PEOPLE VS. CATANTAN
286 of
FACTS: The Pilapil brothers - Eugene and Juan Jr. were
fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers away from the shores of
Tabogon, Cebu when accused Emiliano Catantan and
Jose Macven Ursal, boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils
and Catantan leveled his gun on the Pilapils.
As the pumpboat of the Pilapil breaks donw, Catantan
boarded another pumpboat and ordered the operator
Juanito to take them to Mungaz, Cebu.
The new pumpboat ran out of gas and the accused were
apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils reported
the matter to the local authorities.
RTC: Appellants were convicted of the crime of Piracy
under PD532.
Sentenced them to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether accused-appellant committed grave
coercion or Piracy under PD 532.
HELD: The decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be
committed it is essential that there be an attack on or seizure
of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not
attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using
force or intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it
was only when they were already on board that they used
force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other
place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no
intention of permanently taking possession or depriving
complainants of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they
saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right
away to approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils
behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he
simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
The Court does not agree on the contention of the
appellant that the facts constitute grave coercion defined
in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy under
PD No. 532.
Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave
coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code,
this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it
may be true that Pilapil brothers were compelled to go
elsewhere other than their place of destination, such
compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their
boat.
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any
attack upon or seizure of any vessel, xxx by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things, committed by any person, xxx in Philippine waters,
shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter
provided."
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art.
the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any person who,
without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent
another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compel him to do something against his will, whether it be
right or wrong."
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into
one of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that a
fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the
accused by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the
boat was not produced in evidence cannot exculpate him
from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that
Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force
and intimidation the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter
were fishing in Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision
appealed from, the conviction of accused-appellant
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy
penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him
accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs
against accused-appellant.
PEOPLE VS TULIN
FACTS: MT Tabangao, cargo vessel owned by PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation , was sailing near the
coast of Mindoro loaded with barrels of kerosene, gasoline,
and diesel oil with a total value of 40.4M was suddenly
boarded by seven fully armed pirates. The pirates detained
the crews and took control of the vessel, the PNOC logo
were painted over with black and was painted over with the
name Galilee. The ship crew was forced to sail to Singapore
and later went back to Batangas, Philippines and remained
at sea.
Days later, it sailed back to Singapore and later another
vessel called the Navi Pride anchored beside it. Cheong San
Hiong, supervised the Navi’s crew and received the cargo
on board MT Tabangao/Galilee. After the transfer of goods
were completed, MT Tabangao/Galilee sailed back to the
Philippines and the original crew members were released by
the pirates and was ordered not to report to authorities .
However, the chief engineer reported the incident to the
coast guard and thereafter followed a series of arrests were
effected and charged the accused of qualified piracy or
violation of PD 532.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of qualified
piracy.
HELD: Yes, the accused are guilty of piracy. Art. 122 of the
RPC (piracy in general and mutiny in the high seas) provided
that piracy must be committed in the high seas by any
person not a member of its complement nor a passenger
thereof. It was amended by RA 7659, which broadened the
law to include offenses committed in Philippine waters. PD
532 on the other hand, embraces any person, including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in
the Philippine waters.
Passenger or not, member of the complement or not, any
person is covered by the law. No conflict exists among the
mentioned laws; they exist harmoniously as separate laws.
The attack on and the seizure of MT Tabangao and its cargo
were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive
vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore, where
its cargo was offloaded, transferred and sold. Such transfer
was done under Hiong’s supervision.
Although the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its
cargo was not done in
Philippine waters, it is still deemed part of the same act.
Piracy falls under Title 1 of Book 2 of the RPC. It is an
exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same
principle applies to the case, even if Hiong is charged with
violation of a special penal law, instead of the RPC.
Regardless of the law penalizing piracy, it remains to be a
reprehensible crime against the whole world.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PABLITO ANDAN
HERNANDEZ
FACTS: Marianne Guevarra, a second-year nursing student
at Fatima was on her way to her school dormitory in
Valenzuelal, Metro Manila when Pablito Andan alias
“Bobby” asked her to check the blood pressure of the
grandmother of Andan’s wife but there was nobody inside
the house. She was punched in the abdomen by Andan
and was brought to the kitchen where he raped her. She
was left in the toilet until it was dark and was dragged to the
backyard.
It was when Andan lifted her over the fence to the adjacent
vacant lot where she started to move. Andan hit her head
with a concrete block to silence her and dragged her body
to a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. The death
of Marianne drew public attention which prompted Baliuag
Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form a team of police officers to
solve the case. Apart from the vacant lot, they also
searched Andan’s nearby house and found evidences
linked to the crime.
The occupants of the house were interviewed and learned
that accused-appellant was in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag,
Bulacan. A police team lead by Mayor Trinidad located
Andan and took him to the police headquarters where he
was interrogated where he said that Dizon killed the girl. The
three were then brought to Andan’s house where he
showed the police where the bags of Marianne were
hidden. They were then brought back to the police station
while waiting for the result of the investigation.
The gruesome crime attracted the media and as they were
gathered at the police headquarters for the result of the
investigation, Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the
investigation room.
Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approved him and
whispered a request that they talk privately to which the
mayor agreed. They went to another room and there, the
Andan agreed to tell the truth and admitted that he was the
one who killed Marianne. The mayor opened the door of the
room to let the public and the media representatives witness
the confession. Mayor Trinidad first asked for a lawyer to
assist the appellant but since no lawyer was available he
ordered the proceedings photographed and recorded in
video. In the presence of the media and his relatives, Andan
admitted to the crime and disclosed how he killed Marianne
and that he falsely implicated Larin and Dizon because of
ill-feelings against them.
However, appellant entered a plea of “not guilty” during his
arraignment. He provided an alibi why he was at his father’s
house at another barangay and testified that policemen
tortured and coerced him to admit the crime but the trial
court found him guilty and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of Andan to the mayor
without the assistance of counsel is in violation of the
constitution and cannot be admitted as evidence in court.
HELD: Under these circumstances, it cannot be claimed that
the appellant’s confession before the mayor is inadmissible.
A municipal mayor has “operational supervision and
control” over the local police and may be deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1)
Y and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, Andan’s
confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not
question appellant at all and no police authority ordered
the appellant to talk to the mayor. It was the appellant who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a
private meeting. The mayor acted as a confidant and not
as a law enforcer and therefore did not violate his
constitutional rights.
Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not
apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
committed the crime. What the constitution bars is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confession.
Hence, we hold that appellant’s confession to the mayor
was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Andan was found guilty of the special complex crime of
rape with homicide.
SKECHERS, U.S.A., INC. vs. INTER PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL
TRADING CORP.
Petitioner’s claim: Skechers, USA contend that respondents
are guilty of trademark infringement of their registered
trademark “S” (within an oval design).
Respondents’ claim: they argued that there was no
confusing similarity between petitioner’s "Skechers" rubber
shoes and its "Strong" rubber shoes
Facts: Petitioner filed an application for the issuance of
search warrants against an outlet and warehouse operated
by respondents for infringement of trademark under Section
155, in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, IP
Code of the Philippines. In the course of its business,
petitioner has registered the trademark "SKECHERS" and the
trademark "S" (within an oval design) with the IPO. Two
search warrants were issued and more than 6,000 pairs of
shoes bearing the “S” logo were seized. Respondents
moved to quash the warrants arguing that there was no
confusing similarity between petitioner’s "Skechers" rubber
shoes and its "Strong" rubber shoes. RTC granted the motion
and quashed the search warrants. Petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA which affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Thus, petitioner filed the present petition with the SC
assailing that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
when it considered matters of defense in a criminal trial for
trademark infringement in passing upon the validity of the
search warrant when it should have limited itself to a
determination of whether the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in quashing the warrants. And that it
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that
respondents are not guilty of trademark infringement in the
case where the sole triable issue is the existence of probable
cause to issue a search warrant. Subsequently, petitioner-
intervenor filed a Petition-in-Intervention with the Court
claiming to be the sole licensed distributor of Skechers
products here in the Philippines, but the same was dismissed.
Both petitioner and petitioner-intervenor filed separate
motions for reconsideration.
Issue: whether or not respondent is guilty of trademark
infringement.
Ruling: Yes. The essential element of infringement under R.A.
No. 8293 is that the infringing mark is likely to cause
confusion. In determining similarity and likelihood of
confusion, two tests have been developed: (1)the
Dominancy Test which focuses on the similarity of the
prevalent or dominant features of the competing
trademarks that might cause confusion, mistake, and
deception in the mind of the purchasing public. Duplication
or imitation is not necessary; neither is it required that the
mark sought to be registered suggests an effort to imitate.
Given more consideration are the aural and visual
impressions created by the marks on the buyers of goods,
giving little weight to factors like prices, quality, sales outlets,
and market segments. (2) the Holistic or Totality Test which
necessitates a consideration of the entirety of the marks as
applied to the products, including the labels and
packaging, in determining confusing similarity. The
discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the
predominant words, but also on the other features
appearing on both labels so that the observer may draw
conclusion on whether one is confusingly similar to the other.
There are two types of confusion: (1) confusion of goods
(product confusion), where the ordinarily prudent purchaser
would be induced to purchase one product in the belief
that he was purchasing the other; and (2) confusion of
business (source or origin confusion), where, although the
goods of the parties are different, the product, the mark of
which registration is applied for by one party, is such as
might reasonably be assumed to originate with the
registrant of an earlier product, and the public would then
be deceived either into that belief or into the belief that
there is some connection between the two parties, though
inexistent.
In the case at bar, the Court applied the Dominancy Test
and found that the use of the stylized "S" by respondent in its
Strong rubber shoes infringes on the mark already registered
by petitioner with the IPO. While it is undisputed that
petitioner’s stylized "S" is within an oval design, to this Court’s
mind, the dominant feature of the trademark is the stylized
"S," as it is precisely the stylized "S" which catches the eye of
the purchaser. Thus, even if respondent did not use an oval
design, the mere fact that it used the same stylized "S", the
same being the dominant feature of petitioner’s trademark,
already constitutes infringement under the Dominancy Test.
The protection of trademarks as intellectual property is
intended not only to preserve the goodwill and reputation
of the business established on the goods bearing the mark
through actual use over a period of time, but also to
safeguard the public as consumers against confusion on
these goods. While respondent’s shoes contain some
dissimilarities with petitioner’s shoes, this Court cannot close
its eye to the fact that for all intents and purpose,
respondent had deliberately attempted to copy petitioner’s
mark and overall design and features of the shoes. Let it be
remembered, that defendants in cases of infringement do
not normally copy but only make colorable changes. The
most successful form of copying is to employ enough points
of similarity to confuse the public, with enough points of
difference to confuse the courts.
VICTORIO P. DIAZ VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LEVI
STRAUSS, INC.
Facts: Levi Strauss Philippines, Inc. (Levi’s Philippines) is a
licensee of Levi’s. After receiving information that Diaz was
selling counterfeit LEVI’S 501 jeans in his tailoring shops in
Almanza and Talon, Las Piñas City, Levi’s Philippines hired a
private investigation group to verify the information.
Surveillance and the purchase of jeans from the tailoring
shops of Diaz established that the jeans bought from the
tailoring shops of Diaz were counterfeit or imitations of LEVI’S
501. Armed with search warrants, NBI agents searched the
tailoring shops of Diaz and seized several fake LEVI’S 501
jeans from them. Levi’s Philippines claimed that it did not
authorize the making and selling of the seized jeans; that
each of the jeans were mere imitations of genuine LEVI’S 501
jeans by each of them bearing the registered trademarks,
like the arcuate design, the tab, and the leather patch; and
that the seized jeans could be mistaken for original LEVI’S
501 jeans due to the placement of the arcuate, tab, and
two-horse leather patch.
On his part, Diaz admitted being the owner of the shops
searched, but he denied any criminal liability. Diaz stated
that he did not manufacture Levi’s jeans, and that he used
the label “LS Jeans Tailoring” in the jeans that he made and
sold; that the label “LS Jeans Tailoring” was registered with
the Intellectual Property Office; that his shops received
clothes for sewing or repair; that his shops offered made-to-
order jeans, whose styles or designs were done in
accordance with instructions of the customers; that since
the time his shops began operating in 1992, he had received
no notice or warning regarding his operations; that the jeans
he produced were easily recognizable because the label
“LS Jeans Tailoring,” and the names of the customers were
placed inside the pockets, and each of the jeans had an
“LSJT” red tab; that “LS” stood for “Latest Style;” and that the
leather patch on his jeans had two buffaloes, not two horses.
Issue: Whether there exists a likelihood of confusion between
the trademarks of Levi’s and Diaz.
Held: The Court held, through the application of the holistic
test, that there was no likelihood of confusion between the
trademarks involved. Accordingly, the jeans trademarks of
Levi’s Philippines and Diaz must be considered as a whole in
determining the likelihood of confusion between them. The
maongpants or jeans made and sold by Levi’s Philippines,
which included LEVI’S 501, were very popular in the
Philippines. The consuming public knew that the original
LEVI’S 501 jeans were under a foreign brand and quite
expensive. Such jeans could be purchased only in malls or
boutiques as ready-to-wear items, and were not available
in tailoring shops like those of Diaz’s as well as not acquired
on a “made-to-order” basis. Under the circumstances, the
consuming public could easily discern if the jeans were
original or fake LEVI’S 501, or were manufactured by other
brands of jeans.
Diaz used the trademark “LS JEANS TAILORING” for the jeans
he produced and sold in his tailoring shops. His trademark
was visually and aurally different from the trademark “LEVI
STRAUSS & CO” appearing on the patch of original jeans
under the trademark LEVI’S 501. The word “LS” could not be
confused as a derivative from “LEVI STRAUSS” by virtue of the
“LS” being connected to the word “TAILORING”, thereby
openly suggesting that the jeans bearing the trademark “LS
JEANS TAILORING”came or were bought from the tailoring
shops of Diaz, not from the malls or boutiques selling original
LEVI’S 501 jeans to the consuming public.
The prosecution also alleged that the accused copied the
“two horse design” of the petitioner-private complainant
but the evidence will show that there was no such design in
the seized jeans. Instead, what is shown is “buffalo design.”
Again, a horse and a buffalo are two different animals
which an ordinary customer can easily distinguish.
The prosecution further alleged that the red tab was copied
by the accused. However, evidence will show that the red
tab used by the private complainant indicates the word
“LEVI’S” while that of the accused indicates the letters “LSJT”
which means LS JEANS TAILORING. Again, even an ordinary
customer can distinguish the word LEVI’S from the letters
LSJT.
In terms of classes of customers and channels of trade, the
jeans products of the private complainant and the accused
cater to different classes of customers and flow through the
different channels of trade. The customers of the private
complainant are mall goers belonging to class A and B
market group – while that of the accused are those who
belong to class D and E market who can only afford Php 300
for a pair of made-to-order pants.
PEOPLE VS VILLANUEVA
FACTS: OnOn25 April 2007, AAA ran away from home after finding
out that she was adopted and after being scolded by her mother,
who became the private complainant in this case. The friends of
AAA informed private complainant that AAA was staying at the On
Tap Videoke Bar, working as a Guest Relations Officer. Private
complainant sought assistance from the Channel 2 TV program
"XXX" to regain custody over AAA. Private complainant,
accompanied by the TV crew, lodged a preliminary complaint with
the Southern Police District (SPD) Headquarters of Taguig City
against On Tap Videoke Bar and a task force was created for the
rescue of AAA. Police Officer 1 Ariel Sullano (PO1 Sullano),
accompanied by private complainant was tasked to go inside the
videoke bar to talk to AAA. PO2 Thaddeus Abas (PO2 Abas) and
the other police officers were stationed outside the bar, awaiting
the predetermined signal. After the operation, AAA was taken to
the SPD headquarters, together with accused-appellant and five
(5) other videoke bar employees who were without the necessary
Mayor's and Health Permits. Private complainant executed a
complaint-affidavit against On Tap Videoke Bar and AAA was
endorsed to the Social Development Center of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)-Las Pinas. Accused-
appellant and the five (5) apprehended employees were booked,
investigated and underwent medical examinations.
On 17 May 2007, accused-appellant and the five (5) employees
were referred to the inquest prosecutor with charges for violation of
R.A. No. 7610 and working without Mayor's/ Health Permit,
respectively. The Office of the City Prosecutor charged accused-
appellant with human trafficking under R.A. 9208, instead of
violation of R.A. 7610 for the reason that accused-appellant
"recruited and exploited AAA, a 13-year old minor, to work as a
GRO in her bar by taking advantage of her vulnerability as a child."
On 24 May 2007, a Petition for Bail was filed by accused-appellant,
alleging that the evidence of guilt was not strong. The prosecution
presented the testimonies of PO2 Abas and the private
complainant to prove otherwise.
Meanwhile, on 31 May 2007, an Affidavit of Desistance was
executed by private complainant, which formed part of the
exhibits. The Affidavit of Desistance was executed after the private
complainant had the opportunity to talk to AAA after the rescue
operation and after AAA revealed that she was merely allowed to
stay at the videoke bar after she ran away from home.
PO2 Abas testified as to the filing of the complaint and the
entrapment and rescue operation conducted. He narrated that
during the operation, he was stationed a couple of blocks from the
videoke bar; and that upon the execution of the pre-arranged
signal, he and his companion officers rushed to the bar to take
custody of AAA and other girls working without permits. On cross-
examination, PO2 Abas admitted that he was only acting based on
the preliminary complaint filed by private complainant; and that he
was not aware of why AAA was in the viedoke bar or who had
custody over AAA. When asked about the other details of the
investigation and the operation, he failed to give coherent answers
and insisted that his only designation was to secure the GROs and
the other persons in the videoke bar.
The prosecution then presented private complainant as the
second witness. She recounted the details of the rescue operation
and the subsequent filing of the complaint against accused-
appellant. On cross-examination, she clarified that she had never
been to the videoke bar before the rescue operation; and that
when she saw her daughter in the videoke bar, she was neither
drinking, singing, nor smoking. When asked about the conversation
she had with her daughter after the rescue, private complainant
revealed that AAA claimed that she was neither hired nor recruited
as a GRO at the videoke bar. Private complainant further narrated
that she signified her lack of intention to pursue her complaint
against accused-appellant after hearing the side of her
daughter. Unfortunately, while the trial was ongoing, AAA
absconded from DSWD custody, resulting in the prosecution's failure
to obtain her testimony.
The Petition for Bail was granted by the court and accused-
appellant was allowed to post bail. To supplement the testimonies
of the witnesses presented during the bail hearing, the prosecution
offered the testimony of P/Chief Insp. Jerome Balbontin (PCI
Balbontin). He narrated that on May 16, 2007, the private
complainant, accompanied by the TV crew, reported that her
missing 13-year old daughter was seen working as a GRO at the On
Tap Videoke Bar. According to the witness, he was not present
during the operation but he sent SPO1 Camaliga, PO2 Andador,
PO1 Sullano, PO2 Abas, PO2 Espinosa, among others, to conduct
the surveillance and rescue. He further narrated that after the
rescue operation, the TV crew interviewed the child at the police
station; and that unfortunately, the footage of said interview and
the rescue operation could not be obtained.
The defense presented Wilfred Aquino (Aquino), the videoke bar
waiter, as first witness. He testified as to the events which transpired
during the rescue operation. He narrated that two male individuals
asked him to call AAA; that AAA approached their table to speak
with them; and that after five minutes, the policemen announced
the rescue operation. The witness insisted that accused-appellant
was not aware of AAA's stay in the videoke bar because it was her
father, Rosito Villanueva, Sr., who allowed AAA to stay in the
videoke bar. Wilfred also insisted that AAA has been staying in the
videoke bar for two weeks before the rescue operation; and that
during such stay; she was always in the kitchen helping therh wash
glasses. On cross-examination, he testified that his immediate
superior was Rosito Villanueva, Jr., (Villanueva, Jr.) accused-
appellant's brother, who was the one managing the videoke bar.
Villanueva, Jr. was the second witness for the defense. He testified
as to the circumstances surrounding AAA's stay in the videoke bar.
He claimed that while he was on vacation, his father took over the
management of the videoke bar and allowed the temporary stay
of AAA, upon the request of their employee. Like Aquino,
Villanueva, Jr. claimed that accused-appellant was unaware of
AAA's stay in the videoke' bar because accused-appellant had no
hand in the daily operations and management. On cross-
examination, he testified that the videoke bar was merely registered
under his sister's name; and that all earnings belonged to him
because the videoke bar was put up by his sister for him.
Accused-appellant maintained that at the time the raid was
conducted, she was at her sister's house. Her brother called her to
apprise her of the situation, prompting her to rush to the bar to
handle the situation. She went with the authorities to the SPD
Headquarters and presented herself as the registered owner of the
videoke bar. Accused-appellant vehemently denied hiring and/or
recruiting AAA as a GRO, insisting that she was not involved in the
day-to-day operations. Asserting that she was unaware that AAA
was staying at the bar, accused-appellant explained that she
merely provided capital for the business and that her brother,
Villanueva, Jr., was the one managing the same. Both accused-
appellant and her brother aver that it was their father who allowed
AAA to stay at the videoke bar upon the request of one of the
waiters.
The RTC found accused-appellant's denial unavailing and
incredible, considering that the corroborating testimonies came
from witnesses who were not disinterested
The appellate court found the appeal bereft of merit. Enumerating
the different circumstantial evidence presented, the CA ruled that
the conviction was warranted.
ISSUE: Whether the circumstantial pieces of evidence presented by
the prosecution inexorably lead to the conclusion that accused-
appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Trafficking.
HELD: The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt
of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall still be considered
"trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve any of the means
set forth in the first paragraph of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208. Given
that the person allegedly trafficked in the case at bar is a child, we
may do away with discussions on whether or not the second
element was actually proven.
In an attempt to prove the first element, the prosecution stresses the
fact that accused-appellant is the registered owner of the On Tap
Videoke Bar. The prosecution insists that by merely being the
registered owner, accused-appellant necessarily committed the
act of recruiting, maintaining or harboring AAA. Such contention is
misplaced. Recruiting, harboring, or maintaining a person for the
purpose of exploitation are acts performed by persons who may or
may not be registered owners of establishments. Thus, being the
registered owner per se does not make one criminally liable for the
acts of trafficking committed in the establishment. What the
prosecution should have done was to prove the act of trafficking
by other means, and not by mere showing that accused-appellant
was the registered owner. The defense, on the other hand,
countered the allegation by presenting testimonies of Aquino, an
employee of the videoke bar; Villanueva, Jr., manager of the
videoke bar and brother of accused-appellant; and accused-
appellant herself. The RTC found accused-appellant's denial and
the corroborating testimonies as unavailing and incredible, for the
reason that such testimonies did not come from disinterested
witnesses. This Court is not unaware of the longstanding doctrine
that findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are
matters best left to the trial court, which is in the best position to
observe the witnesses' demeanor while being examined. However,
we take exception from such rule, considering that there are facts
and circumstances which if properly appreciated, could alter the
outcome of the case. That the defense witnesses are closely related
to accused-appellant —one being the brother and manager of the
videoke bar and the other being an employee—is not a sufficient
reason to disregard their testimonies. The declaration of interested
witnesses is not necessarily biased and incredible. More importantly,
there was no evidence suggesting that the testimonies of the
witnesses were untruthful to begin with.
The prosecution likewise failed to prove the third element—that the
recruiting, maintaining or harboring of persons is for the purpose of
exploitation. Curiously, AAA was seen by the prosecution witnesses
at the videoke bar only on the day the rescue operation was
conducted. That AAA was exploited could not be proven by her
mere presence at the videoke bar during the rescue operation. The
prosecution should have presented evidence as to the nature of
work done by AAA, if any. Testimonies as to how often AAA was
seen in the bar while entertaining customers could have also lent
credence to the prosecution's contention that she was in the
videoke bar because she was being exploited.
Since AAA was not presented in court, the prosecution was not able
to offer direct evidence showing that accused-appellant actually
recruited, harbored or maintained AAA in the videoke bar for the
purpose of exploiting her. Neither can private complainant's
testimony which merely revolved around the filing of the complaint
be considered direct evidence. Private complainant's testimony, if
considered in light of all the other evidence, is weak. Private
complainant testified roughly a month after the Affidavit of
Desistance was executed and filed; thus, she had every opportunity
to deny the execution of the Affidavit during the cross-examination.
Instead of denying the veracity of such Affidavit, private
complainant confirmed its truthfulness and accuracy. Though it can
be said that private complainant's affirmative answers were only
prompted by the leading questions asked by the defense lawyer
during cross-examination, it cannot be denied that the prosecution
did not even bother to rebuild its case during re-direct examination.
On re-direct examination, private complainant merely testified as
to matters regarding AAA's adoption. She also claimed that she
came to know of accused-appellant's trafficking activities through
AAA's friends whose identities she cannot remember. However, on
re-cross examination, private complainant admitted that she did
not validate such information before she reached out to the TV
program and the authorities.

A review of the scarce jurisprudence on human trafficking would

readily show that a successful prosecution for human trafficking, to
a certain extent, relies greatly on the entrapment operation. In
entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the authorities for
the purpose of capturing the perpetrator in flagrante delicto. Thus,
it can be said that testimonies of the apprehending officers
regarding the entrapment operation are crucial for a conviction,
most especially in cases where the victim is unable to testify.

We rule that the circumstantial evidence cited by the appellate

court does not lead to the inescapable conclusion that accused-
appellant committed the crime, let alone that a crime was
actually committed. As previously mentioned, the mere presence
of AAA at the videoke bar does not prove that accused-appellant
was maintaining or harboring her for the purpose of exploitation.
In fact, such was the holding of the RTC when it granted accused-
appellant's petition for bail. Nowhere in the text of R.A. No. 9208
can it be inferred that a presumption arises by the mere fact of
presence of a child in a videoke bar or similar establishment. Our
survey of jurisprudence likewise does not reveal such established
presumption. More to the point, the constitutive crime of
trafficking through harboring or receipt of a person must be
specifically for purposes of exploitation. In other words,
establishing mere presence without establishing the purpose
therefor cannot be considered as an element of trafficking. In
this case, the private complainant's affidavit of desistance
categorically explained the child's presence in the videoke bar—
for humanitarian reasons of providing shelter to a runaway
minor.

That AAA was wearing skimpy clothing similar to those worn by

the GROs at the videoke bar during the rescue operation is not
inconsistent with the defense's position that AAA merely sought
refuge and shelter at the bar after she ran away from home. It
is highly possible that AAA borrowed clothes from the videoke
bar employees, considering that she ran away from home and
was unable to take all her belongings with her. That accused-
appellant showed propensity for hiring workers without permits
is irrelevant in the case at bar. One may be equipped with the
proper permits and yet still be guilty of trafficking. Accused-
appellant's propensity for not following ordinances does not
necessarily prove commission of the crime of human trafficking.
Lastly, even if it be conceded that AAA was washing dishes at the
back of the kitchen, such circumstance is still not inconsistent
with the defense's position. As a token of gratitude for allowing
her to temporarily stay at the bar, AAA could have voluntarily
done the chores. From the foregoing, it is obvious that the
totality of circumstantial evidence will not lead to an inescapable
conclusion that accused-appellant committed the crime charged.
It bears stressing that "where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not meet
or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction."