LEONORA B. RIMANDO VS.
SPOUSES ALDABA and PEOPLE Moreover, while the filing of the two sets of Information under the
October 13, 2014, 738 SCRA 232
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: Rimando allegedly enticed Sps. Aldaba to invest in her business
under the assurance that it is stable and that their money would earn 8%
monthly interest. Convinced by Rimando’s proposal and taking into
consideration their long friendship, Sps. Aldaba gave Rimando a check in
the amount of P500,000 as investment in her business and invested the
same to Mulitel (as evidenced by a signed Investment Contract). In turn,
Rimando gave Sps. Aldaba three (3) postdated checks (amounting to
P540,000); but upon maturity of the checks, they were dishonored due to
insufficient funds. This prompted Sps. Aldaba to file a criminal complaint
for estafa and BP 22 against her. The RTC acquitted Rimando of the
crime of estafa, but found her civilly liable to Sps. Aldaba in the amount of
P500,000. Meanwhile, in the BP 22 case, she was acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt, with a declaration that the act or omission
from which liability may arise does not exist.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Rimando’s civil liability in
the estafa case despite her acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in
the BP 22 cases
HELD: YES. At the outset, the Court notes that Rimando’s acquittal in
the estafa case does not necessarily absolve her from any civil liability to
private complainants, Sps. Aldaba. It is well-settled that "the acquittal of
the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on
the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only
civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
In this case, Rimando’s civil liability did not arise from any purported act
constituting the crime of estafa as the RTC clearly found that Rimando
never employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce them to invest
money in Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being
an accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba
on behalf of Multitel. In lending her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted
as a surety to the latter, and assuch, she may be held directly liable for
the value of the issued check.
provisions of BP No. 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by
the petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense,
because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses
and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an
offense is one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no
double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits
refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated,
prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is
prosecution for the same offense. Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an
estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of facts, they
nevertheless present different causes of action. Both cases can proceed
to their final adjudication – both as to their criminal and civil aspects –
subject to the prohibition on double recovery.
JUDITH YU vs. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD and the PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 170979 February 9, 2011 fresh period
rule, appeal
OCTOBER 6, 2017
FACTS:
An Information for Estafa against the petitioner was filed with the
RTC. The RTC convicted the petitioner as charged.
Fourteen (14) days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with
the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that
would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted.
Respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion for new trial for lack
of merit.
The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that
pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a “fresh
period” of 15 days from the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial
within which to file a notice of appeal.
The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10
days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal
cases.
ISSUE:
Whether the “fresh period rule” enunciated in Neypes applies to
appeals in criminal cases.
RULING:
The “fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the period
for appeal in criminal cases.
The raison d’être for the “fresh period rule” is to standardize the
appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to
when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day
period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern
themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to
appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final
order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s
pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the
period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably
filed her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the date of
receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.
G.R. No. 189669. February 16, 2015.*
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION and PETRON
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL GASES
CORPORATION, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Search Warrants; Since Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of persons to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and search warrants constitute a limitation on
this right, then Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
should be construed strictly against state authorities who would be enforcing the
search warrants.—Under paragraph (b) thereof, the application for search warrant
in this case should have stated compelling reasons why the same was being filed
with the RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the latter
court that has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was
committed and also the place where the search warrant was enforced. The wordings
of the provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring a statement of compelling
reasons if the application is filed in a court which does not have territorial
jurisdiction over the place of commission of the crime. Since Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of persons to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and search warrants constitute a limitation on this right,
then Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
construed strictly against state authorities who would be enforcing the search
warrants. On this point, then, petitioner’s application for a search warrant was
indeed insufficient for failing to comply with the requirement to state therein the
compelling reasons why they had to file the application in a court that did not have
territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Search Warrants; The Supreme Court
(SC) distinctly stated in Abuan v. People, 505 SCRA 799 (2006), that “the motion to
quash the search warrant which the accused may file shall be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or
known dur-
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* THIRD DIVISION.
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548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation
ing the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing
of the motion to suppress.”—The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule
15, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9, demands that all available objections be
included in a party’s motion, otherwise, said objections shall be deemed
waived; and, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if not
pleaded in said motion are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations. It should be
stressed here that the Court has ruled in a number of cases that the omnibus
motion rule is applicable to motions to quash search warrants. Furthermore, the
Court distinctly stated in Abuan v. People, 505 SCRA 799 (2006), that “the motion
to quash the search warrant which the accused may file shall be governed
by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; The trial court could only take cognizance of an issue that
was not raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or existent
when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or (2) the issue was one
involving jurisdiction over the subject matter.—In accordance with the omnibus
motion rule, therefore, the trial court could only take cognizance of an issue that
was not raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or existent
when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or (2) the issue was one
involving jurisdiction over the subject matter. Obviously, the issue of the defect in
the application was available and existent at the time of filing of the motion to
quash. What remains to be answered then is, if the newly raised issue of the defect
in the application is an issue of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Courts; The power to issue a special criminal process is inherent
in all courts.—As elucidated by the Court, proceedings for said applications are not
criminal in nature and, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply
thereto. Evidently, the issue of whether the application should have been filed in
RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one involving jurisdiction because, as stated
in the aforequoted case, the power to issue a special criminal process is
inherent in all courts.
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Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Poblador, Bautista & Reyes for petitioners.
Carpio & General for respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 13,
2009, and the Resolution2 dated September 14, 2009, denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration thereof, be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts are:
Petitioners received information that respondent was selling, offering for sale,
or distributing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by illegally refilling the steel
cylinders manufactured by and bearing the duly registered trademark and device
of respondent Petron. Petron then obtained the services of a paralegal investigation
team who sent their people to investigate. The investigators went to respondent’s
premises located in San Juan, Baao, Camarines Sur, bringing along four empty
cylinders of Shellane, Gasul, Total and Superkalan and asked that the same be
refilled. Respondent’s employees then refilled said empty cylinders at respondent’s
refilling station. The refilled cylinders were brought to the Marketing Coordinator
of Petron Gasul who verified that respondent was not authorized to distribute
and/or sell, or otherwise deal with Petron LPG products, and/or use or imitate any
Petron
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, with Associate Justices
Rebecca De Guia Salvador and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 54-65.
2 Id., at pp. 67-70.
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550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation
trademarks. Petitioners then requested the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to investigate said activities of respondent for the purpose of apprehending
and prosecuting establishments conducting illegal refilling, distribution and/or sale
of LPG products using the same containers of Petron and Shell, which acts
constitute a violation of Section 168,3 in
_______________
3 Sec. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies.—168.1.
A person who has identified in the mind of the public the goods he manufactures or
deals in, his business or services from those of others, whether or not a registered
mark is employed, has a property right in the goodwill of the said goods, business
or services so identified, which will be protected in the same manner as other
property rights.
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary
to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which
he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having established such
goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be
guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection
against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair
competition:
(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general
appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods
themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the
devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would
be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a
manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who
otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and
defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or
any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means
calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the services of
another who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or
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Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation
relation to Section 1704 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, otherwise known as
the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, and/or Section 25 of R.A. No. 623,
otherwise known as An Act To Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles,
Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers.
The NBI proceeded with their investigation and reportedly found commercial
quantities of Petron Gasul and Shellane cylinders stockpiled at respondent’s
warehouse. They also witnessed trucks coming from respondent’s refilling facility
loaded with Gasul, Shellane and Marsflame cylinders, which then deposit said
cylinders in different places, one of them a store called “Edrich Enterprises” located
at 272 National
_______________
(c) any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or
who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to
discredit the goods, business or services of another.
168.4. The remedies provided by Sections 156, 157 and 161 shall
apply mutatis mutandis. (Sec. 29, R.A. No. 166a)
4 Sec. 170. Penalties.—Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions
imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5)
years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) to Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000), shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of
committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155, Section 168 and Subsection
169.1. (Arts. 188 and 189, Revised Penal Code)
5 SECTION 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written
consent of the manufacturer, bottler or seller who has successfully registered the
marks of ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section,
to fill such bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, or other similar containers so marked or
stamped, for the purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of, buy, or traffic in, or wantonly
destroy the same, whether filled or not, or to use the same for drinking vessels or
glasses or for any other purpose than that registered by the manufacturer, bottler
or seller. Any violation of this section shall be punished by a fine or not more than
one hundred pesos or imprisonment of not more than thirty days or both.
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation
Highway, San Nicolas, Iriga City. The investigators then bought Shellane and
Gasul cylinders from Edrich Enterprises, for which they were issued an official
receipt.
 Thus, the NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City (RTC-Naga), two separate Applications for Search
Warrant for Violation of Section 155.1,6 in relation to Section 1707 of R.A. No. 8293
against respondent and/or its occupants. On October 23, 2002, the RTC-Naga City
issued an Order granting said Applications and Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and
2002-28 were issued. On the same day, the NBI served the warrants at the
respondent’s premises in an orderly and peaceful manner, and articles or items
described in the warrants were seized.
On November 4, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant Nos.
2002-27 and 2002-28, where the only grounds cited were: (a) there was no probable
cause; (b) there had been a lapse of four weeks from the date of the test-buy to the
date of the search and seizure operations; (c) most of the cylinders seized were not
owned by respondent but by a third person; and (d) Edrich Enterprises is an
authorized outlet of Gasul and Marsflame. In an Order dated February 21, 2003,
the RTC-Naga denied the Motion to Quash.
However, on March 27, 2003, respondent’s new counsel filed an Appearance
with Motion for Reconsideration. It was only in said motion where respondent
raised for the first time, the issue of the impropriety of filing the Application for
_______________
6 Sec. 155. Remedies; Infringement.—Any person who shall, without the
consent of the owner of the registered mark:
155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colourable
imitation of a registered mark or the same container or a dominant feature thereof
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods
or services including other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
7 Supra note 4.
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Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation
Search Warrant at the RTC-Naga City when the alleged crime was
committed in a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga
City. Respondent pointed out that the application filed with the RTC-Naga
failed to state any compelling reason to justify the filing of the same in a court
which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of the commission of the
crime, as required by Section 2(b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Petitioner opposed the Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that it was
already too late for respondent to raise the issue regarding the venue of the filing
of the application for search warrant, as this would be in violation of the Omnibus
Motion Rule.
In an Order dated July 28, 2003, the RTC-Naga issued an Order granting
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, thereby quashing Search Warrant Nos.
2002-27 and 2002-28.
Petitioner then appealed to the CA, but the appellate court, in its Decision
dated March 13, 2009, affirmed the RTC Order quashing the search warrants.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per
Resolution dated September 14, 2009.
Elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari,
petitioner presents herein the following issues:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT VENUE
IN AN APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT IS JURISDICTIONAL. THIS IS
BECAUSE A SEARCH WARRANT CASE IS NOT A CRIMINAL CASE.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO QUASH IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE OMNIBUS
MOTION RULE AND THAT THE ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation
MAY NOT BE WAIVED AND MAY EVEN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL.8
Petitioner’s arguments deserve closer examination.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides thus:
SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed.—An
application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within
the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only
be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. (Emphasis supplied)
The above provision is clear enough. Under paragraph (b) thereof, the
application for search warrant in this case should have stated compelling reasons
why the same was being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City,
considering that it is the latter court that has territorial jurisdiction over the place
where the alleged crime was committed and also the place where the search
warrant was enforced. The wordings of the provision is of a mandatory nature,
requiring a statement of compelling reasons if the application is filed in a court
which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of commission of the
crime. Since Section 2, Article III of the
_______________
8 Rollo, p. 21.
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Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation
1987 Constitution guarantees the right of persons to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and search warrants constitute a limitation on this right,
then Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
construed strictly against state authorities who would be enforcing the search
warrants. On this point, then, petitioner’s application for a search warrant was
indeed insufficient for failing to comply with the requirement to state therein the
compelling reasons why they had to file the application in a court that did not have
territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed.
Notwithstanding said failure to state the compelling reasons in the application,
the more pressing question that would determine the outcome of the case is, did
the RTC-Naga act properly in taking into consideration the issue of said defect in
resolving respondent’s motion for reconsideration where the issue was raised for
the very first time? The record bears out that, indeed, respondent failed to include
said issue at the first instance in its motion to quash. Does the omnibus motion rule
cover a motion to quash search warrants?
The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section
1, Rule 9, demands that all available objections be included in a party’s motion,
otherwise, said objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the
court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence of another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by
statute of limitations.9 It should be stressed here that the Court has ruled in a
number of cases that the omnibus motion rule is applicable to motions to quash
search warrants.10 Fur-
_______________
9 Anunciacion v. Bocanegra, 611 Phil. 705, 716-717; 594 SCRA 318, 329
(2009).
10 Abuan v. People, 536 Phil. 672, 692; 505 SCRA 799, 812 (2006); Garaygay v.
People, 390 Phil. 586, 594; 335 SCRA 272, 280
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556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation
thermore, the Court distinctly stated in Abuan v. People,11 that “the motion
to quash the search warrant which the accused may file shall be governed
by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress x x x.”12
In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial court could
only take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in the motion to quash if, (1)
said issue was not available or existent when they filed the motion to quash the
search warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Obviously, the issue of the defect in the application was available and
existent at the time of filing of the motion to quash. What remains to be answered
then is, if the newly raised issue of the defect in the application is an issue of
jurisdiction.
In resolving whether the issue raised for the first time in respondent’s motion
for reconsideration was an issue of jurisdiction, the CA ratiocinated, thus:
It is jurisprudentially settled that the concept of venue of actions in criminal
cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element
of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts
in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by
the accused. Thus,
_______________
(2000); People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126379, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA
400.
11 Id.
12 Id. (Emphasis ours)
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Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation
it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory.13
Unfortunately, the foregoing reasoning of the CA, is inceptionally flawed,
because as pronounced by the Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,14 and
reiterated in the more recent Worldwide Web Corporation v. People of the
Philippines,15 to wit:
x x x as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, an application for a search
warrant is a “special criminal process,” rather than a criminal action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the
application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution
and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus
categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue
which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction
over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact
that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are
completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely
constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and
directed to a
_______________
13 CA Decision, Rollo, p. 61. (Emphasis omitted)
14 G.R. No. 104879, May 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 249.
15 G.R. No. 161106 and G.R. No. 161266, January 13, 2014, 713 SCRA 18.
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558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it
before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a
writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made
necessary because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept
and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively
considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise
of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by
a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
 Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal
action. x x x16 (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing explanation shows why the CA arrived at the wrong conclusion.
It gravely erred in equating the proceedings for applications for search warrants
with criminal actions themselves. As elucidated by the Court, proceedings for said
applications are not criminal in nature and, thus, the rule that venue is
jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue of whether the
application should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one
involving jurisdiction because, as stated in the aforequoted case, the power to
issue a special criminal process is inherent in all courts.
Inferring from the foregoing, the Court deems it improper for the RTC-Naga to
have even taken into consideration an issue which respondent failed to raise in its
motion to quash, as it did not involve a question of jurisdiction over the subject
_______________
16 Id., at p. 36.
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Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation
matter. It is quite clear that the RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to issue criminal
processes such as a search warrant.
Moreover, the Court must again emphasize its previous admonition in Spouses
Anunciacion v. Bocanegra,17 that:
We likewise cannot approve the trial court’s act of entertaining supplemental
motions x x x which raise grounds that are already deemed waived. To do so would
encourage lawyers and litigants to file piecemeal objections to a complaint in order
to delay or frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiff’s cause of action.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated March 13, 2009, and the Resolution dated September 14, 2009 in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 80643 are REVERSED. The Order dated February 21, 2003
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Naga, Camarines Sur, Branch 24, denying
respondent’s motion to quash, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Del Castillo,** Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed.
Notes.—The rules do not require respondents in search warrant proceedings
to be residents of the premises to be searched. (Del Rosario vs. Donato, Jr., 614
SCRA 332 [2010])
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3)
the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant
_______________
17 Supra note 9.
18 Id., at p. 717; pp. 329-330.
* * Designated acting member, in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H.
Jardeleza, per Special Order No. 1934 dated February 11, 2015.
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560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation
and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically
describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. (Del Castillo vs.
People, 664 SCRA 430 [2012])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 204419. November 7, 2016.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. EDMAR P. CASTILLO,
SR., as Presiding Judge of Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, Aparri, Cagayan and
JEOFREY JIL RABINO y TALOZA, respondents.
Certiorari; A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
proper when (1) any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and (2) there is no appeal, nor
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of
annulling or modifying the proceeding.—A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is proper when (1) any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and (2)
there is no appeal, nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding.
Grave Abuse of Discretion; Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an
arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility;
or a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion
or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation
of law.—Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or a whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to
perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For
an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.
Hierarchy of Courts; The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the
hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons
or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions
filed directly before it.—The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the
hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling
reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of
petitions filed directly before it. In this case, since the pivotal issue raised by
petitioner involves an application of a rule promulgated by this Court
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
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People vs. Castillo, Sr.
 in the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution regarding the
jurisdiction of courts in the proper issuance of a search warrant, this Court deems
it proper to resolve the present petition.
Liberal Interpretation; Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice
must always be avoided.—The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed
despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle
that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must
always be avoided.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Search Warrants; Requisites for
issuance of Search Warrant.—The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant
are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5)
the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
Same; Same; Same; Motion to quash a search warrant may be based on
grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the
property seized are not those specified or described in the search warrant; and (2)
there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.—A motion to
quash a search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant,
such as (1) the place searched or the property seized are not those specified or
described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance
of the search warrant.
Search Warrants; A search warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the resultant case may be filed in
another court that has jurisdiction over the offense committed.—A search warrant
may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the
offense committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is merely a process,
generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a
criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction.
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People vs. Castillo, Sr.
Same; In certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court
may issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense
allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements for the issuance of such
warrant are present.—In certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed,
any court may issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the
offense allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements for the issuance of
such warrant are present.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Catral, Catral & Urani Law Offices for private respondents.
PERALTA,** J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
dated November 12, 2012 of petitioner People of the Philippines as represented by
Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Carlos B. Sagucio, that seeks to reverse and
set aside the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan) Joint
Resolution1 dated May 14, 2012 quashing Search Warrant No. 45 issued by the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gattaran, Cagayan and eventually dismissing
Criminal Case No. 11-10881 against private respondent Jeofrey Jil
Rabino y Taloza.
The facts follow.
On January 13, 2012, Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran,
Cagayan issued Search Warrant No. 45, which reads, in part, as follows:
_______________
** Designated Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2395 dated October
19, 2016.
1 Penned by respondent Judge Edmar P. Castillo, Sr., Rollo, pp. 27-30.
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80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Castillo, Sr.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER
TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath
SPO1 RONEL P. SATURNO of the Regional Intelligence Division based at
Regional Office 2, Camp Adduru, Tuguegarao City, the applicant herein, and his
witness that there is probable cause to believe that a Violation [of] R.A. 9165
Comprehensive Dangerous Drug, has been and is being committed and there are
good and sufficient reasons to believe that JEOFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO, a
resident of Rizal Street, Maura, Aparri, Cagayan has in his possession or control
the following items, to wit:
SHABU (Methamphetamine and PARAPHERNALIAS)
you are hereby ordered to make an immediate search at any time of the day or
night but preferably at daytime at the aforestated residential place of JEOFREY
JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO and its premises and forthwith seize and take
possession of the above described items to immediately bring him, thereafter, to
the undersigned to be dealt with in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the
December 1, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
 WITNESS MY HAND and SEAL this 13th day of January 2012, at Gattaran,
Cagayan.2
Thereafter, to effect the above Search and Seizure Order, a search was
conducted by elements of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and
officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) yielding one (1) sachet containing
residue of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride inside the house of private
respondent Rabino located in Aparri, Cagayan. When the confiscated item was
submitted to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office No. 2 of the PNP in Tuguegarao
City for qualitative examination, the test gave positive result for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.3
_______________
2 Id., at p. 12.
3 Id., at p. 13.
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People vs. Castillo, Sr.
Thus, an Information4 dated January 15, 2012 was filed against private
respondent Rabino for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, which
reads as follows:
That on or about January 14, 2012, in the Municipality of Aparri, [P]rovince of
Cagayan, and within, the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, without any legal authority thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control and custody
one (1) big zip-lock transparent plastic sachet containing two (2) pieces of
transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, one sachet with
traces of said substance gave POSITIVE results to the tests for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a dangerous drug,
while the other sachet gave negative results to said tests, the said accused knowing
fully well and aware that it is prohibited for any person to possess or use any
dangerous drug regardless of the quality of the purity thereof, unless authorized
by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 11-10881, the case was raffled to the RTC,
Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, presided by respondent Judge Castillo.
Before the case was set for arraignment, or on March 13, 2012, private
respondent Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of
Illegally Acquired Evidence with the following grounds:
Search Warrant; Issuing Court must have territorial jurisdiction over the place to
be searched; No compelling reason for MTC Gattaran to issue warrant
xxxx
No probable cause to issue Search Warrant
xxxx
No searching question elicited from deponent
_______________
4 Id., at p. 10.
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82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Castillo, Sr.
xxxx
No particularity in the places to be searched
xxxx
Irregularity in the implementation of the search
xxxx
Suppression of Evidence Just and Proper5
The RTC, through respondent Judge Castillo, granted the above motion in its
Joint Resolution dated May 14, 2012, which partly reads as follows:
It is indubitable from the foregoing that the minimum penalty for illegal
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is imprisonment of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, which penalty is way beyond
imprisonment of six (6) years. A fortiori, MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction
to entertain the application for and to issue Search Warrant No. 45. As such, Search
Warrant No. 45 is null and void. [Corollary] thereto, all proceedings had in virtue
thereof are likewise null and void.
With the foregoing conclusion, any further discussion on the grounds relied
upon by the accused to buttress his motion and the opposition interposed by the
public prosecutor are deemed mere surplusage.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED. Search
Warrant No. 45 is hereby ordered QUASHED. Consequently, all evidence obtained
in the execution of Search Warrant No. 45 are likewise ordered SUPPRESSED.
There being no more evidence to support them, the Informations in the above
captioned cases are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the same
court in its Joint Order7 dated September 24, 2012.
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 16-20.
6 Id., at pp. 29-30.
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 People vs. Castillo, Sr.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue and arguments raised by petitioner are as follows:
With all due respect, the assailed Resolution of May 14, 2012 was issued by
respondent Judge Castillo with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and/or is patently erroneous. It is respectfully submitted that the
Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue Search
Warrant No. 45 earlier mentioned to search and seize the shabu stated therein in
Aparri, Cagayan a place which is within the same second judicial region in violation
of R.A. 9165, notwithstanding the fact that the power to hear and try the offense is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondent, on the other hand, in his Comment8 dated January 25,
2016, claims that the petition was filed in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. He also argues that the petition should have been filed by the State, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, and not petitioner Second Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Carlos B. Sagucio. Lastly, private respondent insists that the petition
does not show that the assailed Joint Resolution of the RTC was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
This Court finds merit to the petition.
Before proceeding with the discussion on the substantial issue raised in the
petition, certain procedural issues have been pointed out by private respondent
that need to be tackled. According to the private respondent, the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner before this Court must be struck
down as it violates the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Private respondent further
argues that petitioner did not provide any compelling reason that would merit the
direct filing with this Court of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is also
averred that the petition should have been filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General and not the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor because
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 35-36.
8 Id., at pp. 75-82.
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84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Castillo, Sr.
the petition is in the nature of an appeal and the former is vested with the power
of representing the people before any court.
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper when (1)
any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and (2) there is no appeal, nor plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of
annulling or modifying the proceeding.9 Grave abuse of discretion exists when
there is an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or
personal hostility; or a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to
act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done
with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross.10 On the other hand, a remedy is considered “plain, speedy and adequate” if
it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment the
acts of the lower court or agency.11 Its principal office is only to the inferior court
within
_______________
9 Ang Biat Huat Sons Industries, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 547 Phil. 588, 594;
518 SCRA 697, 702-703 (2007).
10 Villanueva v. Porras-Gallardo, G.R. No. 147688, July 10, 2006.
11 San Miguel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 425 Phil. 951, 956; 375 SCRA
311, 315 (2002).
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People vs. Castillo, Sr.
the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.12
The special civil action for certiorari is the proper recourse availed of by
petitioner in questioning the quashal of the search warrant as the petition alleges
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge that ordered the said quashal. In
his allegation that the judge misapplied the rules on jurisdiction or on the proper
courts authorized to issue a search warrant, petitioner has shown that the quashal
of the search warrant was patently and grossly done. In any case, the Court had
allowed even direct recourse to this Court13 or to the Court of Appeals14 via a
special civil action for certiorari from a trial court’s quashal of a search
warrant.15 The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of
courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed
directly before it.16 In this case, since the pivotal issue raised by petitioner involves
an application of a rule promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making
power under the Constitution17 regarding the jurisdiction of courts in the proper
issuance of a search warrant, this Court deems it proper to resolve the present
petition.
As such, even if the petitioner in this case, representing the People, is only the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and not the Office of the Solicitor General, such
technicality can be relaxed in the interest of justice. The Court has allowed some
meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This
is in keeping with the principle
_______________
12 People v. Court of Appeals, 468 Phil. 1, 10; 423 SCRA 605, 612 (2004).
13 See Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, G.R. No. 78631, June 29, 1993, 223
SCRA 761.
14 See Washington Distillers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 650; 260 SCRA
821 (1996); 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-76649-
51, August 19, 1988, 164 SCRA 655.
15 Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., 563 Phil. 781, 796; 538 SCRA 474, 488 (2007).
16 United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 500 Phil. 342, 359; 461 SCRA 574, 593
(2005).
17 Sec. 5, Art. VIII of the CONSTITUTION.
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People vs. Castillo, Sr.
that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must
always be avoided.18 It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court
to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the
ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave
injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while
actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice. 19 In certain cases,
this Court even allowed private complainants to file petitions for certiorari and
considered the said petitions as if filed by the Office of the Solicitor General.
In United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip,20 this Court ruled that an exception exists to
the general rule that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court
assailing any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the
People of the Philippines, through the OSG, thus:
The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme
Court to assail any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is
the People of the Philippines, through the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a private corporation
(the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and considered the
petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in the said case even held that the
petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu of the OSG:
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were
involved in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No.
23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while the general rule is that
it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions
on behalf of the People or the Re-
_______________
18 Buscaino v. Commission on Audit, 369 Phil. 886, 900; 310 SCRA 635, 646
(1999).
19 Aguam v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137672, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 784.
20 Supra note 16.
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People vs. Castillo, Sr.
public of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the
Court of Appeals, if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge
or a lack of due process, the petition will be deemed filed by the private
complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor General. In line with
this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will allow
petitioners to argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the
Solicitor General.
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts.
However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by
the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before
it. In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition, considering
the nature of the issues raised by the parties.21
Therefore, if this Court had previously considered the petitions filed by private
complainants and deemed them as if filed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
there is no reason to disallow the petition herein filed by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor.
Anent the main issue as to whether a municipal trial court has the authority to
issue a search warrant involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction, this
Court answers in the affirmative.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally
_______________
21 Id., at p. 359; pp. 592-593. (Citations omitted)
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88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Castillo, Sr.
by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and
the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.22 Necessarily, a motion to quash a search warrant may be based on grounds
extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the property seized
are not those specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no
probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.23
 The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search warrant and
eventually dismissed the case based merely on the fact that the search warrant was
issued by the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan proceeding from a suspected violation of
R.A. 9165 or The Dangerous Drugs Act, an offense which is beyond the jurisdiction
of the latter court. It is therefore safe to presume that the other grounds raised by
the private respondent in his motion to quash are devoid of any merit. By that
alone, the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search
warrant on a basis other than the accepted grounds. It must be remembered that
a search warrant is valid for as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the
Constitution and must only be quashed when any of its elements are found to be
wanting.
This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search
warrant. Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed.—An
application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the
_______________
22 People v. Francisco, 436 Phil. 383, 390; 387 SCRA 569, 575-576 (2002).
23 Abuan v. People, 536 Phil. 672, 692; 505 SCRA 799, 816 (2006),
citing Franks v. State of Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978); US v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984); US v. Mittelman, 999 F.2d 440 (1993); US v.
Lee, 540 F.2d 1205 (1976).
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People vs. Castillo, Sr.
place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only
be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.
Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within
the same judicial region where the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling
reasons, the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue
a search warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the application
thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the same judicial region. The fact
that the search warrant was issued means that the MTC judge found probable
cause to grant the said application after the latter was found by the same judge to
have been filed for compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court was duly complied with.
It must be noted that nothing in the above quoted rule does it say that the court
issuing a search warrant must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search
warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction
over the offense committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is merely
a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction,
and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction.24 Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed,
any court may issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the
offense allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements for the issuance of
such warrant are present.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
dated November 12, 2012, of petitioner People of the Philippines is GRANTED.
Consequently, the Joint Resolution dated May 14, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, insofar as it quashed Search Warrant No. 45 issued by
the Municipal Trial Court
_______________
24 Macondray & Co., Inc. v. Bernabe, 67 Phil. 658 (1939); Co Kim Cham v.
Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113 (1945).
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90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Castillo, Sr.
of Gattaran, Cagayan, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Criminal Case No.
11-10881 against private respondent Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Perez, Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., On Official Leave.
Petition granted, joint resolution reversed and set aside.
Note.—An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted
either as an incident in a main criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation
of one yet to be filed. Whether the criminal case (of which the search warrant is an
incident) has already been filed before the trial court is significant for the purpose
of determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a
search warrant. (Worldwide Web Corporation vs. People, 713 SCRA 18 [2014])
——o0o——
[RULE 126, SEC. 2] An application for a search warrant is not a criminal
action; thus, conformity of the public prosecutor (under Rule 110, Sect.
5) is not necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to question
an order quashing search warrants.
[RULE 126, SEC. 4] The requirement of particularity in the description
of things to be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search
warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
sought. It need not describe the items to be seized in precise and
minute detail.
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION, ET AL. VS. PEOPLE AND
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE (PLDT) COMPANY
January 13, 2014, G.R. No. 161106
SERENO, C.J.
FACTS: Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional
Intelligence Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National
Police filed applications for warrants3 before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 78, to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web
Corporation (WWC)4 located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188
Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of petitioner
Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet) located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient
Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. The
applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass
operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No.
401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or
Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters
and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). On 25 September 2001, the trial
court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants. The
applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund Gali (Gali) of the
Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.
Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 central processing units
(CPUs), 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a
laptop computer. Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its
employees were confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of
international calls, such as the President’s Office and the Information Desk,
were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken
computers, were also seized.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s appeal to
question the quashal of the search warrants without the conformity of
the public prosecutor had no personality to question the quashal of
the search warrants (NO)
(2) Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable
cause (considering that the acts complained of allegedly do not
constitute theft) (YES)
(3) Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed search
warrants were not general warrant (NO)
HELD:
(1) NO. Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to question
the quashal of the search warrants without the conformity of the
public prosecutor. They argue that it violated Section 5, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: SEC. 5. Who must prosecute
criminal actions.—All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
prosecutor. The provision states the general rule that the public
prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of “all criminal
actions commenced by a complaint or information.” However, a
search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an
information, but by the filing of an application therefor. Clearly then,
an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; thus,
conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary to give the
aggrieved party personality to question an order quashing search
warrants.
(2) YES. A trial judge’s finding of probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant is accorded respect by reviewing courts when the
finding has substantial basis. In the issuance of a search warrant,
probable cause requires "such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are
in the place to be searched." There is no exact test for the
determination of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants.
It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the
process of exercising their judicial function. Here, the applications for
search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as
incidents to pending criminal actions. When the search warrants
issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing
left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search
warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be
properly taken therefrom.
(3) NO. The requirement of particularity in the description of things to be
seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search warrant
bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is sought. It
need not describe the items to be seized in precise and minute
detail. The warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to
readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves them with no
discretion regarding the articles to be seized.
A general warrant is defined as “(a) search or arrest warrant that is not
particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized.” It is
one that allows the “seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another”
and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to
take. Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the
warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have
been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched
only for the most compelling and lawful reasons. In furtherance of this
constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
amplify the rules regarding the following places and items to be searched
under a search warrant.

In this case, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to
be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its
telephone services and business. Prior to the application for the search
warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners
and was then able to confirm that they had "utilized various
telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables,
antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment,
and support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and
other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations.”
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L. YU, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 161106 January 13, 2014
PONENTE: Sereno
RULING:
Is an application for a search warrant a criminal action?
The Supreme Court held that an application for a search warrant is not a
criminal action.
As held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 104879, 6 May 1994, 232
SCRA 249), an application for a search warrant is a “special criminal
process,” rather than a criminal action.
A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing
issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal
process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic
in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.
Is the conformity of the public prosecutor necessary to question an
order quashing search warrants?
NO. The Court has consistently recognized the right of parties
to question orders quashing those warrants. Accordingly, the Court sustained
the CA’s ruling that the conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary
before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order granting a
motion to quash search warrants.
May an order quashing a search warrant be the proper subject of an
appeal?
It depends. Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a
pending criminal case, the quashal of a search warrant is merely
interlocutory. There is still “something more to be done in the said criminal
case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein.”
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued
in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the order quashing the
warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the grant) ends the
judicial process. There is nothing more to be done thereafter.
In this case, the applications for search warrants were instituted as principal
proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the
search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was
nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search
warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly
taken therefrom.
What is a general warrant?
It is defined as “a search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the
person to be arrested or the property to be seized.” It is one that allows the
“seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another” and gives the
officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take.
State the rule in describing the place to be searched and the things to
be seized in a search warrant.
The search warrant must satisfy the requirement of particularity in the
description of the things to be seized
A search warrant need not describe the items to be seized in precise and
minute detail. The warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to
readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion
regarding the articles to be seized.
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of
the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that
bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
In this case, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to
be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its
telephone services and business. Prior to the application for the search
warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners
and was then able to confirm that they had utilized various
telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines,
cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching
equipment, and support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes,
manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass
operations.”
PEOPLE vs. COGAED
 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan
(PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel, La Union,
“received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer”that one
Marvin Buya “[would] be transporting marijuana” from Barangay Lun-Oy,
San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.
 PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order “to intercept the suspect. They
set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel
bound for San Fernando City.
 A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived and the jeepney
driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two
male passengers who were carrying marijuana.
 SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later
identified as Victor Romana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao.
Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a
yellow bag.
 SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their
bags. Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know
since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomate
named Marvin.
 Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like
marijuana. Both of them were then arrested. Case against Dayao was
dismissed because he was a minor.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the
marijuana confiscated is admissible as evidence.
HELD: NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana
confiscated shall not be admissible as evidence.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was
no approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest.
The person searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant.
The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was
Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he
was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one
circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed
and his belongings without a valid search warrant. Likewise, the facts of the
case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of
the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were
present when the arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed
has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime.
There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. Also,
Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have
qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule prohibits the issuance of general
warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions.
[RULE 126, SEC. 13] A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant.
PEOPLE VS. MEDARIO CALANTIAO
June 18, 2014, G.R. No. 203984
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS: Upon a complaint filed by Edwin Lojera regarding a shooting
incident, PO1 Nelson Mariano and PO3 Eduardo Ramirez proceeded to
Caloocan City where they found the white taxi reported by Lojera. While
approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted, fired their guns towards
them and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they
were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag
containing 2 bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops. Calantiao was charged
before the RTC of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
However, Calantiao questions the admissibility of the marijuana found in his
possession as evidence against him on the ground that it was discovered via
an illegal search.
ISSUE: Whether the marijuana is admissible as evidence.
HELD: YES. The marijuana is admissible as evidence since earches and
seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that a person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant. The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure
incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the arresting officer from being
harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. A
valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on
the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. In
the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao's
possession and within his immediate control. He could have easily taken any
weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the
black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao's possession, it was
within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly
conduct a warrantless search.
Admissibility of Evidence
People of the Philippines vs. Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta, G.R. No.
203984, June 18, 2014
FACTS:
Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta was convicted guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 by the RTC of Caloocan City,
Branch 127 on July 23, 2009. On appeal is the decision dated January 17,
2012 of the court of Appeals affirming in in toto the decision of the RTC.
On November 11, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two bricks of dried
marijuana fruiting tops with a total weight of 997 .9 grams, knowing the same
to be a dangerous drug.
PO1 Nelson Mariano and PO3 Eduardo Ramirez were on duty; a certain
Edwin Lojera arrived at their office and asked for police assistance
regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that while
driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City,
he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow
said vehicle until they reached along 8th Avenue Street corner C-3 Road,
Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of them was
accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns.
PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately responded to said complaint by
proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they found
the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted
therefrom, fired their guns towards them and ran away. PO1 Mariano and
PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered
from Calantiao a black bag containing two bricks of dried marijuana fruiting
tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez
recovered from Calantiao’s companion a .38 revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3
Pablo Temena, police investigator at Bagong Barrio Police Station for
investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana
contained in a black bag with his initials, “NM”. Thereafter, said specimens
were forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The
result of the examination conducted by P/SINSP. Jesse Dela Rosa revealed
that the same was positive for marijuana.
On Calantiao’s defense the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were
riding almost collided with another car. Reyes then opened the window and
made a “fuck you” sign against the persons on board of that car. That
prompted the latter to chase them and when they were caught in a traffic
jam, PO1 Nelson Mariano; one of the persons on board of that other car
alighted and kicked their taxi. Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1
Mariano slapped the latter and uttered some words, police officer poked his
gun against Reyes and when Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired.
Calantiao and Reyes were then handcuffed and were brought to the police
station. Thereat, they were subjected to body frisking and their wallets and
money were taken. PO1 Mariano then prepared some documents and
informed them that they will be charged for drugs. A newspaper containing
marijuana was shown to them and said police officer told them that it would
be sufficient evidence against them.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not that the allegedly seized items are inadmissible
evidence in accordance to plain view doctrine.
2. Whether or not the arresting officers’ patent non-compliance with the
requirements for the proper chain of custody of the seized dangerous
drugs.
HELD:
1. In People v. Valeroso, this Court had the occasion to reiterate the
permissible reach of a valid warrantless search and seizure incident
to a lawful arrest, viz: When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for
the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove
any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect
his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered,
and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for
the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of
the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only
on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within
the latter’s reached. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the
seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of
the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The
phrase “within the area of his immediate control” means the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one
who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one
concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. In Valeroso,
however, the Court held that the evidence searched and seized from
him could not be used against him because they were discovered in
a room, different from where he was being detained, and was in a
locked cabinet. Thus, the area searched could not be considered as
one within his immediate control that he could take any weapon or
destroy any evidence against him. In the case at bar, the marijuana
was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his
 immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the
bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag
containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it was within
the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly
conduct a warrantless search.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of
evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside
the suspect’s person and premises under his immediate control. This is so
because “objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.” “The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object. It serves to supplement the prior
justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present
unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and permits the
warrantless seizure. ”The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in
Calantiao’s situation because the police officers purposely searched him
upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the
black bag, which was in Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately opened it,
as part of the search incident to Calantiao’s lawful arrest.
2. SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner: (a) The apprehending
officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized
marijuana from the time the police officers confiscated it, to the time it was
turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it was brought to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination. This Court has no reason to
overrule the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of
custody of the seized drugs to have not been broken so as to render the
marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or
tampering of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence
has been preserved will remain. The burden of showing the foregoing to
overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs
with regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao.
Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to discharge such burden. It is worthy to note
that these arguments were only raised by Calantiao on his appeal. He
himself admits this. 23 His theory, from the very beginning, was that he did
not do it, and that he was being framed for having offended the police
officers. Simply put, his defense tactic was one of denial and frame-up.
However, those defenses have always been frowned upon by the Court, to
wit: The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this
Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and
standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.
In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with
strong and convincing evidence. In the cases before us, appellant failed to
present sufficient evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-
serving assertions, no plausible proof was presented to bolster his
allegations.
Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the
apprehending officers were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly
perform their duties, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
January 17, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04069.
[RULE 126, SEC. 13] Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows
for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest,
there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest
as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
PEOPLE VS. COGAED
June 30, 2014, G.R. No. 200334
LEONEN, J.
FACTS: Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-
Oy and during a checkpoint, the driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal
to the police telling that Cogaed was carrying marijuana inside Cogaed’s bag;
the police officer then approached Cogaed and asked the accused about the
contents of his bags. Cogaed replied that he did not know what was inside
and that he was just transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a barriomate.
Cogaed subsequently opened the bag revealing the bricks of marijuana
inside. He was then arrested by the police officers.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the
marijuana confiscated is admissible as evidence.
HELD: NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana
confiscated shall not be admissible as evidence.
As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the
requirements of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution are reasonable. This
warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be
determined by a judge.
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when
warrantless. The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless
searches and seizures are:
(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
(2) Seizure of evidence in “plain view,”
(3) Search of a moving vehicle;
(4) Consented warrantless search;
(5) Customs search;
(6) Stop and frisk; and
(7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it
did not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the
Constitution.
“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are
necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the
legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of
“suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police officer finds himself
or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police
officer. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere
suspicion. It has to be a “genuine reason to serve the purposes of the “stop
and frisk” exception.
The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the
purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was
no approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest.
The person searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant.
The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was
Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he
was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one
circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed
and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of
arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court were present when the arrest was made. At the time of his
apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about
to commit a crime. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police
officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not
have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we
assume that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags.
Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search.
The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee.
The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule prohibits the issuance of general
warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence
obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because
it is “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” It ensures that the fundamental rights
to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon
and are upheld.
G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
PO3 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a
motorcycle without a helmet and so he flagged him down. He invited the
accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged
down the accused is almost in front of the sub-station to where he is
assigned as a traffic enforcer. The accused violated a municipal ordinance
which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor
vehicle. While the officers were issuing a citation ticket for violation of
municipal ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that the accused was uneasy and
kept on reaching something from his jacket. He was alerted and told the
accused to take out the contents of his jacket’s pocket as the latter may have
a weapon inside it. The accused obliged, slowly put out the contents of his
jacket’s pocket which included two plastic sachets of suspected shabu.
The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs as the
substances are positive of methampethamine hydrochloride. Upon appeal,
the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
Upon a petition for reiew on certiorari, petitioner claims that there was no
lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that
the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not
even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance.
Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never
consented to the search conducted upon him.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest, searches and seizure were invalid.
Held:
Yes, there was no valid arrest. When he was flagged down for committing a
traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was
likewise illegal.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender,
but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter. At the time that he was
waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said
to have been under arrest. rior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during
which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as
waiting time.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs
are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the
acquittal of the accused.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on
the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search
means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
[RULE 126, SEC. 2(b)] The wordings of the provision is of a mandatory
nature, requiring a statement of compelling reasons if the application is
filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the
place of commission of the crime.
PILIPINAS SHELL VS. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL
February 16, 2015, G.R. No. 189669
PERALTA, J.
FACTS: Petitioners received information that respondent was selling, offering
for sale, or distributing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by illegally refilling the
steel cylinders manufactured by and bearing the duly registered trademark
and device of respondent Petron. Petitioners requested the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) to investigate said activities of respondent which acts
constitute a violation of Section 168, in relation to Section 1704 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8293, and/or Section 25 of R.A. No. 623. The NBI proceeded
with their investigation and reportedly found commercial quantities of Petron
Gasul and Shellane cylinders stockpiled at respondent's warehouse.
Thus, the NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City (RTC-Naga), two separate Applications for Search
Warrant against respondent and/or its occupants. The RTC-Naga City issued
an Order granting said Applications and Search Warrants were issued.
However, respondent raised for the first time, the issue of the impropriety of
filing the Application for Search Warrant at the RTC-Naga City when the
alleged crime was committed in a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
RTC-Iriga City. RTC-Naga issued an Order granting respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration, thereby quashing Search Warrants, which was later on
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the application filed with the RTC-Naga failed to state any
compelling reason to justify the filing of the same in a court which does not
have territorial jurisdiction over the place of the commission of the crime.
HELD: YES. Petitioner’s application for search warrant failed to state any
compelling reason required under Rule 126, Section 2 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure:
SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed.
An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: xxx
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission
of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced. xxx
Under paragraph (b), the application for search warrant in this case should
have stated compelling reasons why the same was being filed with the RTC-
Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the latter court that
has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was
committed and also the place where the search warrant was enforced. The
wordings of the provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring a statement of
compelling reasons if the application is filed in a court which does not have
territorial jurisdiction over the place of commission of the crime. Since
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of persons
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and search warrants
constitute a limitation on this right, then Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure should be construed strictly against state
authorities who would be enforcing the search warrants. On this point, then,
petitioner's application for a search warrant was indeed insufficient for failing
to comply with the requirement to state therein the compelling reasons why
they had to file the application in a court that did not have territorial
jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed.