Nuclear Program of Pakistan: International Concerns, its

safety and security:

Introduction
Overt nuclearisation of India destabilized the South Asia strategic balance.

Pakistan had no choice but to follow to redress the strategic balance on which peace and security in
South Asia depends.

Pakistan’s nuclear capability, assisted by the conventional capability, has been the main factor for
limiting crises with India from spiraling to unwanted levels.

A key example was that the Indian coercive arms buildup on Pak-India borders in 2000-2001 neither
achieved its aims, nor led to an outbreak of all-out war.

In essence, every nuclear state has to credibly demonstrate and project that it is ‘a responsible
nuclear state.’

Origin:

The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was set up in 1956 so that Pakistan could
participate in the Atoms for Peace programme launched by U.S. President Eisenhower.

In 1960, the U.S. gave Pakistan a $350,000 grant to help prepare the country for its first research
reactor.

The reactor, a 5 MW light-water research reactor known as the Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor
(PARR-1), began operating in 1965 at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology
(PINSTECH) in Nilore, near Islamabad.

In 1971, the Canadian General Electric Co. completed a 137 MW (electrical) CANDU power reactor
for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) which began commercial operation in October 1972.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme was started in 1972 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.

India's 1974 testing of a nuclear "device" and that gave Pakistan's nuclear programme added
momentum.

Pakistan’s Nuclear doctrine/policy

Pakistan has not formally announced a nuclear doctrine.

However, the salient aspects of Pakistan’s nuclear policy can be summarized as follows:

 Pakistan’s policy will be based on a minimum credible deterrence.

 It will eschew a strategic arms race with India.

 It will continue to support international arms control regimes, which are non-discriminatory in
nature.

 It will participate in the FMCT negotiations.

 It will refrain from further nuclear testing.

 Pakistan will strengthen existing controls on the export of nuclear technology through
administrative and legal mechanisms.

International Concerns:

Pakistan’s nuclear program has been the focus of discussion in national and international media,
think tanks, and officials of global powers.

Foreign state and non-state organizations and agencies raise certain questions and concerns over
the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, fissile material, and technological knowledge,
as well as Pakistan’s role in the international fora, such as Conference on Disarmament (CD).

Similarly, Pakistani media, analysts and officials also raise their voices over the differential treatment
of some powerful capitals vis-à-vis India.

Global Concerns

1. The potential threat of nuclear terrorism.

The IAEA in the context of potential nuclear terrorism has highlighted four key areas:

• Theft of a nuclear weapon

• Theft of material to make an improvised nuclear explosive device

• Theft of other radioactive material for an RDD (Radiological Dispersal Devices)

• Sabotage of a facility or transport

2. Extremist government in Power

3. Radicals’ take over
4. Terrorist attacks on nuclear installations
5. The insider dimension [concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear material, technology
and knowledge of nuclear weapons development. Pakistan has been projected as the only
country that is halting the progress on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in the
Conference on Disarmament (CD)].

Western media and academics highlight that Pakistan might not have the capability to put up a
credible command and control system, or the aptitude to understand the importance of nuclear free
world, or the resources to build credible deterrence against a fast growing adversary.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Safety and Security System

The civilian elements of Pakistan’s nuclear programme are overseen largely by the Pakistan Atomic
Energy Commission (PAEC) and the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA).

The PNRA ensures the safety and security of radiological material from the moment it is imported
into the country till its safe disposal after it has outlived its useful life.

The PNRA maintains an updated database of all radiological sources in the country and carries out
periodic inspections to ensure that all material is safely stored, does not pose any hazard to and is
not vulnerable to theft or sabotage.

Institutional Framework:

Pakistan has put in place a comprehensive institutional framework

National Command Authority (NCA)

The apex authority for policy formulation, employment and development of strategic systems.

The Prime Minister is the Chairman.

Strategic Plans Directorate (SPD) is the Secretariat to the NCA

There are the Services Strategic Forces of all the three Armed Forces of the Army, Navy and Air
Force.

While technical, training & administrative control rests with the respective services, operational
control is vested in the NCA.

Legislative Framework:

NCA Act gives legislative cover to the administrative and executive order.

The purpose of NCA Act is to give cover to the NCA for complete command and control over
research, development, production and use of nuclear and space technologies and other related
applications in various fields, and to provide for the safety and security of all personnel, facilities,
information, installations or organizations and other activities or matters connected therewith or
ancillary thereto.

The Act entrusts upon the NCA three major areas of responsibility;

(i) effective command and control of the strategic programs

(ii) safety and security of strategic programs
(iii) maintenance of a system of personnel reliability

Comprehensive export control regime:

The legislative, regulatory, administrative and enforcement measures of Pakistan’s export control
regime are on a par with the standards followed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group.
Comparisons with other countries:

Why there is focus only on Pakistan?

Those quarters which raise concern about Pakistan in the nuclear field, should make comparisons
with the security of nuclear weapons, fissile material and nuclear facilities in other nuclear weapons
states, including Russia and India, while incidents have also taken place in the United States of
America.

Case of Russia

In Russia, the threat has been much greater. It necessitated the American, Nunn-Lugar legislation
for assistance for safeguarding Russian facilities and fissile material after the breakup of the Soviet
Union.

There has been some leakage of fissile material.

Example: Chernobyl incident.

Case of India

In the context of India, fissile material and nuclear weapons are arguably in greater danger.

There are seventeen ongoing insurgencies, which are potential terrorist threats. India has also
displayed an unwillingness to engage with other countries on security practices.

Furthermore, most of the Indian power reactors were outside IAEA safeguards.

Indian scientists working in Iran have been sanctioned by the US.

There have been some media reports of trans-border leakage of some fissile material, and some
reports of problems in Indian reactors during their operation cycles.

The International Panel on Fissile Materials has stated inter alia in its 2010 publication, “Reducing
and Eliminating Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to Nuclear
Disarmament”, that, “India’s current stockpile of weapon grade plutonium is estimated as 700 kg by
the IPFM, sufficient for about 140 fission weapons, and 6.8 tons of reactor-grade plutonium,
sufficient for about 850 fission weapons”.

Way Forward

The following elements should be projected and implemented as a matter of public policy.

1. Pakistan’s nuclear program is a vital element of Pakistan’s national security.

2. Pakistan is a responsible nuclear state with a command, control and security system second
to none, along with strong strategic export controls, all subject to internal monitoring, review
and improvement if required
3. Pakistan’s participation in many UN, IAEA activities and international initiatives concerned
with nuclear safety and security as well as non-proliferation demonstrates its commitment
and ability.
 4. The civil power generation nuclear program, in which all the civil power reactors are under
IAEA safeguards, is essential to Pakistan’s energy security.
5. The power generation component of the program must be advanced to meet Pakistan’s
growing energy requirements.
6. In view of Pakistan’s experience and expertise in the safe operation of nuclear reactors and
facilities, Pakistan should explore avenues of cooperation with other countries planning their
safeguarded civil nuclear programs.
7. Pakistan’s strategic nuclear program based on credible minimum nuclear deterrence is
essential to maintain peace and security in this region.
8. Through engagement, Pakistan should continue to attempt to correct misperceptions.

Conclusion:

Global concerns over Pakistan’s nuclear program are unrealistic.

These concerns have generated suspicion that such a campaign is part of a plan to try to destabilize
Pakistan and to try to neutralize Pakistan’s strategic assets and nuclear deterrent capability.

Pakistan’s strategic nuclear program based on credible minimum nuclear deterrence is essential to
maintain peace and security in this region.