECTION 108 OF PD 1529 INCLUDES PUBLICATION AND SERVICE OF SUMMONS.

G.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PETITION IN THE
ABSENCE OF SUMMONS AND PUBLICATION.

H.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF NAME AND MARITAL
STATUS IN THE TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 154627 AND 154628.

I.

WHETHER OR NOT LEANDRA D. CABAÑEZ IS ENTITLED TO NOTICE AND SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY VIRTUE OF THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATIY CITY-BRANCH 137 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND
LEGALLY BELONGED TO THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTY.

J.

WHETHER OR NOT AN AFFIDAVIT THE CONTENTS OF WHICH WAS NOT TESTIFIED TO HAS PROBATIVE VALUE.

K.

WHETHER OR NOT THE SECURITY OR BOND MENTIONED IN SECTION 108 OF PD 1529 BEFORE ENTRY OF CORRECTION OR
ALTERATION MAY BE MADE IS MANDATORY TO PROTECT THE INTEREST OF THIRD PERSON.

L.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS [IS] PROCEDURALLY CORRECT IN ADMITTING THE
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF THE RESPONDENT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PETITION WAS ALREADY LONG
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION.[12]
The Court finds merit in the petition, but for reasons which are not identical as those espoused by petitioner.

At the outset, it bears to reiterate that the CA ruled on the basis of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529), otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree. Specifically, the CA cited Sections 2 and 108 of the said law, which provide as follows:
Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the
Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission
with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration,
with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Section 108. Amendment, and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book
after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same be Register of Deeds, except by order
of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner of other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the
Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that
the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated
and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made
in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the same or any person on the certificate
has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no
right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved
has not convened the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and
determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or
cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if
necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen
the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest
of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the
owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section. (emphasis supplied)

All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any other provision of this Decree after original registration shall be filed
and entitled in the original case in which the decree or registration was entered.
The Court notes that the petition was clearly one which was filed after original registration oi title, as provided under the abovequoted
Section 2 of PD 1529. Moreover, respondent's petition was filed with the RTC for the purpose of correcting supposed errors which were
committed when entries were made in the subject TCTs, as contemplated under Section 108 of the same law.

However, under settled jurisprudence, the enumerated instances for amendment or alteration of a certificate of title under Section 108 of
PD 1529 are non-controversial in nature.[13] They are limited to issues so patently insubstantial as not to be genuine issues. The
proceedings thereunder are summary in nature, contemplating insertions of mistakes which are only clerical, but certainly not controversial
issues.

As early as the case of Tangunan v. Republic of the Philippines[14], which was later cited in Angeles v. Razon, et al.[15], this Court,
sitting en banc, ruled that:
x x x the lower court did not err in finding that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present petition for the simple reason that it involves a
controversial issue which takes this case out of the scope of Section 112 of Act No. 496 [now Section 108 of PD 1529]. While this section,
among other things, authorized a person in interest to ask the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title "upon
the ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased",
and apparently the petition comes under its scope, such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no
adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed
out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs. Thus, it was held that "It is not proper to cancel an original
certificate of Torrens title issued exclusively in the name of a deceased person, and to issue a new certificate in the name of his heirs,
under the provisions of Section 112 of Act No. 496, when the surviving spouse claims right of ownership over the land covered by said
certificate." And, in another case, where there was a serious controversy between the parties as to the right of ownership over the
properties involved, this court held, "that following the principle laid down in the decision above cited, the issues herein should be ventilated
in a regular action x x x."[16] (citations omitted)
In the present case, the Court notes that in a separate action for annulment of title and recovery of ownership filed by petitioner's wife
against respondent, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 137, in its decision in Civil Case No. 91-2648, dated July 5, 1993, made a categorical
finding that petitioner and his wife are the lawful owners of the subject properties and ordering respondent to surrender possession thereof
to the said spouses.[17] This RTC judgment was later affirmed by the CA in its Decision[18] in CA-G.R. CV No. 49446, dated April 29,
1997. Respondent, on the other hand, claims that she together with petitioner and his wife subsequently executed an amicable settlement
dated June 22, 2000, which was approved by the RTC, wherein petitioner's wife waived her rights and interests over the said properties.
She also alleged that petitioner executed an Affidavit of Declaration Against Interest, dated January 22, 2007, indicating that he has no
right or interest over the subject properties. Petitioner, nonetheless, claims that he executed a subsequent Affidavit of Non-Waiver of
Interest, dated January 14, 2008, claiming that he was deceived by respondent into signing the said Affidavit of Declaration Against
Interest and that he was seriously ill at the time that he affixed his signature.

From the foregoing, there is no question that there is a serious objection and an adverse claim on the part of an interested party as shown
by petitioner's subsequent execution of his Affidavit of Non-Waiver of Interest. The absence of unanimity among the parties is also
evidenced by petitioner's petition seeking the annulment of the RTC Decision which granted respondent's petition for correction of entries
in the subject TCTs. These objections and claims necessarily entail litigious and controversial matters making it imperative to conduct an
exhaustive examination of the factual and legal bases of the parties' respective positions. Certainly, such objective cannot be
accomplished by the court through the abbreviated action under Section 108 of PD 1529. A complete determination of the issues in the
present case can only be achieved if petitioner and his wife are impleaded in an adversarial proceeding.

In addition, the Court finds apropos to the instant case the ruling in the similar case of Martinez v. Evangelista[19] where the petitioner in
the said case, being the registered owner of certain real properties, sought to strike out the words "married to x x x" appearing in the
Transfer Certificates of Title covering the said properties on the ground that the same was so entered by reason of clerical error or
oversight and in lieu thereof the word "single" be substituted, which according to the petitioner in the said case is his true and correct civil
status. This Court held that:
x x x x changes in the citizenship of a person or in his status from legitimate to illegitimate or from married lo not married are substantial
as well as controversial, which can only be established in an appropriate adversary proceeding as a remedy for the adjudication of real
and justifiable controversies involving actual conflict of rights the final determination of which depends upon the resolution of issues of
nationality, paternity, filiation or legitimacy of the marital status for which existing substantive and procedural laws as well as other rules
of court amply provide.[20]
In the present case, it is now apparent that before the trial court can alter the description of the civil status of respondent in the transfer
certificates of title in question, it will have to receive evidence of and determine respondent's civil status. This requires a full dress trial
rendering the summary proceedings envisaged in Section 108 of PD 1529 inadequate.

Finally, it is settled that a land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be
constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.[21] However, as found by the CA, respondent failed to comply
with the said requirements. In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute, and when the manner of
obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void.[22] It is wrong for the CA to
rule in its Amended Decision that publication is not a jurisdictional requirement for the RTC to take cognizance of respondent's petition.
The appellate court's reliance on the case of Chan v. Court of Appeals[23] is misplaced. In the said case, this Court considered the notice
to the Register of Deeds as substantial compliance with the notice and publication requirements of the law simply because in the petition
for correction filed by the petitioner therein, only the said petitioner and the Register of Deeds had an interest in the correction of titles
sought for. This Court ruled that there is therefore no necessity to notify other parties who had no interest to protect in the said petition.
This is not true, however, in the present case. As discussed above, on the bases of petitioner's serious objection and adverse claim, it is
apparent that he has an interest to protect. Thus, the ruling in Chan finds no application in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.

BANGUIS VS. TAMBUYAT

FACTS:

Adriano Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda Balcom – Tambuyat were married on September 16, 1965. During their marriage, Adriano
acquired several real properties, including a 700 sq. m. parcel of land located at Brgy. Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which was
bought on November 17, 1991. The Deed of Sale was signed by Adriano alone as vendee.

One of the signing witnesses was petitioner Rosario Banguis – Tambuyat, who signed therein as “Rosario Tambuyat”. All this time
petitioner Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco. When TCT covering the subject property was issued, it was made under the
name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis.
When Adriano died intestate on June 7, 1998, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of the subject TCT. She alleged that she was
the surviving spouse of Adriano. That the TCT was erroneously registered and made in the name of “Adriano M. Tambuyat married to
Rosario E. Banguis.” That per annexed marriage contract, Banguis was still married to Nolasco. Wenifreda prayed that the TCT be
cancelled. That a new certificate of title be made out in Adriano’s name, with her as the spouse indicated, and that Banguis be ordered
to surrender her copy of TCT.

On her defense, Banguis claimed that she and Adriano were married on Sept. 2, 1988, and thereafter lived together as married couple;
that their union produced a son; and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation, which is merely a summary
proceeding – considering that a thorough determination will have to be made as to whether the property is conjugal or exclusive property,
and since she and Adriano have a child whose rights will be adversely affected by any judgment in the case.

The RTC decided in favor of Wenifreda and directed the RD of Meycauayan to cancel the TCT of Banguis and in lieu thereof to issue a
new certificate of title in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Wenifreda “Winnie” Balcom Tambuyat. RTC justified its decision
by using Sec. 108 of PD 1529 which states: “court authorization is required for any alteration or amendment of a certificate of title when
any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate, or when
there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of the title.

The CA sustained the trial court’s decision, noting that Banguis’ name was included in the TCT by error or mistake. It held that the
evidence adduced proved that Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is the lawful wife of Adriano; that there is a valid and subsisting marriage
between Nolasco and Banguis, and the latter admitted to such fact during the course of the proceedings in the trial court; and that
Banguis’s opposition to Wenifreda’s petition for cancellation of TCT is not real and genuine as to place the latter’s title to the subject
property in doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether the cancellation of the TCT filed by Wenifreda be granted by the court.

Held:

YES! Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title may be resorted to
in seven instances, included are (1) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon
or on any duplicate certificate and (2) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title. The present case falls
under the two instances because the RD of Bulacan committed and error in issuing the disputed TCT, in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat
married to Rosario E. Banguis” when, in truth and in fact, respondent Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is Adriano’s lawful spouse. As
correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano.
Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be said that they have a common
law relationship at all.

Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband
and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. While it is true that our laws do
not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and
interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co ownership requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly
providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.

PAZ VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS:

Petitioner averred that he was the owner of the subject lots situated in parts of Manila. On November 29, 2000, the petitioner filed for the
cancellation of OCT 684 pursuant to Section 108 of PD 1529 issued under the name of the Republic claiming he owns the said lot. The
OCT sought to be cancelled included one lot, Lot 392 of the Muntinlupa Estate which was segregated from OCT 684 and was
subsequently issued a TCT No. 185552 still registered under the Republic. Pursuant to a joint venture agreement, the parties constructed
a subdivision which cause LOT 392 to be subdivided thereby causing the cancellation of TCT No. 185552, and the issuance of TCTs for
the resulting individual subdivision lots in the names of the Republic and FAI and that the subdivision lots were then sold to third parties.

Petitioner’s contention:

-that the OCT 684 and all its subsequent titles be cancelled and a new title will be issued in his favor free from all liens and encumbrances
-his petition for cancellation was not an initiatory pleading that must comply with the regular rules of civil procedure but a mere incident
of a past registration proceeding; that unlike in an ordinary action, land registration was not commenced by complaint or petition, and did
not require summons to bring the persons of the respondents within the jurisdiction of the trial court; and that a service of the petition
sufficed to bring the respondents within the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Respondent’s contention:

-the Petition for cancellation of title is litigable in an ordinary action outside the special and limited jurisdiction of land registration courts
thus removed from the ambit of Sec. 108 which requires, as an indispensable element for availment of the relief thereunder, either
unanimity of the parties or absence of serious controversy or adverse claim; that it authorizes only amendment and alteration of certificates
of title, not cancellation thereof; and there is Lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the persons of the respondents who were not validly
served with summons but only a copy of the Petition.

Ruling of the lower court:

Favored the respondent and ruled that the petition made by the petition has all the elements of and action for recovery, to wit;
a) it was commenced long after the decree of registration in favor of the Respondent Republic of the Philippines had become final
and incontrovertible, following the expiration of the reglementary period
b) there is an imputation of a wrongful or fraudulent titling in the issuance of OCT No. 684 allegedly irregular due to the absence
of survey plan, decree of registration and court record
c) the Petition seeks as its main relief the issuance of a new title to him

And that the issue involves title to a land or an interest thereon "arising after the original" proceeding, which should be filed and entitled
under the original land registration case under the instructions of Sec. 2 of PD 1529 and not Sec 108.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

Affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action is one for cancellation of title?

RULING:

NO! Based on the proceeding of Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the amendment and alteration of a certificate of title is
applicable in seven instances or situations, namely:

a) when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased;
b) when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate;
c) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate; or any memorandum
d) thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (d) when the name of any person on the certificate; has been changed;
e) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest
of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected;
f) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after
its dissolution; and
g) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title

In this case, the petitioner was in reality seeking the reconveyance of the property covered by OCT No. 684, not the cancellation of a
certificate of title as contemplated by Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, his petition did not fall under any of the situations covered by
Section 108. Moreover, the fling of the petition would have the effect of reopening the decree of registration, and could thereby impair the
rights of innocent purchasers in good faith and for value. To reopen the decree of registration was no longer permissible, considering that
the one-year period to do so had long ago lapsed, and the properties covered by OCT No. 684 had already been subdivided into smaller
lots whose ownership had passed to third persons.

PADAYHAG VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS:

The CA Decision states the following facts as culled from the records:

This case involves six (6) parcels of land identified as Lot Nos. 2883, 2888, 2921, 2922, 2102, and 2104. These lots are claimed by two
(2) parties, namely: the Heirs of Lourdes Padayhag, and Southern Mindanao Colleges (SMC).

The first two lots (Lot Nos. 2102 and 2104 [Santa Lucia Lots]) are located at Jamisola Street, Santa Lucia District, Pagadian City. The
other four lots (Lot Nos. 2883, 2888, 2921, and 2922 [Lumbia Lots]) are located at Lumbia District, Pagadian City.

The Director of Lands, acting for and in behalf of the Government, instituted with the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur
(now RTC of Pagadian City) Cadastral Case No. N-17, GLRO CAD Rec. No. N-468 pursuant to the government's initiative to place all
lands under the Cadastral System.

On January 4, 1967, Lourdes Padayhag filed her Answer in Cadastral Case No. N-17.

On January 18, 1967, SMC filed its Answer in Cadastral Case No. N-17.

The Heirs of Lourdes Padayhag [Padayhags] claim that the Spouses Federico and Lourdes Padayhag are the original owners of [the
Lumbia] Lots [(Lot Nos. 2883, 2888, 2921, and 2922)]. These lots are part of the 5-hectare landholding of their father, Federico Padayhag.
On August 31, 1948, Spouses Federico and Lourdes Padayhag and Southern Mindanao Institute. ([SMI,] now Southern Mindanao
Colleges) entered into an Agreement Referring to Real Property conveying the possession of these lots to SMI in consideration of 30
shares of stock of SMI. When x x x [SMC] succeeded x x x SMI, x x x Lourdes Padayhag wanted to return the shares of stock issued to
them so that the Padayhags could get back the land subject of the contract.

As for [the Sta. Lucia Lots (Lot Nos. 2102 and 2104)], the Padayhags [claim] that since 1927 they occupied 300 square meters of Lot
[No.] 2102 and 412 square meters of Lot [No.] 2104. However, when a cadastral survey was made on [L]ot [N]os. 2102 and 2104, they
were not able to object as they were not informed of such survey. They protested with the Bureau of Lands asserting that there was error
in the survey of the boundaries.

On the other hand, x x x SMC argued that it bought [L]ot [N]o. 2102 from Mangacop Ampato evidenced by a Deed of Conveyance of Real
Estate executed on January 22, 1960; and [L]ot [N]o. 2104 from Adriano Arang evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on
January 31, 1964. Likewise, the said conveyance was reflected in the Status Book of the Bureau of Lands.

On May 30, 2006, the RTC, sitting as Land Registration Court, rendered a Decision in favor of SMC, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this court sitting as cadastral court, adjudicates, as it hereby adjudicate and award Lot [N]os. 2102 [and] 2104, situated
at comers Jan1isola and Aquino Streets, Santa Lucia District, Pagadian City, and Lot [N]os. 2883, 2888, 2921 and 2922, all situated at
Pagadian City, together with all the improvements thereon, to [c]laimant Southern Mindanao Colleges, thru its President, with principal
office at Pagadian City.

SO ORDERED."10

On July 19, 2006, the Padayhags filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted in a Resolution11 dated December 27, 2007, the
dispositive portion of which is quoted [below:]12

"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered granting the Motion for Reconsideration of the [ c ]laimant
Heirs of Lourdes Padayhag and

1. REVERSING the previous decision of this Court dated May 30, 2006 over subject Lot Nos. 2102, 2104, 2883, 2888, 2921, and 2922,
Pls-119 awarding said lots to [c]laimant SMC, and awarding portions of Cadastral Lot Nos. 2102 and 2104, or Lot No. 2102-A and 2104-
A, and Cadastral Lot· Nos. 2883, 2888, 2921, and 2922 to the [c]laimants-Heirs of Lourdes Padayhag;

2. Return of what has been receive[d], proceeding from the void Agreement Regarding Real Property, namely Cadastral Lot Nos. 2883,
2888, 2921, and 2922 to the [c]laimants-Heirs of Lourdes Padayhag, and the thirty shares of [stock] to [c]laimant SMC; and

3. Declaring the remaining portions of Cadastral Lot Nos. 2102 and 2104, namely Lot Nos. 2102-B and 2104-B as alienable lands of the
public domain.

SO ORDERED."13

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, SMC appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and ruled that:

In the present case, there being no indication at all from the records that notice of the Order for Initial Hearing was published in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation, the decision rendered by the RTC of Pagadian City is void ab initio for having been
rendered without jurisdiction.14

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.15

SMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration,16 which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated January 10, 2013 while the Padayhags
filed their Petition with the Court.

On February 5, 2013, SMC filed an "Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court" in UDK 14834.17 In a Resolution dated August 12, 2013, the Court resolved to deny SMC's motion for extension for lack
of payment of docket fees pursuant to Sections 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(c), Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended.18 Thereafter, an Entry of Judgment was issued certifying that the said Resolution had become final and executory on
November 8, 2013.19

On March 8, 2013, SMC filed a Petition for Certiorari (under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court).

Anent the Padayhag Petition, SMC filed a Comment20 dated February 14, 2013. The Padayhags filed a Reply21 dated February 18,
2013. Public respondent Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Comment22 dated April 15, 2013.
The OSG argued that the CA did not err in setting aside the May 30, 2006 Decision and December 27, 2007 Resolution of the RTC for
having been rendered without jurisdiction and pointed to the lack of publication in the Official Gazette of the notice of the initial hearing
as required by Act No. (Act) 2259, the Cadastral Act.23 The OSG cited as additional ground the deprivation of the State of its day in court
because the OSG was allegedly not furnished with copies of the court orders, notices and decisions in the cadastral case.24
The Padayhags filed a Reply25 dated May 16, 2013. They argued that the requirement of publication of the notice of initial hearing was
complied with. They mentioned that they have attached the certified copies of the pertinent pages of the Official Gazette in their previous
submissions26 with the Court.

The Court in its Resolution27 dated June 19, 2013 resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 206062 with G.R. No. 202872 to avoid conflicting
decisions on related cases and to save the time and resources of the Court, both petitions involving the same parties, the same facts and
issues and assail the same CA Decision.

The OSG on behalf of the public respondents filed a Comment28 dated September 24, 2013 to the consolidated petitions. In the
Comment, the OSG argued that SMC availed of the wrong remedy. SMC should have filed a Rule 45 petition instead of a Rule 65 certiorari
petition,29 and the assailed CA Decision and Resolution are not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.30 The OSG also reiterated the
lack of jurisdiction of the RTC due to the lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.31 Further, the OSG argued that it was not
furnished with copies of the court orders, notices and decisions in the cadastral case and, thus, the State was deprived its day in court,
rendering the RTC Decision void.32

In their Supplemental Comment33 dated October 25, 2013, the Padayhags alleged that the filing by SMC of its Rule 65 certiorari petition
did not cure the jurisdictional defect of the earlier denial of SMC's "Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court" for failure to pay the appeal fee.34

SMC filed a Reply35 dated May 19, 2014 to the Padayhags' Supplemental Comment wherein it explained the delay in the filing thereof,
the choice of the remedy that it availed of, and the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction that CA committed.36 SMC
also filed a Reply37 dated October 7, 2014 to the OSG's Comment, reiterating essentially the arguments that it raised in its earlier Reply.

The Padayhags filed their Reply38 dated March 25, 2015. They stated therein that they agreed with the OSG that the remedy of certiorari
under Rule 65 is not a substitute for lapsed appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.39 Further, they argued that they complied with the
publication of the notice of initial hearing requirement.40

The Padayhags filed their Memorandum41 dated November 12, 2015. The OSG filed a Memorandum42 dated December 28, 2015. SMC
filed its Memorandum43 dated November 24, 2015. The Padayhags subsequently filed on December 3, 2015 a Motion for Leave to File
Amended Memorandum44 dated December 2, 2015 and an Amended Memorandum45 dated November 12, 2015.

Issues

The pertinent issues raised in the consolidated Petitions are the following:

(1) whether the CA erred in setting aside the R TC Decision and Resolution for want of jurisdiction;

(2) whether the RTC's failure to notify the OSG of the cadastral proceedings and the orders therein deprived the State of due process
and rendered the RTC Decision and Resolution void;

(3) whether the CA erred in failing to decide on the nature of the "Agreement Referring to Real Property" which covers Lot Nos. 2883,
2888, 2921 and 2922;

(4) whether there remain mixed questions of law and facts as to Lot Nos. 2102 and 2104 that should be remanded to the CA for its
resolution; and

(5) whether SMC's certiorari petition under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail the CA Decision.

The Court's Ruling

To recall, the CA in the assailed Decision epigrammatically justified the dismissal of the appeal for lack of merit in this wise:

In the present case, there being no indication at all from the records that notice of the Order for Initial Hearing was published in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation, the decision rendered by the RTC of Pagadian City is void ab initio for having been
rendered without jurisdiction.46

The Padayhags counter the CA's finding of lack of publication and assert that:

x x x the Notice of Initial Hearing for Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC Cadastral Record No. N-468 was published in successive issues of
the Official Gazette on October 24 and 31, 1966. In particular, it was published in the Official Gazet1te Volume 62, Number 43 and 44. x
x x The name of one of the Heirs of Lourdes Padayhag, Federico Padayhag, Jr. was even mentioned in O.G. Vol. 62, No. 44 in page
8314 thereto as one of the known claimants. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in OG Vol. No. 62[,] No. 43 pages 8044 to 8047
(Sub-Annexes E-1 and E-2, attached to the Motion for Leave to File Manifestation with Motion for Substitution of Heirs) and O.G. Vol. 62,
No. 44, pages 8312 to 8315 (Annex "E," attached to the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45).47

A verification of the documents adverted to by the Padayhags, which bear a certification by the University of the Philippines Library, Media
Service Section, Diliman, Quezon City that they are microfilm print-outs of the Official Gazette issues concerned, reveals the presence of
a Notice of Initial Hearing in Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC Cadastral Record No. N- 468 before the then Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Sur addressed to the Solicitor General, Adriano Arang, Mangacap Ampato, and Federico Padayhag, Jr. among others,
stating that:

Whereas, a petition has been presented to said Court by the Director of Lands, praying that the titles to the following described lands or
the various parcels thereof, be settled and adjudicated:

A parcel of land with the buildings and improvements thereon, containing an area of 236,6925 hectares, more or less, divided into 1,409
lots, situated in the Municipality of Pagadian, Province of Zamboanga del Sur, the same being designated as Pagadian Public Lands
Subdivision Pls- 119, Case 1 x x x.

You are hereby cited to appear at the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, at its session to be held in the Municipality of
Pagadian, Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines, on the 16th day of January, 1967, at 8:00 o'clock in the forenoon, to present such
claims as you may have to said lands or any portion thereof, and to present evidence if any you [may] have, in support of such claims.

And unless you appear at the time and place aforesaid, your default will be recorded and the title to the lands will be adjudicated and
determined in accordance with the prayer of the petition and upon the evidence before the Court, and you will be forever barred from
contesting said application or any decree entered thereon.

Witness the Hon. Antonio Montilla, Judge of said Court, the 2nct day of June, in the year 1966.48

The Notice was attested to by Antonio H. Noblejas, then Commissioner of Land Registration and issued at Manila on September 12,
1966.49

Act 2259 (The Cadastral Act, enacted on February 11, 1913) provides:

SEC. 7. Upon the receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing of the petition the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office shall cause notice thereof to be published twice, in successive issues of the Official Gazette, in the English language. The notice
shall be issued by order of the court, attested by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, and shall be in form substantially as
follows:

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On the other hand, Act 496 (The Land Registration Act, approved on November 6, 1902) provides:

SEC. 31. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing of the application from the clerk of Court of First Instance,
the Chief of the General Land Registration Office shall cause a notice thereof to be published twice, in successive issues of the Official
Gazette, in the English language. The notice shall be issued by order of the court, attested by the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office, and shall be in form substantially as follows:

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The above quoted provisions of The Cadastral Act and The Land Registration Act are amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 96, which took
effect upon its approval on March 24, 1947.

Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529 (the Property Registration Decree, done/approved on June 11, 1978) provides:

SEC. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - x x x

The public shall be given notice of the initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and
(3) posting.

1. By publication. -

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of
initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided,
however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed
to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may
concern". Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer
of said application shall not be granted.

2. By mailing. -

(a) Mailing of notice to persons nan1ed in the application. -

The Commissioner of Land Registration shall also, within seven days after publication of said notice in the Official Gazette, as hereinbefore
provided, cause a copy of the notice of initial hearing to be mailed to every person named in the notice whose address is known.

(b) Mailing of notice to the Secretary of Public Highways, the Provincial Governor and the Mayor. - If the applicant requests to have the
line of a public way or road determined, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a copy of said notice of initial hearing to be
mailed to the Secretary of Public Highways, to the Provincial Governor, and to the Mayor of the municipality or city, as the case may be,
in which the land lies.

(c) Mailing of notice to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Public Works, the
Director of Forest Development, the Director of Mines and the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. - If the land borders on a
river, navigable stream or shore, or on an arm of the sea where a river or harbor line has been established, or on a lake, or if it otherwise
appears from the application or the proceedings that a tenant-farmer or the national government may have a claim adverse to that of the
applicant, notice of the initial hearing shall be given in the same manner to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Solicitor General, the
Director of Lands, the Director of Mines and/or the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, as may be appropriate.

3. By posting. -

The Commissioner of Land Registration shall also cause a duly attested copy of the notice of initial hearing to be posted by the sheriff of
the province or city, as the case may be, or by his deputy, in a conspicuous place on each parcel of land included in the application and
also in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land or portion thereof
is situated, fourteen days at least before the date of initial hearing.

The court may also cause notice to be served to such other persons and in such manner as it may deem proper.

The notice of initial hearing shall, in form, be substantially as follows:

xxxx

Given that the initial hearing based on the published notice was scheduled on January 16, 1967, the applicable laws were Act 496 and
Act 2259 which required only the notice of initial hearing to be published twice, in successive issues of the Official Gazette. Thus, it was
erroneous for the CA to have required an additional publication of the said notice in a newspaper of general circulation. Such requirement
was imposed only with the passage of PD 1529.

As proof of the publication in two successive issues of the Official Gazette of the Notice of Initial Hearing for Cadastral Case No. N-17,
LRC Cadastral Record No. N-468, the Padayhags submitted to the Court microfilm print-outs of the issues of the Official Gazette on
October 24 and 31, 1966, Volume 62, Number 43, pages 8044 to 8047, and Number 44, pages 8312 to 8315 certified by the University
of the Philippines Library, Media Service Section, Diliman, Quezon City. Adriano Arang, Mangacap Ampato, and Federico Padayhag, Jr.
appear in the said issues among the many claimants of the 1,409 lots with a combined area of 23 6,6925 hectares situated in the then
Municipality of Pagadian, Province of Zamboanga del Sur and designated as Pagadian Public Lands Subdivision Pls-119, Case 1.
Mangacap Ampato or "Mangacop Ampato" and Adriano Arang are allegedly predecessors-in-interest of SMC. The case in the RTC is
docketed as "CADASTRAL CASE NO. N-17 LRC CAD. REC. NO. N-468 LOTS NOS. 2102, 2104, and 2883, 2888, 2921 and 2922, Pls-
119."50

Given that Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-468 does not only cover the six lots in dispute in this case, but around 1,409
lots, the copies of the issues of the Official Gazette where the Notice of the Order for Initial Hearing was published could have been
included in the records of the cadastral proceedings of the other lots included therein. Thus, it was imprudent for the CA to rule that the
Decision rendered by the RTC is void ab initio for having been rendered without jurisdiction. The repercussion of such pronouncement
by the CA is far-reaching as it would cast doubt on the validity of the cadastral proceedings of the 1,409 lots in the then Municipality of
Pagadian. At the very least, the CA should have required the parties to present proof of the publication of the Order for Initial Hearing in
the pertinent issues of the Official Gazette.

In Republic v. CA,51 the Court noted that anent the publication requirement in reconstitution proceedings under Section 13,52 RA 26,
mere submission of the subject Official Gazette issues would evidence only the first element - publication in two consecutive issues of
the Official Gazette, and what must be proved is not the content of the Order published in the Official Gazette but the fact of two-time
publication in successive issues at least 30 days before the hearing date.53 The Court further stated therein that it has consistently
accepted the probative value of certifications of the Director of the National Printing Office in reconstitution cases.54 The Court even
quoted therein the lower court's observation that the Official Gazette is an official publication of the government and consequently, the
Court can take judicial notice of its contents.55

In this case, no certification from the Director of the National Printing Office was presented.1âwphi1 The certification alone without the
copy of the Notice of Initial Hearing may not suffice. There is a need to verify the contents of the said Notice to ensure that the subject
properties (6 lots) and parties/claimants are covered thereby. The Notice of Initial Hearing was not only for subject properties and
parties/claimants, but for 1,409 lots and numerous claimants. If the Notice of Initial Hearing pertained to a specific registered property, as
in the case of the reconstitution of a title, then a certification of publication from the Director of the National Printing Office in this wise
would suffice:

Order relative to LRC No. F-504-84 In Re: Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Burned/Destroyed Original Copy of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-304198, SPS. FERNANDO DAYAO and REMEDIOS NICODEMUS, x x x was published in the Official Gazette, to wit:

VOLUME NUMBER PAGES DATE OF ISSUE

85 24 June 12, 1989
25 June 19, 1989
June 19, 1989 issue was released for publication on June 28, 1989.56
It will be recalled that the Official Gazette was created by decree of Act 453, "An Act providing for the publication by the Insular Government
of an Official Gazette, under the general direction of the Department of Public Instruction," which was enacted by the Philippine
Commission on September 2, 1902, by authority of the United States of America. Vol. 1, No. 1 of the Official Gazette came out on
September 10, 1902.57 In March 5, 1903, Act 664 amended Act 453 to provide for publication of the Official Gazette weekly in two parts,
one part in English and the other in Spanish, with each part issued separately and containing, among others, all legislative Acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Insular Legislature, all executive orders, such as decisions of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Customs Appeals, and the Court of Land Registration.58 Subsequently, Commonwealth Act No. 638, "An Act to provide for the uniform
publication and distribution of the Official Gazette," was passed by the Third Session of the Second National Assembly on May 22, 1941
and subsequently approved by President Manuel L. Quezon on June 10, 1941.59 The Administrative Code of 1987 requires publication
of laws in the Official Gazette to take effect.60

Given that the Official Gazette is the official publication of the government, the Court can take judicial notice thereof pursuant to Section
2 of Rule 129, Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

Thus, the Court takes judicial notice of the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing for Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC Cadastral Record
No. N- 468 in the issues of the Official Gazette on October 24 and 31, 1966, Volume 62, Number 43, pages 8044 to 8047, and Number
44, pages 8312 to 8315.

As to the alleged failure by the RTC to notify the OSG of the cadastral proceedings and the orders therein which purportedly deprived the
State of due process and would render the RTC Decision and Resolution void, the Court finds it hard to reconcile the position taken by
the OSG in this case with the nature of cadastral proceedings.

Sections 1 and 5 of the Cadastral Act (Act 2259) provides:

SECTION 1. When, in the opinion of the Governor-General (now the President), the public interests require that the title to any lands be
settled and adjudicated, he may to this end order the Director of Lands to make a survey and plan thereof.

The Director of Lands shall, thereupon, give notice to persons claiming an interest in the lands, and to the general public, of the day on
which such survey will begin, giving as full and accurate description as possible of the lands to be surveyed. Such notice shall be published
in two successive issues of the Official Gazette, and a copy of the notice in the English and Spanish languages shall be posted in a
conspicuous place on the chief municipal building of the municipality, township or settlement in which the lands, or any portion thereof,
are situated. A copy of the notice shall also be sent to the president of such municipality, township, or settlement, and to the provincial
board.

xxxx

SECTION 5. When the lands have been surveyed and platted, the Director of Lands represented by the Attorney-General (now Solicitor
General), shall institute registration proceedings, by petition against the holders, claimants, possessors, or occupants of such lands or
any part thereof, stating in substance that the public interests require that the titles to such lands be settled and adjudicated, and praying
that such titles be so settled and adjudicated.

xxxx

Evidently, the herein cadastral proceedings were supposed to have been instituted by the then Director of Lands represented by the
Solicitor General. For the OSG to now deny that it had no involvement in or that it had not been notified of the proceedings is not in
keeping with the nature of cadastral proceedings. The Court is not prepared to nullify the cadastral proceedings involving the then
municipality of Pagadian without due process being accorded to all the claimants involved therein and without the OSG going thoroughly
over the records of the entire cadastral proceedings to verify whether it participated therein. It must be noted that in these petitions, the
RTC Decision was finally rendered on May 30, 2006 after 40 years from June 2, 1966, the date of the Notice of Initial Hearing. To
summarily nullify the cadastral proceedings at this juncture would be unjust. Suffice it say that for purposes of these cases, the Court is
relying on the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed pursuant to Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

Regarding the third and fourth issues, these involve questions of fact and the CA should be given the opportunity to rule on them as the
reviewer of facts.61 In reviews on certiorari, the Court, not being a trier of facts, addresses only questions of law;62 and since the CA has
not resolved the cases on the merits, remand to the CA is in order. The consolidated cases are being remanded to the CA to enable the
CA to rule on the factual issues of the consolidated cases.

As to the fifth and last issue, both the Padayhags and the OSG are correct that SMC availed of the wrong remedy.1âwphi1 A petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45 is the proper remedy of a party desiring to appeal by certiorari a judgment,
final order or resolution of the CA.63

Also, SMC is not justified to avail itself of a Rule 65 certiorari petition after its earlier attempt to avail of a Rule 45 certiorari petition had
failed. SMC, prior to the filing of the SMC Petition, attempted to comply with a Rule 45 certiorari petition when on February 5, 2013, it filed
an "Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court" in UDK 14834.64
However, in its Resolution dated August 12, 2013, the Court resolved to deny SMC's motion for extension for lack of payment of docket
fees pursuant to Sections 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(c), Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.65 Thereafter, an
Entry of Judgment was issued certifying that the said Resolution had become final and executory on November 8, 2013.66

Given that SMC resorted to successive Rule 45 and Rule 65 certiorari petitions to question the CA Decision and Resolution and that the
Rule 45 certiorari petition had already been denied, the denial of the SMC Petition is in order because certiorari is not and cannot be
made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence as in this case where the
appeal was lost due to non-payment of docket fees.67

The denial of the SMC Petition is, however, of no moment since the instant cases are being remanded to the CA and the CA will have to
pass upon the respective claims of the Padayhags and SMC on the lots in question in the resolution of the appeals before the CA on the
merits.

WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 202872 is hereby GRANTED.

DELA PAZ VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS:

On 5 June 2007, Marcelino Dela Paz (Marcelino) filed a verified petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 206714 covering a parcel of land
described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 457-A-12-B-2-B-2-A) of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-2114428, being a partion of Lot 457-A-12-B-2-B-2 (LRC)
Psd-1774344 L.R.C. Record No. 3563, situated in Barrio of Bagbag, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the N. points 2 to 3 by
existing road 8 m. wide; on the E. and S. points 3 to 4 and 4 to 1 by Lot 457-A-12-B-2-B-1 (LRC) Psd-177344. Beginning at a point marked
"1" on plan beginning 50 deg. 50'E., 457.01 m. from L.W. 22, Piedad Estate; thence N. 22 deg. 40'3., 28.02 m. to point 2; thence N. 85
deg. 54'3., 15.00 m. to point 3; thence S. 1 deg. 57'W., 25.06 m. to point 4; thence S. 85 deg. 54'W., 24.97 m. to the point of beginning;
containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED (500) SQUARE METERS more or less.[5] xxx
This parcel of land was the subject of an extrajudicial settlement dated 23 October 2000 among the heirs of Luz Dela Paz, namely:
Franklin S. Bortado, Sr., Franklin P. Bortado, Jr., and Marylou Bortado. Thereafter, Marcelino and his mother, Jenny Rose Dela Paz,
bought the subject land on 23 November 2005.

Based on the petition for reconstitution, the original copy of TCT No. 206714 was destroyed by fire that razed the Quezon City Hall
building on 11 June 1988, thus, the owner's duplicate copy was lost as evidenced by the affidavit of loss duly registered and recorded
with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Marcelino submitted the following as evidence: (1) a photocopy of TCT No. 206714; (2) real
property tax declarations; (3) receipts of payments of real property tax; and (4) the land's sketch plan and subdivision plan.

Marcelino likewise submitted a Land Registration Authority (LRA) report stating that the plan and technical description of the property
may be used as basis for the inscription of the technical description on the reconstituted title. In addition, Marcelino submitted a certified
microfilm copy of the plan and a technical description of the property on file with the LRA, which he claimed to be a valid b asis and
reference for reconstitution. Marcelino believed that these documents corroborate the other documentary evidence covering the subject
property.

After considering the evidence presented, the RTC granted the petition and ordered the reconstitution of TCT No. 206714 based on the
approved subdivision plan and technical description submitted. The RTC said:
The [c]ourt, after considering the evidence presented, finds that this is a proper case for the judicial reconstitution of the original and
owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 206714 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City based on the approved
subdivision plan and technical description of the subject property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to reconstitute the original copy of TCT No. 206714 in the name of Luz Dela
Paz and to issue second owner's duplicate copy of the title to the petitioner Marcelino Dela Paz, based on the approved subdivision plan
and technical description which may be used as basis for the inscription of the technical description of the reconstituted certificate,
provided that the reconstituted title should be made subject to such encumbrance as may be subsisting, and provided further, that no
certificate of title exists in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.[6]
The Assailed CA Rulings

When the case was elevated before the CA, the RTC's decision was reversed and set aside, and the petition for reconstitution was
dismissed. The CA was not convinced that the evidence adduced in support of the petition for reconsideration was enough. It held:
First. The heirs of Luz Dela Paz, who allegedly executed the Extrajudicial Settlement and Deed of Absolute Sale relative to the subject
property covered by TCT No. 206714 were not presented in court to acknowledge the same. The contract of sale was not even registered
with the Register of Deeds as required under Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 for it to become a credible basis for the granting of [Marcelino]'s
cause.

Second W[e] observe that the Certification issued by the Quezon City Registry of Deeds relative to the alleged loss of the original of TCT
No. 206714 due to fire that razed the City Hall on June 11, 1988 was a form document as the name of Luz Dela Paz and the number of
the TCT were merely entered on the blanks therein provided.

Further, it cannot be deduced from the wordings of the said certification that TCT No. 206714 was actually issued and registered under
Luz Dela Paz. It states that "xxx the original of TCT No. 206714 allegedly registered under the name of Luz P. Dela Paz was/were not
included among those saved titles during the fire that razed the Quezon City Hall Building last June 11, 1988 xxx." Furthermore, it could
hardly be concluded therefrom that TCT No. 206714 was indeed part of the Registry's, record. Although it was mentioned therein that
TCT No. 204714 was not among those salvaged files during the fire incident, it does not necessarily follow that this document was among
those records on file with the Quezon City Registry of Deeds.

Third. It should be remembered that the original TCT No. 206714 was allegedly destroyed during the June 11, 1988 fire incident. The
owner's duplicate copy was allegedly lost in 2001. From 1988 to 2001, the heirs of Luz Dela Paz did not bother to file a petition for the
reconstitution of the damaged TCT. They even failed to execute an affidavit concerning the loss of their copy in 2001 when at that time
they were the alleged owners and presumably in possession of said property. It was only when the subject lot was transferred to
[Marcelino] and his mother Jenny Rose Dela Paz on November 23, 2005 that said affidavit was made at [Marcelino]'s instance. In said
document, he failed to explain the surrounding circumstances how said copy was lost. He just made a general statement therein that the
duplicate original copy "got lost and could no longer be located despite diligent effort to locate the same." Inexplicably, the extant petition
was filed only in 2007 or nineteen (19) years from the copy's destruction in 1988.

Fourth. The tax declaration and tax receipt presented cannot likewise be valid bases for reconstitution as these documents are issued for
tax purposes only. Besides, a tax declaration is not a reliable source of reconstruction of a certificate of title. It can only be prima facie
evidence of claim of ownership, which, however, is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding. A reconstitution of title does not pass
upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title but merely determines whether are issuance of such title is proper.
(citations omitted)

Fifth. The photocopy of TCT No. 206714 offered by [Marcelino] can only be considered secondary evidence, hence, inadmissible. Absent
any satisfactory proof that would establish its admissibility as provided under Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the same cannot
be relied upon [for] the reconstitution of the subject certificate of title.

What further surprises this Court is that [in] the said copy, the name of the subject lot's registered owner was concealed as the space
provided for therein was deliberately covered. [Marcelino] even failed to testify why he had a photocopy of the owner's duplicate copy and
how he was able to secure the same. (italics supplied)

Sixth. The Sketch Plan and Subdivision Plan submitted by [Marcelino] are mere additional requirements under R.A. No. 26 and per se
not sufficient bases for reconstitution. This is evident under Section 12 of R.A. No. 26, thus:

xxxx

We also examined the LRA Report dated January 21, 2008 verifying that the plan and technical description of Lot 457-A-12-B-2-B-2-A of
the Subdivision Plan are true representations of the lot approved under (LRA) PR-08-01589-R. Despite said certification, [we] cannot still
ascertain whether this lot was indeed covered by TCT No. 206714 and registered under Luz Dela Paz. The Report states "xxx Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 206714, allegedly lost or destroyed and supposedly covering Lot 457- A-12-B-2-B-2-A of the subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-214428 xxx." The Technical Description and Sketch/Special Plan appended therewith do not even bear the TCT covering said
property. Moreover, the officers who d and verified the plan and technical description of the land were not presented as witnesses to
confirm the same.[7]
Aggrieved by the reversal, Marcelino filed a motion for reconsideration that the CA eventually denied; hence, the present petition.

THE PETITION

Marcelino faults the CA in saying that the documentary evidence submitted are not enough to reconstitute TCT No. 206714. He argues
that he has fully complied with the jurisdictional requirements set forth in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26. The RTC even found it proper to
reconstitute based on the approved subdivision plan and technical description of the property.

Marcelino submits that the documents he submitted are sufficient to establish the existence of TCT No. 206714 to warrant its
reconstitution. Although the certification that the original copy of TCT No. 206714 was not included among those saved during the fire is
pro forma, it is still a public document which contents are presumed to be true and accurate. Meanwhile, the LRA report favors
reconstitution because (1) the approved plan and technical description were verified by the LRA; and (2) the report mentions that the
approved plan and technical description may be used as basis for the property's description in the reconstituted title. As to the other
documents, Marcelino maintains that they are genuine evidence for reconstitution as they are public documents. Therefore, considered
all together, the pieces of documentary evidence are sufficient for reconstituting TCT No. 206714.

THE COURT'S RULING

The present petition is devoid of merit.

Preliminary considerations

The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Marcelino presented competent proof that TCT No. 206714 may be reconstituted based
on the documentary evidence he submitted. We generally do not entertain a question of fact requiring a re-evaluation of the evidence on
record, given the limited rule review provided us in Rule 45 that a petition shall only raise questions of law.

The Court, not being a trier of facts, does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties
during the trial of the case.[8] Ordinarily, we will not review the factual findings of the lower courts as they are conclusive and binding.
This rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions, i.e., when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court. Here,
the CA reversed the RTC's Order because it found the submitted documentary evidence unsatisfactory to warrant reconstitution.

For this reason, we take cognizance of the issue before us and shall examine the probative weight of the pieces of evidence presented
by Marcelino to support his petition for reconstitution.

Quantum of evidence required in reconstituting a Certificate of Title

Time and time again, we have cautioned the lower courts against the hasty and reckless grant of petitions for reconstitution. In such
cases, it is the duty of the court to carefully scrutinize and verify all supporting documents, deeds, and certifications. In fact, we have
warned the courts in reconstitution proceedings of the tampering of genuine certificates of title and the issuance of fake ones - a
widespread occurrence that has seriously threatened the stability of our Torrens system. It is most unfortunate that our courts have been,
at times, unwitting accomplices to these transactions and easy targets for corruption.[9]

Reconstitution is the restoration of the instrument or title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition.[10] Its only purpose
is to have the title reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction
occurred.[11] The process involves diligent circumspect evaluation of the authenticity and relevance of all the evidence presented for fear
of the chilling consequences of mistakenly issuing a reconstituted title when in fact the original is not truly lost or destroyed.[12]

Henceforth, it is imperative that a proper standard be set in evaluating the probative value of the documentary evidence. Having such a
standard would guide our courts accordingly in granting the reconstitution of a certificate of title, and would serve as a yardstick in
determining whether trial court judges have grossly violated their judicial duty to warrant the imposition of administrative sanctions.

The established legal principle in actions involving land registration is that a party must prove its allegations not merely by a
preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence.[13] Evidence is clear and convincing if it produces in the mind of the
trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegation sought to be established.[14] It is indeterminate, being more than preponderance,
but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases.[15] Appropriately, this is the standard of
proof that is required in reconstitution proceedings.[16]

To our mind, clear and convincing evidence proving the jurisdictional requirements must exist before a court may order the reconstitution
of a destroyed or lost title. An order reconstituting a title would produce two (2) effects: the cancellation of the alleged lost or destroyed
title and the reissuance of a new duplicate title in its original form and condition. In addition, a reconstitution proceeding is an in rem
proceeding; and when an order in such a proceeding becomes final, the findings therein can no longer be opened for review.[17] With
these in mind, evidence proving the petitioner's allegations in a petition for reconstitution is needed because, without proof that a certificate
of title existed and was eventually lost or destroyed, this alleged lost or destroyed title is still presumed to exist.

Therefore, in order to forestall, if not eliminate entirely, anomalous or irregular reconstitution of a lost or destroyed title, the petitioner must
clearly show with convincing evidence: (1) that a certificate of title was lost or destroyed; (2) that the certificate of title sought to be
reconstituted is in its original form before it was lost; and (3) that the petition has legal interest over the land covered by the lost or
destroyed title.

The petition lacks competent evidentiary basis to reconstitute TCT No. 206714.

In his petition, Marcelino enumerates the documents he had submitted, which the RTC relied upon in granting the petition for
reconstitution:
(1)
Extrajudicial Settlement dated 23 October 2000 executed by the heirs of the late Luz Dela Paz involving the property covered by TCT
No. 206714;
(3)
Affidavit of Publication of the extrajudicial settlement issued by the newspaper Remate dated 20 March 2000;
(3)
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 23 November 2005 executed by the heirs of Luz Dela Paz in Marcelino's favor concerning the subject lot;
(4)
Certification dated 17 November 2006 issued by the LRA to the effect that TCT No. 206714 was not included among those saved titles
during the fire that razed the Quezon City Hall Building on 11 June 1988 and the records leading to its issuance were burned;
(5)
Affidavit of Loss dated 23 November 2005 executed by Marcelino as to the loss of the duplicate owner's copy of TCT No. 206714 duly
annotated by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City;
(6)
Tax Declaration or Official Receipt issued by the Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City showing payment of real property tax covering
the subject lot;
(7)
A photocopy of TCT No. 206714;
(8)
Extrajudicial Sketch Plan of TCT No. 206714;
(9)
Subdivision Plan certified by the microfilming officer of the LRA; and
(10)
The LRA Report to the trial court which states:
1.
The present petition seeks the reconstitution of TCT No. 206714, allegedly lost or destroyed and supposedly covering Lot 457-A-12-B-2-
B-2-A of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-214428 situated in the Barrio of Bagbag, Quezon City.
2.
The plan and technical description of Lot 457-A-12-B-2-B-2-A of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-214428, were verified correct by this
Authority to represent the aforesaid lot and the same have been approved under (LRA) PR-08-01589-R pursuant to the provisions of
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing information anent the property in question is respectfully submitted for consideration in the resolution of the
instant petition, and if the Honorable Court, after notice and hearing, finds justification pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 26 to
grant the same, the plan and technical description having been approved, may be used as basis for the inscription of the technical
description on the reconstituted certificate.[18]
Section 110 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended by R.A. No. 6732,
allows the reconstitution of lost or destroyed original Torrens title.[19] Based on the foregoing, reconstitution of a lost or destroyed
certificate of title may be done judicially, in accordance with the special procedure laid down in R.A. No. 26;[20] or administratively, in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6732. By filing the Petition for Reconstitution with the RTC, Marcelino sought judicial
reconstitution of TCT No. 206714.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 enumerates the sources for reconstitution of TCTs:

Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the
following order:
(a)
The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b)
The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c)
A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d)
The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated
copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was
issued;
(e)
A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged,
leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and
(f)
Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of
title. (emphasis supplied)
Not one of the documentary evidence Marcelino had presented falls under this enumeration. Our reasons, apart from those that the CA
had already discussed, are as follows:

First. The extrajudicial settlement and the deed of absolute sale cannot fall under paragraph (d) of Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 because (1)
these were not filed with the Registry of Deeds and, more importantly, (2) these were not the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 206714.
True, they involve the same property covered by TCT No. 206714; however, neither the extrajudicial settlement nor the deed of sale
reflects under whose name the title should be registered. If we were to use the extrajudicial settlement between the heirs of Luz Dela Paz
as basis for a reconstituted title, the title should reflect that the land is registered under their names. By analogy, the same logic applies
if we were to use the deed of absolute sale in favor of Marcelino. As clearly alleged in the petition, Marcelino seeks to reconstitute the
title under the name of Luz Dela Paz; hence, for the court to order the reconstitution of a title where the registered owner is Luz Dela Paz,
a deed of transfer or other document transferring ownership to such person should be presented.

Second. The photocopy of TCT No. 206714 that Marcelino offered as evidence is not a certified copy previously issued by the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City or by the legal custodian thereof. The requirement for a certified true copy of the title has practical considerations:
(1) a copy of a document, without a certification that it is an exact copy of the original from its legal custodian, lacks credibility and weight
as evidence; and (2) it would be impossible to reconstitute a title not based on an exact and accurate copy of its original. As noted by the
CA, the name of the registered owner in the photocopy of TCT No. 206714 was concealed as the space provided for therein was
deliberately covered.[21] Following the purpose of reconstitution, we cannot allow the reproduction of a title based on a document that
does not identify the registered owner. This circumstance on its own already raises doubt as to the authenticity and genuineness of the
photocopy of TCT No. 206714.

Third. None of the documents submitted by Marcelino fall under paragraph (f) because they are not similar to those mentioned in
paragraphs (a) to (e), which all pertain to documents issued or are on file with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Under the principle
of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such
general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned.[22] Thus, in Republic of the Phils. v. Santua,[23] we held that when paragraph (f) speaks of any
other document, the same must refer to similar documents previously enumerated therein, that is, those mentioned in paragraphs (a),
(b), (c), (d), and (e).

The documents alluded to in paragraph (f) must be resorted to in the absence of those preceding in order.[24] If the petitioner for
reconstitution fails to show that he had, in fact, sought to secure such prior documents (except with respect to the owner's duplicate copy
of the title which it claims had been, likewise, destroyed) and had failed to find them, the presentation of the succeeding documents as
substitutionary evidence is proscribed.[25]

Moreover, it is settled that reconstitution on the basis of a survey plan and technical description is void for want of factual support.[26] In
themselves, such plan and technical description are not recognized sources of reconstitution of title under Section 3 of R.A. No. 26. In
fact, under Section 12 of R.A. No. 26 and LRA Circular No. 35 dated 13 June 1983, the submitted survey plan and technical description
are mere additional documents that accompany the competent sources for reconstitution. This can clearly be gleaned from the wording
of the law:
Section 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act,
shall be filed with the [Regional Trial Court], by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The
petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owners duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or
destroyed; (b) that no co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost
or destroyed; (c) the location area and boundaries of the property (d) the nature and description of the building or improvements, if any,
which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the
names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all
persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g)
a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or if there be any, the
registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence
in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is
to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Section 2(t) or 3(t) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan
and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office or with a certified copy of the
description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property. (emphasis and underlining supplied)
Similarly, paragraph 5 of LRA Circular No. 35 dated 13 June 1983 states that:
In case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Sections 2 (f) and 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 26, in relation
to Section 12 thereof, the signed duplicate copy of the petition to be forwarded to this Commission shall be accompanied by the following:

(a) A duly prepared plan of said parcel of land in tracing cloth, with two (2) print copies thereof, prepared by the government agency which
issued the certified technical description, or by a duly certified technical description. Where the plan as submitted is certified by the
government agency which issued the same, it is sufficient that the technical description be prepared by a duly licensed Geodetic Engineer
on the basis of said certified plan. (emphasis and underlining supplied)
Fourth. Neither does the tax declaration submitted support Marcelino's cause. A tax declaration can only be prima facie evidence of claim
of ownership, which, however, is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding. A reconstitution of title does not pass upon the ownership
of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title but merely determines whether a re-issuance of such title is proper.[27] At most, the tax
declaration is merely a prima facie evidence that the subject land has been declared for taxation purposes by Marcelino.

In sum, all these documentary evidence being considered, we find that not one of them is a competent source for reconstitution.

The requirements under R.A. No. 26 are indispensable and must be strictly complied with. In a reconstitution proceeding, the petitioner
is burdened to adduce in evidence the documents in the order stated in Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 as sources of the deed to be reconstituted,
and likewise burdened to prove the execution or existence of the original copy of the title, which is the copy on file with the Registry of
Deeds, and the contents thereof.[28] Here, Marcelino failed to do both; thus, the CA did not commit a reversible error in reversing the
RTC's order, and in dismissing the petition for reconstitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED.

DY VS. ALDEA

FACTS:

Mamerto Dy is the owner of Lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-24849. Nelson Dy the brother of Mamerto found out
that the subject land had gone through a series of anomalous transactions. The owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24849 was declared
lost. As a result, a new owner's duplicate copy of the same TCT was issued and the subject land was subsequently mortgaged. Mamerto,
through his lawyer, sent a letter to the Register of Deeds of informing the said office that his owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24849
was never lost and that he never mortgaged his property to anyone.

Then Mamerto immediately filed a complaint against the Lourdes before the barangay office. Lourdes, however, failed to attend the
hearing. A certificate to file action was subsequently issued.

Atty. Manolo D. Rubi, Deputy Register of Deeds, informed Nelson that TCT No. T-134753 covering the subject land was issued in Lourdes'
name. Mamerto insisted that he never executed any deed of sale in favor of Lourdes and that the signature appearing on the pu rported
deed of sale was not his authentic signature.

Lourdes alleged that she met the person impersonating Mamerto. She gave the impostor the payment for the subject land. Thereafter,
they signed the Deed of Sales. Thereafter, Lourdes was informed that the impostor was dead and he had not given any money to process
the transfer of the subject land. So, she went to the Office of the Provincial Assessor to process the payment and the transfer of title in
her name. Eventually, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. T-134753 under her name. Consequently, Mamerto filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of deed of sale and TCT No. T-134753, and recovery of real property with injunction and damages.
RTC rule in favor of Mamerto. On appeal CA reversed the RTC’s decision. It declared that Lourdes was an innocent purchaser for value
and that a person dealing with registered land is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of
the register or the certificate of title. It observed that the only annotation at the back of the title was that it was mortgaged to Audie C. Uy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lourdes is an innocent purchaser for value who is entitled to the application of the Mirror Doctrine.

RULING:

NO! Only an innocent purchaser for value may invoke the mirror doctrine. The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to
quiet title to land and to put a stop to any question of legality of the title except claims which have been recorded in the certificate of title
at the time of registration or which may arise subsequent thereto. As a consequence, the mirror doctrine provides that every person
dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way obliged to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. Every registered owner and every subsequent purchaser for value in
good faith holds the title to the property free from all encumbrances except those noted in the certificate. As such, a defective title, or one
the procurement of which is tainted with fraud and misrepresentation may be the source of a completely legal and valid title, provided that
the buyer is an innocent third person who, in good faith, relied on the correctness of the certificate of title, or an innocent purchaser for
value.

Thus, in order to resolve whether Lourdes holds an indefeasible title to the subject land, it becomes necessary to determine whether she
is an innocent purchaser for value.

Lourdes is not an innocent purchaser for value. In Nobleza v. Nuega, the Court defined an innocent purchaser for value, to wit: An
innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or interest in the
property, for which a full and fair price is paid by the buyer at the time of the purchase or before receipt of any notice of claims or interest
of some other person in the property. It is the party who claims to be an innocent purchaser for value who has the burden of proving such
assertion, and it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith. To successfully invoke and be considered as a buyer in
good faith, the presumption is that first and foremost, the "buyer in good faith" must have shown prudence and due diligence in the
exercise of his/her rights. It presupposes that the buyer did everything that an ordinary person would do for the protection and defense of
his/her rights and interests against prejudicial or injurious concerns when placed in such a situation. The prudence required of a buyer in
good faith is not that of a person with training in law, but rather that of an average man who 'weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibration of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil.' A buyer in good faith does his homework and
verifies that the particulars are in order — such as the title, the parties, the mode of transfer and the provisions in the deed/contract of
sale, to name a few. To be more specific, such prudence can be shown by making an ocular inspection of the property, checking the
title/ownership with the proper Register of Deeds alongside the payment of taxes therefor, or inquiring into the minutiae such as the
parameters or lot area, the type of ownership, and the capacity of the seller to dispose of the property, which capacity necessarily includes
an inquiry into the civil status of the seller to ensure that if married, marital consent is secured when necessary. In fine, for a purchaser
of a property in the possession of another to be in good faith, he must exercise due diligence, conduct an investigation, and weigh the
surrounding facts and circumstances like what any prudent man in a similar situation would do.

In the case at bench, Lourdes was deficient in her vigilance as buyer of the subject land.

IBIAS SR. VS MACABEO

FACTS:

The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition.

As one of the heirs of the deceased Albina Natividad Y. Perez and Marcelo Ibias, along with respondent Marcelo, married to Gonigonda,
Benita filed a petition for annulment of title of TCT No. 245124, alleging that Ernesto made it appear that the antecedent of the title, TCT
No. 24605, was lost while in their parents possession, thus a reconstitution of the title was made, and TCT No. 245124 was issued.
Benita alleges that the title was never lost, and Ernesto fully well knew that the title was in possession of Benita, as shown by a letter he
sent to Benita dated July 23, 1999, where he asked Benita for TCT No. 245124. In his defense, Ernesto claimed that he and his brother
are the only heirs of their parents; the lot was acquired sometime in 1950, and they lived in the lot since birth. He inquired from Benita if
she has the title, but the latter asked for money as her share in the property, which he gave. Despite receipt of the money, Benita did not
deliver the title. Thus he believed in good faith that the title was lost and executed an Affidavit of Loss, and filed a petition for issuance of
owner’s duplicate title.

The RTC ruled in Benita’s favor. It ruled that Ernesto was able to procure the new title in his name through fraudulent means. Their
appeal to the CA was denied, hence, the spouses elevated their case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the title in the name of the spouses should be annulled.

RULING:
The petition has no merit. The RTC and CA were correct in cancelling TCT No. 245124 and reinstating TCT No. 24605.
Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.[⁠1 described reconstitution, thus:

The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not
determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of
title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.

Ernesto claimed loss of TCT No. 24605, and instituted reconstitution proceedings. Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) provides for
the procedure in case of loss of an owner’s duplicate certificate of title:

Section 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. -In case of loss or theft of an owner’s duplicate certificate of title, due
notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land
lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying
for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction
may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered.

Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after-notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a
new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall
in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this
decree.

Section 109 applies only if the owner’s duplicate certificate is indeed lost or destroyed. If a certificate of title has not been lost, but is in
fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted title is void and the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.⁠2
Consequently, the decision may be attacked any time.⁠3 Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6732, which amended Section 19 of RANo.
26⁠4, provides:

SEC. 19. If the certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, and subsequently found or recovered, is not in the name of the same
person in whose favor the reconstituted certificate of title has been issued, the Register of Deeds or the party concerned should bring the
matter to the attention of the proper Regional Trial Court, which, after due notice and hearing, shall order the cancellation of the
reconstituted certificate of title and render, with respect to the memoranda of new liens and encumbrances, if any, made in the
reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, such judgment as justice and equity may require: Provided, however, That if the
reconstituted certificate of title has been cancelled by virtue of any deed or instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, or by an order
of the court, and a new certificate of title has been issued, the procedure prescribed above, with respect to the memorandum of new liens
and encumbrances made on the reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, shall be followed with respect to the new certificate
of title, and to such new liens and encumbrances, if any, as may have been on the latter, after the issuance thereof.

Section 11 of RA No. 6732 further provides that “[a] reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other machination is void ab
initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof.”

In the present case, the allegedly lost owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 24605 was in the possession of Benita. The lost TCT was
offered in evidence during the trial.⁠5 The Spouses Ibias did not contest the genuineness and authenticity of said TCT. The Spouses
Ibias only questioned the submission of a photocopy of the TCT, but the trial court, after hearing the arguments of both parties, admitted
the photocopy as part of the evidence presented by Benita. There is no reason to justify the issuance of a reconstituted title in the name
of Spouses Ibias; hence, there is no error in the cancellation of the same reconstituted title.

Ernesto claimed that he believed that the original owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 24605 was lost after he asked Benita for it then she
failed to show it to him. Ernesto chose to omit facts and to avail of Section 109 as remedy instead of Section 107. Section 107 of PD 1529
reads:

Section 107. Surrender of withhold duplicate certificates. – Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any
involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be
registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may
file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner
or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon
such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if not any reason the
outstanding owner’s duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of
a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of
the outstanding duplicate.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the rulings of the trial and appellate courts which cancelled TCT No. 245124 and reinstated TCT
No. 24605.

REPUBLIC VS. DAGONDON

FACTS:

The Facts
The instant case arose from a Petition4 filed before the RTC on March 10, 2009 by respondents Homer and Ma. Susana Dagondon
(respondents), as attorneys-in-fact of Jover P. Dagondon (Jover),5 praying for the reconstitution of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
of a 5,185-square meter parcel of land located at Bonbon, Catarman, Camiguin, denominated as Lot No. 84 of the Catarman Cadastre
(Lot 84). In the petition, respondents alleged that: (a) Jover is the registered owner of Lot 84, having purchased the same from a certain
Lourdes Borromeo Cordero,6 and consequently, registered it under his name for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 013775;
7 (b) on October 23, 2008, they obtained two (2) separate certifications from the Land Registration Authority (LRA), one stating that
Decree No. 466085 was issued in relation to Lot 84,8 and the other stating that it did not have a copy of Decree No. 466085 on file, and
that the same was presumed lost or destroyed as a consequence of the last world war;9 (c) on February 13, 2009, they secured another
certification, this time from the Register of Deeds (RD) of Mambajao, Camiguin, declaring that the subject property had no existing OCT
and that it was probably destroyed or dilapidated during the eruption of Hiboc-Hiboc Volcano10 or World War II;11 and (d) they were filing
the petition for reconstitution on the basis of Decree No. 466085.12

In opposition,13 petitioner Republic of the Philippines, as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner), prayed for the
dismissal of the petition for insufficiency in form and substance, considering that respondents, among others, failed to establish the
existence of the very Torrens Title which they sought to reconstitute.14

The RTC Proceedings

After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, respondents presented Sebastiana Dagatan, Land Registration Examiner, from the
Office of the Register of Deeds (RD) of Mambajao, Camiguin. After identifying the certification issued by her office, she testified that while
the subject property had already been issued a decree, there is, however, no existing title in their files covering Lot 84.15

In a Decision16 dated July 23, 2010 (RTC Decision), the RTC granted the petition for reconstitution and, accordingly, ordered the RD of
Mambajao, Camiguin to reconstitute the OCT of Lot 84. In ruling for respondents, the RTC ratiocinated that neither the government nor
any interested party would be prejudiced if it resolved to grant the petition.17

Asserting that it was notified of the adverse ruling on August 6, 2010,18 petitioner moved for reconsideration on August 23, 2010.19
However, in a Resolution20 dated January 28, 2011, the RTC denied the said motion for having been filed out of time. Contrary to
petitioner's assertion, the RTC found that based on the registry return card, petitioner received the July 23, 2010 Decision on August 5,
2010; and counting fifteen (15) days therefrom, it only had until August 20, 2010 to file the same. Resultantly, the motion for
reconsideration should be disregarded for being a mere scrap of paper.21

The foregoing dismissal on procedural grounds notwithstanding, the RTC still opted to rule on the merits of the aforesaid motion. It held
that despite the non-existence of the OCT for Lot 84, it could still be validly reconstituted on the strength alone of Decree No. 466085. In
this regard, the RTC opined that the decree itself was sufficient and proper basis for the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate
of title.22

Undeterred, petitioner appealed to the CA.23

The CA Ruling

In a Decision24 dated November 29, 2013, the CA dismissed petitioner's appeal. It held that the RTC Decision had already attained
finality due to petitioner's failure to move for its reconsideration within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period provided by law. As such,
the RTC Decision could no longer be assailed pursuant to the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments. The CA further noted that
petitioner failed to proffer compelling reasons to justify the belated filing of its motion, and worse, even concealed the date it received the
RTC Decision which was consequently belied by the date indicated in the registry return card.25cralawred

Notably, the CA no longer delved into the issue of the propriety of the order of reconstitution of the OCT covering Lot 84.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues Before the Court

The essential issues for the Court's resolution are: (a) whether or not the RTC Decision could no longer be assailed pursuant to the
doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments; and (b) whether or not the RTC correctly ordered the reconstitution of the OCT of Lot
84.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

I.

At the outset, it bears reiterating that the CA did not assess the substantive merits of the RTC Decision - which ordered the reconstitution
of the OCT of Lot 84 - on the pretense that it had already attained finality which rendered it beyond the scope of judicial review.

Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether
it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction
to amend, modify or alter the same.26

The mandatory character, however, of the rule on immutability of final judgments was not designed to be an inflexible tool to excuse and
overlook prejudicial circumstances. Hence, the doctrine must yield to practicality, logic, fairness, and substantial justice.27 In Sumbilla v.
Matrix Finance Corporation,28 the Court had the occasion to name certain circumstances which necessitate a relaxation of the rule on
the immutability of final judgments, to wit:

Consequently[,] final and executory judgments were reversed when the interest of substantial justice is at stake and where special and
compelling reasons called for such actions. In Barnes v. Judge Padilla, we declared as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the
highest court of the land.

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor[,] or property,
(b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to
alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final.29 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As will be discussed, a departure from the doctrine is warranted since its strict application would, in effect, circumvent and undermine the
stability of the Torrens System of land registration adopted in this jurisdiction. Relatedly, it bears stressing that the subject matter of the
instant controversy, i.e., Lot 84, is a sizeable parcel of real property. More importantly, petitioner had adequately presented a strong and
meritorious case.

Thus, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, the Court deems it apt to exercise its prerogative to suspend procedural rules and to resolve
the present controversy according to its merits.

II.

Republic Act No. (RA) 2630 governs the process by which a judicial reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title may be done. Specifically,
Section 2 of the said law enumerates in the following order the competent and exclusive sources from which reconstitution of an OCT
may be based, viz.:

Section 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the
following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;

(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was
issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged,
leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate
of title. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Verily, case law provides that "[t]he reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or
destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing
the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred. RA 26
presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be reconstituted has already been brought under the provisions of the Torrens
System."31 Hence, under the aforesaid law, the following must be present for an order for reconstitution to issue: (a) that the certificate
of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of
the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the
certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are
substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.32 Thus, petitioner correctly pointed out that the
applicability of RA 26 in this case is contingent on the existence of a previously issued OCT which has been lost or destroyed.

In the case at bar, respondents miserably failed to adduce clear and convincing proof that an OCT covering Lot 84 had previously been
issued by virtue of Decree No. 466085. Accordingly, there is no title pertaining to Lot 84 which could be "reconstituted," re-issued, or
restored. Guided by the foregoing, judicial reconstitution of title under Section 2 of RA 26 is clearly improper in this case; and hence, the
RTC erred in ordering the same.

For another, and even assuming that RA 26 applies, respondents could not predicate their petition for reconstitution on the basis of
Decree No. 466085 alone because as mentioned by petitioner, a copy of the same was not even presented as evidence before the trial
court; hence, its contents remain unknown.33 Neither could the certification34 issued by the LRA stating that Decree No. 466085 was
issued to Lot 84 be given any probative weight, considering that an ambiguous LRA certification without describing the nature of the
decree and the claimant in such case, practically means nothing and could not be considered as a sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting a lost or destroyed certificate of title. The pronouncement in the case of Republic v. Heirs of Ramos35 is highly instructive
on the matter, viz.:

Moreover, the Certification issued by the LRA stating that Decree No. 190622 was issued for Lot 54 means nothing. The Land Registration
Act expressly recognizes two classes of decrees in land registration proceedings, namely, (i) decrees dismissing the application and (ii)
decrees of confirmation and registration. In the case at bench, we cannot ascertain from said Certification whether the decree alluded to
by the respondents granted or denied Julio Ramos' claim. Moreover, the LRA's Certification did not state to whom Lot 54 was decreed.
Thus, assuming that Decree No. 190622 is a decree of confirmation, it would be too presumptuous to further assume that the same was
issued in the name and in favor of Julio Ramos. Furthermore, said Certification did not indicate the number of the original certificate of
title and the date said title was issued. In Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals[(203 Phil. 652 [1982])], we held that the
absence of any document, private or official, mentioning the number of the certificate of title and date when the certificate of title was
issued, does not warrant the granting of such petition. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)36

In sum, the failure of respondents to satisfactorily prove that Lot 84 had been registered under the Torrens System rendered judicial
reconstitution under RA 26 inapplicable.

At any rate, it must be stressed that this decision does not operate to completely divest respondents of their interest, if any, in Lot 84.
Rather, it simply underscored the wrong procedural remedy availed of. If they remain insistent to have the title of the subject property
issued under their names, they can institute the appropriate proceedings in accordance with law and jurisprudence.37

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

TAN PO CHU VS. CA

FACTS:

Fiber Technology Corporation (FiberTech) was a Philippine corporation with Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Registration
No. 0000142818. It was also the registered owner of a parcel of land in Marikina (subject lot) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 157923 entered on November 28, 1988. The SEC allegedly revoked FiberTech's registration on September 29, 2003.

On April 4, 2005, respondent Felix Chingkoe executed an affidavit of loss of TCT No. 157923 allegedly on behalf of FiberTech.

On June 2, 2005, FiberTech - supposedly represented by respondent Rodrigo Garcia pursant to a December 2, 2004 Board Resolution[5]
- filed a petition for the reissuance/replacement of its owner's duplicate of TCT No. 157923. The petition was based on the affidavit of
loss that Felix executed. The petition alleged: (1) that Felix and his wife Rosita acquired 3 00% ownership of FiberTech in 2004 pursuant
to an award by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); (2) that Felix was elected Corporate Secretary soon after; (3) that Felix
asked the former directors and officers of FiberTech to turn over the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 157923, but the latter denied knowledge
or possession thereof; and (4) that after conducting an exhaustive search, the subject title was nowhere,to be found.[6]

The petition was raffled to the RTC, Marikina City, Branch 193 and docketed as LRC Case No. 2005-771-MK.

On July 23, 2006, the RTC granted the petition. It declared the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 157923 as lost and ordered its
reissuance.[7]

On December 21, 2007, Tan Po Chu - mother of Fibertech's incorporators Faustino and respondent Felix Chingkoe - filed a petition before
the CA for annulment of judgment against the RTC's decision.[8] The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101727 with Tan Po Chu
and FiberTech as petitioners.

Tan alleged: (1) that the missing owner's duplicate of TCT was in her custody as the responsible officer of FiberTech; (2) that Felix was
aware of this fact; (3) that Felix committed perjury when he executed the Affidavit of Loss; (4) that Felix and Rosita had not acquired
100% ownership of FiberTech; (5) that Rosita and Rodrigo Garcia were not even stockholders of record in Fibertech; and (6) that the
respondents had no authority to file the petition for reissuance of the owner's duplicate copy on behalf of FiberTech.[9]

Citing New Durawood Co. v. Court of Appeals[10] and Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals,[11] Tan further argued that if an owner's duplicate
TCT has not been lost, but is in fact possessed by another person, then the reconstituted title is void and the court that rendered the
decision never acquired jurisdiction.

However, the CA dismissed Tan's petition outright on January 16, 2008 on the grounds that the petition suffered from procedural infirmities
and lacked substantial merit.
The CA observed that: (1) the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were executed alone by Tan Po Chu without showing
that she had the authority to sign for and on behalf of the corporation; (2) Tan's actual address was not indicated in the petition as required
by Rule 46, Section 3; and (3) the attached copy of the owner's duplicate TCT No. 157923 was not a certified true copy.

The CA also brushed aside Tan's substantive argument. It held that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case after complying with the
notice and hearing requirements under Section 109 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree.[13]

Tan moved for reconsideration. However, on July 16, 2008, the CA denied the motion, insisting that Tan's assertion that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction was without merit.[14]

On September 19, 2008, Tan filed the present petition for certiorari.

The Petition

Tan argues that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that her allegation of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction was not
meritorious. She maintains that the respondents misled the RTC because: (1) Felix and Rosita never became 100% owners of FiberTech;
and (2) they knew that the "missing" owner's duplicate was in her possession. Pursuant to the cases of New Durawood, Serra Serra,
Strait Times v. CA,[15] and Demetriou v. CA,[16] the RTC never acquired jurisdiction to reconstitute the owner's duplicate TCT.

The respondents counter that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition. Further, assuming the CA
decided in a manner contrary to prevailing jurisprudence, then it only committed an error of law and not an error of jurisdiction. They
conclude that Tan's resort to a special civil action of certiorari was unwarranted because the correct remedy would have been to appeal
the dismissal of her petition.

Our Ruling

At the outset, we observe that Tan resorted to the wrong remedy by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The. Rules of Court
explicitly authorizes the CA to dismiss outright a petition for annulment of judgment if the court finds no substantial merit in the petition.
Section 5. Action by the court. - Should the court find no substantial merit in the petition, the same may be dismissed outright with specific
reasons for such dismissal.

Should prima facie merit be found in the petition, the same shall be given due course and summons shall be served on the respondent.[17]
Accordingly, outright dismissal of Tan's petition is within the jurisdiction of the CA and its correctness may be reviewed through an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45.

Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy of last resort for when another remedy is present, certiorari is not available.[18] It is a limited form
of review confined to errors of jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the officer or tribunal acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[19] On the other hand, an error of judgment is
one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.[20] They only involve errors in the court or tribunal's appreciation of the
facts and of the law.[21] Errors of jurisdiction are reviewable on certiorari; errors of judgment, only by appeal.[22]

Ordinarily, this Court would have dismissed the petition outright for being an improper remedy. As a general rule, certiorari will not lie as
a substitute for an appeal. However, an exception to this rule is where public welfare and the advancement of public policy so dictates.[23]

This Court cannot ignore the implications if the petitioner's allegations - that she has the original owner's duplicate TCT of the subject lot
and that the SEC revoked FiberTech's registration in 2003 - are true. There will currently exist two owner's duplicate TCTs over the same
property possessed by two contending factions in an intra-corporate dispute of a defunct corporation. This anomalous situation can
potentially bring considerable hann to the general public and to the integrity of our Torrens system. This Court, therefore, cannot simply
leave the parties as they were.

The CA committed a grave error when it brushed aside Tan's argument that the RTC rendered its decision without jurisdiction. It ruled
that the replacement of a lost duplicate certificate is a proceeding in rem, directed against the whole world; therefore, the RTC acquired
jurisdiction when it complied with the notice and hearing requirements under Section 109ofP.D. 1529.

The CA completely missed the point because Tan did not assail the RTC's jurisdiction by alleging noncompliance with the requirements
of notice and hearing; she questioned the RTC's jurisdiction over the res by claiming that the allegedly lost owner's duplicate was, in fact,
not lost but was in her custody. Therefore, the RTC's compliance with Section 109 of P.D. 1529 was irrelevant.

We have consistently held that when the owner's duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another
person, then the reconstituted certificate is void because the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter - the allegedly lost
owner's duplicate.[24] The correct remedy for the registered owner against an uncooperative possessor is to compel the surrender of the
owner's duplicate title through an action for replevin.

A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all.[25] It has been held to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw
and . slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its ugly head.[26] It may be attacked at any time.

If Tan's allegation were true, then the RTC's judgment would be void and the CA would have been duty-bound to strike it down. The CA
could have nipped this anomalous situation in the bud before it could cause any harm to innocent third persons. However, the CA opted
to turn its back on this duty and dismiss the case outright based on rigid technicalities and on irrelevant considerations regardless of the
implications to the general public.

Moreover, the CA's dismissal based on technical grounds was erroneous. The CA raised the following procedural infirmities:
...(1) the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was executed alone by affiant Tan Po Chu without any showing that [s]he
had the authority to sign for and in behalf of petitioner corporation pursuant to Sec. 5(1), Rule 7 and Sec. 4(3), Rule 47 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure considering that [s]he is one of the incorporators and stockholders of her co-petitioner corporation; (2)
The actual address of petitioner Tan Po Chu is not indicated in the petition as required by Sec. 3 (1), Rule 46 of the same Rule; (3) The
copy of the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 157923 is not certified as a true copy of the original owner's duplicate by the proper government
agency as alleged by the petitioners.[27]
First, we note that Tan alleged that FiberTech's corporate existence had already ceased when the SEC revoked its corporate registration
on September 29, 2003, and that she was a trustee of the corporation for the purpose of its dissolution.[28] We note further that the
petition for annulment was filed in the names of both FiberTech and Tan Po Chu.

While FiberTech may no longer have judicial personality to initiate the suit or authorize Tan Po Chu to file the case, Tan Po Chu remained
a real party-in-interest as the lawful possessor of the allegedly lost owner's duplicate TCT. The respondents could not legally oust her of
this possession by reconstituting the owner's duplicate instead of filing an action for replevin. Therefore, the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping remained valid with respect to Tan Po Chu even though it might have been defective with respect to FiberTech.

Second, we also note that Tan Po Chu submitted her address in her motion for reconsideration to cure the defect in the petition.[29] Her
motion for reconsideration substantially complies with Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.

Finally, a petition for annulment of judgment only requires the inclusion of a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the
judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof.[30] It does not require the petitioner to annex certified true copies or duplicate
originals of his evidence to the petition because these may be presented during the evidentiary hearings of the case. To our mind, none
of the procedural infirmities warranted the CA's outright dismissal of the case.

Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an evasion of positive duty, or a virtual
refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law.[31] It is present when power is exercised in a despotic manner by reason, for instance,
of passion and hostility.[32] The use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is also sufficient to taint a decision maker's
action with grave abuse of discretion.[33]

By dismissing Tan's petition for annulment of judgment solely based on a technicality and on an irrelevant consideration, the CA acted
with grave abuse of discretion. The outright dismissal was also made at the expense of the substantial justice and of the general public
who have a right to rely on the integrity of our Torrens system. This amounted to an evasion of its positive duty to uphold the integrity of
our Torrens system and to a virtual refusal of its duty to determine and strike down decisions rendered without jurisdiction.

Courts are routinely expected to balance competing state values and interests. When the interest of strictly enforcing rules of procedure
comes in conflict with the interests of rendering substantial justice and protecting the general welfare, the scales of justice tilt substantially
in favor of the latter. The rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid technical sense so as to override substantial justice.[34]

Ultimately, this Court finds that the interests of dispensing justice and of protecting both the general public and the integrity of our Torrens
system will best be served by requiring the CA to proceed with the case to determine the truth of Tan's factual allegations.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition.

REPUBLIC VS. PASICOLAN

FACTS:

Respondents Cesar C. Pasicolan (Cesar) and Gregorio C. Pasicolan (Gregorio) filed a Petition for Reconstitution[5] of OCT No. 8450 in
the name of Pedro Callueng (Pedro) before the RTC of Tuguegarao City. Respondents claimed to be the legal and forced heirs of the
late Pedro.

In support of their Petition for Reconstitution, respondents submitted the following evidence:

Exhibit
Description
A
Decree No. 339880
B
Technical Description
C
Sepia Film Plan
D
Certification issued by the Registry of Deeds
E
Certification issued by the Land Registration Authority, Quezon City
F
Report issued by the Land Registration Authority
G
Certificate of Publication issued by the National Printing Office
H
Official Gazette Vol. 99 No. 39
I
Official Gazette Vol. 99 No. 40
J
Certification issued by the City Secretary, Tuguegarao City
K
Certification issued by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
L
Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General
M
Declaration of Real Property dated August 28, 1935
N
Declaration of Real Property dated October 24, 1947
O
Official Receipt No. 4854586
P
Official Receipt No. 6096680
Q
Official Receipt No. 34107

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC granted the Petition in a Decision[6] dated October 8, 2004, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, finding this petition to be sufficient in form and substance and pursuant to the report of the LRA[,] this petition is hereby
granted. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cagayan is hereby directed to reconstitute the original copy of Original Certificate of
Title No. 8450 in the name of Pedro Callueng in exactly the same words and figures as the destroyed original copy based on the certified
copy of the Decree upon payment of the petitioners of the lawful fees and charges, subject to the encumbrances mentioned in Decree
No. 339880 in the absence of evidence showing that the same has already been cancelled, and provided that no certificate of title covering
the same parcel of land exists in the office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan.

Furnish copies of this Decision to the petitioners, the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cagayan, the Land Registration Authority,
Quezon City, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Solicitor General.

The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cagayan is hereby directed to issue a new owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title
No. 8450 in the name of Pedro Callueng in lieu of the lost/destroyed one upon payment of the lawful fees and charges.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Believing that the RTC erred in granting the Petition for Reconstitution, petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA ascribing upon the court a quo the following error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT [RESPONDENTS] FAILED TO PRESENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW
THAT THE ALLEGED LOST CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WAS VALID AND SUBSISTING AT THE TIME OF ITS ALLEGED LOSS AND
THAT A MERE COPY OF DECREE NO. 339880 IS NOT A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR RECONSTITUTING ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE NO. 8450.[8]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

After both parties filed their respective Briefs, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the appeal. It gave credence to the pieces
of documentary evidence presented by the respondents and the report of the LRA which provides in part and quoted by the CA as follows:

2. From Book No. 52 of the 'Record Book of Cadastral Lots' on file at the Cadastral Decree Section, this Authority, it appears that Decree
No. 339880 was issued for Lot 1921, Tuguegarao Cadastre on September 12, 1928, in Cadastral Case No. 4, GLRO Cad. Record No.
415. However, copy of said decree is no longer available in this Authority;[9]

It thus ratiocinated as follows:

We find no reason not to give the LRA's determination full faith and credit. The OSG ought to remember that: the LRA exists for the sole
purpose of implementing and protecting the Torrens system of land titling and registration; it is the central repository of all land records
involving registered or titled lands; it keeps the title history or records of transaction involving titled or registered lands x x x and; it is
specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings. x x x
Moreover, We constantly adhere to the established rule that 'factual findings of administrative officials and agencies that have acquired
expertise in the performance of their official duties and the exercise of their primary jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect
but, at times, even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. x x x
What made the case stronger for the appellees was the lower court's granting of the prayer for the reconstitution and issuance of
certificates of title. After a thorough examination of the presented evidence and testimony, pursuant as well on the report made by the
LRA, the lower court concluded that the petition was sufficient in substance.

Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard
of the evidence before it that can otherwise [a]ffect the results of the case, those findings should not be ignored. In this case, We give
great weight on the lower court's findings of fact as the latter was in a better position to examine the real evidence, and observed whether
the witness was telling the truth or not. x x x

Upon the foregoing, We are persuaded to believe and so hold that sufficient basis thus exists to allow the reconstitution and issuance of
certificates of title in favor of the appellees. For failure of the OSG to prove otherwise, the Court has no recourse but to deny its appeal.[10]

Hence, this Petition.

Issue

The OSG interposed the present recourse anchored on the ground that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT RECONSTITUTION IS JUSTIFIED ON THE
BASIS OF A COPY OF AN UNAUTHENTICATED DECREE AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.[11]

The OSG's Arguments

The OSG contends that the CA erred in affirming the Decision of the trial court granting respondents' Petition for Reconstitution
considering that "the decree which [the LRA] certified as a true copy did not previously form part of its records." In refuting the lower
court's finding of authenticity of the decree of registration, the OSG argues, thus:

x x x The machine copy of the decree that was attached to the petition for reconstitution itself became the source of a document that was
forwarded to the LRA, which document was, in turn, made the basis of a decree that was released by LRA as a certified true copy of its
records. Indeed, there is no authentic decree to speak of in the instant case. At best, the certification made by LRA on the decree
submitted as Exhibit A merely proves the subsequent appearance thereof in the records of the LRA. But it can never serve to prove its
authenticity for purposes of reconstitution under Section 2 (d) of Republic Act No. 26.[12]

The OSG also insists that respondents failed to present competent proof of the loss of OCT No. 8450. It maintains that the non-execution
of an affidavit of loss before the Register of Deeds in accordance with Section 12[13] of Republic Act No. 26 (RA 26),[14] as well as the
absence of any "testimony on record setting forth the circumstances that led to such loss"[15] cast doubt on respondents' claim that the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 8450 is indeed lost.

Respondents' Arguments

For their part, respondents assert that petitioner never questioned the recommendation of the LRA, "especially that portion of the report
that the Honorable Court may use the authenticated decree as a source of the desired reconstitution."[16] This thus renders the OSG's
objection to the same as "already late in the day."[17]

Our Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

The absence of opposition from the

government does not bar it from
assailing the decision granting the
Petition for Reconstitution.

Before we delve into the merits of the Petition, it would be best to address respondents' argument that "no person came forward to contest
the reconstitution of the subject title even after the requirements of posting and publication have been complied with," in light with our
ruling in Macawadib v. Philippine National Police Directorate for Personnel and Records Management,[18] thus:

On the question of whether or not respondent is estopped from assailing the decision of the RTC for failure of the OSG, as government
representative, to participate in the proceedings before the trial court or to file an opposition to petitioner's petition for correction of entries
in his service records, this Court rules that such an apparent oversight has no bearing on the validity of the appeal which the petitioner
filed before the CA. Neither can the State, as represented by the government, be considered in estoppel due to the petitioner's seeming
acquiescence to the judgment of the RTC when it initially made corrections to some of petitioner's records with the PNP. This Court has
reiterated time and again that the absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling significance, because the State
cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. Nor is the Republic barred from assailing the decision
granting the petition for correction of entries if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit.[19]

That having been said, we now discuss the merits of this Petition.
The instant Petition falls under the
exceptions to the general rule that
factual findings of the appellate court
are binding on this Court.

"Ordinarily, this Court will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the CA, especially where such findings coincide with those
of the trial court. The findings of facts of the CA are, as a general rule, conclusive and

binding upon this Court, since this Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case."[20]

"The above rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions, such as (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both parties; (7)
when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record."[21]

This case falls under the ninth exception; hence, we opt to take cognizance of the question brought to us by the OSG.

Respondents failed to present a

competent source of reconstitution.

Section 2 of RA 26 enumerates the sources from which reconstitution of lost or destroyed original certificates of title may be based:

SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from (such of) the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available in the
following order:

(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;

(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was
issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged,
leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate
of title.

Respondents predicate their Petition for Reconstitution on a decree of registration under Section 2(d) of RA 26. As both the original and
the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 8450 are lost or destroyed, it is only proper, no doubt, that we scrutinize the authenticity of Decree No.
339880.

A review of the records of this case shows that the CA did not directly address the issue of the decree's authenticity. In fact, it merely
stated that the pieces of evidence presented before the trial court "were further sustained by the unmistakable and reliable findings of the
Land Registration Authority (LRA)."[22]

However, a cursory reading of the LRA's report would reveal that the LRA made an admission only as to the existence of Decree No.
339880. Then, it went on to state that "[h]owever, [a] copy of said decree is no longer available in this Authority."[23] The Court cannot
therefore help but wonder how can a decree that is undisputedly unavailable with the LRA the "central repository of all land records
involving registered or titled lands [which] keeps the title history or records of transaction involving titled or registered lands."[24] be
suddenly presented before the trial court and accepted by it as authentic?

As if this was not disconcerting enough, what is more mind boggling would be the LRA's recommendation that "if the Honorable Court,
after notice and hearing, finds justification pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 26 to grant the same, an authenticated copy of
Decree No. 339880 may be used as a source of the desired reconstitution pursuant to Section 2(d) of said Act"[25] despite its admission
of the decree's absence in its records.

Now, the underlying question is: Where did respondents really secure Decree No. 339880 which they presented before the trial court?
As testified by Cesar, he was allegedly able to secure Decree No. 339880 from the LRA, to wit:

ATTY. AGUSTIN:
q
When you discovered x x x the loss of said title[,] what did you do next?
a
I tried to secure a copy of the Decree of this title, sir.
q
Were you able to secure one?
a
Yes, sir.
q
I am showing to you a copy of this Decree No. 339880 of lot 1921[,] will you please go over it and tell if this is the one?
a
That is the same certified xerox copy I have taken from the Land Registration Authority[,] which was already marked as Exhibit A, Sir.[26]

Clearly, this contradicts the LRA's admission that a copy of the decree is no longer available on its file.

Further, on the strength of the claim that the decree came from the LRA, respondents argue that it need not be authenticated since it is
in the nature of a public document.

While respondents may have raised a valid point, this Court, given the fact that the source of the subject decree is questionable, finds
the necessity of applying the requirements for authenticating a private document to dispel or confirm any doubts on the decree's
genuineness.

Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

Therefore, presentation of either the testimony of "anyone who saw the document executed or written" or of "evidence of the genuineness
of the signature or handwriting of the maker" would have addressed the issue before the Court. However, none was presented. Instead,
what is glaring from the decree itself is that it was not signed by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office (GLRO) who, by law,[27]
is tasked to issue decrees of registration. It only bears the signature of the Deputy Chief of the GLRO who merely signed to certify that
the document is a true copy. Even then, the genuineness of the said signature was not ascertained. Further, the decree is without the
signature of the witness Honorable Catalino Sevilla, the Judge of First Instance of Cagayan who supposedly ordered its issuance.[28]
The lack of evidence of its authenticity, the above-mentioned flaws in the decree, the admission of the LRA that the said document is not
available in their records and, the conflicting testimony of Cesar as to the source thereof, all cast serious doubts as to the genuineness
of Decree No. 339880. In view of the same, respondents would then have to present evidence under Section 2(f) of RA 26, i.e., any other
document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the loss or destroyed OCT.

The next question, thus, is: Do the pieces of evidence presented by respondents constitute "[a]ny other document which, in the judgment
of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title?"[29]

We find that they do not.

Respondents' other documentary evidence

such as the technical description, sepia film
and tax declarations are not sufficient pieces
of evidence to grant a Petition for
Reconstitution under Section 2(f) of RA 26.

This Court finds that the other pieces of documentary evidence submitted by respondents do not warrant the reconstitution of their alleged
lost title. The Court has pronounced in Republic v. Heirs of Julio Ramos,[30]

Respondents predicate their Petition for Reconstitution on Section 2(f) of RA 26. And to avail of its benefits, respondents presented survey
plan, technical description, Certification issued by the Land Registration Authority, Lot Data Computation, and tax declarations.
Unfortunately, these pieces of documentary evidence are not similar to those mentioned in subparagraphs (a) to (e) of Section 2 of RA
26, which all pertain to documents issued or are on file with the Registry of Deeds. Hence, respondents' documentary evidence cannot
be considered to fall under subparagraph (f). Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of
persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but
are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Thus, in Republic of the
Philippines v. Santua, we held that when Section 2(f) of RA 26 speaks of "any other document," the same must refer to similar documents
previously enumerated therein, that is, those mentioned in Sections 2(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e).

Also, the survey plan and technical description are not competent and sufficient sources of reconstitution when the petition is based on
Section 2(f) of RA 26. They are mere additional documentary requirements. This is the clear import of the last sentence of Section 12,
RA 26 earlier quoted. Thus, in Lee v. Republic of the Philippines, where the trial court ordered reconstitution on the basis of the survey
plan and technical description, we declared the order of reconstitution void for want of factual support.[31]

Furthermore, the Certification[32] issued by the LRA stating that Decree No. 339880 was issued for Lot No. 1921 would not serve to help
respondents' Petition for Reconstitution any better. Again, as we have already discussed in Republic v. Heirs of Julio Ramos,[33] a vague
Certification by the LRA without stating the nature of the decree, as well as the claimant in such case cannot be considered as a sufficient
and proper basis for reconstituting a lost or destroyed certificate of title.[34] To reiterate our ruling there, we quote:

Moreover, the Certification issued by the LRA stating that Decree No. 190622 was issued for Lot 54 means nothing. The Land Registration
Act expressly recognizes two classes of decrees in land registration proceedings, namely, (i) decrees dismissing the application and (ii)
decrees of confirmation and registration. In the case at bench, we cannot ascertain from said Certification whether the decree alluded to
by the respondents granted or denied Julio Ramos' claim. Moreover, the LRA's Certification did not state to whom Lot 54 was decreed.
Thus, assuming that Decree No. 190622 is a decree of confirmation, it would be too presumptuous to further assume that the same was
issued in the name and in favor of Julio Ramos. Furthermore, said Certification did not indicate the number of the original certificate of
title and the date said title was issued. In Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held that the absence of any
document, private or official, mentioning the number of the certificate of title and date when the certificate of title was issued, does not
warrant the granting of such petition. [35]

Neither do the tax declarations submitted support respondents' cause. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Santua,[36] a tax
declaration can only be prima facie evidence of claim of ownership, which, however, is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding. A
reconstitution of title does not pass upon the ownership of land covered by the lost or destroyed title but merely determines whether a re-
issuance of such title is proper. Besides, the tax declaration submitted by respondents only serve to bolster the OSG's claim that no such
decree exists as to serve as basis of the alleged OCT of Pedro. This is considering that the tax declarations submitted cover only the
years 1974 to 2000.[37] Notably,

no tax declarations for the years 1928 to 1973 were presented. Needless to state, the submission of tax declarations for the year 1928
and the years immediately following could have supported respondents' allegation that Pedro was issued a decree in 1928 and eventually
an OCT. However, no such documents were submitted. On the other hand, the tax declarations submitted pertaining to years 1974 to
2000 were paid only on March 30, 2000 or just shortly before the filing of the petition for reconstitution. One can only reasonably conclude
that the same was made in anticipation of the filing of the petition.

We also share the OSG's observation that the non-submission of an affidavit of loss by the person who was allegedly in actual possession
of OCT No. 8450 at the time of its loss casts doubt on respondents' claim that OCT No. 8450 once existed and subsequently got lost.
Under Section 109[38] of Presidential Decree No. 1529,[39] the owner must file with the proper Registry of Deeds a notice of loss executed
under oath. In this case, the presentation of such affidavit becomes even more important considering the doubtful testimony of Cesar that
OCT No. 8450 was lost, viz:

q
Where is the owner's copy of this original certificate of title?
a
It was lost, sir.
q
Will you plese explain how that owner's copy of OCT No. 8450 was lost?
a
The title was in our possession and later on it was lost in our possession.
q
What happened when you discovered the loss of said title?
a
We exerted efforts to locate but we were not able to locate the same.[40]

As can be gleaned from the above, Cesar's testimony was very vague. It utterly lacks details as to how the title got lost and fails to specify
the efforts they supposedly undertook in searching for the title's whereabouts. Indeed, his testimony is highly suspect and cannot be given
the expected probative weight. An affidavit of loss, in a way, could have helped explain the loss. But as mentioned, none was submitted.

At this point, it is imperative to remind trial courts that granting Petitions for Reconstitution is not a ministerial task. It involves diligent and
circumspect evaluation of the authenticity and relevance of all the evidence presented, lest the chilling consequences of mistakenly
issuing a reconstituted title when in fact the original is not truly lost or destroyed.

Here, the CA should have been more cautious in deliberating on the appeal taken by the OSG. It should not have hastily denied the same
merely because of the LRA's report recommending the reconstitution of OCT No. 8450 and the trial court's approval of such
recommendation. It should have taken note that the same report contains a crucial admission on the part of the LRA that the decree of
registration which was the main evidence used for respondents' petition was not available in their records.

In fine, we are not convinced that respondents adduced competent evidence to warrant reconstitution of the allegedly lost OCT.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED.

LOCSIN VS. HIZON

FACTS:

Petitioner Locsin was the registered owner of a lot covered by TCT No. 235094. In 1992, she filed an ejectment case against one Billy
Aceron (Aceron) to recover possession over the land in issue. Eventually, the two entered into a compromise agreement, which the MTC
approved.

Locsin later went to the US without knowing whether Aceron has complied with his part of the bargain under the compromise agreement.
In spite of her absence, however, she continued to pay the real property taxes on the subject lot.

In 1994, after discovering that her copy of TCT No. 235094 was missing, Locsin filed a petition for administrative reconstruction in order
to secure a new one.

However, she discovered that one Marylou Bolos had TCT No. RT-97467 cancelled and then secured a new one in her favor by registering
a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Locsin.

Bolos later sold the subject lot to Bernardo Hizon, but it was titled under Carlos Hizon’s name. Carlos is Bernardo’s son. Later, Bernardo,
claiming to be the owner of the property, filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution for the enforcement of the court-approved
compromise agreement. Furthermore, the property was already occupied and was, in fact, up for sale.

Locsin, sent Carlos a letter requesting the return of the property since her signature in the purported deed of sale in favor of Bolos was a
forgery. Carlos denied Locsin’s request, claiming that he was unaware of any defect or flaw in Bolos’ title and he is, thus, an innocent
purchaser for value and good faith.

Locsin learned that Carlos had already sold the property for PhP 1.5 million to his sister and her husband (spouses Guevara), who had
a new certificate of title issued in their names. The spouses Guevara then immediately mortgaged the said property to secure a PhP 2.5
million loan/credit facility with Damar Credit Corporation (DCC).

Locsin filed an action for reconveyance, annulment of TCT No. N-237083, the cancellation of the mortgage lien annotated thereon, and
damages, against Bolos, Bernardo, Carlos, the Sps. Guevara, DCC, and the Register of Deeds, Quezon City. The charges against DCC,
however, were dropped on joint motion of the parties. This is in view of the cancellation of the mortgage for failure of the spouses Guevara
to avail of the loan/credit facility DCC extended in their favor.

The RTC dismissed the complaint.

The CA ruled that it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that Locsin failed to prove that her signature was forged.

The CA, however, affirmed the RTC’s finding that respondents are innocent purchasers for value.

The CA ruled that Locsin can no longer recover the subject lot. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Carlos and Spouses Guerrero are innocent purchasers for value.

RULING:

An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest
in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim.

As such, a defective title–– or one the procurement of which is tainted with fraud and misrepresentation––may be the source of a
completely legal and valid title, provided that the buyer is an innocent third person who, in good faith, relied on the correctness of the
certificate of title, or an innocent purchaser for value.

Complementing this is the mirror doctrine which echoes the doctrinal rule that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely
on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition
of the property.

The recognized exceptions to this rule are stated as follows:

[A] person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion
should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate.
One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and, hence,
does not merit the protection of the law.
Thus, in Domingo Realty, Inc. v. CA, we emphasized the need for prospective parties to a contract involving titled lands to exercise the
diligence of a reasonably prudent person in ensuring the legality of the title, and the accuracy of the metes and bounds of the lot embraced
therein, by undertaking precautionary measures, such as:

1. Verifying the origin, history, authenticity, and validity of the title with the Office of the Register of Deeds and the Land Registration
Authority;

2. Engaging the services of a competent and reliable geodetic engineer to verify the boundary,metes, and bounds of the lot subject of
said title based on the technical description in the said title and the approved survey plan in the Land Management Bureau;

3. Conducting an actual ocular inspection of the lot;

4. Inquiring from the owners and possessors of adjoining lots with respect to the true and legal ownership of the lot in question;

5. Putting up of signs that said lot is being purchased, leased, or encumbered; and

6. Undertaking such other measures to make the general public aware that said lot will be subject to alienation, lease, or encumbrance
by the parties.

In the case at bar, Bolos’ certificate of title was concededly free from liens and encumbrances on its face. However, the failure of Carlos
and the spouses Guevara to exercise the necessary level of caution in light of the factual milieu surrounding the sequence of transfers
from Bolos to respondents bars the application of the mirror doctrine and inspires the Court’s concurrence with petitioner’s proposition.

REPUBLIC VS. MILLADO

FACTS:

Respondent filed a petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2108 issued in favor of the following, in undivided
equal shares: Isabel Bautista, single; Sixto Bautista, married to Elena Ela; and Apolonia Bautista, single. Respondent alleged that he and
his wife are the vendees of the property covered by the said title, by virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale
executed by the heirs of spouses Sixto and Elena Bautista on December 29, 2006.

He further averred that the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 2108 was in his possession while he was securing clearances for the transfer
of title in their names but he either left or misplaced the same. Respondent claimed that despite efforts he exerted to locate the owners
duplicate of OCT No. 2108, he was unable to find it. Upon verification with the Registry of Deeds, the original copy of OCT No. 2108 was
likewise not found in the files of said office, as per the certification issued by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Zambales stating
that said title was "declared missing as per Inventory dated Dec. 17, 1981 and that despite diligent effort to locate it, the same could not
be found."

The trial court ordered respondent to submit the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the
owners of the adjoining properties and all persons who may have any interest in the property. In compliance, respondent submitted only
the names and addresses of the owners/actual occupants of the adjoining lots. Thereupon, the trial court issued an Order setting the
hearing of the petition on September 11, 2007.

Considering that the National Printing Office could no longer accommodate the publication of the notice for the scheduled hearing date,
the trial court issued an Amended Order setting a new hearing date for the petition, December 13, 2007, and directing that (a) the
notice/order be published twice in the successive issues of the Official Gazette, posted in the premises of the subject property, the main
entrance of the Provincial Capitol and at the entrance of the municipal building of San Narciso, Zambales; (b) copies of the notice/order
together with the petition be sent to the proper parties; (c) the LRA thruits Records Section submit its report within 30 days from receipt
of the order/notice, pursuant to Sections 10 and 12 of LRC Circular No. 35; and (d) the Register of Deeds to submit her verification in
accordance with the aforesaid rule, within 30 days from receipt of notice/order. At the hearing, JovitoCalimlim, Jr., Records Officer of the
Registry of Deeds of Zambales, testified that based on the inventory files of titles in their office, OCT No. 2108 was declared missing as
of December 17, 1981, with no pending transaction, per verification from the Primary Entry Book. Upon being notified that the owners
duplicate copy of said title was likewise lost, they advised respondent to file a petition for reconstitution with the court. Respondent also
confirmed the loss of the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 2108 sometime in February or March 2007 while he was securing clearances
from the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the payment of capital gains tax. He said that at that time he had a bunch of documents in an
envelope but he forgot about it. He went back to the said office looking for the envelope but there were many people going in and out of
said office. He secured a certification from the Register of Deeds on the lost or missing original OCT No. 2108 in their files, and also a
certification from the LRA regarding the issuance of the decree of registration.

After the formal offer of documentary evidence showing compliance with publication and posting of notice requirements, and receipt of
the Report from the LRA, the case was submitted for decision. The trial court rendered its decision granting the petition for reconstitution.
The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) thru the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court gravely erred in
granting the petition for reconstitution despite non-compliance with all the jurisdictional requisites. It pointed out that respondent failed to
notify all the interested parties, particularly the heirs of the registered owners.

By Decision dated October 13, 2010,the CA dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed the trial courts ruling. It held that the respondent
had satisfactorily complied with the statutory notice requirements so that the adjoining owners and any other persons who may have an
interest in the property may be duly notified of the proceedings and given the opportunity to oppose the petition.
ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that respondent failed to comply with all the jurisdictional requisites for reconstitution of
title.

RULING:

Court of Appeals decision is overruled.

CIVIL LAW: reconstitution proceedings The nature of judicial reconstitution proceedings is the restoration of an instrument which is
supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of title or any document is to
have the same reproduced, after proper proceedings in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred.

The registered owners appearing in the title sought to be reconstituted, or in this case, their surviving heirs, are certainly interested parties
who should be notified of reconstitution proceeding under Section 12 in relation to Section 13 of R.A. 26. Indeed, for petitions based on
sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and 3(f), Section 13 adds another requirement aside from publication
and posting of notice of hearing: that the notice be mailed to occupants, owners of adjoining lots, and all other persons who may have an
interest in the property. Notwithstanding the sale supposedly effected by vendors claiming to be heirs of the registered owners, they
remain as interested parties entitled to notice of judicial reconstitution proceedings.

It is settled that the actual notice requirement in Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of R.A. 26 is mandatory and jurisdictional.

As such, the court upon which the petition for reconstitution of title is filed is duty-bound to examine thoroughly the petition for reconstitution
of title and review the record and the legal provisions laying down the germane jurisdictional requirements. Thus, we have held that
notwithstanding compliance with the notice publication, the requirement of actual notice to the occupants and the owners of the adjoining
property under Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. 26 is itself mandatory to vest jurisdiction upon the court in a petition for reconstitution of title
and essential in order to allow said court to take the case on its merits. The non-observance of the requirement invalidates the whole
reconstitution proceedings in the trial court. Republic of the Phil. v. Court of Appeals.

For non-compliance with the actual notice requirement to all other persons who may have interest in the property, in this case the
registered owners and/or their heirs, in accordance with Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of RA 26, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over L.R.A. Case No. RTC-237- I. The proceedings therein were therefore a nullity and the January 14, 2009 Decision was
void.

CUSI VS. DOMINGO

FACTS:

Lilia Domingo owned a certain real property which was vacant and unfenced. After some time, a construction activities were being
undertaken on her property without her knowledge and more so, without her consent. She soon was able to discover a series of
anomalous transactions involving her property. It turned out that Radella Sy was able to execute a falsified deed of sale and thereafter,
acquired a valid title to the property. Sy then divided the property into two and sold each half to spouses De Vera and Spouses Cusi, and
both buyers were able to have valid titles to the property on their names. All of the said transactions took place without the knowledge of
the real owner Lilia Domingo. Upon learning of the circumstances, Domingo filed a case at the RTC seeking annulment or cancellation
of the titles issued. The RTC rendered a decision, affirmed by the CA in favor of Lilia Domingo.

ISSUE:

What is the effect of acquiring a real property under the Torrens System of Land Registration?

RULING:

Under the Torrens system of land registration, the State is required to maintain a register of landholdings that guarantees indefeasible
title to those included in the register. The State issues an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner
of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. One
of the guiding tenets underlying the Torrens system is the curtain principle, in that one does not need to go behind the certificate of title
because it contains all the information about the title of its holder. This principle dispenses with the need of proving ownership by long
complicated documents kept by the registered owner, which may be necessary under a private conveyancing system, and assures that
all the necessary information regarding ownership is on the certificate of title. Consequently, the avowed objective of the Torrens system
is to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and, as a rule, to dispense
with the necessity of inquiring further; on the part of the registered owner, the system gives him complete peace of mind that he would
be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land.

The petitioners were shown to have been deficient in their vigilance as buyers of the property. It was not enough for them to show that
the property was unfenced and vacant; otherwise, it would be too easy for any registered owner to lose her property, including its
possession, through illegal occupation. In view of the foregoing, the court affirmed the decision of the lower courts and restores to Domingo
her rights of dominion over the property.
 AZNAR VS. YBANEZ

FACTS:

Aznar Brothers Realty Company (Aznar Brothers) is on appeal to review and undo the adverse decision promulgated on October 10,
2002,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on March 8, 1996 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
10, in Cebu City[2] insofar as the RTC: (a) dismissed for lack of merit Aznar Brothers' complaint for the declaration of the nullity of the
extrajudicial declaration of heirs with extrajudicial settlement of estate and deed of absolute sale, and (b) declared Lot No. 18563 as
legally owned by defendants Spouses Jose and Magdalena Ybañez (Spouses Ybañez), but modified the decision of the RTC by deleting
the awards of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit.

Antecedents

On March 21, 1964, Casimiro Ybañez (Casimiro), with the marital consent of Maria Daclan, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Aznar Brothers conveying for P2,500.00 the 17,575-square-meter unregistered agricultural land planted with 17 coconut trees situated in
Banika-Bulacao, Pardo, Cebu City, and covered by Tax Declaration No. IV-00128.[3] The Deed of Absolute Sale described the property
as bounded on the North by Aznar Brothers; on the East by Angel Sabellano; on the South by Bernardo Sabellano; and on the West by
Agaton Bacalso. The parties agreed to register the sale under Act No. 3344.[4]

On February 17, 1967, Saturnino Tanuco sold to Aznar Brothers for P2,528.00 the 15,760-square-meter parcel of corn and cogon land
planted with 17 coconut trees situated in Candawawan, Pardo, Cebu City, bounded on the North by Alfonso Pacaña; on the East by Tecla
Cabales; on the South by Angel Abellana; and on the West by Castor Sabellano. Tax Declaration No. IV-004787 was issued for the
property. The parties agreed to register the parcel of land under Act No. 3344.[5]

In his affidavit of confirmation executed on April 11, 1967, Angel Abellana declared that during the lifetime of his daughter, Rosa, he had
given to her husband, Tanuco, a parcel of land "known as Lot No. 18563" with an area of 15,760 square meters located in Pardo, Cebu
City; that the land was bounded on the North by Alfonso Pacaña; on the East by Tecla Cabales; on the South by Lot No. 5316 of Angel
Abellana; and on the West by Castor Sabellano; that the property assessed at P300.00 was declared under Tax Declaration No. IV-
004787; and that on February 17, 1967 Tanuco had sold the parcel of land to Aznar Brothers for P4,728.00.[6]

On July 3, 1968, Casimiro died intestate leaving as heirs his wife Maria, and their children, namely, Fabian and Adriano, both surnamed
Ybañez, and Carmen Ybañez-Tagimacruz, Fe Ybañez-Alison, and Dulcisima Ybañez-Tagimacruz. On August 29, 1977, the heirs of
Casimiro executed a document entitled Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person
and Deed of Absolute Sale, whereby they divided and adjudicated among themselves Lot No. 18563 with an area of 16,050 square
meters situated in Banika, Bulacao, Pardo Cebu City. By the same document, they sold the entire lot for P1,000.00 to their co-heir,
Adriano D. Ybañez (Adriano).[7]

On June 21, 1978, Adriano sold Lot No. 18563 to Jose R. Ybañez for P60,000.00. Lot No. 18563 is described in their deed of sale as
containing an area of 16,050 square meters, and was bounded on the North by the lot of Eusebia Bacalso; on the East by a lot of Aznar
Brothers; on the South by a lot of Angel Abellana; and on the West by a lot of Teofila C. Leona.[8]

On January 15, 1979, Jose R. Ybañez filed Free Patent Application No. (VII-I) 18980 in respect of the land he had bought from Adriano.[9]
In due course, on July 20, 1979, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2150 was issued to Jose R. Ybañez. The 16,050-square-meter
land is particularly described in OCT No. 2150 as

situated in the Barrio of Bulacao-Pardo, City of Cebu x x x. Bounded on the NorthEast, along lines 1-2-3 by Lot No. 1811, on the SouthEast,
along lines 3-4 by Lot No. 5316; on the SouthWest, along lines 4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11 by Lot No. 18565; on the NorthWest, along line 11-12
by Lot No. 18566; along line 12-1 by Lot No. 18114, all of Cebu City.[10]

On May 26, 1989, Aznar Brothers filed in the RTC a complaint against Jose R. Ybañez claiming absolute ownership of Lot No. 18563 by
virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 21, 1964 executed in its favor by Casimiro (Civil Case No. CEB-7887). Alleging that the
free patent issued in favor of Jose R. Ybañez covered the same property "already adjudicated as private property," Aznar Brothers sought
judgment to compel Jose R. Ybañez to surrender all the documents pertaining to the free patent for cancellation, and to order him to pay
attorney's fees of P5,000.00 and litigation expenses of P3,000.00.[11]

Jose R. Ybañez moved to dismiss the complaint of Aznar Brothers on the ground of lack of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the action, and estoppel by laches.[12] After Aznar Brothers opposed,[13] the RTC denied the motion to dismiss.[14] Thereafter,
Jose R. Ybañez filed his answer to the complaint.

In his answer, Jose R. Ybañez reiterated the grounds of his motion to dismiss (i.e., lack of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the action, and the bar by estoppel by laches); and prayed that Aznar Brothers be ordered to pay moral damages of P100,000.00;
exemplary damages in an amount to be determined by the court; attorney's fees of P20,000.00; and litigation expenses of P5,000.00,
plus costs of suit.[15]

In its reply, Aznar Brothers averred that Jose R. Ybañez did not present "records or certification as to the ownership of the land at the
time of the application for free patent xxx to prove that the land xxx is not a private land."[16]

In the course of the case, Aznar Brothers amended its complaint to allege the sale executed on February 17, 1967 by Tanuco and
confirmed by Angel Abellana on April 11, 1967.[17]
In his amended answer, Jose R. Ybañez contended that Aznar Brothers had offered to buy the property from him, requesting him to
update and prepare all the documents relevant to the sale, but Aznar Brothers later opted to claim the property as its own when the sale
could not be finalized.[18]

Aznar Brothers amended its complaint a second time to implead Jose R. Ybañez's wife Magdalena Marcos-Ybañez as defendant, averring
that both defendants held "no legal right nor just title to apply for free patent over the lot in question," for the land was "no longer a public
disposable agricultural land but a private residential land" that it already owned; that the issuance of OCT No. 2150 was erroneous and
without factual and legal bases; that it learned about the registration of the land in the name of Jose R. Ybañez only when his agent
offered to sell the land to it; that it refused the offer because it was already the owner of the land; and that consequently OCT No. 2150
should be cancelled, and Jose R. Ybañez should be ousted from the land.[19]

Aznar Brothers sought a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the Spouses Ybañez from disposing of the land. It
further sought the declaration as null and void ab initio the Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Person and Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 29, 1977, and of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 21, 1978; the
cancellation of OCT No. 2150; an order directing the Register of Deeds to issue another title in its name; the ouster of the Spouses
Ybañez from the property; the permanent injunction to prevent Spouses Ybañez from interfering with or disturbing its possession and
ownership of Lot No. 18563; and judgment ordering the Spouses Ybañez to pay moral damages of P50,000.00, attorney's fees of
P30,000.00, and litigation expenses of P20,000.00.

The Ybañez Spouses opposed the admission of the second amended complaint, claiming that the cause of action would thereby be
changed from accion publiciana to accion reivindicatoria; that while Magdalena Marcos-Ybañez was thereby being impleaded, the heirs
named in the Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person and Deed of Absolute Sale,
specifically Adriano, were not being impleaded; and that the declaration of nullity of OCT No. 2150 was a prohibited collateral attack on
their title to the property.[20]

The RTC admitted the second amended complaint, emphasizing that the original cause of action of accion publiciana would not be
changed because the second amended complaint would incorporate additional but related causes of action, a change permitted only
during the pre-trial stage.[21]

The Ybañez Spouses then amended their answer by reiterating the allegations in their previous answers, and, in addition, pleaded that
they had religiously paid the taxes on the land; that the claim of ownership of Aznar Brothers had been based only on tax declarations;
that their application for free patent had been granted more than ten years prior to the filing of the complaint by Aznar Brothers, who were
all too aware of the land registration case; that Aznar Brothers did not question their title within one year from its issuance; that a decree
of registration being binding on the whole world, the filing of the complaint ten years after the title had been issued left the complaint
without any cause of action; that the action for recovery of possession constituted a collateral attack on their title to the property; and that
adverse, notorious and continuous possession of the property under a claim of ownership was ineffective against a Torrens title. They
sought the dismissal of the second amended complaint for lack of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, estoppel by laches, and lack of
proper parties; and prayed for moral damages of P100,000.00; exemplary damages in such amount as the court would award in the
exercise of discretion; attorney's fees of P20,000.00; and litigation expenses of P5,000.00 plus costs of suit.[22]

Judgment of the RTC

On March 8, 1996,[23] the RTC rendered judgment after trial, declaring that the identity of the land sold to Aznar Brothers by Casimiro
and the land sold by the heirs of Casimiro to Jose R. Ybañez was "not an issue anymore" because it was "not raised as an issue" during
the pre-trial conference; that the issue remaining for resolution concerned which of the conflicting claims of ownership that of Aznar
Brothers based on Tax Declaration No. GR-07-049-00694 or that of the Spouses Ybañez based on OCT No. 2150 should prevail; that
the Spouses Ybañez with their OCT No. 2150 should prevail, rendering Aznar Brothers' complaint dismissible for lack of merit; that Lot
No. 18563 was "legally owned by the defendants;" and Aznar Brothers was liable to pay the Spouses Ybañez moral damages of
P100,000.00, exemplary damages of P50,000.00, attorney's fees of P20,000.00, and litigation expenses of P5,000.00, plus costs of suit.

Decision of the CA

Aznar Brothers appealed to the CA, assailing the judgment of the RTC for not sustaining the sale by Casimiro in its favor of Lot No. 18563
despite the sale being registered under Act No. 3344, as amended; and for awarding moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's
fees and litigation expenses to the Spouses Ybañez.

As earlier mentioned, the CA promulgated its adverse decision on October 10, 2002,[24] decreeing thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court AFFIRMS the appealed judgment but DELETES the award of attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, costs of the suit, moral and exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Aznar Brothers.

Issues

Only Aznar Brothers has come to the Court for review, raising the following issues for consideration and resolution, to wit:
THE CONCLUSION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT PETITIONER IS BARRED BY ESTOPPEL BY LACHES, IS
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND/OR WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT THEREBY COMMITTING A
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHICH IS GRAVELY PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER OVER THE SUBJECT
LOT NO. 18563. SAID CONCLUSION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY FACTS ON RECORDS (sic).

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DECLARING
SUBJECT LOT AS LEGALLY OWNED BY THE RESPONDENTS DESPITE OF ITS OWN FINDING THAT: RESPONDENTS WERE
BUYERS IN BAD FAITH AND THAT THEIR SELLERS WERE NOT OWNERS OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION AND THEREFORE,
THERE WAS NOTHING THAT THEY COULD HAVE SOLD TO THE RESPONDENTS.[25]

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

1.
Identity of the lot in litis is no
longer a proper issue herein

The CA and the RTC both held that the identity of the property in litis was no longer an issue to be considered and determined because
the parties did not raise it at the pre-trial. The Spouses Ybañez insist herein, however, that the RTC and the CA should have made such
a finding nonetheless in view of the materiality of whether the land claimed by Aznar Brothers was different from Lot No. 18563, the land
subject of their OCT No. 2150.

We clarify that although the Spouses Ybañez's non-appeal barred them from assigning errors for purposes of this review, they are not
prevented from now insisting, if only to uphold the judgment of the CA against Aznar Brothers,[26] that the property in litis was not the
same as Lot No. 18563, but they would not be accorded any relief upon those reasons,[27] even if the Court should find Aznar Brother's
appeal unmeritorious or utterly frivolous.[28]

Regardless, the holding by both lower courts was proper and correct. The non-inclusion in the pre-trial order barred the identity of the
property in litis as an issue, for it is basic that any factual issue not included in the pre-trial order will not be heard and considered at the
trial,[29] much less, on appeal. The parties had the obligation to disclose during the pre-trial all the issues they intended to raise during
the trial, except those involving privileged or impeaching matters, for the rule is that the definition of issues during the pre-trial conference
will bar the consideration of others, whether during trial or on appeal. The basis of the exclusion is that the parties are concluded by the
delimitation of the issues in the pre-trial order because they themselves agreed to it.[30]

The waiver of the identity of the property in litis as an issue did not violate the right of any of the parties herein due to the Rules of Court
having forewarned them in Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court that should the action proceed to trial, the pre-trial order would
explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried, and its contents would control the subsequent course of the action, unless modified before
trial to prevent manifest injustice.

In reality, the parties could still have reversed the waiver had they so wanted. Towards that end, they had three opportunities after the
issuance of the pre-trial order to submit the identity of the property in litis as an issue for trial and decision. The first was for either of them
to seek the modification of the pre-trial order prior to the trial in order to prevent manifest injustice,[31] but neither did so. The second was
for either of them to have the trial court consider the identity of the property in litis as an issue proper for the trial, but such party must
give a special reason to justify the trial court in doing so. This would have been authorized under Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of
Court.[32] Again, neither of them seized such opportunity. And the third was for the Spouses Ybañez to adduce evidence on Lot No.
18563 being different from the land claimed by Aznar Brothers. Had they done so, Aznar Brothers could have either allowed such evidence
without objection, or objected to such evidence on the ground of its not being relevant to any issue raised in the pleadings or in the pre-
trial order. The RTC could then have proceeded as it deemed fit, including allowing such evidence. This procedure would have been
authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment
of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected
to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and
shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The
court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made. (5a)

Moreover, for the Spouses Ybañez to call upon the Court now to analyze or weigh evidence all over again upon such a factual matter
would be impermissible considering that the Court is not a trier of facts.[33]

There are exceptional instances in which the Court has held itself competent to make its own appreciation of the facts, and not be
concluded by the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts, namely: (1) when the factual findings of the CA and those of the trial
court were contradictory; (2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (3) when the inference
made by the CA from its findings of fact was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in
the appreciation of facts; (5) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings were contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the judgment of the CA was premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) when
the CA failed to notice certain relevant facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of facts
were themselves conflicting; (9) when the findings of fact were conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they were
based; and (10) when the findings of fact of the CA were premised on the absence of evidence but such findings were contradicted by
the evidence on record. [34] None of the aforementioned exceptions obtains in this case.

Accordingly, the Court, just as the lower courts have been bound, shall proceed upon the assumption that the property in litis and Lot No.
18563 were one and the same realty.

2.
CA correctly concluded that Aznar Brothers
owned Lot No. 18563; and that the Spouses Ybañez
were not buyers in good faith

In its assailed judgment, the CA concluded that the RTC erred in holding in favor of the Spouses Ybañez, observing as follows:

The trial court however erred when it held:

Nevertheless, from the totality of the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no preponderant evidence that the defendants had prior
knowledge of the previous sale of subject property to the plaintiff when they bought the same from Adriano D. Ybañez on June 21, 1978.
And there is neither any showing that defendant had prior knowledge of such sale when they applied for and was issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 2150 on August 14, 1979. Thus, defendants can very well be considered as purchasers to the protection of the
provisions of P.D. 1529. While plaintiff has shown to have acquired or was issued tax declaration No. GR-07-049-00694 and had paid
taxes on the property, said tax declaration and realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership (Ferrer-Lopez vs. Court of
Appeals, 150 SCRA 393). It cannot prevail over Original Certificate of Title No. 2150 in the name of the defendants, as a torrens title
concludes all controversies over ownership of land covered by a final decree of registration (PNB vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 435).

The Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit F) in favor of plaintiff-appellant Aznar was registered under Act 3344, as amended on March 23, 1964
with the Register of Deeds of Cebu City. The registration of said deed gave constructive notice to the whole world including defendant-
appellees of the existence of said deed of conveyance. (Gerona v. Guzman, 11 SCRA 153) Defendant-appellees cannot, therefore, claim
to be buyers in good faith of the land in question. Resultantly, they merely stepped into the shoes of their sellers vis a vis said land. Since
their sellers were not owners of the property in question, there was nothing that they could have sold to defendant-appellees.[35]

We sustain the CA's conclusion that the Spouses Ybañez were guilty of bad faith, and that they acquired Lot No. 18563 from sellers who
were not the owners. Accordingly, we resolve the second error raised herein in favor of Aznar Brothers.

The records and evidence fully substantiated the CA's conclusion. The Spouses Ybañez acquired Lot No. 18563 through the deed of
sale executed on June 21, 1978 by Adriano in favor of Jose R. Ybañez. Together with his siblings Fabian Ybañez, Carmen Ybañez-
Tagimacruz, Fe Ybañez-Alison, and Dulcisima Ybañez-Tagimacruz, Adriano had supposedly inherited Lot No. 18563 from Casimiro, their
father, who had died intestate on July 3, 1968. Holding themselves as the heirs and successors-in-interest of Casimiro, they had then
executed on August 29, 1977 the Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person and
Deed of Absolute Sale, whereby they divided and adjudicated Lot No. 18563 among themselves, and then sold the entire lot to Adriano.

But, as the CA correctly found, the Spouses Ybañez held no right to Lot No. 18563 because Adriano, their seller, and his siblings were
not the owners of Lot No. 18563. Indeed, Casimiro had absolutely conveyed his interest in Lot No. 18563 to Aznar Brothers under the
Deed of Absolute Sale of March 21, 1964 with the marital consent of Maria Daclan, Casimiro's surviving spouse and the mother of Adriano
and his siblings. Considering that such conveyance was effective and binding on Adriano and his siblings, there was no valid transmission
of Lot No. 18563 upon Casimiro's death to any of said heirs, and they could not legally adjudicate Lot No. 18563 unto themselves, and
validly transfer it to Adriano. The conveyance by Adriano to Jose R. Ybañez on June 21, 1978 was absolutely void and ineffectual.

There is also no question that the Spouses Ybañez were aware of the conveyance of Lot No. 18563 by Casimiro to Aznar Brothers
considering that the Deed of Absolute Sale of March 21, 1964 between Casimiro and Aznar Brothers was registered in the book of registry
of unregistered land on the same day pursuant to their agreement. Such registration constituted a constructive notice of the conveyance
on the part of the Spouses Ybañez pursuant to Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended by Act No. 3344,
which provided as follows:

Section 194. Recording of instruments or deeds relating to real estate not registered under Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six
or under the Spanish Mortgage Law. No instrument or deed establishing, transmitting, acknowledging, modifying or extinguishing rights
with respect to real estate not registered under the provisions of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, entitled "The Land
Registration Act," and its amendments, or under the Spanish Mortgage Law, shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto, until
such instrument or deed has been registered, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, in the office of the register of deeds for the province
or city where the real estate lies.

It shall be the duty of the register of deeds for each province or city to keep a day book and a register book of unregistered real estate, in
accordance with a form to be prepared by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, with the approval of the Secretary of Justice.
The day book shall contain the names of the parties, the nature of the instrument or deed for which registration is requested, the hour
and minute, date and month of the year when the instrument was received. The register book shall contain, among other particulars, the
names, age, civil status, and the residences of the parties interested in the act or contract registered and in case of marriage, the name
of the wife, or husband, as the case may be, the character of the contract and its conditions, the nature of each piece of land and its
improvements only, and not any other kind of real estate or properties, its situation, boundaries, area in square meters, whether or not
the boundaries of the property are visible on the land by means of monuments or otherwise, and in the affirmative case, in wh at they
consist; the permanent improvements existing on the property; the page number of the assessment of each property in the year when
the entry is made, and the assessed value of the property for that year; the notary or the officer who acknowledged, issued, or certified
the instrument or deed; the name of the person or persons who, according to the instrument, are in present possession of each property;
a note that the land has not been registered under Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law; that
the parties have agreed to register said instrument under the provisions of this Act, and that the original instrument has been filed in the
office of the register of deeds, indicating the file number, and that the duplicate has been delivered to the person concerned; the exact
year, month, day, hour, and minute when the original of the instrument was received for registration, as stated in the day book. It shall
also be the duty of the register of deeds to keep an index-book of persons and an index-book of estates, respectively, in accordance with
a form to be also prepared by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, with the approval of the Secretary of Justice.

Upon presentation of any instrument or deed relating to real estate not registered under Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six and
its amendments or under the Spanish Mortgage Law, which shall be accompanied by as many duplicates as there are parties interested,
it shall be the duty of the register of deeds to ascertain whether said instrument has all the requirements for proper registration. If the
instrument is sufficient and there is no legitimate objection thereto, or in case of there having been one, if the same has been dismissed
by final judgment of the courts, and if there does not appear in the register any valid previous entry that may be affected wholly or in part
by the registration of the instrument or deed presented, and if the case does not come under the prohibition of section fourteen hundred
and fifty-two of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, the register of deeds shall register the instrument in the proper book.
In case the instrument or deed presented has defects preventing its registration, said register of deeds shall refuse to register it until the
defects have been removed, stating in writing his reasons for refusing to record said instrument as requested. Any registration made
under this section shall be understood to be without prejudice to a third-party with a better right.

The register of deeds shall be entitled to collect in advance as fees for the services to be rendered by him in accordance with this Act,
the same fees established for similar services relating to instruments or deeds in connection with real estate in section one hundred
fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred ninety-six entitled "The Land Registration Act," as amended by Act Numbered Two thousand
eight hundred and sixty-six. (Emphasis in the original; bold italics supplied.)

Although a deed or instrument affecting unregistered lands would be valid only between the parties thereto, third parties would also be
affected by the registered deed or instrument on the theory of constructive notice once it was further registered in accordance with Section
194, i.e., the deed or instrument was written or inscribed in the day book and the register book for unregistered lands in the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the realty was located. As ruled in Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza:[36]

The non-registration of the aforesaid deed does not also affect the validity thereof. Registration is not a requirement for validity of the
contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. The principal purpose of registration is
merely to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property has been entered into. The conveyance
of unregistered land shall not be valid against any person unless registered, except (1) the grantor, (2) his heirs and devisees, and (3)
third persons having actual notice or knowledge thereof. As held by the Court of Appeals, petitioners are the heirs of Ignacio, the grantor
of the subject property. Thus, they are bound by the provisions of the deed of donation inter vivos.

The effect on third parties of the constructive notice by virtue of the registration of the deed or instrument was aptly illustrated in Bautista
v. Fule,[37] where the Court pronounced that the subsequent buyer of unregistered land sold at an execution sale, which the purchaser
at the public auction registered under Act No. 3344 seven days after that sale, was "deemed to have constructive notice" of the sale, and,
therefore, could not be "entitled to the rights of a purchaser in good faith." The Court emphasized that as to lands not registered under
either the Spanish Mortgage Law or the Land Registration Act, the registration under Act No. 3344 should produce its effects against third
persons if the law was "to have utility at all."[38]

It is worth mentioning that Act No. 3344 (approved on December 8, 1926) was the governing law at the time of the execution of the deed
of absolute sale of March 21, 1964 between Casimiro and Aznar Brothers, and the deed of absolute sale of February 17, 1967 between
Tanuco and Aznar Brothers. Both deeds were registered pursuant to Section 194; while, on the other hand, the sale between Adriano
and Jose R. Ybañez on June 21, 1978 was covered by the P.D. No. 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree (whose
effectivity was upon its approval on June 11, 1978).[39]

Section 3 of P.D. No. 1529, albeit expressly discontinuing the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law, has considered
lands recorded under that system as unregistered land that could still be recorded under Section 113 of P.D. No. 1529 "until the land
shall have been brought under the operation of the Torrens system;" and has provided that "[t]he books of registration for unregistered
lands provided under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344, shall continue to remain in force;
provided, that all instruments dealing with unregistered lands shall henceforth be registered under Section 113 of this Decree." It is clear,
therefore, that even with the effectivity of P.D. No. 1529, all unregistered lands may still be registered pursuant to Section 113 of P.D. No.
1529, which essentially replicates Section 194, as amended by Act No. 3344, to the effect that a deed or instrument conveying real estate
not registered under the Torrens system[40] should affect only the parties thereto unless the deed or instrument was registered in
accordance with the same section.[41]

The only exception to the rule on constructive notice by registration of the deed or instrument affecting unregistered realty exists in favor
of "a third party with a better right." This exception is provided in Section 194, as amended by Act No. 3344, to the effect that the
registration "shall be understood to be without prejudice to a third party with a better right;" and in paragraph (b) of Section 113 of P.D.
No. 1529, to the effect that "any recording made under this section shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right." As to
who is "a third party with better right" under these provisions is suitably explained in Hanopol v. Pilapil,[42] a case where the sale of
unregistered land was registered under Act No. 3344 but the land was sold twice, as follows:
It thus appears that the "better right" referred to in Act No. 3344 is much more than the mere prior deed of sale in favor of the first vendee.
In the Lichauco case just mentioned, it was the prescriptive right that had supervened. Or, as also suggested in that case, other facts and
circumstances exist which, in addition to his deed of sale, the first vendee can be said to have better right than the second purchaser.[43]
(Bold emphasis supplied.)

The Court also observes in Sales v. Court of Appeals,[44] a case involving parties to a deed of donation who had agreed to register the
instrument under Act No. 3344 but failed to do so, that the "better right" of a third party relates to "other titles which a party might have
acquired independently of the unregistered deed such as title by prescription."[45] But the exception does not obviously apply to the
Spouses Ybañez because they acquired their right from Adriano who did not hold any legal or equitable interest in Lot No. 18563 that he
could validly transfer to the Spouses Ybañez.

3.
Estoppel by laches did not bar
Aznar Brothers' right over Lot No. 18563

Unexpectedly, the CA disregarded its aforecited correct conclusion on Aznar Brothers' ownership of Lot No. 18563, and instead ruled
that estoppel by laches had already barred Aznar Brothers' "dominical claim" over Lot No. 18563. It ratiocinated thusly:

But then, there were pre-existing and supervening circumstances which effectively quashed the dominical claim of plaintiff-appellant over
the subject land. Plaintiff-appellant was never in possession of the land which it bought. Even after buying the land from Casimiro Ybañez,
plaintiff-appellant did not take possession of it. On the other hand, the heirs of Casimiro Ybañez took possession of said land upon the
latter's death. Said heirs sold their shares on said land to one of their co-heirs, Adriano Ybañez, who in turn, sold the whole land to
defendant appellees, the spouses Jose and Magdalena Ybañez. The latter continued possessing said land, tax declared it, paid realty
taxes thereon and finally secured a free patent and title over it. Up to the present, defendant-appellees are in possession of the land as
owners thereof.

There is absolutely no doubt that in law, plaintiff-appellant had lost its dominical and possessory claim over the land for its inaction from
1964 when it bought the land up to 1989 when it filed the Complaint in the trial court or a long period of 25 years. This is called estoppel
by laches.[46]

Aznar Brothers now assails this adverse ruling under its first assigned error by pointing out that the CA erred in relying on estoppel by
laches, a rule of equity, to bar its "dominical claim" over Lot No. 18563. It insists that its action to declare the nullity of the Extrajudicial
Declaration of Heirs with Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person and Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 29, 1977, and
the Deed of Absolute Sale of June 21, 1978 was imprescriptible under Article 1410 of the Civil Code; and that on the assumption that
accion publiciana would prescribe in ten years, its filing of the original complaint on May 26, 1989 was done within the 10-year period
counted from August 14, 1979, the date of the issuance of OCT No. 2150 in the name of Jose R. Ybañez.

The Spouses Ybañez counter that the CA was correct because Aznar Brothers did not assert possession and ownership over the land
for 25 years; that it brought its complaint only in 1989 after they had undergone the proceedings in rem for the issuance of OCT No. 2150;
that it did not challenge their application for the free patent or the proceedings for the issuance of OCT No. 2150; that it did not also
oppose the conduct of the survey of the land relevant to the application for the free patent despite the notice of the survey given by the
surveying engineer to the adjoining lot owners; that during the hearing of the case, Jose R. Ybañez testified that only three hectares of
the land originally owned by Casimiro had been sold to it, the rest having been retained by Casimiro that became the subject of the
extrajudicial settlement by his heirs, who had then sold that retained portion to Jose R. Ybañez; that the tax declarations presented by it
described property distinct from that covered by OCT No. 2150, although it claimed that the same property had been sold to it twice by
Casimiro and Tanuco; and that on at least three occasions, it had attempted to buy the lot from them but the negotiations did not push
through.

We hold and declare that the CA's ruling in favor of the Spouses Ybañez was devoid of legal and factual support, and should be rightfully
reversed.

Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exerting due diligence a party
could and should have done earlier.[47] A suit that is barred on the ground of laches is also called a stale demand. Laches is based on
grounds of public policy that requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is
not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.[48] Tempus enim modus tollendi obligationes et actiones, quia tempus currit contra desides et sui juris contemptores (For time
is a means of dissipating obligations and actions, because time runs against the slothful and careless of their own rights).[49] Truly, the
law serves those who are vigilant and diligent, not those who sleep when the law requires them to act.[50]

For laches to bar a claim, four elements must be shown, namely: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims,
giving rise to a situation of which a complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainant's right, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to
institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases
his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event that the relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred.[51]

The CA incorrectly barred the claim of Aznar Brothers to Lot No. 18563 because of laches. For one, Aznar Brothers immediately registered
the purchase in accordance with Act No. 3344, the law then governing the registration of unregistered land. Its action in that regard
ensured the protection of the law as to its ownership of the land, and evinced that it did not abandon its ownership. Verily, its maintaining
Lot No. 18563 as an unregistered land from then on should not prejudice its rights; otherwise, its registration pursuant to l aw would be
set at naught. Secondly, the supposed acts of possession of Lot No. 18563 exercised by the Spouses Ybañez from the time of their
purchase from Adriano, including causing it to be surveyed for purposes of the application for free patent, did not prejudice Aznar Brothers'
interest because the registration under Act No. 3344 had given constructive notice to the Spouses Ybañez of its prior acquisition of the
land. Thereby, the Spouses Ybañez became bound by the sale from Casimiro to Aznar Brothers, and rendered them incapable of
acquiring the land in good faith from Adriano. Consequently, Jose R. Ybañez's intervening application for the free patent, the grant of the
free patent and the issuance of OCT No. 2150 thereafter did not supplant the superior rights and interest of Aznar Brothers in Lot No.
18563. And, lastly, the Spouses Ybañez would not suffer any prejudice should Aznar Brothers prevail herein, for Adriano, their
predecessor-in-interest, did not transmit to them any kind or degree of right or interest in Lot No. 18563.

4.
Lot No. 18563, not being land of the
public domain, was not subject to the free patent
issued to the Spouses Ybañez

The Spouses Ybañez's position rests on their having been issued the free patent and OCT No. 2150.

The records do not support the position of the Spouses Ybañez. Although Jose R. Ybañez declared in paragraph 4 of his application for
the free patent that Lot No. 18563 was public land, and was not then claimed or occupied by any other person;[52] and further declared
under oath in the affidavit submitted to support his application for the free patent that he "recognize(d)" Lot No. 18563 "as public land,"
his declarations did not establish that Lot No. 18563 was land of the public domain. Nor did the Spouses Ybañez show that Jose R.
Ybañez had acted in good faith in applying for the free patent pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act), as amended.
Instead, they were fully aware of the nature and character of the land as private. In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 21, 1978,
Adriano stated that he had been "the absolute owner in fee simple free from all liens and encumbrances whatsoever" of Lot No. 18563;
and that he (Adriano) had held the "perfect right to convey the same (as) the purchaser of the same as per Extrajudicial Declaration of
Heirs with extrajudicial settlement of estate of deceased person and deed of absolute sale."[53] In view of the privity between Adriano
and the Spouses Ybañez as to the land, the former's statements concluded the latter.[54]

In contrast, Aznar Brothers acquired Lot No. 18563 as the private land of Casimiro. In their Deed of Absolute Sale of March 21, 1964,
Casimiro expressly warranted that the land was his "own exclusive property."[55] With the ownership of Aznar Brothers being thus
established, the free patent issued to Jose R. Ybañez by the Government was invalid for the reason that the Government had no authority
to dispose of land already in private ownership.[56] The invalidity of the free patent necessarily left OCT No. 2150 a patent nullity. As
ruled in Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago:[57]

The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no legal effects whatsoever. Private
ownership of land as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants is not affected by the issuance of a free patent
over the same land, because the Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority to
grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in character and have passed to private ownership. Consequently, a certificate
of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding only if the land covered
by it is really a part of the disposable land of the public domain. (Bold emphasis supplied)

To the same effect was Agne v. Director of Lands,[58] where the Court declared that if land covered by free patent was already the private
property of another and, therefore, not part of the disposable land of the public domain, the patentee did not acquire any right or title to
the land.

The principle of indefeasibility of the Torrens title does not protect OCT No. 2150 because the free patent on which the issuance of the
title was based was null and void. A direct attack as well as a collateral attack are proper, for, as the Court declared in De Guzman v.
Agbagala:[59]

x x x. An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack. OCT No.
P-30187 was registered on the basis of a free patent which the RTC ruled was issued by the Director of Lands without authority. The
petitioners falsely claimed that the land was public land when in fact it was not as it was private land previously owned by Carmen who
inherited it from her parents. x x x.

Nonetheless, it appears that Aznar Brothers actually mounted a direct attack on the title of the Spouses Ybañez. In the original complaint,
Aznar Brothers sought judgment ordering them to "[s]urrender all the documents pertaining to the Free Patent for cancellation." Such
relief was predicated on the allegation that the land in question "was already adjudicated as private property of the plaintiff" through the
Deed of Absolute Sale of March 21, 1964. Aznar Brothers reiterated the relief in the amended complaint. In its second amended complaint,
it expressly prayed for the "cancellation and annulment" of OCT No. 2150. By such pleadings, it directly attacked OCT No. 2150, because
their object was "to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment or proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed."[60]

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision

NORTH GREENHILLS VS. MORALES

FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction[1] filed under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner North Greenhills Association, Inc. (NGA) seeks the review of the March 13, 2015 Decision[2] and
February 3, 2016 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 131707, which affirmed the February 17, 2010 Decision[4]
and August 8, 2013 Resolution[5] of the Office of the President (OP) in O.P. Case No. 08-1-004. The CA ruled in favor of respondent
Atty. Narciso Morales (Atty. Morales), a resident of North Greenhills Subdivision, who filed a Complaint before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), docketed as HLURB Case No. HOA-A-050425-0014, against the NGA for allegedly blocking his side access
to the community park.

Atty. Morales is a resident of North Greenhills Subdivision in San Juan City. His house is located alongside Club Filipino Avenue and
adjacent to McKinley Park, an open space/playground area owned and operated by NGA. He also has a personal access door, which he
built through a wall separating his house from the park. This access door, when unlocked, opens directly into the park. On the other hand,
NGA, an association composed of members of the subdivision, organized to promote and advance the best interests, general welfare,
prosperity, and safeguard the well-being of the owners, lessees and occupants of North Greenhills, is the undisputed owner of the park.
It has acquired ownership thereof through a donation made by the original owner, Ortigas &. Co. Ltd.

In June 2003, NGA started constructing a pavilion or kiosk occupying the side of the park adjacent to the residence of Atty. Morales. Part
of the design was a public restroom intended to serve the needs of park guests and members of NGA.

Objecting to the construction of the restroom, Atty. Morales filed on July 23, 2003 a complaint before the HLURB... he amended his
complaint and additionally sought the demolition of the pavilion which was then being built.

Atty. Morales alleged that for a period spanning 33 years, he had an open, continuous, immediate, and unhampered access to the
subdivision park through his side door, which also served as an exit door in case of any eventuality; that having such access to the park
was one of the considerations why he purchased the lot; that the construction of the pavilion was illegal because it violated his right to
immediate access to the park, Presidential Decree No. 957 and the Deed of Donation of Ortigas & Co. Ltd., which required the park to
be maintained as an open area; and that the restroom constructed by NGA was a nuisance per se.

NGA, in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, rejected the assertions of Atty. Morales. It contended that as the absolute owner of
the park, it had the absolute right to fence the property and impose reasonable conditions for the use thereof by both its members and
third parties; that the construction of the restroom was for the use and benefit of all NGA members, including Atty. Morales; and that Atty.
Morales' use of a side entrance to the park for 33 years could not have ripened into any right because easement of right of way could not
be acquired by prescription.

the HLURB Arbiter conducted an ocular inspection of the park and noted that the construction started by NGA blocked Atty. Morales' side
access to the park.

HLURB Arbiter rendered a Decision... ordering respondents of the removal of the pavilion and the relocation of the common toilet in a
place where it will not be a nuisance to any resident. Respondents are further directed to remove the obstruction to the side door of the
complainant. All other claims and counterclaims are hereby dismissed

NGA appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners

HLURB Board modified the ruling of the HLURB Arbiter... respondent NGA is ordered to relocate the restroom constructed or being
constructed in the McKinley Park away from the walls of any resident and where it will not block complainant's side door access to the
park.

NGA appealed to the Office of the President (OP).

OP rendered its decision, affirming in toto the ruling of the HLURB Board.

NGA moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the OP

Aggrieved, NGA filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA

Ruling of the CA In its March 13, 2015 Decision,[10] the CA affirmed the ruling of the OP. It found no error on the part of the OP in
affirming the characterization of the restrooms built as nuisance per accidens considering that the structure posed sanitary issues which
could adversely affect not only Atty. Morales, but also his entire household; that even if there existed a perimeter wall between the park
and Atty. Morales' home, the odor emanating from the restroom could easily find its way to the dining area, and the foul and noxious smell
would make it very difficult and annoying for the residents of the house to eat; and that the proximity of the restroom to Atty. Morales'
house placed the people residing therein at a greater risk of contracting diseases both from improperly disposed waste and human
excrements, as well as from flies, mosquitoes and other insects, should NGA fail to maintain the cleanliness of the structures.

NGA moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the CA

Hence, this petition.

Issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN IN RULING THAT THE TOILET BUILT BY NGA
AT THE MCKINLEY PARK IS A NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS, ON THE BASIS OF MERE SPECULATION, SUPPOSITION AND PURE
CONJECTURE, CONSIDERING THE TOTAL LACK OF EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE SO.

RESPONDENT ATTY. MORALES DID NOT SET OUT TO PROVE THAT THE TOILET ADJACENT HIS HOUSE INJURED HIM OR
THAT FOUL ODOR EMANATED FROM IT BECAUSE HE MISTAKENLY ALLEGED THAT THE TOIILET WAS A NUISANCE PER SE.

BY FAILING TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE THAT THE TOILET, IN ANY WAY, ANNOYED RESPONDENT'S SENSES, OR THAT FOUL
ODOR EMANATED FROM IT, OR THAT IT POSED SANITARY ISSUES DETRIMENTAL TO HIS FAMILY'S HEALTH - THE SUBJECT
TOILET CANNOT BE LEGALLY CONSIDERED NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS.

WHETHER THE CA CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE HLURB HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT FILED BY ATTY.
MORALES; 2. WHETHER THE CA CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE RESTROOM BUILT BY NGA INSIDE THE MCKINLEY PARK IS
A NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS; 3. WHETHER NGA HAS THE RIGHT TO BLOCK ATTY. MORALES' ACCESS TO THE PARK; AND 4.
WHETHER THE CA CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM OF NGA AGAINST ATTY. MORALES FOR UNPAID
ASSOCIATION DUES WAS A PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM.

Ruling:

The Court partly grants the petition.

On the finding that the restroom was a nuisance per accidens The CA in disposing the case, ruled that the restroom posed sanitary issues
to Atty. Morales and is, therefore, a nuisance per accidens. Such is a finding of fact, which is generally conclusive upon the Court, because
it is not its function to analyze and weigh the evidence all over again.

By the use of the words "would, should, could," it can be discerned that the CA was not even sure that the restroom has caused such
annoyance to Atty. Morales or his family. Its declaration that the restroom is a nuisance per accidens had no basis in evidence.

It was improper on the part of the CA to assume those negative effects because modern day restrooms, even those for the use of the
public, are clean, safe and emitting no odor as these are regularly maintained. For said reason, it was an error on the part of the CA to
rule that the restroom was a nuisance per accidens and to sustain the order that it should be relocated.

NGA claims that the CA erred in upholding Atty. Morales' unbridled access to the park, which effectively constituted an easement of right
of way without any basis as against the clear statutory right of NGA, as the owner of the park, to fence and protect its property on the
basis of Articles 429 and 430 of the Civil Code. The Court agrees with NGA.

CA essentially violated the right of NGA. Atty. Morales never introduced any evidence that he had acquired any right by prescription or
by agreement or legal easement to access the park through his side door. Moreover, he never claimed that his side door was his only
access to the park. He has other means and, being adjacent to the park, going through other means is not cumbersome.

The conditions[25] set forth under the Deed of Donation by Ortigas & Co. Ltd. to NGA could not be used by Atty. Morales in his favor.
Assuming that he has a right as a member to use the park, it does not mean that he can assert that his access to the park could only be
done through his side door. Atty. Morales knows very well that he can access the park through some other parts of the park.

Principles:

On Jurisdiction Basic is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations
in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an
action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined from the allegations contained in the complaint, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.

There are, however, well-recognized exceptions. These are (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

A nuisance per accidens is one which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it
cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.

Obviously, it requires a determination of such circumstances as to warrant the abatement of the nuisance. That can only be done with
reasonable notice to the person alleged to be maintaining or doing the same of the time and place of hearing before a tribunal authorized
to decide whether such a thing or act does in law constitute a nuisance per accidens.
it requires a proper appreciation of evidence before a court or tribunal rules that the property being maintained is a nuisance per accidens.

Under the Civil Code, NGA, as owner of the park, has the right to enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live
or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. It also has a right to exclude others from
access to, and enjoyment of its property. NGA's legal right to block the access door is beyond doubt. Courts have no business in securing
the access of a person to another property absent any clear right on the part of the latter.