GAMBITO VS.

BACENA

FACTS:

The records show that before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Jose V. Gambito (Gambito) filed a
complaint for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of title, specific performance and damages over a parcel of land located in La Torre
South, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, against Adrian Oscar Z. Bacena (Bacena), one of the defendants therein.

Gambito alleged before the MTC that he is the true and registered owner of a certain parcel of land located in La Torre South,
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya containing an area of 8,601 square meters, more or less, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
149954. The said parcel of land was acquired by him through a Deed of Donation executed on July 9, 2008 by his mother, Luz V.
Gambito (Luz), who held said property under TCT No. 92232. Her mother, Luz, acquired the same property from Dominga Pascual
(Pascual) and her co-owner, Rosalina Covita (Covita), through a Deed of Sale dated December 16, 1994 which finds its origin from
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. R-578 issued on March 30, 1916.4

Gambito claimed that through his efforts, he discovered that Bacena surreptitiously secured before the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), a patent title, Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Bilang P-21362 covering 4,259 sq m, more or less,
which was a part and portion of the same lot registered in Gambito's name under TCT No. T-149954. Gambito further alleged that he is
aware his parents filed a protest before the CENRO, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on August 31, 2007 against Bacena but the same
was later withdrawn by his parents upon realization that said office is not the proper forum and that the order of dismissal was issued on
April 8, 2009 and thus there is a need to clear up the cloud cast by the title of Bacena over his ancient title.

Bacena, in his defense, alleged that the folder of Petronila Castriciones (Castriciones), survey claimant of Lot No. 1331, Cad 45, La
Torre, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, is supported by the records of the CENRO, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. The title OCT No. P-
21362 was regularly issued and was based on authentic documents.5 On the other hand, the title of Gambito's predecessor-in-interest
is evidently null and void ab initio because it was derived from a Deed of Sale, dated December 16, 1994 which supposedly signed by
vendor Pascual although she was already dead, having died on August 25, 1988 or after a period of seven years. Moreover, the
signatory-vendor, Covita denied that she ever signed the Deed of Sale which is supposedly that of her husband, Mariano G. Mateo,
supposedly signifying his conformity to the sale, is likewise a fake signature of her husband because he was already dead at the time of
the execution of the document having died on June 14, 1980.6

By way of counterclaim, Bacena prayed, among others, that Gambito's Title (TCT No. T-149954) and that of his predecessor-in-interest,
Luz, TCT No. T-92232 and the Deed of Sale, basis of TCT No. T-92232 as null and void; and to declare that title of Bacena, OCT No.
P-21262, valid and effective and be cleared/quieted of any cloud thereto.7

Ruling of the MTC

After the parties' presentation of evidence, the MTC rendered a Decision8 dated March 11, 2014 in favor of Gambito. The MTC
considered the defense's position as a collateral attack on Gambito's title.9 The MTC ruled that the issue on the validity of title, whether
or not fraudulently issued, can only be raised in action expressly instituted for that purpose.

Moreover, the MTC ruled that in successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or
interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest, and here, the origin of Gambito's title
was issued in 1916 and while Bacena's title was only issued on February 25, 1999.10

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Aggrieved, Bacena appealed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, which granted the
appeal in a Decision11 rendered on November 21, 2014.

In its ruling, the RTC laid that in an action for quieting of title, it is an indispensable requisite that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal
or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action, which is however wanting at the time Gambito filed his
verified Complaint.12

The RTC also noted that Gambito's title was derived through a certificate of title which was based on a falsified Deed of Sale which was
made to appear to have been signed by the parties who were long dead at the time of its execution.13

Moreover, the RTC found that Bacena's title has become indefeasible and incontrovertible as it has been possessed by Bacena and his
predecessors-in-interest and never been occupied by Gambito and his mother.

Contrary to the MTC's ruling, the RTC held that Bacena's counterclaim partakes of a direct attack on Gambito's title.

The RTC likewise found that the title in the name of Bacena was regularly issued as he and his predecessors have been in undisturbed
possession, occupation and utilization of Lot No. 1331 as early as October 1, 1913 when it was cadastrally surveyed and even before it;
has always been declared for taxation purposes with taxes thereof duly paid yearly; and that as private property, it is not within the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to grant it to public land application.14

The RTC awarded damages in favor of Bacena.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision15 dated April 8, 2016, affirmed the RTC's Decision dated November 21, 2014. The CA agreed with
the findings and ruling of the RTC.

Undaunted, Gambito filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision of the CA which was however denied in its Resolution16
dated July 19, 2016.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

In support of the petition, Gambito assails the decision of the CA claiming that it is not in consonance with law and jurisprudence. The
underlying issues presented by Gambito for resolution are as follows, viz.:

The decision did not properly address the important issue on laches;
The decision misapplied the concept of transferee in good faith; and
The decision misappreciated the objection on the award for damages.
Ruling of the Court

The petition is denied.

The decision of the CA is in consonance with law and jurisprudence

On the issue of laches, the decision of the CA properly addressed the important issue thereon and the CA correctly held that it should
be Bacena and not the Gambito who should invoke laches.

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.17

It should be noted that the CA found that Bacena has no reason to doubt his own ownership and possession of Lot No. 1331, as
established in this case obtained through the right of Castriciones. Moreover, it was Gambito who disturbed that open, continuous,
peaceful, adverse and notorious possession of Bacena and his predecessors-in-interest. Thus, Bacena is not expected to assert his
right for having possession and title to the land in dispute and the CA is correct when it found that Bacena has no reason to doubt his
own ownership and possession of Lot No. 1331. Hence, the Court is in accord with the CA when it held that laches cannot apply and it
should be Bacena and not Gambito who should invoke laches.

Private ownership of land—as when there is prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear
showing of open continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants—is not affected by the issuance of
a free patent over the same land.18

While Gambito assails both the RTC and CA on the principle of laches on the uninterrupted existence of OCT No. R-578 of 98 years, it
should be noted that the CA found, it was certain that when the cadastral survey was conducted in 1913 to 1914, there were already
two survey claimants, one of which is Castriciones. Thus, OCT No. R-578 should not have included Lot No. 1331, as there was already
a supervening event that transpired from the time it was applied for until the title was issued. Moreover, here it established that
Castriciones is the previous occupant with open continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession as above contemplated. Hence, OCT
No. R-578 issued as a free patent, by application, cannot affect Castriciones' previous occupation with open continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession.

On the issue of transferee in good faith, the decision of the CA did not misapply the concept of transferee in good faith.

While Gambito argues that the CA misapplied the concept of transferee in good faith for the reason that bad faith has died when
Pascual, inherited the property from Venancio Pascual, We disagree.

Under Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree, in all cases of registration procured by
fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the
rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. After the entry of the decree of registration on the original petition or
application, any subsequent registration procured by the presentation of a forged duplicate certificate of title, or a forged deed or other
instrument, shall be null and void.

In this case, Gambito is not an innocent holder for value for the reason that he is a donee acquiring the property gratuitously by a Deed
of Donation and not by purchase. Hence, the concept of an innocent purchaser for value cannot apply to him.

Moreover, in Ingusan v. Heirs of Aureliano I. Reyes,19 the Court happened to pass upon falsified documents involving properties, thus:

There is no doubt that the deed of donation of titled property, cancellation of affidavit of loss and agreement of subdivision with sale,
being falsified documents, were null and void. It follows that TCT Nos. NT-241155, NT-241156, NT-239747 and NT-239748 which were
issued by virtue of these spurious documents were likewise null and void.20

In this case, it is an established fact that the fraud referred to by the CA is the fraud on the transfer of the property from Pascual and
Covita to Luz on the basis of fake signatures considering that the vendor signatories therein are all dead. As such, by applicability of the
foregoing jurisprudence, the deed is considered a forged deed and hence null and void. Thus, Luz's title is null and void which
transferred nothing by Deed of Donation to her son Gambito, the petitioner herein. Hence, the CA did not misapply the concept of
transferee in good faith by considering the fraud in the transfer of the property to Luz consequently ending up with Gambito.

On the issue that the CA decision misappreciated the objection on the award for damages, Gambito's argument that he cannot be in
bad faith deserves scant consideration.

Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry;21 an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage
of another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render
the transaction unconscientious."22

The CA in its resolve as to the award of damages referred to the RTC's basis of the awards. As can be gleaned from the CA's
Resolution dated July 19, 2016, viz.:

The trial court discussed the basis of the awards, yet petitioner, aside from his self-serving claim that there was no bad faith, failed to
discuss the lack of sufficient basis for the grant of awards.23

In this connection, the RTC in its Decision24 dated November 21, 2014, laid down its basis in concluding the award for damages finding
absence of good faith on the part of Gambito by taking a second hard look into the facts and circumstances obtaining on the manner by
which the appellee, who was the notary public who notarized the Last Will and Testament and who as expected fully knew the rights of
the appellant over the lot in question.25 Thus, it is evident that Gambito's state of mind had no honesty of intention and had no freedom
from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put him upon inquiry. Hence, Gambito's claim that the CA decision misappreciated the
objection on the award for damages is incorrect.

In sum, the Court finds that the decision of the CA is in consonance with law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED.

COOMBS VS. CASTANEDA

FACTS:

LRC Case No. 04-035... petitioner Mercedita C. Coombs... rendered declaring the lost owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title [No.] 6715 of the Registry of Deeds of Muntinlupa City as null and void.

owner of the real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 6715 situated on Apitong Street, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa City;... ometime in March 2005, when she tried to pay the real property tax due relative to the real property covered by TCT
No. 6715, she was told that said real property was no longer listed under her name... upon further verification, she came to know that
TCT No. 6715 had already been cancelled and had been replaced by TCT No. 14115 issued in the name of herein respondent Virgilio
Veloso Santos

TCT No. 6715 was ordered cancelled by the RTC in a Decision dated August 26, 2004 in LRC Case No. 04-035, entitled "In Re:
Petition for the Issuance of Second Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6715, [by] Mercedita C. Coombs,
represented by her Atty.-in-Fact Victoria C. Castañeda";... she neither authorized Victoria C. Castañeda (Castañeda) to file petition for
issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 sometime in 2004, nor asked her to sell the subject property to herein
respondent Santos; that Santos, in turn, sold the same to herein respondents Pancho and Edith Leviste (spouses Leviste); that the
spouses Leviste executed a real estate mortgage over the subject property in favor of herein respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands
Family Savings Bank (BPI Family).

the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment.

Obviously, the ground relied upon in the present action is extrinsic fraud. However, the petitioner failed to state the facts constituting
extrinsic fraud as a ground.

RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter in LRC Case No. 04-035 because the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715
was never lost.

the Court of Appeals denied the said motion and explained that the RTC has jurisdiction over all proceedings involving title to real
property and land registration cases.

Thus, it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of LRC Case No. 04-035.

petitioner Coombs maintains that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter in LRC Case No. 04-035 because the
owner's duplicate copy of the TCT sought to be annulled was never lost and had always been in her possession.[15]

ISSUES:

whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed outright petitioner Coombs' petition for annulment of judgment.
RULING:

the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by petitioner Coombs was clearly grounded on lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the
subject matter of the case, and not extrinsic fraud.

petitioner Coombs sought to annul the RTC Decision for being rendered without jurisdiction. According to her, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of LRC Case No. 04-035—one for the reconstitution of a lost certificate of title—because the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 was never lost in the first place, which argument has been upheld by the Court in a catena of cases
that she cited to support her assertion.

the above-stated allegations made out a prima facie case of annulment of judgment to warrant the Court of Appeals' favorable
consideration.

It is doctrinal that jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by law. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 26[22]
vests the RTC with jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution of a lost or destroyed owner's duplicate of the certificate of title. However,
the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the subject matter of LRC Case No. 04-035 was within the RTC's jurisdiction, being a court
of general jurisdiction.

In a long line of cases,[23] the Court has held that the RTC has no jurisdiction when the certificate sought to be reconstituted was never
lost or destroyed but is in fact in the possession of another person. In other words, the fact of loss of the duplicate certificate is
jurisdictional.

First, when a petition for annulment of judgment is grounded on lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner need not allege that the ordinary
remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the judgment sought to be annulled are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is
because a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is fundamentally void. Thus, it may be questioned any time unless laches has already
set in.[24]

Second, petitioner Coombs in fact was able to attach to her petition documents supporting her cause of action.

Verily, our ruling in Veneracion[25] required the petitioners to: (a) allege with particularity in their petition the facts and the law relied
upon for annulment as well as those supporting their cause of action, and (b) attach to the original copy of their petition the affidavits of
their witnesses and documents supporting their cause of action.

petitioner Coombs' Petition for Annulment of Judgment was grounded on lack of jurisdiction. Based on our review of the records, she
annexed to her petition the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 and the RTC Decision - which sufficiently support the petition's
cause of action. A copy of the TCT alleged (in LRC Case No. 04-035) to have been missing supports the claim that the same was never
lost. In the same vein, a copy of the RTC Decision, in conjunction with supporting jurisprudence, supports petitioner Coombs' averment
that said decision was rendered without jurisdiction. Her allegations coupled with the appropriate supporting documents give rise to a
prima facie case that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter in LRC Case No. 04-035. As we ruled in Tan Po Chu v.
Court of Appeals,[26] if allegations of this nature turned out to be true, the RTC Decision would be void and the Court of Appeals would
have been duty-bound to strike it down

REPUBLIC VS. SUSI

FACTS:

On September 27, 2005 Susi filed before the RTC a verified Petition 6 for reconstitution of TCT No. 118999 purportedly registered in her
name, Covering Lot 257 of plan Psu-32606 located m Barrio (now Barangay) Talanay, Quezon City (QC), with an area of 240,269 square
meters (subject land). She claimed that the original copy of TCT No. 118999 was destroyed by the fire that gutted the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City (RD-QC) on June 11, 1988;8 hence, the petition based on the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999,9 docketed as
LRC Case No. Q-20493(05).

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an Order10 dated October 13, 2005: (a) setting the case for
initial hearing on February 2, 2006; (b) directing that the concerned government offices be furnished a copy thereof; and (c) directing that
the said order be published in the Official Gazette once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks and posted at least thirty (30) days prior to
the scheduled hearing at the main entrance of the Quezon City Hall, the bulletin boards of the RTC, as well as the Sheriffs Office of the
R TC of QC, and the Barangay Hall of the barangay where the subject land is situated. 11 The notice was published in the December 19
and 26, 2005 issues of the Official Gazette (Vol. 101, Nos. 51 and 52), 12 and posted as required. 13

On January 16, 2006, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) filed with the RTC a Manifestation14 dated December 5, 2005 stating that
respondent filed similar petitions for reconstitution covering the subject land before Branches 88 and 220 of the same RTC, for which it
had previously issued Reports dated March 1, 1995 15 and December 12, 199 5, 16 respectively.

On February 2, 2006, Susi presented proof of the jurisdictional

requirements without any opposition. 17 The City Government of QC (QC Government) thereafter filed an Opposition18 dated February
3, 2006 on the ground of res judicata. 19However, the latter was subsequently declared to be without any locus standi to oppose the
reconstitution petition.20
After Susi was allowed to formally offer her evidence,21 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance in the case, and
manifested that it had deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor of QC to appear on its behalf, subject to its supervision and control.22

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision23 dated January 12, 2011 (January 12, 2011 Decision), the RTC granted Susi's petition, and directed the RD-QC to
reconstitute the lost/destroyed original copy of TCT No. 118999.24

The RTC ruled that the presentation of the owner's copy of TCT No. 11899925 and the Certification26 from the RD-QC that the original
of TCT No. 118999 was burned during the fire that razed the QC Hall on June 11, 1988 were sufficient to warrant the reconstitution
sought. It held that the subject petition was not barred by the dismissal by Branch 220 of the same RTC of a similar petition anchored on
her failure to: (a) comply with the technical requirements of the law, specifically, her omission to allege matters required under Sections
11 and 12 of Republic Act No. (RA) 26;27 and (b) convince the court that TCT No. 118999 sought to be reconstituted was valid and
existing at the time it was destroyed, holding that both objections have been sufficiently overcome in the present case.28

Dissatisfied, the QC Government filed a motion for reconsideration,29 while the Republic, through the OSG, filed its Notice of Appeal,30
which were both denied in an Order31 dated July 8, 2011. The QC Government's subsequent Notice of Appeal32 was also denied in an
Order33 dated September 15, 2011, on the grounds that (a) it has no authority to appear or to bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic; and (b) the appeal was belatedly filed, hence, not perfected.1âwphi1 The RTC likewise declared the January 12, 2011 Decision
as having attained finality.

On October 25, 2011, the Republic, through the OSG, filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment,34 insisting that the January 12, 2011 Decision
should be set aside and vacated on the ground of res judicata.35On March 8, 2012, Sunnyside Heights Homeowner's Association, Inc.
moved36to join the OSG's motion, claiming to be registered owners and occupants of various portions of the subject land.

Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011, the LRA filed a Manifestation37 (a) expressing its unwillingness to comply with the directive contained in
the January 12, 2011 Decision; and (b) praying that the RTC set aside the same and dismiss Susi's petition on the ground that her owner's
duplicate of TCT No. 118999 is of doubtful authenticity.38 Consequently, the LRA maintained that there was a need to comply with the
mandatory and jurisdictional requirements under Sections 3 (f), 12, and 13 of RA 26, without which the RTC did not have jurisdiction over
the subject petition.39

In an Order40 dated July 5, 2012 (July 5, 2012 Order), the RTC denied the Motion to Vacate Judgment, considering that the January 12,
2011 Decision had become final and executory after the Republic's appeal had been denied due course. Thereafter, the corresponding
Writ of Execution41 was issued on July 20, 2012.

Unperturbed, the Republic filed a Petition for certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction42
before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 127144.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision43 dated February 13, 2014, the CA found no reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
in granting the petition for reconstitution, considering that Susi was able to sufficiently establish that the certificate of title sought to be
reconstituted was valid and existing under her name at the time it was destroyed. 44

The CA found the principle of res judicata to be inapplicable to this case since the dismissal of the prior similar petition was based on
Susi's failure to comply with the technical requirements of the law. Hence, the latter was not precluded from filing another petition to prove
the necessary allegations for the reconstitution of the subject title, which the RTC correctly found to have been fully established. 45

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration,46 attaching therewith a copy of a Resolution 47 issued by the LRA en consulta, stating,
among others, that: (a) the subject land is also covered by subsisting titles and occupied by a number of persons;48 and (b) Susi has two
(2) uncertified reproduced owner's duplicate copies of TCT No. 118999, but bearing different serial numbers49 - i.e., a copy bearing serial
number 177563450 which was earlier presented before Branch 220, and another one with serial number 112195551 adduced in evidence
a quo.

In a Resolution52 dated June 25, 2014, the CA denied the said motion; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion
in: (a) issuing the Order dated July 5, 2012 denying the Republic's Motion to Vacate Judgment in LRC Case No. Q-20493(05); and (b)
upholding the January 12, 2011 Decision granting Susi's petition for reconstitution.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

A. The Republic is not estopped from assailing the propriety of the order of reconstitution.
At the outset, it is well to emphasize that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, absent
any showing that it had dealt capriciously or dishonorably with its citizens. 53 Thus, whether or not the OSG's motion to vacate was the
proper remedy under the Rules of Court (Rules) does not bar the Republic from assailing the propriety of the reconstitution ordered by
the RTC which it claimed to have acted without jurisdiction in hearing and, thereafter, resolving the case. Moreover, it bears to emphasize
that even assuming that no opposition was filed by the Republic or a private party, the person seeking reconstitution is not relieved of his
burden of proving not only the loss or destruction of the title sought to be reconstituted, but that also at that time, she was the registered
owner thereof. As such, the Republic is not estopped from assailing the decision granting the petition if, on the basis of the law and the
evidence on record, such petition has no merit. 54

B. Procedures and requirements for reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title; effect of non-compliance.

The judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title under RA 26 means the restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed
Torrens certificate attesting the title of a person to registered land. The purpose of the reconstitution is to enable, after observing the
procedures prescribed by law, the reproduction of the lost or destroyed Torrens certificate in the same form and in exactly the same way
it was at the time of the loss or destruction. 55

RA 26 provides two procedures and sets of requirements in the reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title depending on the
source of the petition for reconstitution. 56 Section 10 in relation to Section 9 provides the procedure and requirements for sources falling
under Sections 2 (a), 2 (b), 3 (a), 3 (b), and 4 (a). On the other hand, Sections 12 and 13 lay down the procedure and requirements for
sources falling under Sections 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f), 3 (c), 3 (d), 3 (e), and 3 (f).57 Thus, before the court can properly act, assume, and
acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for, petitioner must observe the above procedures
and requirements prescribed by the law. 58

In numerous cases, the Court has held that the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure and requirements deprives the trial court
of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case and, consequently, all its proceedings are rendered null and void. The rationale
underlying this rule concerns the nature of the conferment in the trial court of the authority to undertake reconstitution proceedings. In all
cases where the authority to proceed is conferred by a statute and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, the same must be
strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void. 59 As such, the court upon which the reconstitution petition is filed is duty-
bound to examine thoroughly the same, and review the record and the legal provisions laying down the germane jurisdictional
requirements. 60

C. The petition for reconstitution failed to comply with the applicable procedures and requirements for reconstitution.

The present reconstitution petition was anchored on a purported owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999 (questioned certificate) which
is a source for reconstitution of title under Section 3 (a)61 of RA 26, prompting Branch 77 to follow the procedure outlined in Sections 962
and 1063 of the said law.

However, records show that as early as January 16, 2006, the LRA, in a Manifestation64 dated December 5, 2005, had already called
the court's attention to its Report65 dated March 1, 1995 in the previous reconstitution petition before Branch 88, expressing serious
doubts on the authenticity of Susi's duplicate title, and informing it of the existence of other titles over the subject land.66

It is well to point out that trial courts hearing reconstitution petitions under RA 26 are duty-bound to take into account the LRA's report.67
Notably, both the RTC and the CA overlooked the fact that while the petition for reconstitution before Branch 77 was filed on the basis of
Susi's purported owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999 bearing Serial No. 1121955, Susi's prior reconstitution petitions, as stated in
the LRA's Report, were anchored on an owner's duplicate certificate bearing a different serial number, i.e., Serial No. 1775634. Indeed,
a perusal of the said certificates68 of title, which were attached to the Republic's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision dated
February 13, 2014, reveals that save for the serial number, all the entries therein are the same. The Court notes that Susi did not refute
the existence of the said certificates bearing different serial numbers in her comment69 to the said motion.

In cases where the LRA challenges the authenticity of the applicant's purported owner's duplicate certificate of title, the reconstitution
petition should be treated as falling under Section 3 (f)70 of RA 26, and the trial court should require compliance with the requisites under
Sections 1271 and 1372 of RA 26.73

In particular, the reconstitution petition and the published and posted notice of hearing in compliance with the October 13, 2005 Order
failed to show that notices were sent to the other occupants, possessors, and persons who may have an interest in, or who have buildings
or improvements on the land covered by the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted, as well as the owners of adjoining properties.
74

Jurisprudence is replete with cases underscoring the indispensability of actual and personal notice of the date of hearing of the
reconstitution petition to actual owners and possessors of the land involved in order to vest the trial court with jurisdiction thereon.75 If no
notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is
deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void. 76

Thus, in light of the LRA's report of the subsistence of other certificates of title over the subject land, it behooved the RTC to notify the
registered land owners of the reconstitution proceedings, in observance of diligence and prudence; 77 however, it failed to act accordingly.
But more than this, courts have the inherent power to correct fatal infirmities in its proceedings in order to maintain the integrity thereof.
78
In view of the failure to comply with the requirements of Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26, particularly, on the service of notices of hearing on
the registered owners and/or actual possessors of the land subject of the reconstitution case, the RTC, did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case, and all proceedings held thereon are null and void. That being said, the Court finds it unnecessary to delve on the other matters
raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

HEIRS OF NAYA VS. NAYA

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a complaint for quieting of title, reconveyance of ownership, damages, and attorney's fees against respondents involving
a parcel of land in Cebu City. Petitioners claim that they, together with respondent Orlando P. Naya, are the legitimate and compulsory
heirs of the late Spouses Andres and Gregoria Naya. Andres’ heirs executed an extra judicial adjudication and settlement of estate where
his surviving spouse, Gregoria, held all his properties in trust in favor of the other heirs and on the condition that she will assume all debts
and pay all the obligations of the estate. Gregoria failed to fulfill this condition. Despite such failure, Orlando allegedly sold the property,
under the name of his parents, to one Alfonso Uy .
Alfonso, after the property was in titled in his name then sold it to Orlando, who registered it in his name. Orlando sold the property to
respondent Honesimo C. Ruiz. The title, however, was transferred to Honesimo's name only in 2007. Petitioners alleged that they only
learned of Orlando's anomalous transactions in September 1974, prompting them to cause the annotation of an adverse claim to Orlando's
title. They stressed that Honesimo is not a buyer in good faith because he acquired the property after the notice of adverse claim had
already been annotated on Orlando's title.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and laches for only instituting the action after 45 years. The RTC
ruled that the assailed transactions were conducted through the deceit and fraudulent scheme of Orlando, yet, petitioners did not give
details of the same. The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the findings of the RTC that the complaint does not state a cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the petitioners have a cause of action.

RULING:

We grant the petition.

The action of petitioners is, aside from Quieting of Title, one for reconveyance on the ground that petitioners are its rightful owners by
succession and that the land was wrongfully registered in the names of Spouses Ruiz.

In Mendizabel v. Apao, where the case was one for annulment of titles, reconveyance and damages, we were also confronted with an
argument that the complaint must be dismissed because the circumstances constituting the allegations of fraud or mistake were not
stated with particularity. We ruled against this argument, holding that in an action for reconveyance, all that must be alleged in the
complaint are two facts which, admitting them to be true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) that
the plaintiff was the owner of the land or possessed the land in the concept of owner, and (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed
him of the land. The allegations in petitioners' complaint certainly measure up to the requisite statement of facts to constitute an action
for reconveyance based on an implied trust.

Under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it
as a mere trustee, and the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property On its face, therefore, the complaint
states a cause of action and raises issues of fact that can be properly settled only after a full-blown trial.

DELFIN VS. BACUD

FACTS:

On September 9, 1999, petitioners Delfin Tappa (Delfin)5 and Maria Tappa (Spouses Tappa) filed a complaint6 for Quieting of Title,
Recovery of Possession and Damages (Complaint) against respondents Jose Bacud (Bacud),7 Henry Calabazaron (Calabazaron), and
Vicente Malupeng (Malupeng).8 The property subject of the complaint is a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3341, Pls-793 with an area
of 21,879 square meters, located in Kongcong, Cabbo, Pefiablanca, Cagayan (Lot No. 3341).9

In their complaint, Spouses Tappa alleged that they are the registered owners of Lot No. 3341, having been issued an Original Certificate
of Title No. P-69103 (OCT No. P-69103) on September 18, 1992, by virtue of Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194. 10 Delfin allegedly
inherited Lot No. 3341 from his father, Lorenzo Tappa (Lorenzo). Spouses Tappa claimed that both Delfin and Lorenzo were in open,
continuous, notorious, exclusive possession of the lot since time immemorial. 11

In their Answer, 12 respondents Bacud, Calabazaron and Malupeng claimed that the original owner of Lot No. 3341 was Genaro Tappa
(Genaro) who had two children, Lorenzo and Irene. Upon Genaro's death, the property passed on to Lorenzo and Irene by operation of
law; and they became ipso facto co-owners of the property. As co-owners, Lorenzo and Irene each owned 10,939 square meters of the
lot as their respective shares. Lorenzo had children namely, Delfin, Primitiva, and Fermina. Upon the death of Irene, her share in tum
passed to her heirs, Demetria, Juanita, Pantaleon and Jose Bacud. 13
Respondents presented before the RTC a joint affidavit dated April 29, 1963 (1963 Affidavit) signed by Delfin, his sisters, Primitiva and
Fermina, and their mother, Modesta Angoluan. 14 The 1963 affidavit stated that Genaro originally owned Lot No. 3341. It further stated
that one-half (Yz) of the property was owned by Lorenzo; but that the whole property was declared as his, only for taxation purposes.

Calabazaron claimed that he became the owner of 2,520 square meters of Lot No. 3341 by virtue of two Deeds of Sale executed in his
favor, one dated October 12, 1970 executed by Demetria, and another dated August 22, 1971 executed by Juanita. 15 After the sale,
Calabazaron entered into possession of his portion and paid the real property taxes. 16 He remains in possession up to this date. 17

Malupeng, on the other hand, claimed that he became the owner of 210 square meters of Lot No. 3341 by virtue of a Deed of Sale
executed on November 30, 1970 by Pantaleon in his favor. 18 After the sale, Malupeng entered into possession of his porcion of propeny
and paid the real property taxes. 19 He remains in possession up to this date. 20

Bacud claimed ownership over 1,690 square meters of Lot No. 3341 in his own right as heir of Irene.21

Respondents started occupying their respective portions after the sale made to each of them. They continued to occupy them despite
several demands to vacate from Spouses Tappa.22

Spouses Tappa claimed that the 1963 Affidavit was executed through force and intimidation.23 Bacud and Malupeng denied this
allegation.24

The Ruling of the RTC

The RTC issued its Decision,25 the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and the Court hereby orders:

1. Plaintiffs to be the owners of Lot 3341, Pls 793 and unqualifiedly vests in them the full and untrammeled rights of ownership:

2. All the defendants must, if still in possession of portions of the lot in issue, convey the same to the plaintiffs;

3. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

The R TC ruled that the basic requirement of the law on quieting of title under Article 447 of the Civil Code was met, thus:

Delfin and Maria's title is clear and unequivocal, and its validity has never been assailed by the defendants – nor has any evidence been
adduced that successfully overcomes the presumption of validity and legality that the title of Delfin and Maria enjoys.27 (Emphasis in the
original.)

The RTC ruled that there was no document in the hands of respondents as strong and persuasive as the title in the name of the Spouses
Tappa that will support respondents' claim of ownership and Irene's antecedent ownership.28 The RTC stated that the 1963 Affidavit
contains nothing more than the allegations of the affiants and does not, by itself, constitute proof of ownership of land, especially as
against documents such as titles.29

Respondents appealed to the CA, raising the following arguments:

First, respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa fraudulently applied for, and were issued a free patent over Lot No. 3341, and eventually
OCT No. P-69103 dated September 18, 1992.30 They alleged that Spouses Tappa committed fraud because they were not in possession
of the lot since 1963, which possession was required for an applicant for a free patent under the law. 31

Second, respondents argued that the complaint should be dismissed because both extinctive and acquisitive prescription have already
set in.32 Respondents claimed that both ordinary acquisitive prescription of 10 years, and extraordinary acquisitive prescription of 30
years in claiming ownership of immovable property apply in the case.33 They argued that more than 30 years have already lapsed from
the time they entered possession of the subject lot in 1963 up to the filing of the complaint on September 9, 1999.34 They also pointed
out that Spouses Tappa admitted in their complaint that respondents were in possession of the lot since 1963. 35

Particularly, Calabazaron argued that the 10-year prescriptive period under Article 1134 of the Civil Code applies to him by virtue of the
two duly executed Deeds of Sale in his favor. 36 It was never alleged that he had any participation in the alleged duress, force and
intimidation in the execution of the 1963 Affidavit.37 Hence, he is a purchaser in good faith and for value. Calabazaron entered possession
of the lot after the sale to him in 1970, thus, the prescriptive period of l0 years had long lapsed. 38

Bacud and Malupeng claimed that, even assuming that the execution of the 1963 Affidavit was attended with force and intimidation, the
complaint against them should have been dismissed because the extraordinary acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years under Article
1137 of the Civil Code applies to them.39 They also argued that the action for quieting of title had already prescribed since the possession
of Bacud and Malupeng started in 1963, which fact was allegedly admitted by Spouses Tappa in their complaint.40 Thus, Spouses Tappa
had only until 1993 to file a complaint, which they failed to do.
All respondents claimed that from the start of their possession, they (1) have paid real taxes on the lot, (2) have planted c rops, and (3)
have continued to possess the lot in the concept of owners. 41

Third, respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa failed to prove their right over the subject lot because they cannot rely on the certificate
of title issued to them on September 18, 1992 by virtue of a free patent.42 They asserted that Spouses Tappa fraudulently obtained the
free patent on Lot No. 3341 by concealing material facts; specifically the fact of not being in possession of the lot since 1963. 43

The Ruling of the CA

The CA set aside the decision of the RTC.44 The relevant dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision dated July 6, 2007 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint.

SO ORDERED.45

On the issue of prescription, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and explained that their possession over Lot No. 3341 already ripened
into ownership through acquisitive prescription.46 The CA noted that Spouses Tappa acknowledged in their complaint that they have not
been in possession of the lot, and that respondents have been continuously occupying portions of it since 1963. 47 It explained:

The substantial length of time between 1963, up to the time of filing of the present complaint on September 9, 1999, which is more than
30 years, should be considered against [S]pouses Tappa, and in favor of defendants-appellants. Settled is the rule that an uninterrupted
adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years could ripen into ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription, which is a
mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. Hence, appellants' possession of the land has ripened into
ownership by virtue of acquisitive prescription.48 (Citation omitted.)

On the merits of the case, the CA ruled that the two indispensable requisites for an action to quiet title under Articles 476 and 477 of the
Civil Code were not met. 49

The first requisite is absent because Spouses Tappa do not have a legal or an equitable title to or an interest in the property. The CA
explained that the free patent granted to Spouses Tappa produced no legal effect because Lot No. 3341 was a private land, thus:

As heretofore discussed, the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by appellants of the subject parcel of land within the
period prescribed by law has effectively converted it into a private land. Consequently, the registration in the name of Maria Tappa on
September 18, 1992 under OCT [No.] P-69103, by vi1iue of Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194, produces no legal effect. Private ownership
of land-as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants-is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over
the same land, becam,e the Public Land [L]aw applies only to lands of the public domain.50 (Citation omitted.)

The CA further stated that while Spouses Tappa were able to obtain a free patent over the property, and were able to register it under
the Torrens system, they have not become its owners. The CA said that "[r]egistration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership
over immovable prope1ty---it does not create title nor vest one but it simply confirms a title already vested, rendering it forever
indefeasible."51

The second requisite that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be shown to be in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity is likewise unavailing. The CA ruled that no other evidence (aside
from Delfin's own testimony) was presented to prove the allegation of fraud and intimidation, making the testimony self-serving.52 The
CA further noted that Delfin's own sister, Fermina, one of the signatories of the 1963 Affidavit, belied his testimony. Fermina testified that
they went to the house of one Atty. Carag to sign the affidavit and they did so, on their own. 53

Spouses Tappa filed a Motion for Reconsideration,54 which the CA denied.55

Hence, spouses Tappa filed a petition for review on certiorari before this court, raising the following issues:

I. Whether the CA erred in dismissing Spouses Tappa's complaint for quieting of title against respondents;56

II. Whether the CA erred in not finding that Spouses Tappa's certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked in this case;57 and

III. Whether the CA erred in finding that respondents have acquired the property through acquisitive prescription. 58

The Ruling of the Court

We affirm the decision of the CA.

The action for quieting of title

should not prosper.

The action filed by Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title and recovery of possession. In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 59 an
action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity, to wit:
x x x Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure"... an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse
to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger
of hostile claim." In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and
other claimants, "... not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not
disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated,
and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems
best. x x x. "60 (Emphasis in the original.)

In our jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Article 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, which state:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.

Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need
not be in possession of said property.

From the foregoing provisions, we reiterate the rule that for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the
deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.61

Spouses Tappa failed to meet these two requisites.

First, Spouses Tappa's claim of iegal title over Lot No. 3341 by virtue of the free patent and the certificate of title, OCT No. P-69103
issued in their name cannot stand. The certificate of title indjcates that it was issued by virtue of Patent No. 021519-92-3194. We agree
with the CA that at the time of the application for free patent, Lot No. 3341 had already become private land by virtue of the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341 had been removed from the coverage of the Public
Land Act,62 which governs public patent applications.

The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no legal effects. whatsoever.1awp++i1
Private ownership of land-as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear
showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants-is not affected by the issuance of a
free patent over the same land, because the Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no
authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in character and have passed to private ownership.63

In Magistrado v. Esplana, 64 we cancelled the titles issued pursuant to a free patent after finding that the lots involved were privately
owned since time immemorial. A free patent that purports to convey land to which the Government did not have any title at the time of its
issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner. 65

In this case, the parties were able to show that Lot No. 3341 was occupied by, and has been in possession of the Tappa family, even
before the 1963 Affidavit was executed. After the execution of the 1963 Affidavit, respondents occupied their respective portions of the
property. Delfin testified that before his father, Lorenzo, died in 1961, Lorenzo had been occupying the lot since before the war, and that
Delfin was born there in 1934.66

Records show that Lorenzo declared Lot No. 3341 for taxation purposes as early as 1948, and paid the real property taxes (evidenced
by real property tax payment receipts in the name of Lorenzo from 1952 until his death in 1961).67 Spouses Tappa were likewise shown
to pay the real property taxes from 1961 to 2000.68 Similarly, respondents also declared their respective portions of Lot No. 3341 for
taxation in their names in 1994, and paid real property taxes on those portions from 1967 to 2004.69 Although tax declarations or realty
tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. 70

Spouses Tappa also admitted in their complaint that sometime in 1963, Bacud and Malupeng started occupying portions of Lot No. 3341
and planted crops on the property, while Calabazaron did the same on another portion of the lot in the 1970's.71 The complaint stated
further that since 1963. the respondents "continuously occupied portion of the subject land." 72

In view of the foregoing circumstances that show open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 3341,
the property had been segregated from the public domain. 73 At the time the patent and the certificate of title were issued in 1992,
Spouses Tappa and their predecessors-in-interest were already in possession, at least to the half of the lot, since 1934; and respondents
were also in possession of the other half since 1963. Therefore, the free patent issued covers a land already segregated from the public
domain.

In Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago,74 we ruled, thus:

Considering the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land by respondents and their predecessors
in interests, they are deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued. The land was thus segregated from the public domain and the director of lands had no authority to issue a patent.
Hence, the free patent covering Lot 2344, a private land, and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto, are void.75

Records also show that Spouses Tappa were aware of respondents' possession of the disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. They even
admitted such possession (since 1963) by respondents in their complaint filed in 1999. Despite this, Spouses Tappa were able to obtain
a free patent of the whole property even if they were not in possession of some of its portions. Therefore, Free Patent No. 021519-92-
3194 and OCT No. P-69103 are void not only because it covers a private land, but also because they fraudulently included76 respondents'
portion of the property. In Avila v. Tapucar, 77 we held that "[i]f a person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by
mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become
the owner of the lands illegally included."78

In an action to quiet title, legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership. 79 As discussed, the
free patent and the certificate of title issued to Spouses Tappa could not be the source of their legal title.

The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise wanting. We find that although an instrument (the 1963 Affidavit) exists, and
which allegedly casts cloud on Spouses Tappa's title, it was not shown to be in fact invalid or ineffective against Spouses Tappa's rights
to the property.

A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is
apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished (or terminated)
or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title.80

The 1963 Affidavit it is no doubt an instrument, which appears to be valid. It is dated and appears to be executed and signed by Delfin,
his mother, and sisters. It is also notarized by a public notary. It states that Genaro originally owns the land described, and that one-half
(l/2) of which is actually owned by Irene as a co-heir. This is contrary to the claim of

Spouses Tappa that the property was solely Lorenzo's. Respondents' argue that this affidavit evidences the title of their predecessor-in-
interest over Lot No. 3341 and effectively, theirs.81

The 1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated)
or barred by extinctive prescription. The CA correctly found that Spouses Tappa's claim of force and intimidation in the execution of the
1963 Affidavit was "unsubstantiated."82 The CA pointed out that, "[a]side from the testimony of Delfin Tappa, no other evidence was
presented to prove the claim of force and intimidation, hence, it is at most, self-serving."53 Also, the 1963 Affidavit was duly notarized
and, as such, is considered a public document, and enjoys the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due execution.

Thus, we affirm the ruling of the CA that the requisites for an action to quiet title are wanting in this case.84

There is no collateral attack

on the Certificate of Title.

Spouses Tappa argue that respondents collaterally attacked the certificate of title of Lot No. 3441 when they raised the issue of its validity.
Spouses Tappa used the same argument against the CA when it declared the certificate of title to be without legal effect. 85

Spouses Tappa's argument is without merit. The certificate of title was not collaterally attacked. Section 48 of PD 1529,86 provides that
"[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law." This rule is not applicable in this case.

We reiterate our ruling in Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals,87 where we stated that, "[ w ]hat cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds x x x. By title, the law refers
to ownership which is represented by that document."88 Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter being only the best
proof of ownership of a piece of land. 89 Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence
of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.90

In Vda. de Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla, 91 citing Lacbayan v. Samay, Jr., 92 we reaffirm this ruling, and stated that:

Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-
ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired
interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle
of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership.93

In this case, what respondents dispute, as raised in their Answer, is Spouses Tappa's claim of sole ownership over Lot No. 3341. As
affirmative defense, respondents claimed that Spouses Tappa were owners of only one-half (1/2) of the lot since it was originally owned
by Genaro, the father of Lorenzo and Irene. 94 Respondents claim that Lorenzo and Irene became ipso facto co-owners of the lot. 95
Thus, respondents claim that, by virtue of a valid transfer from Irene's heirs, they now have ownership and title over portions of Lot No.
3341, and that they have been in continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of their occupied portions.96 Malupeng and
Calabazaron claim ownership and title over their respective portions by virtue of a valid sale. Bacud claims ownership and title by virtue
of succession. Therefore, it is the ownership and title of Spouses Tappa which respondents ultimately attack. OCT No. P-69103 only
serves as the document representing Spouses Tappas' title.

Respondents cannot likewise argue that the certificate of title of Spouses Tappa is indefeasible.97 We have already ruled that the one-
year prescriptive period does not apply when the person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the property.98
This is because the action partakes of a suit to quiet title, which is imprescriptible.99 In this case, respondents have been proved to be in
possession of the disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. Thus, their claim against Spouses Tappa cannot be barred by the one-year
prescriptive period.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.

SYJUCO VS. BONIFACIO

FACTS:

Petitioners Imelda, Leonardo, Fidelino, Azucena, Anita, and Syjuco discovered that the land in question, covered by their TCT No.T-
108530, was being sold by Respondent Bonifacio who claimed ownership over the latter through her own TCT No. 285313. Petitioners
therefore filed a petition praying for the declaration of nullity and cancellation of Respondent’s TCT as it was issued fraudulently and in
spite of the fact that they have been in continuous and open possession of the disputed land since 1926. Respondent in turn raised as a
defense that her title was valid as she had acquired it pursuant to a court order by another branch of the same RTC. The latter held in
favor of Respondent hence Petitioner appealed. On appeal, the CA affirmed on the ground that the petition was a collateral attack on
Respondent’s valid title in violation of Sec. 48 PD No. 1529. Being denied on appeal, petitioners appealed before the Court hence this
case. Petitioners maintain that the CA erred in its ruling as their undisturbed possession of the subject property gave them a continuing
right to seek the aid of the court. ISSUE:

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioners are prohibited by Sec. 48 of PD 1529 from attacking Respondent’s title.

RULING:

NO! Petitioners’ action is not a prohibited collateral attack on the TCT of Respondent over the disputed land as contemplated by Sec. 48
of PD 1529.

The Court held that an attack is direct when the object of an action is to annul a judgment or enjoin its enforcement. It is indirect when, in
an action obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Petitioners’ complaint for quieting
of title, they specifically prayed for the declaration of nullity of Respondent’s TCT No. 265778 over the subject land. The relief sought by
the action is feasible given that the objective of an action to quiet title was to remove, invalidate, and annul a cloud on title to real property
or any interest therein by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but
is in truth and in fact invalid.

Under land ownership disputes, it is well established that the filing of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the disputed real property
was in the possession of the plaintiff. One in actual possession, in the concept of an owner, may wait until his possession or title is
disturbed or attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. This is so because his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right
to seek the court’s aid.

MAYUGA VS. ATIENZA

FACTS:

On May 4, 2000, Araceli Mayuga, as plaintiff, instituted a petition for Cancellation and Recall of Free Patent Application and Reconveyance
against Antonio Atienza, representing the heirs of Armando Atienza, Benjamin Atienza, Jr., representing the heirs of Benjamin Atienza,
Sr., Community Environment and Natural Resource Officer and Register of Deeds of Romblon, as defendants in the RTC-Romblon.

In her Petition, Araceli, alleged, that [she, Benjamin A. Atienza, Sr. and Armando A. Atienza are the surviving legitimate, legal and forced
heirs of the late Perfecto Atienza who died intestate on June 1, 1978[7], and:

3.) That the said deceased Perfecto Atienza left estates located in Romblon

4.) That through manipulation and misrepresentation with intent to defraud a co-heir, respondent Antonio L. Atienza[, son of deceased
Armando Atienza,[8]] was able to secure Free [P]atent (NRDN-21) 11636 while respondent Benjamin A. Atienza was able to secure Free
Patent (NRDN- 21) 11637, both patents dated February 28, 1992.

5.) That Petitioner was not notified of the application filed with public respondent Community Environment & Natural Resource Officer nor
any notice of hearings of proceedings as required by law, being a co-heir and party- in-interest.

On August 18, 2000, the RTC issued an Order admitting the Reply to Bill of Particulars.
In their Answer, defendants denied the material allegations of the complaint, and by way of affirmative defenses, averred that, the petition
is moot and academic; the Free Patent Titles have become indefeasible after the lapse of one year from its issuance in 1992; fraud as a
ground for review of title under Section 38 of Act 496 is not applicable to a case where a certificate of title was issued in pursuance of a
patent application;

Defendant Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO, for short) also filed an Answer, alleging that, Free Patent
No. 045909-92-141P was issued by then Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO), Dionico F. Gabay on February
28, 1992 by virtue of the Free Patent Application No. (NRD-IV-21)-11636 filed by Antonio L. Atienza at the CENRO Office in Odiongan,
Romblon covering Lot No. 9819, Cad. 341-D, Odiongan Cadastre which is identical to Lot 61-A, Csd-04-008722-D; while Free Patent
Application No. (NRD-IV-21)11637 filed by Benjamin A. Atienza with the CENRO Office covering Lot 9820, Cad. 341-D, Odiongan
Cadastre which is identical to Lot 61-B, Csd-04-008722-D; it has no participation whatsoever in the processing and issuance of free
patents and/or titles in the names of Antonio L. Atienza and Benjamin A. Atienza. It also prayed that it be excluded as a defendant in the
case.

Defendants moved to dismiss the original petition for failure of the plaintiff’s counsels to state their IBP No. and P.T.R. No. and the
amended complaint for failure to attach a verification and certification against forum-shopping but on September 13, 2001, he RTC issued
an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

On April 27, 2010, the RTC ruled in favor of Plaintiff Araceli. It ruled that the application by the defendants for a Free Patent with the
CENRO is tainted with fraud because said application was processed without the plaintiff’s knowledge nor a notice of hearing of any
proceeding was sent to her. In fact, the defendants took advantage while the latter was in the United States. Moreover, the titling of the
fraudulently registered real property will not bar the action for reconveyance.

Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in the Order dated July 29, 2010.

Aggrieved, defendants interposed an appeal [before the Court of Appeals] assailing the decision of the RTC.[9]

The CA granted the appeal. It reversed and set aside the RTC Decision dated April 27, 2010, and dismissed the Amended Complaint for
Recall and Cancellation of Free Patent Application (FPA) No. 11636 and FPA No. 11637 and Action for Reconveyance.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC Decision and dismissing the amended complaint of the petitioner for cancellation of free
patent and reconveyance?

2.) W/o there is fraud according to the petitoner?

RULING:

NO!. An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action for reversion. The
difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an
action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land.

On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiffs
ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant's fraud or mistake;
as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the
nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow
and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio. The real party in interest is x x x the plaintiff who
alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant.

With respect to the purported cause of action for reconveyance, it is settled that in this kind of action the free patent and the certificate of
title are respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant's name. All that must be alleged in the complaint are two (2) facts which admitting
them to be true would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land and,
(2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the same.

Given the foregoing differences, an action for reconveyance and an action for declaration of nullity of the free patent cannot be pursued
simultaneously. The former recognizes the certificate of title issued pursuant to the free patent as indefeasible while the latter does not.
They may, however, be pursued alternatively pursuant to Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court on alternative causes of action or
defenses.

The action for declaration of nullity of the free patents issued in favor of the respondents must fail, as the CA correctly ruled.

2.) Regarding the petitioner's allegation of fraud, the CA correctly dismissed the same. The bottom line here is that, fraud and
misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence, with mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact which must be proved.
In this case, the allegations of fraud were never proven. There was no evidence at all specifically showing actual fraud or
misrepresentation (Lopez v CA).
 REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF CABRERA

FACTS:

Sometime in 1971, Meynardo filed an Application for Free Patent concerning an 8,0726 square-meter parcel of land situated in Pining,
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro.7 In said application, Meynardo alleged that he had been in possession of such parcel of land since 1936,
through his predecessor-in-interest Marcelo Cabrera.8

In the same year, the Bureau of Lands (BOL) issued Free Patent No. 516197 in favor of Meynardo, covering two (2) lots denominated
as: (i) Lot 1 with an area of 3,591 square meters, and (ii) Lot 2, with an area of 4,481 square meters.9 On the basis of said patent, the
ROD issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RP-132 (P-9193) covering both lots in Meynardo's name.10

Thereafter, a 2,445-square-meter portion of Lot 1 (Lot 1-A11 ) was transferred to Consolacion.12 Thus, on April 6, 1982, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16580 covering Lot 1-A was issued in Consolacion's name.13 Later still, Consolacion sold portions of Lot 1-
A to several purchasers namely: Dy, Agbayani, Soriano, Calma, and Liwanag.14

Learning of the issuance of TCT No. 16580, Jose and Leticia De Castro (De Castros), claiming to be the actual possessors of Lot 1-A,
filed before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) a petition urging DENR to conduct an investigation to
determine Lot 1-A's land classification status.15

Consequently, in the DENR Final Investigation Report16 (DENR Final Report) dated November 9, 1994 issued by Erwin D. Talento of
the DENR Land Management Office (LMO), Free Patent No. 516197, covering Lots 1, 1-A, and 2 (collectively, Roxas Properties), was
declared null and void for having been issued over land forming part of the public domain. The pertinent portions of the DENR Final
Report read:

Sensing that they don't have any chance in the court to prove their better right to occupy and possess [Lot 1-A] x xx the [De Castros]
addressed their petitions to the DENR basing their claim on the weight of a certification of [the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority (NAMRIA)] x x x. The [De Castros] are now seeking administrative remedies for the issue which they have already brought to
the attention of the court and wherein they have failed to prove their priority right to occupy and possess [Lot 1-A]. Granting that [the
Roxas Properties constitute] forest land and [Free Patent No. 516197] issued in favor of [Meynardo] be (sic) rendered null and void [ab]
initio, it (sic) doesn't warrant that they have better right to possess and occupy [Lot 1-A] because [Meynardo, through his predecessors-
in-interest] have entered [Lot 1-A] since the year 1943 and have exercised their ownership over the same x x x.

In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the petition of [the De Castros] be dismissed x x x and appropriate legal
action be instituted for the cancellation of Free Patent No. 516197 issued in favor of Meynardo x x x for the same covers land of the public
domain which is certified by the proper authority as public forest.17 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thereafter, Antonio G. Principe, the DENR Regional Executive Director of Region IV, issued an Order18 dated August 8, 1997 declaring
Free Patent No. 516197 null and void.

Later, on November 15, 1999, the Republic filed against the Respondents a complaint (Complaint) for the annulment and/or cancellation
of Free Patent No. 516197, OCT No. RP-132 (P-9193), and TCT No. 16580. The Complaint also prayed for the reversion of the Roxas
Properties in the State's favor.19

The Republic based its claim on the (i) DENR Final Report; and (ii) NAMRIA certifications dated January 31, 1994, February 1, 1994, and
October 3, 1994, all stating that the Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A) had been reclassified as forest land as early as November 24,
1949. The statements in these documents were, in turn, based on the inscriptions appearing on Land Classification Map No. 209 (LC
Map 209) dated March 6, 1924 covering the Roxas Properties. The Republic reasoned that while LC Map 209 indicates that the parcels
of land thereunder were classified as alienable and disposable at the time it was prepared, a subsequent annotation made thereon
indicates that they were reclassified as forest land sometime thereafter, and had thus become inalienable.20

In their respective answers, the Respondents averred, among others, that: (i) Lot 1-A forms part of the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, as evidenced by the original statements appearing on LC Map 209; (ii) the annotations appearing on LC Map 209 do
not serve as sufficient proof of reversion; and (iii) the land area which had been purportedly reclassified as forest land was not properly
identified since the Republic failed to present the technical description corresponding thereto.21 In addition to these common assertions,
respondents Dy, Agbayani, Soriano, and Liwanag further averred that they acquired portions of Lot 1-A from Consolacion in good faith,
and have, since then, been in actual, exclusive, open, and continuous possession of their respective portions as owners.22

On December 5, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant complaint for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.23

The RTC found that the Republic failed to present proof that the Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A) have been reclassified as forest
land. Citing Republic v. Animas,24 (Animas) the RTC held that in order to prove reversion of alienable and disposable land to forest land,
a positive government act evincing the same is necessary.25

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration (MR), which was denied in the RTC's Order dated October 18, 2011.26
CA Proceedings

Aggrieved, the Republic elevated the case to the CA via petition for review under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 98120 (Appeal).

In the Appeal, the Republic argued that the Court's ruling in Animas cannot be applied to the present case, since, in the former, the fact
sought to be established was the classification of forest land to alienable and disposable land, and not the other way around, as in this
case.27 Further, the Republic averred that fraud must have necessarily attended the issuance of Free Patent No. 516197, OCT No. RP-
132 and TCT No. 16580, owing to the status of the Roxas Properties as forest land.28

On July 18, 2014, the CA rendered the Assailed Decision dismissing the Appeal. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated December 5, 2005 of the [RTC] x x x is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.29

According to the CA, the Public Land Act vests the power to classify (and reclassify) lands of the public domain with the President. On
this score, the CA held that the annotations appearing on LC Map 209 anent the alleged reversion of the Roxas Properties deserve scant
consideration, as they do not appear to be based on any executive directive. Consequently, the NAMRIA certifications and DENR Final
Report relied upon by the Republic are insufficient to sustain its cause, as they are, in turn, based solely on said annotations.30

The Republic filed an MR, which was denied by the CA in its Assailed Resolution dated May 20, 2015. The Republic received a copy of
the Assailed Resolution on June 8, 2015.31

On June 19, 2015, the Republic filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, praying for an additional period of twenty-
five (25) days from June 23, 2015, or until July 18, 2015 within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. Subsequently, the Republic
filed a Second Motion for Extension, praying for a five (5)-day extension.32

Finally, on July 22, 2015, the Republic filed the present Petition, to which Respondents filed their Compliance and Comment dated
December 16, 2016.33

Thereafter, the Republic filed a Manifestation and Motion dated May 28, 2017, adopting the Petition as its reply to Respondents'
Compliance and Comment.34

The Issue

The Petition calls on the Court to determine whether the CA erred when it held that a positive act of government is necessary to evince
the reclassification of land from alienable and disposable to forest.

The Court's Ruling

In this Petition, the Republic maintains that the Court's ruling in Animas did not have the effect of making a positive executive act a
necessary requirement for the purpose of proving the reclassification of alienable and disposable land.35 Instead, the Republic posits
that Animas affirms its right to institute reversion proceedings in instances where portions of forest land are erroneously included within
the scope of land patents.36 Moreover, the Republic argues that in reversion proceedings, the State should not be made to bear the
burden of proving that the land in question constitutes public domain (i.e., forest land).37 In any case, the Republic posits that the
documentary and testimonial evidence it had presented sufficiently proved such fact.38

The Petition should be denied for lack of merit. The CA did not err when it affirmed the RTC Decision, as the Republic failed to establish
that the Roxas Properties were classified as forest land at the time Free Patent No. 516197 was issued.

The Republic's Petition and

Respondents ' Compliance and
Comment should be admitted in the
interest of substantial justice.

At the outset, the Court notes that the parties herein, albeit at different stages of the proceedings, have both prayed for the relaxation of
the Rules of Court (Rules).

For its part, the Republic filed two (2) motions which sought for an aggregate period of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the initial
thirty (30)-day period prescribed by the Rules for the filing of a petition for review on certiorari. The Respondents, on the other hand,
sought the admission of their Compliance and Comment, filed more than seven (7) months after the filing of the Petition.39

Considering the nature of the issues involved in the present Petition, and the lack of evidence showing that neither the Republic's nor the
Respondents' requests for accommodation had been impelled by any ill-motive, the Court resolves to admit in the interest of substantial
justice the Republic's Petition and the Respondents' Comment with Compliance.

The Court's ruling in Animas does not

apply to the present case.
The Republic's Petition primarily proceeds from the supposition that in ruling in favor of Respondents, the RTC and the CA erroneously
relied on Animas.

In Animas, the Republic filed an action for reversion against respondent therein, claiming that the Free Patent issued in the latter's favor
covered forest land.1âwphi1 The Court of First Instance dismissed the Republic's action on the ground that the original certificate of title
covering said land had become indefeasible, the same having been issued more than one (1) year prior to the filing of the Republic's
action. Hence, the issue brought before the Court in Animas was whether the lapse of said one (1)-year period had the effect of precluding
the State from initiating reversion proceedings to recover land which had been unlawfully registered, either through fraud or oversight.
Resolving the issue, the Court held that public land fraudulently or erroneously included in the scope of patents or certificates of title may
be recovered by the State through reversion proceedings, in accordance with the Public Land Act.

While the Animas ruling upholds the State's right to seek reversion with respect to fraudulently or erroneously registered lands, it does
not, in any manner, lay down the facts that must be established for an action for reversion to prosper. Undoubtedly, the RTC and CA's
reliance on the Animas ruling is misplaced.

Nevertheless, such erroneous reliance on Animas, as will be discussed below, does not advance the Republic's cause, since the principle
which serves as basis for the decisions of the RTC and CA remains correct, albeit attributed to the wrong case.

The power to classifY and reclassify

land lies solely with the Executive
Department.

The Regalian Doctrine has long been recognized as the basic foundation of the State's property regime,40 and has been consistently
adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions;41 it espouses that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that,
as a consequence thereof, any asserted right of ownership over land necessarily traces back to the State.42

At present, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into five (5) categories - forest lands,
agricultural lands, timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks. The Court's ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Palanca v. Republic,43
instructs that in the absence of any prior classification by the State, unclassified lands of the public domain assume the category of forest
lands not open to disposition.44

In turn, the classification of unclassified lands of the public domain, and the reclassification of those previously classified under any of the
categories set forth in the 1987 Constitution (such as the Roxas Properties), are governed by Commonwealth Act No. 14145 dated
November 7, 1936, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Sections 6 and 7 thereof provide:

SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the
lands of the public domain into -

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and
disposition.

SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act. (Emphasis supplied)

These provisions are clear and leave no room for interpretation - the classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest land is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department,46 and is exercised by the latter through the
President, or such other persons vested with authority to exercise the same on his behalf.47

Since the power to classify and reclassify land are executive in nature, such acts, effected without executive authority, are void, and
essentially ultra vires.

In reversion proceedings, the State

bears the burden of proving that the
property in question was inalienable
at the time it was decreed or
adjudicated in favor of the defendant.

A land registration proceeding is the manner through which an applicant confirms title to real property. In this proceeding, the applicant
bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership.48 Accordingly, the applicant is bound to establish, through
incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered had been declared alienable or disposable through a positive act of the
State.49
Conversely, reversion proceeding is the manner through which the State seeks to revert land to the mass of the public domain;50 it is
proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of in favor of private individuals or corporations,51 or when a person
obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system as they
form part of the public domain.52

Owing to the nature of reversion proceedings and the outcome which a favorable decision therein entails, the State bears the burden to
prove that the land previously decreed or adjudicated in favor of the defendant constitutes land which cannot be owned by private
individuals. The Court's ruling in Republic v. Development Resources Corporation53 is instructive:

Since a complaint for reversion can upset the stability of registered titles through the cancellation of the original title and the others that
emanate from it, the State bears a heavy burden of proving the ground for its action. x x x54 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in Republic v. Espinosa55 (Espinosa), the Court held that the dismissal of the Republic's action for reversion is proper since the
Republic failed to establish that the land subject thereof was classified as forest land at the time the cadastral decree in favor of the
defendant was issued:

[I]t is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N x x x. Having been granted
a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain. This means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the
property is alienable and disposable property in the cadastral proceedings.

xxxx

In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings and in the
issuance of the title in Espinosa's favor. The argument for the State is merely that the property was unlawfully included in the certificate
of title because it is of the public domain.

Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is on the State to prove that the property was classified
as timberland or forest land at the time it was decreed to Espinosa. To reiterate, there is no burden on [the present owner] to prove that
the property in question is alienable and disposable land. At this stage, it is reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom [the present
owner] derive[s] her title, had already established that the property is alienable and disposable land considering that she succeeded in
obtaining the OCT over it. In this reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of
the property in Espinosa's title because it was of public dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the burden of proof rests on the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue.56 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Hence, to resolve this Petition, the Court must determine whether the documentary and testimonial evidence offered by the Republic are
sufficient to sustain its cause.

The Complaint should be dismissed as

the Republic failed to show that the
Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A)
were classified as forest land at the
time Free Patent No. 516197 was
issued in Meynardo's favor.

To recall, the Republic presented the following pieces of evidence to support its complaint for reversion: (i) DENR Final Report; (ii)
NAMRIA certifications; and (iii) LC Map 209. However, these documents, whether taken individually or collectively, do not evince a positive
act of reclassification by the Executive Department. As aptly stated by the CA:

In this case, the Republic presented the [NAMRIA certifications], the [DENR Final Report] and [LC Map 209] dated March 6, 1924, with
an inscription that the [Roxas Properties] [were] reverted x x x to the category of forest land on November 24, 1949. However, it appears
that the findings of the CENRO and the NAMRIA are based solely on such mapping [LC Map 209] where eighteen (18) hectares, including
the location therein of the [Roxas Properties], [were] reclassified as forest land. Engineer [Mariano] Mendez57 testified that:

xxxx

Q: So you don't have the law or the order reverting that portion of land to forest land on November 24, 1949?

A: Except only that it is a swamp land. And it is shown here in our map, sir.

xxxx

PROS. MARCO:

x x x [W]hat is the basis, if any, of you (sic) in declaring that this portion of land was reverted back from timber land to forest land on
November 24, 1949?
A: Our files and records.

Q: What are these files and records?

A: As indicated in [LC Map 209].

Engineer Mendez admitted that there was no presidential order or act reverting the classification of the subject property from alienable
and disposable to forest land, thus:

Q: Did you prepare the basis of the reversion of the land from disposable to forest land on November 24, 1949?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What were the basis?

A: Yes, because when I studied that, I found out that the area was a swamp land?

Q: Aside from that, that the area was a swamp land, what are your other basis?

A: Nothing more, sir. As per records, that is the only basis.

Q: Did you not research any law, decree, presidential order or act as the basis of reverting this parcel of land to forest zone on November
24, 1949?

A: I have even decrees or law reverting certain area to forest land but not in this particular area.

Q: So, you know that before a certain parcel of land would be reverted from alienable and disposable to forest zone, there should be a
basis for the same, like proclamation or law. From your experience, presidential decrees?

A: Yes, sir. These are proclamation decrees regarding the reversion of certain land use. But in this particular area, the land is swamp
land.

Q: But in this particular case, did you encounter or did you see any law, executive order, presidential proclamation declaring this parcel
of land from alienable and disposable to forest zone?

A: I have not encountered any decree or presidential proclamation or order reverting this land to forest zone.x x x

Even Engineer Mendez of the NAMRIA agreed that a law or proclamation is required before a certain parcel of land is reclassified from
alienable and disposable to forest land. His insistence that because the land was (originally) swamp land that reclassification was made
(sic), is not supported by any presidential or legal pronouncement or by practice and tradition x x x Unfortunately, the Republic failed to
present any law, presidential proclamation, order or act to prove that the subject property was indeed within the area which is reclassified
as forest land. Even an administrative order from the Bureau of Forestry was not presented to show that the subject property had been
reclassified as forest land.58 (Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The foregoing testimony, culled from the Assailed Decision, confirms that the alleged reclassification of the Roxas Properties is bereft of
basis, as it was done by Engineer Mendez on his sole account, without any prior directive from the President, or a duly authorized officer
from the Executive Department. In fact, the annotation appearing on LC Map 209 upon which the Republic relies does not even state
upon whose authority the alleged reclassification had been made,59 placing the annotation's validity, veracity and worth in serious doubt.

Ultimately, the Republic failed to prove that the Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A) were classified as forest land when they were decreed
in Meynardo's favor in 1971. Thus, in accordance with the Court's ruling in Development Resources Corporation and Espinosa, the
present Petition must be, as it is hereby, denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.

REPUBLIC VS. ESPINOSA

FACTS:

Land Registration Proceedings. In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State
ownership.

Reversion of property. Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass
of the public domain.34 It is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations.35
There are also instances when we granted reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as when a “person obtains a title under the Public
Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not
have jurisdiction over the same because it is of the public domain
Remedial Law. The rules require that documentary evidence must be formally offered in evidence after the presentation of testimonial
evidence, and it may be done orally, or if allowed by the court, in writing.

FACTS:

A cadastral decree was issued in favor of Espinosa. The Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Espinosa who later sold
to Caliston which a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued.

The Sated through Regional Executive Director of the DENR filed a Complaint for annulment of title and reversion of land with the RTC
claiming the property is inalienable public land because it fell within the timberland area.

RTC ruled in favor of the State and ordered reversion of the property.

CA ruled in favor of Espinosa and found that the State failed to prove fraud or misrepresentation when she was issued the Original
Certificate of Title. It further ruled that the State failed to prove that the property is forest land. The lone piece of evidence consisting of
LC Map No, 2978 was not authenticated pursuant to Section 24 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It noted that the parties stipulated only
as to the existence of the map, but not as to genuineness of truthfulness of its content. Assuming that the map is admitted in evidence,
Espinosa’s rights over the property, which accrued in 1962, should not be prejudiced by a subsequent classification by the State done in
1986, or after 24 years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the State has sufficiently proved that the property is part of inalienable forest land at the time Espinosa was granted the
cadastral decree and issued a title.

RULING:

NO! The State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the time of the grant of the cadastral decree and issuance
of title to Espinosa.

In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership. It must establish,
through incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the
government.30 Since cadastral proceedings are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence, a cadastral decree
and a certificate of title are issued only after the applicant proves all the requisite jurisdictional facts-that they are entitled to the claimed
lot, that all parties are heard, and that evidence is considered. As such, the cadastral decree is a judgment which adjudicates ownership
after proving these jurisdictional facts.

Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N, the predecessor title
of Caliston’s TCT No. 91117. Having been granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome
the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.33 This means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was
able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and disposable property in the cadastral proceedings.

This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to recover the property if indeed it is part of the inalienable lands of the public
domain. The State may still do so through an action for reversion, as in the present case.

Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass of the public domain.34
It is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations.35 There are also instances
when we granted reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as when a “person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes,
by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the
same because it is of the public domain.”

In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings and in the
issuance of the title in Espinosa’s favor. The argument for the State is merely that the property was unlawfully included in the certificate
of title because it is of the public domain.

Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is on the State to prove that the property was classified
as timberland or forest land at the time it was decreed to Espinosa.37 To reiterate, there is no burden on Caliston to prove that the
property in question is alienable and disposable land.38 At this stage, it is reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom Caliston
derived her title, had already established that the property is alienable and disposable land considering that she succeeded in obtaining
the OCT over it.39 In this reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of the property
in Espinosa’s title because it was of public dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the burden of proof rests on the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue.

Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of evidence, the land classification map prepared in 1986. The records show,
however, that LC Map No. 2978 was not formally offered in evidence. The rules require that documentary evidence must be formally
offered in evidence after the presentation of testimonial evidence, and it may be done orally, or if allowed by the court, in writing.41 Due
process requires a formal offer of evidence for the benefit of the adverse party, the trial court, and the appellate courts.42 This gives the
adverse party the opportunity to examine and oppose the admissibility of the evidence.43 When evidence has notbeen formally offered,
it should not be considered by the court in arriving at its decision.44 Not having been offered formally, it was error for the trial court to
have considered the survey map. Consequently, it also erred in ordering the reversion of the property to the mass of the publ ic domain
on the basis of the same.

Moreover, even assuming that the survey can be admitted in evidence, this will not help to further the State’s cause. This is because the
only fact proved by the map is one already admitted by the State, that is, that the land was reclassified in 1986.45 This fact does not
address the presumption/ conclusion that Espinosa has, at the time of the cadastral proceedings conducted in 1955, proved that the land
is alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the decree issued in his favor in 1962.

At this juncture, we agree with the CA’s application of SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc.,50 which involved a complaint for annulment of title and
reversion of a lot covered by a free patent and original title. To support its claim that the lot was part of the timberland and forest reserve,
the State submitted as evidence a photocopy of a land classification map. This map also became the basis of the testimonies of City
Environment and Natural Resources Office officers declaring that the lot falls within the timberland or forest reserve. The State, however,
failed to submit either a certified true copy or an official publication of the map, prompting the trial court to deny its admission in evidence.
After proceedings, the trial court dismissed the complaint due to the State’s failure to show that the subject lot therein is part of the
timberland or forest reserve or has been classified as such before the issuance of the free patent and the original title. The CA, relying
on the map, reversed the trial court.

When the case was brought before this court, we reinstated the trial court’s decision. We held that the photocopy of the land classification
map cannot be considered in evidence because it is excluded under the best evidence rule. We emphasized that all parties, including the
Government, are bound by the rules of admissibility and must comply with it-

The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same rule holds true when the Government is one of the parties. The
Government, when it comes to court to litigate with one of its citizens, must submit to the rules of procedure and its rights and privileges
at every stage of the proceedings are substantially in every respect the same as those of its citizens; it cannot have a superior advantage.
This is so because when a [sovereign] submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court and participates therein, its claims and rights are
justiciable by every other principle and rule applicable to the claims and rights of the private parties under similar circumstances. Failure
to abide by the rules on admissibility renders the L.C. Map submitted by respondent inadmissible as proof to show that the subject lot is
part of the forest reserve.

he result would have been different had the State proved that the property was already classified as part of forest land at the time of the
cadastral proceedings and when title was decreed to Espinosa in 1962. However, it failed to discharge this burden; the grant of title which
carries with it the presumption that Espinosa had already proved the alienable character of the property in the cadastral proceedings
stands. To grant the reversion based on a subsequent reclassification, more so on lack of evidence, would amount to taking of private
property without just compensation and due process of law. This, however, is not what our Constitution envisions; fairness and due
process are paramount considerations that must still be observed.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

YABUT VS. ALCANTARA

FACTS:

Romeo Alcantara filed a Complaint of Reconveyance claiming that he is the true owner of parcel of agricultural- residential land located
in Balangasan, Pagadian City, known as Lots 6509-C and 6509-D, Pls- 119 with a combined area of 2.5 hectares more or less. He
claimed that he owns it since the time he bought the said lot in 1960 from Pantaleon Suazola. It was said that Tiburcio Ballesteros
purportedly employed fraud to have the said property. Ballesteros then sold the lots to his daughter, Fe B. Yabut. Ballesteros, applied for
a Sales Application (SA 10279) covering a total land area of 46.2930 hectares with the Bureau of Lands as far back December 9, 1927.
On July 31, 1928, Barbara Andoy filed a Sales Application (SA 10960) over a portion of the same land area applied by Ballesteros. On
April 10, 1930, the Assistant Director of Lands issued a Decision in the case S.A No. 10279, Tiburcio Ballesteros, Applicant and
Contestant, versus S.A . No. 10960, Barbara Andoy, Applicant and Respondent, the case was in favor for Ballesteros due to Andoy’s
entry was not made in good faith. In July 1931, SA 10279 was parceled into Lot Nos. 5862, 5863, 6576, 6586, 7098 and 6509.

Andoy’s heirs laid out their claims on portions of SA 10279: Faustino Andoy Jamisola on Lot No. 6509, Faustina Jamisola de Calivo on
Lot No. 6576, and Olivia Jamisola de Libutan on Lot Nos. 6586 and 7098. Bacause of this, Ballesteros was forced to file a case of forcible
entry against Jamisola siblings in 1938 before the local Municipal Justice of Peace. This was later elevated to the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga. Unfortunately, Ballesteros was imprisoned for three (3) years at the Capas, Tarlac concentration camp. During his
absence on August 20, 1946, Andoy’s son Faustino Andoy Jamisola, sold the said lot covered an area of six (6) hectares to Pantaleon
Suazola identified as Lot No. 6509-A.

When Ballesteros returned to Pagadian in 1946 he learned about the sale between the Faustino and Suazola. He then recognized the
said sale in an affidavit, despite the covered property being part of sa 10279 due to deference to Suazola’s son, who was his compadre.
On September 3, 1952, Suazola filed Free Patent Application No. V9352 (FPA No. V8352) over what he identified as Lot No. 4111, which
turned out to be whole 11.5 hectares of Lot No. 6509.Thus, Ballesteros filed a Letter Protest to the Director of Lands against Suazola’s
FPA No. V8352. On August 11,1953, the Director of Lands ruled the rejection of Andoy’s sales application and recognize Ballesteros
instead. The Jamisola siblings then appealed to the Secretary of Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR). In line with
the landless policy Ballesteros then filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the Jamisolas were not landless and they owned
several tracts of land. Through to the new evidence presented, the sales application of Ballesteros should be further given due course.
The Jamisola siblings filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of First Instance (CFI) but the same was dismissed. They elevated the
case to the Supreme Court Which was docketed as G. R No. L-17466.
On August 12 and September 12,1960, Alcantara bought Lot Nos. 6509-C and 6509-D from Suazola’s heirs and applied for a Free Patent
Lot No. 6509-C on October 15, 1960 and another over Lot No. 6509-Don April 25,1962.

On September 18,1965, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. L-17466 upheld the CFI’S dismissal of the petition filed by Jamisola Siblings as
well as September 3, 1955 ORDER of the DANR granting the MR of Ballesteros.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there is legal basis to support the reconveyance of the properties in question in favor of the Alcantaras.
2. Whether or not the CFI erred when it held that the Director of Lands and DANR had not acted with grave abuse of discretion in rejecting
Suazola’s free patent application.

RULING:

1. NO! the respondents miserably failed to prove that they are the actual owners of the parcel of land that they are claiming. They failed
to present adequate evidence pointing to any legal and valid source of a right over said lots.

2. NO! because the respondents failed to show that they, in fact the real owner of the Lots. It now becomes clear that before the registration
of title over the subject properties in the name of Ballesteros, the same had been public land as such, could have been possibly owned
by any private person with a judicially confirmed title over the same. To reiterate, Alcantara merely filed free patent applications, which
were, unfortunately, never granted.

It is settled that in an action for reconveyance, the free patent and the certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible. What is sought
instead is the transfer of the title to the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant’s name. All that is
needed to be alleged in the complaint are these two (2) crucial facts, namely, (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that
the defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the same. Therefore, the claimant/complainant has the burden to of proving ownership
over the registered land. Considering the overwhelming amount of evidence which include final decisions of no less than Court itself,
recognizing the standing claims of Ballesteros over Lots 6509-C and –D, the RTC and the CA undeniably committed a reversible error
when they ruled that respondents were able to overcome the burden of proof required of them. The Supreme Court, in G.R. No. L-17466,
upheld the cfi’s dismissal of the petition filed by Jamisola siblings as well as the September 3, 1955 Order of the DANR granting the MR
to Ballesteros. But still the Jamisolas refuse to vacate the said property.

The Courts, thus ORDERS the Alcantaras, their successors-in-interest, relatives, representatives, tenants, or anybody acting in their
behalf to vacate the premises and finally place petitioners in peaceful and exclusive possession of the same; and the respondents to pay
cost of the suit.

ANG VS. ESTATE OF SY SO

FACTS:

Sometime in the late 1930s, respondent Sy So, a Chinese citizen, was married to a certain Jose Ang.[4] Sy So maintained a sari-sari
store, while her husband maintained a foundry shop. Testimonial evidence showed that, by virtue of her business, she was financially
well-off on her own.[5]

The couple was childless. In 1941, when a woman approached respondent Sy So and offered a seven- or eight-month-old infant for
adoption, respondent immediately accepted the offer.[6] No formal adoption papers were processed, but the child was christened as Jose
Norberto Ang (Jose Norberto), the present petitioner.[7] Respondent subsequently "adopted" three other wards: Mary Ang, Tony Ang,
and Teresita Tan.[8]

Jose Ang died in 1943 during the Pacific War.[9] After his death, respondent Sy So maintained her store and engaged in cigarette
trading.[10]

Later, respondent Sy So acquired a property described as a 682.5 square meter lot located at 10th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City.
She registered it under TCT No. 73396 (the 10th Avenue lot) in the name of petitioner Jose Norberto, who was then three years old, in
keeping with the Chinese tradition of registering properties in the name of the eldest male son or ward. Respondent Sy So subsequently
acquired the other subject property with an area of 1,977 square meters, located at 11th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City and
registered under TCT No. 10425 (the 11th Avenue lot) on 24 July 1944, likewise under Jose Norberto's name.[11]

Between 1940 and 1950, a six-door apartment building on the 10th Avenue lot was constructed at respondent Sy So's expense.[12] Later
on, two more apartment doors were built on the property, bringing the total to eight apartment doors. For over 30 years, respondent Sy
So, along with petitioner and her other wards, lived there.[13]

Respondent Sy So alleged that she kept the titles to the two properties under lock and key and never showed them to anyone.[14]
However, she gave Jose Norberto a photocopy of TCT No. 10425, so that he could show it to prospective tenants.[15]
Unbeknownst to respondent Sy So, Jose Norberto filed Petitions for the Issuance of Second Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title for TCT
Nos. 73396 and 10425.[16] In 1971, he sold the 11th Avenue lot, which was covered by TCT No. 10425.[17]

On 5 April 1974, Jose Norberto's counsel wrote respondent Sy So, demanding a monthly payment of P500 as her contribution for real
estate taxes on the 10lh Avenue lot.[18]

On 14 March 1989, said counsel wrote another letter to respondent Sy So, formally demanding that she vacate the 10th Avenue lot within
a period of three months, and informing her that she would be charged ¥5,000 as monthly rent.[19]

On 25 July 1989, Jose Norberto filed an ejectment suit against respondent Sy So on the ground of nonpayment of rentals on the 10th
Avenue lot.[20] The ejectment case was dismissed on 30 October 1989 by the Metropolitan Trial Court.[21]

On 14 November 1996, Jose Norberto filed a second ejectment?case against respondent Sy So, but the case was dismissed by the MTC
on 30 October 1997. The dismissal was affirmed by this Court on 4 June 2001,[22]

Meanwhile, on 9 June 1993, respondent Sy So filed with the RTC a case for "Transfer of Trusteeship from the Defendant Jose Norberto
Ang to the New Trustee, Tony Ang, with Damages.[23] Citing Jose Norberto's gross ingratitude, disrespectfulness, dishonesty and breach
of trust, respondent Sy So argued that she had bought the two parcels of land and constructed the apartment doors thereon at her own
expense. Thus, she alleged that there was an implied trust over the properties in question.[24] She thereafter prayed for the following
reliefs:
[Orders be] issued to the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, ordering the removal or cancellation of the name of Jose Norberto Ang as
owner in TCT No. 73396 in the value of P375,000.00 more or less which includes improvements, and placing, instead, the name of Tony
Ang as the owner and trustee;

To declare null and void the fraudulent sale made to Benjamin Lee as per Annex "C" of the complaint;

Ordering the defendant to pay moral damages in the amount of at least P50,000.00;

Plaintiff prays for such other relief or reliefs as may be just, proper and equitable under the premises.[25]
In his Answer, Jose Norberto countered that respondent Sy So was a plain housewife; that the two subject parcels of land were acquired
through the money given to him by his foster father, Jose Ang; and that the apartments were built using funds derived from the sale of
the latter's other properties. Jose Norberto further alleged that when he came of age, he took possession of the properties and allowed
respondent Sy So to stay thereon without paying rent. However, he shouldered the real estate taxes on the land.[26]

THE RULING OF THE RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 23 May 2005 dismissing respondent Sy So's Complaint. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this Court hereby deems it proper to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint, as well as Defendant's
counterclaim, as the same are hereby DISMISSED for failure of the parties to prove their respective claims by preponderance of evidence.

Likewise, the titles under the name of the Defendants are hereby confirmed and affirmed with all the attributes of ownership.

SO ORDERED.[27]
In so ruling, the trial court found that there was no implied trust because, under Art. 1448 of the New Civil Code, "[tjhere is an implied
trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the
beneficial interest of the property." In this case, the trial court reasoned that respondent Sy So did not intend to have the beneficial interest
of the properties, but to make her wards the beneficiaries thereof.[28]

Moreover, the RTC cited Article 1448 of the New Civil Code which states: "[i]f the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate
or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor
of the child." Applying this provision to the present case, the trial court ruled that when Sy So gave the subject properties to Jose Norberto
- who was her child, though not legally adopted - no implied trust was created pursuant to law.[29]

Finally, the RTC ruled that the action was a collateral attack on Jose Norberto's Torrens title; and that, in any event, respondent Sy So's
cause of action was barred by laches, having been instituted 49 years after the titles had been issued in petitioner's name.[30]

THE RULING OF THE CA

Aggrieved by the trial court's Decision, respondent Sy So appealed to the CA.

In her Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief, Sy So argued that Jose Norberto could not be considered as her child in the absence of any formal
adoption proceedings.[31] This being so, under Article 1448 of the New Civil Code, there could be no disputable presumption that the
properties had been given to him as gifts.[32] She also argued that laches had not set in, because there is no prescriptive period for an
action to compel a trustee to convey the property registered in the latter's name for the benefit of the cestui que trust.[33] Furthermore,
she alleged that the trust was repudiated on 25 July 1989 when the first ejectment suit was filed by petitioner, and that when the present
case was instituted against him, only three years, 10 months and 14 days had elapsed.[34]

For his part, petitioner argued in his Appellee's Brief that Sy So had acknowledged that Jose Norberto was one of her wards or adopted
children; hence, Sy So could no longer claim that he was not her child.[35] He further argued that the instant case should have been
dismissed outright because respondent, being a Chinese citizen, could not own real property in the Philippines under the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits aliens from owning private lands save in cases of hereditary succession.[36] He alleged that the present case involved a
prohibited collateral attack against his title and claimed that, as the Complaint was filed almost 50 years after the issuance of the title in
his name, the action was already barred by laches.[37]

The appellate court partially granted respondent Sy So's appeal in a Decision dated 25 July 2007, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED in the sense that Appellant's claim for reimbursement of the
purchase price over the lot covered by TCT No. 10425 is DENIED on the ground of prescription whereas with respect to Appellant's action
re the subject property covered by TCT No. 73396, the Appellant is declared as the true, absolute and lawful owner of the property under
TCT No. 73396 and ordering the Appellee to RECONVEY said property to the Appellant within ten (10) days from notice and to pay the
costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.[38]
The CA upheld the applicability of Article 1448[39] of the New Civil Code and the existence of an implied trust.[40] Moreover, it found that
petitioner had not been legally adopted by respondent[41] and thus, there being no legal relationship between the parties, the disputable
presumption under Article 1448 did not arise.[42]

As to the issue of whether there was a collateral attack on Jose Norberto's title, the CA ruled that the legal doctrine of indefeasibility of a
Torrens title was inapplicable. It explained that respondent did not question the validity of petitioner's title, but merely prayed for the
transfer thereof, as the instant action was actually one of reconveyance.[43]

Finally, the CA found that laches had set in as regards the 11th Avenue lot covered by TCT No. 10425, but not with respect to the 10th
Avenue lot covered by TCT No. 73396. Since respondent Sy So was in possession of the 10th Avenue lot, the CA reasoned that the
action for reconveyance was imprescriptible.[44]

However, the CA did not pass upon petitioner's contention that under the Constitution, respondent Sy So was disqualified from owning
private lands in the Philippines.

After unsuccessfully praying for a reconsideration of the CA Decision,[45] Jose Norberto filed the instant Rule 45 petition for review before
this Court.

On 9 October 2008, We received notice of the death of Sy So pending the resolution of the instant case.[46] Counsel for respondent
likewise notified this Court that Tony Ang, one of the foster sons and allegedly the trustee-designate of the deceased, should substitute
in her stead.[47]

In a Reply dated 17 December 2008, petitioner Jose Norberto vehemently opposed the substitution. He argued that the original action
for transfer of trusteeship was an action in personam; thus, it was extinguished by the death of respondent.[48] Moreover, he contended
that Tony Ang had no legal personality to represent Sy So as her alleged trustee, because there was as yet no final judgment validating
the change of trusteeship between the parties.[49]

OUR RULING

We grant the Petition.

Respondent Sy So would have this Court declare that she is the true owner of the real properties in question and that as owner, she has
the right to have the land titles transferred from the name of Jose Norberto to that of Tony Ang, Sy So's trustee-designate. On the other
hand, petitioner Jose Norberto counters that reconveyance does not lie, because respondent Sy So is a Chinese citizen.

Sy So's Chinese citizenship is undisputedly shown by the records, and even supported by documentary evidence presented by the
representative of respondent Sy So herself.

The purchase of the subject parcels of land was made sometime in 1944,[50] during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. The relevant
sections of Article XIII thereof provide:
SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,
and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

XXXX

SECTION 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
As early as Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,[51] We have interpreted the foregoing to mean that, under the Constitution then in force, aliens
may not acquire residential lands: "One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution x x x is
'that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore,
be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity.'"

These provisions have been substantially carried over to the present Constitution, and jurisprudence confirms that aliens are disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain. In Ting Ho v. Teng Gui,[52] Muller v. Muller[53] Frenzel v. Catito,[54] and Cheesman v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[55] all cited in Matthews v. Sps. Taylor[56] We upheld the constitutional prohibition on aliens acquiring land
in the Philippines. We have consistently ruled thus in line with constitutional intent to preserve and conserve the national patrimony. Our
Constitution clearly reserves for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos the right
to acquire lands of the public domain.[57] The prohibition against aliens owning lands in the Philippines is subject only to limited
constitutional exceptions, and not even an implied trust can be permitted on equity considerations.[58]

Much as We sympathize with the plight of a mother who adopted an infant son, only to have her ungrateful ward eject her from her
property during her twilight years, We cannot grant her prayer. Applying the above rules to the present case, We find that she acquired
the subject parcels of land in violation of the constitutional prohibition against aliens owning real property in the Philippines. Axiomatically,
the properties in question cannot *be legally reconveyed to one who had no right to own them in the first place. This being the case, We
no longer find it necessary to pass upon the question of respondent Sy So's substitution in these proceedings.

The Solicitor General, however, may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State.[59] In sales of real estate to aliens
incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution, both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have
committed the constitutional violation. Being in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party. The proper party who could
assail the sale is the Solicitor General.[60]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is GRANTED.

DE GUZMAN JR VS. CA

FACTS:

The Facts

The property subject of this case (property) is a 480-square meter lot that formed part of Lot No. 532 located at North Poblacion, Medina,
Misamis Oriental. Lot No. 532, which has a total area of 25,178 square meters, was acquired by Lamberto Bajao's (respondent) parent,
Leoncio Bajao,6 through Free Patent No. 4000877 issued on May 28, 1968.8

Petitioners acquired the property in two transactions. On May 24, 1969, Spouses Bajao sold 200 square meters of Lot No. 532 to them
for P1,000.9 On June 18, 1970, Spouses Bajao sold another 280 square meters of Lot No. 532 to petitioners for P1,400.10 Both
transactions were evidenced by separate Deeds of Absolute Sale.11 Spouses Bajao allegedly promised to segregate the property from
the remaining area of Lot No. 53212 and to deliver a separate title to petitioners covering it.13 However, because the promise was not
forthcoming, petitioner Lydia S. de Guzman executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim14 on April 21, 1980 covering the property. This was
annotated on the title covering Lot No. 532, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-6903, on April 25, 1980.15

On May 29, 1980, petitioners initiated the segregation of the property from Lot No. 532 through a survey.16 As a result of the survey,
petitioners acquired Lot 2-A, Psd-10-002692.17 They allegedly acquired possession over the land immediately, fenced the area,
introduced improvements, and planted it with fruit-bearing trees.18

On September 26, 1980,19 or after the death of Leoncio Bajao on February 1, 1972,20 respondent and Anastacia Bajao executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs21 (Extrajudicial Settlement), which subdivided Lot No. 532 into three parts.22 The property was
included in Lot No. 532-C, which was adjudicated in favor of respondent.23 The Extrajudicial Settlement was registered on December
10, 1980.24

On December 16, 1980, respondent caused the cancellation of petitioners' annotated adverse claim over the property and later obtained
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-7133 on February 13 and October 2, 1981.25 Petitioners thereafter requested respondent to
deliver TCT No. T-7133 so they could present it to the Register of Deeds, together with the two Deeds of Absolute Sale, for proper
annotation.26 Respondent, however, refused to heed their request.27cralawred

Thus, on January 21, 2000, petitioners filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages.28
They alleged that they were innocent purchasers for value who took possession of the property after the sale and religiously paid its real
property taxes.29 Petitioners also alleged that respondent was in bad faith since he knew about the sale of the property between them
and his parents, and the existing survey and segregation over the area, yet he fraudulently included the same in his share upon the
issuance of TCT No. T-7133.30

In his Answer with Defenses and Counterclaims,31 respondent argued that the action is time barred and there is no more trust to speak
of.32 He pointed out that more than 10 years have lapsed from the date of the registration of the Extrajudicial Settlement on December
10, 1980 and the registration of TCT No. T-7133 on February and October 1981, to the date of filing of the Complaint.33 Respondent
also countered that there was no mistake or fraud in including the property in TCT No. T-7133 since his rights arose from the Extrajudicial
Settlement.34

Ruling of the Trial Court

On October 22, 2004, the trial court promulgated its Decision,35 the decretal portion of which reads:
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WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, this Court finds for the plaintiffs and hereby orders
the defendant:

1. to reconvey to the plaintiffs the four hundred eighty square meter lot in question in accordance with the survey plan made by Engr.
Pedro Q. Gonzales which was approved by Acting Director of Lands Guillermo C. Ferraris as certified by the Office of the Regional
Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and to surrender TCT No. 7133 to the Register of Deeds of
Misamis Oriental for appropriate annotation;

2. to pay to plaintiffs the sum of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as moral damages; and

3. to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.36ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court found the two Deeds of Absolute Sale free from infirmities.37 It ruled that their execution was equivalent to the delivery of
the thing sold;38 registration not being necessary to make the contract of sale valid and effective as between the parties.39 Citing
Sanchez, et al. v. De la Cruz, et al.,40 and Philippine Suburban Development Corporation v. Auditor General,41 the trial court held that
as between the parties and their privies, an unrecorded deed of sale covering land registered under the Torrens system passes title of
ownership once the land is conveyed to the vendee. Failure of registration does not, at anytime after the sale, vitiate or annul the right of
ownership conferred to such sale.42

The trial court also found respondent in bad faith.43 Respondent admitted that he was aware of the adverse claim annotated at the back
of the title when he went to the Register of Deeds to register the Extrajudicial Settlement.44 The ultimate paragraph of the Extrajudicial
Settlement provides that what was being conveyed to respondent was the "remaining portion of Lot [No.] 532, Cad-347, under O.C.T. Bo,
P-6903." The trial court construed this provision to mean the remaining portion of Lot No. 532 after taking into consideration the 480-
square meter lot sold to petitioners.45

Respondent appealed to the CA.46 In his appellant's brief,47 he argued that: (1) petitioners' Complaint is already barred by the statute
of limitations, estoppel and laches;48 (2) the "remaining portion" in the Extrajudicial Settlement refers to Lot No. 532-C with an area of
10,178 square meters;49 and (3) the petitioners are not entitled to moral damages.50

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA granted the appeal of respondent. The decretal portion of its Decision51 reads:
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WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and as a consequence,
the Complaint for Reconveyance with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA noted that an implied trust between the parties under Article 145653 of the Civil Code was created at the time Anastacia Bajao
and respondent executed the Extrajudicial Settlement on September 26, 1980, with respondent becoming the trustee who holds the
property in trust for the benefit of petitioners.54 The CA held that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10
years from the registration of title in the Office of the Register of Deeds.55 Thus, petitioners' action for reconveyance filed in January
2000 has already prescribed since more than 10 years have lapsed from October 1981, the date of registration of respondent's title.56

Further, the CA held that petitioners failed to prove their actual possession of the property by substantial evidence.57 It was only in the
1980s that they fenced the area in a furtive attempt to establish possession.58 The CA held them guilty of laches for failing to assert their
right to be placed in control and possession of the property after its sale in 1969 and 1970 and to have it registered.59

Finally, the CA held that the phrase "remaining portion of Lot No. 532, Cad-347 under OCT No. P-6903" found in the Extrajudicial
Settlement could also mean restricting respondent's share to the whole portion of Lot No. 532-C, which is the remaining portion of Lot
No. 532 after subdividing it into three parcels and giving Lot Nos. 532-A and 532-B to Anastacia Bajao as her share.60

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration61 of the Decision. They insisted that prescription and laches do not apply because
respondent was in bad faith.62 They maintained to be in possession of the property.63 Thus, their action for reconveyance partakes of a
suit to quiet title which is imprescriptible.64 The CA in its Resolution65 dated November 19, 2008 denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, this petition, which essentially raises the issue of whether the CA erred in dismissing the Complaint on the ground of prescription.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

It is undisputed that Leoncio Bajao obtained Lot No. 532 through Free Patent No. 40008766 granted and issued on May 28, 1968. Free
Patent No. 400087 was used as basis in the issuance of OCT No. P-6903 which was transcribed in the Registration Book of the Register
of Deeds of Misamis Oriental on August 4, 1970.67 Section 11868 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, prohibits the alienation or encumbrance of lands acquired under free patent or homestead within a period of five years from the date
of issuance of the patent.69 The parties, however, never raised this issue on prohibition, but this failure will not deter us from resolving
the issue. We have held that:
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We cannot turn a blind eye on glaring misapplications of the law or patently erroneous decisions or resolutions simply because the parties
failed to raise these errors before the court. Otherwise, we will be allowing injustice by reason of the mistakes of the parties' counsel and
condoning reckless and negligent acts of lawyers to the prejudice of the litigants. Failure to rule on these issues amounts to an abdication
of our duty to dispense justice to all parties.70ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We have explained the rationale behind this prohibition in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:71
The prohibition against the encumbrance — lease and mortgage included — of a homestead which, by analogy applies to a free patent,
is mandated by the rationale for the grant, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for
their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section
116) within five years after the grant of the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits alienation of the homestead; but in
line with the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his family the statute provides that such alienation or conveyance (Section
117) shall be subject to the right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs within five years. This Section 117 is undoubtedly
a complement of Section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State
had gratuitously given to him. It would, therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold, that the right to repurchase
exists not only when the original homesteader makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by his widow or heirs. This construction
is clearly deducible from the terms of the statute."72ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under Section 124 of the Public Land Act, any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation
of Sections 118 to 123 of the Public Land Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution. The violation shall also produce the
effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed actually or presumptively. The
violation shall also cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State. The contract executed in violation of these
sections being void, it is not susceptible of ratification, and the action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of such a contract is
imprescriptible.73

In this case, portions of Lot No. 532 were conveyed to petitioners by virtue of two Deeds of Absolute Sale executed on May 24, 1969 and
June 18, 1970, or after the grant and issuance of Free Patent No. 40008774 on May 28, 1968. Both Deeds of Absolute Sale were executed
within the prohibited period of five years. Consequently, following Section 124, these Deeds are null and void and produce no effect. They
did not convey any right from Spouses Bajao to petitioners on the property. The parties could not have claimed ignorance of the free
patent grant. We held in Beniga v. Bugas:75
Section 118 does not exempt patentees and their purported transferees who had no knowledge of the issuance of the patent from the
prohibition against alienation; for the law does not say that the five years are to be counted "from knowledge or notice of issuance" of the
patent or grant. The date of the issuance of the patent is documented and is a matter of government and official record. As such, it is
more reliable and precise than mere knowledge, with its inherent frailties. Indeed, the policy of the law, which is to give the patentee a
place where to live with his family so that he may become a happy citizen and a useful member of our society, would be defeated were
ignorance of the issuance of a patent a ground for the non-application of the prohibition.76ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Nonetheless, although Section 124 states that a violation of Section 118 causes the reversion of the property to the State, we have held
that a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of cancelling a free patent and
the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby will again form part of the
public domain, since only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so.77 Until then, respondent, as heir of the
vendors, has the better right to remain in possession of the property.78

The rule of pari delicto will not apply here in view of the nullity of the contracts of sale between the parties.79 To have it otherwise would
go against the public policy of preserving the grantee's right to the land under the homestead law.80 In Binayug v. Ugaddan,81 we
returned the properties which were acquired through a grant of a homestead patent to the heirs of the original owner after it was proven
that the properties were alienated within the five-year prohibition period under Section 118 of the Public Land Act. Citing De los Santos
v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, et al.,82 we explained:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In De los Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, a homestead patent covering a tract of land in Midsayap, Cotabato was granted
to Julio Sarabillo (Sarabillo) on December 9, 1938. (XT No. RP-269 was issued to Sarabillo on March 17, 1939. On December 31, 1940,
Sarabillo sold two hectares of land to the Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap (Church). Upon Sarabillo's death, Catalina de los Santos
(De los Santos) was appointed administratrix of his estate. In the course of her administration, De los Santos discovered that Sarabillo's
sale of land to the Church was in violation of Section 118 of the Public Land Act, prompting her to file an action for the annulment of said
sale. The Church raised as defense Section 124 of the Public Land Act, as well as the principle of pari delicto. The Court, in affirming the
CFI judgment favoring De los Santos, ratiocinated:

xxx

x x x Here [De Los Santos] desires to nullify a transaction which was done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto
would apply to her because her predecessor-in-interest has carried out the sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality, but because
the subject of the transaction is a piece of public land, public policy requires that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it
because it was given by law to her family for her home and cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead law is predicated. This
right cannot be waived. "It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve". We
are, therefore, constrained to hold that [De Los Santos] can maintain the present action it being in furtherance of this fundamental aim of
our homestead law.

xxx
Jurisprudence, therefore, supports the return of the subject properties to respondents as Gerardo's heirs following the declaration that
the Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 10, 1951 between Gorardo and Juan is void for being in violation of Section 118 of the Public Land
Act, as amended. That the subject properties should revert to the Slate under Section 124 of the Public Land Act, as amended, is a non-
issue, the State not even being a party herein.83ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
With respect to the purchase price of P2,400 which petitioners paid for the land, respondent should return it with interest.84 We similarly
ruled in the recent case of Tingalan v. Spouses Melliza85 which also involved the void sale of land covered by the Public Land Act, as
amended. We applied the rule that upon annulment of the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced to the purchase price and its interest.86

But, even on the assumption that there was no violation of Section 118 of the Public Land Act, the ruling of the CA that petitioners' action
has already prescribed would have been correct.

Petitioners allege that respondent fraudulently included the property in TCT No. T-7133, which was issued on February 13 and October
2, 1981.87 Article 145688 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through mistake or fraud becomes, by operation of
law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust
generally prescribes in 10 years, the reckoning point of which is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate
of title over the property.89 Thus, petitioners had 10 years from 1981 or until 1991 to file their complaint for reconveyance of property.
The Complaint, however, was filed only on January 21, 2000,90 or more than 10 years from the issuance of TCT No. T-7133. Hence, the
action is already barred by prescription.

The exception to the ten-year rule on prescription is when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed.91 In such case, the
action becomes one for quieting of title, which is imprescriptible.92 Here, petitioners allege that they were in juridical possession of the
property from the time they put up a fence on it until the filing of the Complaint.93 Respondent disputes this claim, countering that
petitioners are not in actual and material possession of the property.94 Whether petitioners have actual possession of the lot is a question
of fact.95 We have repeatedly ruled that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall raise only questions
of law and not questions of facts.96 When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding
on the parties and are not reviewable by us, unless the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions.97 Petitioners never raised any
of these exceptions. Assuming they did, none of the exceptions would apply.

We affirm the CA's finding that petitioners were not able to establish their actual possession of the lot except by bare allegations not
substantiated by evidence.98 It is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence.99 Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their
opponent.100

During trial, petitioners testified that they do not live on the property.101 They alleged putting up a fence alter they purchased the lot but
there was no evidence to support their allegations as to when this fence was constructed.102 Respondent presented pictures showing a
fence erected by petitioners only in 1996 and respondent contested such act through a letter sent to petitioners asking them to remove
the fence.103 Although there were mango trees and chico trees in the lot, it was unclear who planted them.104 The tax declaration of
Lot No. 532-C which respondent offered in evidence also shows that coconut trees were planted in the lot.105 Petitioners never alleged
having planted any coconut tree.

Further, petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that they have been paying real property taxes religiously from the time of the sale in
1969. They only formally offered in evidence official receipts issued for the period 2000 to 2002 showing payment of real property
taxes.106 No tax declaration of the lot was also formally offered107 in evidence, although petitioners attached one in their Complaint.108
Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.

Finally, the survey plan commissioned by petitioners does not prove their actual possession over the property. The survey plan merely
proves the identity of the property. It plots the location, the area and the boundaries of the property, but it hardly proves that petitioners
actually possessed the property.109

On the other hand, respondent offered in evidence the tax declaration110 of Lot No. 532-C under his name, as well as the tax
clearance111 and official receipts for payment of real property taxes for the period 2000 to 2003.112 We have held that although tax
declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession
in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession.113

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.

SOQUILLO VS. TORTOLA

FACTS:

On March 8 1966, a parcel of land lacated in Alubijid, Misamis Oriental originally owned by Lorenzo Coloso, Jr was sold to Ramon Jamis
through execution of notarized deed of conditional sale. The sale became definite the day after. Subsequently, Jamis sold the subject
property to Jorge Tortola (herein respondent).

Tortola took possession of the property, paid its realty taxes due from 1975-2002. However, the receipts for the payments still stated
Coloso, Jr.’s name, withthe exception of Tax Declaration Nos. 942443, indicating “Lorenzo Coloso, Jr. c/o Mr. Tortola” and 026083,
bearing the name of “Jorge Tortola” Tortola moved to Bukidnon and left the subject lot under the care of Godofredo Villaflores.
Later, Atty. Pacana was informed of the desire of the heirs of Coloso to recover the subject lot and notified Tortola through letter. Tortola
sent, in reply, copy of the notarized deed of definite sale executed between the latter and Jamis.

On September 22 1993, application for free patent was filed by the Colosos with Commnity of Environmental and Natural Resources in
Cagayan De Oro City to obtain title over the subject land. After survey was conducted, it was reported by the land investigator that the
Colosos had been in possession and cultivating the subject land Colosos were recommended to be issued free patent.

On December 14, 1994, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-20825 covering the disputed property was issued in favor of the Heirs
of Coloso, Jr. Colosos subsequently sold the land to Santiago Soquillo through execution of absolute deed of sale. Soquillo, knowing
there were other people in possession of the land, filed a complaint for illegal detainer against spouses Villaflores

MTC Ruling: For failure of Villaflores to file an answer, the case was decided in favor of Soquillo. Hence the former was ejected from the
subject land. Upon knowing of the ejectment, Tortola filed with the Regional Trial Court of Branch 44, Initao, Misamis Oriental a complaint
against Coloso, the Heirs ofColoso, Jr., Soquillo and the MTC of Alubijid, Misamis Oriental for annulment of title/sale/judgment with
prayers for the issuance of injunctive reliefs and award of damages

RTC Ruling: Santiago V. Soquillo versus Jorge P. Tortola (G.R. No. 192450), the trial court ruled in favor of Tortola. Accordingly, it can
be established that [Tortola] acquired a right over the subject parcel of land under a Deed of Definite Sale dated March 29, 1966, which
was registered on September 5, 2002 in the Registry of Deeds, and by the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 023086 by Tax Declaration
No.026083 in the name of Jorge Tortola.

Registration of the instrument in the Office of the Register of Deeds constitutes constructive notice to the parties of the transfer of
ownership over the subject property. The respondent occupied the said property and constructed his house and resided thereon until he
left for Maramag, Bukidnon sometime in the late 1960’s, leaving the occupation of the said property to Spouses Villaflores, with his
permission, continuously until 2002.

The ownership and possession of the land was admitted and acknowledged by the herein defendants Heirs of Coloso, Jr. in their letters
to [Tortola]. Likewise, defendant Soquillo, admitted the actual occupation of the land by Spouses Villaflores by the fact of his filing a civil
action against them in court. Under the law, if the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for
reconveyance is still available. Defendant Soquillo cannot be considered as an innocent purchaser for value or that he acquired the
subject property through mistake and fraud.

He can only be considered a trustee by implication, for the benefit of Tortola, who is the true and lawful owner of the litigated land,
pursuant to Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Laches cannot prejudice the lawful right of Tortola in its ownership and possession of the
subject litigated property. There was no failure or neglect on the part of Tortola]in asserting his rights after knowing defendant’s conduct,
evidenced by all the letters sent to the defendants resulting to their knowledge of the actual ownership and occupation of the subject land.

The principle of indefeasibillity of title does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of title, as in this case. The settled rule is that a
free patent issued over aprivate land, which in this case the subject litigated land belonged to plaintiff Tortola, is null and void, and
produces no legal effects whatsoever (Heirs of Simplicio Santiago vs. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, 404 SCRA 193).

Soquillo appealed to Court of Appeals, averring that the RTC erred in not finding that Tortola’s complaint stated no cause of action. He
alleged that since Tortola sought the cancellation of a free patent, not him but the State, was the real party-in interest. He also argued
that he was a purchaser in good faith and for value, thus, the RTC’s order to reconvey the disputed property and award damages in
Tortola’s favor was improper.

Ruling of Court of Appeals: Santiago V. Soquillo versus Jorge P. Tortola (G.R. No. 192450). The appellate court denied the petition
According to the lower court, the defense that the Complaint failed to state a cause of action must be raised at the earliest possible time.

Petitioner cannot be considered a purchaser in good faith and for value because defendant Arthur Coloso as Attorney-in-fact of the heirs
of Lorenzo Boy Coloso did not have the right to sell the disputed land to the former. Knowledge that Villaflores was the agent of Tortola
serves as prior knowledge and despite that, Colosos still filed application for free patent made false declaration that they have been
cultivating and in possession thereof. Such false declarations in the Application, however, constituted concealment of material facts,
which amounted to fraud. This, therefore, inevitably resulted to the cancellation of title.

Public policy demands that one who obtains title to a public land through fraud should not be allowed to benefit therefrom. “Indeed, the
general rule is that a purchaser may rely on what appears on the face of a certificate of title. An exception to this rule is when there exist
important facts that would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man (and spur him) to go beyond the present title and to investigate
those that preceded it. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser
in good faith, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.” Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA erred in:

1. not finding that the complaint states no cause of action;
2. not finding that the petitioner is a purchaser in good faith and for value;
3. awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
RULING:

The Court DENIED the petition. Questions of law and not of facts are the proper subjects of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule45. In the case at bar, Soquillo raises factual questions which were already resolved in the proceedings below. Further, the factual
findings of the RTC and the CA were in accord with each other and were supported by substantial evidence.

Even if we were to resolve the first issue raised by Soquillo relative to the alleged lack of standing of Tortola as the real party-in-interest,
there is still no ground to dismiss the latter’s complaint. The action filed by Tortola was not for reversion, but for the declaration of nullity
of a free patent and a certificate of title.

The second and third issues raised by Soquillo were exhaustively discussed by the RTC and the CA. Soquillo was not a purchaser in
good faith. He and the heirs of Coloso, Jr. Santiago V. Soquillo versus Jorge P. Tortola (G.R. No. 192450) who were his predecessors-
in-interest knew about the sale made to Tortola and the possession of the disputed property by Villaflores. Besides, Tortola registered
the sale, albeit with much delay, in 2002. As of the time Tortola's complaint was filed, no registration was effected by Soquillo.

SN ABOITIZ VS. MUN. OF ALFONSO LISTA

FACTS:

Mun. of Alfonso Lista filed a declaration of nullity of Special Patent No. 3723 and OCT No. 0-1 against NPC (predecessor of SNAP)
because the same were void for failure to reflect the true location of the subject parcels of land as they were actually in Ifugao whereas
NPC made it appear that they were in Isabela. SC dismissed for failure to state a cause of action since one of the elements of a Declaration
of Nullity of Title Complaint is that the allegations contain assertions of ownership over the land, whereas the Municipality was not claiming
ownership over the property. As consolation, the Court said that the Municipality has a remedy to settle this boundary dispute—Sec 118
of the Local Government Code.

1. Municipality of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao (MUN) filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that the National Power Corporation (NPC)
fraudulently secured Special Patent No. 3723 by making it appear in the survey plans that certain parcels of land were located in Brgy
General Aguinaldo, Ramon, Isabela when these parcels of land were actually located in Brgy Sto. Domingo in Alfonso Lista, Ifugao.

2. MUN’s Allegation: That on the strength of such survey plans, NPC succeeded in having the Special Patent No. 3723 entered in
the registry of books of the Register of Deeds of Santiago City in 2004. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1 was
issued. Later on, NPC alienated such parcels of land in favor of Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM),
a GOCC, which in turn transferred the same to petitioner SN Aboitiz Power Magat, Inc (SNAP).

3. MUN prayed for the declaration of nullity of Special Patent No. 3723 and OCT No. 0-1 because the same were void for failure
to reflect the true location of the subject parcels of land. MUN averred that the Register of Deeds of Isabela, which registered the subject
patent, did not have the authority to do so because it had no jurisdiction over the parcels of land covered by the same. In the alternative,
MUN prayed that the wordings of Special Patent No. 3723 and the subsequent titles derived therefrom be amended to reflect the true
location of the subject parcels of land (Brgy. Sto. Domingo). MUN emphasized that it was asserting its right of. jurisdiction, not ownership,
over the land.

4. Instead of filing an Answer, SNAP, as successor-in-interest of NPC, filed a Motion to Dismiss (MtD) on the grounds of prescription
and failure to state a cause of action. SNAP maintained that it had a valid title to the subject property.

5. RTC denied the MtD. SNAP filed MR (denied).

6. SNAP filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA. CA denied. The issue of the validity of petitioner’s claim of title
over the subject property should be threshed out through the presentation of evidence and resolved after trial on the merits. SNAP filed
MR (denied).

ISSUE/HELD:

Whether or not the dismissal of the case is proper.

RULING:

YES! for not stating a cause of action.

1. Cause of Action (COA) Elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part
of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.
2. What Complaint for Action for Nullification of Title must state for Sufficiency of COA: (1) that the claimant is the owner of the
subject land prior to the issuance of the title to the defendant; and (2) that fraud or mistake was perpetrated in obtaining said title over the
subject land.
3. Sec 118(c), LocGov Code: Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled
amicably. To this end: xxx (c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred
for settlement to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
RATIO

1. [SEE RULES 1-2] Based on the amended complaint, MUN does not claim ownership over the property . The main thrust of
MUN’s claim rests on its allegations that fraud attended the securing of the subject patents and certificates of title and that such fraud
had the effect of depriving it of its territorial jurisdiction. Such deprivation hinges on MUN’s claim that the subject property is actually
situated within its territorial jurisdiction, and not in the Province of Isabela. On the other hand, SNAP strongly denied the allegations of
MUN and underlined the validity of its title over the subject property. As it is, MUN is claiming its territorial jurisdiction over the property
and its corollary right to collect taxes. Without the claim of ownership, there was no supposed right upon which MUN may anchor its claim
and which SNAP may violate. The amended complaint was insufficient for lack of COA.

2. Neither can an action to amend the subject title proceed. [SEE NOTES, provision not THAT important] Relief under said provision
can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in
interest, otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident
properly belongs. The issues are limited to those which are so patently insubstantial as not to be genuine issues. Proceedings under this
provision are summary in nature, contemplating insertions of mistakes which are only clerical, but certainly not controversial issues. Here,
the issues are controversial in nature and cannot be summarily disposed of. As aforementioned, the gist of respondent municipality's
amended complaint revolves around its territorial claim over the subject property. To allow this proceeding to take place and grant the
ultimate relief prayed for by respondent municipality is to allow not only the cancellation or amendment of the subject patent and title, but
also the alteration of territorial jurisdiction over the Province of Isabela, should a ruling be made in favor of respondent municipality.

3. The territorial dispute between Ifugao and Isabela has not yet been resolved though raised in the case of NPC v. Isabela when
NPC sought its exemption from payment of local taxes payable to the Isabela. Moreover, Ifugao impleaded Isabela when it filed the
amended complaint, maintaining its argument that the location of the subject parcels of land are within its territorial jurisdiction. However,
the latter failed to file its Answer. Thus, any relief granted in this action would preempt the proceedings which may later on take place
with respect to the territorial jurisdiction of both provinces.

4. MUN is not without remedy. If at all, any issue as to boundary dispute may be resolved by referring the same to the provinces'
respective Sangguniang Panlalawigan following Section 118 of the Local Government Code. MUN’s territorial claim can neither be
resolved in an action for nullification of title nor in an action to amend title.

GRANTED.

Sec 108, PD 1529 provides that proceeding for erasure, alteration or amendment of a certificate of title may be resorted to in 7 instances:
: (1.) when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (2.)
when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; (3.) when any error, omission or mistake was
made in entering a certificate of any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (4.). when the name of any person on the
certificate has been changed; (5.) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been
terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (6.) when a corporation, which owned registered land and
has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (7.) when there is reasonable ground for the
amendment or alteration of title.

PMO VS. QUESADA

FACTS:

On December 8, 2011, herein [respondents Edgardo V. Quesada, Ma. Gracia Quesada-Manalo, Elizabeth Quesada-Jose, Eugenio V.
Quesada, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact Eugenio v. Quesada (the Quesadas)] filed a Petition to Surrender [Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT)] No. 27090 pursuant to Section 107 of [Presidential Decree (P.D.)] No. 1529. The said petition was raffled to public respondent
Hon. Judge Rosa M. Samson of the [Regional Trial Court] of Quezon City, Branch 105 [(RTC)].

It was alleged in the Petition x x x that [the Quesadas] are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Quezon City under TCT No. 27090.
TCT No. 27090 was originally registered in the name of [the Quesadas'] predecessors-in-interest and it was donated to them sometime
in 1997 (See: Deed of Donation, Rollo, pp. 32-33). The original copy of TCT No. 27090, on file with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
was destroyed when the interior of the Quezon City Hall was gutted by fire in 1998. This prompted [the Quesadas'] predecessors-in-
interest to file a Petition for Reconstitution of Title under Civil Case No. Q-24149 (07).

The said original TCT, which has not been reconstructed, may be reconstituted on the basis of the [owner's] copy thereof. However, the
said owner's copy of the TCT is presently in the possession of x x x [PMO], the government agency that took over the functions of the
Asset Privatization Trust (APT), x x x PMO got hold of the said [owner's] copy of the TCT because it was delivered in 1983 to Golden
Country Farms, a defunct private corporation, to secure the performance by [the Quesadas'] predecessors-in-interest5 of their obligation
in a contract designated as Growership Agreement which [the Quesadas'] predecessors-in-interest had entered into with Golden Country
Farms. Golden Country Farms, however, was later considered a crony corporation and was sequestered by the APT.

[The Quesadas] also alleged that whatever obligation their predecessors-in-interest may have under the Growership Agreement, the
same had already been extinguished by prescription. Furthermore, under Civil Case No. 8438, the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 113 issued
a Decision dated August 23, 1999 x x x declaring that [the Quesadas'] predecessors-in-interest had no more liability to the corporation or
that whatever liability there may be cannot anymore be enforced.
[The Quesadas] alleged that as far as they know, the said TCT No. 27090 has not been delivered to any person or entity to sec ure the
payment or performance of any obligation whatsoever, nor any transaction or document relating to the same presented for or pending
registration in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Thus, in order that [the Quesadas] may transfer the ownership of the
property from their predecessors-in-interest to their name[s], they would need the duplicate certificate of title which is in the possession
of x x x PMO. Several demands were made to x x x PMO to surrender the said title but the same were not favorably acted upon by the
said office. [The Quesadas] were constrained to file the instant petition to surrender the withheld duplicate certificates pursuant to Section
107 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.

x x x PMO, through the Office of the Solicitor General [OSG], filed a Motion to Dismiss x x x on the following grounds: (i) the petition failed
to state a cause of action; (ii) the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the petition because it involves an adverse claim to the land or controversial
issue which should be properly threshed out in an ordinary case, and (iii) any action against the [APT] (now x x x PMO) is barred by res
judicata. [The Quesadas], in their [C]omment/Opposition, moved for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss and reiterated that there is no
annotation of the alleged right of x x x PMO on the subject title that would give it a right to hold the same. Neither did x x x PMO file an
Opposition to the Petition for Reconstitution filed by [the Quesadas] which was already decided with finality in their favor.

On July 3, 2013, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 105 issued an Order, [the] pertinent portion[s] of which are as follows:
"In this case, taking into account the allegations of the Oppositor in its Motion to Dismiss which raise serious objection to the claim of the
petitioners [the Quesadas], the issue becomes contentious, hence, there is a need for a full-blown trial whereby both parties are afforded
the opportunity to present their evidence proving their respective claims.

WHEREFORE, without necessarily giving due course to the petition and in order to avoid multiplicity of suit[s], the Motion to Dismiss filed
by the Oppositor is DENIED it being possible to convert this case into an ordinary civil action.

xxx xxx xxx." x x x

x x x PMO filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the Order dated July 3, 2013 and Motion to Suspend Pre-Trial x x x. [PMO], among
others, raised the question of whether or not the RTC sitting as land registration court should act on the instant petition taking into account
its opposition that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as the issue mainly involves one that affects ownership of the
property covered by TCT No. 27090.

On December 23, 2013, the RTC issued the x x x Order as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, finding merit to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the oppositor, the same is GRANTED.
The Order dated [July 3, 2013] is hereby reconsidered and set aside.

Accordingly, the instant petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction." x x x
[The Quesadas], for their part, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated December 23, 2013 x x x. x x x PMO move[d] for the
denial of the said Motion for Reconsideration x x x. However, in another x x x Order dated April 8, 2014, the RTC denied [the Quesadas']
Motion for Reconsideration ruling that the RTC indeed has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as the issue involved therein
must be threshed out in an ordinary proceeding.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing Orders, [the Quesadas] filed [a] Petition for Certiorari [with the CA], arguing[, among others, that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case contrary to its Order dated
July 3, 2013.

The CA granted the petition of the Quesadas in its Decision dated June 29, 2015, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated December 23, 2013 and April 8, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105, in LRC Case No. 32715 (11) are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss
filed by x x x PMO is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

The CA justified the jurisdiction of the RTC, as a land registration court, over the present petition to surrender title pursuant to Section
107 of P.D. No. 1529 despite the contentious issues raised by the parties in this wise:

[Section 2] has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court (Concepcion v. Concepcion, 448 SCRA 31, 38 [2005]). Under
the former law (Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act), all summary reliefs such as the instant action to compel surrender of owner's
duplicate of Title could only be filed with the RTC sitting as a land registration court only if there was unanimity among the parties or there
was no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest. Otherwise, if the case became contentious and controversial,
it should be threshed out in an ordinary action or in the case where the incident properly belonged. Under the amended law, the court is
now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-controversial cases but even the contentious and substantial issues (Averia, Jr. v.
Caguioa, 146 SCRA 459, 462 [1986]).

PMO filed a motion for reconsideration, raising as issues the propriety of a petition for certiorari as a remedy to question the denial of a
motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal and the failure of the Quesadas to state a cause of action.

The CA denied PMO's motion for reconsideration in its Resolution10 dated May 2, 2016. The CA pointed out that it was justified in giving
due course to the petition and treating the same as an ordinary appeal because it was filed within the prescribed 15-day period.11 It also
invoked the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and substantial justice to justify the granting of the petition for certiorari despite
acknowledging that a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction is a final decision.12 As to the issue on the alleged failure
of the original petition to state a cause of action, the CA stated that this issue was impliedly ruled upon when the CA proceeded to resolve
the petition.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Quesadas filed a Comment to the Petition14 dated
December 19, 2016.

Issues

Whether the CA erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari when it is not the proper remedy to seek a review from an order of
dismissal.

Whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC can take cognizance of the petition to surrender the duplicate copy of TCT No. 27090
pursuant to Section 10715 of P.D. No. 1529.16

The Court's Ruling

The petition is not impressed with merit. It is accordingly denied.

On the first issue, PMO insists that the RTC's Order denying the motion for the reconsideration of the Order dismissing the original petition
was a final order and the remedy available to the Quesadas would have been to appeal the questioned Order and not to resort to petition
for certiorari.17

The Quesadas contend that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed
the case, giving them the right to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.18

While the Court concedes, as did the CA, that the RTC's Order dismissing the original petition of the Quesadas on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction is a final order that is normally subject of an appeal, nevertheless the Court finds that the CA did not commit reversible error
when it gave due course to the petition for certiorari and treated the same as an ordinary appeal.19

The Court in China Banking Corp. v. Cebu Printing and Packaging Corp.20 cited the several instances when the Court has treated a
petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari and allowed the resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari despite the
availability of an appeal, viz.:
It is true that in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court has,
before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the
reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is
sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.
This Court was also liberal in its treatment of a wrong mode of appeal in Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA, wherein it was ruled that:
x x x However, there are cases where the [certiorari] writ may still issue even if the aggrieved party has a remedy of appeal in the ordinary
course of law. Thus, where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may not prove adequate either in
point of promptness or completeness so that a partial or total failure of justice may result, a [certiorari] writ may issue.
The same was also applied in Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. LEYECO IV Employees Union-ALU, thus:
In addition, while the settled rule is that an independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal, there are a
few significant exceptions when the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, namely:
(a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the
writs issued are null; and (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.21 (Citations omitted)
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court agrees with the CA that there is sufficient justification that would merit a deviation from the
strict rule of procedure that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is
available, as it was in this case.22 The petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file an appeal and
the broader interests of justice justifies the relaxation of the rules.23

On the second issue, PMO insists that the original petition failed to state a cause of action because the allegations therein do not fall
under the two circumstances contemplated in Section 107 of P.D. No. 1529,24 and that the summary proceedings under the said Section
do not empower the RTC to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.25

The Quesadas take the position that the CA was correct in declaring that the instant case could be converted into an ordinary action to
avoid multiplicity of suits.26

Section 107 of P.D. No. 1529 provides:

SEC. 107. Surrender of withhold duplicate certificates. — Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any
involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be
registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may
file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner
or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon
such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if not27 any reason the
outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of
a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of
the outstanding duplicate.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the RTC as a land registration court is provided in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529, viz.:
SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. — Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the
Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance [now, Regional Trial Courts] shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title
to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration
Commission [now, Land Registration Authority] with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in
applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As correctly observed by PMO, Section 107 contemplates ONLY two situations when a petition for surrender of withheld duplicate
certificate of title may be availed of. These are: (1) where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary
instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his consent, and (2) where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered
by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title.

Clearly, the original petition before the RTC does not allege an involuntary instrument which intends to divest the title of the registered
owner against his consent. TCT No. 27090 is registered in the name of the Quesadas' predecessors-in-interest and the Quesadas are
not divesting the title of their predecessors-in-interest against the latter's will.

Rather, the Quesadas require the surrender of the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 27090 in the possession of PMO based on an alleged
deed of donation in their favor, viz.:

It was alleged in the Petition x x x that [the Quesadas] are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Quezon City under TCT No. 27090.
TCT No. 27090 was originally registered in the name of [the Quesadas'] predecessors-in-interest and it was donated to them sometime
in 1997 (See: Deed of Donation, Rollo, pp. 32-33). x x x.

xxxx

x x x Thus, in order that [the Quesadas] may transfer the ownership of the property from their predecessors-in-interest to their name[s],
they would need the duplicate certificate of title which is in the possession of x x x PMO.28 (Emphasis supplied)
Inasmuch as the original petition before the RTC seeks the surrender of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 27090 in the possession
of PMO so that a voluntary instrument — a Deed of Donation — can be registered but the registration cannot be made by reason of the
refusal of PMO, the holder, to surrender the same, a cause of action under Section 107 of P.D. No. 1529 has been sufficiently alleged in
the original petition. Thus, a dismissal of the said petition on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action is not warranted.
Consequently, the RTC, as a land registration court, has jurisdiction over the original petition.

With respect to the power of the RTC to hear and decide contentious and substantial issues, such as, whether the obligation of the
Quesadas' predecessors-in-interest under the Growership Agreement had already been extinguished by prescription and whether the
Decision dated August 23, 1999 of the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 113 in Civil Case No. 8438, declaring that the Quesadas' predecessors-
in-interest had no more liability to Golden Country Farms (now PMO) or that whatever liability there might be against them could no longer
be enforced,29 or those that affect the ownership of the property covered by TCT No. 27090,30 Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529 confers a
broad jurisdiction upon the RTC "with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such [petition]."

As pointed by the Court in Lozada v. Bracewell31 it is settled that:

x x x with the passage of PD 1529, the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction conferred
upon it as a cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs now have the power to hear and determine all questions, even contentious and
substantial ones, arising from applications for original registration of titles to lands and petitions filed after such registration. x x x [T]he
matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only
a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction x x x.32 (Emphasis in the original omitted; emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)
As explained by the Court in Ignacio v. CA,33
x x x This amendment was aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits and at expediting the disposition of cases. Regional Trial Courts now
have the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after the original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions. Indeed, the land registration court can
now hear and decide controversial and contentious cases and those involving substantial issues x x x.

In the instant case, the trial court, although sitting as a land registration court, took cognizance of the petition as an ordinary civil action
under its general jurisdiction. The court did not decide the case summarily, but afforded both petitioner and private respondents the
opportunity to present their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. Ordinary pleadings and memoranda were likewise filed.
The decision of the trial court squarely addressed all the issues raised by the parties and applied substantive law and jurisprudence.34
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The CA, thus, correctly ruled, to wit:
x x x Since P.D. No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the [RJegional [T]rial [C]ourt and the limited
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law [Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act] when acting merely as a cadastral court, then
public respondent RTC has overstepped its boundaries when it dismissed the instant petition for lack of jurisdiction. To echo the Supreme
Court:
"x x x doctrinal jurisprudence holds that the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), as a Land Registration Court, can hear
cases otherwise litigable only in ordinary civil actions, since the Court[s] of First Instance are at the same time, courts of general jurisdiction
and could entertain and dispose of the validity or invalidity of respondent's adverse claim, with a view to determining wheth er petitioner
is entitled or not to the relief that he seeks" (Concepcion v. Concepcion, 448 SCRA 31, 38 [2005]; cited case omitted).
Considering the serious objection raised by x x x PMO on [the Quesadas'] claim, the issue becomes contentious and the RTC albeit
sitting as a land registration court, has the authority not only to take cognizance of the said petition, but also to thresh out the issue in a
full-blown hearing, to receive evidence of both parties and to determine whether or not [the Quesadas] are indeed entitled to the relief
prayed for.35
Verily, after the parties have been duly heard in a full-blown hearing, the RTC, being a court of general jurisdiction, can squarely address
all the issues to be raised by the parties and resolve their conflicting claims, applying substantive law and jurisprudence. Indeed, this
matter is procedural and not jurisdictional.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

CABAÑEZ VS. SOLANO

FACTS:

Subject of the present controversy are two (2) parcels of land located in Alabang Hills, Muntinlupa, with land areas measuring 739 and
421 square meters, and are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 154626 and 154627, respectively. Appearing on the face of
these titles as the registered owner is herein respondent, "Maria Josephine S. Cabañez, of legal age, married to [herein petitioner]
Benjamin H. Cabañez x x x."

On February 12, 2007, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City a "Petition for Correction of the Name and
Marital Status of the Registered Owner of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No[s.] 154626 and 154627 of the Registry of Deeds for
Muntinlupa City."[3] The petition was docketed as LRC Case No. 07-007 and raffled to Branch 203. In the said petition, respondent
alleged as follows:
xxxx

1. Petitioner is of legal age, single and a resident of #21 Dona Ines St., Alabang Hills Village, Muntinlupa City;

2. Petitioner is the owner of two parcels of land situated in Alabang, Muntinlupa City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 154626
and 154627 issued by the Registry of Deed for Muntinlupa, though the same were issued under the name Ma Josephine S. Cabañez,
married to Benjamin H. Cabañez. x x x

3. Without knowing the legal implication, Petitioner erroneously made it appear that she is married to Mr. Benjamin when in truth and in
fact they are not married but merely living a common-law relationship

4. Mr. Benjamin H. Cabañez is actually married to a certain Leandra D. Cabañez who had previously filed a case against Petitioner,
questioning the ownership of the said properties which case however was terminated by virtue of a compromise approved by the court in
an Order dated November 23, 2000. xxx

5. Mr. Benjamin H. Cabañez has also declared that he is not actually married to the Petitioner and that he has no interest or share
whatsoever in the aforesaid properties as evidenced by the hereto attached copy of the Affidavit of Declaration Against Interest dated
January 22, 2007. x x x

6. No interests or rights will be affected by the correction of the name and status of Petitioner as registered owner of the said properties.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that Petitioner's name and marital status appearing in Transfer Certificates
of Title No. 154626 and 154627 be corrected to (sic) from "MA. JOSEPHINE S. CABAÑEZ, married to BENJAMIN H. CABAÑEZ" to
["]MARIE JOSEPHINE C. SOLANO, single" as it is the true and actual status of petitioner.

x x x x[4]
The RTC then conducted hearings where respondent presented her evidence ex parte.

On June 28, 2007, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 203, rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be well-founded and meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City is directed to cause the correction of the name and civil status of the registered
owner of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 154626 and 154627 from MA. JOSEPHINE S. CABAÑEZ, married to BENJAMIN H. CABAÑEZ,
to MARIE JOSEPHINE C. SOLANO, single.

SO ORDERED.[5]
The RTC held that from the evidence presented by herein respondent, it has been satisfactorily established that the subject properties
should indeed be in respondent's name and that her status should be "single".

On November 23, 2007, herein petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment[6] assailing the above Decision of the
RTC on the ground that the said trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because respondent's petition
was not published in a newspaper of general circulation and that petitioner and other persons who may have interest in the su bject
properties were not served summons.

On January 27, 2011, the CA rendered a Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 June 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, in LRC Case No. 07-007, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA ruled, among others, that respondent's petition for correction of her name and marital status as appearing in the subject TCTs
should have been published in accordance with Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and that respondent failed to present sufficient evidence
to prove compliance with such requirement. The appellate court also held that respondent also failed to serve summons upon petitioner,
which is in violation of the latter's right to due process and of the principle of fair play.

Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration[8] contending, among others, that the provisions of PD 1529, and not Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, should be applied in the present case; posting of the notice of hearing of respondent's petition is deemed constructive
notice to the whole world, including petitioner; the petition filed by respondent is an action in rem where jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

After petitioner filed its Comment,[9] the CA rendered its presently assailed Amended Decision and disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 June 2007 of the Regional Trial Court or
Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, in LRC Case No. 07-007, is REINSTATED. Perforce, the Petition for Annulment of Judgment is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[10]
This time, the CA agreed with respondent and ruled that PD 1529 is the governing law and that there is nothing under the pertinent
provisions of the said law which states that publication is a requirement for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over respondent's petition. The
CA also ruled that petitioner failed to prove the existence of extrinsic fraud as a ground for annulment of the assailed judgment of the
RTC.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[11]

However, in its Resolution of January 10, 2012, the CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari based on the following grounds:
A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN AMENDING ITS ORIGINAL DECISION DATED
JANUARY 27, 2011 CONSIDERING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLICATION AND SUMMONS WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDING PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 108 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529 IS
SUMMARY IN NATURE ALBEIT THE EVIDENT PRESENCE. OF OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES THAT MAY BE AFFECTED BY THE
JUDGMENT AS A RESULT OF EX-PARTE PROCEEDINGS.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF CHAN V. COURT OF APPEALS (298
SCRA 713, 733) APPLIES IN THE INSTANT CASE WHERE IT WAS RULED THAT MERE NOTICE TO THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
WAS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE.

D.

WHETHER OR NOT AMENDMENT AND ALTERATION OF CERTIFICATES OF TITLE PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 108 OF PD
1529 IS AN IN REM PROCEEDINGS THAT REQUIRES STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT.

E.

WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT SUPPLETORILY APPLY TO THE PROCEEDINGS
PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 108 OF PD 1529 WHEREIN THE REQUIREMENT OF PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY.

F.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PHRASE "THE COURT MAY HEAR AND DETERMINE THE PETITION AFTER NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES
IN INTEREST" IN SECTION 108 OF PD 1529 INCLUDES PUBLICATION AND SERVICE OF SUMMONS.

G.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PETITION IN THE
ABSENCE OF SUMMONS AND PUBLICATION.
H.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF NAME AND MARITAL
STATUS IN THE TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 154627 AND 154628.

I.

WHETHER OR NOT LEANDRA D. CABAÑEZ IS ENTITLED TO NOTICE AND SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY VIRTUE OF THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATIY CITY-BRANCH 137 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND
LEGALLY BELONGED TO THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTY.

J.

WHETHER OR NOT AN AFFIDAVIT THE CONTENTS OF WHICH WAS NOT TESTIFIED TO HAS PROBATIVE VALUE.

K.

WHETHER OR NOT THE SECURITY OR BOND MENTIONED IN SECTION 108 OF PD 1529 BEFORE ENTRY OF CORRECTION OR
ALTERATION MAY BE MADE IS MANDATORY TO PROTECT THE INTEREST OF THIRD PERSON.

L.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS [IS] PROCEDURALLY CORRECT IN ADMITTING THE
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF THE RESPONDENT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PETITION WAS ALREADY LONG
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION.[12]
The Court finds merit in the petition, but for reasons which are not identical as those espoused by petitioner.

At the outset, it bears to reiterate that the CA ruled on the basis of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529), otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree. Specifically, the CA cited Sections 2 and 108 of the said law, which provide as follows:
Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the
Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission
with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration,
with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Section 108. Amendment, and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book
after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same be Register of Deeds, except by order
of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner of other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the
Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that
the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated
and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made
in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the same or any person on the certificate
has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no
right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved
has not convened the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and
determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or
cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if
necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen
the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest
of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the
owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section. (emphasis supplied)

All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any other provision of this Decree after original registration shall be filed
and entitled in the original case in which the decree or registration was entered.
The Court notes that the petition was clearly one which was filed after original registration oi title, as provided under the abovequoted
Section 2 of PD 1529. Moreover, respondent's petition was filed with the RTC for the purpose of correcting supposed errors which were
committed when entries were made in the subject TCTs, as contemplated under Section 108 of the same law.

However, under settled jurisprudence, the enumerated instances for amendment or alteration of a certificate of title under Section 108 of
PD 1529 are non-controversial in nature.[13] They are limited to issues so patently insubstantial as not to be genuine issues. The
proceedings thereunder are summary in nature, contemplating insertions of mistakes which are only clerical, but certainly not controversial
issues.

As early as the case of Tangunan v. Republic of the Philippines[14], which was later cited in Angeles v. Razon, et al.[15], this Court,
sitting en banc, ruled that:
x x x the lower court did not err in finding that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present petition for the simple reason that it involves a
controversial issue which takes this case out of the scope of Section 112 of Act No. 496 [now Section 108 of PD 1529]. While this section,
among other things, authorized a person in interest to ask the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title "upon
the ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased",
and apparently the petition comes under its scope, such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no
adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed
out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs. Thus, it was held that "It is not proper to cancel an original
certificate of Torrens title issued exclusively in the name of a deceased person, and to issue a new certificate in the name of his heirs,
under the provisions of Section 112 of Act No. 496, when the surviving spouse claims right of ownership over the land covered by said
certificate." And, in another case, where there was a serious controversy between the parties as to the right of ownership over the
properties involved, this court held, "that following the principle laid down in the decision above cited, the issues herein should be ventilated
in a regular action x x x."[16] (citations omitted)
In the present case, the Court notes that in a separate action for annulment of title and recovery of ownership filed by petitioner's wife
against respondent, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 137, in its decision in Civil Case No. 91-2648, dated July 5, 1993, made a categorical
finding that petitioner and his wife are the lawful owners of the subject properties and ordering respondent to surrender possession thereof
to the said spouses.[17] This RTC judgment was later affirmed by the CA in its Decision[18] in CA-G.R. CV No. 49446, dated April 29,
1997. Respondent, on the other hand, claims that she together with petitioner and his wife subsequently executed an amicable settlement
dated June 22, 2000, which was approved by the RTC, wherein petitioner's wife waived her rights and interests over the said properties.
She also alleged that petitioner executed an Affidavit of Declaration Against Interest, dated January 22, 2007, indicating that he has no
right or interest over the subject properties. Petitioner, nonetheless, claims that he executed a subsequent Affidavit of Non-Waiver of
Interest, dated January 14, 2008, claiming that he was deceived by respondent into signing the said Affidavit of Declaration Against
Interest and that he was seriously ill at the time that he affixed his signature.

From the foregoing, there is no question that there is a serious objection and an adverse claim on the part of an interested party as shown
by petitioner's subsequent execution of his Affidavit of Non-Waiver of Interest. The absence of unanimity among the parties is also
evidenced by petitioner's petition seeking the annulment of the RTC Decision which granted respondent's petition for correction of entries
in the subject TCTs. These objections and claims necessarily entail litigious and controversial matters making it imperative to conduct an
exhaustive examination of the factual and legal bases of the parties' respective positions. Certainly, such objective cannot be
accomplished by the court through the abbreviated action under Section 108 of PD 1529. A complete determination of the issues in the
present case can only be achieved if petitioner and his wife are impleaded in an adversarial proceeding.

In addition, the Court finds apropos to the instant case the ruling in the similar case of Martinez v. Evangelista[19] where the petitioner in
the said case, being the registered owner of certain real properties, sought to strike out the words "married to x x x" appearing in the
Transfer Certificates of Title covering the said properties on the ground that the same was so entered by reason of clerical error or
oversight and in lieu thereof the word "single" be substituted, which according to the petitioner in the said case is his true and correct civil
status. This Court held that:
x x x x changes in the citizenship of a person or in his status from legitimate to illegitimate or from married lo not married are substantial
as well as controversial, which can only be established in an appropriate adversary proceeding as a remedy for the adjudication of real
and justifiable controversies involving actual conflict of rights the final determination of which depends upon the resolution of issues of
nationality, paternity, filiation or legitimacy of the marital status for which existing substantive and procedural laws as well as other rules
of court amply provide.[20]
In the present case, it is now apparent that before the trial court can alter the description of the civil status of respondent in the transfer
certificates of title in question, it will have to receive evidence of and determine respondent's civil status. This requires a full dress trial
rendering the summary proceedings envisaged in Section 108 of PD 1529 inadequate.

Finally, it is settled that a land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be
constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.[21] However, as found by the CA, respondent failed to comply
with the said requirements. In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute, and when the manner of
obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void.[22] It is wrong for the CA to
rule in its Amended Decision that publication is not a jurisdictional requirement for the RTC to take cognizance of respondent's petition.
The appellate court's reliance on the case of Chan v. Court of Appeals[23] is misplaced. In the said case, this Court considered the notice
to the Register of Deeds as substantial compliance with the notice and publication requirements of the law simply because in the petition
for correction filed by the petitioner therein, only the said petitioner and the Register of Deeds had an interest in the correction of titles
sought for. This Court ruled that there is therefore no necessity to notify other parties who had no interest to protect in the said petition.
This is not true, however, in the present case. As discussed above, on the bases of petitioner's serious objection and adverse claim, it is
apparent that he has an interest to protect. Thus, the ruling in Chan finds no application in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.