A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte's Early

Presidency (2017) Nicole Curato (Editor)

Southeast Asia Program Publications
A bookreview by Maria Vivod1 (April 2018)

The preface to this volume written by the editor bears the date of April 2017 ten months after
Rodrigo "Rody" Roa Duterte (born 1945) became the 16th President of the Philippines. The book was
published in August, almost exactly a year after Duterte assumed his presidency. Personally, I feel the
need to congratulate to the editor for successfully organizing and compiling this volume in such a
relatively short period, short for the academic circumstances. The reader has a good book in his
hands: it’s a volume to be read by all wishing to know or to understand the contemporary
Philippines. It can also serve to those who are interested in a superstar-politician who shook the
world political scene when he appeared. His scandalous public statements, his straightforwardness,
his way of dealing with public security related issues in his country and the fact that before he
became president he was virtually unknown to the outside world, resulted in great interest in him
and his country even in the most distant parts of the planet. People in Hungary, Serbia – just to
mention few – are know his name, comment his actions and keep an eye on the Philippines, since
Duterte became president. This volume paints a portrait of a homo politicus, a president of a country
of great contrasts; this is a portrayal from painted from various angles while using various scientific
approaches steaming from diverse disciplines. It is an attempt, and I would add, rather a successful
one, to offer a sort of ‘manual’ in understanding the public persona of Rodrigo Duterte while
endeavoring to understand the bewilderment that Duterte’s appearance on the international scene
seemed to cause. Difficult to categorize, challenging to understand, he is a modern-day political
mystery often and easily labeled as populist and sometimes branded as fascist. Who is the relatively
unknown Duterte, how he become a president of a country which over 100 million of inhabitants and
what ideology leads his actions? This volume is a possible handbook of early stages of an archaic yet
modern political style as well. And it focuses on a man whose political roots are in the XXth century
and rhetoric’s in the XXIth, a century in which soft-language diplomacy is considered as servility
dictated by weakness.

The volume ‘A Duterte reader’ contains fifteen contributions, an introduction and an epilogue
written by Nicole C. Curato the editor. The contributors are the ‘usual suspects’, specialists of the
Philippines in various fields of social sciences, some already having published on the topic of this 16th
president of this country, such as Teehankee, Quimpo, Coronel and others. There are though some
‘usual’ who are missing from this volume, such as Mark R. Thompson, who abundantly publishes and
gives lectures on this very topic; however his ‘physical’ absence is compensated by his abundant
presence in the bibliography (in ten references) and in-text references (idem).

1
Maria Vivod, Ph.D., is an associate researcher in Cultural Anthropology at the research laboratory ‘Dynamics
of Europe’ (Strasbourg, France). Her fields of research and interest are the relation of organized crime and
paramilitary units, Fascism (totalitarian regimes), Medical / Visual Anthropology.

1
*

We need to talk about Rody is a suitable Introduction to this volume but also figures as the
contribution of the editor, Nicole Curato. Her chapter is a pretty good start for those who are not
familiar with the topic of Duterte but want to know more about him. Curato starts with resuming
Duterte’s shocking public statements and in enumerating swiftly his public incidents of speech
(cursing the Pope, calling Obama a son of a whore and cases of similar vernacular jewels). Her goal is
set for this volume: it is the depiction of the broader context that gave rise to such individual as
Duterte from various angles, through various disciplines. It is a line-up of Philippine studies scholars
of different generations and their perception of Duterte and his era, as she states. She successfully
manages to embed her own ideas in the text and to build on the chapters of her contributors
masterfully, while introducing their contributions in the same time. Curato places Duterte as an idea,
the idea of ‘Dutertismo’ - Dutertism, which appears to be a specific political worldview and political
practice. Dutertism disrupts and perpetuates Philippines elite democracy (page 2) and Curato
demonstrates it on the pages that follow. The reader has the occasion to know more about the
conditions before the presidential race in which it seemed that Duterte is ‘too old, too tired and too
poor’ to run – as he, misleadingly, stated himself (page 4). The Philippine social and political
environment that facilitated the rise of populist leaders is one of the main factors that Curato
scrutinizes. According to her, Duterte’s presidency is in the same time the disruption and the
perpetuation of a particular Philippine-style elite politics: the mass phantasies embodied in speeches
during the presidential campaign in which it is promised to deal with the long-lasting problems in a
swift and painful way or the crass politics and spectacle-driven publics are the features of this
environment. Her contribution contains a lengthy description of the usual – pre-Dutertian – electoral
campaign in the country, in which opponents customarily ‘outgun, outgoon and outgold each other’
(page 6). The political folklore during the Philippine presidential campaign is indeed traditionally
colorful yet again Duterte managed to mobilize the masses in an original way and succeeded to be
different from the usual practices. Curato provides a fascinating account of the ways in which
Duterte disrupts the ‘Imperial Manila’ (page 9), his strategy –which is focusing into winning votes of
specific regions Ilocos, Visayas, regions in which he has ancestry - and his political message which sat
him apart from the previous presidents and presidential campaigns bringing frenzy into the
presidential campaign. She gives him credit in how Duterte “masterfully articulated the language of
inclusion among diverse peoples of the South” (page 10), proving again that politics and particularly
populism is the art of the language (see Abao in this volume). Curato inspects all the elements that
launched Duterte into the presidential seat: his personal background: Visayan, Mindanaon,
Maranaoan – contributed to his image of the ‘man of the people’ – securing support from different
ethnic groups, different age groups and socio-economic classes. Not a small thing was the backing up
of the Muslim Midanaoan elite which was usually divided in earlier presidential campaigns in support
different candidates.

As president Duterte clearly demonstrates the disruption strategy with which he intends to mark his
term: Curato also examines Duterte’s disruptive politics toward the EDSA system. It is a political
effort in creating a rupture between him and all his predecessors since the Marcos era who built
their legitimacy on the People’s Revolution of EDSA (1986) that pulled the Marcos regime down. In a
way this seems to be a desire to exhibit the hypocrisy of the post EDSA presidents: the supreme
cacique leader Marcos was gone but little changed occurred for the ordinary Pilipino citizen. In order
to make sense to Duterte’s efforts of disruption, Curato takes Thompson’s model of Philippine

2
presidencies (2010) which tends to swing elections between reformist and populists Philippine
presidents; hence Duterte as a political phenomenon can be seen as just another Philippine
populists, a bit more colorful then usually (page 14). His success partially is to be found in widespread
frustration of the populous which since EDSA hopes and waits a some better but still distant future;
therefore Curato is pretty accurate when stating that Duterte efficaciously “tapes into ‘politics of
anger’ “ (page 15) – henceforward the support coming from the middle class Filipinos and the
Diaspora. Curato goes on examining Duterte’s first policies, particularly those which go against
human rights, viewed as “particular and not universal” which roots are in the mass illiberal phantasy
(page 16) in which fighting insecurity and crime is the condition sine qua non of creating prosperity.
In that sense Duterte’s ‘success story’ – the city of Davao – as Curato states: his primal ‘exhibit A’ is
the example he is trying to scale up (page 17-20). She is aware that the blueprint city Davao is
effective (page 20) ergo tempting to the masses. The author then continues with an extensive
portrayal of the securitization of the drug menace – topic that was the leitmotif of Duterte’s
campaign and one of his first presidential acts in the Oplan Tokhang (‘knock and plead’) police
operation. She notices that a template of police killings, extra-judicial killings in the Philippines is not
a new thing (page 24) and Duterte had built on the previous ‘tradition’. The public loss of confidence
in state institutions and the upper mentioned conditions ensured a wide public support to him,
something that didn’t diminish after the elections but instead grow. The author also takes time to
depict the launching of the Oplan Tokhang and the police adaptation to Duterte’s War on Drugs that
derailed his initial idea of ‘cleaning’ the country from drugs. The most interesting part of her
contribution is her analysis of the dutertian crass-politics, the crude language that seems to
hypnotize the masses and the spectacle driven public. The vulgarity of the public language as
characteristic of populism is more than a strategy, it is an essential condition of a creation of a
teatrum politicum in which the rhetoric and spectacle not only sustains and articulates the public
frustration but canalize it. Curato concludes her very extensive and detailed account with some
prognosis: she wonders if a post-EDSA regime will occur, with the same social structures but with a
different kind of authoritarian regime, creating in this manner, two regimes in which the EDSA period
was a pause.

The first contribution comes from Julio C. Teehankee in which this author answers his initial
question – also the paper’s title -that fittingly opens this volume : Was Duterte’s rise inevitable?
Teehankee depicts the political circumstances, particularly the previous presidential regimes, which
contributed to the rise of personality such as Duterte. Inspired by Krasner’s theory of regimes,
Teehankee depicts the evolution of presidential styles and political attitudes of all previous Philippine
presidencies and places Duterte in this diachronic landscape. The author provides excellent graphics
containing the names of all previous presidents, the exact dates of their governance and places them
in regime-categories: proto-, neo-colonial-, authoritarian-, and reformist. In this third category, along
with Aquino 1 & 2, Ramos, Estrada, Macapagal-Arroyo, belongs Duterte too. Mindful that a sole
category, especially organized through a looking-glass of the present, is probably insufficient,
Teehankee introduces Skowronek’s classification (1979) of presidential stances. This classification
offers another dimension to the presidential ‘style’ and embraces the attitudes of how a president
relates to the previous presidential regimes. This dimension is polarized: the president is either
supportive (‘affiliated’) or unsympathetic (‘opposed’) to the previous regime which, again places
him/her in a ‘vulnerable’ or ‘resilient’ political situation. The ‘vulnerable’ aspect produces
‘disjunctive leaders’ (Macapagal-Arroyo and Aquino 2), or ‘great repudiators’ (Aquino 1 and Duterte).

3
This analytical facet offers Teehankee a standpoint from which he develops his analysis. One by one
he analyses the previous presidencies. A populist – as Duterte is considered by most of the
contributors – navigates through the opposition with the previous regime, rejecting the EDSA on
which all the previous five presidencies maintained a foothold. Teehankee’s analysis is a cool-
headed examination of Duterte’s presidency in the actual habitus of the Philippine presidencies. The
previous presidential styles and types of regimes made possible and somewhat probable the arrival
of such president as Duterte. Teehankee answers his initial question by pointing toward the
frustration of the Philippine middle class, which, frustrated and disappointed by the Aquino 2
presidency, was eager to demonstrate its protest (page 52).

The second chapter is written by Ronald D. Holmes. The author also starts his contribution with a
question, by turning his gaze toward those who voted and support(ed) Duterte. In many things
Duterte is indisputably an ‘inaugural’ starts Holmes: Duterte is the first local official who was directly
voted as president - without previously passing, as usually, trough Senate. He is the first president
who was born and raised in Mindanao; the first to cut the customary ties with the USA, the first to
“show the middle finger to EU” (page 57), to “call the pope a whore and the UN secretary General a
devil.” (idem). Duterte maybe the very first Philippine president to accomplish successfully all this in
a relatively short period of time, however, he is also, as Holmes acknowledges, a former bad student
(Holmes quotes Duterte) who managed to become a president2. And this is, at least when it comes
to the world of academia, an extraordinary achievement. Holmes contribution turns around the
pivotal question of public support that Duterte enjoyed and still enjoys. The author of this chapter
provides as analytical tool the surveys carried out by Pulse Asia and SWS in June, September and
December 2016. The participants were asked to assess Duterte’s performance (raging from
‘approval’, ‘indecision’ to ‘disapproval’) and trust in Duterte (‘trust’, ‘indecision’, ‘distrust’).
Subsequently the author analyses the answers given by the period, the geographical area in which
the pool was made, the socio-economic class of the participants and their gender. Not surprisingly,
the president’s satisfactory work is best rated in Mindanao. As the author continues his analysis the
numbers clearly show that there is a high level of trust and approval in the ratings. Holmes interprets
the rating results to be the fruit of Duterte keeping his pre-electoral promise in dealing with crime. It
also becomes obvious in comparing the popular satisfaction rate with the national administration on
fighting crimes from November 1990 to 2016, that Duterte’s administration enjoys the highest rating
across all administrations. In his quest to further make sense of such a popular support, Holmes also
produces a parallel analysis of ratings of the post-Marcos presidents in the same period of the
presidency, by the same institutions Pulse Asia and SWS –at the beginning of the first six months of
the presidential term and six months after. It turns out that Duterte leads again and that his support
is stronger after six months. Holmes puts forward carefully, that during the terms of former
presidents’ incidents happened which resulted in the erosion of the public support. Comparatively
Estrada’s appraisal was on the highest peak, while Macapagal-Arroyo was the Philippine president
who touched bottom. Holmes’s contribution revises the conditions that impacted the ‘rise’ and the
‘drop’ of all presidents, one by one. He also provides a tabulation of the research data done by Pulse
Asia from July 2016 which concentrates on the qualitative dimension of a popular assessment. The
participants were asked to qualify Duterte with a word or a phrase that best describes him. And this
survey introduces a different version of Duterte’s public support –image of the first six months.
Qualifications such as ‘fighter/courageous’, ‘man of his word’, ‘principled’, ‘compassioned’,

2
Not every elected president is an ‘excellent student’ as f.i. Aleksandar Vučić… #cynicism

4
‘effective’, ‘fighting drugs and corruption’, ‘impolite’ are offered. We can’t speak in terms about
‘public support’ but simple of a ‘public evaluation’ strictu sensu and it becomes obvious that six
months were enough for the participants to grasp more about who their president is. A new popular
portrait appears from it: Duterte is in short a ‘dirty-mouthed man of his word who fights drugs and
corruption’3. Holmes also provides an anecdotal vignette which occurred during the December 2016
Pulse Asia survey: one participant refused to give a description of Duterte, from fear it might be used
against him/her. Holmes’s contribution ends with an epilogue: with the results obtained through a
survey in March 2017- probably just before the volume was printed – by Pulse Asia and which clearly
show that Duterte’s public support dropped. This makes the author speculate that the future will
bring a steady erosion of the public support if Duterte’s administration will not show visible results in
other areas of civil life which directly impact the quality of life of the Philippine citizens.

The third chapter is one of the weakest contributions in otherwise a solid volume. Surprisingly it
comes from Walden Bello. Maybe the surprise comes from the reader’s high expectations: people
tend to expect quality from lustrous social thinkers and authors. The contribution starts with a
dramatic tone: “In 2016, fascism came to the Philippines in the form of Rodrigo Duterte.” (page 77). I
presume that the Philippine Falange, Makapili, the Japanese invaders during WWII – just to mention
few that come to my mind – was either a walk in the park or Duterte’s previous life incarnations.
Bello’s contribution rests on this simple assertion -as the title of this paper states – that Duterte is a
‘fascist original’. Unfortunately the author doesn’t take time to explain what a ‘fascist imitation’
should be. In order to avoid any confusion about the nature of a ‘fascist original’ that is to say a
‘fascist leader’ Bello provides his own definition (page 78): “ (a) a charismatic individual with strong
inclinations toward totalitarian rule who (b) derives his or her (sic) strength from a heated multiclass
mass base, (c) is engaged in or supports the systematic and massive violation of basic human, civil
and political rights, and (d) proposes a political a political project that contradicts the fundamental
values and aims of liberal democracy or social democracy.” Here Bello stops and he forgets to
provide a theoretical frame, or even a reference for at least a part of his definition. Those who study
fascism would hope at this point that the author draws his definition from the domain of philosophic
fascism that usually offers such an analytical frame. However, Bello takes the reader in the opposite
direction, toward the historic fascism in his subchapter called ‘A fascist original’. While trying to
explain Duterte’s charisma, the first feature of a fascist leader according to him, he harnesses the
notion of “cariño brutal’ (page 78), probably from the very popular Philippine movie under the same
title (1998). Venturing into the field of psychology, particularly the Jungian archetype-theory, Bello
depicts his own definition of ‘cariño brutal’ from which I will spare the reader of this book review.
Again, Bello doesn’t provide any reference to his definition or theoretical frame. Luckily, in the next
paragraph (idem), Bello does points toward a definition of how he perceives Duterte, as a ‘contra
revolutionary’ as defined by Arno Mayer but unfortunately this claim rests on a single phrase. Bello
then initiates a clumsy comparison of Duterte with Hitler and Mussolini which he continues on the
following couple of pages. He calls Hitler and Mussolini as Duterte’s “predecessors” (still page 78). At
this point it becomes obvious that either Bello pushes his metaphor a bit too far, or he is simply
oblivious that the Japanese were those fascists’ forces that invaded the Philippines during WWII and
not the Italians or the Germans. Notwithstanding Bello manages to find differences between Hitler,
Mussolini and Duterte. The difference is according to him, that Duterte doesn’t “wages war against
the left” as Hitler and Mussolini did (idem). Bello seems unaware that Italian fascism comes directly

3
Compounded from the offered expressions

5
from the Left, by Mussolini being a syndicalist4 and producing, before his presidency a nice collection
of socialist writings5. Bello’s idea is that Duterte fights “liberal democracy and political system of our
time” (page 78). But still he doesn’t produce any references for this claim. The author probably
forgets to mention, that both Hitler and Mussolini had their ideologies well developed and exposed
in writing (Hitler: ‘Mein Kampf’; see for Mussolini’s case6) a little ideological detail that is absent from
Duterte’s political parkour. Bello develops the concept of the ‘contra revolutionary’ (page 79) trying
to depict such a personality, claiming that “ideological purity is not high on their agenda” (idem).
Again, there are no provided references to this definition. The thing with this assertion is that it
follows that Hitler wasn’t a contra revolutionary….for being obstinately ‘ideologically pure’
(‘ideologically pure in the Nuremberg-way’…?).

In his effort to prove his claim that Duterte is a ‘fascist original’ is the fact that “is that he brought the
dominant section of the left into his ruling coalition, something that would have been unthinkable
with most previous fascist leaders.” (idem). Indeed: Hitler has sent the members of the Left directly
to the concentration camps…. At this moment the reader is procured with an additional definition of
Bello’s ‘fascist original’ leader: a leader whose is capable entering into coalition with its (ideological)
opponents. But the fact is that Duterte had the support of the Left during the presidential campaign
(see infra contribution Sanchez) and while young he was a communist party member (see infra
Claudio & Abinales page 98). Entering into coalition with the left doesn’t make a political leader (a
president) a fascist; only perhaps if you are Pol Pot. But the author has no intention to stop here: he
speaks about “Duterte’s distinctive contribution to fascism is in the area of his political methodology”
(page 79). He continues “The stylized paradigm of fascism coming to power hast the fascist leader or
party begin with violations of civil rights, followed by the power grab, then indiscriminate
repression.” (idem) Again, there are no references to this claim/definition. If a ‘stylized paradigm of
fascism’ when coming to power would have been all what Bello claims, than the leaders of the
French revolution (1789) Robespierre, Marat & Danton could easily apply to this definition and well
as Lenin’s (1917) or Tito’s and the Yugoslav communists party’s coming to power (1945) would fit
also into ‘stylized fascism’7. Just to mention a couple particular examples which could fit into this
strangely fluid definition... In order to confuse the reader, Bello rapidly produces an example to
support his claim: “the Marcossian model of ‘creeping fascism’ ”, which began also “with massive
impunity” (page 79).

Luckily the next subchapter provides a relief from the overstretched definitions and comparisons
with Hitler and Mussolini. In this subchapter Bello positions Duterte in a post-EDSA perspective,
explaining at least partially –and shortly – the hypocrisy of the EDSA trough which Duterte gained his
presidency.

4
In a letter to Giuseppe Prezzolini in 1909, Mussolini indicated that he had been a syndicalist since 1904. Letter
dated 4 April 1909 in Emilio Gentile (ed.), Mussolini e “La Voce” (Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1976), p. 37
5
Just to mention few of Mussolini’s writings : “Pagine rivoluzionarie,” “Il congresso dei socialisti italiani in
Svizzera,” “Opinioni e documenti: La crisi risolutiva,” “Uomini e idee,” “La teppa,” “Socialismo e movimento
sociale nel secolo XIX,” Oo, 1, pp. 43–45., “Socialismo e socialisti,”. “Lo sciopero generale e la violenza,”, “Il
proletariato ha un interesse alle conservazioni delle patrie attuali?” ….
6
There is an essay on "The Doctrine of Fascism" written by Benito Mussolini that appeared in the 1932 edition
of the Enciclopedia Italiana, and excerpts can be read at Doctrine of Fascism. Also ‘La mia Vita’ (1929) which
includes details from his personal life but also political ideas.
7
Oh, wait….

6
But the relief is short, the next subchapter, entitled ‘Fascism in power’ takes the reader back to the
overstretched and imposed comparison method: “Probably no fascist personality since Hitler came
to power in Germany, in 1933, has used the mandate of plurality at the polls to reshape the political
arena more swiftly and more decisively than Duterte in 2016.” (page 80) Using the mandate of
plurality of the polls to swiftly reshaped the political arena is far from being a fascist modus operandi
and one could guess that the absence of references after this claim indicate its void. Bello continues
to list examples – in which according to him – Duterte embodied the fascist in power: Marcos’s
funeral, reshaping of the power relations with the US, etc. Bello however does give credit to Duterte
(page 81) with a unique sentence: “Duterte has been able to tap into this emotional underside of
Filipinos in a way that the Left has never been able to with its anti-imperialist program.”

With a firm decision to continue his unfortunate comparison of Duterte with Hitler and Mussolini,
the following subchapter is dedicated to prediction how Duterte’s presidency might end. Bello’s hope
is that the “age factor” (page 80) can potentially end Duterte’s presidency. He succumbs to the
temptation to compare him, again, with Mussolini and Hitler: Duterte was 72 at the time Bello wrote
his contributions, while Hitler was 44 and Mussolini 39. And then the comparison stops at this point.
There is an interior logic to this comparison that the poor writer of this review just simply is unable to
decipher. Luckily, from this point Bello’s analysis becomes more sober, at least for a while.

Bello argues that the mass movement that got Duterte elected in the first place isn’t institutionalized,
and Kilusang Pagbabago organized by Jun Evasco faces practical obstacles to become something
similar like National Democratic Front. The second challenge that Duterte will have difficulties to
overcome is to deliver the much needed social and economic reforms. Bello calls these reforms
Duterte’s Achille’s Heel (page 83) and he predicts that if the reforms are not implemented a ground
for a successful opposition will become possible. In all, Bello’s stance toward the war on drug is
nothing more than a part of the authoritarian agenda which goal is to destroy the democratic
institutions (idem). In the following subchapters Bello analyses the possible ways in which the
opposition could grow stronger. Logically, for the reason that the ‘elite’ (Bello mentions the Liberal
Party) opposition to Duterte is weak, he arrives to the Left (page84). In the following part Bello
pitilessly critics the Left, in coalition with the Duterte’s government and almost tacitly accepts
Duterte’s war on drugs – except the Communist Party which issued a statement. Bello rightly
formulates a question, then why do they provide legitimacy to Duterte’s administration by being
present as coalitional partners? Bello then ‘buckles the buckle’ and returns to the comparison of the
Philippine president with Hitler and Mussolini – who unlike Duterte – didn’t accept the Left in their
government. Bello’s opinion is that the military is the sole Philippine institution which was not
“shaken up” (page 86) by Duterte. After he eliminates the military too as a possible opposition to
Duterte, Bello arrives to civil society.

And at the moment when it seems that Bello wraps up his contribution, he inflicts a coup de grâce to
the reader: “What the opposition still has to internalize, though, is that opposing to fascism in power
will not be, to borrow a saying from Mao, ‘a dinner party’,’ that will indeed be exceedingly difficult to
demand great sacrifices.” (page 87). A part from the fact that is repugnant to mention a quote from a
leader who could be easily be labeled as a ‘red fascist’8 and who was personally responsible for more

8
The notion that there are basically two types of fascism – red and black -depending on which pole of the Left-
Right dichotomy they occur depicts perfectly a diabolic nature of fascism. Ishay Landa analyzes this feature of
fascism in his masterpiece of book of a fitting title ‘The apprentice sorcerer’ (2010).

7
than 45 million of deaths (Great Leap Forward), Bello seems completely oblivious of some historical
facts, taxonomy and theoretical framework of fascism. Not to mention that the whole contribution is
desperately under-referenced and at occasions contradictory to itself. There is not one reference of a
study of fascism in this contribution. Bello could have used – for instance - Reich’s concept of
irrationality as a crucial aspect of fascism9: Duterte’s waging of war to crime is, slightly said,
irrational. In all human history only China managed to eradicate drugs and use of drugs from its
society but only temporally. Bello could have also used - for instance - Bataille’s theory of fascism
too10. Bataille sharply and methodically defines the field in which fascism thrives, a sort of
battleground in which heterogeneity and homogeneity play a crucial and often opposite role. In that
sense Bataille uses the anthropological concept of clean/unclean; the efforts to make a society
‘clean’ of something is a strong characteristic of proto-fascism in which Duterte’s effort to ‘clean the
Philippines from drogue and criminals’ fits comfortably. But Bello omits these as well numerous
other theoretical possibilities to back up his claim either because of idleness of spirit or because of
his humanism-oriented shortsightedness.

Nowadays it is fashionable to use the word ‘fascism’ and ‘fascist’ to labeled and condemn ad hoc the
ideological or political opponents. These attacks are usually of ad hominem nature11 which goal is to
vilify the person on whom the label ‘a fascist’ is employed. The frequency and easiness with which
the symbolically burdened term ‘fascist’ and ‘fascism’ is castoff unfortunately deflates the content of
the word and the features of the concept that otherwise should be taken very, very seriously. As
Umberto Eco stated in his now famous writing about the basic features of ‘ur’ (or ‘proto’) fascism he
provided (1995):” These features cannot be organized into a system; many of them contradict each
other, and are also typical of other kinds of despotism or fanaticism. But it is enough that one of
them be present to allow fascism to coagulate around it.” A leader –as an individual, or a society that
possess such a feature cannot be brevi manu declared as ‘fascist’, but having such a characteristic
create conditions which can ferment and take over other parts of society and human behavior bit by
bit.

Duterte, although clearly demonstrating fascist tendencies, we are far from the customary
Gleichschaltung and Duterte can’t be compared with Hitler or Mussolini and not even with Mao.
There are no traces of an ideology behind his acts, or at least none which is articulated in a
symbolical manner or is written, expressed in an uttered manner. Duterte’s public statements and his
political acts are ’chameleonique’. He is in the best case (and worst) a criminal, someone who
abuses the power and trust he was given. But the thing is that he did clearly promise during his
presidential campaign what he later enacted: to kill. And therefore we have to be wary to speak
about ‘abuse of power and trust’. There is a notion of implicit quid pro quo between Duterte and his
voters: ‘you vote for me and I will do this and that for you’ – as it exists in other political systems
around the world. But in the Philippine context the authorization stretches to the ‘right to kill’. The
feudal ‘right to kill’ called in Latin ius gladii is a privilege on the top of the feudal hierarchy. This is a
capital punishment and a symbol of high jurisdiction which is fulfilled by the sovereign or the feudal

For the ideological connection and political ‘affiliation’ of the Left and fascism read Sternhell, Mises, Fritz Stern
and many, many others whose studies and arguments underpin the claim that fascism is the
‘bastard/unwanted child’ of Marxism and socialism.
9
W. Reich The Mass Psychology of Fascism (1933)
10
G. Bataille The psychological structure of fascism (1933)
11
Attacking the person’s character or political affiliation instead of his/her arguments

8
ruler. The feudal ruler’s obligation is moreover oriented toward his vassals. In a sense, the capital
punishment, suspended in 2006 in the Philippines was re-established when Duterte got elected. In
this line of thinking he is the embodiment of the ius populi or ius gentium (‘law of nation/people’) – a
notion which originates in the Ancient Roman law –based on the natural reason and sense of justice
of the populous (customary laws). Duterte was chosen by the citizens to act upon their will; he was
chosen to be a recidivist and to react what he managed to do in his ‘success-story’ –or a Curato
wrote (see supra), ‘his exhibit A’ – the city of Davao. He promised that once president, he will use his
power of ius gladii; to remain in the register of the Roman law this means that he uses his supreme
jurisdiction and that is to decide who is going to die and who lives. And that makes him a pronged
arm of the people: a just suzerain.

My ‘favorite’ part of Bello’s contribution is its very last sentence: “Like the anti-Marcos resistance
four decades back, the only certainty members of the anti-fascist front can count on is that they are
doing the right thing. And that, for some, is a certainty worth dying from.” (page 88).

There is nothing so ‘appealing’ when an old man, sitting comfortably in his armchair motivates and
instigates others people’s children to die for the Cause12. There is a Serbian proverb that depicts
perfectly such a formula: Lako je tuđim kurcem gloginje mlatiti.13

The fourth contribution is a joint paper from Claudio and Abinales. Their initial stance is the remark
that Duterte is the first Philippine president who disregards completely the ‘table-manners’ of the
liberal democratic politics. Starting from Duterte’s – as they call “political lexicon” (page94), referring
g to the special Dutertian ‘political glossary’ – they notice the absence of the usual idioms, words
from Duterte’s vocabulary, such as ‘justice’, ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. In this manner the authors
touched a crucial point in which Duterte is radically different from his predecessors and that makes
him supported not only by the Philippine citizen who voted for him but other, distant populations, as
for instance Serbian or Hungarians: his frank, speech, in which vulgarity is only a proof of sincerity
and where the upper mentioned usual belong to the political phraseology, with words void of
meaning, which qualify as political topoi. Unfortunately, the authors don’t develop this concept
further, although maybe the reader can look forward to this enquiry will be their next project in
common. They too, as Bello, note Duterte’s authoritarian ways, in which they found traces, as they
call it a “garden variety” of fascism (idem). But Claudio and Abinales point toward nationalism which,
as a political project – unfinished since the Marco’s regime – which is in the basis of Duterte’s
political mechanism. The authors smartly notice that there is a big chance that the present state in
which a person such as Duterte can lead politics as he does, is extraordinary by all standards when it
comes to political alliances and political practices, and they are giving it a name, the “Philippine age
of extremes” – pointing toward the stormy past of this part of the world, which, for a change, hit the
Philippine islands. The authors examine two political conditions that made possible Duterte’s
election: the Marcosianism and Maoism, which they find enrooted in him. This a past that Duterte
has seen and lived from up close and in many ways shaped him as a public figure and impacted his
political stance and public behavior. In that sense Claudio and Abinales do a wonderful job tracing
down Duterte’s past, deciphering his acts, words and behavior. The authors are no sparing in

12
Šešelj likes this.
13
It is an expression for people who enjoy benefits while someone else is taking the risk for it, and therefore
they can give false advice, act irresponsibly without retribution. The saying can be literarily translated as:
“Thrashing around in stinging nettle with someone else's dick.”

9
criticism of the Philippine Left, which entered in coalition with Duterte and supported him in the
presidential race; in many ways they found a lot of influence on Duterte. I’ve particularly appreciated
a touch of cutting humor in this sentence which exposes the common features of the Left and
Duterte: “Both the president and the politburo see themselves as vanguards of a movement which
will bring about the birth of the nation, beginning in distancing the country from the United States.”
(page 99) Duterte’s anti-Americanism is seen by them as a proof of a “vintage bourgeois nationalist in
origin” (idem). In that sense, Claudio and Abinales provide enough descriptions and elements that
support their thesis. Inspired by the work of Benedict Anderson about the Philippines, they join to
the theory of ‘caciquism’ in which Duterte is a ‘come-back’, a “redux” (page 102) of a supreme
cacique, as Marcos was described by Anderson (and other such Kreuzer 2005, Sidel 199914). They see
traces of the same absolutism, just as in Marcos, who equals the state with himself in Duterte too.
The same efforts of centralization, which were already practices in Davao, are attempted as head of a
state, in which Duterte sees himself as the ‘mayor of the Philippines’ (page 104). In this seeming
contradiction, between the ideology of the Left, the impact of Joma Sisson, and the Marcosian
nostalgia of a supreme cacique, Claudio and Abinales produce a nice definition which unites the
Dutertian paradox: “[…]while Duterte may deploy Sisonite rhetoric, his actions are pure marcosian.”
(page 104) The authors note the multitude of scholarly attempt to classify Duterte (page 105) and
observe that Duterte’s unorthodoxy and contradiction make difficult to place him in just one
presidential style, or category of a regime. Indisputably Claudio and Abinales, as well as all the rest of
the contributors to this volume inherently sense that it is extremely difficult to position Duterte on
the usual Left-Right political spectrum. Duterte may be unclassifiable because he is tremendously
flexible and opportunistic in his conduct and speech, and that an absence of a ‘steady’ ideology is
actually of amalgam of seemingly irreconcilable poles. His roots are as Claudio and Abinales rightly
claim in a special mix of the past Philippine political currents. He might be a ‘false Leftard’ or a
‘genuine’ (original as –claims Bello) Rightard, but this man is where he is because of his ability to
speak in convincing ways which usually comes from knowing how to listen to the others. But then
again, Duterte might be just a man of his time: belonging to a new/recycled breed of politicians
called ‘populist’ who successfully mix ideas from the Left and from the Right, creating a convincing
narrative which sounds true and is easily understandable to the voters and are not in discomfort to
pursue uncommon, shocking and even undemocratic political means and practices. In that sense
Duterte is just a Philippine precursor of a fashionable political style.

Caday and Altez’s contribution is the fifth chapter of the book. In order to understand Duterte,
their rightful assertion is, one has to examine the social, political and historical conditions of his
native island: Mindanao. In order to understand Mindanao, the authors start with the analysis of the
conflict which is raging on this island since decades. In the root of this conflict – which is property of
land and its resources –is to be found Duterte’s popular support. He is a man, the progeny of the
Christian settlers and Muslim autochthonous inhabitants. He seems to understand the conflict and
the issues that create a waste symbolical field in which negotiations between diverse groups and
their representatives are negotiated. Duterte is well aware and locally present in this community that

14
Anderson, Benedict: Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams New Left Review I/169, May-
June 1988
Kreuzer, Peter ; Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (Ed.): Political clans and violence in the
southern Philippines. Frankfurt am Main, 2005
Sidel John T. 1999Capital, Coercion, and Crime Bossism in the Philippines, Stanford University Press

10
represents not only his political stronghold but provides him legitimacy to represent them as the
Philippine president. The provincial representative in the presidential palace in Manila is not only
symbolically important for the inhabitants of his native island; it gives hope to other, under-
represented, geographically distant communities. These elements nurture Duterte’s legitimacy and
strength and public support he is as Caday and Altez rightly define ‘one of us’ (page 116). There is a
wonderful definition the authors provide (page 117) that perfectly explains in metaphor the rise of
such a man as Duterte: “In a culture that values blood next to God, Mr.Duterte is seen as an
opportunity bound by familial commonality […].” Duterte is as Caday and Altez explain a physical
embodiment of Mindanaon social contradictions and ways of life. In that sense, he is expected to
understand the token of the conflict and he is trusted that his administration is going to deliver a
solution that other, post-EDSA presidents and administrations were unable: a solution that will be
satisfactory to everyone. Only a Mindanaon can understand Mindanao and only a Mindanaon can fix
Mindanaoan problems (page 122). Caday’s and Altez’s contribution is a precious window in the
background of Duterte’s home public support. However the authors are very careful to avoid any
prediction of the future of Duterte’s presidency. A simple ‘quirk’ that will rub off his home-based
public support: will Duterte be able to deal with problems that accumulated the past fifty years on
this island, and if he doesn’t, how will he return home as a failure and how a popular backlash is
going to be articulated….?

Adele Webb is the author of the sixth contribution and her paper exposes a crucial point in which
Duterte’s political stance was – at least for the present – diametrical opposition of his predecessors:
the question of the Philippine – USA relation. Webb carefully begins her topic with a vignette, a
statement that Duterte pronounced two and half months after he become president (sept 2016).
In order to understand the context to which Webb is referring to, we should recall those words and
those times. Duterte’s words were directed to the US president Obama: "You must be respectful. Do
not just throw away questions and statements. Son of a whore, I will curse you in that forum," said -
Duterte at a news conference shortly before flying to Laos to attend a summit15. At that precise
moment the planet stopped for a second and everyone hold his breath. The fact is that at least the
half of the human population would love to pronounce the ‘son of the whore ‘ to the most powerful
man on Earth of that time, but obviously Duterte was the only who actually did it. How such a
statement could be interpreted beside the obvious crudeness that shocked so many? Duterte was
insulting a president whose one foot was already outside the White House. If his ‘bid’ was successful:
he gained an enormous public support in his country, and a foreign support on the international
level, by those who the warmongering eight years of the Obama administration disappointed so
many16. In the case Clinton would have won the US presidency, it was clear that a political double-
faced individual as Clinton is would not mind insults oriented toward the former president. If Trump
would have won….well, we know about how that would turn out. One can’t escape the feeling that
Duterte has a really good sense of ‘Realpolitik’ and has instinctively felt what will become oblivious a
couple of months later when Trump was elected president: that one era in the US politics was over

15
https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2016/sep/06/rodrigo-duterte-calls-barack-obama-a-son-of-a-
whore-video
16
The only US president in history who started & completed his presidency with a nation at war; Obama’s
administration intervened bringing ‘peace and democracy’ in seven countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia,
Libya, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Some interventions were started during previous administrations (Iraq &
Afghanistan); but the majority was set of by Obama’s.

11
and another period was about to emerge. The man who undeservingly17 got the Nobel Prize - only
because of the color of his skin - was not in situation to pose a threat to Duterte. With such a
statement Duterte had not much to lose but a lot to gain. But let us return to Webb’s contribution:

Webb develops further the astonishment that the other half of the human population felt when the
Philippine president insulted so gravely the American: that Duterte’s ‘curse’ no matter how shocking
just “cement[ed] the president’s support” (page 127) and all the international critique that were
shoot at Duterte that day and the months to come only “seem[ed] to bolster the determination of
[Duterte’s] supporters”. This is the basis on which Webb builds her contribution and presents the
already mentioned element in this volume of Duterte’s presidency (Holmes): the strong resentment
of the former colonial Master and the desire “to exorcise the ghost of colonialism” (page 136
quotation from Hau 2000). But the thing is that the Philippine voters didn’t voted in despite of
condemnation of human rights organization for an individual who already and without hypocrisy
exposed as a major of Davao of what he was capable of. Such an interpretation - as the research,
survey data in previous chapters clearly has shown (Teehankee, Holmes) and some which will follow
(Lemchek in this volume) – would suggest that the average voter was incapable comprehending the
nature of Duterte’s presidential race promises. It was also suggested (Curato) that as the voters in
Davao the Philippine voters simply exchanged a part of their civil rights in order to get some public
safety. And such a ‘batter’ didn’t include the basic human rights, that later Duterte’s administration
disregarded. But the thing is that none of these upper or later explanations doesn’t even stops and
ponder over the possibility that the average Philippine voter’s ‘selfishness’ to choose a president
could possibly stem from seeing the human-rights issues as a catalyst. Denying that human rights and
their implementation in the countries called the ‘Third World’ – which basically refers to all countries
which are seen and labeled as such by the Western World – is completely exempt from politics and
political ideologies would be a grave error (see Mutua 1996). Human rights are imposed from the top
down, from the rich Western countries toward the poor countries (Mutua 1996); hence after a while
a resistance - steaming from different moral and ethical stances – has become palpable. Imposing HR
has become an act of hubris, another tentative to ‘impose civilization’ or a form of colonialism
(idem). In that sense HR appear as the new world ideology (idem). The resistance toward the
imposition of a set of political ideologies imposed by powerful countries would actually present a
form of stimulus to a voter who would vote against this new form of colonialism (idem). Of course,
the customary explanation is that it seems that the Philippine voters have chosen a more urgent, a
more pressing concern and a president who promised to deal according to that concern: local public
safety over distant human rights. In that sense the author of this contribution is asking the right
questions but develops her argument toward the usual set of ideas.

Adele Webbs contribution is instead built on the Philippine resistance to the American imperialism.
In that sense she thoroughly analyzes step by step Duterte’s statements and his discursive strategies
elements from his biography in parallel with historic and social conditions that posed the two
countries on the geopolitical chess board. From her description in the subchapter ‘America’s ‘Empire
of Liberty’ in the Philippines’ (page 130) in which the author returns to the very beginnings of the
American colonialism, the reader can already distinguish what is yet to come in the XXth and XXIth
century: a specific US-modus operandi of delivering nations from the Darkness and bringing them

17
Obama has at least one other merit, as for instance stimulating Trump to become a president:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8TwRmX6zs4

12
Democracy trough usually sword and fire: “The American government and its people wished to teach
the Filipinos about political freedom and self-government, but this “democratic-tutelage” came in
the form of the forceful imposition of a direct rule” (page 131). The Americans didn’t change their
foreign policy a bit the past hundred years…. Seeking in historical documents, analyzing newspaper
articles from the colonial era Webb depicts a pretty detailed portrait that will cast its shadow a
century later on the Philippine political culture and particularly the Duterte administration. A
contribution worth of reading necessary in understanding the ambivalent relationship between two
countries, two cultures and in understanding how the American hegemony exercised in all corners of
the world made its first steps.

Nathan G. Quimpo is the author of the seventh contribution. One can only expect the best from this
author and he remains true to the quality of his previous papers. Quimpo places Duterte among his
peers and predecessors in the Philippine culture of caciquism, of the warlord, or the boss as
numerous authors have called this particular phenomenon of political-warfare leadership (Anderson,
Kreuzer, Sidel). Quimpo further relies on the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School, the so
called ‘securitization’. The term was coined by Ole Wæver in 1995, and in short it is a political and
administrational strategy and it refers to a process of state actors converting subjects into matters of
"security". This is an extreme version of politicization that enables extraordinary means to be used in
the name of security. Recently it has become a pretty popular political game to play (f.i. Sarkozy
2007-2012; Orbàn 2010-ongoing; just to mention of couple of Hungarians….). Quimpo starts his
arguments by putting forward how Duterte and his administration forged a situation in which
securitization has become a leitmotif of his rule. Duterte’s estimations (July 2016) was 3.7 million of
drug addicts while the DDB (Dangerous Drugs Board) put forward a significantly lower number of 1.8
million drug users in the Philippines. Quimpo analysis other examples from across the world, in
countries that can be labeled really as ‘narco states’ in comparison with the Philippines . He arrives to
the conclusion that the Philippines is far from becoming a narco-state and that Duterte’s
securitization is just another political strategy of the already known ‘bossism’ tactic. In order to
sustain his claim, Quimpo goes back, to the ‘source’: Davao and searches the roots of his claim. The
author asks a key question which becomes obvious: why has Duterte securitized illegal drugs? (page
152) For Quimpo that answer to this question is to be found in the populist attitude of the Philippine
president. In that sense Quimpo depicts a sharp portrait of a political opportunism called ‘populism’,
capable of using the “thin-centered ideology” (quoting Mudde 2004 page 152) an ideology which is
easily combined what is ‘handy’: ecology, humanism, etc. In that sense Duterte reapers just as one of
the many opportunistic, Philippine tough-guys, who nurture their public image of ‘man of the people’
and rule with an iron fist. Quimpo – an excellent clairvoyant when it comes to political development
in the Philippines sees what will yet to happen; he predicts that Duterte’s presidency might result in
the most “murderous private army in the post-Marcos era” (page 156). At the time Quimpo wrote
his contribution the number of killings of the ‘Oplan-Tokhang’ operation was: 1400. At the time I
write these lines the number of killed individuals in the anti-drug operations is 6400 (source:
http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/04/16/18/philippines-bars-eu-socialist-party-official-for-criticizing-
duterte). Quimpo relies on Kreuzer’s research of Duterte’s Death Squads and finds Kreuzer’s analysis
pertinent: “Duterte makes abundantly clear that there can be security, but only he himself can
provide it.” (page 156 quotation by Kreuzer 2009). Quimpo further advances the characteristics of
Duterte’s populism, which is according to him “eclectic and unmixed with other ideologies”
(page159), which is in opposition to the claims of other authors in this volume (see Claudio &

13
Abinales). Quimpo’s forecasts are grim: he expects the ‘vigilante president’ as he calls him (page161)
and even ‘a serial –killer president’ (idem) who will become more authoritarian with time to go full to
dictatorship or in the best case will establish a form of competitive authoritarianism.

Chapter eight is the article written by Sheila S. Coronel. Coronel takes the reader brevi manu into the
Duterte’s policing. For starters, this an excellent, well documented and very detailed contribution.
Coronel provides a nice historical frame for the ways of the Philippine policing which was, at least
when it comes to historians always corrupt, deployed coercion, was used and abused by political
interests and was a tool of excessive violence. Then the author takes back to the depiction of
Duterte’s past in Davao, and in despite that a lot was said in this volume about how Duterte ruled
that city, Coronel manages to bring some new elements into light. The roots of what is happening in
the contemporary Philippines indeed are to be found in the most southern city of Mindanao. Coronel
is very thorough and detailed and depicts the modus operandi of the War on Drugs from police
sources, testimonies and newspaper articles and often personal interviews. Her contribution is a
splendid research paper, a sort of résumé for all wanting to learn more on how Duterte’s extra-
judicial machinery actually functions. Coronel even provides a comparative table – a sort of ‘price list’
(sic) - she compiled from various sources containing concrete data of the types of police activities and
amounts which are usually extorted by the policemen. Coronel depicts a staggering background of
the Oplan-Tokhang action which was a wonderful opportunity, not to be missed by the already
corrupt police forces to make some additional ‘earnings’. This contribution is an unforgettable insight
into the other side of the coin which is usually mention when speaking, writing about Duterte’s War
on Drugs. Rich in personal descriptions, in compiling various written, oral, private and official sources
this chapter is not to be missed. Reading Coronel’s line one can really asses for what the Philippine
citizens actually have given authorization when voted for Duterte: a practice that already existed was
further empowered.

The ninth chapter written by Jayson S. Lamchek is entitled “A mandate for a mass killing?’ Public
support for Duterte’s war on drugs.” It is a contribution which reads like an exercise of thought
rather than a scientific article for its weakness of a theoretical frame and lack of references. Lamchek
is starting from the question that puzzles not only most of the contributors of this volume, but a big
part of the Philippine public and particularly shocks the international community: what is the reason
of the public support of Duterte especially with the piling up of bodies killed in extra-judicial manner?
Lamchek starts with an idea of a Philippine journalist, Ramos Marlon that the Philippine voters “care
more about solving the drug problem than protecting individual rights “(page 199). In that sense, he
agrees with the general assessment of the situation around the extra-judicial killings’ and according
to which Duterte is popular because he keeps his word given before the presidential elections.
Lamchek then goes on comparing Duterte’s administration with the US President George W. Bush
(2001-2009) in which the public 40.8 % of Americans supported torture of it’s to be used as means to
prevent terrorism. Lamchek forgets to provide any references to when the survey/statistics were
made and the period of time in which it was done. This particularly problematic, because the
question which was presented to the American survey seems to be hypothetical – and the survey
was presumably done after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in which the citizens of the US were attacked
on their own soil. In that sense the comparison that Lamchek suggests is out of the place: the
American survey was about the hypothetical support of un-democratic practices. While in the case of
the Philippines the topic that the Duterte administration uses is a question of public safety, a
situation in situ and it is far from being hypothetical.

14
Then Lamchek goes on to ask a rhetorical question, wondering about the overwhelming public
support of Duterte’s extra-judicial killings: “Did Filipinos ever consider human rights important?”. He
wonders if “the people were harboring murderous contempt for criminals” (page 200). And “[w]here
the citizens just waiting for a strongmen unshackled by political correctness to speak against the
tyranny of human rights?”. In the rest of his paper Lamcheks tries to answers these self-imposed key
questions while arguing that the public is “at best, ambivalent toward these killings” and “[t]their
knowledge and the judgment of the killings are being muddled by the haze Duterte and his allies
have created over the question of killings” (idem). We can’t of course exclude that many of the
Philippine voters are/were completely unaware of Duterte’s past in Davao, and that there is
indisputably a lot of ‘haze’ which impedes the average voter to see trough in how the extra-judicial
killings are conducted, but the way how the author of this contribution constructs his arguments
potentially nurtures the feeling that Lamchek’s contribution is more of an ideological construct than
a scientific contribution.

But let us start from the beginning: “Did Filipinos ever consider human rights important?”. This a
question that puts the one who is asking it in a morally superior position. What I mean by that, is that
if the Filipinos did / did not consider the question of HR, the author should have provided some
reference, or a survey data which demonstrates the Filipino attitude toward the HR. Otherwise, such
a question, even if it is rhetorical comes from a direction of a moral high ground: the authors cares,
ergo he wonders, he is potentially outraged by the conduct of the Philippine voters. But then again, if
we consider the history of HR – which is quite recent (seven decades or since the end of WWII) – we
can clearly see that the imposition HR ideology is a western world concept. While HR concept is not
unique to the European societies, the current ‘universal’ and the ‘official’ HR corpus is essentially
European (see more on this Donnelly 1990, Mutua 1996 etc.18) In a cross-cultural perspective, there
are great differences in what the concept HR cover and if there is a ‘hierarchy’ between various HR,
which one comes first (see also Mutua 1996 on this). Not all HR are accepted and applied in the same
manner across cultures. Let us take the example one of the most democratic countries in the world:
the USA. There is a thing called the ’American exceptionalism’ in applying human rights. While the
first-generation of HR were readily accepted (civil and political rights are the first generation of
human rights), many HR of the second- and the third- HRs were not (see Neier 2012 on this19). When
it comes to the study of the history of HR we can see examples of the implementation and the
respect of HR is cross-culturally enacted (see Mutua 1996): the human rights are often a requirement
coming from the rich countries toward the poor, in order to grant an aid, or obtain something. HRs
are imposed from the top down (idem), from rich Western countries toward the poor, hence the
resistance (as I mention it in the review of Webb’s contribution); especially when it comes to
different moral or ethical stances of a society/country (idem). Imposing them has become an act of
hubris (Mutua 1996) another tentative to ‘impose civilization’, - openly said, another form of
‘colonialism’. In that sense Lamchek’s rhetorical questions could have oriented his contribution as for
instance analyzing the public support of Duterte, as a reaction of the Filipinos, a collective awareness
that the HR ideal is unattainable, and their choice of Duterte as a backlash against modernism. But to

18
Donnelly, Jack, The Relative Universality of Human Rights. Human Rights Quarterly. Volume 29, Number 2,
May 2007. pp. 281-306
Mutua, Makau W. The Ideology of Human Rights. Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 36, 1996, pp 589-
657
19
Neier, Aryeh 2012. The International Human Rights Movement A History. Princeton University Press

15
orient one’s research toward those courses would imply treating the issue of HR as a new world
ideology, a political ideology and for that a high moral ground is not a good point to start.

Lamchek in trying to answer his initial questions by bringing forth and interpreting the survey data –
provided the Social Wheatear Station and Pulse Asia. He arrives to the conclusion that the data does
not openly endorse the extra-judicial killings (page 202). It becomes also clear that the public,
although not really wanting the death of the suspects is rather concerned by its own safety – not
being the victim of the extra-judicial killings. The author then goes on depicting the Philippine state’s
strategy: “denial, recalibration and deflection” (page 202) which resume well the Philippine state’s
response. Subsequently, aware of the international outrage that Duterte’s presidency inspires, the
author also speculates over the possibility if the HR –organization fact-finding and campaigning
matter. In that spirit it is pretty shame that he didn’t developed in the first place the concept of HR as
ideology as I suggested above. While Lamchek is compiling the data from the reports of Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, Peace Research Frankfurt from the first six months of Duterte’s
presidency he seems blissfully unaware of the international criticism of the bias and unethical
behavior that two of these organizations faced the past couple of years20. One would argue that this
criticism is irrelevant for the Philippine ‘case’ and the reputation of a NGO doesn’t matter21… But it
does.

Lamchek’s sub-chapter entitled ‘Participatory Surveillance and Community-Sourced Death Sentence’

is probably the most interesting part of his contribution. It deals with the question if the citizens
themselves will engage in the extra-judicial killings, as Duterte urged them (page 210) by sending to
the barangay-officials a circular asking them to create lists of drug-users and pushers (page 2011).The
author projects if this call-up would be accepted how it might result. The author is of the opinion that
it might turn to“genocide” (pages 213 and 215). I wonder if the author of this ‘paper-social activism’
thinks having his ‘own’ definition of genocide…. One can’t the escape the feeling that he thinks that
the number of killed individuals is the main characteristic of the concept of ‘genocide’. At the
beginning of his contribution, Lamcheks mentions a number of 7000 of killed individuals in Duterte’s
War on Drugs (page 199). The Srebrenica-genocide counts 837222. If Lamchek anticipates genocide
somewhere in the future, that means that 7000 dead souls don’t qualify as such… Would 10 000
do?? The author should really, really reconsider the context in which he intends to use such a
concept as ‘genocide’. Some concept should be taken very seriously otherwise an unsmart use of the
word banalizes its meaning; in short it ‘inflates the currency’.

The tenth contribution is a pretty original stance of examination of the Duterte presidency. It is a
chapter written by Anna Cristina Pertierra. She focuses on the Philippine media and the celebrity

20
For HRW see the list on: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Human_Rights_Watch
For AI: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Amnesty_International
21
For more on how the ‘holy-cows’ of the HR ideology are created and function see Makau (1996); on how
NGOs manipulate the civil society on third world countries see: Warleigh (2001), Bryant (2002), Hemment
(2004), Ghosh (2009), etc. etc….
Warleigh, Alex ‘Europeanizing’ Civil Society: NGOs as Agents of Political Socialization. Volume39, Issue4.
November 2001. pp. 619-639
Bryant, Raymond L. False Prophets? Mutant NGOs and Philippine Environmentalism. Society & Natural
Resources. Volume 15, 2002 - Issue 7
Hemment, Julie. The Riddle of the Third Sector: Civil Society, International Aid, and NGOs in Russia.
Anthropological Quarterly. Volume 77, Number 2, Spring 2004. pp. 215-241 |
22
Bodies are found and added to the grave-memorial with each year

16
culture in the Philippine national electoral machine. Pertierra argues that Duterte’s success is
partially due to this powerful machinery which is an important factor in creating public images. The
author turns her gaze toward the past (ab)uses by the media starting from the Marcoses in which the
Maroc’s couple’s ‘intimacy’ display in public was a “crucial element in their popularity” (page 220).
She then enumerates a couple of other, well-known examples, who building on their public image (or
roles) created themselves a political carrier: Mayor Lim, Estrada, Manny Pacquiao – just to mention
few. Pertierra advances the idea the “media celebrities and elected politicians both build upon
longstanding traditions of chains of vertical loyalty between the rich and the poor” (page 221). She
goes on then describing a form of politics she calls ‘televisual’ which are basically the televised
proceedings from the senate and the congress. She analyses the case of Senator de Lima, who
sharply criticized Duterte and later faced repercussions or of the former National Chief of the
Philippine Police Dela Rosa. Intrigues and discussions in the senate and congress were braodcasted
by TV chains and were watched as Perierra states “like soap opera storylines” (page 222). She also
enquires the reasons of such interest, or rather the fascination of the Philippine public with the
political intrigues which are theatrically ‘served’ trough television. She first examines the Latin-
American ‘TV-wonder’, the phenomenon of telenovelas and compares them to the dutertian political
intrigues. The fascination that the public feels – and feelings is the key-word - is how the viewers
relate to the telenovelas and other topics presented as such (page 224) and how they catch and
shape the public interests of politics. The newly-found interest however is a double-edged sword:
although it introduces political topics to a part of the population which is usually dispassionate it
banalizes politics and turns away the attention from the pertinent questions toward trivialities. It
turns the political participant or rather the voter into a consumer, a consumer seeking entertainment
(page 225). Perierra then establishes how the viewers taste for entertainment forms into political
support (page 227).

The eleventh chapter, a joint contribution written by Jason Vincent A. Cabañes and Jaeel S. Cornelio.
It is as much original stance as the previous chapter. They deal with the political participation trough
social media and the phenomenon of trolls. Indisputably the arena of political debates has become
more personal with the emergence and the development of social networks and accessibility of
internet. Cabañes and Cornelio have hit the right spot by analyzing the phenomenon of the ‘troll’ and
‘trolling’. Political trolling is probably the most upsetting trolling from all other subspecies of this
internet-creature. The authors take time to describe what political trolling actually means and which
are the usual tactics in general: posting provocative messages, pissing participants off, disfiguring
original messages, creating abusive gif-s, sharing inaccurate data, by exaggerating/parodying extreme
views creating traps for laughing stock (Poe’s Law), etc . The authors then go toward the analysis of
the ‘Dutertard’ ( ‘a retarded supporter of Duterte’ page 235) which is a troll-subspecies created
during the presidential race and is quite active since Duterte’s presidency. The activity of the trolls
creates a particularly tense online atmosphere in which the participants of any debate as soon as
such troll appear resort to two sorts of behaviors: by disregard or by closing immediately any form of
meaningful debate. The ‘fight or flight’ strategy usually ends with ‘flight’ when encountering a troll.
The success of political trolls is such that even a category of ‘professional trolls’ appeared. The
authors of this highly captivating contribution take time and analyze the rise of such political trolls.
Who are they, how much money these individuals can earn with their online activities…? Cabañes
and Cornelio paint a fascinating landscape of this usually hidden fragment of any political scene in
the world. The phenomenon is of a such extent that it had created a subculture made of individuals,

17
who are often, disillusioned by the realities of their daily life, embrace amplified forms of cynicism
and black humor in order to give voice to their frustrations and counter-balance the elite-driven
reportages of the mainstream media (page238). This creates an eco-system in which Duterte’s
massive public support becomes possible. The authors go on and speculate about the future of
trolling and interpreting the emotional, social sources in which gives birth to trolling. Is trolling a form
of moral panic, an attack of an idealized social order…? (page 241). I’m tempted to say that the
authors probably are unfamiliar with Rabelais’s Gargantua (XVIth century). The image of Gargantua
and his internet-progeny is probably old as the institution of social layers, in which ill-mannered,
dark-humored personages served as pipes to let out the unwanted steam of social upheaval…. The
authors of this chapter too arrive to the same conclusion, meaning that the trolls bring up salient
issues which make the public – or the participants of an online debate – stop and think (page 245).

The twelfth contribution is probably the weakest in all the volume, although the chapter starts with
an excellent and rather original idea of analyzing Duterte’s political stance and administration under
the prism of the queer theory (aka gender studies). However the contribution is rather poorly backed
up with relevant theoretical background and is occasionally ‘embroidered’ with slang typical for the
gender studies-publications. Hardly any references are to be found in the text, no contextual backing
whatsoever is provided and occasional outburst of unsustained claims makes the reader wonder if
this contribution is truly a result of scientific query. Evangelista, the author of this theoretically
modest contribution starts from the idea of Duterte as “strongman/father/womanizer politician as a
part of [Duterte’s] narrative of tough governance” (page 252.) Indeed the idea is justifiable and it
merits a thorough analysis in order to develop and finally defend this premise, however Evangelista
doesn’t deliver. Rather Evangelista brings forth a theoretically void but idiomatic elaboration: “”A
hetero-patriarchal system is one where political practices are understood trough hierarchical
dichotomies between sexes” (page 253) – cunningly suggests the author. But the thing is, Evangelista
doesn’t provide a reference or a source of this potential quotation or remark. He doesn’t even take
time to explain what a ‘hetero-patriarchal system’ is according to him. What theoretical grounding
of the concept ‘patriarchy’ the author is starting from? Sociological? Feminist? The reader can’t
know. And what makes the use of the notion of this term difficult is the thing that different scientific
traditions organize differently the semantic meaning of this concept23. Furthermore, presumably to
confuse additionally the reader, the author adds that this ‘system’ can be understood “trough
hierarchical dichotomies between sexes”. No explanation whatsoever why the concept of dichotomy
– a division into two (see Meriam-Webster dictionary or any other for the meaning of ‘dichotomy’ )
contrasting entities is in Plural. Are there more dimensions than the gendered dimension(s)? Not to
mention that Evangelista in his starting point uses the term’ sexes’ – which are biological categories
and which contradict his immediate following sentence: “These are dichotomies because sexes are
“biologically” understood as a heterosexual binary: male or female.” (idem) The word ‘dichotomy’
refers to a division of some kind into two groups – ergo the Plural is far from being logical.
Evangelista probably skipped the class of Biology in his primary school, otherwise he would be
informed that sexes are a binary category in Biology… And only God knows why Evangelista is using
quotation marks – perhaps he is convinced that this branch of science is a cultural construct or a

23
‘patriarchy’ in Philosophy is different from ‘patriarchy’ in Anthropology, Sociology and so forth (see Ferguson
1999 or Lockard (2007) or Henslin 2001 etc)
KE Ferguson ‘Patriarchy’ Women's Studies Encyclopedia, 1999
C Lockard. Societies, Networks, and Transitions: Volume I: A Global History. 2007
Henslin, James M. (2001). Essentials of Sociology. Alin and Bacon

18
form of religion…? I can’t help wondering. I can only presume that Evangelista is blissfully unaware
about the harsh realities of the impact of the chromosomes. In order to develop his idea, Evangelista
proceeds using the notion of ‘hetero-patriarchal system’ (page 253) which according to him “derives
its strength from the assumption that this order is being “natural”(idem). Considering that the reader
can’t know what semantical field or theoretical concept this system actually should cover, one
cannot know how the assumption of the ‘natural order’ is actually made. When Evangelista finally
quotes a reference in the following sentence (quotation by Chris Weedon, same page), he is using it
in a quite opposite sense as Weedon uses it: “appeal to the ‘natural’ is one of the most powerful
aspects of the common sense of thinking, but it is a way of understanding social relations which
denies history” (idem). Exactly what the author himself is trying to force upon the reader by the
simple putting into quotation mark a whole branch of science.

On the following pages the author develops his initial position, by taking into scrutiny the contra-
example of the critics against Hilary Clinton as female political persona whose femininity was denied
because of her public image (page 254). Evangelista draws a parallel on the Duterte’s opponent
Grace Poe, who struggled with the same image in the public (idem). This would be an interesting
parallel if Evangelista would provide more references to his claims, but he exposes his arguments in a
rather narrational style and when he quotes he forgets to mention from where. His paper has the
form due to its theoretical shortcoming to a newspaper article. The author drives the reader through
a lengthy description of Duterte’s predecessors and their language (of course without references or
quotation-sources) trying desperately to analyze what a Philippine perception of ‘masculinity’ and
‘virility’ might be. This is an original stance but without the proper quotations it reads like a bunch of
enumeration. Finally (page 257) Evangelista begins to analyze Dutere’s appearance, public speech. In
this part too, Evangelista throws the gender-theoretical slang at the reader 24 probably to convince
him/her and turn away the reader’s gaze from his theoretical shortcomings. The author analyzes
Manuel Roxas, one of the critics of Duterte and takes him as contra-example: first he analyzes Roxas
as also an example of a politician who plays a card of a ‘virile politician’ but what sets him apart from
Duterte is Roxas politeness: one being a ‘polite’ (Roxas) the other being bestowed by a ‘street
masculinity’ (page 257). One can’t help wondering whose assessment is taking into account in the
taxonomy of vulgarity & masculinity…. To make sure, Evagelista clarifies: “Nevertheless Roxas sets
his masculinity apart by performing respectability” concludes the author (page 257). It may probably
come as a shock to the author but ‘respectability’ can’t be ‘performed’. Simply because the notion
‘respectability’ is an assessment of quality made by others25. God knows how such a category could
be ‘performed’ and Evangelista decided to keep the reader in dark.

24
A usual practice in the newspeak-branches of ‘sciences’ such as for instance porn studies, fat studies, etc. For
more colorful examples see the collection of the ‘New Real Peer Review’ on Twitter (@RealPeerReview) who
constituted a nice anthology of publication of these new branches of ‘sciences’ which often kidnap terms and
notions from humanities (their favorite one are Sociology and Anthropology) and (ab)use them in the most
extraordinary manner by adding/subtracting to their original semantic fields, hence the appellation ‘newspeak-
sciences’ (cf Orwel).
25
See definition of Merriam-Webster: Definition of ‘respectable’
1 : worthy of respect : estimable
2 : decent or correct in character or behavior : proper
3 a : fair in size or quantity
Or the Cambridge English Dictionary: ‘Respectable’- considered to be socially acceptable because of your good
character, appearance, or behavior

19
Evangelista doesn’t stop at the theoretical analysis which is void of almost completely from theory.
He suggests a strategy that reveals his activism ambitions: disruption. “By putting forward a queer26
analysis of Duterte’s political style, I do not mean to excuse his sexism. Instead, it is important to
understand how his masculinity is performed, to better understand spaces for engagement.” (page
206).

At the beginning of this chapter I was still convinced that I am having a volume compiled of serious
research based on scientific methods, meaning: an objective scientific contribution. But reading this
paragraph I can’t help myself wondering: if Evangelista’s contribution is week – lacking in theory –
because it is more oriented toward activism, and if so what does it do in an otherwise serious
scientific volume? Or if it’s activism - one doesn’t exclude the other – why not providing a serious
scientific background to his claims…? A serious scientific contribution based on facts might have a
hint of activism in it. But a piece of activist pamphlet usually doesn’t rely on science: au contraire, it is
usually full of ideology and concepts based on such ideology. And then another conundrum in the
same sentence: why the author presumes that the reader would think that Evangelista is ‘excusing’
Duterte? Why would Evangelista’s opinion –or his presumption about the reader’s speculations
about his ‘opinion’ might be relevant…? A hint of polarization is peeping out of this unfortunate
sentence. All these questions emerge, but we will not find the answer for them in the remaining two
and a half pages. Instead Evangelista suggest a set of actions in which the leading role would be
played by the LGBT community in which micro-protests (page 261) will “destabilize the hetero-
patriarchal norms” (idem). No mention which norms he is referring to, or from which examples of
successful micro-protests Evangelista draws his conclusion. Personally, I don’t think that waiving the
rainbow flag on the streets of Manila with the goal to make Duterte drops from his presidential seat
is going be very efficacious.

Evangelista finally concludes by quoting Foucault in which he probably tries to compensate his
otherwise theoretically void contribution full of ideological slang27: “As critics of hetero-patriarchal
discourses […]we must be pessimistic hyper-activists” (page 262). In order to grasp why Evangelista
quotes Foucault and how come in this context, we have to look it up the original quotation: “My
point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as
bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to
apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic - activism. I think that the ethico-political choice we have to
make every day is to determine which is the main danger.” (from 1983 page number missing in
Evangelista’s chapter, otherwise page 343 from a volume published in 198428). The quotation is taken
from an interview Foucault gave. It is particularly interesting that Evangelista didn’t quote from
Foucault’s philosophical corpus but rather from his personal agenda. When quoting just the poignant
expression of ‘pessimistic hyper-activism’ the author of this contribution by avoiding a pitfall has
fallen into the trap of the Foucauldian danger: by choosing fervent activism, failed as an academic
contributor.

-A respectable amount or quality is large enough or of a good enough standard to be acceptable

26
At least the word ‘queer’ in its original sense is logical in this context
27
‘queering’; ‘performing masculinity/respectability/femininity’, etc.
28
“On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress.” Afterword, in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul
Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. (1983)

20
The contribution by Cleve Kevin Robert V. Arguelles stands on the place of chapter thirteen.
Arguelles examines another Duterte’s war as he calls the Philippine president’s attitude toward the
memory of the EDSA popular rising(s). Beside the occasional oblivion to mark the source of
quotations this is an interesting publication. Arguelles is examining Duterte’s public stance toward
the Marcosian past of his country. Duterte is the first Philippine president who doesn’t build his
legitimacy on the EDSA popular upheaval that brought the Marcoses dwon from power. This element
of his presidency was somewhat mentioned in this volume (see Teehankee’s or Claudio & Abinales’s
contributions) but Arguelles consecrates his whole contribution in demonstrating step by step the
strategies how Duterte relates to that past. Arguelles argues that Duterte is promoting public
amnesia over collective remembering (page 265). The author takes the reader trough two events
that marked the beginning of Duterte’s presidency and showed what Duterte’s attitude on the
Marcosian dictatorship might be. The first event is the allowing the burial of remains of the former
dictator in the Heroes’ Cemetery in the capital city, where all the great individuals of the Patria lie. In
spite of the public rage and fervent opposition, with the support of the Supreme Court, the
embalmed body of Marcos which traveled quite considerably crossways several continents, across
the living room of his widow, to Batac and finally to Manila, was laid to the ground. Duterte was
conveniently out of the country, while the demonstrations tried to stop this late putting into the
ground. The second event is the absence of the public celebration of the EDSA uprising which usually
happened at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, hence the abbreviation EDSA. Duterte was not absent at
the Avenue and instead “celebrated in the military headquarters because, according to him, the
revolution “actually began”” (page 268). These two events and Duterte’s rupture with the practice of
the previous presidents who all built their credibility on the symbols of the popular rise against the
Marcos regime proved that Duterte is distancing himself and his administration from this tradition.
Arguelles calls Duterte’s presidency a ‘mnemonic regime’ (page 268). He refers to Bernhard and
Kubik’s (2014) definition which is the “dominant pattern of memory politics in a particular society in
a particular time” (idem). The set of strategies which were used by the post-EDSA presidents seems
to be completely disregarded by Duterte; instead his efforts are invested in turning a new page, a
sort of blanco-page (an impossible things what History teaches us) in forgetting and even erasing
some of the country’s past. Arguelles demonstrates the roots of the Duterte’s oblivion-politics: it lies
in the political debt he has toward the Marcos family. Then he continues tracing down how the
Marcoses never were trialed, and how actually disappeared from the political scene of the
Philippines. Duterte’s presidency was an ideal time for the to ‘ressurect’ as Arguelles puts it. The
forgetting is not Duterte’s exclusivity – the author admits. The Marocses have accumulated a gradual
electoral success since the end of the dictatorship. No legal pursuits, no confiscation of their assests,
no lustration of those who helped them. Duterte’s ‘political oblivion’ is actually based on the
collective shame. In a particular macabre subchapter entitled ‘The politics of dead bodies’ (page 274)
Arguelles illustrates the Philippine laxism to purge the Marcosian past: the cadaver of Marcos is
embalmed, dragged around from exile back to the Philippines, exhibited in the house by his widows
where his birthday is ‘celebrated’… While the successive Philippine presidents choose to look the
other way. In that sense Arguelles masterfully concludes that in the Philippines “the past is never
dead […] and [i]t not even past” (page 281).

Chapter fourteen is a contribution of Emerson M. Sanchez. The contribution deals with the topic of
the Filipino Left as a coalition-partners, supporter and critic of Duterte’s presidency. The scrutiny
starts with Duterte’s first SONA (State of the Nation Address) in which the Philippine administration

21
usually outline its agenda and reports its accomplishments. Usually the SONA is an occasion of
oppositional movements to demonstrate their dissent of dissatisfaction. Often there are clashes
between the demonstrators and the police in Manila that day (as for instance in 2014). But Duterte’s
SONA was diametrically in opposition with the previous ones: the state was hospitable toward the
demonstrators, offered assistance in organization, and the mood was peaceful, and as Sanchez adds
“if not jubilant” (page284). This unusual situation is what Sanchez examines in his enquiry. In order to
understand the absence of visible opposition during the time of the SONA the author takes unto
scrutiny the alliance between Duterte and the militant Filipino Left (page 285). He resumes the
Duterte’s actions and public statements from the presidential race to the appointments he
magnanimously allocated to the representatives from the various groups coming from the Left, such
as the farmer’s group (Kilusang Mambubukid), militant feminists, labor party, youth groups, etc. The
appointments, as Sanchez points out, support the image as people-oriented, socialist president (page
286). On the other hand, Duterte’s public statements and his actions, such as Oplan Tokhang (War on
Drugs), clearly make visible a confusing gap between the political ecosystem with which he is
surrounded and his actions of a tough-handed leader. Sanchez tries to make a sense to this at first
glimpse contradictory ‘marriage’. The usual assessment is that Duterte has a long history with
members of the Filipino Left and that he shares some of the basic concepts of social justice (see
upper chapters). Duterte was close political ally to individuals linked with NPA (New People’s Army),
such as Leoncio ‘Jun’ Evasco Jr. Duterte also allowed a hero’s burial for another leader of the NPA,
Leoncio Pitao, during his reign in Davao. And he never hid his sympathies with the Left (page 287).
When he was elected as president he didn’t forget his allies, former political associates and
ideological connections. But the excitement of the official Left was short: Duterte’s presidency, and
particularly Oplan Tokhang was a blow and Sanchez analyzes the rupture that was born out of the
disillusionment which was absent during the SONA. No public protest, why – asks Sanchez? The
authors tries to decipher this absence by first seeking explanation in the hopes of the Left that
Duterte is going, or is about to change economic policies of the country in a manner that would
satisfy them. However the first steps undertaken by the new president are not pointing in that
direction: it seems that Duterte is going to lead a similar, clientelist economic agenda, as his
predecessors did (page 291-292). The second big blow to the slowly sobering Filipino Left was
Marcos’s burial. Duterte’s laissez-faire attitude which materialized the conditions for such thing to
happen blow out the fuse and Bayan finally hold its first protest against Duterte outlining their
demands (page 294). This resulted in a particular situation which could be called as schizophrenic,
because a part of the Filipino Left did support Duterte in his presidential race and a part did entered
into his government as his coalition and a part has even become member(s) of his cabinet. In that
sense the Filipino Left didn’t actually distance itself from Duterte or his acts. Sanchez describes this
situation pretty diffidently. The comfort of an armchair, of a status in government’s cabinet seems to
prevail: Oplan Tokhang is, was not enough for the Left to distance itself from Duterte, Marcos’s burial
was a blow (but it seems the Filipino Left managed to overcome it…) and 400 political prisoners are
still waiting for a supposed amnesty (page 295). And Bayan decided to take a stand of “critical
engagement” (idem). However soft this might sound, as Sanchez notes, this created a situation in
which public demonstrations organized by the Left began to reappear. Ironically, when Duterte’s
effigy was planned to be burned, on the 24th of July 2014, in his second State of the Nation Address,
it rained. So the resourceful Filipino Left just smashed Duterte’s effigy (page 297).

22
Carmel Veloso Abao is the contributor of the chapter fifteen. This is a cleverly written chapter that
builds on the concept of populism as a structure to reexamine Duterte’s first year of presidency. The
author’s initial stance is simple: she positions populism as counterweight to pluralism. Starting from
John B. Judis’s (journalist) analysis of populism, which includes individuals from the classical
dichotomy Left-Right – a detail that Abao finds interesting (page 302)– and trough Kazin’s definition
(idem) of populism which is also used by Judis, Abao provides an easily understandable resume of the
concept of populism. Populism appears to be a fruit born from a different kind of Left and different
kind of Right (idem); hence we are witnessing with a massive resurrection of populist presidents and
political parties across the globe, a political shift in creation, which is not yet fully articulated but
which contours are easily perceivable (see comments on the chapter by Claudio and Abinales). In
order to further develop her claim, Cas Mudde’s definition of populism comes handy (idem) that
compensates the absence or the ‘thin-centered’ ideology on the simplistic dichotomy based on ‘pure
people’ & ‘corrupt elite’. This is an area of interpretation well-known to anthropologists, well aware
in exercising their discipline, when studying the social need to divide cultural concepts, social
phenomena, events and practices as ‘pure’ vs ‘impure’ (see Mary Douglas’s work on this). Abao also
scrutinizes Robert S. Jansen’s taking on populism as rather a practice – from the sociological
perspective - in which ‘doing populism’ prevails to a worldview and a structured ideology. Abao then
places populism into opposition to pluralism (page 303). In pluralism according to her, the accent is
on the rule of law, on structures that embody the will of the people (idem); while in populism the
leader embodies the will or the rule of the people. Opposed in this manner the concepts of
phenomenology, homogeneity and heterogeneity are the key ideas. According to Abao, populism
builds on homogeneity while pluralism is marked by heterogeneity (page 302). Abao continues to
resume characteristics and differences between populism and pluralism in an interesting manner,
however she unfortunately forgets to provide additional references to her claims (page 304).
Miraculously she arrives to the fashionable concept of fascism which is often mentioned in the same
class of concepts as populism. She states: “Unlike fascism, where all state apparatuses are utilized to
maintain a very high level of social control, populism can thrive even within democracies.” (page
304). No references or theoretical background is provided hence the reader has to wonder how Abao
came to this conclusion. If Abao would have expanded her initial features of populism/pluralism
meaning homogeneity/heterogeneity, while using the theoretical ground provided by Bataille (1933)
she would have easily proven her claim. Bataille clearly demonstrates that the imperative form of
heterogeneity is in fact a basis of sovereignty that per se is the beholder also of the familiar concepts
of ‘pure’ and ‘impure’. Fascism – according to Bataille – is the battlefield between the notions of
heterogeneity and homogeneity, a battlefield that provides a fertile ground of development of
fascism and in which heterogeneity is a force that disrupts the existing order. Abao’s definition is
hence rather simplistic and skips stages in the development of her definition. The basis of fascism is
however not only the authoritative rule which was born on a massive support which can be found in
populism as well, but a strong ideological basis, which is absent in populism – Abao herself notices
this, when referencing Cas Mudde (page 302).

In order to sustain her initial stance, the author goes on analyzing Braun’s study about the Chavesian
populism (page 304), which is built on the “redemptive force rather than the destructive one”
(idem),” seen as taking wealth away […]and bringing back to the people” (idem), “without having to
resort to the full scale fascism” (idem). Abao yet again neglects to provide any references why she
thinks that fascism is about wealth-redistribution. Au contraire, I would say: fascism is intransigently

23
linked with power and big capital (see Reich on this, or Bataille, Deleuze & Gattari, etc….). Power is
not given back to the people and wealth is not redistributed in fascism; instead it’s promiscuous,
carefully nurtured relation that fascism cultivates with big capital and I would add, vice versa.

Finally the author positions herself and provides her own definition of populism while using pluralism
as a model (page 304): “I posit that populism overvalues power and ends up producing
authoritarianism while pluralism undervalues power and ends up producing elitism.” In both case
‘giving power back to the people’ is purely rhetoric –she claims (page 305) and are different who
holds the power: the populist individual or the pluralist elite.

Her initial position – pluralism vs. populism - enables Abao to take under scrutiny from this point on
Duterte’s presidency, the past conditions which enabled him to rise, the ideological attitude(s)
Duterte embraced and his purism toward public safety. Abao takes off her gloves and directly points
toward mainstream political institutions which supported Duterte’s rise by legitimizing him and his
actions (page 309). She also takes time to turn toward the (absence) of dissent in which the
Philippine president agilely avoid the accusation by eternally presenting himself as an alternative to
the elitist elite (page 311). The author concludes that the “vacuum without a name” (page 314) as
the author calls it – created between populism and pluralism disables the creation of a successful and
cohesive, unified opposition to Duterte. Beside some shortages in referencing (such as naming
sources of quotations or providing references for claims) Abao’s contribution is a pretty interesting
and smart take on a populism in general and the incapacity to construct an opposition in such cases.

The editor of this remarkable volume, Nicole Curato has the last take in this book: the Epilogue. She
concludes with enumerating and commenting the key-questions that the contributors were
examining in their respective chapters: the analytical challenges that the contributors faced when
trying to categorize Duterte, the fact that a “murderous president” as she calls Duterte (page 319)
continuous to enjoy eighty percent of the public support (idem), the fact that Duterte’s rhetoric gives
voice to the frustrated sentiments of his supporters. Curato answers on some the dilemmas about
the Dutertian presidency that a reader still might have: “[…] he is dangerous man who considers
murder a national policy”. Duterte as a social phenomenon might be impossible in another
environment; Curato admits that a part of his popularity is a “product of the constant weighing of
anxieties, aspirations and values by citizens in relation to what a man in charge can deliver” (page
320). Personally I find this definition of hers the most sharp and accurate assessment of Duterte’s
rise and support by the masses. Curato’s epilogue would be perfect if she wouldn’t raise the topic of
the “seeming lack of outrage in the Philippines” of Duterte’s regime. She thinks that the roots of that
lack are to be found in the social apathy and oppression. She is probably right because the concept of
‘outrage’ is intransigently linked with the capacity of being shock by something. However outrage
takes place in those who feel being morally superior… And I dare to say, since EDSA no Philippine
presidency or administration was spotless or an example of a ‘moral high ground’ and often parts of
the population played the game they though they should. An outrage as a reaction on the events
and forms of governance in the Philippines would have enchain a cycle ever-since 1986. An
impossible mission. Ergo laissez-faire is a less energy-consuming strategy. Curato concludes with a
sentence that is highly problematic for several reasons: “Instead of asking when will Duterte’s
popularity drop, perhaps we should first ask, how can the world pay better attention? To effectively

24
condemn, it is first important to listen” (page 321).
Why in the first place Duterte’s popularity should depend on foreign (aka ‘the world’) assessment
and why that ‘world’ would interfere..? Duterte won his presidency and the manner in which
achieved that is called ‘democracy’ – no foreign power or pressure has the moral right to interfere if
that election was not rigged. His presidency is the will of the people for right or wrong. Duterte’s
attitude of dare propelled him into power and ensured him public support in the first place. He might
lose a part of that support by the end of his presidency which will probably disillusion many. His
presidency might just be a valuable lesson to the country’s population in dealing with future issues in
a different manner… A foreign assessment and intervention would be unwise and probably
counterproductive.

Secondly, why ‘condemn’ even after ‘listening’? Which country has a spotless history so it’s
leadership might condemn the will of the people of another…? ‘Condemnation’ is the usual idiom
used at the official global level and is rarely followed by any action if it is not in the interest of those
who condemn. In that sense the expression is inflated by its overuse. The hypocrisy that usually
follows official condemnation as its shadow is less and less accepted: Duterte’s speeches and his
occasional outbursts of vulgarities expose that hypocrisy. The developed nations, countries which
blissfully condemn the democratically chosen governances of other countries which are not
according to their ‘taste’ should keep in mind that they don’t have any moral or legal right to do so.
Or if it’s a condemnation that comes from the direction of the ‘enlightened’ local or foreign elite,
various commentators, and ‘good-wishers’ who simply cannot grasp why would anyone vote for
Duterte –or any other ‘dictator-in-grain’ – they should be reminded that ‘Little knows the fat man
what the lean one thinks….’.
Duterte’s rise and his public support and the strange fruits of his presidency reveal the flaws of a
formal democracy. As Chinua Achebe sharply defined: “A functioning, robust democracy requires a
healthy educated participatory followership, and an educated, morally grounded leadership.” We
don’t have that in the Philippines.

*
There is one thing that kept puzzling me as an anthropologist while I was reading this volume: a
detail that is not mentioned by those contributors who scrutinized how Duterte benefited public
support on the question of drugs. Contributions dwelt on the detail which propelled Duterte to
power. It was the exaggeration of the number of drug addicts and the amplification of the actual
issue in order to securitize the topic as a part of his political strategy. This is indeed true and the
argument is solid. But there is something that escapes the gaze of the middle-class, well-off scientists
sitting comfortably in their chair, observing this issue from a higher ground (even moral ground when
it comes to Lemchek). Can the analytics possibly understand the motivation of citizens to whom the
drug-problem seems essential or even vital? There are 1.8 million of drug users – a far lesser number
then the number mentioned by Duterte (3.5 million) but how many individuals are impacted by the
drug-abuse-habits of a single individual?
People do not live in a social vacuum. Around a single individual a social net is weaved from his birth.
How many individuals are in some form of a social relationship with a single user? Parents, siblings,
protracted family, neighbors, friends, colleagues…? One drug user can and will impact the daily life of
a dozen of other individuals (and possibly depending on the social context even more); he/she makes
their life a bitter experience: stealing, abusing, harming – physically and emotionally a whole bunch

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of other people. A friend of mine29 once said that he would rather see his child dead than seeing his
downfall as a drug addict. He explained further that a drug-addict destroys his parents, who are
witnessing the ruin of his life and can’t do much. Such a child, he said, influences in a negative way
his siblings too. Steals from the neighbors, attacks small vendors in the street for money, sells his
body in order to provide for his daily needs….. Drug-abuse and substance abuses are happening in
the realm of the society impacting entire networks of communities. In that sense they are strictu
sensu if not a disease then certainly a problem of the society at large. Stating that the number of
drug users impacts those 1.8 million is being blissfully unaware of the problem. Behind those 1.8
million they are at least twice as much individual who is suffering on the daily basis. Daily being
scared, daily being abused, daily living in some form of immediate danger. Offering an easy solution
to those individuals might be an act of political opportunism, but who wouldn’t resist the temptation
to deal with such a problem with a swift stroke? No matter how bloody that stroke might be.

29
K.L. (male, born 1972, married, cook, father of a single child), Serbia, Novi Sad (private conversation)

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