PERSONS

CASES: Naturalization (DIGEST) On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.

Petition filed by Zita Ngo Burca, L-23252. January 30, 1967- NO DIGEST
Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to
Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after
GR No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 SCRA 292 the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction.

FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-
immigrant on 8 February 1961.
In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese
residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip
to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping.
At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was
admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or
Tagalog, except for a few words.
She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one,
Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period ISSUE:
of one month.

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of marriage to a Filipino citizen.
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his HELD:
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative
might properly allow.
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she
Philippines up to 13 February 1962.
is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the
same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes
his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization
proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16.
Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies
during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should
follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently.
As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today,
there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to
enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own
citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon
to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or
business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof
that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's
acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation
obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial
or administrative case.
Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by
virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
YUNG UAN CHU
vs.
REPUBLIC
GR L-34973, April 14, 1988
SECOND DIVISION,
PARAS
(J): 4 concur
Facts:
This is an appeal by the Government seeking the reversal of the Decision of
the then Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, General Santos City dated
December 7, 1971 granting the petition for naturalization of Yung Uan Chu
alias Lina Yung Yu Hui Tin.
After trial, a decision was rendered on December 7, 1971 finding petitioner
Yung Uan Chu baptized as Lina Yung, known in school in her registered name
as Lina Uan Chu and now as Mrs. Lina Y. Cupang, as possessed of all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a Filipino citizen and
therefore authorized to take her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register the same in the proper civil registrar.
The sole issue raised by appellant is whether or not the lower court erred in
concluding that it has jurisdiction to declare petitioner a Filipino citizen based
on its conclusion that if administrative bodies are possessed with such power
(to determine the absence of disqualifications on the status of citizenship),
there is stronger reason for the court to have jurisdiction over the case."
The Government thru the Solicitor General submitted that in the case of Moy
Yu Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, this Court, while holding that an
alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen ipso facto becomes a Filipino
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under
Section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 473, reiterated the rule that "a judicial
declaration that the person is a Filipino citizen cannot be made in a petition
for naturalization and that, in this jurisdiction there can be no independent
action for the judicial declaration of citizenship of an individual."
Issue:
Whether a judicial declaration that a person is a Filipino citizen can be made
in a petition
for naturalization
Held:
the sole and only purpose of the petitioner is to have the petitioner declared
a Filipino citizen will be grant, this court clearly stated: Under our laws, there
can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship
of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable
controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable,
an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned
by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the
rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a
pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is
beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding may be
instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married,
or single, or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be made as
necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said
status.
In re: Mallare (A.M. No. 533 April 29, 1968)
In re: Mallare
A.M. No. 533 April 29, 1968
Facts: The respondent, Florencio Mallare, was admitted to the practice of law
on 5 March 1962. In his verified petition to take the bar examinations in 1961,
he alleged that he is a citizen of the Philippines and that “his father is Esteban
Mallare and his mother is Te Na, both Filipino citizens”. (Personal Record, No.
17450, Bar Division) On 16 July 1962, the then Acting Commissioner of
Immigration Martiniano P. Vivo denounced the respondent to this Court as a
Chinaman masquerading as a Filipino citizen and requested that the matter
be investigated thoroughly and if the respondent fails to show that he has
legally become a Filipino, steps be taken for striking his name from the roll of
persons authorized to practice law. Acting upon the request, this Court, on 9
August 1962, referred the matter to its Legal Officer-Investigator for
investigation and report. An investigation was thus held wherein the relator
or complainant and the respondent appeared and adduced their respective
evidence. The position of the respondent-lawyer is that he is a Filipino citizen
based on the supposed citizenship of his father, Esteban Mallare, alleged to
be a Filipino citizen by choice, because he was the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipina mother, Ana Mallare and that the respondent’s
mother, Te Na, a Chinese, followed the citizenship of her husband upon their
marriage.
Issue: Whether or not Mallare is a Filipino citizen able to practice law in the
Philippines.
Held: No. The entire family, consisting of the father, mother and their four (4)
children (Raymundo was not yet born) were registered as aliens in 1942 in
the then Division of Alien Statistics, pursuant to the proclamation of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and
Executive Order No. 25 of the then Executive Commission. (See letter of Jan.
18, 1963 from the Bureau of Immigration to the Legal Officer-Investigator,
see also pp. 171 and 180-181, Vol. I, No. 4, Official Gazette, published during
Japanese occupation.) .
In addition, the respondent himself was again registered as an alien in 1950,
his application thereto bearing his thumbprints and stating therein that he is
a Chinese; that he belongs to the yellow race and that he had used these
other names: “Tan Jua Gae”, “Enciong” and “Jua Gac” (Exh. “N”). He had been
a teacher in the Candon Chinese School (t.s.n., p. 17, Oct. 3, 1962). His
explanation that it was his mother who registered him as an alien is flimsy;
and, as stated hereinbefore, he did not present his mother as a witness.
The evidence is thus clearly preponderant, if not overwhelming that the
respondent’s father, Esteban Mallare or “Mallari”, also known as “Esteban
Dy”, “Esteban Dy Mallare” and “Esteban Tan”, was and remained a Chinese
until he died; consequently, the respondent’s mother, admittedly a Chinese,
retained her original citizenship and their offspring, respondent, Florencio
Mallare, together with his brothers and sisters, are likewise Chinese
nationals, through and through.
On the basis of the foregoing declaration by the Court of First Instance of
Quezon Province, the respondent and his brothers and sisters filed Special
Proceeding No. 3925, in the same court, but in a different branch, for the
“correction” of their birth records. The local fiscal, representing the Solicitor
General, appeared but did not oppose the petition; wherefore, after hearing,
the court granted the petition. Based on the same judicial declaration, the
then Commissioner of Immigration De la Rosa (not the complainant)
cancelled on June 8, 1960, the alien registration of the herein respondent and
that of his brothers and sisters, and issued to them identification certificates
recognizing them as Filipino citizens. Then Solicitor General Alafriz took the
same position.
Civil Case No. 329-G and Special Proceeding No. 3925 are not modes of
acquiring Philippine citizenship; neither is the Chinese citizenship of the
respondent converted to Filipino because certain government agencies
recognized him as such. He remains, by jus sanguinis, a Chinese until he is
naturalized.
CUA SUN KE V. REPUBLIC, GR NO. 29674 APRIL 8, 1988- NO DIGEST
Labo vs. COMELEC
Facts:
For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino ctizen, Ramon
Labo, Jr filed his COC for mayor of Baguio City on March 23, 1992 for the May
11, 1992 elections. Petitioner Roberto Ortega on other hand, also filed his
COC for the same office on March 25, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding
against Labo before the COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a Filipino
citizen.
On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution denying
Labo’s COC.
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads: Acting
on the “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Clarification”, filed by respondent (Labo)
on May 9, 1992, the Commission resolves that the decision promulgated on
May 9, 1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final
and executory only after five (5) days from promulgation pursuant to Rule 18,
Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as
candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final
outcome of this case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court
either on appeal or certiorari.
On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend
the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City
Mayor of Baguio.On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition
for review with prayer, among others, for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent
Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct
respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the event he wins
in the contested elections.
Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion when it refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution
notwithstanding the fact that said resolution disqualifying Labo has already
become final and executory.Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court
did not issue a temporary restraining order as regards the May 9, 1992
resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy,
said resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega further posits
the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Petition to deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy —
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless
stayed by the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. WON Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is qualified
to assume as Mayor of Baguio City.
2. WON disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega)
receiving the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning
candidate for mayor of Baguio City.
Held:
First Issue:
No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9,
1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo’s) certificate of
candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May
14, 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same
day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining
order was issued by this Court.
The resolution cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that
he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains
the SC to rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a citizen of
the Philippines. Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen,
lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine
citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. The
fact that he was elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.
Second Issue:
No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle
petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to
proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the
office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the
sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate
for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the
people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make
respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.
Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate.
He was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a
disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to
deny due course to petitioner’s (Labo’s) candidacy, the same did not deter
the people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was
allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus
Election Code).
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
 Norlainie Mitmug Limbona , Petitioner
vs
Commission on Elections and Malik T. Alingan, Respondents.
that her domicile by operation of law by virtue of marriage, is Rapusan,
Marawi City. Hence, failure to comply with the residence requirement,
Petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of mayor in Pantar, Lanao del
Norte.

Facts:

Petitioner Norlainie Limbona , her husband, and respondent Malik Alingan

were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao Del Norte. After filing their
Certificate of Candidacy, Respondent filed a petition of disqualifying the
husband of petitioner for non-compliance with the one year residence
requirement. Subsequently, respondent also filed the same petition, this time
against the petitioner. Petitioner filed a withdrawal of her candidacy which
the COMELEC granted. The COMELEC granted the disqualification of
petitioner’s husband. Petitioner filed a new Certificate of Candidacy as
substitute candidate for her husband which was approved by COMELEC.
Respondent yet again sought Petitioner’s disqualification.

Petitioner claimed that she has been staying , sleeping and doing business in
her house for more than 20 months in Lower Kalangaan.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner satisfied the one year residency requirement
and qualify to run for the office mayor in Pantar, Lanao del Norte?

Ruling:

No. Petitioner failed to qualify the one-year residence requirement. In order

to acquire domicile by choice, there must be residence or bodily presence in
the new locality, an intention to remain there, and intention to abandon the
old domicile. A person’s domicile once established is considered to continue
and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.

The court noted the findings of the COMELEC that petitioner’s domicile of
origin is Manguing, Lanao Del Norte, which is his also her place of birth; and