1 |Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
ART. 613 New Civil Code is explicit that the owner has the right to
1. G.R. No. 152440. January 31, 2005
FELICITACION B. BORBAJO, petitioner, vs. HIDDEN VIEW
HOMEOWNERS, INC., SPS. MARCELINA A. SARCON, ELY D.
SARCON, ROBERTO ALVAREZ, CORAZON NOMBRADO, and
GILBERT ANDRALES, in their personal
capacities, respondents.
FACTS:
Jose C. Bontuyan (Bontuyan), Lucy Solon, Georgina
Solon, Helen Solon
the registered andof
owners Vicente Solon,
a parcel Jr. (the Solons)
of agricultural landwere
(Lot
10183-A), covering an area of 13,910 square meters as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 73709 of
the Register of Deeds of Cebu City. At the instance of
Bontuyan, the property was surveyed on 19 May 1991 to
convert it into a subdivision. Meanwhile, in his own behalf
and as attorney-in-fact of the Solons and following the
subdivision scheme in the plan, Bontuyan sold the resulting
lots to different individuals,as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 18 June 1991. Among the lots sold are
the ones which later became the subject of this case, the
three (3) road lots. The road lots were sold to petitioner
Felicitacion B. Borbajo. Using the advance payments of his
lot purchasers, Bontuyan proceeded to develop a
subdivision which was later named Hidden View
Subdivision I by its residents and homeowners. Later, he
applied for and secured from the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) a License to Sell.
The residents
Subdivision and homeowners
I heard reports of Hidden
to the effect that BorbajoView
had
purchased the entire subdivision from Bontuyan through
an oral agreement. They also heard that they have no
right to use the road lots, since the lots have already been
registered in Borbajos name. As a consequence, the
Hidden View Homeowners, Inc. invited Borbajo to a
meeting. When confronted by the homeowners about her
claim that she had bought the subdivision from Bontuyan,
Borbajo confirmed her claim of ownership over the
subdivision and the road lots. She also told them that they
have no right regarding the road right-of-way. [12]On 10
August 1997, the homeowners caused the construction of
a guardhouse at the entrance of Hidden View Subdivision
I and hired the services of a security guard to prevent
unauthorized persons and construction vehicles from
passing through their subdivision. The measures adversely
affected the residents of the subdivisions at the back, as
well as Borbajo herself since her delivery trucks and heavy
equipment used in the construction of her housing projects
then on-going
passing hadroad
through the been
lots.effectively
[15] prevented from
The trial court issued a TRO effective for seventy-two (72)
hours. After due hearing, it also granted Borbajos
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. It denied
respondents motion to dismiss on the ground that it is the
HLURB which has jurisdiction over the case.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court
decision
ISSUE:
Whether respondents may legally prevent Borbajo from
using and passing through the three (3) road lots
within Hidden View Subdivision I
RULING:
No. As a registered co-owner(Petitioner) of the road
lots, Borbajo is entitled to avail of all the attributes of
ownership under the Civil Code jus utendi, fruendi,
abutendi, disponendi et vindicandi.[32] Article 428 of the
enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law. A co-owner, such as Borbajo, is
entitled to use the property owned in common under
Article 486 of the Civil Code. Therefore, respondents
cannot close the road lots to prevent Borbajo from using
the same.
The court is bound by the value in law and the evidentiary
weight of the titles in the name of Borbajo. As long as the
titles are not annulled, Borbajo remains registered a co-
owner and therefore her right to use the road lots subsists.
road Likewise,
lots, it iswith Borbajo
utterly as a registered
pointless to discuss co-owner
whether of
shethe
is
entitled to the easement of right of way. Both from the text
of Article 649 [36] of the Civil Code and the perspective of
elementary common sense, the dominant estate cannot
be the servient estate at the same time. One of the
characteristics of an easement is that it can be imposed
only on the property of another, never on ones own
property. An easement can exist only when the servient
and the dominant estates belong to different owners. [37]
Borbajo, being a registered co-owner of the three (3)
road lots, is entitled to the injunctive relief.
2. G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991
SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita,
Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 157750
of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The same lies in the
vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of the
private respondent corporation under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 128784.
The private respondent's title came from a prior owner,
and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as
an easement of way. As a consequence, an annotation
was entered in the private respondent's title.
The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as
other residents of neighboring estates) made use of the
above private alley and maintained and contributed to its
upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests,
the private respondent constructed steel gates that
precluded unhampered use.
On December
injunction 6, 1984,
against the the petitioner
private commenced
respondent, suitthe
to have for
gates removed and to allow full access to the easement.
The trial court rendered judgment against the private
respondent.
The private respondent appealed to the respondent Court
of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals held that the summary
judgment was improper and that the lower court
erroneously ignored the defense set up by the private
respondent that the easement in question had been
extinguished. According to the Appellate Court, an
easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it
does not impair the private respondent's title, and that
since the private respondent had acquired title to the
property, "merger" brought about an extinguishment of the
easement.
2 |Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES

The petitioner submits that the respondent Court of
Appeals erred, because the very deed of sale executed
between the private respondent and the previous owner
of the property "excluded" the alley in question, and that
in any event, the intent of the parties was to retain the
"alley" as an easement notwithstanding the sale.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not an easement exists on the subject
property
2. Whether or not the easement had been
extinguished by merger.
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the
benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to
whom the encumbered estate does not belong.
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a
dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement
pertains to persons without a dominant estate ,17 in this
case, the public at large.
Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior
servient-dominant owner relationship, and the
termination of that relation leaves the easement of no
use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of

RULING:
1. YES. It is true that the sale did include the alley. On
the
takepublic
place–– if that
that is possible
would –– no
terminate genuine merger
a personal can
easement.
this score, the Court rejects the petitioner's contention
that the deed of sale "excluded" it, because as a mere 2. NO. No genuine merger took place as a
right-of-way, it can not be separated from the tenement consequence of the sale in favor of the private
and maintain an independent existence. Thus: respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to merger exists when ownership of the dominant and
which they actively or passively belong.9 servient estates is consolidated in the same person.
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of Merger requires full ownership of both estates.
which they form part.10 Although they are possessed of
a separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they Note that the servitude in question is a personal servitude
can not, however, be alienated11 from the tenement, or (established for the benefit of a community, or of one or
mortgaged separately. more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not
belong). In a personal servitude, there is therefore no
The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the
easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no easement pertains to persons without a dominant
argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as estate, in this case, the public at large. Thus, merger
an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the could not have been possible.
title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his
right to use (jus utendi). ART. 614
As the petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the deed
itself stipulated that "a portion thereof [of the tenement] 1. G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991
measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS, SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner,
more or less, had been converted into a private alley for vs.
the benefit of the neighboring estates. . ."13 and BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF
precisely, the former owner, in conveying the property, APPEALS, respondents. (See digest above)
gave the private owner a discount on account of the
easement, thus:
2. G.R. No. 151797 October 11, 2007
WHEREAS, to compensate for the foregoing, the parties SPOUSES MANUEL MEJORADA AND ROSALINDA P.
hereto agreed to adjust the purchase price from THREE MEJORADA,
petitioners, vs.
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND FOUR GLORIFICACION VERTUDAZO, SOL VERTUDAZO, SPS. JIMMY
HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P3,790,440.) to THREE MILLION GALVIZO and GLOSITA T. GALVIZO, SPS. FERMIN CABRERA
FIVE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY and ELLEN CABRERA, SPS. FELIXTO ARIATE and RENA ARIATE,
PESOS (P3,503,240.00) and SPS. RAUL ARLALEJO and ARCILA
ARLALEJO, respondents.
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private
respondent did acquire ownership over the property –– FACTS:
including the disputed alley –– as a result of the
conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that Glorificacion and Sol Vertudazo and their co-respondents

alley or otherwise
prevent the publicput upusing
from obstructions thereon
it, because and thus
as a servitude,
the alley is supposed to be open to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that
of the Court of Appeals, that no genuine merger took
place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the
private respondent corporation. According to the Civil
Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant
and servient estates is consolidated in the same
person.15 Merger then, as can be seen, requires full
ownership of both estates.
One thing ought to be noted here, however. The
servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say,
one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement (a
real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general
public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article
established
meter their permanent
lot located residence
at Telaje, Tandag, on adel
Surigao 300-square
Sur. Their
property is landlocked being bordered on all sides by
different lots. As an access route going to Quiñones Street
and the public highway, they utilized a proposed
undeveloped barangay road on the south side of their
property owned by Rosario Quiñones.
In 1988, spouses Manuel and Rosalinda Mejorada,
petitioners, bought Rosario’s 646-square meter lot
adjacent to respondents’ property. Included therein is an
area measuring 55.5 square meters which serves as an
adequate outlet to Quiñones Street, now the subject of
the present controversy. For several years, respondents
and the general public have been using that area as a
passageway to and from Quiñones Street.
On July 2, 1997, petitioners closed the passageway by
building a new garage for their service jeep. Hence,
respondents brought the matter to

of the Civil Code: thethe

by barangay
parties.concerned butthen
Respondents no settlement was reached
filed a complaint 3 with
3 |Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Tandag, Surigao del Sur
praying for a grant of easement of right of way over
petitioners’ property with an application for writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondents.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of
the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents are entitled to the easement of right
of way on the property owned by petitioners.
RULING:
YES. Easement has been defined as an encumbrance
imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner. The
immovable in favor of which the easement is established
is called the dominant estate; that which is subject thereto,
the servient estate.4 In this case, the dominant estate is
respondents’ property, while the servient estate belongs to
petitioners.
Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real
right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other
persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway,
is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment of the proper
indemnity. Xxx
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established
at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and,
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted
by law for public use or for private interest. Pursuant to the
above provisions, the owner of an estate may claim a
legal or compulsory right of way only after he has
established the existence of these four (4) requisites: (a)
the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is
without adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) after
payment of the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not
due to the proprietor’s own acts; and (d) the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
Here, these four requisites have been satisfied.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, there is no other
road which respondents could use leading to Quiñones
Street except the passageway on petitioners’ property.
Second, respondents have offered to pay petitioners
proper indemnity for the easement of way.
Third, the Court of Appeals likewise found that the isolation
of respondents’ property was not due to their acts.
Fourth, the easement is at the point least prejudicial to
petitioners’ property. In fact, the area of the easement
which is 55.5 square meters is located at the corner of
petitioners’ landholding, hence, does not cause them
inconvenience in anyway.
3. G.R. No. L-14116 June 30, 1960
LAUREANA A. CID, petitioner,
vs.
IRENE P. JAVIER, MANUEL P. JAVIER, JOSEFINA P. JAVIER,
FERNANDO P. JAVIER, JOSE P. JAVIER, GUILLERMO P.
JAVIER, ISIDORA P. JAVIER, BENJAMIN P. JAVIER, and
LEONOR CRISOLOGO, respondents.
FACTS:
The windows in question are admittedly in respondents'
own building erected on their own lot. The easement, if
there is any, is therefore a negative one.1 The alleged
prohibition having been avowedly made in 1913 or 1914,
before the present Civil Code took effect, the applicable
legal provision is Article 538 of the Spanish Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 538. In
referred toorder
in thetonext
acquire by prescription
preceding the time
article, the easements
of the
possession shall be computed, ... in negative easements,
from the day on which the owner of the dominant estate
has, by a formal act, forbidden the owner of the servient
estate to perform any act which would be lawful without
the easement. (Emphasis supplied.)
As may be seen, the only question hinges on the
interpretation of the phrase "a formal act". The lower court
and the Court of Appeals considered any prohibition
made by the owner of the dominant estate, be it oral or
written, sufficient compliance with the law. The Court of
Appeals declared:
In the light of the foregoing decisions, (Cortes vs. Yu Tibo, 2
Phil., 26 and the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain
therein cited), we agree with the trial court that the "formal
act" of prohibition contemplated by Art. 538 of the old Civil
Code may be either a written or verbal act. The decisions
of the Supreme
mention written Court of Spain
but merely someabove-quoted do not at all
act of prohibition.
ISSUE:
whether the respondents Irene P. Javier, et al., owners of a
building standing on their lot with windows overlooking the
adjacent lot, had acquired by prescription an
enforceable easement of light and view arising from a
verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and light, alleged
to have been made upon petitioner's predecessor-in-
interest as owner of the adjoining lot, both of which lots
being covered by Torrens titles.
RULING:
No. . The law is explicit. It requires not any form of
prohibition, but exacts, in a parenthetical expression, for
emphasis, the doing not only of a specific, particular act,
but a formal act. The following definitions are pertinent:
Formal
due —ororpertaining
form to in
order, done form,
duecharacterized by one
form with a solemnity
regular; relating to matters of form. (C. J. S. vol. 37, p.
115.)
Act—In civil law, a writing which states in legal form
that a thing has been done, said or agreed. (1
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 150, citing Marlin Report.)
From these definitions, it would appear that the phrase
"formal act" would require not merely any writing, but one
executed in due form and/or with solemnity. That this is the
intendment of the law although not expressed in exact
language is the reason for the clarification2 made in
Article 621 of the new Civil Code which specifically
requires the prohibition to be in "an instrument
acknowledged before a notary public". This is as it should
be. Easements are in the nature of an encumbrance on
the servient estate. They constitute a limitation of the
dominical right of the owner of the subjected property.
Hence, they can be acquired only by title and by
prescription, in the case of positive easement, only as a
result of some sort of invasion, apparent and continuous,
4 |Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
of the servient estate. By the same token, negative
easements can not be acquired by less formal means.
Hence, the requirement that the prohibition (the
equivalent of the act of invasion) should be by "a formal
act", "an instrument acknowledged before a notary
public."
The Court of Appeals found as undisputed the fact 'that
plaintiffs' lot (dominant) as well as defendant's lot (servient)
are covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. 7225 and
7545, respectively", both issued by the Register of Deeds of
Ilocos Norte, in pursuance of the decrees of registration
issued on December 27, 1937, in Cadastral Case No. 51,
G.L.R.O.
CertifiedCadastral
copies ofRecord No. 1212 ofof
these certificates Laoag, Ilocos
title are Norte.
found as
Annexes "A" and "B", pages 77 to 80 inclusive of the Record
on Appeal. In both of them, it does not appear any
annotation in respect to the easement supposedly
acquired by prescription which, counting the twenty (20)
years from 1913 or 1914, would have already ripened by
1937, date of the decrees of registration. Consequently,
even conceding arguendo that such an easement has
been acquired, it had been cut off or extinguished by the
registration of the servient estate under the Torrens System
without the easement being annotated on the
corresponding certificate of title, pursuant to Section 39 of
the Land Registration Act. 3
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed
from is hereby reversed.
4. G.R. No. 175510 July 28, 2008
SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ AND JOCELYN VALDEZ,
represented by their Attorney-In-Fact, VIRGILIO
VALDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO TABISULA AND CARIDAD
TABISULA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased
via a January 11, 1993 Deed of Absolute Sale 1 (the deed)
from respondent-spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad
Tabisula a 200 square meter (sq.m.) portion (the subject
property) of a 380 sq. m. parcel of land located in San
Fernando, La Union, which 380 sq.m. parcel of land.
Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on the
western side of the subject property.2 Believing that that
side is the intended road right of way mentioned in the
deed, petitioners, through their representative, reported
the matter to the barangay for mediation and
conciliation. Respondents failed to attend the
conferences
drawing scheduled
petitioners to file by the 1999
in April barangay,
or morehowever,
than six
years after the execution of the deed a Complaint for
3
Specific Performance with Damages against respondents
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City,
La Union.
Petitioners alleged that they purchased the subject
property on the strength of respondents’ assurance of
providing them a road right of way. They thus prayed that
respondents be ordered to provide the subject property
with a 2½-meter wide easement and to remove the
concrete wall blocking the same.4
Respondents, in their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim (for damages and attorney’s fees),5 averred
that the 2 ½-meter easement should be taken from the
western portion of the subject property and not from
theirs;6 and petitioners and their family are also the owners
of two properties adjoining the subject property, which
adjoining properties have access to two public roads or
highways.
RTC of San Fernando dismissed petitioners’ complaint and
granted respondents’ Counterclaim by Decision .
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, by
Decision of May 29, 2006,12 affirmed that of the trial court,
it holding that the deed only conveyed ownership of the
subject property to petitioners, and that the reference
therein to an easement in favor of petitioners is not a
definite grant-basis of a voluntary easement of right of
way.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
respondents of anpetitioner
easementmayon
demand the grant
the western side by
of
respondents’ lot.
RULING:
NO. An easement or servitude is "a real right constituted on
another’s property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of
which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or
to allow somebody else to do something on his property
for the benefit of another thing or person. "17 The statutory
basis of this right is Article 613 of the Civil Code which
reads:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance
imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is
established is called the dominant estate; that which is
subject thereto, the servient estate.
There are two kinds of easements according to source –
by law or by the will of the owners. So Article 619 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the
will of the owners. The former are called legal and the
latter voluntary easements.
From the allegations in petitioners’ complaint, it is clear
that what they seek to enforce is an alleged grant in the
deed by respondents of an easement reading: "they shall
be provided a 2 ½ meters wide road right-of-way on the
western side of their lot but which is not included in this
sale."
Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction
involving the sale or disposition of real property must be in
writing.18 The stipulation harped upon by petitioners that
they "shall
way be western
on the providedside
a 2 of
½ meters
their lotwide
but road
whichright-of-
is not
included in this sale" is not a disposition of real property. The
proviso that the intended grant of right of way is "not
included in this sale" could only mean that the parties
would have to enter into a separate and distinct
agreement for the purpose.19 The use of the word "shall,"
which is imperative or mandatory in its ordinary
signification, should be construed as merely permissive
where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit or private
right requires it to be given an imperative meaning.20
Besides, a document stipulating a voluntary easement
must be recorded in the Registry of Property in order not to
prejudice third parties. So Articles 708 and 709 of the Civil
Code call for, viz:
Art. 708. The Registry of Property has for its object the
inscription or annotation of acts and contracts relating to
the ownership and other rights over immovable property.
5 |Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
Art. 709. The titles of ownership, or of other rights over
immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or
annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice
third persons.
Petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory
easement of right of way. For to be entitled to such kind of
easement, the preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of
the Civil Code must be established, viz:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real
right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other
persons,
highway, isand without
entitled adequate
to demand outlet
a right tothrough
of way a public
the
neighboring estates, after payment of the proper
indemnity.
xxxx
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the
immovable is due to the proprietor’s own acts.
(Underscoring supplied)
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way
under Article 649, the following requisites must be
complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
isolation is (2)
notproper indemnity
the result must be
of the owner paid;
of the (3) the
dominant
estate’s own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the
extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.21 The onus of proving the existence of these
prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant
estate,22 herein petitioners.
As found, however, by the trial court, which is supported
by the Sketch23 (Exhibit "B"; Exhibit "1") of the location of the
lots of the parties and those adjoining them, a common
evidence of the parties, petitioners and their family are
also the owners of two properties adjoining the subject
property which have access to two public roads or
highways.24
Since petitioners then have more than adequate passage
to two public roads, they have no right to demand the
grant
of by respondents
[respondents’] lot." of an easement on the "western side
5. EDILBERTO ALCANTARA, FLORENCIO VILLARMIA,
POLICARPIO OBREGON,+ RICARDO ROBLE, ESCOLASTICA
ONDONG, ESTEBAN RALLOS, HENRY SESBINO, SERGIO
SESBINO, MANUEL CENTENO,+ RENATO CRUZ, MARCELINO
CENEZA, BUENAVENTURA ONDONG, and BENJAMIN
HALASAN, petitioners, vs. CORNELIO B. RETA, JR.
respondent.
FACTS:
Edilberto Alcantara, Florencio Villarmia, Policarpio
Obregon, Ricardo Roble, Escolastica Ondong, Esteban
Rallos, Henry Sesbino, Sergio Sesbino, Manuel Centeno,
Renato Cruz, Marcelo Ceneza, Buenaventura Ondong
and Benjamin Halasan, filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Davao City, Branch 14, a complaint[4] against Cornelio B.
Reta, Jr. for the exercise of the right of right of first refusal
under Presidential Decree No. 1517, injunction with
preliminary injunction, attorney’s fees and nullity of
amicable settlement.
The plaintiffs claimed that they were tenants or lessees of
the land located in Barangay Sasa, Davao City, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-72594, owned by Reta;
that the land has been converted by Reta into a
commercial center; and that Reta is threatening to eject
them from the land. They assert that they have the right of
first refusal to purchase the land in accordance with
Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since they are
legitimate tenants or lessees thereof.
They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed
between Reta and Ricardo Roble was void ab initio for
being violative of Presidential Decree No. 1517.
On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is beyond
the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since it has not
been proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone; that the
applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 for failure of the
plaintiffs to pay the rentals for the use of the land; and that
the amicable settlement between him and Ricardo Roble
was translated to the latter and fully explained in his own
dialect.
On March 8, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint and ordering the plaintiffs to pay
Reta certain sums representing rentals that had remained
unpaid.[5]
On April 6, 1994, plaintiffs appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals.[6]
On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated
a decision[7] affirming in toto the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this appeal.[8]
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have the right of first
refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517.
RULING: The petition is without merit.
The area involved has not been proclaimed an Urban
Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). In fact, petitioners filed a petition
with the National Housing Authority requesting that the
land they were occupying be declared as an ULRZ. On
May 27, 1986, the request was referred to Mr. Jose L.
Atienza, General Manager, National Housing Authority, for
appropriate action.[9] The request was further referred to
acting mayor Zafiro Respicio, Davao City, as per 2nd
Indorsement dated July 1, 1986.[10] Clearly, the request to
have the land proclaimed as an ULRZ would not be
necessary if the property was an ULRZ.
Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as “The
Urban Land Reform Act,” pertains to areas proclaimed as
Urban Land Reform Zones.[11] Consequently, petitioners
cannot claim any right under the said law since the land
involved is not an ULRZ.
To be able to qualify and avail oneself of the rights and
privileges granted by the said decree, one must be: (1) a
legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2)
must have built his home on the land by contract; and, (3)
has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years.
Obviously, those who do not fall within the said category
cannot be considered “legitimate tenants” and,
therefore, not entitled to the right of first refusal to
purchase the property should the owner of the land
decide to sell the same at a reasonable price within a
reasonable time.[12]
Respondent Reta denies that he has lease agreements
with petitioners Edilberto Alcantara and Ricardo
Roble.[13] Edilberto Alcantara, on the other hand, failed
to present proof of a lease agreement other than his
6| Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
testimony in court that he bought the house that he is
occupying from his father-in-law.[14]
Respondent Reta allowed petitioner Ricardo Roble to use
sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he
gathered tuba. This arrangement would show that it is a
usufruct and not a lease. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the
property of another with the obligation of preserving its
form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the
law otherwise provides.[15]
Petitioner Roble was allowed to construct his house on the
land because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This
would be in the nature of a personal easement under
Article 614 of the Civil Code.[16]
Whether the amicable settlement[17] is valid or not, the
conclusion would still be the same since the agreement
was one of usufruct and not of lease. Thus, petitioner Roble
is not a legitimate tenant as defined by Presidential
Decree No. 1517.
As to the other petitioners, respondent Reta admitted that
he had verbal agreements with them. This
notwithstanding, they are still not the legitimate tenants
contemplated by Presidential Decree No. 1517, who can
exercise the right of first refusal.
A contract has been defined as “a meeting of the minds
between two persons whereby one binds himself, with
respect to the other, to give something or to render some
service.”[18]
Clearly, from the moment respondent Reta demanded
that the petitioners vacate the premises, the verbal lease
agreements, which were on a monthly basis since rentals
were paid monthly,[19] ceased to exist as there was
termination of the lease.
Indeed, none of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the
right of first refusal under P. D. No. 1517.
Another factor which militates against petitioners’ claim is
the fact that there is no intention on the part of respondent
Reta to sell the property. Hence, even if the petitioners had
the right of first refusal, the situation which would allow the
exercise of that right, that is, the sale or intended sale of
the land, has not happened. P. D. No. 1517 applies where
the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third
party.[20]
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court
AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals[21] and the
resolution denying reconsideration thereof.
ARTICLE 615
1. BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF MAGDALENO VALDEZ
SR., respondents.
FACTS: The respondents in this case were the heirs of
Magdaleno Valdez Sr., who purchased an unregistered
parcel of land located in Cebu from Feliciana Santillan
(seller). The land was possessed by decedent who had
also paid taxes thereon.
The heirs subsequently inherited the land. However, a
sugar company, Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. was able to
obtain title to Lot No. 954, the narrow lot where the railroad
tracks (existent even prior to the sale to decedent) lay. The
lot was likewise declared for tax purposes under the name
of the company.
The heirs filed a complaint for Compensation and/or
Recovery of Possession of the lot claiming that Bomedco
was
for agranted by30
period of theyears
sellerwhich
of the had
lot aexpired
railroad sometime
right of way
in
1959 but that the heirs allowed Bomedco to continue using
the land because one of them was then an employee of
the company.
Bomedco, on the other hand, claimed that it was the
owner and possessor of the registered lot when it bought
the lot from seller in 1929 and that the heirs were already
barred by prescription and laches because of Bomedco’s
open and continuous possession of the property for more
than 50 years.
The trial court rejected the evidence presented by
Bomedco (as it was only a Xerox copy of an unsigned
deed of Sale)
acquired but ruledofthatthe
ownership Bomedco had through
property already
acquisitive prescription because it possessed the property
in good faith for more than10 years.
This was reversed by the Court of Appeals which ruled that
Bomedco only acquired an easement of right of way by
unopposed and continuous use of the land, but not
ownership.
ISSUE:
1) Whether Bomedco had indeed acquired ownership of
the land through extraordinary acquisitive prescription?
2) Whether easement was continuous and thus Bomedco
had acquired title over the use of the land?
RULING:
1. NO. Bomedco only acquired an easement of right
of way by unopposed and continuous use of the
land, but not ownership, under Article 620 of the
Civil Code.
The appellate court further ruled that Bomedcos
claim of a prior sale to it by Feliciana Santillan was untrue.
Its possession being in bad faith, the applicable
prescriptive period in order to acquire ownership over the
land was 30 years under Article 1137 of the Civil Code.
Adverse possession of the property started only in 1965
when Bomedco registered its claim in the cadastral survey
of Medellin. Since only 24 years from 1965 had elapsed
when the heirs filed a complaint against Bomedco in 1989,
Bomedcos possession of the land had not yet ripened into
ownership.
And since there was no showing that respondent
heirs or their predecessor-in-interest was ever paid
compensation for the use of the land, the appellate court
awarded compensation to them, to be computed from
the time of discovery of the adverse acts of Bomedco.
An easement or servitude is a real right,
constituted on the corporeal immovable property of
another, by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from
doing, or must allow someone to do, something on his
property, for the benefit of another thing or person. It exists
only when the servient and dominant estates belong to
two different owners. It gives the holder of the easement
an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title
thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement
is an admission that the property belongs to another.
Having held the property by virtue of an
easement, Bomedco cannot now assert that its
occupancy since 1929 was in the concept of an
owner. Neither can it declare that the 30- year period of
extraordinary prescription started from that year.
7| Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
Moreover, the mere expiration of the period of
easement in 1959 did not convert petitioner’s possession
into an adverse one. Mere material possession of land is
not adverse possession as against the owner and is
insufficient to vest title, unless such possession is
accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner.
1. Continuous and apparent easements are
acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals both
upheld this view for the reason that the railroad right of
way was, according to them,continuous and apparent in
nature. The more or less permanent railroad tracks were
visually apparent and they continuously occupied the
subject strip of land from 1959 (the year the easement
granted by Feliciana Santillan to petitioner expired). Thus,
with the lapse of the 10-year prescriptive period in 1969,
petitioner supposedly acquired the easement of right of
way over the subject land.
The easement of right of way is considered
discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person
passes or sets foot on somebody elses land. Like a road for
the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right
of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous because the right
is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person
passes over another's property. In other words, the very
exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or
intervention of man which is the very essence of
discontinuous easements.
Under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous
easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired
only by title. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never
acquired any title over the use of the railroad right of way
whether by law, donation, testamentary succession or
contract. Its use of the right of way, however long, never
resulted in its acquisition of the easement because, under
Article 622, the discontinuous easement of a railroad right
of way can only be acquired by title and not by
prescription.
A party is deemed to acquire title over the use of
the land if:
(a) it had subsequently entered into a contractual right of
way with the heirs for the continued use of the land under
the principles of voluntary easements; or
(b) it had filed a case against the heirs for conferment on
it of a legal easement of right of way under Article 629 of
the Civil Code, then title over the use of the land is
deemed to exist.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
2. EMETERIA LIWAG, Petitioner vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent
FACTS: Sometime in 1978, F.G.R. Sales, the srcinal
developer of Happy Glen Loop, obtained a loan from
Ernesto Marcelo (Marcelo), the owner of T.P. Marcelo
Realty Corporation. To settle its debt after failing to pay its
obligation, F.G.R. Sales assigned to Marcelo all its rights
over several parcels of land in the Subdivision, as well as
receivables from the lots already sold.
As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot
buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA)and the
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a
water facility is available in the subdivision. The said water
facility has been the only source of water of the residents
for thirty (30) years.
In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to
Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No.C-350099 was issued to the latter.
In 2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife Emeteria
Liwanag of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the
respondent Association demanding the removal of the
overhead water tank over the parcel of land.
The latter refused and filed a case before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty
Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs
of Hermogenes.
The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent
Association. One of the things it affirmed was the existence
of an easement for water system/facility or open space on
Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep well
and overhead tank are situated.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not an easement for water facility exists on
Lot 11, Block 5 of Happy Glen Loop Subdivision.
2. Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is
considered an “open space” as defined in
P.D. 1216.
RULING:
1. NO. Easements or servitudes are encumbrances
imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner, for the benefit
of a community, or for the benefit of one or more persons
to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.
The law provides that easements may be continuous or
discontinuous and apparent or non-apparent. The
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code are quoted below:
Art. 615 . Easements may be continuous or discontinuous,
apparent or non-apparent.
Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may
be incessant, without the intervention of any act of man.
Discontinuous easements are those which are used at
intervals and depend upon the acts of man.
Apparent
and easementskept
are continually are those which
in view are made
by external known
signs that
reveal the use and enjoyment of the same.
Non-apparent easements are those which show no
external indication of their existence.
In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance on Lot
11, Block 5 of the Subdivision for the benefit of the
community. It is continuous and apparent, because it is
used incessantly without human intervention, and
because it is continually kept in view by the overhead
water tank, which reveals its use to the public.
Contrary to petitioners contention that the existence of the
water tank on Lot 11, Block 5 is merely tolerated, we find
that the easement of water facility has been voluntarily
established either by Marcelo, the Subdivision owner and
developer; or by F.G.R. Sales, his predecessor-in-interest
and the srcinal developer of the Subdivision. For more
than 30 years, the facility was continuously used as the
residents sole source of water.[31] The Civil Code provides
8 |Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
that continuous and apparent easements are acquired
either by virtue of a title or by prescription of 10 years.
It is therefore clear that an easement of water facility has
already been acquired through prescription.
2.YES. It is considered an “open space.” The decree
makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water
facilities. Therefore, we resort to statutory construction to
determine whether these areas fall under other similar
facilities and amenities. The basic statutory construction
principle of ejusdem generis states that where a general
word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and
specific words of the same class, the general word or
phrase is to be construed to include or to be restricted to
things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as,
those specifically mentioned.
Applying that principle, the Court found out Sec. 1 of P.D.
1216 that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the
common welfare of the community.
Here, the water facility was undoubtedly established for
the benefit of the community. Water is a basic need in
human settlements, without which the community would
not survive. We therefore rule that, based on the principle
of ejusdem generis and taking into consideration the
intention of the law to create and maintain a healthy
environment in human settlements, the location of the
water facility in the Subdivision must form part of the area
reserved for open space.
3. SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.BIO HONG
TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Solid Manila Corp. is the owner of a parcel of land located
in Ermita, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 157750 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The same
lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered under Bio
Hong and the vendor, 900 sqm of the lot was reserved as
an easement of way.
There is no question that an easement, as described in the
deed of sale executed between the private respondent
and the seller, had been constituted on the private
respondent's property, and has been in fact annotated at
the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784.
Specifically, the same charged the private respondent as
follows: "(6) That the alley shall remain open at all times,
and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon;
(7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has been
constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and
allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage
purposes, and shall not [ask] for any indemnity for the use
thereof. . . 8Its act, therefore, of erecting steel gates across
the alley was in defiance of these conditions and a
violation of the deed of sale, and, of course, the servitude
of way.
The petitioner claims that ever since, it (along with other
residents of neighboring estates) made use of the above
private alley and maintained and contributed to its
upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests,
the private respondent constructed steel gates that
precluded unhampered use.
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for
injunction against the private respondent, to have the
gates removed and to allow full access to the easement.
The trial court ordered Bi Hong to open the gates but the
latter argued that the easement has been extinguished by
merger in the same person of the dominant and servient
estates upon the purchase of the property from its former
owner.
CA reversed holding that an easement is a mere limitation
on ownership and that it does not impair the private
respondent's title, and that since the private respondent
had acquired title to the property, "merger" brought about
an extinguishment of the easement.
Thus, Solid Manila Corporation went to the SC alleging that
the very deed of sale executed between the Bio Hong
and the previous owner of the property "excluded" the
alley in question, and that in any event, the intent of the
parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement
notwithstanding the sale.
[While the case was pending, Bio Hong asked the RTC to
cancel the annotation in question, which it granted
subject to the final outcome of the prior case.]
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not easements may be alienated (sold) from
the tenement or mortgaged separately
2) Whether or not the easement had been extinguished by
merger.
RULING:
1. NO. The sale included the alley. The Court rejects the
Solid's contention that the deed of sale "excluded" it,
because as a mere right-of-way, it cannot be separated
from the tenement and maintain an independent
existence.
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to
which they actively or passively belong.9
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of
which they form part.10 Although they are possessed of a
separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they
can not, however, be alienated11 from the tenement, or
mortgaged separately.12
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent
did acquire ownership over the property –– including the
disputed alley –– as a result of the conveyance, it did not
acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up
obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from
using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to
be open to the public.
2) NO. No genuine merger took place as a consequence
of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation.
According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when
ownership of the dominant and servient estates is
consolidated in the same person. Merger requires full
ownership of both estates.
One thing ought to be noted here, however. The
servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say,
one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement (a
real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general
public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article
of the Civil Code:
9 |Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit
of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the
encumbered estate does not belong.16
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a
dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement
pertains to persons without a dominant estate ,17 in this
case, the public at large.
In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a
valid defense, indeed, a sham one, because as we said,
merger is not possible , and secondly, the sale
unequivocally preserved the existing easement. In other
words, the answer does not, in reality, tender any genuine
issue on a material fact and cannot militate against the
petitioner's clear cause of action.
ARTICLE 616
1. ELISEO FAJARDO, JR., and MARISSA FAJARDO,
petitioners, vs. FREEDOM TO BUILD, INC., respondent.
FACTS: Freedom to Build Inc., an owner-developer and
seller of low-cost housing sold to petitioner-spouses a
house and lot in the De La Costa Homes, in Barangka,
Marikina, Metro Manila. The Contract to sell executed
between the parties, contained a Restrictive Covenant
providing certain prohibitions, to wit:
“Easements. For the good of the entire community, the
homeowner must observe a two-meter easement in front.
No structure of any kind (store, garage, bodega, etc.) may
be built on the front easement.
“Upward expansion. A second storey is not prohibited. But
the second storey expansion must be placed above the
back portion of the house and should not extend forward
beyond the apex of the srcinal building.
“Front expansion: 2nd Storey: No unit may be extended in
the front beyond the line as designed and implemented
by the developer in the 60 sq. m. unit. In other words, the
2nd floor expansion, in front, is 6 meters back from the front
property line and 4 meters back from the front wall of the
house, just as provided in the 60 sq. m. units.”
The above restrictions were also contained in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-115384 covering the lot issued in
the name of petitioner-spouses.
The controversy arose when the petitioners despite
repeated demand from the respondent, extended the
roof of their
second floorhouse to house
of their the property line and
to a point expanded
directly above the
the
srcinal front wall. Respondent filed before the RTC an
action to demolish the unauthorized structures.
The RTC rendered a judgment against the petitioner
ordering them to immediately demolish and remove the
extension of their expanded housing unit that exceeds the
limitations imposed by the Restrictive Covenant, otherwise
the Branch Sheriff of this Court will execute the this decision
at the expense of the defendants.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the for the lack of a specific
provision, prescribing the penalty of the demolition in the
“Restrictive Covenant” in the event of the breach thereof,
the prayer of the respondent to demolish the structure
should fail.
RULING: The Court held that the argument of the
petitioner-spouses has no merit; Article 1168 of the New
Civil Code states that : “When the obligation consists in not
doing and the obligor does what has been forbidden him,
it shall be undone at his expense.”
This Court is not unaware of its ruling in Ayala Corporation
vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation, which has
merely adjudged the payment of damages in lieu of
demolition. In the aforementioned case, however, the
elaborate mathematical formula for the determination of
compensatory damages which takes into account the
current construction cost index during the immediately
preceding 5 years based on the weighted average of
wholesale price and wage indices of the National Census
and Statistics Office and the Bureau of Labor Statistics is
explicitly provided for in the Deed of Restrictions entered
into by the parties. This unique and peculiar circumstance,
among other strong justifications therein mentioned, is not
extant in the case at bar.
In sum, the Court holds that since the extension
constructed exceeds the floor area limits of the Restrictive
Covenant, petitioner spouses can be required to demolish
the structure to the extent that it exceeds the prescribed
floor area limits.
Wherefore, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
ARTICLE 617
1. SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.BIO HONG
TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS: Solid Manila Corp. is the owner of a parcel of land
located in Ermita, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 157750 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The
same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered under
Bio Hong and the vendor, 900 sqm of the lot was reserved
as an easement of way.
There is no question that an easement, as described in the
deed of sale executed between the private respondent
and the seller, had been constituted on the private
respondent's property, and has been in fact annotated at
the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784.
Specifically, the same charged the private respondent as
follows: "(6) That the alley shall remain open at all times,
and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon;
(7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has been
constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and
allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage
purposes, and shall not [ask] for any indemnity for the use
thereof. . . 8Its act, therefore, of erecting steel gates across
the alley was in defiance of these conditions and a
violation of the deed of sale, and, of course, the servitude
of way.
The petitioner claims that ever since, it (along with other
residents of neighboring estates) made use of the above
private alley and maintained and contributed to its
upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests,
the private respondent constructed steel gates that
precluded unhampered use.
10 | Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for
injunction against the private respondent, to have the
gates removed and to allow full access to the easement.
The trial court ordered Bi Hong to open the gates but the
latter argued that the easement has been extinguished by
merger in the same person of the dominant and servient
estates upon the purchase of the property from its former
owner.
CA reversed holding that an easement is a mere limitation
on ownership and that it does not impair the private
respondent's title, and that since the private respondent
had acquired title to the property, "merger" brought about
an extinguishment of the easement.
Thus, Solid Manila Corporation went to the SC alleging that
the very deed of sale executed between the Bio Hong
and the previous owner of the property "excluded" the
alley in question, and that in any event, the intent of the
parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement
notwithstanding the sale.
[While the case was pending, Bio Hong asked the RTC to
cancel the annotation in question, which it granted
subject to the final outcome of the prior case.]
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not easements may be alienated (sold) from
the tenement or mortgaged separately
2) Whether or not the easement had been extinguished by
merger.
RULING:
1. NO. The sale included the alley. The Court rejects the
Solid's contention that the deed of sale "excluded" it,
because as a mere right-of-way, it cannot be separated
from the tenement and maintain an independent
existence.
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to
which they actively or passively belong.9
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of
which they form part.10 Although they are possessed of a
separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they
can not, however, be alienated11 from the tenement, or
mortgaged separately.12
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent
did acquire
disputed ownership
alley over of
–– as a result the property
the –– including
conveyance,
it did not
acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up
obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from
using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to
be open to the public.
2) NO. No genuine merger took place as a consequence
of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation.
According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when
ownership of the dominant and servient estates is
consolidated in the same person. Merger requires full
ownership of both estates.
One thing ought to be noted here, however. The
servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say,
one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement (a
real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general
public.
Personal
of servitudes
the Civil Code: are referred to in the following article
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be e stablished for the benefit
of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the
encumbered estate does not belong.16
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a
dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement
pertains to persons without a dominant estate ,17 in this
case, the public at large.
In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a
valid defense, indeed, a sham one, because as we said,
merger is not possible , and secondly, the sale
unequivocally preserved the existing easement. In other
words, the answer does not, in reality, tender any genuine
issue on a material fact and cannot militate against the
petitioner's clear cause of action.
ARTICLE 618
1.) G.R. No. 201405, August 24, 2015
LIWAYWAY ANDRES, RONNIE ANDRES, AND PABLO B.
FRANCISCO, Petitioners, v. STA. LUCIA REALTY &
DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioners and Liza filed a Complaint4 for Easement
of Right-of-Way against respondent before the RTC on
November 28,2000. They alleged that they are co-owners
and possessors for more than 50 years of three parcels of
unregistered agricultural land in Pag-asa, Binangonan,
Rizal with a total area of more or less 10,500 square meters
(subject property). A few years back, however,
respondent acquired the lands surrounding the subject
property, developed the same into a residential
subdivision known as the Binangonan Metropolis East, and
built a concrete perimeter fence around it such that
petitioners and Liza were denied access from subject
property to the nearest public road and vice versa. They
thus prayed for a right-of-way within Binangonan
Metropolis East in order for them to have access to Col.
Guido Street, a public road.
RTC: The RTC granted the easement of right of way in favor
of the petitioners. It then ratiocinated that based on Article
113724 of the Civil Code, petitioners and Liza are
considered owners of the subject property through
extraordinary prescription. Having real right over the same,
therefore, they are entitled to demand an easement of
right-of-way under Article 649 of the Civil Code.
The RTC further held that Pablo's testimony sufficiently
established: (1) that the subject property was surrounded
by respondent's property; (2) the area and location of the
right-of-way sought; (3) the value of the land on which the
the
right-of-way is to be constituted which was P600.00 per
square meter; and (4) petitioners and Liza's possession of
the subject property up to the present time.
CA: On appeal, respondent argued that petitioners and
Liza were neither able to prove that they were owners nor
that they have any real right over the subject property
intended to be the dominant estate. In fact, the intended
dominant estate was declared under the name of Juanito
Blanco et. al for taxation purposes. Hence, they are not
entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way. At any
rate, they likewise failed to establish that the only route
available from their property to Col. Guido Street is through
respondent's subdivision. The decision of the court a quo
was reversed.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are entitled to demand an
easement of right-of-way from respondent. - NO
HELD: NO, the petitioners are not entitled. Under Article 649
of the Civil Code, an easement of right-of-way may be
demanded by the owner of an immovable or by any
11 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use
the same. It must be stressed at the outset that contrary to
petitioners' allegations, there is no showing that Carlos filed
a claim of ownership over the subject property with the
DENR. His April 13, 1998 letter35 to the said office which
petitioners assert to be an application for the registration
of such claim is actually just a request for the issuance of
certain documents and nothing more. Moreover, while
Carlos indeed attempted to declare the subject property
for taxation purposes, his application, as previously
mentioned, was denied because a tax declaration was
already issued to the Blancos.
ARTICLE 619
1.) [G.R. No. 95252. September 5, 1997.]
LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC., ATENEO DE MANILA
UNIVERSITY, ROMULO VILLA, LORENZO TIMBOL, EMDEN
ENCARNACION, VICENTE CASIÑO, JR., DOMINGO REYES,
PEDRO C. MERCADO, MARIO AQUINO, RAFAEL GOSECO,
PORFIRIO CABALU, JR., and ANTONIO ADRIANO, in their
behalf and in behalf of the residents of LOYOLA GRAND
VILLAS, INC., PHASES I AND II, Respondents.
FACTS: The controversy in this case is regarding the right of
way in Manyan road. The road is a 15 meter wide road
abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the
edges of La Vista Subdivision on the north and of the
Ateneo de Manila University (AdMU) and Maryknoll
College on the south. The said road was srcinally owned
by the Tuasons who sold a portion of their land to Philippine
Building Corporation. Included in such sale was half or 7.5
meters width of the Mangyan road. The said corporation
assigned its rights, with the consent of the Tuasons, to
AdMU through a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Mortgage. AdMU later on sold to Maryknoll the western
portion of the land. Tuason developed their land which is
now known as La Vista. On January, 1976, Ateneo and La
Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement or a Mutual
right of way wherein the parties would allow the other to
use their half portion of the Manyan road (La Vista to use
AdMU’s 7.5 meters of the mangyan road and also the
other way around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property
wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola Grand
Villas, was the highest bidder.
ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the right
to negotiate the easement on the road. However, La Vista
did not want to recognize the easement thus they block
the road using 6 cylindrical concrete and some guards
over the entrance of the road blocking the entrance of
the residents of Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. filed
for injunction and La vista in turn filed a third party
complaint against AdMU. Some of the arguments of the
petitioner were that Loyola residents had adequate outlet
to a public highway using other roads and also that AdMU
has not yet finalized the negotiation of the easement.
ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not there is an easement of right of
way? – YES. 2.) Whether or not an adequate outlet to a
highway can extinguish a voluntary easement? – NO.
HELD: 1.) Yes, there was an easement of right of way. A
legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted
by law for public use or for private interest. By express
provisions of Arts. 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the
owner of an estate may claim a legal or compulsory right-
of-way only after he has established the existence of four
(4) requisites, namely: (a) the estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public
highway; (b) after payment of the proper indemnity; (c)
the isolation was not due to the proprietor’s own acts; and
(d) the right-of-way claimed is at a point least prejudicial
to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be shortest. A voluntary easement on
the other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement
of the parties . Hence, having established that there was
indeed a previous agreement to constitute an easement,
the easement in the case at bar is a voluntary easement.
2.) No, an adequate outlet to a highway cannot extinguish
a voluntary easement. The argument of petitioner LA VISTA
that there are other routes to LOYOLA from Mangyan
Road is likewise meritless, to say the least. The opening of
an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal
or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in
the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may
have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not
detract from its permanency as a property right, which
survives the termination of the necessity.
2.) G.R. No. 125339 June 22, 1998
CRESENCIA CRISTOBAL, ROBERTO MAKIMKIM, DAMASO
MAKIMKIM, SPOUSES SALVADOR HERMALINO and
PONCIANA MAKIMKIM, MILAGROS MAKIMKIM, REMEDIOS
MAKIMKIM, SPOUSES FRANCISCO ESTANISLAO and
FLORDELIZA MAKIMKIM, ERLINDA MAKIMKIM, JOSE
MAKIMKIM and GINA MAKIMKIM, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR LEDESMA, INC., SPOUSES JESUS
C. PACIONE and LERMA B. PACIONE, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Cristobal owned a house and lot in
Visayas Avenue Extension. Respondent Cesar Ledesma,
Inc. on the other hand was the owner of the adjoining
subdivision, which included the disputed lots 1 and 2. Lots
1 and 2 were srcinally a part of the private road. Upon the
making of Visayas Avenue as a public road, respondent
Cesar Ledesma, Inc. petitioned the exclusion of the two
disputed lots from the road. They were granted to do so.
Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma , Inc., sold both lots to
Macario Pacione in whose favor transfer Certificates of
Title were correspondingly issued. In turn, Macario Pacione
conveyed the lots to his son and dauhter-in-law,
respondent spouses Jesus and Lerma Pacione.
When the Pacione spouses, who intended to build a house
on Lot 1, Visited the property in 1987, they found out that
a portion of the lot was being used a passageway by
petitioners to and from Visayas Avenue. Accordingly, the
spouses complained about the intrusion into their property
to the Barangay Office. At the barangay conciliation
proceeding, petitioners offered to pay for the use of a
portion of Lot 1 as passageway but the Pacione spouses
rejected the offer. When the parties failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement, the spouses started enclosing Lot 1
with a concrete fence.
Petitioners prostested the enclosure alleging that their
property was bounded on all sides by residential houses
belonging to different owners and had no adequate
outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue except through the
property of the Paciones.
RTC and CA : The trial court dismissed the complaint
holding that one essential requisite of a legal easement of
right of way was not proved, i.e., the absence of an
alternative adequate way or outlet to a public highway,
in this case, Visayas Avenue. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision.
ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to an
easement of right of way. – NO. 2.) Whether or not a path
walk that is much longer, circuitous and inconvenient is an
adequate outlet. – YES.
12 | Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
HELD: 1.) No, the petitioners are not entitled to an
easement of right of way. To be entitled to a compulsory
easement of right of way, the preconditions provided
under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be
established. These are: (1) that the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has
been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate
and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. The burden of proving the existence of these
prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
In the present case, the first element is clearly absent. As
found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, an outlet
already exist, which is a path walk located at the left side
of petitioners' property and which is connected to a
private road about five hundred (500) meters long. The
private road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is
about 2.5 meters wide and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This
outlet was determined by the courta quo to be sufficient
for the needs of the dominants estate, hence petitioners
have no cause to complain that they have no adequate
outlet to Visayas Avenue.
2.) Yes, a path walk that is much longer, circuitous and
inconvenient can still be considered an adequate outlet.
The petitioners' concept of what is "adequate outlet" is a
complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that
in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of
way there must be a real, not ficititious or artificial,
necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate
is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a
compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it
can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same
should not be imposed.
3.) [G.R. NO. 173252 : July 17, 2009]
UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. JOSEPH CHUNG, KIAT CHUNG
and KLETO CHUNG, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Unisource Commercial and
Development Corporation is the registered owner of a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 1762534 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The title
contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary
easement which has been carried over from the Original
Certificate of Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico. The
easement was constituted in favor of Francisco Hidalgo y
Magnifico. As Sandico's property was transferred to
several owners, the memorandum of encumbrance of a
voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was
consistently annotated at the back of every title covering
Sandico's property until TCT No. 176253 was issued in
petitioner's favor. On the other hand, Hidalgo's property
was eventually transferred to respondents Joseph Chung,
Kiat Chung and Cleto Chung.
On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the
Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right of Way 8 on
the ground that the dominant estate has an adequate
access to a public road which is Matienza Street.
Thereafter, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection
of the property. In a Decision dated August 19, 2002, the
trial court ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance
of voluntary easement of right of way. It found that the
dominant estate has no more use for the easement since
it has another adequate outlet to a public road which is
Matienza Street.
The CA reversed the RTC’s decision. The appellate court
ruled that Article 631(3)13 of the Civil Code, which was
cited by the trial court, is inapplicable since the presence
of an adequate outlet to a highway extinguishes only legal
or compulsory easements but not voluntary easements like
in the instant case, which can be extinguished only by
mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the
dominant estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the easement can be extinguished
because of the finding of that there is another adequate
outlet to a public road. – NO.
HELD: No, the petition should not prosper. As defined, an
easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal
and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must
refrain fromtodoing
something or allowing
be done somebody
on his property, elsebenefit
for the to do of
or
another person or tenement. Easements are established
either by law or by the will of the owner. The former are
called legal, and the latter, voluntary easements.
In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary
easement of right of way exists in favor of respondents.
In its petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary
easement of right of way, petitioner alleged that "[t]he
easement is personal. It was voluntarily constituted in favor
of a certain Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico, the owner of
[the lot] described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650." It further stated
that "the voluntary easement of the right of way in favor of
Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted simply by
will or agreement of the parties. It was not a statutory
easement and definitely not an easement created by
such court order because '[the] Court merely declares the
existence of an easement created by the parties." In its
Memorandum dated September 27, 2001, before the trial
court, petitioner reiterated that "[t]he annotation found at
the back of the TCT of Unisource is a voluntary easement."
Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now
claim that what exists is a legal easement and that the
same should be cancelled since the dominant estate is
not an enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to a
public road which is Callejon Matienza Street. As we have
said, the opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can
extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not
voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that
an easement by grant may have also qualified as an
easement of necessity does not detract from its
permanency as a property right, which survives the
termination of the necessity. A voluntary easement of right
of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only
by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of
the dominant estate.
Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal
only to Hidalgo since the annotation merely mentioned
Sandico and Hidalgo without equally binding their heirs or
assigns. That the heirs or assigns of the parties were not
mentioned in the annotation does not mean that it is not
binding on them. Again, a voluntary easement of right of
way is like any other contract. As such, it is generally
effective between the parties, their heirs and assigns,
except in case where the rights and obligations arising
from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or
by stipulation or by provision of law.
4.) [G.R. NO. 149125 : August 9, 2007]
RESURRECCION OBRA, Petitioner, v. SPS. VICTORIANO
BADUA & MYRNA BADUA, SPS. JUANITO BALTORES &
FLORDELIZA BALTORES, SPS. ISABELO BADUA & PRESCILA
BADUA, SPS. JOSE BALANON & SHIRLEY BALANON, SPS.
ORLANDO BADUA & MARITA BADUA and SPS. LEONCIO
BADUA & JUVY BADUA, Respondents.
13 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
FACTS: The case arose from a Complaint for Easement of
Right-of-Way filed by respondents against Anacleto and
Resurreccion Obra, Donato and Lucena Bucasas, and
Paulino and Crisanta Badua. Respondents alleged that
their residential houses, erected on a lot commonly owned
by them were located west of the properties of the Obras,
Bucasases, and Baduas. Their only access to the national
highway was a pathway traversing the northern portion of
petitioner's property and the southern portion of the
properties of the Bucasases and Baduas. The pathway was
more than one meter wide and sixteen meters long. They
claimed that this pathway had been established as early
as 1955. In 1995, however, petitioner Obra constructed a
fence on respondents'
blocking the northern access
boundary
to of
thetheir property;
national thus,
highway.
Respondents demanded the demolition of the fence, but
petitioner refused.
Petitioner averred that respondents had not established
any easement of right-of-way either by law or agreement.
She claimed that respondents failed to satisfy the requisites
provided in Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code in order
to establish an easement of right-of-way on the northern
portion of her property. Moreover, she alleged that
respondents had another access as ingress and egress to
the public road other than the one traversing her property.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. It stated in its
decision in Civil Case No. 5033 that "the new pathway is
more than adequate" for respondents' use. Thus, the
applied easement of right-of-way on the northern portion
of petitioner's property was not allowed. The case was
dismissed.
It must be noted that the "new" pathway used by
respondents, however, traversed the southern portion of
petitioner's property. Sometime in 2001, petitioner
constructed a fence on this portion of her lot, which again
restricted the use of respondents' "new" pathway.
Aggrieved and prejudiced by petitioner's action,
respondents filed on March 6, 2001 a Motion to Enforce the
July 7, 2000 Decision of the RTC. They alleged that the
Decision of the RTC dismissing the case was based on the
existence of a new pathway which they had been using
since 1995. Thus, they asserted that petitioner was
prohibited from closing said passage.
RTC granted the Motion to Enforce and later clarified its
previous decision that the southern portion was an
"agreed pathway," petitioner could not reduce its width;
thus, the trial court ordered petitioner to remove the fence
blocking the passage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC was correct in ordering the
removal of the fence blocking the passage in the southern
portion of the lot. – NO.
HELD: No the RTC was not correct. Apparently, no
pronouncement was ever made regarding the nature and
legality of this "new" pathway; therefore, no easement was
established by the Court on petitioner's property in Civil
Case No. 5033. Thus, their claim for a right-of-way on the
southern portion had no basis.
The trial court erred, in clarifying its previous decision, and
in concluding that the said passage in the southern portion
was an agreed or voluntary easement of right-of-way
which petitioner should respect. It is a settled doctrine that
a decision, after it becomes final, becomes immutable
and unalterable. Thus, the court loses jurisdiction to
amend, modify, or alter a final judgment and is left only
with the jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. Any
amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final
and executory judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose.
Granting for the sake of argument that the issue of
voluntary easement of right-of-way, subject of the assailed
March 20, 2001 Order, was proper, relevant, and material
to the issue of right-of-way as averred in the complaint in
Civil Case No. 5033, still, the conclusion that there was an
agreed or voluntary easement of right-of-way had no
basis. The records of Civil Case No. 5033 do not reveal any
agreement executed by the parties on the claimed right-
of-way. Glaring is the fact that the terms of the
arrangement were not agreed upon by the parties, more
particularly, the payment of the proper indemnity. The
evidence is not ample enough to support the conclusion
that there was a verbal agreement on the right-of-way
over the southern portion.
More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any
agreement creating it should be drawn and executed
with the same formalities as a deed to a real estate, and
ordinarily must be in writing. No written instrument on this
agreement was adduced by respondents.
5.) [G.R. NO. 160725, September 12, 2008]
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
PUREFOODS CORPORATION, SOLID DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., SILVESTRE BAUTISTA,
ALFREDO CABANDE, HEIRS OF VICTOR TRINIDAD, AND
MOLDEX REALTY INCORPORATED, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner NAPOCOR, in order to construct and
maintain its Northwestern Luzon Project , NAPOCOR had to
acquire an easement if right-of-way over certain parcels
of land situated in the towns of Angat, San Rafael and San
Ildefonso and in the city of San Jose del Monte ---- all in the
province of Bulacan.
On November 5, 1997, NAPOCOR filed a special civil
action for eminent domain before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan. The defendants were the vendors and vendees
of the affected parcels of land.
The RTC then appointed commissioners to determine the
valuation of the land. On May 18, 2001, the commissioners
who were appointed by the RTC submitted separate
reports to the RTC. The commissioners recommended that
the compensation due from NAPOCOR be based on the
fair market value of P 600.00/sq.m for the properties
belonging to Moldex and P 400.00/sq.m for the
undeveloped and underdeveloped properties belonging
to the rest of the respondents. In the December 17, 2001,
the RTC rendered its decision and fixed the amount of just
compensation based on the recommendation of the
commissioners.
NAPOCOR assailed the RTC’s valuations of the properties.
It claimed
exceed that
10% only
of the an easement
declared marketfee, which
value, should
should not
be paid
to the respondents. NAPOCOR cites Section 3A, R.A. 6395,
as amended and the implementing regulation of R.A. No.
8974 in support of this argument. On November 7, 2003, the
CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
NAPOCOR, through the OSG, elevated the case to the SC
via petition for review of certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not only an easement fee of 10% of the
market value of the expropriated properties should be the
just compensation that should be paid to the affected
owners of the easement of right-of-way. - NO
HELD: No, the question of just compensation for an
easement of right-of-way over a parcel of land that will be
traversed by NAPOCOR's transmission lines has already
been answered in National Power Corporation v.
Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation. In
that case, the Court held that because of the nature of
the easement, which will deprive the normal use of the
14 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
land for an indefinite period, just compensation must be
based on the full market value of the affected properties.
While Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, and the
implementing rule of R.A. No. 8974 indeed state that only
10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner
of the property subject to an easement of right-of-way,
said rule is not binding on the Court. Well-settled is the rule
that the determination of “just compensation” in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function. The court reiterated its
ruling in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, that any
valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes
may serve only as guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation but it may not substitute
the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such
amount. The executive department or the legislature may
make the initial determinations but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private
property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can
mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the
court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded
from looking into the “just-ness” of the
decreed compensation.
6. SPA. DE LA CRUZ v. RAMISCAL
G.R. No. 137882
February 4, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Olga Ramiscal is the registered owner of a
parcel of land. Petitioner, Spa. Elizabeth and Alfredo De La
Cruz are occupants of a parcel of land located at the
back of Ramiscal’s property, owned by the mother of
Alfredo. The subject matter of this case is a long strip of
land owned by respondent which is being used by
petitioners as their pathway to and from the nearest public
highway from their property.
Respondent leased her property, including the building
thereon, to Phil. Orient Motors. Phil. Orient Motors also
owned a property adjacent to that of respondent’s. Years
later, Phil. Orient Motors sold its property to San Benito
Realty. It was only during the relocation survey and
location plan for both contiguous properties of respondent
and San Benito Realty that respondent discovered that the
aforementioned pathway being occupied by petitioners
is part of her property.
Respondent filed a complaint, seeking the demolition of
the structure allegedly illegally constructed by petitioners
on her property. Respondent asserted in her complaint
that petitioners have an existing right of way to a public
highway other than the current one they are using, which
she owns.
Petitioners claimed that such use was with the knowledge
of respondent. They also alleged that respondent initiated
the construction on her property of a motor shop known
as Phil. Orient Motors and they, as well as the other
occupants of the property at the back of respondent’s
land, opposed the construction of the perimeter wall as it
would enclose and render their property without any
adequate ingress and egress. They asked respondent to
give them an easement on the eastern side of her
property, which would be reciprocated with an easement
by the owner of another adjacent estate. Respondent did
not want to give them the easement on the eastern side
of her property but, instead, offered to them the disputed
passageway, which offer they had accepted.
Issue: W/N Petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or legal
easement of right of way
Ruling:
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the
corporeal immovable property of another, by virtue of
which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow
someone to do, something on his property, for the benefit
of another thing or person.
Petitioners herein failed to show by competent evidence
other than their bare claim that they entered into an
agreement withcredence
tied from giving respondents. The handsself-serving
to petitioners’ of this Court are
claim
that such right of way was voluntarily given them by
respondent for the following reasons:
First, petitioners were unable to produce any shred of
document evidencing such agreement. The Civil Code is
clear that any transaction involving the sale or disposition
of real property must be in writing. Thus, the dearth of
corroborative evidence opens doubts on the veracity of
the naked assertion of petitioners that indeed the subject
easement of right of way was a voluntary grant from
respondent.
Second, as admitted by the petitioners, it was only the
foreman, Mang Puling, who talked with them regarding
said pathway on the northern side of respondent’s
property. Thus, petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz testified that
she did not talk to respondent regarding the arrangement
proposed to them by Mang Puling despite the fact that
she often saw
petitioners to respondent.
believe thatIt is,
thetherefore,
alleged foolhardy
foreman for
of
respondent had the authority to bind the respondent
relating to the easement of right of way.
Third, their explanation that said Mang Puling submitted
said agreement to the Quezon City Engineer’s Office, in
connection with the application for a building permit but
said office could no longer produce a copy thereof, does
not inspire belief. Petitioners should have requested a
subpoena duces tecum from said court to compel the
Quezon City Engineer’s Office to produce said document
or to prove that such document is indeed not available.
The fact that the perimeter wall of the building on
respondent’s property was constructed at a distance of
1.10 meters away from the property line, does not by itself
bolster the veracity of petitioners’ story that there was
indeed such an agreement. Further, as noted by the trial
court, it was Atty. Federico R. Onandia, counsel of Phil.
Orient Motors, who wrote petitioners on 25 August 1994
advising them that his client would close the pathway
along 18th Avenue, thereby implying that it was Phil. Orient
Motors, respondent’s lessee, which tolerated petitioners’
use of said pathway.
Likewise futile are petitioners’ attempts to show that they
are legally entitled to the aforesaid pathway under Article
649 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real
right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other
persons, and without adequate outlet to a public
highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment of the proper
indemnity.
The conferment of a legal easement of right of way under
Article 649 is subject to proof of the following requisites: (1)
15 | Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
it is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of
proper indemnity; (3) the isolation is not the result of its own
acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.31 The first three requisites are not obtaining in the
instant case.
7. Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v CA G.R. No. 124699 July
31, 2003
NOTE: better if i-read ang fulltext 3 ka topics ang igo ani na
case
Facts:
The respondents in this case were the heirs of Magdaleno
Valdez Sr., who purchased an unregistered parcel of land
located in Cebu from Feliciana Santillan (seller). The land
was possessed by decedent who had also paid taxes
thereon. The heirs subsequently inherited the land.
However, a sugar company, Bogo-Medellin Milling Co.
was able to obtain title to Lot No. 954, the narrow lot where
the railroad tracks (existent even prior to the sale to
decedent) lay. The lot was likewise declared for tax
purposes under the name of the company.
The heirs filed a complaint for Compensation and/or
Recovery of Possession of the lot claiming that Bomedco
was granted by the seller of the lot a railroad right of way
for a period of 30 years which had expired sometime in
1959 but that the heirs allowed Bomedco to continue using
the land because one of them was then an employee of
the company. Bomedco, on the other hand, claimed that
it was the owner and possessor of the registered lot when
it bought the lot from seller in 1929 and that the heirs were
already barred by prescription and laches because of
Bomedco’s open and continuous possession of the
property for more than 50 years.
The trial court rejected the evidence presented by
Bomedco (as it was only a Xerox copy of an unsigned
deed of Sale) but ruled that Bomedco had already
acquired ownership of the property through acquisitive
prescription because it possessed the property in good
faith for more than 10 years. This was reversed by the Court
of Appeals which ruled that Bomedco only acquired an
easement of right of way by unopposed and continuous
use of the land, but not ownership. .
Issue:
1) whether Bomedco had indeed acquired ownership of
the land through extraordinary acquisitive prescription?
2) Whether easement was continuous and thus Bomedco
had acquired title over the use of the land?
Ratio/held:
1. No. Bomedco only had a right of easement over the
land as shown by tax receipts wherein it declared, for
several years, the property to be a “central railroad right
of way” or “sugar railroad right of way” when it could have
declared it to be “industrial land” as it did fo r the years
1975 and 1985. Instead of indicating ownership of the lot,
these receipts showed that all petitioner had was
possession by virtue of the right of way granted to it. X x x
A person cannot have an easement on his own land, since
all of the uses of an easement are fully comprehended in
his general right of ownership.
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the
corporeal immovable property of another, by virtue of
which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow
someone
of anothertothing
do something
or person. on his property,
It exists forthe
only when theservient
benefit
and dominant estates belong to two different owners. It
gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest
on the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an
acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the
property belongs to another.
Having held the property by virtue of an easement,
Bomedco cannot now assert that its occupancy since
1929 was in the concept of an owner. Neither can it
declare that the 30- year period of extraordinary
prescription started from that year.
Moreover, the mere expiration of the period of easement
in 1959 did not convert petitioner’s possession into an
adverse one. Mere material possession of land is not
adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient
to vest title, unless such possession is accompanied by the
intent to possess as an owner.
2. An easement is continuous if its use is, or may be,
incessant without the intervention of any act of man, like
the easement of draineage and it is discontinuous if it is
used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like the
easement of right of way.
x x x an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is
discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and
when a train operated by a person passes over another’s
property.
A party is deemed to acquire title over the use of the land
if: a) it had subsequently entered into a contractual right
of way with the heirs for the continued use of the land
under the principles of voluntary easements, or b) it had
filed a case against the heirs for conferment on it of a legal
easement of right of way (see src case for the
requirements)
The point is, bomedco did not exercise any of the
abovementioned options in order for it to acquire title over
the railroad right of way.
ARTICLE 620
Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v CA G.R. No. 124699 July
31, 2003
ARTICLE 621
1.LAUREANA A. CID vs. IRENE P. JAVIER, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-14116 ; June 30, 1960
Facts:
Respondents own a building with windows overlooking the
adjacent lot, owned by the petitioners. Allegedly, in 1913
or 1914, before the New Civil Code took effect, the
predecessors-in-interest
prohibited of thetopetitioner
by the respondent wereand
obstruct view verbally
light.
When the Court of Appeals adjudicated the case, it found
out that the two estates are covered by Original
Certificates of Title, both issued by the Register of Deeds.
The court further observed that in both of the title, any
annotation does not appear in respect to the easement
supposedly acquired by prescription which, counting the
twenty (20) years from 1913 or 1914, would have already
ripened by 1937, date of the decrees of registration.
ISSUE: Whether the owners of a building standing on their
lot with windows overlooking the adjacent lot, had
acquired by prescription an enforceable easement of
light and view arising from a verbal prohibition to obstruct
such view and light, to petitioner's predecessor-in-interest
as owner of the adjoining lot, both of which lots being
covered by Torrens titles.
HELD: Inasmuch as the alleged prohibition having been
avowedly
Code tookmade
effect,inthe
1913 or 1914, before
applicable the present
legal provision Civil
is Article
16 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
538 of the Spanish Civil Code which provides that negative
easements are acquired, from the day on which the
owner of the dominant estate has, by a formal act,
forbidden the owner of the servient estate to perform any
act which would be lawful without the easement.
The law requires not any form of prohibition, but exacts, in
a parenthetical expression, for emphasis, the doing not
only of a specific, particular act, but a formal act. The
phrase "formal act" would require not merely any writing,
but one executed in due form and/or with solemnity. That
this is the intendment of the law although not expressed in
exact language is the reason for the clarification made in
Article
requires621
theof prohibition
the new Civil
to Code
be inwhich
"an specifically
instrument
acknowledged before a notary public".
Easements are in the nature of an encumbrance on the
servient estate. They constitute a limitation of the
dominical right of the owner of the subjected property.
Hence, they can be acquired only by title and by
prescription, in the case of positive easement, only as a
result of some sort of invasion, apparent and continuous,
of the servient estate. By the same token, negative
easements can not be acquired by less formal means.
Hence, the requirement that the prohibition (the
equivalent of the act of invasion) should be by "a formal
act", "an instrument acknowledged before a notary
public."
Conceding arguendo that such an easement has been
acquired by prescription which, counting the twenty (20)
years from 1913 or 1914, would have already ripened by
1937,
of theitservient
had been cut under
estate off or extinguished by the without
the Torrens System registration
the
easement being annotated on the corresponding
certificate of title, pursuant to Section 39 of the Land
Registration Act.
2. G.R. No. 97039 April 24, 1992
CONCORDIO ABELLANA, SR., et al., vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, et al.,
Facts: The petitioners who live on a parcel of land abutting
the northwestern side of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision,
sued to establish an easement of right of way over a
subdivision road which, according to the petitioners, used
to be a mere footpath which they and their ancestors had
been using since time immemorial, and that, hence, they
had acquired, through prescription, an easement of right
of way therein. The construction of a wall by the
respondents around the subdivision deprived the
petitioners of the use of the subdivision road which gives
the subdivision residents access to the public highway.
They asked that the high concrete walls enclosing the
subdivision and cutting of their access to the subdivision
road be removed and that the road be opened to them.
The private respondents denied that there was a pre-
existing footpath in the place before it was developed into
a subdivision. They alleged furthermore that the Nonoc
Subdivision roads are not the shortest way to a public road
for there is a more direct route from the petitioners' land to
the public highway.
The RTC decided in favour of petitioners and held that
defendants Orlando P. Naya and Rosendo Estoye, Jr. and
the intervenors are hereby ordered to demolish the subject
fences or enclosures at the dead ends of Road Lots 1 and
3 of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision at their expense and to
leave them open for the use of the plaintiffs and the
general public, within fifteen (15) days from finality of this
judgment. The complaint as against defendant Municipal
Government of Talisay, Cebu is ordered dismissed. All
counterclaims are ordered dismissed. No pronouncement
as to costs.
On appeal the CA rendered decision ordering the
Municipal Government of Talisay, Cebu, at its option, may
institute the proper action for expropriation.
Issue: WON the contention of the petitioner that the
easement of right of way was acquired by prescription.
Ruling: NO.
Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is
continuous and apparent and may be acquired by
prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code, is
erroneous. The use of a footpath or road may be apparent
but it is not a continuous easement because its use is at
intervals and depends upon the acts of man. It can be
exercised only if a man passes or puts his feet over
somebody else's land (4 Manresa 597; Haffman vs.
Shoemaker, 71 SE 198, both cited on p. 454, Vol. 2, 6th Ed.,
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines). Hence, a right of way
is not acquirable by prescription (Cuaycong, et al, vs
Benedicto, et al., 37 Phil. 781; Ronquillo, et al. vs. Roco, et
al., 103 Phil. 84; Ayala de Roxas vs. Case, 8 Phil. 197).
Neither may petitioners invoke Section 29 of P.D. 957 which
provides:
Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road. — The owner or
developer of a subdivision without access to any existing
public road or street must secure a right of way to a public
road or street and such right of way must be developed
and maintained according to the requirement of the
government authorities concerned.
The above provision applies to the owner or developer of
a subdivision (which petitioners are not) without access to
a public highway.
ARTICLE 622
1. Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v CA G.R. No.
124699 July 31, 2003
2. ) G.R. No. L-33507 July 20, 1981
FE P. VELASCO, represented by ALFREDO
GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR. and THE CITY OF
DAVAO, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of
Davao an action against Davao City to quiet title to her
lot known as Lot 77-B-2, a portion of which she claims to
having been occupied illegally as part of Bolton Street,
Davao City. The CFI, presided over by respondent Judge
Hon. Vicente Cusi Jr., dismissed the case. Hence, this
petition for certiorari seeking a review of the Order of
dismissal.
The complaint alleged that the action is to quiet
title and damages. But the complaint does not allege any
cloud or doubt on the title, 'Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-7000 of the Register of Deeds of the City of Davao, of the
plaintiff to Lot No. 77-B-2. According to the complaint,
when plaintiff bought the said lot 77-B-2 from the srcinal
owner in 1956, the Bolton Street was already existing; that
17 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
without ascertaining the monuments along Bolton Street,
she had her house constructed on her said lot and built
fence along said Bolton Street which she believed to be
the boundary between her lot and said street and in line
with other offences already existing when she bought said
lot. The petitioner has just discovered, after a relocation of
the monuments of her lot, Lot No. 77-B-2, that the Bolton
Street of the defendant has encroached at least TWENTY-
FIVE (25) SQUARE METERS with dimension of 2.5 meters by
10 meters. Petitioner also discovered that Bolton Street was
delimited to nine (9) meters wide, but the proposed width
was 15 meters Thus, petitioner filed this complaint in order
to quiet her title to the said portion of 2.5 meters by 10
meters because the
by the defendant continued
has occupation
cast a cloud of doubtofon said
theportion
title of
the plaintiff over the portion of plaintiff's Lot No. 77-B-2 now
being occupied by Bolton Street.
ISSUE: WON the lot owned by the petitioner is subject to a
legal encumbrance of the public highway. YES
RULING:
It appears on the face of the complaint that
Bolton Street has been where it is from time immemorial.
When the mother title of petitioner's Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T- 7000, which is O.C.T. No. 638, was issued in 1911,
it was issued subject to the provisions of Section 39 of Act
496 which reads:
Section 39. Every person receiving a certificate of
title in pursuance of a decree or registration, and every
subsequent
certificate ofpurchasers of registered
title for value land shall
in good faith who hold
takesthe
a Sometime in 1972, the Bicol Sugar Development
same free of all encumbrances, except those noted on
said certificate, and any of the following encumbrances
which may be subsisting namely:
xxx xxx xxx
Third. Any public highway, way, private way, ... or
any government irrigation, canal, or lateral thereof
...
From the foregoing provision, Bolton Street which
is a public highway, already subsisting when O.C.T. No. 638
was issued, as this fact is apparent too from the face of the
complaint itself, is deemed to have attached as a legal
encumbrance to the lot srcinally registered lot No. 77,
notwithstanding the lack of an annotation thereof on O.C.T.
No. 638. Petitioner, therefore, cannot rely, as she almost
entirely does for the relief she seeks, on the aforequoted
provision, which she had repeatedly cited but without
making mention, perhaps conveniently, of the exception
as expressly provided in the later part of the legal provision
invoked.
If from the undisputed fact Chat when Lot -77 was
registered, Bolton Street had already been a legal
encumbrance on said lot, pursuant to Section 39 of Act
496, contrary to petitioner's theory based on the same
legal provision but o committing the portion pertinent to
the instant case, there can be no gainsaying the fact that
petitioner's lot, Lot No. 77-B-2, which admittedly was
srcinally a part of Lot No. 77, must have to remain subject
to the same legal encumbrance of a public highway.
From her own allegations in her complaint, Bolton
Street cannot be a discontinuous easement as she claims
it to be, which may not be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, whether the mode of acquisition of the
easement that Bolton Street is, would be only by virtue of
title, as petitioner contends, this is not material or of any
consequence, in the present proceedings, once it
indubitably appears as it does, from the allegations of the
complaint itself, that Bolton Street constituted an
easement of public highway on Lot No. 77, from which
petitioner's lot was taken, when the said bigger lot was
srcinal registered. It remained as such legal
encumbrance, as effectively as if it had been duly noted
on the certificate of title, by virtue of the clear and express
provision of Section 39 of Act 496, it being admitted that
at the time of the registration of Lot 77, the public highway
was already in existence or subsisting.
ARTICLE 624
1.) G.R. No. 172077 October 9, 2009
BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE, INC.
(BAPCI), Petitioner,
vs.
EDMUNDO O. OBIAS, PERFECTO O. OBIAS, VICTOR
BAGASINA, ELENA BENOSA, MELCHOR BRANDES, ROGELIO
MONTERO, PEDRO MONTERO, CLAUDIO RESARI, PILAR
GALON, ANTONIO BUISON, PRUDENCIO BENOSA, JR.,
MARIA VILLAMER and ROBERTO PADUA, Respondent.
FACTS:
Corporation (BISUDECO) constructed a road ("the
disputed road") – measuring approximately 7 meters wide
and 2.9 kilometers long. The disputed road was used by
BISUDECO in hauling and transporting sugarcane to and
from its mill site and has thus become indispensable to its
sugar milling operations.
On April 19, 1993, BISUDECO filed a
Complaint against respondents (Ricefield owners) alleging
that on March 27, 1993 and April 3, 1993, respondents
unjustifiably barricaded the disputed road by placing
bamboos, woods, placards and stones across it,
preventing petitioner’s and the other sugar planter’s
vehicles from passing through the disputed road, thereby
causing serious damage and prejudice to petitioner.
Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the
disputed road pursuant to an agreement with the owners
of the ricefields the road traversed. The agreement
provides that BISUDECO shall employ the children and
relatives of the landowners in exchange for the
construction of the road on their properties. Petitioner
contends that through prolonged and continuous use of
the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way over
the properties of the landowners, which right of way in turn
was acquired by it when it bought BISUDECO’s assets.
Petitioner prayed that respondents be permanently
ordered to restrain from barricading the disputed road
and from obstructing its free passage.
On the part of the respondents, they denied
having entered into an agreement with BISUDECO
regarding the construction and the use of the disputed
road. They alleged that BISUDECO, surreptitiously and
without their knowledge and consent, constructed the
disputed road on their properties and has since then
intermittently and discontinuously used the disputed road
for hauling sugarcane despite their repeated protests.
ISSUE: Whether or not an easement was established.
18 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
RULING: NO.
The easement of right of way – the privilege of
persons or a particular class of persons to pass over
another’s land, usually through one particular path or linen
– is characterized as a discontinuous easement because
its use is in intervals and depends on the act of
man. Because of this character, an easement of a right of
way may only be acquired by virtue of a title.
Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable
law in the case at bar, viz:
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements,
and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by virtue of a title.
As to Acquisition by Title: Crucial to the petitioner’s
cause was its burden of proving the existence of the
alleged agreement between BISUDECO and respondents
for the construction of the road. In this regard, the RTC
found that petitioner failed to prove its existence, to wit:
It is clear that the plaintiff failed to present any
concrete evidence to prove that there was such an
agreement between BISUDECO and defendants.
As to Acquisition by Prescription: Continuous and
apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title
or by prescription of ten years.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements
are
manner eitherthey
continuous or discontinuous
are exercised, accordingtoto the
not according the
presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the
existence of such easements. Thus, easement is continuous
if its use is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of
any act of man, like the easement of drainage; and it is
discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the
act of man, like the easement of right of way.
The easement of right of way is considered
discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person
passes or sets foot on somebody else’s land. Like a road for
the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right
of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous because the right
is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person
passes over another's property. In other words, the very
exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or
intervention of man which is the very essence of
discontinuous easements.
The presence
tracks does of more
not, in any or less permanent
way, convert the naturerailroad
of an
easement of right of way to one that is continuous. It is not
the presence of apparent signs or physical
indications showing the existence of an easement, but
rather the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes
such easement into continuous or discontinuous. The
presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an
easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road
(which reveals a right of way) and a window (which
evidences a right to light and view) are apparent
easements, while an easement of not building beyond a
certain height is non-apparent.
In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the
passage of petitioner’s trains denotes the existence of an
apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way.
And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous
easements, whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by title .
The conclusion is inevitable that the road in
dispute is a discontinuous easement notwithstanding that
the same may be apparent. To reiterate, easements are
either continuous or discontinuous according to the
manner they are exercised, not according to the
presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the
existence of such easements. Hence, even if the road in
dispute has been improved and maintained over a
number of years, it will not change its discontinuous nature
but simply make the same apparent. To stress, Article 622
of the New Civil Code states that discontinuous
easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired
only by virtue of a title.
On Laches and Estoppel: We hold the same view
on the issue of acquisition of an easement of right of way
by laches. To our mind, settled jurisprudence on the
application of the principle of estoppel by laches militates
against the acquisition of an easement of right of way by
laches.
Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are
basically courts of law and not courts of equity; equity,
which has been aptly described as "justice outside
legality," should be applied only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law; Aeguetas nunguam
contravenit legis. Based on this principle, we find that the
positive mandate of Article 622 of the Civil Code – the
statutory provision requiring title as basis for the acquisition
of an easement of a right of way – precludes the
application of the equitable principle of laches.
On the other hand, as to the issue of estoppel, this
Court likewise
petitioner did notagrees with
present anythe finding that
evidence of the CAshow
would that
an admission, representation or conduct by respondents
that will give rise to estoppel.
2.) G.R. No. 147957 July 22, 2009
PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE, Petitioner, vs.
LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC., Respondent.
FACTS:
Caruff Development Corporation owned several
parcels of land along the stretch of Roxas Boulevard,
Manila. Sometime in December 1975, Caruff obtained a
loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to finance the
construction of a 21-storey condominium along Roxas
Boulevard. The loan accommodation was secured by a
real estate mortgage over three (3) parcels of land, where
Caruff planned to erect the condominium.
In 1979, Caruff started constructing a multi-storey
building on the mortgaged parcels of land. Along with the
other appurtenances of the building constructed by
Caruff, it built a powerhouse (generating set) and two
sump pumps in the adjacent lot .
After the completion of the condominium project,
it was constituted pursuant to the Condominium Act
(Republic Act No. 4726), as the Legaspi Towers 300, Inc.
However, for Caruff’s failure to pay its loan with
PNB, the latter foreclosed the mortgage and acquired
some of the properties of Caruff at the sheriff’s auction
sale.
Thereafter, Proclamation No. 50 was issued. It was
aimed to promote privatization "for the prompt disposition
of the large number
government of non-performing
financial institutions, assets certain
and of the
19 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
government-owned and controlled corporations, which
have been found unnecessary or inappropriate for the
government sector to maintain." It also provided for the
creation of the Asset Privatization Trust (APT).
By virtue of Administrative Order No. 14 and the
Deed of Transfer executed by PNB, the National
Government, thru the APT, became the assignee and
transferee of all its rights and titles to and interests in its
receivables with Caruff, including the properties it
acquired from the foreclosure of Caruff’s mortgage.
Meanwhile, Caruff filed a case against PNB for the
nullification of PNB’s foreclosure of its properties. A
Compromise Agreement dated August 31, 1988 was later
entered into by Caruff, PNB, and the National Government
thru APT. The parties agreed, among other things, that
Caruff would transfer and convey in favor of the National
Government, thru the APT, the lot where it built the
generating set and sump pumps.
On July 5, 1989, respondent filed a case for
Declaration of the existence of an easement before the
RTC. Respondent alleged that the act of Caruff of
constructing the powerhouse and sump pumps on its
property constituted a voluntary easement in favor of the
respondent. It prayed, among other things, that judgment
be rendered declaring the existence of an easement over
the portion of the property covered by TCT No. 127649
(now TCT No. 200760) that was being occupied by the
powerhouse and the sump pumps in its favor, and that the
Register of Deeds of Manila annotate the easement at the
back of said certificate of title.
APT alleged that respondent had no cause of
action against it, because it was but a mere transferee of
the land. It acquired absolute ownership thereof by virtue
of the Compromise Agreement, free from any liens and/or
encumbrances. It was not a privy to any transaction or
agreement entered into by and between Caruff,
respondent, and the bank. It further alleged that the
continued use of the subject property by respondent and
the condominium owners without its consent was an
encroachment upon its rights as absolute owner and for
which it should be properly compensated.
RTC rendered a Decision declaring the existence
of an easement over the portion of the land
Subsequently, the term of existence of APT
expired. The Privatization and Management Office (PMO)
substituted APT in its appeal.
CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Petitioner argues that the presence of the
generator set and sump pumps does not constitute an
easement. They are mere improvements and/or
appurtenances complementing the condominium
complex, which has not attained the character of
immovability. They were placed on the subject property as
accessories or improvements for the general use and
comfort of the occupants of the condominium complex.
Petitioner posits that respondent failed to present
any evidence to prove the existence of the necessary
requisites for the establishment of an easement. There is no
concrete evidence to show that Caruff had a clear and
unequivocal intention to establish the placing of the
generator set and sump pumps on the subject property as
an easement in favor of respondent.
For its part, respondent argues that it was the
intention of Caruff to have a voluntary easement in the
subject property and for it to remain as such even after the
property was subsequently assigned to APT. It was Caruff
who constructed the generating set and sump pumps on
its adjacent property for the use and benefit of the
condominium adjoining it. Also, the manner in which the
sump pumps were installed is permanent in nature, since
their removal and transfer to another location would
render the same worthless and would cut off the supply of
electricity and water to the condominium and its owners.
ISSUE: WON an easement was constituted on the subject
property. NO
RULING:
An easement or servitude is "a real right
constituted on another’s property, corporeal and
immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has
to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do
something on his property for the benefit of another thing
or person." The statutory basis of this right is Article 613 of
the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an
encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for
the benefit of another immovable belonging to a
different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the
easement is established is called the dominant
estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient
estate.
There are two sources of easements: by law or by
the will of the owners. Article 619 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 619. Easements are established either
by law or by the will of the owners. The former are
called legal and the latter voluntary easements.
In the present case, neither type of easement was
constituted over the subject property.
In its allegations, respondent claims that Caruff
constituted a voluntary easement when it constructed the
generating set and sump pumps over the disputed portion
of the subject property for its benefit. However, it should be
noted that when the appurtenances were constructed on
the subject property, the lands where the condominium
was being erected and the subject property where the
generating set and sump pumps were constructed
belonged to Caruff. Therefore, Article 613 of the Civil Code
does not apply, since no true easement was constituted or
existed, because both properties were owned by Caruff.
Also, Article 624 of the Civil Code is controlling, as
it contemplates a situation where there exists an apparent
sign of easement between two estates established or
maintained by the owner of both. The law provides:
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent
sign of easement between two estates,
established or maintained by the owner of both,
shall be considered, should either of them be
alienated, as a title in order that the easement
may continue actively and passively, unless, at
the time the ownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary should be provided in the
title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign
aforesaid should be removed before the
20 | Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
execution of the deed. This provision shall also
apply in case of the division of a thing owned in
common by two or more persons.16
From the foregoing, it can be inferred that when
the owner of two properties alienates one of them and an
apparent sign of easement exists between the two
estates, entitlement to it continues, unless there is a
contrary agreement, or the indication that the easement
exists is removed before the execution of the deed.
In relation thereto, the Compromise Agreement,
as approved by the court, clearly states, among other
things, that:
x x x x 2.0 That in consideration of the covenants
hereunder stipulated, plaintiff [Caruff] Development
Corporation (CDC), hereby terminates the instant case
against defendants Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the
National Government/APT, and hereby:
2.1 Assigns, transfers and conveys in favor of
defendant National government thru APT, CDC’s r ights,
title and interest in the Maytubig property, situated at the
back of the Legaspi Towers 300 Condominium, consisting
of seven (7) contiguous lots with an aggregate area of
1,504.90 square meters, covered by the following Transfer
Certificate of Title, viz: TCT No. 23663 – Pasay City Registry;
TCT No. 142497 – Metro Manila 1 Registry; TCT No. 142141 –
Metro Manila 1 Registry; TCT No. 127649 – Metro Manila 1
Registry; x x x; all titles, free from any and all liens and
encumbrances, to be delivered, and the necessary
papers and documents
effect transfer in favor of to
thebe turned Government/APT,
National over/executed to
upon approval of this Compromise Agreement; x x x x.
Thus, when the subject property was assigned to
the National Government thru the APT, no easement a rose
or was voluntarily created from the transfer of ownership,
considering that the parties, more particularly, Caruff,
pledged that it was assigning, transferring, and conveying
the subject property in favor of the National Government
thru the APT "free from any and all liens and
encumbrances."
Compromise agreements are contracts, whereby
the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to resolve
their differences, thus, avoiding litigation, or put an end to
one already commenced. As a contract, when the terms
of the agreement are clear and explicit that they do not
justify an attempt to read into it any alleged intention of
the parties; the terms are to be understood literally, just as
they appear on the face of the contract. Considering that
Caruff never intended to transfer the subject property to
PMO, burdened by the generating set and sump pumps,
respondent should remove them from the subject
property.
As regards PMO’s claim for rent, respondent has
been enjoying the use of the subject property for free from
the time the rights over the property were transferred and
conveyed by Caruff to the National Government.
We have held that "[t]here is unjust enrichment
when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience." Article 22 of the Civil Code
provides that "[e]very person who, through an act or
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter,The
him." without just or
principle oflegal
unjustground, shall return
enrichment under the same
Article 22 to
of
the Civil Code requires two conditions: (1) that a person is
benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that
such benefit is derived at another’s expense or damage.
In the present case, there is no dispute as to who
owns the subject property and as to the fact that the
National Government has been deprived of the use
thereof for almost two decades. Thus, it is but just and
proper that respondent should pay reasonable rent for the
portion of the subject property occupied by the
generating set and sump pumps, from the time
respondent deprived the lawful owner of the use thereof
up to the present. To rule otherwise would be unjust
enrichment on the part of respondent at the expense of
the Government.
From the records, APT/PMO submitted, as part of its
evidence, a letter dated June 18, 1992, wherein it fixed the
monthly rental fee per square meter of the entire property
at ₱56.25, or ₱1.81 per square meter per day. Hence,
respondent should pay the National Government
reasonable rent in the amount of ₱56.25 per square meter
per month, to be reckoned from August 28, 1989 up to the
time when the generating set and sump pumps are
completely removed therefrom.
3.) G.R. No. 185240 : January 20, 2010
SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA
SALIMBANGON, Petitioners, v. SPS. SANTOS AND ERLINDA
TAN, Respondents.
FACTS:
Guillermo Ceniza died intestate on July 11, 1951,
leaving a parcel of land. Twenty years later on July 17, 1973
his children Benedicta, Guillermo, Jr., Victoria, Eduardo,
and Carlos executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs
and partition, adjudicating and dividing the land among
themselves as follows:
1. To Benedicta T. Cabahug, Lot A subject to a perpetual
and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its
NW. boundary in favor of L ots B, E, and D, of the subdivision;
2. To Eduardo Ceniza, Lot B subject to a perpetual and
grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW.
boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the subdivision;
3. To Carlos Ceniza, Lot C;
4. To Guillermo Ceniza Jr., Lot D subject to a perpetual and
grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its NE.
boundary in favor of Lot B and E of the subdivision; and
5. To Victoria Ceniza, Lot E, subject to a perpetual and
grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW.
boundary in favor of Lot D of the subdivision .1
Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street. But
Lots D and E were not, they being interior lots. To give these
interior lots access to the street, the heirs established in their
extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way
consisting of a 3-meter wide alley between Lots D and E
that continued on between Lots A and B and on to the
street. The partition that embodied this easement of right
of way was annotated on the individual titles issued to the
heirs.
Realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal
division of the property, the heirs modified their
21 | Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
agreement by eliminating the easement of right of
way along Lots A, D, and E, and in its place, imposed
a 3-meter wide alley, an easement of right of way, that
ran exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot B
from Lots D and E to the street.
Victoria (now petitioner Victoria Salimbangon)
later swapped lots with Benedicta with the result that
Victoria became the owner of Lot A, one of the three lots
adjacent to the city street. Victoria and her husband (the
Salimbangons) constructed a residential house on this lot
and built two garages on it. One garage abutted the
street while the other, located in the interior of Lot A, used
the alley or easement of right of way existing on Lot B to
get to the street. Victoria had this alley cemented and
gated.
Subsequently, however, respondent spouses
Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought Lots B, C, D, and
E from all their owners. The Tans built improvements on Lot
B that spilled into the easement area. They also closed the
gate that the Salimbangons built. Unable to use the old
right of way, the Salimbangons lodged a complaint with
the City Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans. For their
part, the Tans filed an action with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) against the Salimbangons for the extinguishment of
the easement on Lot B.
RTC rendered judgment, upholding the
Salimbangons easement of right of way over the alley on
Lot B, the lot that belonged to the Tans. The court pointed
out that the easement in this case was established by
agreement of the parties for the benefit of Lots A, D, and
E. Consequently, only by mutual agreement of the parties
could such easement be extinguished.
CA reversed the RTC decision, extinguished the
easement of right of way established on the alley in Lot B
of the Tans, and denied the Salimbangons claim for
damages. The court ruled that based on the testimony of
one of the previous owners, Eduardo Ceniza, the true
intent of the parties was to establish that easement of right
of way for the benefit of the interior lots, namely, Lots D and
E. Consequently, when ownership of Lots B, D, and E was
consolidated into the Tans, the easement ceased to have
any purpose and became extinct.
The Salimbangons point out that the partition
agreement among the heirs established in their favor, as
owners of Lot A, an easement of right of way on Lot B from
the interior of their lot to the city street. Since theirs was an
easement established by agreement of the parties, only
by mutual agreement could the same be extinguished.
ISSUE: WON the easement of right of way established by
the partition agreement among the heirs has been
extinguished. -YES
RULING:
The true agreement of the heirs was for the
establishment of an easement of right of way for the
benefit solely of the lots that did not have direct access to
the street, namely Lots D and E.
As srcinally constituted in that agreement, each
of Lots A and B was to contribute a strip of 1.5 meters
between them that when combined formed a 3-meter
wide alley leading from Lots D and E to the street. To the
extent that Lots A and B retained the right to use the 1.5-
meter portion that they contributed to the establishment
of the easement, the agreement gave their owners the
right to use the common alley as well. As Eduardo testified,
however, the true intent of the heirs was to give Lots D and
E access to the street. Lots A and B did not need this alley
since they were facing the street.
Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and E also
became the owner of Lot B, the easement of right of way
on Lot B became extinct by operation of law. The existence
of a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible
with the idea that both estates belong to the same person.
There is no question that when the heirs realized
that it was not fair to take strips of 1.5 meters from each of
Lots A, D, and E for the easement of right of way when
these lots were already small, the heirs executed a
"Cancellation of Annotation of Right of Way, etc." that
cancelled the easement of right of way they earlier
established on Lots A, D, and E and in its place imposed a
3-meter wide easement of right of way solely on Lot B.
Although the "cancellation" document did not say
so, it was implicit that the changed location of the
easement cancelled not only the 1.5-meter strip of
easement imposed on Lot A of the Salimbangons but also
their right to use the new 3-meter easement alley that lay
entirely on Lot B. Strictly speaking, if the Salimbangons insist
that their right as dominant estate under the srcinal
partition agreement remains, then that would be partly on
a 1.5-meter strip of their own Lot A and partly on the
equivalent 1.5-meter strip on the side of Lot B, not on the
new 3-meter alley established entirely on Lot B.
The point is that, obviously, in establishing the new
easement of right of way, the heirs intended to abandon
the old one. Since this 3-meter alley on Lot B directly
connected Lots D and E to the street, it is also obvious that
only the latter lots were its intended beneficiary. And, with
the ownership of Lots B, D, and E now consolidated in a
common owner, namely, the Tans, then the easement of
right of way on Lot B may be said to have been
extinguished by operation of law.
ARTICLE 627
1.) G.R. No. 171072 April 7, 2009
GOLDCREST REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
CYPRESS GARDENS CONDOMINIUM
CORPORATION, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Goldcrest Realty Corporation
(Goldcrest) is the developer of Cypress Gardens, a ten-
storey building. Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and
Declaration of Restrictions which constituted Cypress
Gardens into a condominium project and incorporated
respondent Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation
(Cypress) to manage the condominium project and to
hold title to all the common areas. Title to the land on
which the condominium stands was transferred to Cypress.
But Goldcrest retained ownership of the two-level
penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth floors of the
condominium. Goldcrest and its directors, officers, and
assigns likewise controlled the management and
administration of the Condominium until 1995.
Following the turnover of the administration and
management of the Condominium to the board of
directors of Cypress in 1995, it was discovered that certain
22 | Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
common areas pertaining to Cypress were being
occupied and encroached upon by Goldcrest. Thus, in
1998, Cypress filed a complaint with damages against
Goldcrest before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB), seeking to compel the latter to vacate the
common areas it allegedly encroached on and to remove
the structures it built thereon. Cypress sought to remove
the door erected by Goldcrest along the stairway
between the 8th and 9th floors, as well as the door built in
front of the 9th floor elevator lobby, and the removal of the
cyclone wire fence on the roof deck.
Goldcrest averred that it was granted the
exclusive use of the roof deck’s limited common area by
Section 4(c) of the condominium’s Master Deed. It likewise
argued that it constructed the contested doors for privacy
and security purposes, and that, nonetheless, the
common areas occupied by it are unusable and
inaccessible to other condominium unit owners.
The HLURB Arbiter ruled in favour of Cypress. The
Arbiter found that Goldcrest enclosed and used the
common area fronting the two elevators on the ninth floor
as a storage room. It was likewise discovered that
Goldcrest constructed a permanent structure which
encroached 68.01 square meters of the roof deck’s
common area. It was noted that Goldcrest failed to secure
an alteration approval for the said permanent structure.
Thus, he required Goldcrest, among other things, to: (1)
remove the questioned structures, including all other
structures which inhibit the free ingress to and egress from
the condominium’s limited and unlimited common areas;
(2) vacate the roof deck’s common areas and to pay
actual damages for occupying the same; and (3) pay an
administrative fine for constructing a second penthouse
and for making an unauthorized alteration of the
condominium plan.
The HLURB Special Division modified the decision
of the Arbiter. It held that Cypress has no cause of action
regarding the use of the roof deck’s limited common area
because only Goldcrest has the right to use the same.
Aggrieved, Cypress appealed to the Office of the
President. The Office of the President dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the ruling of the HLURB.
Cypress thereafter elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals, which partly granted its appeal. The
appellate court noted that the right of Goldcrest under
Section 4(c) of the Master Deed for the exclusive use of the
easement covering the portion of the roof deck
appurtenant to the penthouse did not include the
unrestricted right to build structures thereon or to lease
such area to third persons. Thus the appellate court
ordered the removal of the permanent structures
constructed on the limited common area of the roof deck.
Goldcrest contended that since the roof deck’s
common limited area is for its exclusive use, building
structures thereon and leasing the same to third persons
do not impair the subject easement.
Cypress insists the said acts impair the subject
easement because the same are already beyond the
contemplation of the easement granted to Goldcrest.
ISSUE: WON Goldencrest has the right to erect structures on
the limited common areas. - NO
RULING:
The limited common area of the roof deck is
specifically identified by Section 4(c) of the Master Deed.
Section 4(c) of the Master Deed, which reads:
Section 4. Limited Common Areas. Certain parts of the
common areas are to be set aside and reserved for the
exclusive use of certain units and each unit shall have
appurtenant thereto as exclusive easement for the use of
such limited areas:
(c) Exclusive use of the portion of the roof deck (not
shaded red in sheet 10 of Annex "B") by the Penthouse unit
on the roof deck.
In this case, we find no cogent reason to overturn
the similar finding of the HLURB, the Office of the President
and the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest has no right to
erect an office structure on the limited common area
despite its exclusive right to use the same . We note that not
only did Goldcrest’s act impair the easement, it al so
illegally altered the condominium plan , in violation of
Section 2218 of Presidential Decree No. 957.
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate
any of the following prescribed restrictions on its rights on
the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights
necessary for the use of the easement;20 (2) it cannot use
the easement except for the benefit of the immovable
srcinally contemplated ;21 (3) it cannot exercise the
easement in any other manner than that previously
established;22 (4) it cannot construct anything on it which
is not necessary for the use and preservation of the
easement;23 (5) it cannot alter or make the easement
more burdensome;24 (6) it must notify the servient estate
owner of its intention to make necessary works on the
servient estate;25 and (7) it should choose the most
convenient time and manner to build said works so as to
cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient
estate.26 Any violation of the above constitutes
impairment of the easement.
Here, a car eful scrutiny of Goldcrest’s acts shows
that it breached a number of the aforementioned
restrictions. First, it is obvious that the construction and the
lease of the office structure were neither necessary for the
use or preservation of the roof deck’s limited area.
Second, the weight of the office structure increased the
strain on the condominium’s foundation and on the roof
deck’s common limited area, making the easement more
burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the
condominium unit owners. Lastly, the construction of the
said office structure clearly went beyond the intendment
of the easement since it illegally altered the approved
condominium project plan and violated Section 4 of the
condominium’s Declaration of Restrictions.
ARTICLE 633
1.) G.R. No. L-22733 September 25, 1968
SALVADOR BENEDICTO (deceased). ROBERTO S.
BENEDICTO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE A. HERAS, respondents.
FACTS:
The adjoining properties of the petitioner and the
respondent formerly belonged to one owner, MIRIAM R.
HEDRICK, consisting of Lots Nos. 8, 9, 10, 22, 23, and 24.
23 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
MIRIAM R. HEDRICK sold a portion of the above
described property, particularly Lots Nos. 8, 9, 22 and 23 to
CLARO M. RECTO, and retained for herself Lots Nos. 10 and
24.
At the time of the sale, the following buildings
were located in the respective properties of Claro M.
Recto and Miriam R. Hedrick as described in the Deed of
Purchase-Sale: On the parcels 2a (Lot No. 9) and 3a (Lot
No. 10) two buildings (Chalets) of equal structure,
configuration and volume are constructed, both
constructed of concrete and other strong materials, and
on The parcels 5a (Lot No. 23) and 6a (Lot No. 24), the
respective dependencies of said properties."
The sale to CLARO M. RECTO as evidenced by the
Purchase-Sale Agreement was subject to the following
conditions:
"SIXTH. That between the portion sold to Claro M. Recto
and that which is in the possession of Miriam R. Hedrick,
there is a passage for vehicles, about three to four meters
wide, which is roughly half or equal parts on each of These
portions and both parts of this deed are each bound to
respect the right of the other to use all the extension of said
passage for all the time and all the needs of each of the
two properties, the one sold hereby To Claro M. Recto and
the one that is in the possession of Miriam R. Hedrick, being
obligatory this pact for all those that later acquired by any
title the mentioned farms.
In the light of the irregular form of the property described
in
thisthedeed,
Certificate
bothofparties
Title mentioned
agree toin paragraph FIRST
practice a of
new
measurement of said property in order that the dividing
line between the portion sold And that it remains in the
domain of Miriam R. Hedrick falls in the middle of the
passage described and alluded in the previous
paragraph, and said line will be perpendicular to the street
San Marcelino.
This agreement of the parties, MIRIAM R. HEDRICK and
CLARO M. RECTO, is annotated on the respective titles of
the petitioner and respondent.
The property purchased by CLARO M. RECTO from
MIRIAM R. HEDRICK became the subject of a series of
transfers : a.) Sold by CLARO M. RECTO to EMMANUEL
CONTY; b.) Sold by EMMANUEL CONTY TO SALVADOR
BENEDICTO (the petitioner),
The property of MIRIAM R. HEDRICK became the
subject of a series of transfers: a.) Sold by MIRIAM R.
HEDRICK to CHOW KWO HSIEN; b.) Sold by CHOW KWO
HSIEN to GENERAL SECURITY AND INVESTMENT CO; c.) Sold
by GENERAL SECURITY AND INVESTMENT CO. To VICENTE A.
HERAS (the respondent),
Sometime in 1941, the respondent demolished the
entire building situated on its property. Petitioner, on the
otherhand, enclosed a portion of the property which
prevented respondent to use the easement of way. Thus,
the respondent filed an action to recover a portion of land
enclosed and walled by the petitioner Salvador
Benedicto, and to demand the reopening of an easement
of way between his real property and that of the
petitioner.
The trial court likewise found that the easement of
way was found entirely within the property of Benedicto,
contrary to the stipulation in the deed of sale between
Miriam R. Hedrick and Claro M. Recto that it should be
between their properties, with each contributing an Equal
portion of his property. According to the court, this was the
reason why Recto, Benedict's predecessor-in-interest, who
had earlier asked to resurvey in accordance with the deed
of sale, subsequently withdrew his motion, after finding
that the passageway was located entirely within his
property. The court directs both parties to contribute
equally to the maintenance of a three-four-meter-wide
passageway between their properties, with the property
line running at the middle of the passageway. It rejected
Benedict's claim that the easement had been
extinguished by nonuser and by the cessation of the
necessity for a passageway .
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision
affirming in toto the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner alleged that the easement was
srcinally constituted because the buildings were erected
on the respective properties of Miriam R. Hedrick and
Claro M. Recto were adjoined each other only the back
portions of the properties could be reached by their
owners from San Marcelino street was through the
passageway. He claims that when the respondent had his
building demolished in 1941 the property gained direct
access to San Marcelino street with the result that since
there has been no need for the passageway. The
petitioner argues further that it could be assumed that
since 1941 the passageway ceased to be used "for
certainly [the respondent] could not be expected to be
making 'detours' to reach San Marcelino Street when the
frontage of his property was now open In its entirety to San
Marcelino Street. "
ISSUE: WON the the easement had been extinguished by
non-user and by the cessation of the necessity for a
passageway. -NO
RULING:
Article 631 of the Civil Code provides in part:
Art. 631. Easements are extinguished:
Xxx xxx xxx
(2) By nonuser for ten years, with respect to
discontinuous easements, this period shall be computed
from the day on which they ceased to be used; And, with
respect to continuous easements, from the day on which
an act contrary to the same took place;
(3) When either or both of the estates fall into such
condition that the easement can not be used; But it shall
not be necessary for the use of the provisions of the
preceding paragraph; . . . .
This provision was taken from article 546 of the Civil
Code of 1889, with the modification that the period of
nonuser was reduced from 20 to 10 years.
The petitioner argues at length that this case is
governed by the present Code, and that since 14 years
had elapsed from the time the building on Heras' property
was demolished in 1941 to 1955 when this action was
begun To be used because Heras' property had direct
access to the street, the easement must be deemed to
have been extinguished.
For the purposes of this decision we do not find it
necessary
nonuser in to
thisdetermine
case is 20whether the appropriate
or 10 years. For one thingperiod
, thereof
is
24 | Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
no indubitable proof of nonuser. The petitioner merely
assumes that the passageway in question had not been in
use since 1941 because the property of Heras has since
gained direct access to St. Marcellin's street with the
demolition of his house. For another, even if we assume
that the period of prescription based on nonuser is 10
years, the very testimony of the petitioner Benedicto shows
that it was only in 1946 that he had the passageway walled
in by constructing a fence, and since the present action
Was filed in 1955, granting that article 631 of the Civil Code
is applicable, the prescriptive period has not yet elapsed.
Nor can presumptive renunciation by Heras of the
use of the said passageway be inferred. It would appear
from the record that Heras began the construction of an
apartment building on his parcel of land after the
demolition of his house in 1941, and that although
interrupted by World War II, construction was continued in
1955. Since it is patent from the Stipuation of facts that the
easement in question is mainly to vehicular passageway,
the obvious need for such passageway to the rear portion
of the projected apartment building negates any
presumptive renunciation on the part of Heras.
Moreover, the easement in this case is perpetual
in character ("for all the time and all the necessities of
each one of the two properties, the one sold by the
present to Claro M. Recto and the one that is in the
possession of Miriam R. Hedrick , This covenant being
obligatory for all those who subsequently acquired for any
title the aforementioned farms ") and was annotated on
all the transfer certificates of title issued in the series of
transfers from Miriam R. Hedrick through to the respondent
Heras, and in the Transfer certificates of title issued in the
series of transfers from Claro M. Recto through the
petitioner Benedicto.Since there is nothing in the record
that would point to a mutual agreement between any of
the predecessors-in-interest between the petitioner and
the respondent themselves with respect to the
discontinuance or obliteration of the easement annotated
on the titles, the continued existence of The easement
must be upheld and respected.
The fact that the easement here is one of
necessity does not detract from the conclusion we have
reached. For even assuming that with the demolition of
the house on Heras' property the necessity for the
passageway ceased (a point traversed by Heras who has
demolished his house exactly in order to build an
apartment building in its place), still, as was Held in one
case "The fact that an easement [by grant] may also
qualify as an easement of necessity does not detract from
its permanence as a property right, which survives the
termination of the necessity." Indeed, when the easement
in this case was established, the parties unequivocally
made provisions for their observance by all who in the
future might succeed them in dominion, and this is the
reason the permanent character of the easement was
annotated on each and all of the Transfer certificates of
title
ARTICLE 635
1. G.R. No. 194336 March 11, 2013
PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
RAMON DUMADAG, EMMA BACABAC, RONALDO
NAVARRO, JIMMY PAGDALIAN, PAY DELOS SANTOS,
ARMANDO TRILLOS, FELICISIMO TRILLOS, ARCANGEL
FLORES, EDDIE MARTIN, PRESILLA LAYOG, CONRADO
CAGUYONG, GINA GONZALES, ARLENE PEDROSA,
JOCELYN ABELINO, ROQUE VILLARAZA, ROLANDO
VILLARAZA, CAMILO GENOVE, NILDA ROAYANA, SUSAN
ROAYANA, JUANCHO PANGANIBAN, BONG DE GUZMAN,
ARNOLD ENVERSO, DONNA DELA RAZA, EMELYN
HAGNAYA, FREDDIE DE LEON, RONILLO DE LEON, MARIO
MARTINEZ, and PRECY LOPEZ, Respondents.
Facts: On July 1, 2002, petitioner filed a Complaint4 for
accion publiciana with damages against respondents for
allegedly building their shanties, without its knowledge and
consent, in its 5,613-square-meter property located at
Daisy Road, Phase V, Pilar Village Subdivision, Almanza, Las
Piñas City. It claims that said parcel of land, which is duly
registered in its name under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
481436 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal,
was designated as an open space of Pilar Village
Subdivision intended
amenities for for residents.
subdivision village recreational facilities and
In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents denied the
material allegations of the Complaint and briefly asserted
that it is the local government, not petitioner, which has
jurisdiction and authority over them.
On May 30, 2007, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s
complaint, finding that the land being occupied by
respondents are situated on the sloping area going down
and leading towards the Mahabang Ilog Creek, and
within the three-meter legal easement; thus, considered as
public property and part of public dominion under Article
5027of the New Civil Code (Code), which could not be
owned by petitioner.
The trial court opined that respondents have a better right
to possess the occupied lot, since they are in an area
reserved for public easement purposes and that only the
local government
for recovery of Las Piñas
of possession City could institute an action
or ownership.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same
was denied by the trial court in its Order dated August 21,
2007.9 Consequently, petitioner elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals which, on March 5, 2010, sustained the
dismissal of the case.
The appellate court ruled that the 3-meter area being
disputed is located along the creek which, in turn, is a form
of a stream; therefore, belonging to the public dominion.
It said that petitioner could not close its eyes or ignore the
fact, which is glaring in its own title, that the 3-meter strip
was indeed reserved for public easement. By relying on
the TCT, it is then estopped from claiming ownership and
enforcing its supposed right. Unlike the trial court, however,
the CA noted that the proper party entitled to seek
recovery of possession of the contested portion is not the
City of Las Piñas, but the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), pursuant
to Section known
(otherwise 101 ofasCommonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141
The Public Land Act).
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was
denied by the CA per Resolution dated October 29, 2010,
hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that although the portion of the subject
property occupied by respondents is within the 3-meter
strip reserved for public easement, it still retains ownership
thereof since the strip does not form part of the public
dominion. As the owner of the subject parcel of land, it is
entitled to its lawful possession, hence, the proper party to
file an action for recovery of possession against
respondents conformably with Articles 428 and 539 of
Code.
The Court deny such statement. An easement or servitude
is a real right on another's property, corporeal and
immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain
from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something
to be done on his or her property, for the benefit of another
25 | Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
person or tenement; it is jus in re aliena, inseparable from
the estate to which it actively or passively belongs,
indivisible, perpetual, and a continuing property right,
unless extinguished by causes provided by law.
The Code defines easement as an encumbrance imposed
upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a
community, or of one or more persons to whom the
encumbered estate does not belong. There are two kinds
of easement according to source: by law or by will of the
owners – the former are called legal and the latter
voluntary easement.17 A legal easement or compulsory
easement,
law has for or
its an easement
object by necessity
either public use or constituted
the interest by
of
private persons.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the Land in question is part of
public property.
2. Who is the proper party entitled to institute the case?
Held: 1. Petitioner used Article 630 of the Civil Code as it
provides the general rule that the owner of the estate
retains the ownership of the portion of the easement
established, Article 635 says that “all matters concerning
easements established for public or communal use shall
be governed by the special laws and regulations relating
thereto.” The applicable special laws are DENR A.O. No.
99 021 dated June 11, 1999 which prescribed the
guidelines for the implementation of P.D. Nos. 705 and
1067 which
1216 and P.D.was issued
1067 or Thefor biodiversity
Water Code ofpreservation, P.D.
the Philippines all
of which states that such 3 meter allowance is reserved for
public use. Therefore, it cannot be denied that the subject
land is public property.
In relation to this, the Court held that respondents have no
better right to the property as the petitioners because it is
public land.
In the case at bar, the applicability of DENR A.O. No. 99-21
dated June 11, 1999, which superseded DENR A.O. No. 97-
0519 dated March 6, 1997 and prescribed the revised
guidelines in the implementation of the pertinent
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1273 and Presidential
Decree (P.D.) Nos. 705 and 1067, cannot be doubted. Inter
alia, it was issued to further the government’s program of
biodiversity preservation. Aside from Section 2.1 above-
quoted, Section 2.3 of which further mandates:
2.3 Survey of Titled Lands:
2.3.1 Administratively Titled Lands:
The provisions of item 2.1.a and 2.1.b shall be observed as
the above. However, when these lands are to be
subdivided, consolidated or consolidated-subdivided, the
strip of three (3) meters which falls within urban areas shall
be demarcated and marked on the plan for easement
and bank protection.
The purpose of these strips of land shall be noted in the
technical description and annotated in the title.
2.3.3 Complex Subdivision or Consolidation Subdivision
Surveys for Housing/Residential, Commercial or Industrial
Purposes:
When titled lands are subdivided or consolidated-
subdivided into lots for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes the segregation of the three (3) meter wide strip
along the banks of rivers or streams shall be observed and
be made part of the open space requirement pursuant to
P.D. 1216.
The strip shall be preserved and shall not be subject to
subsequent subdivision. (Underscoring supplied)
Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the
allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks of a stream,
like the Mahabang Ilog Creek in this case, is required and
shall be considered as forming part of the open space
requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216 dated October 14,
1977.20 Said law is explicit: open spaces are "for public use
and are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men" and
that "[the] areas
recreational reserved
use shall for parks, playgrounds
be non-alienable public lands, and
and
non-buildable."
The Court suggests that petitioner should file an action for
mandamus to compel the local government of Las
Piñas City to enforce with reasonable dispatch the
eviction of respondents under R.A. 7279.WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED.
2, As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to
institute a case with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone, We
find and so hold that both the Republic of the Philippines,
through the OSG and the local government of Las Piñas
City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought
to be achieved. The former shall be responsible in case of
action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may
also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of
Republic Act No. 7279 (otherwise known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992).24 Under R.A. 7279,
which
poorer was enacted
sections tocommunities
of the uplift the living conditions
in urban areasinand
the
was envisioned to be the antidote to the pernicious
problem of squatting in the metropolis,25 all local
government units (LGUs) are mandated to evict and
demolish persons or entities occupying danger areas such
as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as
sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds.
ARTICLE 637
1. G.R. No. 4223 August 19, 1908
NICOLAS LUNOD, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
HIGINO MENESES, defendant-appellant.
T. Icasiano, for appellant.
R. Salinas, for appellee.
Facts: On Evaristo
la Vega, the 14thRodriguez,
of March, 1904, Nicolas
Fernando Lunod, Juan
Marcelo, Estebande
Villena, Benito Litao, Ventura Hernandez, and Casimiro
Pantanilla, residents of the town of Bulacan, province of
the same name, filed a written complaint against Higino
Meneses, alleging that they each owned and possessed
farm lands, situated in the places known as Maytunas and
Balot, near a small lake named Calalaran; that the
defendant is the owner of a fish-pond and a strip of land
situated in Paraanan, adjoining the said lake on one side,
and the River Taliptip on the other; that from time
immemorial, and consequently for more than twenty years
before 1901, there existed and still exists in favor of the rice
fields of the plaintiffs a statutory easement permitting the
flow of water over the said land in Paraanan, which
easement the said plaintiffs enjoyed until the year 1901
and consisted in that the water collected upon their lands
and in the Calalaran Lake flow through Paraanan into the
Taliptip River.
From that year however, the defendant, without any right
or reason, converted the land in Paraanan into a fishpond
26 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
and by means of a dam and a bamboo net, prevented
the free passage of the water through said place into the
Taliptip River, that in consequence the lands of the plaintiff
became flooded and damaged by the stagnant waters,
there being no outlet except through the land in
Paraanan; that their plantation were destroyed, causing
the loss and damages to the extent of about P1,000, which
loss and damage will continue if the obstructions to the
flow of the water are allowed to remain, preventing its
passage through said land and injuring the rice plantations
of the plaintiffs.
They therefore asked that judgment be entered against
the defendant,
Paraanan declaring
is subject that the
to a statutory said tract
easement of land in
permitting the
flow of water from the property of the plaintiffs, and that,
without prejudice to the issuing of a preliminary injunction,
the defendant be ordered to remove and destroy the
obstructions that impede the passage of the waters
through Paraanan, and that in future, and forever, he
abstain from closing in any manner the aforesaid tract of
land; that, upon judgment being entered, the said
injunction be declared to be final and that the defendant
be sentenced to pay to the plaintiffs an indemnity of
P1,000, and the costs in the proceedings; that they be
granted any other and further equitable or proper remedy
in accordance with the facts alleged and proven.
On the 29th of August, 1904, The defendant filed an
amended answer, denying each and everyone of the
allegations of the complaint, and alleged that no statutory
easement existed nor could exist in favor of the lands
described in the complaint, permitting the waters to flow
over
ownedthe
in fish pond
the sitio of that he, together
Bambang, the areawith
andhis brothers,
boundaries
of which were stated by him, and which he and his
brothers had inherited from their deceased mother.
The court, on the 13th of March, 1907, entered judgment
declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decision in
their favor, and sentenced the defendant to remove the
dam placed on the east of the Paraanan passage on the
side of the Taliptip River opposite the old dam in the barrio
of Bambang, as well as to remove and destroy the
obstacles to the free passage of the waters through the
strip of land in Paraanan; to abstain in future, and forever,
from obstructing or closing in any manner the course of the
waters through the said strip of land. The request that the
defendant be sentenced to pay an indemnity was
denied, and no ruling was made as to costs.
The defendant excepted to the above judgment and
furthermore asked for a new trial which was denied and
also excepted
exceptions, to, and,was
the question upon approval
submitted of court.
to this the bill of
Issue: Whether or Not Meneses has a right to block the
passage or to construct works to prevent an easement. -
NO
Held: Article 552 of the Civil code provides:
Lower estates must receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man
descend from the higher estates, as well as the
stone or earth which they carry with them.
Neither may the owner of the lower estates
construct works preventing this easement, nor the
one of the higher estate works increasing the
burden.
Article 563 of the said code reads also:
The establishment, extent, form, and conditions of
the easements of waters to which this section
refers shall be governed by the special law
relating thereto in everything not provided for in
this code.
The special law cited in the Law of Waters of August 3,
1866, article 111 of which, treating of natural easements
relating to waters, provides:
Lands situated at a lower level are subject to
receive the waters that flow naturally, without the
work of man, from the higher lands together with
the stone or earth which they carry with them.
Owner
impedeofortheprevent
lower lands
such cannot erect works
an easement or that will
charge,
constituted and imposed by the law upon his estate for the
benefit of the higher lands belonging to different owners;
neither can the latter do anything to increase or extend
the easement.
According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an easement is
charge imposed upon one estate for the benefit of
another estate belonging to a different owner, and the
realty in favor of which the easement is established is
called the dominant estate, and the one charged with it
the servient estate.
It appears to have been clearly proven in this case that
the lands owned by the plaintiffs in the aforesaid barrio, as
well as the small adjoining lake, named Calalaran, are
located in places relatively higher than the sitio called
Paraanan where the land and fish pond of the defendant
are situated, and which border on the Taliptip River; that
during
land ofthe
therainy season
plaintiffs, thewhich
and rain water which falls
flows toward theon he
small
Calalaran Lake at flood time, has no outlet to the Taliptip
River other than through the low land of Paraanan: that
the border line between Calalaran and Paraanan there
has existed from time immemorial a dam, constructed by
the community for the purpose of preventing the salt
waters from the Taliptip River, at high tide, from flooding
the land in Calalaran, passing through the lowlands of
Paraanan; but when rainfall was abundant, one of the
residents was designated in his turn by the lieutenant or
justice of the barrio to open the sluice gate in order to let
out the water that flooded the rice fields, through the land
of Paraanan to the above-mentioned river, that since
1901, the defendant constructed another dam along the
boundary of this fishpond in Paraanan, thereby impeding
the outlet of the waters that flood the fields of Calalaran,
to the serious detriment of the growing crops.
The lands of Paraanan being the lower are subject to the
easement of from
proceeding receiving
the and giving
higher passage
lands and to thelake
the waters
of
Calalaran; this easement was not constituted by
agreement between the interested parties; it is of a
statutory nature, and the law had imposed it for the
common public utility in view of the difference in the
altitude of the lands in the barrio Bambang.
Higino Meneses, as the owner of the servient estate, is
obliged to give passage to and allow the flow of the
waters descending from the Calalaran Lake and from the
land of the plaintiffs through his lands in Paraanan for their
discharge into the Taliptip River; and he is hereby ordered
to remove any obstacle that may obstruct the free
passage of the waters whenever there may be either a
small or large volume of running water through his lands in
the sitio of Paraanan for their discharge into the Taliptip
River; and in future to abstain from impeding, in any
manner, the flow of the waters coming from the higher
lands.
ARTICLE 641
27 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
1. G.R. No. L-60219 June 29, 1984
BIENVENIDO AMISTOSO, petitioner,
vs.
SENECIO ONG, EPIFANIA NERI & HON. PRESIDING JUDGE,
ESTEBAN M. LISING OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CAMARINES SUR, BRANCH VI, respondents.
Facts: On July 27, 1981, petitioner as plaintiff, filed before
the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, a
conplaint for Recognition of Basement with Preliminary
Injunction and Damages. The complaint which was
docketed in the a resaid Court as Civil Case No. P-153
among
defendant others alleged,
Epifania that (one
Neri, plaintiff
of (now
the petitioner) and
herein private
respondents) are the owners of adjoining parcels of
agricultural land situated in Cauayanan, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur; that an irrigation canal traverses the land
of defendant Neri through which irrigation water from the
Silmod River passes and flows to the land of the petitioner
for the latter's beneficial use and that respondent Neri,
owner of the land on which said irrigatrion canal exists and
Senecio Ong, the cultivator of the said property, despite
repeated demands refused to recognize the rights and
title of the petitioner to the beneficial use of the water
passing through the aforesaid irrigation canal and to have
petitioner's rights and/or claims annotated on the
Certificate of Title of respondent Neri. Hence, the filing of
the said complaint.
In their Answer, private respondents denied the existence
of any right on the part of the petitioner to the use of the
canal mentioned in the complaint nor any contract, much
less
assertany
thatdeed or encumbrance
they have not performedonany their
actproperty and
prejudicial to
the petitioner that will warrant the filing of the complaint
against them. By way of affirmative and special defenses,
private respondents alleged that petitioner's complaint
states no cause of action and that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the same.
After petitioner has rested his case by a formal offer of his
testimonial and documentary evidences, private
respondents instead of presenting their evidence, filed a
motion to dismiss. In the said motion, respondents contedn
that the instant case, involving as it does development,
exploitation, conservation and utilization of water
resources falls within the exclusive jursidiction of the
National Water Resources Council pursuant to P.D. NO.
424, Section 2(b) and Section 88 thereof.
Acting on private respondent's motion, respondent Judge
dismissed petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction in an
Order dated January 14, 1981.
Failing to obtain a favorable reconsideration of the Order
of dismissal, petitioner now comes before Us through the
instant petition contending:
(1) That the case at bar is not to settle any water dispute
between the parties but a complaint which calls purely for
a determination of the right of the plaintiff to have an
established right amounting to an easement annotated
on the certificate of title of the defendant, hence the
question is judicial which may be taken cognizance of by
the respondent court;
(2) That since the case was filed on July 26, 1972. Which
was before the effectivity of PD NO. 424, therefore, even if
defendant's contention is correct — that the case involved
water rights dispute — the old law on water applies and
not the present water code otherwise the Court shall lose
jurisdiction contrary to the well-settled rule that once be
lost;
(3) That the herein defendant can no longer raise the
question of plaintiff's right to the beneficial use of irrigation
water since the right to use had already been determined,
decided and laid to rest when the Department of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications awarded
petitioner Water Rights Grant after complying with all the
legal requirements such as publication, payment of fees,
survey, investigation, etc.; and
(4) That the issue in the case at bar which was erroneously
overlooked by the respondent Judge does not involve a
determination of the right of the parties to the utilizatio
conservation and protection of the parties' respective
water rights, hence
nor jurisdiction it National
of the does not Water
fan within the competence
Resources Council.
Private respondents contend that the assailed order of
dismissal was in order since a mere cursory reading of the
complaint shows that petitioner claims for the right to use
water coming from the Silmod River and prays that his right
to the utilization thereof be respected and not be
disturbed and/or obstructed by the respondents. On its
face then, the dispute is on the use, conservation and
protection of the right to water either by the petitioner or
by the private respondents.
Since the controversy hinges on the right to use and
protect the water from the Silmod River that passes on the
land of the private respondents to the petitioner's property,
the proper authority to determine such a controversy is the
National Water Resources Council which is vested with
exclusive jurisdiction over such question pursuant to P.D.
NOS. 424 and 1067.
Issue: 1. Whether or Not Amistoso has the right over the
use of the canal. – YES.
2. Whether or Not National Water Resources Council has
exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. – NO.
Held: From the foregoing stipulations, private respondents
admit that petitioner, then plaintiff, has an approved
Water Rights Grant issued by the Department of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications. Private
respondents, however, contend that the said grant does
not pertain to the beneficial use of irrigation water from
Silmod River. The records, however, do not show any other
irrigation water going to petitioner's property passing thru
respondents' lot aside from that coming from the Silmod
River. Respondents' controversion of petitioner's right to
irrigation water specifically from Silmod River is
undoubtedly a lame denial.
The record clearly discloses an approved Water Rights
Grant in favor of Amistoso. The grant was made three (3)
years before the promulgation of P.D. 1067 (Water Code
of the Philippines). The water rights grant partakes the
nature of a document known as a water
permit recognized under Article 13 of P.D. 1067. the WATER
RIGHTS GRANT of Amistoso does not fall under "claims for a
right to use water existing on or before December 31, 1974"
which under P.D. 1067 are required to be registered with
the National Water Resources Council within two (2) years
from promulgation of P.D. 1067, otherwise it is deemed
waived and the use thereof deemed abandoned.
The grant contradicts the erroneous findings of the
respondent Judge, and incontrovertibly entitles petitioner
to the beneficial use of water from Silmod River. That right
is now a. vested one and may no longer be litigated as to
bring petitioner's case within the jurisdiction of the National
Water Resources Council. To resurrect that issue will be
violative of the rule on res judicata. Amistoso is not asking
the court to grant him the right to use but to compel Neri
28 | Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
to recognize that right and have the same annotated on
the latter’s TCT. The interruption of the free flow of water
caused by the refusal to re-open the closed irrigation
canal constituted petitioner's cause of action in the court
below, which decidedly do not fall within the domain of
the authority of the National Water Resources Council.
ARTICLE 646
1. G.R. Nos. L-33868-76 October 18, 1990
NILO LIZARES, NICOLAS LEDESMA, JAIME CLAPAROLS,
CARMITA C. BALCELLS, EDUARDO CLAPAROLS, EULALIA C.
ROSELLO, ENRIQUE YUSAY, DOMINGO RODRIGUEZ, INC.,
FIRST
vs. FARMERS' MILLING CO., INC., petitioners,
HON. CESAR A. KINTANAR, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, and TALISAY-SILAY
MILLING CO., INC., respondents.
Facts: Private respondent Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.
(Central) is the owner and operator of a sugar mill located
in the Municipality of Talisay, Negros Occidental,
manufacturing centrifugal sugar from sugarcanes
delivered to the mill by petitioners Nilo Lizares, Nicolas
Ledesma, Jaime Claparols ,Carmita C. Balcells, Eduardo
Claparols, Eulalia C. Rogelio, Enrique Yusay, Domingo
Rodriguez, Inc., and First Farmers' Milling Co., Inc. pursuant
to Identical milling contracts executed between the
former and the latter.
Under the provisions of the milling contracts, Central was
granted, inter alia,an easement of aqueduct on the
parcels of land owned by petitioners for the passage of
water
purpose,from the Imbang
Central River to
constructed its sugarwater
concrete mill. For this
canals
traversing the parcels of land of petitioners. The easement
of aqueduct was for a period of fifty (50) years, which
began with 1920-21 crop year up to 1969-70 crop year.
Prior to the expiration of this period, Central, by means of
separate letters, offered to lease from petitioners the areas
occupied by the canals. However, petitioners refused to
entertain the offer of Central.
On June 22, 1970, Central filed its complaints against
petitioners before respondent Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental. On July 20,1970, Central filed its
complaints against Domingo Rodriguez, Inc. and First
Farmers' Milling Co., Inc., docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 9472
and 9473, respectively, before the same court. In all these
cases, Central prayed for the establishment of a legal
easement of aqueduct on the parcels of land owned by
petitioners and for the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction ex parte to restrain the petitioners and/or their
agents, representatives,
removing assigns,
and/or destroying thesuccessors-in-interest from
canals or otherwise from
obstructing the passage of water from the Imbang River to
its mill, through the canals, during the pendency of the
litigation.
On June 30, 1970, respondent court ordered the issuance
of the writs of preliminary injunction with respect to Civil
Cases Nos. 9438, 9439, 9441, 9442, 9443, 9445 and 9446.
On July 20, 1970, respondent court ordered the issuance
of the writs of pre injunction as regards Civil Cases Nos.
9472 and 9473.
On July 27, 1970, petitioners filed a motion to dissolve the
writs of preliminary injunction which was opposed by
Central in a motion dated August 21, 1970. On December
10, 1970, respondent court denied the motion to dissolve
the writs of preliminary injunction.
On December 19, 1970, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration thereof which was, however, denied on
April 21, 1971 for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition.
On January 27, 1988, considering the length of time that
these cases have been pending with this Court, and to
determine whether supervening events have rendered
these cases moot and academic, We resolved to require
the parties to move in the premises. On February 29, 1988
(p. 600, Rollo) and June 23, 1988 (p. 603, Rollo), petitioners
manifested that no supervening events have rendered
these cases moot and academic.
Issue:
abuseWhether or Not
of discretion respondent
in having issuedcourt committed
the orders datedgrave
June
30, 1970 and July 20, 1970 directing the issuance of the writs
of preliminary injunction, the order dated December 10,
1970, denying the motion to dissolve the writs of preliminary
injunction and the order dated April 21, 1971 denying the
motion for reconsideration.
Held: Petitioners have failed to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent court in issuing the
questioned orders.
Petitioners allege that the cases of Bacolod-Murcia Milling
Co., Inc., et al. v. Capitol Subdivision, Inc., et al. (G.R. No.
L25887, July 26, 1966, 17 SCRA 731), Angela Estate, Inc., et
al, v. CFI of Negros Occidental, et al. (G.R. No. L-27084, July
31, 1968, 24 SCRA 500) and Locsin, et al. v. Climaco, etc.,
et al. (G.R. No. L-27319, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 816)
constitute the leading jurisprudence in the issuance of the
writs of preliminary injunction in cases of complaints
praying
thereto, for the declaration
Central of legal
asserts that the easement. In
aforementioned answer
decisions
are inapplicable in these, cases because they refer to
legal easement of right of way.
The cases invoked by petitioners may be applied to this
controversy only insofar as the general principles on the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction reiterated
therein are concerned, but not with regard to the other
principles enunciated therein because they deal with
legal easement of right of way whereas Our concern here
is legal easement of aqueduct.
A preliminary injunction may be granted at any time after
the commencement of the action and before judgment,
when it is established that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the acts
complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts,
either for a limited period or perpetually; that the
commission
during or continuance
the litigation of some act complained
or the non-performance of
thereof would
probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or that the
defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in
violation of the plaintiff s rights respecting the subject of
the action, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
The purpose of this provisional remedy if to preserve
the status quo 2 of the things subject of the action and/or
the relation between the parties, in order to protect the
right of the plaintiff respecting the subject of the action
during the pendency of the suit. Because, otherwise or if
no preliminary prohibitory injunction were issued, the
defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue the
doing of the act which the plaintiff asks the court to
restrain, and thus make ineffectual the final judgment
rendered afterwards granting the relief sought by the
plaintiff.
29 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
We agree with respondent court that Central has
sufficiently established the necessity of issuing writs of
preliminary injunction against petitioners.
2. G.R. No. L-21727 May 29, 1970
CRISPINA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
GUILLERMO GUTIERREZ, and DAMASO
MENDOZA, respondents.
Jaime L. Guerrero and Renato B. Bercades for petitioner.
Judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Bataan in favor of the plaintiff, Crispina Salazar, now
petitioner; on Damaso
Gutierrez and appeal Mendoza,
by the defendants,
the Court ofGuillermo
Appeals
reversed and the plaintiff elevated the case to us for
review by certiorari.
Facts: Crispina Salazar is owner of a piece of land (Lot 436
of the Cadastral Survey of Balanga) situated in Tuyo,
Balanga, Bataan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
1578 issued by the Register of Deeds of the said province,
and acquired by her from the Municipality of Balanga on
May 4, 1949. The lot is bounded on the northeast by Lot
361, on the southeast by Sapang Tuyo, on the southwest
by Lot 435, and on the northwest by Lot 433.
Lot 433 was registered under the Torrens system on July 23,
1923, with Original Certificate of Title 2162. Ownership
passed to respondent Guillermo Gutierrez by inheritance
in 1927, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1059 was issued
in his name on June 11, 1928. No annotation of any lien or
encumbrance affecting the land appears on either title.
Before the present controversy arose, Lot 436 and some of
the surrounding estates, including Lot 433, were irrigated
with water fromSapang Tuyo, a public stream, flowing
through a dike that traversed Lots 431, 434, 433 and 461.
The portion of this dike that passed through Lot 433
branched near the boundary between this lot and Lot 434
into a canal which ran across the rest of Lot 433 up to Lot
436. It was with the water flowing through this canal that
Lot 436 used to be irrigated.
On February 24, 1953 respondent Damaso Mendoza, a
lessee of Lot 433, demolished the said canal, thereby
stopping the flow of the water and depriving Crispina
Salazar's Lot 436 of the irrigation facilities which it had
formerly enjoyed. Her requests that the canal be rebuilt
and the water flow restored having been turned down,
Salazar commenced the present suit on March 2, 1953,
praying that these reliefs be granted her by the Court and
that the defendants be ordered to pay her actual
damages
P5,000, in P1,000
and the sum ofattorney's
for P900, moral damages
fees, in the sum of
plus costs.
The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction as
prayed for by the plaintiff, ordering the defendants to
restore the demolished portion of the canal and to refrain
from again demolishing the same pending trial, but the
writ was dissolved on March 9, 1953, upon a counterbond
filed by the defendants.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Bataan rendered
judgment on April 10, 1956, ordering the defendants to
restore at their expense the canal in question, to connect
it with the canal found in Lot 436 and to cause the
corresponding annotation of the encumbrance on
Transfer Certificate of Title 1059 covering Lot 433; and
ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P1,360 annually beginning the agricultural year 1956-1957
until the restoration of the canal, P4,700 as actual
damages, P5,000 as moral damages and P1,000 as
attorney's fees, plus costs.
However, On July 26, 1963, decision was reversed on
appeal, rendering that easement of aqueduct over Lot
433 is a voluntary one and that upon registration, there was
no annotation of said easement as a subsisting
encumbrance.
Hence this review by certiorari.
Issue: Whether appellate court erred in holding that
petitioner failed to comply with the requisites laid down by
Article 643 in order to claim legal easement set forth in
Article 642 of the New Civil Code.
Held: On the first requisite of Article 643 — that the
petitioner must prove that he can dispose of the water and
that it is sufficient for the use for which it is intended — there
is the statement of the trial court that the disputed canal
had been in existence since the Spanish regime, or at least
prior to the srcinal registration of Lot 433 in 1923, and that
of the Court of Appeals itself confirmatory of this second
alternative finding. If, as thus found, the petitioner had
been using water from Sapang Tuyo to irrigate Lot 436
since she acquired said lot in 1949, as the Municipality of
Balanga had been doing before her, and that such use
had lasted continuously for at least thirty years, it is a fair
presumption that she had a right to do so and that the
water she could dispose of was sufficient for the purpose.
Indeed it would be a superfluity to require her to produce
a permit from the proper authorities, for even without it the
right had already become vested both under Article 194
of the Spanish Law of Waters and under Article 504 of the
Civil Code, which respectively state:
ART. 194.
use of Any person
public waters who has
for a term enjoyed
of twenty the
years
without objection on the part of the authorities or
of any third person, shall continue in its enjoyment,
even though he may not be able to show that he
secured proper permission.
ART. 504. The use of public waters is acquired:
(1) By administrative concession;
(2) By prescription for ten years.
The extent of the rights and obligations of the use shall be
that established, in the first case, by the terms of the
concession, and, in the second case, by the manner and
form, in which the waters have been used.
The third requisite of Article 643 of the Civil Code refers to
the matter of indemnity to the owner of the servient estate.
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner it would be nigh
impossible now to present actual proof that such
indemnity
that has beensince
have elapsed paid,the
considering
easementthe number
had of years
first come into
existence and the subsequent changes in ownership of
the lots involved. It stands to reason, however, that if the
easement had continued for so long in fact, not only
before Lot 433 was registered in 1923 but for thirty years
thereafter, until cut off by the respondents in 1953 the legal
requirement in question must have been complied with.
The other requisite of Article 643 is that "the proposed right
of way is the most convenient and the least onerous to
third persons." The Court of Appeals stated that the
petitioner has not established this fact, and that "her own
evidence reveals that her lot is abutting Sapang Tuyo on
its southern boundary, where from she can easily and
directly draw the water necessary to irrigate her land." This
statement is an oversimplification. Proximity or abutment
of a piece of land to a stream does not necessarily carry
with it the conclusion that water may conveniently be
drawn directly therefrom for irrigation.
30 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
In the first place, the petitioner has pointed out in her brief,
without contradiction by the respondents, that the portion
of her land which abuts Sapang Tuyo is precipice.
Secondly, the trial court made an ocular inspection of the
premises and observed that the eastern and northeastern
portions of Lot 436 are lower than the southwestern,
western and northwestern (the point where Lot 436 adjoins
Lot 433) portions of the same. Finally, it would appear from
the observation made by the same court that the
demolished canal is part of a system of conduits used to
irrigate the lands of the petitioner and the respondents as
well as the surrounding estates belonging to other owners,
and that this system of conduits is of a permanent nature.
In any case the respondents are hardly in a position to
avail of the registration of Lot 433 in 1923 without the
corresponding registration of the easement on the title as
an excuse to summarily terminate it thirty years thereafter.
The srcinal registered owner allowed the easement to
continue in spite of such non-registration: the least that
can be said is that he either recognized its existence as a
compulsory servitude on his estate or voluntarily agreed to
its establishment and continuance. And the respondent
Guillermo Gutierrez, as the successor-in-interest to the, said
owner by inheritance, is not an innocent third person who
could plead the absence of annotation on the title. Not
only was he aware of the existence of the easement when
he inherited the property in 1927, but he likewise allowed it
to continue for twenty-six years after he acquired title. He
is bound both by the act of his predecessor and by his
own.
ARTICLE 649
1. G.R. No. 180282 April 11, 2011
CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR., EVELYN DICHOSO VALDEZ, and
ROSEMARIE DICHOSO PE BENITO, Petitioners,
vs.
PATROCINIO L. MARCOS, Respondent.
Facts: On August 2, 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for
Easement of Right of Way against respondent Patrocinio L.
Marcos. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they
are the owners of Lot No. 21553 of the Cadastral Survey of
Laoag City; while respondent is the owner of Lot No. 1. As
petitioners had no access to a public road to and from
their property, they claimed to have used a portion of Lot
No. 1 in accessing the road since 1970. Respondent,
however, blocked the passageway with piles of sand.
Though petitioners have been granted another
passageway by the spouses Benjamin and Sylvia Arce
(Spouses Arce), the owners of another adjacent lot, the
former instituted the complaint before the RTC and prayed
thatLot
of they 01
be granted
by paying a rightthe
of way over an area
defendant the ofamount
54 sqm
ofP54,000.00, and that the right be annotated on
defendant’s title. In addition to that, the defendant will
pay the plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 as damages for
attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
In the defendant’s answer, he denied that he allowed
anybody to use Lot No. 1 as passageway. Moreover, he
stated that petitioners’ claim of right of way is only due to
expediency and not necessity for there already is an
existing easement of right of way available to petitioners
granted by the Spouses Arce. Thus, there is no need to
establish another easement over respondent’s property.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners by
finding that they had adequately established the
requisites to justify an easement of right of way in
accordance with Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code.
Also, the trial court declared petitioners in good faith as
they expressed their willingness to pay proper indemnity.
however, the he CA reversed and set aside the RTC
decision ruling that a right of way had already been
granted by the sevient estate. Thus, there is no need to
establish an easement over the respondent’s property.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a grant
of legal easement of right of way from their landlocked
property through there is another passageway for them.
Held: No. The petition is without merit.
An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the
property
charge or rights of the servient
encumbrance onowner and is regarded
the servient estate. as
It a
is
incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to
establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence
of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of
right of way may be granted.
To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following
requisites should be met: first, the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; second, there is payment of
proper indemnity; third, the isolation is not due to the acts
of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and fourth, the
right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
In the case at hand, the petitioners failed to show sufficient
factual evidence to satisfy the above-enumerated
requirements.
Admittedly, they had been granted a right of way through
the other adjacent lot owned by the Spouses Arce. In fact,
other lot owners use the said outlet in going to and coming
from the public highway. Clearly, there is an existing outlet
to and from the public road.
However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and
circuitous, and they have to pass through other lots owned
by different owners before they could get to the highway.
We find petitioners’ concept of what is “adequate outlet”
a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine
that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right
of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial,
necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate
is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a
compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it
can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same
should not be imposed.
As it shows, [petitioners] had been granted a right of way
through the adjacent estate of Spouses Arce before the
complaint below was even filed. [Respondent] alleged
that this right of way is being used by the other estates
which are similarly situated as [petitioners]. [Petitioners] do
not dispute this fact. There is also a reason to believe that
this right of way is Spouses Arce’s outlet to a public road
since their property, as it appears from the Sketch Map, is
also surrounded by other estates. The fact that Spouses
Arce are not insisting on a right of way through
respondent’s property, although an opening on the
latter’s property is undoubtedly the most direct and
shortest distance to P. Gomez St. from the former’s
property, bolsters our conviction that they have adequate
outlet to the highway which they are now likewise making
available to [petitioners].
The convenience of the dominant estate has never been
the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. To be
sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is
“adequacy.” Hence, when there is already an existing
31 | Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public
highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet, for one
reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up
another servitude is entirely unjustified.
2. G.R. No. 149023 September 27, 2007
LEO WINSTON BRIN LEE, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES AMADEO and ADELAIDA
CARREON, Respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Amadeo
are the owners of and Adelaida
a house Carreon,
and Lots Nos. respondents,
8-B and 8-C
located in Cebu City covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) Nos. 61049 and 56745, respectively, of the
Registry of Deeds, same city.
On the other hand, Anita Linda Rodriguez is the owner of
Lot No. 6213-A-2 covered by TCT No. 93402. It is situated
within the vicinity of respondent spouses’ lots.
As there is no existing way from their property to the
nearest road, respondents filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 22, Cebu City a complaint for
easement of right of way against Rodriguez, docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-7426. During the pre-trial, the RTC found
that there is another servient estate, owned by Mr. and Ms.
Anselmo Jardin which could be used by respondents as a
right of way. Respondents then filed a Motion for Leave to
Admit Amended Complaint to include spouses Jardin as
co-defendants, the latter being owners of Lots Nos. 6213-
A-3, 6213-A-4property.
respondents’ and 8-AOnlocated
June 9,on thethe
1989, eastern side an
RTC issued of
Order admitting the Amended Complaint.
However, the lots of spouses Jardin were sold pendente lite
to Leo Winston Brin Lee, petitioner. As a result, respondents
filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Amended
Complaint impleading petitioner as additional defendant.
On September 10, 1993, the RTC granted the motion.
RULING OF THE RTC CEBU CITY
After trial, the RTC rendered Judgment in favor of
respondents and against petitioner, ordering Mr. Leo
Winston Brin Lee to grant Sps. Carreon a right of way on
the northern portion of his properties measuring "one-
meter wide and thirteen meters long; and ordering Mr. Leo
Winston Brin Lee to demolish the fence/structure to the
extent obstructing the right of way hereinabove
constituted.
RULING OF THE
On appeal byCOURT OF APPEALS
petitioner, the Court of Appeals, in its
assailed Decision, affirmed the RTC Judgment.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the appellate court in its Resolution of June 21,
2001.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Sps. Carreon are entitled to an easement of right of way
on petitioner’s property.
RULING: NO.
The conferment of a legal easement of right of way is
governed by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code
reproduced as follows:
ART. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real
right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other
persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway,
is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment of the proper
indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that
its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant
estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity
shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the
amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage
for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and
for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate
without a permanent
the payment of theway,damage
the indemnity shall by
caused consist
suchin
encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the
immovable is due to the proprietor’s own acts.
ART. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established
at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and,
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following
requisites should be met:
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649,
par. 1);
3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the
proprietor
par.); and of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest (Art. 650).3
All the above requisites are present here.
WHEREFORE, The Supreme Court DENY the petition. The
challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60511 are AFFIRMED.
3. [G.R. No. 137882. February 04, 2005]
SPS. ELIZABETH DE LA CRUZ and ALFREDO DE LA
CRUZ, petitioners, vs. OLGA RAMISCAL
represented by ENRIQUE MENDOZA, respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Olga Ramiscal is the registered owner
of aLa
De parcel of land.
Cruz are Petitioner,
occupants of aSpa. Elizabeth
parcel of landand Alfredo
located at
the back of Ramiscal’s property, owned by the mother of
Alfredo. The subject matter of this case is a long strip of
land owned by respondent which is being used by
petitioners as their pathway to and from the nearest public
highway from their property.
Respondent leased her property, including the
building thereon, to Phil. Orient Motors. Phil. Orient Motors
also owned a property adjacent to that of respondent’s.
Years later, Phil. Orient Motors sold its property to San
Benito Realty. It was only during the relocation survey and
location plan for both contiguous properties of respondent
and San Benito Realty that respondent discovered that the
aforementioned pathway being occupied by petitioners
is part of her property.
Respondent filed a complaint, seeking the
demolition of the structure allegedly illegally constructed
by petitioners on her property. Respondent asserted in her
complaint that petitioners have an existing right of way to
32 | Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
a public highway other than the current one they are
using, which she owns.
Petitioners claimed that such use was with the
knowledge of respondent. They also alleged that
respondent initiated the construction on her property of a
motor shop known as Phil. Orient Motors and they, as well
as the other occupants of the property at the back of
respondent’s land, opposed the construction of the
perimeter wall as it would enclose and render their
property without any adequate ingress and egress. They
asked respondent to give them an easement on the
eastern side of her property, which would be reciprocated
with an Respondent
estate. easement by
didthenotowner
want ofto another adjacent
give them the
easement on the eastern side of her property but, instead,
offered to them the disputed passageway, which offer
they had accepted.
RULING OF THE RTC
On 31 July 1997, the RTC handed down a Decision, giving
probative weight to the evidence adduced by
respondent. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Olga
Ramiscal and ordering the defendants to demolish the
structure built by them along the pathway on the eastern
side of plaintiffs property towards 18 th Avenue, Murphy,
Quezon City.
RULING OF CA
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal filed by
petitioners from the RTC decision for failure to file brief
within the reglementary period.
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners met the
same fate in the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
05 March 1999.
Hence, the present petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or
legal easement of right of way.
RULING
NO.
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted
on the corporeal immovable property of another, by virtue
of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow
someone to do, something on his property, for the benefit
of another thing or person.[26] The statutory basis for this
right is Article 613, in connection with Article 619, of the Civil
Code, which states:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance
imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is
established is called the dominant estate; that which is
subject thereto, the servient estate.
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the
will of the owners. The former are called legal and the
latter voluntary easements.
Petitioners herein failed to show by competent
evidence other than their bare claim that they and their
tenants, spouses Manuel and Cecilia Bondoc and
Carmelino Masangkay, entered into an agreement with
respondent, through her foreman, Mang Puling, to use the
pathway to 18th Avenue, which would be reciprocated
with an equivalent 1.50-meter wide easement by the
owner of another adjacent estate. The hands of this Court
are tied from giving credence to petitioners self-serving
claim that such right of way was voluntarily given them by
respondent Ramiscal.
Likewise futile are petitioners attempts to show that
they are legally entitled to the aforesaid pathway under
Article 649 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real
right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other
persons, and without adequate outlet to a public highway,
is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment of the proper
indemnity.
The conferment of a legal easement of right of way
under Article 649 is subject to proof of the following
requisites: (1) it is surrounded by other immovables and has
no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of
proper indemnity; (3) the isolation is not the result of its own
acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. The first three requisites are not obtaining in the
instant case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions
dated 11 September 1998 and 5 March 1999 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68216 are AFFIRMED. The
Decision dated 31 July 1997 of the Regional Trial Court is
likewise UPHELD.
4. BRYAN U.
VELASCO in VILLANUEVA,
his capacitypetitioner, vs. HON. TIRSO D.C.
as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N.
SEBASTIAN and SHIRLEY LORILLA, respondents
[A] legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted
for public use or for private interest, and becomes a
continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is
inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as
provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. The
essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are:
(1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) proper indemnity. has been paid; (3) the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point
least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
FACTS
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought
it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said
property. The bank had acquired it from the spouses
Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a public auction on March
19, 1983. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there
was a small house on its southeastern portion. It occupied
one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way
the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas,
predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a
Contract of Easement of Right of Way.
Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land,
the Gabriels had constructed the aforementioned small
house that encroached upon the two-meter easement.
Petitioner was
Sebastian andalso unaware
Shirley Lorilla,that
hadprivate
filed onrespondents,
May 8, 1991,Julio
Civil
33 | Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
Case No. Q-91-8703, for easement, damages and with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order against the spouses Gabriel. As successors-in-
interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the
contract of easement.
On May 1991, the trial court issued a temporary restraining
order. On August 1991, it issued a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction ordering the Gabriels to provide the
right of way and to demolish the small house encroaching
on the easement. On August 1991, the Gabriels filed a
motion for reconsideration which was also denied. Thus,
they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals.
On March 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and upheld the RTC's issuances. The decision
became final and executory on July 1992.
On January 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC in Quezon
City issued an Alias Writ of Demolition. On June 1995, the
sheriff tried to demolish the small house pursuant to the
writ. Petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash
Alias Writ of Demolition. He maintains that the writ of
demolition could not apply to his property since he was
not a party to the civil case. His Third Party Claim with
prayer to quash the writ of demolition was denied for lack
of merit on August 16, 1995. The motion for reconsideration
as well as the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
dated September 12, 1995 were denied on October 19,
1995.
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court that
asserting of Appeals, docketed
the existence as CA-G.R.
of the easementSP No. 39166,
of right of
way was not annotated in his title and that he was not a
party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, hence the contract of
easement executed by the Gabriels in favor of the
Espinolas could not be enforced against him. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and denied
the reconsideration.
Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement on the property binds
petitioner.
RULING NO.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals,
the easement in the instant petition is both (1)
an easement
an easement by by necessity
grant or a
orvoluntary easement, and (2)
a legal easement.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals have declared the
existence of said easement (right of way). This finding of
fact of both courts below is conclusive on this Court.
- The small house occupying one meter of the two-
meter wide easement obstructs the entry of
private respondents' cement mixer and motor
vehicle.
- One meter is insufficient for the needs of private
respondents.
- It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant
estate determine the width of the easement.
- Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish
whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view
of the needs of private respondents' estate.
Petitioner's second proposition, that he is not bound by the
contract of easement because the same was not
annotated in the title and that a notice of lis pendens of
the complaint to enforce the easement was not recorded
with the Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious.
- As already explained, it is in the nature of
legal easement that the servient estate (of
petitioner) is legally bound to provide the
dominant estate (of private respondents in this
case) ingress from and egress to the public
highway.
In this case, private respondents, Julio Sebastian
and Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on
May 8, 1991, against the srcinal owners, the spouses
Maximo and Justina Gabriel. Title in the name of petitioner
was entered in the Register of Deeds on March 24, 1995,
after he bought the property from the bank which had
acquired
Case No. itQ-91-8703
from the Gabriels. Hence, For,
binds petitioner. the decision
althoughinnot
Civil
a
party to the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action in
court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
5. G.R. No. 149125 RESURRECCION OBRA, Petitioner, -
versus - SPS. VICTORIANO BADUA & MYRNA BADUA, SPS.
JUANITO BALTORES & FLORDELIZA BALTORES, SPS.
ISABELO BADUA & PRESCILA BADUA, SPS. JOSE BALANON
& SHIRLEY BALANON, SPS. ORLANDO BADUA & MARITA
BADUA and SPS. LEONCIO BADUA & JUVY BADUA
FACTS:
The case arose from a Complaint for Easement of
Right-of-Way filed by respondents against Anacleto and
Resurreccion Obra, Donato and Lucena Bucasas, and
Paulino and Crisanta Badua in Civil Case No. 5033 entitled
Sps. Victoriano Badua and Myrna Badua, et al. v. Sps.
Anacleto Obra and Resurreccion Obra, et al. before the
RTC. Defendant Anacleto Obra was the husband of
petitioner. Respondents alleged that their residential
houses, erected on a lot commonly owned by them and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 93-01900281 under
Cadastral Lot No. 5518 situated in Galongen, Bacnotan, La
Union, were located west of the properties of the Obras,
Bucasases, and Baduas. Their only access to the national
highway was a pathway traversing the northern portion of
petitioner’s property and the southern portion of the
properties of the Bucasases and Baduas. The pathway was
more than one meter wide and sixteen meters long. They
claimed that this pathway had been established as early
as 1955. In 1995, however, petitioner Obra constructed a
fence on the northern boundary of their property; thus,
blocking respondents’ access to the national highway.
Respondents demanded the demolition of the fence, but
petitioner refused.
In her Answer, petitioner averred that respondents
had not established any easement of right-of-way either
by law or agreement. She claimed that respondents failed
to satisfy the requisites provided in Articles 649 and 650 of
the Civil Code in order to establish an easement of right-
of-way on the northern portion of her property. Moreover,
she alleged that respondents had another access as
ingress and egress to the public road other than the one
traversing her property.
The spouses Badua and Bucasas failed to file an
answer; consequently, they were declared in default.
On July 7, 2000, after trial, the RTC rendered a
Decision dismissing the complaint. It held that respondents
"were not able to satisfy all the requisites needed for their
claim of
when an easement
petitioner of right
fenced the of way." Itportion
northern observed
of that
her
34 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
property, respondents were able to use another pathway
as ingress and egress to the highway. It stated further that
"the new pathway is more than adequate"5 for
respondents’ use. Thus, the applied easement of right-of-
way on the northern portion of petitioner’s property was
not allowed. The said Decision became final and
executory.
It must be noted that the "new" pathway used by
respondents, however, traversed the southern portion of
petitioner’s property. Sometime in 2001, petitioner
constructed a fence on this portion of her lot, which again
restricted the use of respondents’ "new" pathway.
Aggrieved and onprejudiced
respondents filed bya Motion
March 6, 2001 petitioner’s action,
to Enforce the
July 7, 2000 Decision of the RTC. They alleged that the
Decision of the RTC dismissing the case was based on the
existence of a new pathway which they had been using
since 1995. Thus, they asserted that petitioner was
prohibited from closing said passage.
On March 20, 2001, the RTC granted the said motion.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was
rejected in the trial court’s June 20, 2001 Order.
Clarifying its July 7, 2000 Decision, the trial court, in its
March 20, 2001 Order, held that the dismissal of the
complaint depended on petitioner’s representation that
she was allowing respondents to use the southern portion
of her property as an alternative pathway. Since the
southern portion was an "agreed pathway," petitioner
could not reduce its width; thus, the trial court ordered
petitioner to remove the fence blocking the passage.
Hence, we have this petition.
ISSUE:
Petitioner questions the propriety of the trial court’s
issuance of an order clarifying its final and executory
decision and effectively establishing an easement on
petitioner’s property without proper adjudication.
RULING:
The petition is impressed with merit.
No Voluntary Easement of Right-of-Way
The trial court, seemingly aware that it did not determine
the legality of an easement of right-of-way over the
pathway located south of petitioner’s property,
nevertheless, concluded that the said passage was an
agreed orshould
petitioner voluntary easement of right-of-way which
respect.
The trial court was in error.
It is a settled doctrine that a decision, after it becomes
final, becomes immutable and unalterable. Thus, the court
loses jurisdiction to amend, modify, or alter a final
judgment and is left only with the jurisdiction to execute
and enforce it. Any amendment or alteration which
substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose.
To recapitulate, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5033 meant
that no easement was ever established on petitioner’s
property. However, the trial court, by issuing its March 20,
2001 Order directing petitioner to remove the fence that
limited respondents’ passage, effectively created a right-
of-way on petitioner’s property in favor of respondents
allegedly on the basis of a voluntary agreement between
the parties. This directive was in contravention of its July 7,
2000 Decision; thus, it was null and void for having been
issued outside of the court’s jurisdiction.
Granting for the sake of argument that the issue of
voluntary easement of right-of-way, subject of the assailed
March 20, 2001 Order, was proper, relevant, and material
to the issue of right-of-way as averred in the complaint in
Civil Case No. 5033, still, the conclusion that there was an
agreed or voluntary easement of right-of-way had no
basis. The records of Civil Case No. 5033 do not reveal any
agreement executed by the parties on the claimed right-
of-way. Glaring is the fact that the terms of the
arrangement were not agreed upon by the parties, more
particularly, theample
evidence is not payment of the
enough proper indemnity.
to support The
the conclusion
that there was a verbal agreement on the right-of-way
over the southern portion.1avvphi1
More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any
agreement creating it should be drawn and executed
with the same formalities as a deed to a real estate, and
ordinarily must be in writing. No written instrument on this
agreement was adduced by respondents.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the assailed
March 20, 2001 and June 20, 2001 Orders are null, void,
and without any legal effect.
6. G.R. No. 72908 August 11, 1989
EUFEMIA PAJARILLO, CLAUDIO SUTERIO, JR., NYMIA SUTERIO
and MARILYN SUTERIO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THIRD CIVIL CASES
DIVISION, SALUD SUTERIO and PEDRO MATIAS
FACTS:
Perfecta Balane de Cordero died intestate in 1945
and leaving a tract of 28 hectares of land with buildings
and improvements in the Quezon Province. On May 20,
1946, perfecta’s siblings Juana and Felipe executed a
public instrument entitled “ Extra-judicial settlement of the
estate of the decease Perfecta Balane de Cordero.” In it
they disposed that in according to Perfecta’s wishes and
in consideration of love and affection, the said property
be donated to private respondent Salud Suterio de
Matias, Perfecta’s niece, who will assume the
encumbrance/obligation to the Philippine National Bank
in the amount of P 1,000. In the same document, the done
accepted the donation in a public instrument. The
instrument was never registered nor the title transferred to
Salud’s name although she immediately took possession of
the land. Sometime in 1951, Salud transferred the
possession of the land to her mother Juana, who was then
staying with her brother Claudio and his family. During the
period they were occupying the land, Claudio paid realty
taxes thereon. On May 25, 1956, Juana executed a deed
of absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio. Two years
later, Claudio had the land registered in his name. Claudio
died in 1961 and his mother in 1963. On June 30, 1965, the
private respondents Salud and Pedro Matias filed a
complaint for the reconveyance of the property on the
ground that the deed of sale in favour of Claudio was
fictitious and the registration in his name was null and void.
Salud claimed that no compensation was paid by Claudio
and that the transaction was deliberately concealed from
her by her brother and the defendants.
On April 17,1979, Judge Juan M. Montecillo of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon rendered judgment upholding the
donation to the plaintiff and annulling the deed of sale
35 | Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
and the registration of the land in favor of Claudio Suterio,
Sr. The defendants were required to reconvey the land to
Salud Suterio even as their counterclaim was dismissed for
lack of evidence. 11 On appeal, the decision was affirmed
in toto. The respondent court is now sought to be reversed
in this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial settlement was a
donation.
HELD: Yes. Felipe and Juana had declared themselves the
heirs of Perfecta and the owners of the property in
question. As such, they were free to give the land to
whomever they pleased and for whatever reason they
saw fit. Hence, if they choose to respect Perfecta’s wishes
and carry out her intentions by donating the land to Salud,
there was no legal impediment to their doing so. There is
no question that Felipe and Juana could have simply
disregarded their sister’s sentiments and decided not to
donate the property to Salud. The fact that they did not
do this speaks well of their integrity and their loyalty to their
deceased sister. The extra-judicial settlement also reflects
their own affection for Salud which constituted the valid
consideration for their own act of liberality.
ARTICLE 651
1. G.R. No. 77628 March 11, 1991
TOMAS
vs. ENCARNACION, petitioner,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF THE LATE EUSEBIO DE SAGUN and THE HEIRS OF
THE LATE ANICETA MAGSINO VIUDA DE
SAGUN,* respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent
Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the
owners of two adjacent estates situated in Buco, Talisay,
Batangas. ** Petitioner owns the dominant estate which
has an area of 2,590 square meters and bounded on the
North by Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Magsino, on the
south by Taal Lake, on the East by Felino Matienzo and on
the West by Pedro Matienzo. Private respondents co-own
the 405-square-meter servient estate which is bounded on
the North by the National Highway (Laurel-Talisay
Highway), on the South by Tomas Encarnacion, on the East
by other
In Mamerto Magsino
words, and on the
the servient West
estate by Felipe
stands de Sagun.
between the
dominant estate and the national road.
Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was not yet
enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going to the
national highway just crossed the servient estate at no
particular point. However, in 1960 when private
respondents constructed a fence around the servient
estate, a roadpath measuring 25 meters long and about a
meter wide was constituted to provide access to the
highway. One-half meter width of the path was taken from
the servient estate and the other one-half meter portion
was taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino.
No compensation was asked and non was given for the
portions constituting the pathway.1
It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant
nursery business on his land where he also had his abode.
He would use said pathway as passage to the highway for
his family and for his customers.
Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work
flourished and with that, it became more and more
difficult for petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to
and from the nursery and the highway with the use of
pushcarts. In January, 1984, petitioner was able to buy an
owner-type jeep which he could use for transporting his
plants. However, that jeep could not pass through the
roadpath and so he approached the servient estate
owners (Aniceta Vda. de Sagun and Elena Romero Vda.
de Sagun) and requested that they sell to him one and
one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property to be added to
the existing pathway so as to allow passage for his
jeepney. To his utter consternation, his request was turned
down by the
negotiation twofutile.
proved widows and further attempts at
Petitioner then instituted an action before the Regional
Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 6 (Tanauan) to seek the
issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an
additional width of at least two (2) meters over the De
Saguns' 405-square-meter parcel of land.2
During the trial, the attention of the lower court was called
to the existence of another exit to the highway, only eighty
(80) meters away from the dominant estate. On December
2, 1985, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing
petitioner's complaint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court on January 28, 1987 and rejected petitioner's
claim for an additional easement.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals opined
that the necessity interposed by petitioner was not
compelling enough to justify interference with the property
rights of private respondents. The Appellate Court took into
consideration the presence of a dried river bed only eighty
(80) meters away from the dominant estate and
conjectured that petitioner might have actually driven his
jeep through the river bed in order to get to the highway,
and that the only reason why he wanted a wider
easement through the De Sagun's estate was that it was
more convenient for his business and family needs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to an additional
easement of right of way.
RULING
Yes. While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters
from the dominant tenement, that access is grossly
inadequate. (1)
demanded: Generally,
when there the right of no
is absolutely way may tobe
access a
public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is
difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the
present case, the river bed route is traversed by a semi-
concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from the
highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it
must literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters up. Moreover,
during the rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to
the floods. Thus, it can only be used at certain times of the
year. With the inherent disadvantages of the river bed
which make passage difficult, if not impossible, it is if there
were no outlet at all.
Where a private property has no access to a public road,
it has the right of easement over adjacent servient estates
as a matter of law.
Under Art. 651 of the CC, it is the needs of the dominant
property which ultimately determine the width of the
easement of right of way.
36 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
As petitioner’s business grew, so did the need for the use
of modern means of conveyance or transport. Petitioner
should not be denied a passageway wide enough to
accomodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and
necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.
Since the easement to be established in favor of petitioner
is of a continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity
shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the
amount of the damage caused to the servient estate
pursuant to Artcile 649 of the CC.
2) Quimen v. CA
Facts:
Anastacia Quimen, together with his 3 siblings (Sotero,
Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina), inherited a piece of
property in Pandi, Bulacan. Abutting the municipal
road. The share of Anastacia, located at the extreme left,
was designated as Lot No. 1448-B- 1. It is bounded on the
right by the property of Sotero designated as Lot. No. 1448-
B-2. Adjoining Soteros property on the right are Lots Nos.
1448-B-3 and 1448-B-4 srcinally owned by Rufina and
Sulpicio, respectively, but which were later acquired by a
certain Catalina Santos. Located directly behind the lots
of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother
Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter
divided into two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A
and 1448-B-6-B, each with an area of 92 square meters. Lot
No. 1448-B-6-A is located behind Anastacias Lot No. 1448-
B-1, while Lot No. 1448-B-6-B is behind the property of
Sotero, father of respondent Yolanda.
In February of 1982 Yolanda bought lot no. 1448-b-6-a from
her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia ( acting as
his administratrix). Yolanda hesitant to purchase the lot
because it has no access to the municipal road. But
Anastacia, according to Yolanda, promised her that
Anastacia that she would give her right of way on her
adjoining propert for 200.00 pesos per square meter. After
that, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought
using as her passageway to the public highway a portion
of Anastacia s property. When Yolanda offered to pay for
the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the
payment and barred Yolanda from passing through her
property.
In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of
Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly
behind the property of her parents who provided her a
pathway gratis et amore between their house, extending
about nineteen (19) meters from the lot of Yolanda behind
the sari-sari store of Sotero, and Anastacias perimeter
fence. The store is made of strong materials and occupies
the entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters
wide and nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway
leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress
and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with
facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that
one has to pass through the back entrance and the
facade of the store to reach the road.
On 29 December 1987 Yolanda filed an action with the
proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia
s property. An ocular inspection upon instruction of the
presiding judge was conducted by the branch clerk of
court. The report was that the proposed right of way was
at the extreme right of Anastacias property facing the
public highway, starting from the back of Soteros sari-sari
store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her
property and turning left for about five (5) meters to avoid
the store of Sotero in order to reach the municipal road
and the way was unobstructed except for an avocado
tree standing in the middle
TC’s findings: Yolanda’s property was situated at the back
of her father’s property and held that there existed an
available space of about 19m long which could
conveniently serve as a right of way between the
boundary line and the house of Yolanda’ s father. The
vacant space ended at the left back of the store which
was made of strong materials. Which explained why
Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and
cut an opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters
long to serve as her right of way to the public highway.
CA’s finding: The proposed right of way of Yolanda, which
is 1m wide and 5m long at the extreme right of Anastacia’s
property will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as
compared to the suggested passage through the
property of Yolanda’ s father which would mean
destroying the sari-sari store made of strong materials.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of way proposed by
Yolonda is the least onerous/least prejudicial to the parties.
Held:
Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that “the easement
of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest.”
IN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY that easement where the
way is shortest and will cause least prejudice shall be
chosen. However, if the two circumstances do not concur
in a single tenement, the way where damage will be least
shall be used even if not the shortest route. This is so
because least prejudice prevails over shortest
distance. This means that the court is not bound to
establish what is the shortest distance; a longer way may
be adopted to avoid injury to the servient estate, such as
when there are constructions or walls which can be
avoided by a round about way, or to secure the interest
of the dominant owner, such as when theshortest
distance would place the way on a dangerous decline.
In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent
Court of Appeals declared that the proposed right of way
of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters
long at the extreme right of petitioners property, will cause
the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the
suggested passage through the property of Yolanda s
father which would mean destroying the sari-sari
store made of strong materials. Absent any showing that
these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual
support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this
Court accepts and adopts them. As between a right of
way that would demolish a store of strong materials to
provide egress to a public highway, and another right of
way which although longer will only require an avocado
tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be
preferred.
3) Costabella Corporation v. CA
FACTS:
It is admitted that the Costabella Corp. owns the
real estate properties designated as Lots Nos. 5122 and
5124 of the Cadastre, situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago,
Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had constructed a resort and
hotel. The private respondents, on the other hand, are the
owners of adjoining properties. Before the petitioner
began the construction of its beach hotel, the private
respondents, in going to and from their respective
properties and the provincial road, passed through
a passageway which traversed the petitioner's property. In
1981, the petitioner closed the aforementioned
passageway when it began the construction of its hotel,
but nonetheless opened another route across its property
37 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
through which the private respondents, as in the past,
were allowed to pass. (Later, or sometime in August, 1982,
when it undertook the construction of the second phase
of its beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its property thus
closing even the alternative passageway and preventing
the private respondents from traversing any part of it.)
As a direct consequence of these closures, an action for
injunction with damages was filed against the petitioner
by the private respondents on September 2, 1982 before
the then Court of First Instance of Cebu. In their complaint,
the private respondents assailed the petitioner's closure of
the srcinal passageway which they (private respondents)
claimed to be an "ancient road right of way" that had
been existing before World War II and since then had been
used by them, the community, and the general public,
either as pedestrians or by means of vehicles, in going to
and coming from Lapu-Lapu City and other parts of the
country. The private respondents averred that by closing
the alleged road right of way in question, the petitioner
had deprived them access to their properties and caused
them damages. In the same complainant, the private
respondents likewise alleged that the petitioner had
constructed a dike on the beach fronting the latter's
property without the necessary permit, obstructing the
passage of the residents and local fishermen, and
trapping debris and flotsam on the beach. They also
claimed that the debris and flotsam that had
accumulated prevented them from using their properties
for the purpose for which they had acquired them.
Petitioner’s contention: petitioner denied the existence of
an ancient road through its property and counter-averred,
among others, that it and its predecessors-in-interest had
permitted the temporary, intermittent, and gratuitous use
of, or passage through, its property by the private
respondents and others by mere tolerance and purely as
an act of neighborliness. It justified the walling in of its
property in view of the need to insure the safety and
security of its hotel and beach resort, and for the
protection of the privacy and convenience of its hotel
patrons and guests. At any rate, the petitioner alleged, the
private respondents were not entirely dependent on the
subject passageway as they (private respondents) had
another existing and adequate access to the public road
through other properties. With respect to the dike it
allegedly constructed, the petitioner stated that what it
built was a breakwater on the foreshore land fronting its
property and not a dike as claimed by the private
respondents. Moreover, contrary to the private
respondents' accusation, the said construction had
benefited the community especially the fishermen who
used the same as mooring for their boats during low tide.
The quantity of flotsam and debris which had formed on
the private respondents' beach front on the other hand
were but the natural and unavoidable accumulations on
beaches by the action of the tides and movement of the
waves of the sea. The petitioner's answer then assailed the
private respondents' complaint for its failure to implead as
defendants the owners of the other properties supposedly
traversed by the alleged ancient road right way,
indispensable parties without whom no final adjudication
of the controversy could be rendered.
Now before us, the petitioner contends that the decision
of the respondent appellate court is grossly erroneous and
not in accord with the provisions of Articles 649 and 650 of
the Civil Code on easements and the prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter.
The petition is meritorious.
ISSUE:
WON Costabella is obliged to open its properties for the
use of the private respondents.
HELD:
No. Easement of right of way cannot be acquired by
prescription and the respondents were not able to
establish a valid claim of compulsory right.
It is already well-established that an easement of right of
way, as is involved here, is discontinuous and as such
cannot be acquired by prescription. Insofar therefore as
the appellate court adhered to the foregoing precepts, it
stood correct. Unfortunately, after making the correct
pronouncement, the respondent Appellate Court did not
order the reversal of the trial court's decision and the
dismissal of the complaint after holding that no easement
had been validly constituted over the petitioner's property.
Instead, the Appellate Court went on to commit a
reversible error by considering the passageway in issue as
a compulsory easement which the private respondents, as
owners of the "dominant" estate, may demand from the
petitioner the latter being the owner of the "servient"
estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage
for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and
for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate
without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in
the payment of the damage caused by such
encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of
the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established
at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and,
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
Based on the foregoing, the owner of the dominant estate
may validly claim a compulsory right of way only after he
has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1)
the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovable
and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2)
after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation
was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right
of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate. Additionally, the burden of proving the existence
of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on the owner of the
dominant estate.
." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate
outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even
if the said outlet, for one reason or another, be
inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is
entirely unjustified. For to justify the imposition of an
easement
a orartificial
fictitious or right ofnecessity
way, "there
for it."must be a real, not
Hence, the private respondents' properties cannot be said
to be isolated, for which a compulsory easement is
demandable. Insofar therefore as the Appellate Court
declared the case to be proper as a controversy for a
compulsory right of way, this Court is constrained to hold
that it was in error.
Servitudes of right of way are an ancient concept, which
date back to the iter, actus, and via of the Romans. They
are demanded by necessity, that is, to enable owners of
isolated estates to make full use of their properties, which
lack of access to public roads has denied them. Under
Article 649 of the Civil Code, they are compulsory and
hence, legally demandable, subject to indemnity and the
concurrence of the other conditions above-referred to.
But while a right of way is legally demandable, the owner
of the dominant estate is not at liberty to impose one
based
it shall on
be arbitrary choice.
established uponUnder Article 650
two criteria: (1) of
atthe
theCode,
point
38 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
least prejudicial to the servient state; and (2) where the
distance to a public highway may be the shortest.
According, however, to one commentator, "least
prejudice" prevails over "shortest distance." Yet, each case
must be weighed according to its individual merits, and
judged according to the sound discretion of the court.
"The court," says Tolentino, "is not bound to establish what
is the shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid
injury to the servient tenement, such as when there are
constructions or walls which can be avoided by a
roundabout way, or to secure the interest of the dominant
owner, such as when the shortest distance would place
the way on a dangerous decline."
4) National Irrigation Administration v. CA
Facts:
A free patent over three (3) hectares of land, situated in
the province of Cagayan was issued in the name of
Vicente Manglapus, and registered under OCT No. P-
24814. The land was granted subject to the following
proviso expressly stated in the title:
"... that it shall not be subject to any encumbrance
whatsoever in favor of any corporation, association or
partnership except with the consent of the grantee and
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and solely for educational, religious or
charitable purposes or for a right of way; and subject
finally to all conditions and public easements and
servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially
those mentioned in sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended, and the right
of the Government to administer and protect the timber
found thereon for a term of five (5) years from the date of
this patent, provided, however, that the grantee or heirs
may cut and utilize such timber for his or their personal use
(underscoring ours)."
Subsequently, respondent Manglapus acquired the lot
from Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale. On July 18,
1974, the land was registered in Dick Manglapus' name
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-26658 of the Register
of Deeds for the Province of Cagayan.
Sometime in 1982, NIA was to construct canals in Amulung,
Cagayan and Alcala, Cagayan. NIA then entered a
portion of Manglapus' land and made diggings and fillings
thereon. Manglapus filed a complaint for damages
against NIA.
ISSUE:
Whether the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation
for the taking of a portion of his property for use as
easement of a right of way.
Held:
When a land, srcinally public land is awarded to a
provate individual, a legal easement may be constituted
and thus no just compensation is required. It would be
otherwise if the land were srcinally private property, in
which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking
of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right
of way.
The transfer certificate of title contains such a reservation.
It states that title to the land shall be:
". . . subject to the provisions of said Land Registration Act
and the Public Land Act, as well as those of Mining Laws, if
the land is mineral, and subject, further to such conditions
contained in the srcinal title as may be subsisting."
Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a
reservation and condition that the land is subject to "to all
conditions and public easements and servitudes
recognized and prescribed by law especially those
mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This
reservation, unlike the other provisos imposed on the grant,
was not limited by any time period and thus is a subsisting
condition.
Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that
lands granted by patent,
"shall further be subject to a right of way sot exceeding
twenty meters in width for public highways,
railroads,irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraphs and
telephone lines, and similar works..."
We note that the canal NIA constructed was only eleven
(11) meters in width. This is well within the limit provided by
law. Manglapus has therefore no cause to complain.
Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are
established either by law or by the will of the owners. The
former are called legal and the latter voluntary
easements." In the present case, we find and declare that
a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the
government.
The land was srcinally public land, and awarded to
respondent Manglapus by free patent. The ruling would be
otherwise if the land were srcinally private property, in
which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking
of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right
of way.
5) Floro vs. Llenado
Facts:
Simeon Floro owned a piece of land known as
“Floro Park Subdivision” situated in Barangay Saluysoy,
Meycauayan, Bulacan. It has its own egress and ingress to
and from the McArthur Highway by means of its Road Lot
4 and the PNR level crossing. Orlando A. Llenado, on the
other hand, was the registered owner of two parcels of
land known as the “Llenado Homes”. Prior to its purchase
by Llenado from Francisco de Castro, the land was known
as the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, duly licensed and
registered subdivision in the name of Soledad Ortega.
Bounded on the South by Palanas Creek, which separates
it from the Floro Park subdivision, and on the west by
ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo, Montaos and
Guevarra, the Llenado Homes does not have existing road
or passage to McArthur Highway. However, a proposed
access road traversing the idle Riceland of Marcial Ipapo
has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan of
Emmanuel Homes, which was duly approved by the
defunct Human Settlement Regulatory Commission.
Llenados were permitted by Floros to use Road
Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park as a passage to and from
McArthur Highway. However, Floro discovered grave
damage to the lots in question from the passage of heavy
machinery and later barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of
rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones, preventing its use
by Llenado. Llenado filed a complaint for easement of
Right of Way. During pendency of case, Orlando Llenado
died and was substituted by his wife, Wenifreda
On October 16, 1984, the trial court rendered judgment
dismissing the case and lifting the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction previously issued.
39 | Ar ti cl e 61 3 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
On appeal by Llenado, the appellate court set aside the
decision of the trial court in a decision 12 promulgated on
February 11, 1986
Issues:
1. Whether or not there is an easement of right of
way?
2. W/N they are entitled to compulsory servitude of
right of way?
Held:
A legal easement cannot arise merely for the
convenience
prove that the of the dominant
easement estate.
is absolutely The owner
necessary and must
least
restrictive on the servient estate.
1.) It is not disputed that Floro granted the Llenados verbal
permission to pass through Floro Park. No such contract of
easement of right of way was perfected. Citing Dionisio v
Ortiz, the use of Road Lot 4 and 5 by Llenados during the
month of March was by mere tolerance of Floro pending
the negotiation of the terms and conditions of the right of
way. Although such use was in anticipation of a voluntary
easement of right of way, no such contract as validly
entered into by reason of the failure of the parties to agree
on its terms and conditions. Thus, Llenados cannot claim
entitlement to a right of way through Floro Park on the basis
of voluntary easement.
2.) Preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of NCC:
a. That the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovable and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway
b. After payment of proper indemnity
c. That the isolation was not due to acts of proprietor of the
dominant estate
d. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estate
The burden of proving these pre-conditions lies on the
owner of the dominant estate.
First precondition is not met since there is an
existing right of way over the Ipapo Property. Payment of
proper indemnity was also not proven since there the
complaint by Llenado did not contain fixing of amount
that he must pay to Floro in the event the easement of right
of way be constituted. Also, third requisite has not been
met.
Moreover, in order to justify the imposition of the
servitude of right of way, there must be a real, not a
fictitious or artificial necessity for it. Mere convenience for
the dominant estate is not what is required by lawas the
basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the
face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the
servitude, the same should not be imposed. This easement
can also be established foe the benefit of tenement with
an inadequate outlet, but not when outlet is merely
inconvenient.
The court ruled time and again that one may not claim a
legal easement merely out of convenience. Convenience
motivated Llenando to abandon the Ipapo access road
development and pursue an access road through the
Floro estate. He was stacking the cards in his favor to the
unnecessary detriment of his neighbor. The court refused
to countenance his behavior.
Article 656
1) Valderrama v. North Negros Sugar Co.
Facts:
Hacienda owners, who were up to that time customers of
the central, could not furnish sufficient cane for milling, as
required by the capacity of said central, the defendant
made other milling contracts with
various hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros, in
order to obtain sufficient cane to sustain the central; and
this gave rise to the plaintiffs filing their complaint, alleging
that the easement of way, which each of them has
established in his respective hacienda, was only for the
transportation through each hacienda of the sugar cane
of the owner thereof, while the defendant maintains that
it had the right to transport to its central upon the railroad
passing through the haciendas of the plaintiffs, not only
the sugar cane harvested in said haciendas, but also that
of the hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros.
The plaintiffs prayed the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros to pronounce judgment, holding that
the defendant had no right, under the easement or
otherwise, to cause its locomotives and wagons to run
across the estates of the plaintiffs for the purpose of
transporting sugar cane of any agriculturist of Cadiz,
Occidental Negros.
The defendant answered the amended complaints,
admitting some allegations thereof and denying others.
And as special defense, it alleged that the plaintiffs
respectively granted the defendant, for the period of fifty
years from the date of the aforesaid contracts, an
easement of way 7 meters wide upon the lands of the
plaintiffs for the construction and operation of a railroad
for the transportation of sugar cane; that said easement of
way was established without any restriction whatsoever, as
regards the ownership of the cane to be transported over
the said railroad; that said contract was then in full force
and effect and had never been annulled or modified.
After hearing the three cases, the trial court entered one
single judgment for all of them, holding that the defendant
had no right to pass through the lands of the plaintiffs
described in their amended complaints for the
transportation of sugar cane not grown from any of
the haciendas of the plaintiffs. From this judgment, the
defendant appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of way established was
restricted to transporting only sugar cane from the
hacienda owners’ lands.
HELD:
(the SC also made 1 judgment for all the 3 cases)
The contract entered into by each of the hacienda
owners contained a clause that granted the North Negros
an easement of way 7 meters wide for the period of 50
years upon their properties for the construction of a
railroad. The owners allege ambiguity since it could permit
the transportation of sugar cane which they did not
produce which is contrary to their intent but the SC held
that it is clear that the easement was established for the
benefit of all producers and of the corporation as it is the
intent of the milling contract.
Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous
easement of way in favor of the corporation, it is contrary
to the nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes
produced by the servient estates since it is a well settled
rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership
and not by reason of easement. The owners also cannot
40 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
limit its use for there is nothing in the contract prohibiting
the central from obtaining other sources.
Transporting cane from Cadiz also does not make it more
burdensome since what is prohibited in Art. 543 of the CC
is that in extending the road or in repairing it, it should
occupy a greater area or deposit excavations outside the
granted 7 meters. This does not happen in this case when
the North Negros transports sugar cane from Cadiz,
crossing the servient estates, since it continues to occupy
the same area and the encumbrance is still the same
regardless of the number of times it passes through the
estates.
Also the period of the easement is longer than the period
of the milling contracts, so even if the owners no longer
desire to furnish the central canes for milling, the North
Negros still has the right to the easement for the remaining
period so the contention that it should be limited to the
canes produced by the owners has no basis.
Article 676
Parungganan vs. Paredes
FACTS:
Purugganan is the owner of a piece of residential lot
adjacent to and bounded on the north by the lot of
Paredes. The lot of Purugganan is subject to an easement
of drainage in favor of Paredes annotated in the Decree
of registration, which read in part:
That the oppositor (Felisa Paredes) withdraws her
opposition to the registration of the lots Nos. 1 and 2 of the
applicant, and in compensation to said withdrawal by the
oppositor of her opposition, the applicant agrees to
respect an easement or servitude over a portion of the lots
Nos. 1 and 2 which is EIGHT AND ONE HALF (8-½) meters in
length commencing from point 4 of Lot No. 2 and
stretching towards Lot No. 1 going Eastward, and the width
is ONE (1) meter, in order that the rain water coming from
the roofing of a house to be constructed by the oppositor
over the ruins of her brick wall now standing along the
Northeastern boundary of Lot 1 shall fall into the land of
the applicant.
March 1951, the defendants-appellants constructed a
house on their lot adjacent to Lots 1 and 2 of plaintiff-
appellee in such a manner that the southern side of their
house is exactly on the brick wall, the southern side of
which is the demarcation line between the plaintiff-
appellee and the defendants-appellants, demolishing
said brick wall and built thereon the southern wall of their
house with 3 windows. The house constructed by the
defendants-appellants is 2-½ meters longer than the
length of roofing allowed in the above quoted Decree of
Registration, and has an outer roofing (eaves) of 1.20
meters, protruding over the property of the plaintiff-
appellee which is .20 meters wider than that allowed in the
same Decree of Registration, and the rain water from the
GI roofing falls about 3 meters inside Lots 1 and 2 of the
plaintiff-appellee. The defendants-appellants also placed
3 windows each on the first and second floors of their
house on the side facing Lots 1 and 2 of plaintiff-appellee.
From the time the defendants-appellants started to
construct their house, the plaintiff-appellee has repeatedly
and continuously been demanding from the defendants-
appellants that the construction of their house be in
accordance with the easement, but the defendants-
appellants refused to observe the easement and to close
their windows. They also prohibited the plaintiff-appellee
from constructing a party wall between points 1 and 2 of
Lot 2 and between points 2 and 3 and 4 of Lot 1.
Purugganan filed a case prohibiting Paredes from
proceeding with the construction of the roof, which
exceeds the allowed dimensions. Trial court, in a summary
proceeding decided in favor of Purugganan.
Summary judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants:
(a) Ordering the defendants to reconstruct the roof and
eaves of their house on the southern side now existing on
their lot such that the falling water shall not fall on curve
into the lots of the plaintiff beyond one meter from the
boundary line and by 8-½ meters in length and to remove
the said protruding eaves and roof;
(b) Ordering the herein defendants to reconstruct the wall
of their house on the southern side either by placing in two
meters north of the boundary line if they desired their
windows on the first and second floors to continue to exist,
or to permanently close the three windows on the second
floor and such other openings or apertures facing the lot
of the plaintiff;
(c) Ordering the defendants to comply with what is
ordered above in Pars. (a) and (b) within sixty (60) days
from the finality of this judgment. Upon their failure to do so
the Provincial Sheriff of Abra is hereby authorized to
implement this judgment and execute the acts mentioned
in Pars. (a) and (b) hereof, at the expense of the
defendants:
(d) Enjoining perpetually the herein defendants from
prohibiting the plaintiff from making such legal and lawful
constructions on his lots up to the boundary between
plaintiff's lot and defendants' lot, provided always that
such construction in whatever form, as a firewall, fence,
etc., shall not violate the casement of drainage in favor of
the defendants, and to conform with the provisions of Art.
675 of the New Civil Code; and
(e) Ordering the defendants from further encroaching into
plaintiff's lots and molesting the said plaintiff in the lawful
exercise of dominion over his own property.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of drainage refers to the
measure of the roofing?
HELD: No.
In an easement of receiving rainwater, the distances
prescribed in the decree of registration should not
correspond to the width and length of the roof of the
house but on the distance of the rainwater falling inside
the land of the servient estate.
Paredes have made a mistake in applying the distances
prescribed in the decree of registration to the roofing of
their house. They failed to comprehend the meaning of
the phrase “servidumbre de vertiente de los tejados”
constituted on the land of Purugganan. Translated, it
means
roof the easement
which of receiving
is an encumbrance water falling
imposed on thefrom
landthe
of
41 | Ar ti cl e 6 13 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES

Purugganan because the encumbrance is not the roof

itself but the rain water falling inside the property of
Purugganan. The report submitted by the court-appointed
commissioner clearly shows that Paredes exceeded the
dimension allowed in the decree of registration.

Defendants-appellants argued that the summary

judgment of the lower court has no legal basis. Summary
judgment is employed as a method of disposing a case
when the pleadings, depositions, admission and affidavits
filed by the parties show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law (Section 3 of Rule 34). In the
case at bar the plaintiff-appellee's right to the reliefs
sought is dependent on the existence or non-existence of
the easement of drainage and of light and view of favor
of the defendants-appellants as well as on the conditions
attached to such easements. There is no dispute that
plaintiff-appellee's property was registered in 1951 under
the Torrens System and that only the easement of
drainage is annotated on his Certificate of Title, subject to
prescribed distances. But what defendants-appellants
have advanced as factual issues are: (1) that they have
not violated the prescribed distances of the easement of
drainage; and (2) that the easement of light and view was
in existence since time imemorial. The first factual issue was
resolved by the report submitted by the commissioner to
which defendants-appellants have given their conformity.
The second factual issue is immaterial to the disposition of
the case because the servient estate was registered in
1951 without the easement of light and view being

annotated on the title. Since the supposed easement of

light and view is not annotated on the title, it becomes
immaterial whether such easement existed since time
immemorial. On this point, there is no need to have a trial
on the merits and a summary judgment would appear to
be in order.