ALCALA

Case No. 27
C. Adjudicatory Powers
PNB v. Garcia 437 Phil 289
FACTS: Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the RoC, assailing CA decision affirming the Resolution of CSC exonerating Garcia Jr.
from administrative liability
Respondent, a check processor and cash representative at the Buendia Branch of PNB, was charged by the latter with Gross
Neglect of Duty in connection with the 7M funds it had lost.
PNB-Administrative Adjudication Office (AAO) found respondent guilty as charged, imposing upon him the penalty of 'Forced
Resignation with Benefits. . . without prejudiced to his monetary liability arising from the case.
Respondent moved for reconsideration. PNB-AAO denied. Hence respondent’s appeal to CA.
PNB was later privatized pursuant to EO 80 - 1996 Revised Charter of the PNB.
CA granted respondent's appeal in a resolution after finding that the evidence on record failed to establish neglect of duty.
Respondent Garcia was automatically reinstated to his position with back salaries.
PNB moved for reconsideration of the above resolution. CA denied citing Mendez v. CSC which ruled that only the "party
adversely affected by the decision" -- namely, the government employee -- may appeal an administrative case. The CA held that
a decision exonerating a respondent in an administrative case is final and unappealable.
Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: W/N CA is correct in so holding that petitioner cannot anymore elevate on appeal the resolution of the CSC reversing
petitioner's finding of guilt for gross neglect of duty on Respondent Garcia.

RULING: NO. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but a mere statutory privilege that may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by law.

Neither can the old doctrine barring appeal be justified by the provision limiting the jurisdiction of the CSC. According to that
provision, the CSC was limited to the review of decisions involving: (1) suspension for more than 30 days; (2) fine in an amount
exceeding 30 days’ salary; (3) demotion in rank or salary; and (4) transfer, removal or dismissal from office. There is nothing
in the law that bars an appeal of a decision exonerating a government official or an employee from an administrative
charge. If a statute is clear, plain and free form ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. Indeed, the campaign against corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance in government will be undermined if the
government or the private offended party is prevented from appealing erroneous administrative decisions. After all,
administrative cases do not partake of the nature of criminal actions, in which acquittals are final and unappealable based on
the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy.

Furthermore, our new Constitution expressly expanded the range and scope of judicial review. Thus, to prevent appeals of
administrative decisions except those initiated by employees will effectively and pervertedly erode this constitutional grant.
Citing Mendez v. CSC, the CA construed the phrase "party adversely affected” to refer solely to the public officer or
employee who was administratively disciplined. Hence, an appeal may be availed of only in a case where the
respondent is found guilty. However, this interpretation has been overturned in CSC v. Dacoycoy. The phrase ‘party
adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed
for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer,
removal or dismissal from office.

Petition is DENIED.

*Concurring opinion by Justice Puno: What the law declared as "final" were only those decisions of heads of agencies involving
suspensions of not more than thirty days or fines not exceeding thirty days' salary. These decisions, he said, involved minor and
petty offenses, and to allow multiple appeals in those instances would overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our
administrative systems.
ALCALA
Case No. 28
C. Adjudicatory Powers
Mathay v. CA, CSC & Sandy Marquez 378 Phil 466
FACTS: 3 consolidated petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Revised RoC
Mayor Simon appointed private respondents to positions in Civil Service Unit (CSU) of the LocGov of QC. The CSUs were
created pursuant to PD No. 51, which was signed in 1972.
Secretary of Justice rendered an Opinion, stating that PD No. 51 was never published in OG, thus is never in force and effect.
CSC issued Memo Circ No. 30, directing all civil service offices to recall and revoke all appointments made pursuant to PD No.
51. The appointments of the respondents were revoked.
QC City Ordinance No. NC-140 (1990) was enacted, which established the Dept of Public Order and Safety. The law provides
that present personnel of CSU are absorbed into the DPOS. However, the positions in the DPOS were not filled due to lack of
funds.
Mayor Simon then offered the respondents private contractual appointments.
When petitioner Mathay was elected as mayor, he subsequently renewed their appointment. However, upon expiry they
were no longer renewed.

G.R. No. 124374 and G.R. No. 126366

Respondents appealed to CSC.
CSC held that the reappointment of private respondents to the DPOS was automatic pursuant to the QC Ordinance and ordered
their reinstatement.
Petitioner Mayor Mathay brought petitions for certiorari to this Court, to annul the resolutions but, in accordance with
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, the petitions were referred to the CA. CA dismissed the petitions.

ISSUE: W/N respondent CSC has the authority to direct him petitioner Mayor Mathay to reinstate private respondents in the
DPOS.

RULING: NO. Law applicable is old Loc Gov (BP 337). Section 3 of QC Ordinance is invalid for being inconsistent with BP 337.
Ordinance provided for absorption of PERSONNEL, not POSITIONS. Thus, the city council or sanggunian, in effect, dictated who
shall occupy the new positions. BP 337 mandates that the power to appoint rests with the local chief executive. The power of
sanggu is limited to creating, consolidating and reorganizing city officers and positions.
Also, CSC’s power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment. It cannot direct that an appointment of an
individual be made.
Even assuming that the Ordinance is valid, the absorption contemplated is not possible since CSU never legally came into
existence, thus respondents never held permanent positions. The seniority rights and permanent status did not arise since
they have no valid appointment.
The right to hold public office is not a natural right. The right exists only by virtue of a law expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring it. Since PD 51 never became law, it could not be the source of any rights, impose any duties, afford any protection,
and create office.
CSU was never abolished. It never came into existence.
Respondents held temporary and contractual appointments. Non-renewal cannot be taken against petitioner.

G.R. 126354
In this case, CSC seeks the reversal of the decision of the CA, which held that CSC has no authority to compel the mayor of
Quezon City to reinstate appointee Labajo to the DPOS.

ISSUE: W/N CSC has standing to bring this present appeal.

RULING: NO. Basic is the rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Labajo, not the CSC, is the real party in interest. It is Labajo who will be benefited or injured by his reinstatement or non-
reinstatement. When the resolutions of the CSC were brought before the CA, the CSC was included only as a nominal
party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge who should detach himself from
cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review.
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the CSC dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and became an advocate. Its
mandated function is to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies, not to litigate.

PETITIONS OF MAYOR MATHAY ARE GRANTED.