PART II

TExy
 34

SAVRTTIKAYA VAKYARTHAMATRKAYA. UPODCHATO NAMA

PRATHAMAH PARICCHEDAH

FIRST CHAPTER ENTITLED '’INTRODUCTION” OF THE

VMYARTHAMATRKA ALONG WITH THE COMMENTARY.

V (l)
GambhiravltataBartham vaca samksiptaya nibaddhamapi

na v id a n t i y e samagram krpaya tadanugrahah krlyate .

’ An effort i s here made with mercy i n favour o f those

who do not understand f u lly the profound and wide meanings

though presented in the form of b r ie f statements.*

*

Salikahatha Mis'ra has begun h is V r t t i on the

Yakvarthamatrka (VM) with the verse c it e d above, wherein he

has stated the purpose of h is writing the V r t t i. The author

is con fiden t that he has written the Karlkas without much

elaboration so that readers can fo llo w with ease. Yet in

apprehension o f some readers f a i l i n g to grasp the ideas

m aintained in the K arikas, the author has composed the V rt ti

so as to f a c i l i t a t e the easy understanding o f such jeeaders.

By way of stating the purpose of w ritin g the V r t t i, the author

has s a t i s f i e d a tra d itio n a l requirement that one should b«

clear i n mind regarding the purpose or u t i l i t y o f a work

50
b efo r e he starts the same.

50 sarvasyaiva h i sastrasya karmano v a ' p i k a s y a c it /

yavat prayojanam noktam tavat

Also, -
A
prayo jamanudisya na m ando'pi pravartate. Ib id . 5 .5 5 .
A ^
 35

V. tatr a karyavakyarthavadina eva bhavam, bhavanam,

- •
apurvanca vaky arthan p ra tija n a te . ta tr a f purvam^va
vakyartha i t i sadhaniyam. tasya mulam padanamanvita-
-b h id h a y ite ti, £ameva tavadadau parisodh ayati. atra
y e pratyastamitapadavibhagam, vakyameva vakyarthasya
vacakamityacaksate. y e ca vakyantyavarna e v e ti, ye
ca padairananvitah padartha abhihitah parasparanvaya-
matmano' vagamayanti - i t i .

'Those who accept the perform able (karya) as the

sentence-meaning (vakygrtha) admit (understand) a c t iv it y
(Bhava)» urge (Bhavan§) and unseen potency (Apurva) as the
meanings o f the sentences. Of them unseen potency i s to be
esta blish ed as the sen ten ce-w an in g. I t s ( o f the sentence­
meaning) b a sis is th ° expression o f the s y n ta c tic a lly
connected words (Padas), hence (the author) f i r s t scru tin ise s
i t ( i . e. i the very the sta te o f expressiveness o f the syn tact­
i c a l l y connected on es). Those whO\ c a ll the sentence on ly as
aenotating the meaning o f the sentence concerned with no
r e c o g n itio n o f any d iv is io n o f the sentence in to words,
those who admit that the l a s t le t t e r (Varna) o f a sentence
as the aenotator o f the sentence-meaning and those who s ta te
a

that the meanings o f the words n ot s y n ta c tic a lly connected are

/

conveyed by the words and (th e re a fte r) g iv e r i s e to the know­

ledge o f the mutual connection 1. e . , the meaning o f th =
sen ten ce.'

*
 36

In the J te x t " t a t r a ................ e t c . , M Salikanatha

r e fe rs to the three views o f three d iffe re n t scholars regard­

ing their concept o f Vakyartha (sentence-meaning). These three
sects o f philosophers are commonly known as karyavakyartha-
vadins. But they d iffe r from one another in respect of their
idea regarding wbat generates or gives r is e tP a vakyartha.
The karyavakyitfthavadins are namely, the vaiyakaranas, the
Bhatta Mimstfiisakas and the Prabhakara Mimamsakas. According
to the vaiyakaranas, Bhava (a c tiv ity ) is the vakyartha. Bhava
i s the a c tiv ity denoted by a root when i t i s conceived without,
any regard to i t s continuation or progress which is effected
by d iffe re n t instruments o f action or karakas. Though Bhava
and Kriya are almost used as synonyms denoting the sense of
a verb or a verbal d erivative, s t i l l i t can be said that
Bhava shows a completed a c t iv it y , while kriya shows a c tiv ity
in p rogress.51

The followers o f Kumirila Bhatta accept Bhavana (urge)

as the vakyartha and as such they are ca lle d Bhavanavakyar-
thavadins and their theory i s known as Bhavanavakyarthavada.

51 . kidanupati yadrupam ta d a s t it i p ra tiy a te .

p a rita stu paricchinnam bhava ity e v a kathyate.
Va.p. I I I . 8.12
Also,-
yavat siddhamasiddham va sadhyatvenabhidhiyate.
asritakramarupatvat ta t kriyetyabhidhiyate.
I b id ,, I I I . 8 .1.
Bhavana i s a stim ulating a c t iv it y fo r th at which is to

take p l a c e . ^ In course o f our ex p osition o f the VM.II, we

w ill deal with Bhavana and Bhgvanavakyarthavada at len gth .

The Prabhakaras, however, admit Apurva (unseen potency)

as the vakyartha. According to them, Apurva (unseen potency)
53
Niyoga (prompting) and Karya (perform able) are synonyms.
Because o f th eir adm itting Apurva o r Niyoga or Karya as the
vakyartha, they are known as Apurvakaryavakyarthavadins or
Nlyogavakyarthavadins and th e ir theory comes to be known as
Niyogavakyarthavada. In course o f our ex p osition o f the text
o f the VM.II, we w ill have scope to deal with these two
th eories namely, Bhavanavakyartha o f the Bhattas and Niyoga-
vakyartha o f the Prabhakaras. In the V te x t, 1atra ye
p ra ty a s ta m ita .........* e t c . , Salikanatha r e fe r s to the view o f
the (kammarians according to whom, a vakya is an in d iv is ib le
u n it presenting the meaning as a u n it which, fo r convenience,
is further divided in to separate meaning o f in d ivid u a l words
54
which have a phenomenal existen ce.

Again with the expression, 'y e ca vidcyantyavarna e v e fi

e t c ., in the above, the author o f the VM r e fe r s to

52. bhavanatvam nama bhavituh prayo jakavyaparatvam.

MP, p. 62
53. niyogo hi praminantaramap^irvamarthamavabodhayati i t l .
PP, p. 235
54. abhedapurvakah bhedah k a lp ita vakyavidibhih^
bhedapurvamabhedamstu manyante padadars'ina)^
Va.P. 11.57.
 33

the views o f Sabaraswamin and thevNaiyayikas. According to

Sahara, the antya varna (la st le tte r) along with the impress­
ions o f each o f the preceding letters brings about the know-
ledge o f the vakyartha (the meaning of a sentence). 55 Som-^
o f the Naiyayikas also contend that the carama varna (la st
letter) combined with a ll those words revives (the c o lle c tiv e
impressions) and thus give r is e to the knowledge o f the
vakyartha. 56

In the V text, 'y e ca padairananvitah................

Salikanatha refers to the view o f Varttik'akar a Kumarila who
contends that the meanings of the Padas (words), not syntac­
tic a lly connected are conveyed by respective Padas and there­
after give r is e to the knowledge o f the mutual connection,
57
i . e . , the Vakyartha.

The three views referred to above shall come to b»

c r itic is e d by SaJ-ika, in V text under K(6). So, we shall have
the opportunity to discuss these views again in the succeed­
ing pages.

55. purvapurvavarnaj anitasamskarasahito^ntyo varnah

pratyayakah. SB. under MS. 1 .1 .5 .
56. yattu tarkikah - varnam anityatve'pi u ttarottaravarne
purvapurvavarnavattamavyavahitatottarasambandh ena
samskaravas'Sd grhyata i t i padasya pratyaksatvacchaba-
dabodhah. PLM, p. 57}
pr aty ekap adanubhav aj any as amskar ai sc ar amam tavatp adav i s -
ayaka - smaranasyavyavadhanenopatteh; ......................... ..
.t av atp adas amskar as ahi t a-car amav ar na jnanasyo dbo dhak atv a t.
NBM under BP, p. 468.

57. vakyasyavacakatvam ca padarthanim ca fcetuta

sambandhahapeksanam vakyarthe sthapayisyate.
SV. 20 “under MS. 1 .1 .2 .
*
 ‘9

Tannirasaya p r a t i j a n i t e ----

’ Therefore, in order -bo discard (The view s) above,

(the author) proposes* ----

K(l)
padebhya eva vakyarthapratyayo jayate yatha.

tatha vayam nibadhnimah prabhakaragurormatam.

'We explain the view of the teacher Prabhakara as that

the understanding o f the meaning of a sentence re su lts (arise?

out o f) from the very words (padas) o n ly .'

V (l)
padebhya eva, na vakyat, ni'pyantyavarnat,

n a 'p i padar thebhya ityarthah.

' (The knowledge o f the meaning o f a sentence i s attained)

from the words (Padas) only (and& neither from the sentence

(vSkya) nor from the l a s t le t t e r (antya varna) nor also from

the meanings o f the words (padarthas) . 1

In 'padebhya . . . . . . ' e t c of the K (l) and V above,

Salikanatha has la i d stress in e stab lish in g the view of

Prabhakara M isra, according to which the knowledge o f the

vakyartha is from the padas (words) only. The in clu sion o f

the emphatic p a r tic le 'eva* in K and above, indicates that

i t i s only the Padas that give r i s e to the knowledge o f the

vaKyartha and thereby the author discards the views held by

other thinkers, v i z . , the view o f the vaiyekaranas, according

 40

to which the knowledge o f the vakyartha Is dae to the

sentence as a whole} the view o f the Bhasyakara, i . e ., Sahara
who contends that the antya varna (la s t l e t t e r ) alone with
the impressions o f each o f the preceeding varnas brings about
S8
the knowledge o f the vakyartha.0

Salikanatha also re fu te s the view o f the Bhatt.a Mimam-

sakas who a sse rt th at the knowledge o f vakyartha or verbal
comprehension a rises from the padarthas (meanings o f the
59
words)* While the Bhattas regard padarthas as the
Sabaabodhakarana (cause o f the verb al comprehension), the
foCS
Prabhakaras regard pada as such. In oth er words, they
contend th at the vakyartha is denoted by padas. As we have
already stated , we sh a ll discu ss th ese views again in context
o f our ex p osition o f under K(6)

58. purvapurvavarnajanltasam skarasahito'ntye varnah

pratylyakaJi. SB under MS. 1 .1 .5 .

59. padairabhihitaji svarthah smarita va padartha

vakyartham gamay a n ti. TB, p. 27
Also,-
padartha eva tavat parasparanvita vakyartha
ityu cyan te, NBM, p. 96

60. tasmanna vakyam na padanl/ siksadvikyarthabuddhiin

j anay a n ti/k in tu padasvarupabhihitaih padirthaity
samlaksyate* s a v it i slddhametat/ Ib id * , p. 125.
 41

Tam prakaram vaktumupakramate -

•(The author) proceeds to explain that process ( i . e . ,

the process o f conveying the knowledge o f the meaning o f a
sentence by the words c o n s titu tin g i t ) ‘ -

K(2)
p adair ev a' nvitasvartham a trop aks inas'aktibhih
svarthascedbodhita buddho* vak yarth o'p l tatha s a t l.

‘ I f the words (Padas), with th eir denotative powers

being exhausted on ly in re sp e ct o f s y n ta c tic a lly re la te d
meanings o f th eir own (can) convey th eir own meanings, that
being so, the sentence-meaning a lso comes to be con veyed.’

V(2)
vakyarthapratipattau hi padanamanupayatve tadanyatha-
nupapattya vakyamekam tadupayabhutam kalpyate. yadyapi
vyutpattyanapeksaechabdadartho na’ vagamyate. yadyapi
c a ‘ nantyadvakyanam, tadar$hananca, vaidikasya c a ’ rth a s-
ya'nanyopiyatvat vyutpattiras'akya. tathapi kalpanikapsd
padiarthavyupattisamskrtat vakyadvakyarthamavagacchati-
ty a sriy a te . yadi kalpanikatve pada-padarthiaiim pramana-
bhavadekaikavarnoccirane’ rthanavabodhat, kramenoccarita
nahca yugapacchravanasambhavat, purvapurvavarnanubha-
va^anitasamskarasahito1 ntyo varnah pratyayakah, tasya
ca paramarthikapada-padar th avyu tpattissahakariniti
p ak sassvikriyate, yadi va padaissukaravyutpattayo1r a r -
v ita eva svartha abhihita vakyarthamavabodhayanti-
 etyah glk riyate, yadi tu padanyeva1nvitan svarthana-
b h ida d h a tlti sakyate sadhayitnm, ta d ava k yarth asya 'va-
buddhatvatfinaitah kalpana atmanam labhante. (Sr)

‘ For a sentence i s assumed as the cause ( o f verbal

comprehension) in as much as i t ( i . e . , v erb a l comprehension)
does not occur without the involvement o f the words in the
event o f not recog n isin g words as the cause o f verbal compre­
hension ( i . e . , the knowledge o f the sentence-m eaning). Although
a meaning i s n ot known from a word rega rd less o f i t s denotative­
ness (v y u tp a tti), and though the sentences are innunerable and
so also th eir meanings, and there being no other a lte rn a tiv e
means o f knowing the ved ic sentences, the denotativeness
(th at may bri^ g about the vedic meanings) i s n o t p o s s ib le ,
y e t i t i s admitted that one can understand the meaning o f a
sentence based on the im pression by the assumed denotative­
ness o f words and meanings. I f because o f th eir being no p roof
fo r the assumption o f word and i t s meaning, due to not under­
standing a meaning by way o f u tte rin g each le t t e r (s in g ly ) and
on the ground o f the p o s s i b i li t y o f simultaneous hearing ( o f

le t t e r s ) u ttered one a fte r another, and what brings about the

knowledge o f the meaning o f the word i s the la s t le t t e r along

with the im pressions o f each o f the preceeding le t t e r s and
the a lte rn a tiv e view i s admitted that denotativeness o f th°
r e a l wards and meanings serves as the a u x ilia ry cause, i f
again i t is actaitted th at the unrelated meanings which are
e as i l y understood from the words g iv e r i s e to the knowledge
 A2

o f the sentence-meaning, or i f , however, i t can te established

that the words can denote the syntactically related meanings,
then thus the smtence-meaning being understood from the words,
the aforesaid assumptions (views), regarding the knowledge of
verbal comprehension do not hold good.f

In the V text, ' vakyarthapratipattau............ atmanam

labhante* e tc ., above, the author o f the VM, discards totally
the view o f the vaiyakarajnas who contend that the vakya denotes

the vakyartha. Eut in comparison to the view o f the Ckammarians,

Salikanatha prefers the view o f Sahara and in comparison to
y*

this view o f Sahara, he prefers the view o f Kumarila. Eut, on

the whole, ho rejects these aforesaid views and forwards th*
view o f Prabhakara* The emphatic pa rticle 1tu' is used in t.h«
2 in order to eliminate the views o f other philosophers. I t
y
has also been stated by Salikanatha that i f his view ( i . * . ,
the v ie w, according to whicfc, the padas denote related mean­
ings) can be established, then the aforesaid three views do
y*

not stand to reason, we have already stated that Salikanatha

discards these views in his 2 text under K(6) and as such v*»
do not want to discuss here the refutations o f these views
y*

by Salika. We shall discuss the same there in context o f the

exposition o f 2 unaer i^ ).

katham pun ah padanamanvi tasvar thamatra-

bodhakatve vakyarthavagatissidhyatltyatra*ha -
 'How, again, does the knowledge o f the meaning o f a
sentence a r is e from the words as conveying only the rela ted
meanings? Here (th e author) observes thus* ——

*(3 )
pradhioiagunabhavena labddhanyonyasamanvayan.
padarthan«=va vaky ar than sangirante v ip a sclta h .

‘ The scholars d e scrib e the sentence-meaning as the very

meanings o f the words that have (already) attained a mutual
re la tio n sh ip and (understand the two) in a r e la t io n o f p rin ­
c ip a l (pradhana) and secondary (guna)*.

In 1pradhstfia...........1 e t c . o f the K, Salikanatha forwards

the view o f the Prabhakaras who consider the vakyartha as
c o n s titu te d by the Padarthas and who understand the two v i z . ,
the Padartha and the Vakyartha in a r e la t io n o f Pradhana
(p rin c ip a l) and Gauna (secondary). According to the follow ers
o f the Prabhakara, the Padas c o n s titu te a Vaky a and the
Padarthas give r i s e to a Vakyartha. The Prabhakaras contend
th at the Vakyartha i s the Pradhina and the Padartha i® the
Gauna, because the Vakyartha is the whole, while the Padarthas
are i t s p a rts. I t is the parts that make the whole. I t may be
sta ted here that the phala (r e s u lt) i s the Pradhana and the
means o f atta in in g i t i s the Gauna. For instan ce, svarga
(heaven), the phala i s the Pradhana while i t s means, i . e . , the
Pi T
yaga ( s a c r if i c e ) is •le Gauna.

61. t asma t susthu uk£am - yago gunabhutafr svargah

pradhanabhutah i t i . SB under MS. 6 .1 .2 .
 The inclusion o f the p a r tic le * eva* a fte r the word
’ Padarthan*1 in K above, is for laying stress on the view o f
the Prabhakaras that the Paaarthas that have already a t t a in s
a mutual relation sh ip give r is e to the vakyartha. ¥° have
already stated that in the view o f the Prabhakaras, the Pad^s
con stitu te a Vakya and as such the meanings o f the Padas
con stitu te the meaning o f a Vakya. But mere association o f the
Paaarthas can never g iv e r is e to the Vakyartha but the syntac­
t ic a lly rela te d meanings o f the Padas g iv e r is e to Vakyartha.

Nanu tesam bhuyastvad bhuyanso vakyarthah,

vakyani ca syurityatra* ha ~

'As there are many meanings o f sentences due to thea^

being many meanings o f words, l e t therje be many sentences also.
In this connection, i t is said* —

K(4&5A)
Bhuyamso yadyapl svirthidi padinam te prthakprthak.
Prayojantaya tvekavakyar them sampracaksate .
T atpr a ti ty ekakaryatv adv aky amapy ekamucy ate.

'Though theere are maiqr word-meanings (taken) separately,

however, a sin gle sentence-meaning is stated (to e x is t) in
view o f (the unity) o f purpose. And because o f the knowl^dg^
o f that (the sentence-meaning) being a sin gle performance, thp

62. ayambhavah - padanyeva vakyam, padartha eva vakyartha

i t i . gafrtunatasthitih ........................
tatha ca padar than am samsargp na vakyarthah, api
tvanyitah padartha eva vakyartha i t i bhlvaii.
FN under PP, p. 378.
sentence i s also stated to be one (o n ly ).*

In K v i z . , 'bhuyam so................. 1 e t c ., the author proceeds

to remove the m isgiving expressed e a r lie r that as there ar^
many meanings o f the Padas and as such many meanings o f Vakhas,
the Vakyas w ill also come to be many. Salikanatha contends
that though there may be many meanings o f the Padas, s t i l l
these becomes one Vikyartha on ly and as the knowledge o f trvj
Vakyartha leads to a sin g le Karya (perform able), the Vakya is
also sta ted to be one n ecessia ted by the u n ity o f purpose
the word-meanings. The Prabhakaras as the advocates o f the
Anvitabhidhanavada, contend that a Vakya has a unitary mean­
ing o f i t s own, the con stitu en t Padas possess meanings only as
they are re la te d to the unitary sentence-meaning. Thus, in the

expression, ' gamanaya* (bring the cow )j the word ' gau' (th »

cow) means n ot the is o la te d meaning o f ’ gotva' (cOwness), to t

•gau' as r e la te d to the a ct o f ’ anayana' (b rin g in g ), so also
the word ' anaya* ^means the act o f ‘ anayana* as r e la te d to t-.ho
'g a u '. The Padas g iv e th eir own meanings and th eir sy n ta ctica l
r e la t io n to other Padas in the Vakya so that the Vakyartha is
d ir e c t ly conveyed by the Padas themselves.

I t i s also in d ica ted in the K above, that a group o f

Padas serving a s in g le purpose, forms one Vakya, but only
i f any one o f these Padas on being d is jo in e d from the rest
makes i t wanting or d e fe c tiv e . Moreover, the K texts above,

have a re fe re n ce to ' ekavakyata* (p r in c ip le o f unitary passage)

o f the Mimamsakas. itfa sh a ll have scope to discu ss this

p r in c ip le in course o f our e x p o s itio n o f the r e le v a n t V te->-.

l a t e r on.

Katham punar ekaprayo ja n a tv a m ity a tra 'h a —

' Hoy, again, is th a t the purpose i s one? Here does th «

autnor r e p ly ' ——

K (5B ).

pratipattirgu n an iah h i pradhanaikaprayojana.

'F o r , the secondary (meaning) has, as fpr its s in g le

purpose, the knowledge o f the p r in c ip a l (m e a n in g )'.

V (5 ).
yaddhi pradhanabhutam, tadeva kathannama v is is ta m

pratiyatim ityevam artham gunanam pratipadanam, tena

t a t t r a iv a tatparyam, tadeva prameyam, ta tp a ry a v is a y a

eva sabdasya pramanyabhupagamat, tasya tathabhutasya

p ra tip a ttirn a ik a p a d a n ib a n d h a n e ti, vikyameva ta tr a

pramanara. ata eva ca * sasthadye na padam nama kincana

vakye, na padartha nama kecana va k y a rth e' (Bk, 6 . i . i )

ityuktara. prthagbhutam padam nama kincana pramanamasti

prthagbhutasca padartha, na pram eyassantltyar thah et.ao^

t a t r a iv a spastamuktam.

'How th a t which is the p r in c ip a l (meaning) can be known

s p e c ia lly in t h is content? For th is reason , the p re s e n ta tio n

i s th e re , o f the secondary (m eanings). That v e ry (p r in c ip a l

meaning) l i e s in the intentness (o f the secondary meaning?: .
That very (p rin cip a l meaning) is the o b je c t to be known as
because.the admission o f Sabda as Pramana is on ly with r e fe r ­
ence to the o b je c t o f in ten tion (in te n tio n a l meaning). The

knowledge o f that (the p r in c ip a l meaning) o f such nature is

n ot due to one word on ly . (T h erefore), the sentence i t s e l f jc

the source ( o f v a lid knowledge) there (in the content o f v«rba

comprehension). I t i s , th erefore, said — 'I n the beginning or

the six th chapter ( o f the MS), there is nothing l ik e a worn

by name (to be admitted) in a sentence nor ar^ these trie mean­
ings o f words in the meaning o f a sentence' (Brhattika (BK)

6 . 1 .1 ) . There is no word taken separately as pramana nor ar<=

there separate meanings o f words also as o b je c ts to be known.

I t i s c le a r ly sta ted there i t s e l f . '

In ' pratipattirgunansao hi . . . . e t c . ' and 'yaddhi

pradhaoiabhutam............... e t c . ' in K (5B) and V(5) respectively
above, SIlikanabba states that the knowledge o f the p rin cip a l

meaning i s the on ly purpose o f the secondary meanings. In

re p ly to an o b je c tio n as to how that which is the Pradhjjne
artha (p rin cip a l meaning) can be known s p e c ia lly , the author
o f the VM, sta tes that i t i s the Gauna artha (secondary meanin
in the intentness o f which l i e s the Gauna artha or in other

words, the Gauna arthas are in ten t on bringing about the

Pradhana artha, i . e . , the Vakyartha. The Vakyartha which is

the Pradhana artha i s the Prameya or the o b je c t to be know".
I t is because o f the f a c t that Sabda as Pramana i s admitted

only with reference to Tatparya (the in ten tion al meaning;.

This Vakyartha cannot be understood by one Pada only. Th~

Vakya i t s e l f , i s , th erefore, i s the source o f Sabdabocha,

i * e . , the Vakyartha;) nan a (o r the knowledge o f the s&ntence-

meaning). This is , as i t appears, from the present context,

the view o f the Grammarians who accept Vakya as the cause of

the knowledge o f the Vakyartha.

In the Jf above, we fin d a quotation v i z . , *1*Sasthauye

na padam n am a........' etc.,which i s , state# in the VM as being

taken from the U L o f Kumarila. We re g re t, our in a b ilit y to

fin d out the same as the work * i z . , the M is not a v a ila b le

g3
in p rin t. Moreover, the word 'Sasthadye' (i.e ., in the

beginning o f the sixth chapter) must r e fe r to the sixth

chapter o f the SB, because the BK i s a commentary on the SB.

But the contents in the quotation are not found in the beginn
/ * ■*

ing o f the six th chapter o f the SB (Sabarabhagya) and the

quotation, as i t appears from the context, i s in support of

the view o f the Qrammarians.

63. that the BK is not a v a ila b le in p rin t is stated by

K.S. Ramaswami S h astri and A. Sankaranan in their art i.e
1Kumarila and Br&hattika1. They say —

' I t s very name and the references to i t in the c a t a ­

logues show that i t i s very voluminous and probably i 4-
enormous s iz e has stood unfortunately in the way o f Its
being preserved to p o s te rity .* — Proceedings o f the
3rd o rie n ta l conference, Madras, 1927, p. 528.
 •-0

Samprati vakyameva vacakara vakyar th asyeti y e

bruvate, ye ca vakyantyavarna ev eti tannira-
karanaya"ha----

’Now, (the author), in order to r e fu te (the view o f)

those who contend that the sentence I t s e l f i s the denoter o 1'

the sentence-meaning and those who (s ta te ) that the l a s t

l e t t e r o f a sentence alone is the denoter ( o f the sentence­

meaning) Says’ — —
#

K (6 ).

Vyavaharesu vrddhanam vakyas'ravanabhavisu.

Avapoddharabhedena padstfiam s^aktiniscayah.

’ The denotative power (S*akti) o f the words is a s ce rt­

ained by (observing) the d iffe r e n c e o f the process o f in c i ­
sion and exclu sion (Avapa and Uddhara) in the usages subse­
quent to the hearing o f sentences by eld erly p e rso n s.'

\j(&) Yadyapi vr ddhavyavaharapurvikaiva sarva sabdavyutpatt^h,

vs&yaireva ca vyavaharah tathapi yatpadavape yasyar-
thasyavapah, yaduddhare coddharah, tasminnevarhe tss; a
padasya vacakas'aktiravasiyate. Na ca tatha s a ti vakynr-

thapratipattirnopapadyate, vaksyamana^tvannyayasya. v ^ a
karyabalena vakyamekam pratyaksaparidrsyamanavarnapaJa-
bhedapahnavena kalpyeta.
 1

Kinca, " S is o l gamanaya,. Siso*. gam baahana, V atse*

gamanaya, vatsa*. gim badh&ia, Arbhaka'. gamanaya,
Arbhaka’. gam badhana, Dimbhal gamanaya, Dimbha'.
gam boahane" tyastanam vakyinamastau vacakasaktayah
kalpya^ padavadinastu, saptanam padansah sap taiv a
saktaya i t i kalpanalaghavam, Anayaiva d isa suklam itJ
padapraksepe vakyao/adino' stavapaffah kalpyah, padava-
dinas tvek aiva. Aparamarthike ca pada-padarthavibhige
k lm asrita vyutpattirabhyupayatam upaitityapi cln ty a-
niyam.

'Although the knowledge o f a l l the words i s always

preceded only by the usages o f the e ld e rly person and the
usage i s by means o f only the sentences, y e t the den otative
power i s asce rtain e d in re sp e c t o f th at sen se the in clu sio n
o f which i s due to the in c lu sio n o f the word and the exclu­
sion o f which i s due to the exclusion o f th a t (word). It. ir
not in the view o f th is th at the knowledge o f the sentence-
meaning does not a r is e . For, the p r in c ip le i s being state d
h e re a fte r, on the stren gth o f the a p p lic a b ilit y of which
p r in c ip le ) , (only) one sentence i s assumed by way o f conce­
a lin g the p erce p tib le d iffe re n c e of le t t e r ana word.

Moreover, oh', c h ild ( s i s u ) , bring the cow, oh', n i l c

(s^isu), the cow, oh*, boy (v a ts a ), bring the cow, oh', boy
( v a t s a ) ,t i e the cow, oh', c h ild (Arbhaka), brin g the cow, o>
c h lla (Arbhaka), t i e the cow, oh', boy (Dimbha), bring the cow,
oh', boy (Dimbha), t i e the cow, o f these eight sentences,
(There are) eight denotative powers. But the Paaavadins
(state) that there are only sewn denotative powers o f the
seven words and hence, there at lie s the sim plicity in the
matter of assumption (o f the denotative power). In this v<v v
(^ew)j i f the word ‘ white* (sukla) is added to the above
(sentences), then the advocates o f the sentence as the deno-
ter o f the sentence-meaning, Shall have to admit other eighf

(denotative powers), but the advocates of the word as the

denoter o f the sentence-meaning, (w ill assume) only one
(denotative power). And in the event o f admitting the division
o f words and their meanings as unreal, i t is to be thought or

what does the denotativeness rest at ? ’

In the _K(fc>) above, the author, explains how a Sakti

(denotative power) is ascertained and again in V under
K(6), he re je cts the view o f the Grammarians who contend th ’t
a Vakya is the denoter o f the Vakyartha and the view o f Sat-va
and a section o f Naiyayikas who contend that the Antya v?rn-i
is the denoter o f the Vakyartha*

I t is stated in the K above, that Sakti o f the Panes In-

ascertained through a process o f inclusion and exclusion 1e
the usages subsequent to the hearing o f sentences by older! ■
persons. The author here refers to the Yrddhavyavahara (nsa-p-
o f elderly person) which is , in the view o f the Prabttaknr-n /

. V- _
65. na catra vrddhsvyavaharam mukta anyat karanamupalabhaoahe
BR, p. 258.
the most important method o f learn in g the words. There are
eigh t methods o f learn in g. The words these are Grammar',
comparison, D ictionary, Statement o f trustworthy persons,
Usage o f the ela erly persons, Supplementary statement,
66
Paraphrase and the c o n tig u ity of a well-known word. Thoug
the number o f methods suggested f o r acquiring the knowledge
o f new words v a ries from sch ool to s ch o o l, i t is interns tin
to fin d that Vrddhavyavahar a (usage o f eld erly persons) is
in va riab ly recogn ised by almost a l l the sch olars o f various
schools and as such i t deserves to be admitted as th® most
important o f a l l the methods suggested in th is regard. I t i
why w® fin d Nagesa r e fe r r in g to (vrddha) Vyavahara as Sakti
grahakas'iromani, the c h ie f ( l i t . the c r e s t j^wel) o f the
fa c to r s determining the Sakti ( o f w ords).67 This singular
p o s it io n is given to Vrddhavyavahar a in a ll the c h ie f schoo
68
including Mimamsa.

The Naiyayikas also g iv e due re co g n itio n to this

Vrddhavyavahar a. Gangesa comes to admit that the knowledge
a ll words prim arily r e s u lts from Vrddhavyavahar a. He under­
stands the other ways to be dependant on the basic knowledr

66. s'aktigrahari^vyakaranopamanakoslaptavakyad vyavahiratsca

vakyasya sesad v iv rterv a d a n ti sannidhyatah siadhapa^a
vrddhab^ - As quoted in the NSM i
BP, p. 418.
/

6 7. sa ca s'aktissadhusvivapabhramsvapi,
saktigrahakasiromanervyavaharasya tu ly a tv a t. PLM, p.
68. vradhavyavaharapurvlkaiva sarva sabdavyutpa ttih ,
VM, p. 379, Vide, PP.
 69
o f meanings o f words derived through Vrddhavyavahara. It.
is only from the sentences in the im perative mood th at wp

can observe some kind o f v i s i b l e a c t iv it y on the p art o f

the lis t e n e r . Hearing the utterance o f a sentence by a
prayojaka vrddha (d ir e c tin g e ld e rly person) to prayojya
vrdaha (d ir e c te d e la e r ly person) and observing the conse­
quent a c tiv it y on the p art d f the lis t e n e r , a c h ild feets the

iaea that the a c t iv it y o f the d ire cte d elderfyperson is bas«d

on h is understanding the meaning o f a sentence. At th is timp,
the while a c t iv it y o f the d ir e cte d e ld e r ly person is under­
stood as the meaning o f the whole utterance o f the d ir e ctin g
e ld e rly person. From several such observations o f variou s
utterances and th eir meanings, thp c h ild is able to under­
stand the meaning o f sin g le words through a process o f
in clu s io n and exclu sion .
. ^
In the V te x t above, Salikanatha r e fu te s th » view o f
the Vakyavadins, i . e . , the Grammarians who contend that i t
is the Vakya that denotes the Vakyirtha. But according to
the Prabhakaras who are know& as the Paaavadins, i t is th®
Pada that denotes the Vakyartha.70

69. vrdchavyavaharadeva sarvesamadya vyu tp attih , TC. p.463.

70. asmaka® tu pad any eva vakyam tadartha eva
• l

vakyartha i t i na kincidanupapannam. TR, p. 35.

 55

In the j[ text above, Sallkanatha, with a view to giving

us the way h&w a Sakti is ascertained, again sta te s that though
the knowledge of Pada can be acquired by Vrddhavyavahara and
the Vrddhavyavahara i s through the Vakyas, yet the vacaka-s'akti
(denotative power) i s ascertained in respect of that meaning
the inclusion o f which i s due to the inclusion o f the Pada and
the exclusion o f which is due to the Pada. I t cannot be said
that because of admitting the Sak ti in respect of a pada, there
w ill ^e no knowledge o f the Vaky&rtha. For, the prin ciple is
heing stated here after in ^ K (ll) o f the VM. According to this
p rin ciple, because o f their denoting the meaning f i r s t and
of their conveying the tatparya (intention o f the speaker),
i t i s better to admit Sakti in respect of the Padas. We
sh all deal with the prin ciple, at length, in course o f our
exposition o f the relevant (*Q text.

Sallkanatha, again in the 1£ text above, explains both

the views of the VSkyavadins, i . e ., the Grammarians and the

Padavadins i . e . , the Prabhakara Mimamsakas (str ic tly ) regard­

ing their admission o f Sakti in a Vakya and in a Pada respect-
*

ively. In the eight expressions as cited by Sallkanatha in

the Jjf text above,viz., ‘ S iso 1 gamanaya; Siso '. gam badhanaf
Vats a '• gamanaya* Vats a • gam badhana; Arbhaka • gamanaya;
Arbhaka '. gam badhana; Dimbha gamanaya; Qimbha l gam
» -
badhana', the Vakyavadins sh all have to admit eight Saktis

ti. prathamyadabhidhatrtvat tatparyopagamadapi^

p adanameva s i s'aktirvaramabhyupagamyatam^
VM, p. 400, Vide, PP.
 56

( i . e . , tr.p denotative pow ers). I t i s because o f th e ir admitt­

ing the Sakti in a Vakya. But the Padavaains, because o f th eir
admitting the Sakti in a Pada, w ill admit on ly seven S aktis.
They count on ly seven Padas from the above eight expressions.
They are Sisu, Vatsa, Arbhaka, Dimbha, gam, anaya and taahana.
Thus, on the p art o f the Padavaains, there i s s im p lic ity In
the matter o f assumption o f the Sakti and as a r u le , i t is
better to support or accept the view where there i s s im p licity
in the matter o f assumption and to discard the view which
in volves p r o lix it y in the matter o f assumption. Moreover, I f
another Pada as an a d je ctiv e to the noun •gam* is added, then
the Vakyavaains sh a ll have to admit another eight Saktis ir
the a fo re sa id eight expressions, while the Padavaains w ill
admit on ly one Sakti. Thus, In th° view o f the Padavadins
there w ill be on ly eight S a k tis, while in that o f the
Vakyavadins, there w ill be six teen S a k tis. Again, S a lik a -
natha r e je c t s the view o f the Vakyavadins who contend that
the d iv is io n o f Pada and Padartha i s unreal. By means o f r a i ­
sing doubt 1aparamarthike c a ...........1 e tc . in the V te x t above,
he wants to a ssert that in the event o f admitting the d iv isio n
o f Padas and Padarthas as unreal, the knowledge o f the Vakyirtha

72. kalpanalaghavam yatra ta t paksam recayamahe/

kalpanagauravam yatra tat paksam na sahamahaV
73. Regarding th is , there are th ° three Sarhgraha Slokas
( i . e ., c o lle c t e d v °rses) which are as follow s —
dimbharbhaka Sis^o bala gam badhana'nay e ti y a t /
padasaptakametena r a c it e vacanastake ( l ) / /
s'aktyastakam kalpanlyam syadvarnavaJ^vidinah/
padanameva sap tan am saptaiva khalu s'aktayah//(2)
padavadimate kalpya i t i syattasya laghavam/
s'uklamiti padanyasadvakye saudas'ake k r t e //( 3 )
•saktyastakantveva bhavedastinam p»adavadinah. ( 3 2 ) /
 57

w ill be without something to which i t may belong.

*

Ye pun ah — vakyiuityavarnasya vacakatimihuh,

tanm ate'pi tavat padarthatoibhagasya
paramar thikatvat ghatataiva vyu tp attih .
Nanu vacyavacakasambandhagrahanameva
vyu tp attiru cayate. Na ca T/ikyantyavarna-
-ffccakatvavadinam padam padarth*sya vacakam.
Atastanm ate'pi n irvisa ya iva vyu tp attih . y cy a te,
^ Na n irv isa y a , nim ittanaim ittikabhavasya'bhyu-
pagatatvat. keyamavacakasya n lm ittata ? Nai?a
dosah. Vakyaddhi yatpadaprayoge s a t i, yatpadar-
-th an vito vakyi^tha p ra tiy a te , tatpadam ta sy a 'r th a -
sya* vacakam api bhavati nimittssj^. Kimtu tanmate*pi
s'aktikalp anagaur avam pur vok t any ay ena tulyaraeva.

'Those who speak o f the denotativeness o f the la s t

le t t e r o f a sentence, in th e ir view a ls o , the d en ota tiva iess
i s p o s s ib le on ly because, the d iv is io n o f meaning o f words
as a r e a l. I f i t is argued, the ascertain in g o f the r e la t io n
that su b sists between the conveyor and the conveyed, i s what
is c a lle d the denotativeness. And again, the word iJs not the
denoter o f the word-meaning in view o f those who speak o f the
denotativeness o f the la s t l e t t e r o f a sentence. T herefore,
in th eir view a ls o , the denotativeness i s something without
a s u b je c t (itib e lo n g s t o ) . Here i s the rep ly - i t (d en ota tiv e-
ness) cannot be sa id to be without a su b je c t, because o f the
 58

r e la t io n o f cause and e f f e c t being admitted between the

•‘word and i t s meaning. What i s th is caus«ness o f th at which

i s n ot the denoter? (Here i t i s r e p lie d ), there i s no fa c u lt
in i t . Jbr, in a sentence, that word even without being the
denoter ( o f i t s meaning) becames the cause o f that meaning,
which word being used and ^hich word-meaming being s y n ta c tic ­
a lly connected, a sentence-meani||p comes to be conveyed.
But even in that view a ls o , the p r o lix it y in the matter o f
assumption o f the d en otative power i s ju s t the same in the
^ f o r e s a i d manner.*

In the 1 tex t, v i z . , ‘ y e p u n a h ............... * e t c ., above,

the author discards the view o f Bhisyakara Sahara and a
se ctio n o f Nalyayikas l i k e Vatsyayana who maintain that the^
Vakyantyavarna (th e l a s t le t t e r o f a^ en ten ce) as the Vac aka
*

o f the Vakyartha. Sabaraswamin sta tes th at ^ ia t brings about

the knowledge o f the meaning o f a Vakya is the Antya varna
along with the Samskaras (im pressions) o f each o f the p reced -
ing f e t t e r s . Bach component Varna, as i t i s u ttered , leaves
a Samskara behind and ■rfiat brin gs about the knowledge o f the
denotation o f the Vakya i s the l a s t component Varna along
with the Samskiras o f each o f the preceding component Varnas.
In actual experience, the composite word-unit i s never found
to be anything e n tire ly d iffe r e n t from the component Varnas
4

74. purvapuffyfc|anitasamskarasahito*ntyo varnah

pratyiyakah. SB under MS 1 .1 .5 .
/
 59

and as such there can be no Pada apart from the component

* Varnas. This is a much simplex hypothesis than that of the
Vaiyakaranas who have to postulate the 1Sphota’ which is
completely different from the component Varnas.

Vatsyayana states that through a process) one can

acquire the knowledge of the Vakyartha. The process is lik e
this —* every varna is a Vakya iff heard after i t is uttered,
then the varnas heard, be i t one or many are joined together
in the form of Pada and then i t comes to be understood as
Pada. After ascertaining the Padas, one understands, through
Smrti (recollection), the corresponding Padarthas. Thus the
Padas being known, came to be understood as a Vakya and by
taking the related Padarthas, one understands the Vakyartha. 75
I t appears from this view of Vatsyayana that he is perhaps
influenced by Sahara in this regard. I t may be added here
that according to the Nyiya thinkers, the Antyavarna of the
series of words, only as aided by the accumulated Samskaras
corresponding to the very words, serves as the Udbodhaka
(reviver) of the knowledge of the total meaning that amounts

75. vakyasthesu khalu varnesuccaratgu prativarnam tavat •

sravanam bhavati, srutamekamanekam va padabhavena
pratisant^atte, prafcisandfhaya ca padam vyavasyati,
padavyavasayena smrtya pad air tham pratipadyate,
padasamuhapratisandhsuiacca v iky am vyavasyati.
sambandhin ca p ad irth in grh itva vakyartham
pratipadptfte. VB under NS. 3 .2 .5 8 .
 60

to the knowledge o f Vakyartha* The power o f the Car ama varna

( l a s t l e t t e r ) to serve as such an udbodhaka need not be
doubted, otherw ise, I t w ill be d i f f i c u l t to explain the know­
le d g e o f a s in g le word that co n s is ts o f on ly several le t t e r s .
1% Is because, as h eld by the Naiyayikas, the Carama varna
combined wifth the Samskaras o f a l l those words rev iv es the
c o l l e c t i v e Impressions o f the preceding Varnas which come to
76
perish a fte r th eir utteran ce.

In the te x t above, Sallkanatha a sserts that even in

/*
the views o f both Sahara ahd the se c tio n o f the Naiyayikas
as already discu ssed, b eca u se-of the d iv is io n o f the Padarthas
as r e a l, the v y u tp a tti (denotativeness) is p o s s ib le . I t may
be urged here that on ly the a scerta in in g o f the r e la t io n that
su b sists between the Vacya (conveyed) and the Vacaka (conveyor)
i s what i s c a lle d v y u tp a tti. Moreover, because o f th eir admitt­
ing the Antya Varna as the Vicaka o f the Vakyartha, the Pada
cannot be accepted as the Vacaka o f the Padartha and as such
V yutpatti i s , in their view, something without a Visaya

76. tatrottaTapada-anaranena purvapadasmarenasya nas^at

avyavadhanena tattatpada-smaranas#mbhava i t c e t . na,
pr a ty eka-p adanubhdv aj any a-s amskar ai - sc ar amam tav at
pada-visaya^a - smarapasya’ vyavadhanenopapatteh; . .
.......................................... tavat padasamskarasahitacarama-
varnajnanasyodbodhakatvat.
NSM under BP, p. 466.

%
 61

(s u b je c t) to which i t belongs* I t Is r e p lie d here that

Vyutpatti cannot be sa id to be n irv isa y a (w ithout being a
s u b je c t), because a r e la tio n s o f a Nimitta (cause) and
N aim ittika ( e f f e c t ) i s admitted between the Pada and Padartha
( i . e . , a Pada i s a cause and the Padartha is an e f f e c t ) .
There w ill, again, be no fa u lt i f I t i s questioned as to
, what i s th is N im lttata (ca u seless) o f that which i s n ot the
Vacaka. I t i s because in a Vakya, that Pada, even not being
the Vacaka o f the Vakyartha becomes the Nimitta o f that
Padartha, which Pada being used and which Padartha being
s y n ta c tic a lly r e la te d , the Vakyartha comes to be conveyed.
The word ' vakyit* (from a sentence) in tex t, i s to be
understood in the sense o f 1Vakyef (In a sen ten ce). Thus
o'* *

Salikanatha r e je c t s the views o f Sahara and a s e c tio n o f the

Nyiya ph ilosoph ers In as much as these views also l i k e that
o f the Vaiyakaranas, Involve p r o l i x i t y in the matter o f
assumption in r e sp e c t o f S akti, and thereby, he a sserts that
i t is p refera b le to admit Sakti In r e s p e c t o f the Padas.

Ye1pyahuh vakyameva smrtyarusldham vakyartham

p ra tip a d a y a titl, tesamapi praeyameva s'aktikalpana-

-gauravalaksanam dusanamaskyapariharam. Ehasyakara-
-vacananca "purvavarnajanitasam skarasahito’ ntyo varnah
pratyiyakah” (SB, p , 46) i t i nirvisayam. As'akyanca
mahavakyasya sakrtsmaranam. Tasmat padanimeva
vac akas'ak t ir asr ayaniy a.
 62

•Those who * again, contend that only the sentence

conveys the sentence-meaning attained through recollection,

in their view also, there is the demerit in the shape of

prolixity in the matter of assumption of the denotative

power* Ana the statement of the Bhasyakara (Sahara) also,

v i z ., 'what brings about the knowledge of the meaning of t&e

sentence is the last letter along with the impressions of

the preceding letters (SB, p* 46) is of no scope. And the

simultaneous recollection of a 'great sentence' is also

impossible. Therefore, the denotative power is to be admitted

in respect of words only.'

In the V text, •y e 'p y a h u h ..................... etc, above,

/ • - ,
Salikanatha refutes the view of a section of Mimimsakas who

opine that only the Vakya conveys the Yakyartha attained

through Smrti (recollection). According to Salikanatha, this

v iew of these Mimimsakas also cannot avoid the same demerit

i. e ., prolixility In the matter o f assumption of Sakti as Is

also seen In the views of Sahara and a section of Naiyiyikas.

I t Is because, in the view of this section of the Mimimsakas,

there is the contention of Samskara as the word 'Smrti' is

accepted by than and wh«*e there is question of 'Smrti' is

the Samskara is also there in as much as Smrti is the kno w

ledge which is produced by Samskara. I t may be noted here

that Salikanatha categorically rejects the view of Sabara and

77 Samskaramatrajanyam jninam Smrtih. TS, p. 22

 63

as such he observes that the statement o f Bhasyakara Sahara

v i z . , "-./hat brings about the knowledge o f the Vakylrtha is
the Antya Varna along with the Samskaras o f each o f the
preceding varnas," is without any base whatsoever. Moreover,
he comments that the simultaneous r e c o lle c tio n o f a Mahavakva
(great sentence) is not p ossib le. The idea is th is. In a s m a l l e r
sentence lik e 1svargakamo y a je ta ' , i t may be possib le for the
Antya varna o f the series o f varnas, con stitu tin g the vakya
to re v iv e the impressions o f the preceding varnas. But in cere
o f.la r g e r sentences lik e " t a t siddhikarah i t i sarvo byatmariab
karyasiadhim k a roti, anyo’ pi yah tasya karyasiddhiiwkaroti, ss
tasmin uccarite hrdayamagacchati, yatha r a j l pattiganakah i t i ,
pattiganako rajnah kiryam sadhyati, sa rajasabde uccarite
p ra tiya te, evamihapi yajamanakaryain prastaraikakapalau saah-
-ayatah tau yaj amine p r a tite , tasmattau yaj amana sab den a pra+ya-
- y y e te 11, i t is impossible to think o f the Antya varna as capa­
b le o f re v iv in g the impressions o f the preceding varnas in
oruer to convey the Vakyartha. Under these circumstances,
Salikanatha concludes that the Vacaka Sakti is to be adm it^d
78
in respect o f only the Pahas.

sjftcy atra keciccodayanti - nanu vrddhavyavahar aprsyukte

vakye pa din am vacakasaktyavadharanameva nopapadya+e.
purusavakyanamartham p ra ti lingabhavena pramanabva-
- bhyupagamat. vakyaddhi karyabhutatpratitasya

78. pauanam tatpadar thesu s'aktih svibhaviki sthita*

PF, p. 40.
 64

v a k tu s ta a a r th a v i§ a y a m p u rv a v ijn a n a m k a ra n a b h u t-

-am an um lyate. T a sy a c a jn a n a s y a jn e y a v y a b h i c a r it v a t

jn e y a b h u ta r th a n is c a y a i t i , na va ca k a sak ty av a g araa h .

u c y a t e . Na nunam bhavan N itip a th o k ta m a rth a m sam yaga-

- k a l a y a t i . ifrih rta m h i ta tred a m - b a lo h i vyu tp ad ja-

-m anah p r a y o jy a v r d d h a s y a sa b d a sr avanasam anantar abhe-

-v in im v i s i s t'acestan u m itam ar t h a p r a t it im s a b d a k g r a n i-

-k a m a v a g a c c h a ti. Sa t a t h a vyutp an n ah k a d a c i t k a s y a c i -

- d a n a n v ita rth a p a d a ra ca n a m vakyam u p a la b h a t e , ta tb o -

-p a la b h a m an a sy a c a i s a vim ars'o j a y a t e - sam bhavyam anaran-

- v ita rth a p a d a rc a n a m id a m vakyain katham p ra y o jy a v rd d h a s y a

ar th a n is e * yam k r t a v a t ? v r a d h a s y a 'p i p u r u s a y a t t e v a k y p 1

n a n v ita r th a p a d a r a c a n a s a h k a mameva s a m b h a v a t it i. T a s y a i

- v a v i e i k i t s o d a y e p u n a re s a n is e a y o j a y a t e - nunamanena'

yam p r a y o k tetth a m a v ad h a r i t o y a d a n v ita r th a n jr e v a padnnya

-yam prayum kte i t i . T a th a v id h a -p a d a p ra y o g a n iy a m a s 'c a ' sya

nup a la b d h e* n v a y enop ap a d y a ta i t y & amanvay ayop alambb a -

mamimimanena*nvayo n i s c i y a t e . N i s e i t e c a 'n v a y e v a k y a -

metadanuvadabhutam ar t h a s y e t i . E vanc edanuvadaka ta y a

t a s y a * r t h a s y a tadvakyam v a c a k a m e v e ti, p u r v a v a c a k a s a -

k tijn a n a m n a * y a t h ir than i t i m an yate. y a d i param mayn

praga^umanap^L^assaro, r th a n is 'c a y o , s y e t i na* vagatara.

Y a * p i c e y a m a r th a s y a n is c ite * n va ye v i s i s t a v a k t r j n a r a -

- numa, S a 'p i p ad an am svaru p am atravagam adeva n opap aa-

- y a t e , k in t u v is e s a v a g a m a t. Na ca s'akt er any ah pacarnm

v is e s o * v a g a m y a te . T a to may e v a ’ n e n a 'p i padanam v i c a k a a -

- a k t i r a v a d h a r i t a . Tena v is is t in v a y a v a c a k a p a d a p r o y o g a -
 -ttadvisayam vaktuh ptffvajnanamanumitavan, i t i

gambhiro*yam nitimahahradah.

'H ere some (sc h o la rs) r a is e ob jection * The ascertain ­

ing of the denotative power in respect of the words do not

take p la c e in a sentence used by an e ld e rly person. For, th '

sentence of (an e la e rly ) person i s admitted as the source of

knowledge o f the meaning (pramana) in view o f th eir (sentences)

being the in d icato r. For, the previous knowledge o f the speaker

as known from the saiten ce in the form of something perform -

able, is in fe rre d as the cause in respect of that (sentence-

meaning). Eecause of there being again in v a r ia b ilit y of that,

(previous) knowledge in respect o f the objects to be known,

there a rise s the ascertain in g of the meanings o f the knowledges,

and as such, there w ill be no admission o f the denotative ' over.

Here i s the rep ly (to the o b je c tio n ). Surely you have not

understood properly what has been stated in the Nitipatha

(Prakarana o f the P P ). I t has been already refu ted there.

For, a c h ild w hi le learn in g comes to have the knowledge o f a

meaning (o f a word) by way o f in fe rrin g from a p a rtic u la r

e ffo r t of the directed e ld e rly person subsequent to the h ^ a r i r v

o f words (u tte red by the d ire c tin g e ld erly person) ana as­

certain s word as i t s cause ( I . e ., the knowledge o f a meaning).

He who has understood in that manner, comes to ponder again

thus —• how this sentence composed o f the words with p os F it ly

unrelated meanings comes to convey the meaning to the d i r e c t e d

 67

elderly person. Even in (the use o f) a sentence that ip under

the control o f a person, the apprehension o f the moaning b^ir •

constructed with woras of unrelated meanings may occur to th«

(directed) elderly person as does i t to me. Thus doubts having

occured to him in this manner, he comes to ascertain again —

the directed elaetfly person thus underst&eds that surely ho

(directing elderly person) uses the words with related meanings.

Ana the ru le governing the use o f words (o f this sentence)

does not occur in case of not ascertaining the syntactical

relation and hence by way o f inferring the attainment o f th =

syntactical relation thus, the syntactical relation ts ascert­

ained by him ( i . e ., the ch ild ). And the syntactical relation

being ascertained, this sentence comes to be the restatement.

(Anuvada) of the meaning. I f this is so, that sentence on the

strength o f being the restatement o f the said meaning becomes

the denoter of that meaning, and hence, i t is (again) deemea

that the previous knowledge o f the denotative power is not

untrue. I f again the ascertaining of the meaning (of this

sentence) preceded by inference is not understood by me, anc

(in that case), the syntactival relation o f the meanings not

being ascertained, that inference which is the sp e cific knowledge

o f tile speaker, does not a r is e from the knowledge o f the words

as they are ( i . e . , from the words them selves), but from the

knowledge o f the s p e c ific one ( i . e . , the meanings). Again

without the d en otative power, the s p e c i f i c ones (i.e ., the

meanings) from the words are not ascertain ed. Hence, l i k e m ,

by him (the c h ild ) a lso, the denotative power o f words i s

ascertain ed in this manner. Thus, (he i . e . , the c h ild ), because

o f using words as denoting the r e la t io n o f the s p e c ific ones

(i.e ., the meanings), in fe rre d the previous knowledge o f the

speaker (th e d ir e ctin g e ld e r ly person) with regard to that

(the denotative power). Thus th is great lake o f regu la tion s Is

deep ( i . e . , the ru les r e la tin g to the denotative power are v~ry

8
in tr ic a te ).

In the V te x t, 1 atra keciccod ayan ti ............. 1 e t c .,

author o f the VM» proceeds to r e fu te an o b je c tio n r a ise d by a

s e c tio n o f thinkers who argue that in a vakya used by an

elcierly person, the Vaeaka-sakti in re sp e ct o f the Paaas c--nnot

be ascertain ed. I t is because, they contend, the Padas a r«

admitted as the source o f the meanings o f the Vakyas o f thr

e ld e rly persons as Ling a (in d ic a t o r ). I t i s , again, because

o f the f a c t that, the previous knowledge o f the Vakta (Speaker)

as known from the Vakya in the form o f sora® Karyp in fe r re d

as the cause o f the Vakyartha. They also a ssert that du® to

there being in v a r ia b ilit y o f the previous knowledge in re sp e ct

o f the knowable o b je c t s , there a rises th « ascertain in g o f the

meanings o f the knowable o b je c t s and hence, the Vacaka Sakti

cannot be understood. In th is way, these thinkers do not r e co g ­

n ise Pada-s"akti (d en otative pow«r o f the words) o f tho Prabha-

karas. They accept Padartha-sakti (denotative power o f tho

♦

meanings o f the words) which they contend, does not involv®

the p r o l i x i t y in the matter o f assumption, rather i t involves

79 ~
sim p licity# Here, Salikanatha prepares to rep ly to the said
• •
o b je c t io n and comments that ce rta in ly he ( i . e . , the opponent)
*<■*

has not p rop erly understood what has been sta ted by Salikanatha

in the chapter c a lle d 1N itipatha prakarana' o f h is Pr'akarana-

paneika. As we have sta ted in the in trod u ction o f 'the pr®s®nt

work in the sa id Prakarana, the author r e fu te s the Buddhist

theory that words have no connection with meanings and e sta b -

lis h e s the v a lid it y o f non-vedic texts through Anumana. It

is a lso sta ted there that the non-vedic sentence which i s

79. kinca padas'aktitah padar thas'aktireva la g h iy a s i,

MM, p. 97.
30. sruyatamavadhanena gatirnaragiramap^
anumanatprthagbhavam necchanti sur ayaiy? PP, p. 33.
 70

always under c o n tro l o f a person does n ot ascertain the

*

81 ^
meaning. x Noy Salikanatha proceeds to a ssert how the Vacaka-

safcti o f the Padas can be ascertain ed from the Vakyas us<=u by

the e ld e rly persons. In th is con text, he explains hoy a c h ild ,

while learn in g new words, comes to acquire knowledge o f the

meaning o f words by way o f in feren ce from a p a rticu la r e f f o r t

o f the Prayojya Vrddha, « subsequent to hearing o f the words

u ttered by the Prayojaka Vrddha and then he comes to ascertain

word as the cause o f the knowledge o f the meaning. He yho has

understood thus, again ponders as to how th is Vakya composed

o f the Padas with p o ssib ly unrelated meanings conveys the mean­

ing to the Prayojya Vrddha. Bven, in the use o f a Vakya b “ ing

under con trol o f a person, the apprehension o f Hie meaning which

i s con stru cted with the Padas with unrelated meanings, may a rise

to the Prayojya Vrddha as does i t to the c h ild . Thus doubt having

occured to the c h ild In th is way, he comes to ascertain i t

again — the PraySjya Vrddha thus understands that su rely the

Prayojaka Vrddha uses the Padas with r e la te d meanings. This d is ­

cussion on the learn in g o f the new flords from Vrddhavyavahara,

8l* vakyam h i purusadhinaracanam laukikam sadi/

s'ahkyamanayathar thatvam nar th ani sc ay ak am svatal^f Ib id .
 ?1

y<*

i s also made in simpler way by the author in the S a stra p a ri-

- ccheaa of the chapter c a lle d pramanapar ayana o f the PP. J

The ru le governing the use of the Padas in a V a k y a

does not occur in case o f not ascertain in g the syn tactical

re la tio n and, therefore, by way o f in fe r r in g the obtainm<=nt

of the sy n tac tic al re la tio n in th is manner, the c h ild a scert­

ains the sy n tactical re la tio n . The sy n tactical re la t io n being

ascertained} the Vakya comes to be the Anuvada (restatement/

o f the meaning. Salikanatha explains Anuvada (restatement) in

the N itipath a prakarana. I t is stated there that when the

syn tactical re la tio n i s ascertained, then the Vakya com*s

to have Anuvadata o f the meanings Thus i f i t is 4o that

the Vakya comes, on the strength o f being Anuvada o f the

meaning , to denote the meaning, then i t is considered that

the previous knowledge of the Sakti is tru e and thereby in. =

82. yatha h i — vrddhavyavahar adars'anena proyojya-

- vrddhasya1rthapratipattim p r a k a lp y a ...................
» (T

..........vrddhasya1rthapratipattisamarthyam k a lp a y itr
........nunamasyapi vr ddhavyavahar adarsanam eva..........
/-loko vyutpadyate. I b i d . , p. 25i
_ * S' „
83. ta tra rth e n is e it e pascat so 'rth o vakyena gamyate^
tasyazn dasayam vakyasya tasya syadanuvadata^
I b i d . , p. 36.
view that the Vakya denotes the Vakyartha comes to be u nt r’’ °.

M oreover i f the Prayojya^Vrddha does not understand the n r or

taining of the meaning o f the Vakya preceded by Anumana anc

the syntactical re la tio n o f the meanings not being ascertained

that Anumana which is the s p e c ific knowledge o f the sneaker,

aoes not occur from the knowledge o f the Padas as they are

( i . e . > from the Padas themselves), but from the knowledge of

the sp e c ific ones ( i . e . , the meanings o f the P adas). The words

v iz ., 1svarupa' and 1visesa* in the V text, mean the Pad^p

as they are and their meanings re sp e c tiv e ly . Ana without tl “

✓

Sakti of the Padas, the meanings o f the Padas cannot be

ascertained. Therefore, lik e the Prayojya^Vrddha, the c h ii :i

also ascertains the Vacaka-sakti of the Padas. In this way,

the c h ild , because o f using the Padas as denoting the r e ia t io

o f the meanings, in fe rre d the previous knowledge o f the Prayo-

-jakajvrddha regarding the Vacaka-sakti o f the Padas. The r iles

r e la t in g to the Vacaka-sakti o f the Padas, are so in tric a te

that the author compares them to a b ig and deep lake.

 •
• 73

v(t*X atxa kecidacaksate — bhavatu padanam p.adarthe

saktijnanam, tatha'pyanvitabhiohanam na siadhyati
— i t i . ta th ih i - pr atiyoginamanantataya anvayantm-
j»r»intyat, tadanantyp ca'nvitanamapyanantyatsambandha-
-grahanam duskaram. agrhitasambandhasya ca padnsya
▼aeaktve, ekasm atcchabdatsarvarthapratitiprasangab.
samanyanvayabhiah“ananca na' sankaniyameva, vakyebhvo
v isles anv ay avagamat. svarupamatrabhidha»«ne'pi ca
vaky ar thapr at Ip attyup attavanvi tabhidhanasr ayan e
saktikalpanagauravam.

tatha padenV nvitassvar tho'bhidhiyamanah -

kimabhihitena padar than tar ena* n v ito ' bhidb lyatp?
uta, anabhihiteneti? vikalpaniyam. anabhitena c e t,
paaantar apr ayoj|#vaiyartham. ekasmacca ssrvanvayaprrM ti-
-prasangah. abhihitena c e t, tadapi tarh i padamanvitabhi-
a
- ahyitaya padintaropattamarthamabhidhanaya'peksata —
iti, itaretarasrayah prapnoti. tasmatpadantarabhi-
- ahananap eksasvarup a»itrabhidhanam eva' r than am p ad^ih
k riy a te . te ca tathabhutah padair abhihitah padartha
akanksa- sanniahi ~ yogyativanto vakyarthamavagamayanti.
na tesam sambandhagrahanap eksa sankaniya. yatah pada-
- dharmo'yara, na'yamarthadharmah. tadah bhasyakirah -
"paaani h i svam svamaTthamebhidhaya nivr ttavyaparHr i .
ath^danlm avagats^santa vakyar thamavagamay anti
(MS. l.1.25)tl.
'Here some (th in kers) observe - l ° t ther-e be the

knowledge o f the denotative power (S akti) o f words in rosp^ct

o f the meanings o f the words, y e t the expression o f the

c o rr e la te d (Anvitabhidhana) does not occur ( i . e ., does not

a r is e ). For, because o f innum erability o f the sy n ta c tic a l

r e la tio n s due to innumer a b ilit y o f the cou n ter-cor r e la tiv e s

(P ra tiy o g i) and because o f innumer a b ilit y o f the re la te d

meanings due to innumer a b ilit y o f the sy n ta ctica l r e la tio n s ,

the ascertain in g o f the r e la tio n is d i f f i c u l t to make. And

in the event o f (adm itting) the denotativeness o f the word

with r e la t io n not being comprehended, there l i e s the p o s s ib i­

l i t y o f understanding a ll the meanings (o f a l l the words) f"om

one and the same word. And a sy n ta c tic a l r e la t io n o f the words

in general i s n ot to be doubted, as because, the knowledge of

the s y n ta c tic a l r e la tio n o f the meanings o f words i s p o s s ib le

from the very sentences.

In the event o f admitting the knowledge o f tho s e n t -tic

meaning from the denotation o f the words as they are and again

in sim ultaneously accepting the denotation o f the r e la te d

meaning, there i s the p r o lix it y in the matter o f assumption

o f the uenotative power.

I f a meaning, only as r e la te d i s taken to be denote a

by a word, then i t i s to be guessed whether (such a mpaning

 7

is denoted as being re la te d ) with another word-meaning d e n o t e

by (some word) or (such a meaning is denoted as being rela ted )

with another undenoted (word-meaning). I f (tills meaning is

said to be denoted as rela ted ) with an undenoted moaning, t ‘ cr*

i t w ill lea d to the f u t i l i t y o f using- another word. And from i t ,

there w ill be the occa sion o f the knowledge o f the s y n ta ctica l

r e la t io n o f a ll meanings from the same (word). I f ( i t is sain

to be aenotated as re la te a ) with a denoted meaning, that (word)

a ls o , because o f i t s ca p a city to denote only the co rre la te d ,

s h a ll have to await the denotation o f tile meaning obtained from

another word and as such i t w ill be su b ject to the fa lla c y >f

mutual interdependence (ita r e ta r a s r a y a ). T herefore, only the

denotation o f the meanings by words as they are, without caring

fo r tile denotation o f other word i s to be admitted. And sue"'

(unrelated) meanings being denoted by the words and aided ty

expectancy (Akahksa), co n tig u ity (Sannidhi), co m p a tib ility

(Yogyata) give r i s e to the knowledge o f the sentence-meanir

The n ecessity fo r understanding the sy n ta ctica l r e la t io n (o f

these word-meanings) i s not to be apprehended. For this (deno­

ta tion ) i s the fu n ction o f the words and not o f meanings. To

says the Bhasyakara (Sahara) — "F or, the words conveying their
own meanings r e f r a in functioning and then (th<= word-mean in.;?)

being understood give r i s e to the knowledge o f the meaning of

.1 -

the sentence" (SB under MS. 1 . 1 . 2 5 ) . ’

In 1 atra k e c id a c a k s a te ............. ’ etc. o f the V text,

y -

Salikanatha presents the view o f the Bhatta Mimamsakas who

oppose the Anvitabhidhanavada (the theory o f expression o f fh---'

correlated) o f the Prabhakaras and advocate the Abnihitinvaya-

-vada (the theory o f c o rre latio n of the expressed). The word

‘ k e c it 1 in the V text, r e fe r s to the follow ers of Kumarila."*

We have already stated that the Prabhakaras admit Sakti in

respect of the Padas. Here the Bhattas argue that though th

y
knowledge o f the Sakti o f the Padas may be there in respect o f

the Padarthas, yet the Anvitabhidhana of the Prabhakaras carnot

be accepted. They argue that the Pratiyogins ( i . e . , the count

corrective-meanings) are innumerable and as such the syntactics

re la tio n s also come to be innumerable and because o f the inm -

m erab ility o f the syntactical r e la tio n s , the re la t e d meanin.-r

also come to be innumerable. As a r e s u lt , i t becomes difficult

84. padairabhihitah padartha akanksayogyatasattimanto

laksanaya padarthasamsargarupain vakyartham boayay anti ti
bhattamimamsaka aicaate. FN. l unaer PP, p. 3 8 1 .
to a scerta in the r e la t io n between the Pada and the Padartb^.

In the V tex t, the word 'P r o t iy o g i' means the meanings o f

other words to be c o r r e l a t e d with the meaning o f a word i . ,

ye
co u n te r-co rre la tin g to a meaning. Again, i f i t is accented
/■

that a Pada, the r e la t io n o f which with the Padartha is not

ascertained, denotes the Vakyartha, then only from one and he

same word, the meanings o f a ll the words w ill be understood.

Moreover, in the event o f admitting the Vakyartha by the

denotation o f the Padas as they are and a lso in thp event o '

simultaneous acceptance o f the Anvitabhidhana, there w ill wr i ­

the p r o lix it y in the matter o f assumption o f the Sakti in

re sp e ct o f the Padas.

S im ila rly , the qu estion may a r is e as to whether th-

r e la te d meaning which is being denoted by the Pada, is r^lat^d

by the expressed meaning o f the other Pada or by that whiei is

unexpressed. Now, th is is to be ascertained by d iscu ssin g l oth

the a lte rn a tiv e s. I f i t is said that the meaning o f a Pada is

denotated as r e la te d with the undenoted meaning o f the* oth®r

Pada# then there w ill a rise uselessness in resp ect o f thp '- r

o f other Pada. Moreover, on ly one Pada w ill lead to the

 7 -

knowledge o f the sy n ta ctica l r e la tio n o f the meanings o f all

the Padas. I f again, i t is said that the re la te d meaning is

aenotea by the expressed meaning o f other Pada, then i t w ill

in volve the fa lla c y o f mutual inter-depenaence. For, the Pa :a

because o f i t s denoting the r e la te d meaning needs, fo r i t s

denotation, the meaning to be attained from other Pada.

fin d , this d iscu ssion , by our author in h is Rjuvimala ■?'/!)

a lso . 85

Thus the Padas denote on ly the Padarthas as they ar =,

without the denotation o f other Pada. The Padarthas again,

give r is e to the knowledge o f the Vakyartha aided by three

fa c t o r s namely, Akanksa (expectan cy), Sannidhl (co n tig u ity ) '’ ’id

Yogyata (co m p a tib ility ) which are regarded as the causes in

86
understanding the vakyartha. I t is also n ot to be doubted

that the Padarthas have the n e ce ssity fo r ascertain in g the

85. kinca kimabhihi tena visesena tadvyatisaktamabhidtiy;,

anabhihitena va? abnihitapaksa i tare tar asir ay ain o v it l
map i p adamabhjhi tar thantar avyatisaktabhidhayak at ay ex
arapadabhidhanamasrayatiti prasaktam duruttarami tar
tarasrayam, anabhihitapakse padantaraprayogavaiyar th
RVL, p. 285
86. atrakanksa ca yogyatvam ^ n n id h is c e t i tattrayam /
vakyarthavagame sarvaih karanatvena kalpyate / /
MM, p. 09.
 Tp

sy n tactical re la tio n , because, th is ( i . e - , the denotation

o f the Paaarthas) is the function o f the Padas and not o f

th eir Arthas. In their view* the in d ivid u al word-meanings

comers' to serve as the Karana in the matter o f brin gin g abodt

the corresponding Vakyartha with the aid o f the afo resaid

three fa c to rs . The Padarthas are independently apprehended

( i . e, abhihita) u n t ill a l l the words are heard} then there

i s a simultaneous re c o lle c tio n o f various meanings so as to

form the Vakyartha. Thus, as held by the Bhattas, the mutV'-.l

r e la t io n comes to take p lace simultaneously at a la t e r sts,*e

in respect of a ll the meanings irre s p e c tiv e o f the sequence

in which the corresponding Padas appear.

In support of th eir explanation, the Bhattas re fe r to

*
the view o f Sahara who states that the Padas conveyin? th ir

own meanings r e fr a in from functioning and then the Padartras

being understood, give r i s e to the knowledge o f the Yakyarth

This is stated by Sahara in his Bhasya under MS. 1 .1 .2 5 . " '

Thus the fo llo w e rs o f Kumarila do not accent the A n vitabh i-

#

ahana o f the Prabhakaras and p re fe r their theory, i . e . , th^

Abhihitanvayavada. life may add here a note or both the

87 tadbhutanam kriyarthena sama&Mmnay©' rathasya

tannim ittatvat.
theories under discussion.

According to the Anvitabhidhanavada, a word exp r ps r

i t s meaning as connected with some act to be done (K arva).

The words in a sentence convey their meanings in re la tio n fo

the meanings o f other w°r ds. Thus, according to tho rrobhe<ar

the words o f a sentence have the double function o f giving

t ’n oir indiviau al as w ell as the constructed meanings. I r

other words, the theory o f the Prabhakaras contenas that

both the individual word-meanings and th eir mutual re la tio n

are conveyed by the words con stitu tin g a sentence. I t is mean

that a word has no separate existence and i t always com; g r

a complete meaning only in re la tio n with the other words.

Every word, th erefore, expresses it s meaning as connected

with an action which is denoted by other word, and those

cumulative expressions o f a ll the words In a sentence are

88
c a lle d Anvi tab hidh ana. Thus in an expression, v i z . ,

' gamanay.a' (bring the cow)» the word 'gam' does not Drop or xv

mean ‘ gotva1 (cowness), but 1anavananvita gotva* . i. , tb

genus cow as connected with the act o f bringing.

88. yato'n vitesu vyutpatteranvita arthah padalrabhidhiy-

ante'tolnvitarth aparani padanyeva vakyamiti tikakarr-
matanuvartinah. NK under NRM, p. 97.
The theory c a lled Abhihitanvayavada is advocated by the

B hitta Mimamsakas. According to this theory, the words convey

only the individual word-meanings which, m tn eir turn, ;r

39
to be raut ra lly rela te d . Though the meanings o f individual

words can also be comprehended separately as far as the sent­

ence-meaning is concerned, i t resu lts from the association of

word-meanings con stitu tin g the sentence. This makes i t cl~ar

that the meanings o f a ll the words are responsible for tb «

to ta l meaning o f a sentence. When we read or hear a sentence,

we have f i r s t an understanding o f the separate meanings o f ~;i

words one after another. Then by way o f putting together the

meaning o f a ll the words In accordance with th eir Aknnksa,

Sannidhi and Yogyata, we a rrive at the construed meaning o f

the whole sentence. According to this theory o f Abhihitanvu'a

the expression o f the meanings o f words leads to a re la tio n a l

thought, i . e . , Vakyartha. The Abhihitanvaya view is also

shared by the Naiyayikas and the vedantins. ye shall present

a comparative discussion between these two theories in subse­

quent pages.

89. tenatra padavagatlh punah padartha mitho’ nvayam yanti

ityevamabhihitan?ayasiddhanto d a rsito 1smadadioam.
MM, p . 95.
 Tadetannir akar tumupakr amate —

'(Now the author) proceeds to r e j e c t i t (the objection

r a is e d by the Bhattas)" —

•^(7) Aupyante codhriyante ca svartha anvayasalinah.

anvitesveva samar thyam padanam tena gamyate.

' (I n a sentence)) the meanings (o f words only) as

re la te d are included and- excluded. Therefore) (t he d^notati'/e)

capacity o f the words i s understood only in respect o f the

re la te d (meanings)1.

vW - A t ra 'h — satyamanvi tapadarthavisayaveva' vapoddharau,

tatha'pyanvitabhidhanamasakyam. Par amp ary ena’ pi

tadupatteh. tathahi — padairananvito'pyabhihito1r t l o ' -

nvitarthapra^patternimittam b h av a titi, padanam par am-

-paryena* nvitesvapi hetutvam. tadahurvarttikakaramisr-^h-

"na vimuncanti samarthyam vakyarthepi paaani nah,

tanmatravasitesvesu padarthebhya sa gamyate"

(SV. 7.2^29) i t i

P aaar thapr atipadananc a vakyar th apr atip at taye

prayuktanam padanamavantaravyapara i t i ca,

tesameva vyavaharah
 33

"vakyar thamitaye tesam pravrttau nantariyakam.

pake jv a leva kastoanara padsrthapratipadanam.
(Sv. 7 .3 .4 3 )

'Here (some) observe — i t i s c o r r e c t that the in c lu ­

sion and exclu sion correspond on ly to the r e la te d meanings

(o f words), y e t tile expression o f the c o rre la te d qops n ot

take p la ce . For, these two ( i . e . , in clu sio n and exclu sion )

are obtained through in d irectn ess (in d ir e c t ly ) a ls o . I t is

because the meanings denoted by words even though unrelated

comes to be the cause o f understanding the r e la te d meaning

and (as such) the causeness o f words ( i s to be admitted) in

r e s p e c t o f the re la te d meanings also through in d irectn ess

( in d ir e c t ly ) . So, says the revered author o f the V arttikas

( i . e . , Kumar i l a ) —

'For us, even in the meaning o f the sentence, the

words do not give up th eir capacity and as because the d ir e c t

fu n ctio n o f the words stop in the c a p a c itie s o f th^ir in d iv i­

dual denotations, that the meaning o f the sentence is under-

stood from the meanings o f the w ords.' (SV. 7 .2 2 9 ).

And the conveying o f the meanings o f words i s the

interm ediary fu n ction o f the words used towards the understand­

ing o f the meaning o f a sentence and maintain the use o f the

 84

words as follow s —

•There is no obstruction in the functioning o f then

(words) (used) for the purpose o f obtaining the meaning o f a

sentence; just as the burning is (a necessary accompaniment)

o f fuels used for the purpose of cooking, so also the convey­

ing o f the meanings o f w rds is (a necessary accompaniment)

o f words (used for the purpose o f conveying a sentencenneaning)!*

In K(7) (and corresponding texts, v iz ., ' atra' ha

................ ' etc), the author asserts that the Sakti o f the

Padas is understood in respect o f the related meanings and

in the ]£ text v iz ., ' atr&‘ h a ................' e tc ., makes a re fe r­

ence to an apprehension by Varttikakara Kumarila in this

regard. According to Kumarila, although the inclusion and

exclusion correspond to the Padarthas as syntactically related,

yet the Anvitabhidhana theory o f the Prabhakaras does not

hold good. I t is because, Kumarila asserts, the Inclusion

and exclusion are obtained through indirectness. For, tbs

meanings denoted by the words even though not related come

to be the cause o f understanding the related meaning and

hence in directly the Padas are admitted as the cause o f the

related meaning. The Padarthas are the cause that giyijig r is e

 85

to the VakySrtha and the PadSrthas again are conveyed by -

the Padas and as such w hile the Padarthas are the d ir e c t

cause o f the V&kyartha, the Padas are the in d ir e c t cause o f

*

the same. In support o f th is viewi a v erse from the jH iijjg z

v ir t t ik a (SV) o f fiimarila i s r e fe r re d to here. I t is sta ted

in the verse that in the view o f the Bhattas, the Padas do

not abandon th eir ca p a city even at the stage o f Vakyartha

being conveyed. The Vakyartha i s understood from the Padarthas

when the d ir e c t fu n ctio n o f the Padas cease th eir in d ivid u a l

denotation, i&at i s im plied in the verse is that the Padas

are in d ir e c t ly resp on sib le fo r giv in g r is e to a Vakyartha.

Moreover, the conveying o f the meanings o f the Padas

i s the interm ediary fu n ctio n o f the Padas which are used in

order to understand the Vakyartha and the Padas are used fo r

this reason. In th is con tex t another v e rse from the SV is

r e fe r r e d t o ifh a t i s sta ted in the verse is th is —

For the purpose o f bringing about the knowledge ©f the

meaning o f the Vakyas, there i s no o b s tru ctio n in the fu n ct­

ion in g o f the Padas. The Padas are as necessary fo r the Vakya

as fo r anything else.H ith the help o f a s im ile , i t is

I
*
explained by -tej* the author i i e . , humarila. Ju st as the burr­

ing is a necessary accompaniment o f the fu e l fo r the pur->o'«

o f accomplishing the cooking, so also the conveying m

iftg o f meanings o f the Padas i s a necessary accompaniment

o f the Padas fo r the purpose o f conveying the Vakysrtna. Ts ^

Padas, Padart’nas and Vakyartha are compared to th=> fu e l,

burning and the cooking r e s p e c tiv e ly .

Etimasahkamupaksyaiva tavaddosantaram p a rih a ra ti —

'Even having thus n eglected tills apprehension, (th =

author) now, re fu te s the other a sn erit (hinted e a r l i o r ) ' —

K(8 & 8A) Akanksa-sannidhiprap tayogyarthantarasangatan.

Svarthanahuh padaniti vyutpattisam srita ysua.

Anantya-vyabhicarabhyam tad a dos6 na kascans.

'When knowledge occurs that the words convey their

own meanings r e la te d to other com patible meaning air ed cy

expectancy and c o n tig u ity , then there w ill be no fa u lt - r i s ­

ing ou t o f innumerableness (anantya) and v io la tio n (vyabri 7:

(in re s p e ct o f d en otative power o f the w ord s)'.

 87

J*
yattavaduktam - saiantyacchabdasaktyavadhar Snupacatti,

agrhitas'aktesea vacakatve vyabhicaraprasanga itl.

tadanupapannam. upalaksanasrayanena1p i sambandbabodhah,
saukaryadakanksitena yogyena sannihitena c a 1nvitam
svartham paaam v a k t it i v y u tp a ttira s riy a te . tena —
yadyadakanksitam yogyain sannidhanam prapadyat^
tadanvitah paaena1rthassvakiyah p ra tip a d y a t^
i t i samgrahaslokah.

•That what i s sta ted - that becausp o f the in n u m la­

b i l i t y o f the cen ota tiv e power o f the words the ascertain in g

o f the denotative power i s not p o s s ib la and there w ill be the

scope o f v io la t io n in adm itting the denotativenpss o f the

words without the ascertainment o f the denotative pov/ers (o f

th eir corresponding words). This view i s not tenable. (F or),

the sy n ta ctica l r e la tio n takes place even by way o f re so rtin g

to the secondary fu n ction . For the sake o f f a c i l i t y , onp is

to accept the knowledge that the word conveys i t s own meaning

s y n ta c tic a lly r e la te d with (another) meaning expectant, compa­

t i b l e and contiguous, hence ( i t is said) —■

I t s own meaning is conveyed by a word as r e la te d with

whatever (meaning) is a v a ila b le as expectant, com patible ana

 88

contiguous (collected verse) •*

*
In j; 1akahk/sa..............* etc. and 'yattavaduktam

................. 1 etc. o f K and ]f text respectively, Salikanatha

refutes 1*he faults that may arise out of innumerableness and

violation in respect o f assuming the Sakti o f the Padas. We

have already discussed that the Bhattas ob ject to the view

o f the Prabh§karas in their admitting the Sakti in respect

of the Padas. According to the Bhattas i f Sakti is admitted

in respect o f the Padas, then i t w ill lead to the assumption

/ /
o f the innumerable Saktis. But Salikanatha refutes this

objection raised by the Bhattas. According to Salikanatha,

when knowledge arises that the Padas convey their own mean-

ings related to other compatible meanings aided by Akahk$a

and Sannidhi'j' there w ill be no fau lt arising out o f innuner-

ableaess. And what has been stated that, in the event o f

admitting the denotativeness o f the Pada with rela tion not

being comprehended* there l ie s the p o s s ib ility o f understand­

ing a ll the meanings of a ll the Padas from one and the same

Pada/ and thus i t w ill lead to fau lt arising out o f v iola tion

is not tenable. I t is because, the syntactical relation can

 89

be understood by means o f r e s o rtin g to the upalak?ana

(seconday fu n ction ) a lso, one i s ^ o take r e s o r t to the know"

ledge th at the Pada conveys i t s own meaning s y n ta c tic a lly

r e la te d tdth another meaning aided by Akanksa, Yogyata and

Sannidhi. In order to explain th is view o f the Prabhakaras

c le a r ly , Salikan&tha presents a Samgraha Sloka (c o lle c t e d

verse) which sta tes thus —

A Pada conveys ip t s own meaning as r e la te d with that

meaning, whatever meaning has Akanksa, Yogyata and gannidhi.

This v erse i s also found in the Siddhintanuktavali. (NSM),

90
but the second l i n e a varia n t reading.

The Sanyjr aha sloka above, i s obviou sly in r e f erence to

the theory o f Anvitabhidhana o f the Prabhakaras. According

to the Prabhakaras, the Padas can denote th e ir re sp e c tiv e

meanings on ly when they are s y n ta c tic a lly r e la te d . A Pada

conveys a meaning only as i s Yogya (com patible) in r e la tio n

to other word-meanings, Sannihita (contiguous) to word-meanings

with which i t i s intended to be r e la te d and on ly as having

Akanksa (expectan cy). I t comes to be c le a r that in the op in ion

o f the adherents o f the view* Abhidhiuia (denotation) is

90 ten a t e n a n v it a h s v a rth a h p a d a ire v a v a g a m y a te , BP, p . 467.

preceded by Anvaya (S yn ta ctica l, r e la t io n ).

In the K above, we come to have the mention o f thrf -

fa c to r s v i z . , Akanksa, Sanniddhi and Yogyata which arc ecc^-r

*

by a ll as the causes o f understanding the Vakyartha.

sh all take up elaborate d iscu ssion on these three fa c to r s ii

<*■

subsequent pages in connection with Salikanatha's treatmon4-

o f the a foresaid fa c to r s .

s/(3). Ka punariyamakanksa? p ra tip attu r jijn a s a .

Kinnibanotiana punarasau? Avinabhavanibandhaneti
k e c it . Kriya h i karakavinabhaviniti tam p ra tity a ,
karakam jijn a s a t e , evam karakamapi buddhva,
k r iy im iti. tadayuktamiti manyamahe, jijn a s a v ir a -
- manupatteh. Tathahi-yada tavat karakajijn asa, tada
I CO

tadiyaj anaka-tadguna- tatkr iya-tatkarakantar adi j i j n

pyapadyate. Atha prayojanabhavat kaTakatirik ternary a : i
jijn a s y a te , tarh i kriyamatr avagam e‘ p i yatra kernkej-
-nanena prayojanam na* s t i , tatra jijn a s a na syat.
Anustheyataya hi kriyayamavagstayam karakamantarena
taaanusthanupapatteh, karakajnanam na prayoj an? vat.
Vartamanapadesadau tvananustheyataya na' st-i kerakajra
-nena prayojanam. Atha ca yatlta'p i vakyamapsripurnam
manyante, sakamksar thabhiahayitaya ca ’ paripurnata.

91. atrakanksa ca yogyatvam san n id h isceti tattrayany'

vakyarthavagame sarvaih karanatvena kalpyate^'
MM, p. 99.
 Ata eva ta tra ’ dhystfiaramapi kurvanti.

ya tra ’ p i ca*nustheyakriyavagamah, ta tra *p i

nissesakiirakajijnasa syat. Yatha-Devadatta •
* gamanayeti* karananupadanadapaTipurnata.
Athaikakarakajnanena*pi tavadanusttianopapatterna

kitfakantarajijnasa, ta rh i Devadatta '• 1gamanaya

danaene* t i prayukte* p i dandasabde, tadakahksa na
* syat. Tatas'ca anakanksitatvat tasya, tadanvayo na
syadvakyarthe. Atha dandapadoccaranat tatra* kanksa
p arik alp yate. Anyatha dandapadar thasya' nanvaye
tatp adoc car anamanar thakam syat. *

Evama *pyarunayaikahayanya pingaksyi somam

k r in a t i’ (Tai. Sam. 6 .1 .9 ) tyatra* pyananvayapra-
sangah.

Na h i veaapadoccaranana' narthakena na b h a vita -

vyam iti kincand pramanamasti, ato na tatra*kanksodaye
k in citk aran am astiti, ’ Somam krinati* tyato'd h ikasya'n an -
v ita ta syat. Api ca laukikatvat kriyakarakayoh, y a t -
k in cit-k riy a -k ira k op a d a n e'p i tatsiddheravighatanna’ tiva
v is e s a jijn is a ghatate. Ajnate hi jnaneccha ghatate,
na punar jnabe* p i.

’ Hhat again, i s th is expectancy? ( I t is ) the enquiry

( jijn a s a ) on the p a tt o f the l is t e n e r . Of what base (what is

the basis o f th is expectancy), a ga in / i s th is (expectancy)?

 92

According to some* the in v a ria b le concomitance is

i t s basis* For, as the verb (kriya) is the in v a ria b le conco­

m itant to the case (karaka)* so knowing the verb, one wants

to know the case and thus knowing the ca se, one wants to

know the verb. Ws consider i t as improper. For? there w ill

be no end to the con tin u ity o f the enquiry (in the minds o f

the l i s t e n e r s ) . As a matter o f f a c t , when there i s enquiry

in to the case, then arises a lso the enquiry regarding the

cause o f i t (th e c a s e ), i t s a ttr ib u te , i t s verb and oth er

ca se. I f i t i s said that because o f there being no n e ce s s ity ,

nothing other than the case i s enquired (sought to be known),

then where there is no n e ce ssity o f the knowledge o f the ce se

even in understanding the verb on ly , there should be no

enquiry (d e s ir e to learn the c a s e ). As a verb i s known because

o f i t s n e ce ssity o f being performed and as because there can

be no performance o f a verb without a case, so the knowledge

o f a case i s n ot necessary (towards the knowledge o f a v e r b ).

I f the verb i s not necessary to be performed, because o f the

im p osition o f the present tense on i t though i t does not

belong to the present ten se, i t i s not that the knowledge o f

a case i s necessary ( i . e ., i t i s necessary fo r the knowledge

 93

o f the verb). And again where the sentence is deemed to be

incomplete and as that incompleteness arises because o f denot­

ing the expectant meaning, (the scholars), therefore, resort

to importation (Adhyahara) (for the sake o f completing the

sentence). ‘ And where the verb to be performed is known,

there w ill also be enquiry into a ll the cases ( i . e . , exhaust­

iv e ly ). For example, (in the sentence), oh'. Devadatta, "bring

the cow"i there w ill be incompleteness (o f the sentence)

because o f not presenting the instrumental case. I f i t is

said that as the performance (o f a verb) takes place with the

knowledge of a single case, there w ill be no enquiry into any

other case, then in the sentence, "oh ! Devadatta, bring the

cow with the stick ", though the word 'danda' (the stick) is

used, there w ill be no expectancy towards i t . And then because

o f there being no expectancy towards i t , there w ill be no

syntactical relation o f it s meaning ( i . e . , o f the meaning

o f the word 1danda') in the meaning o f the sentence. Hence,

from the utterance o f the word ‘ danda’ (s tic k ), there the

ejqpectancy towards i t is assumed. Otherwise, in the event o f

lack o f the syntactical relation o f the meaning o f the word

'danda* (stick ) (in the context o f the meaning o f the sentence

 94

* gamanaya dandena*) , the utterance o f the word ’ danda' w ill

be f u t i l e .

Sven then, in the sentence, 'o n e purchases the Soma

creeper with the exchange o f one re d -co lo u re d , tawny-eyed

and one year o ld cow' (T a i.S . 6 ,1 .9 ) , there w ill be no scope

o f the s y n ta c tic a l r e la t io n s . For, there is no p ro o f whatso­

ever to a sse rt that there w ill be no meaninglessness in the

utterances o f the Vedic words. Hence, th ere i s no ahy cause

fo r expectancy to a r is e fo r them (u ttered v e d ic words) from

the expression 'Somam k r in a t i' Cone purchases the Soma cre e p e r),

there w ill be no sy n ta c tic a l r e la t io n o f the p o rtio n a d d itio ­

n a l to ('Somam krin ati* i . e . , one purchases the Soma c re e p e r).

Beyond that (popular) verb and ca se on the p resen ta tion o f

which, a v e d ic verb comes to be accomplished, there remains

n o t so much s p e cia l enquiry. For? enquiry to know (something)

e x is ts when i t remains unknown and not (does not a rise ) (when

already) i t is known.*

In 'Ka punariyamikahk?! ..................... * etc. o f the V

te x t, the author presents the view o f the Naiyayikas on

— y —

Akariksa and r e je c t s the seme. Salikanatha says that Akariksa

being the c u rio s ity on the p a rt o f the lis t e n e r s has been

 96

explained by the Naiyayikas on the basis o f invariable

concomittance. The word 1k e c it1 in the ]£ text refers to the

Naiyayikas. Visvanatha, a Naiyayika states that Akinksa o f

a particular word exists with that very Pada without which

i t cannot lead to the idea o f the desired syntactical r e l ­

ation. As without a Kriya (verb), a karaka (case) cannot ?ive

r is e to the apprehension o f a syntactical relation , there is

Akanksa o f the Karaka with that Kriya. Thus in the view of

the Naiyayikas, the invariable concomitance is the basis o f

Akanksa. But this view o f the Naiyayikas regarding Akahksi

is considered improper by Salikanatha and so he proceeds to

re je c t i t in the J text above. Salikanatha does not believe

that Akinksa is an enquiry (cu riosity) on the part o f a

listen er and that this enquiry is due to a relation o f invari­

able association (avinabhava). For there w ill be no end of

the aiquiries on the part o f a liste n e r. Thus when there is

enquiry into the Karaka, then there w ill also arise the

enquiry into the cause o f the Karakaj it s guna (attribu te),

va
92. yena padena vlna yatpadasya’ nvayananubhavakatfm
tena padena saha tasyakinksetyarthah. kriyipadam
vina karakapadao nanvayabodham janayatiti tena
tasyakanksa. NSM under BP, p. 472.
 96

i t s Kriya and othear Karaka. I f i t i s said that because o f

there being no n e ce s s ity , nothing additional to the Karaka

is sought to be known, then where thpre i s no n e ce ssity o f

the knowledge o f the Karaka even in understanding the Kriya

o n ly , there slrm ld be no enquiry into the Karaka. For, a

Kriya i s known because o f i t s n e ce s s ity o f being performed.

»
11 is also because o f the f a c t that there can be no perform­

ance o f a Kriya without a Karaka. But according to the Prabha-

kaTas there i s no n e ce ssity o f the knowledge o f a Karaka fo r

the knowledge o f the Kriya because o f I t s n ot being performed

due to the im position o f the present tense on i t . The word

'n a 1 a fter the word 'n i ' s t i ' in the V te x t above I s , a ctu a lly ,
'nah* (o u r). The VM(D) shows the co rre ct-re a d in g . Moreover,

where a Vakya is deemed to be incom plete and th at the incom­

p leten ess a rise s due to i t s denoting the expectant meaning,

the Prabhakaras accept Adhyahara (im portation) fo r the sake

o f completing a Vakya.

In the te x t above, we fin d S alikan ath a's re fe re n ce

to Aahyahara o f the Mimamsakas. As we know* both the schools

o f Mimamsa accept Adhyahara which a rises as a r e s u lt o f then0

being Incompleteness in a Vakya. But there i s d iffe r e n c e

between these two sch ools in r e sp e c t o f th eir treatment o f

 97

Adhyahara. itfiile the Bhattas accept Sabdadhyahira (im port­

a tion o f words), the Prabhakaras advocate Arthadhyahara

(im portation o f id e a s ). Thus, because o f th eir admitting

Sabgdadhyahiura, the Bhattas are known as Sabdadhyaharavadins

and because o f th eir recog n isin g Arthadhyahara, the Prabha-

-karas come to be kn^wn as the Arthadhyihlravadins. In the

%
u tteran ce o f a word l i k e 'dvaram' (d o o r ), the E hittas import

a word l i k e (Pidhehi' (sh u t). But the Prabhakaras import a

meaning l i k e ‘ shutting’ . But th is view o f the Prabhakaras

on Adhyahara i s n ot accepted by the Naiyayikas and the vedan-

tin s . They p re fe r the view o f the Bhattas. According to the

Naiyayikas, where the word ' dvaram’ i s u tte re d , verb al compre

hension takes p la ce from the apprehension o f a word such as

'P id h eh i' and not from the apprehension o f i t s meaning such

as 'Pidhana' — as held by the Prabhakaras. Bor, the appre­

hension o f p a rticu la r meanings o f words, which i s generated

93. aparipurnavakyasthale sabdadhyaharo'bhihitanvayava-

dibhirbhattamimamsakairahglkriyate. dvaramityatra
p id h e h iti sabaamadhyaharanti..............................................
ata evete s'abdadhyaharavadina i t i prathante.
Anvitabhidhanavadinah prabhakar amimams aka aparipurna-
- vakyasthale pidhanarupamar thamadhyaharanti. ata evote'
- rthadhysdiaravidina i t i giyante. GN. 4 under PP,
p. 280.
 98

by those* words * Is the cause o f p a rticu la r verbal compre-

94
h en sion .o,

The vedantins also admit 'Sabdadhyahara. According to than,

even in the case o f v e d ic sentences, there i s im portation

o f the Padas. Thus in the u tteran ce o f the word 1Is e tv a ’

(oh '.the Palasabranch, (I ), the word 'c h in a tti* (cu ts)

i s imported.

Again in the V te x t above, Salikanatha sta tes that

where the Kriya to be performed i s known, these w il1 also

be enquiry into a ll the Karakas. As fo r in stan ce, the

expression v i z . , ‘ Devadatta gamanayjf (oh Devadatta, bring

the*cOw), w ill be incom plete because o f there being no use

o f the Karana Karaka (instrum ental c a s e ). I f i t is said that

as the performance o f a Kriya takes p la c e by knowing a sin g le

Karaka, there w ill be no enquiry in to any other Karaka, then

in the exp ression , 'Devadatta • gamanaya dandena' (oh '.

Devadatta, bring the cow with the s t ic k ) , though the word

'danda* (s tic k ) is used, there w ill a r is e no Akahksa towards

the word danda. And as there i s no Akanksa towards danda, so

94. ya tra dvaramityuktam, ta tra p id h e h iti padasya jnanadeva

^ yj S, ^
bodhah, na tu pidhanadirupartha;jna£, padajnya t a tt a -
- tp adar thop as t h i t e - j t c c h a b d a b o t l h e h etutva t .
NSM under BP, p . 468
95. ata e^asruta padarthasthale tattatpadadhyahiro yatha
«—"
* j _
__
_ _ a jt. i. i t.J Tm
1

- 99

the m etin g Of ^he word 'danda* w ill have no* sy n tactical

relatio n in resp ect.o f the vakyartha. Therefore, the Akaiksa

*
towards the word ' danda* i s assumed from the utterance of
*

that very word. I f i t i s not assumed lik e th is, then due to

lack o f sy ntactical re la tio n of the meaning of the word

'danda* in the context the Va^yartha, -the utterance o f the

*

word 'danda* w ill come to be meaningless. Likewise, in th°

vedic expressions lik e ' arunayaikahayanya pingaksya somam

krinati* (one purchases the soma creeper with the exchange

o f one red coloured, tawny-eyed and one year old cow) also,

there will be no scope of the sy n tactical relatio n . I t i s

because there i s no proof to a sse rt that there should be no

•
meaningless by the utterances of the Valdika Padas. There­

in fo re , there is no cause in the arisin g out of Akankia towards’

the uttered vaidika Padas. Thus there w ill be no syntactical

re latio n o f the meanings of the words additional to 'Somam

krinati* i . e . , the words ’ anunaya*, * ekahayanya* and 'pin-

-gaksyi* w ill have no syntactical relation in the Vakya.

Moreover, the Kriya and Karaka being laukika (popular) and

*

as on the presentation o f ttiese two the vedic kAya is

accompaiisiied, there i s not so much sp ecial enquiry. I t JLs*

• t *

« (
• ** v
*
 100

because «.esipe to know something exists in that which is not

Known and not in that-which is already known.

The expression v i z . , 1a r u n a y a ...................... 1 etc. is found in

the context o f Krayaha-prakarana (context regarding purchase

qg
of sa c r ific ia l material) in connection with Soma-yaga.'

Thus, Salikanatha rejects Naiyaytkas’ wiew that Akanksa is

the enquiry on the part of the listen ers.

V(Sa) Atrocyate — abhidhaniparyavasanam, abhidhaya-

sir
paryavasanca jijnasodaye nibandhanam. Ekapadaprayoge

h i dvaramityadavabhidhanameva na paryavasyati. Na

hyanuccarite pratiyogisannidhapake pade 1nvitabhidhanam

/akyate vaktum. yrddhavyavaharavasena 1nvitarthaprati-

-padanaparata padanamavadhariteti, tadartham yuktaiva

pratiyagijijijfnasa . Yasya’ pyabhitanvaya i t i raddha-

-ntah, tanmate1p i padarthasya padarthantaramantar ena1-

nvayasimarthyat, tadupapattaye yuktaiva pratiyo£iji j-

-nasa. Tasyanca satyimap]a£ipAttern^akyaparipurakataya

lok e1dhyerfiar asya viditatvat, prakaranadlvas'ena

yogyapratiyogyadhyiharah kriyate.

"Amavasyayamapar ahane pindapitryajnena car anti”

mm *

(A. Srau. 1 . 3 . 7 . Su. 1 .2 ) tyadisvanekapadaprayoggdan-

- vitabhidhane'pi, abhlhitasya karyasya' purvatmano'nu-

96 PLM, p . 118 , .
 101

s than am vlna karyatvanupapatteh* kartra ca vina

tadasambhavat, adhikaradrte ca tadayogat, niyojya-

mantarena ca tasya' navakalpanat, tadupapattaye

yuktaiva tadanvayayogyaniyo jyajijnasa. Tasyam

satyamaj^^p aripurnatvavagamat, lokavadadhyahar e

kartavye satyapl, jivanasya*vasyakatve' ntarangatve

ca vidheranuethitfiitesepo na kalpeteti, tatpar:£yigena

kamye niyojyavisesane sthlta sarvakamipurusavyapis-

-vargasyaiva niyojyavisesanatvayogyatvat, svargakamo

niyojyo' dhyahriyate.

Tatha' dhyayanavidhavanyaprayuktanusthananirva-

-hitakstcyabhave niyojyo ha* dhyahriyate. Alaukikatvafr

- cca' purve karye niyojyasya' dhyaharamant arena' kanksa

na nivartate. Alaukikatvadeva ca "sauryam car urn

nirvapet ghrte suklanam vrihinam brahmavarcasakipBah1

(Mai. Sam. 2 .2 .2 ) ityadau karanopakaramantar ena vidhe-

- ssidhyasambhavat tajjijnasa, taj janakapadirliiajijnasa

ca. At a eva Bhisyakaro vakyanam nyunatamasankya

p arlhrtavan.

Nanvevam tarhi yatra padatrayam prayujyate —

gamlnaya suklimi1 ti loke* tatra hi karakadvayasya'

— *
ssanbhavanna' kanksa' stiti kathamanvitabhidhanam.

1gamanayetye' tavataiva paripurnatvadvakyasya. Satyam.

Padantaranuccarana evamt uccarite tu tasrain, tasya*

py anay ati sannl dhanadekav akya tvavagamadinayalyanvita-

 1 /

svartHabhiahayitvat} akanksam vina ca tadnsamtvy>y't,

anayaterakahksa parik alpyate. Tatha coktam Bhasy

-rena — "bhavati ca raktam pr a ty akinks p" (Sa.3ba.kr.
117) t i . Tena* tra* pyanvl tabhiahanaslddhyartliamova' ‘
-k s a . Yadl paramayam visesah, "dvlram i" tyadau ta sy r-i
paaasya'nyi tabhldlariaya'kanksa, "gam an ay a sukibnji'
tyadau tu padantarasyeti.

Anvitasyabhldhanar thamuktar thaghatanaya ya

p ra tiy o g ln l jijn a s a ya sa’ kahksati g iy st* .
i t i Saragrahnplokah .

Sa ceyamakinksa bhavantl vyutpattavupalaksanarnasriy ;■

Kimi t i punassannidhi-yogyatva eva na" sriy a ta , air^-^
-kcanamanvitabhiuhanadar sanat. " ay ameti putro r ajr-a.,
*
puruso1yamap^niyatami" tyadau putrapadasambanahanir a
-ankso ra ja na purusena1nviyata. Kas#na.tpun?.ran ayah
putr apurusayossannldhi-yogyatvayires *>'pi putrapniva
rajna-ssambadhah, na pururana. ucyate — vskyat
vakyar thapratipatternyayasap eksatvat, nityasap ®ks<=r
putrenaiva ra ja sambadhyate, tatsambandha^nirakAbyr

na purusa"ambandhamanubhavatityik"ankso, p i vyuti-
- alaksanamasriyate.

paripurnena yogyasya samipasya1pyansnvayal.

vyutp attau tpna sabdanamakanksa' pyupalaks --nar.
i t i Samgrahslokab.
 103

S a c e y a m a J c a n k s a p r a t i y o g l s u s a r v e s u n a s a h a s a i v o -

- p a j a y a t e , k l m t u k a r a n o p a n i p a t a k r a m e n a . T a t h a h i —

v i s a y a m a n t a r e n a ' p u r v a m k a r y a in p r a t y e t u r a e v a n a

s a k y a t e i t l , p r a t i p a t t y a n u b a n d h a b h u t a v i s a y a p e k s a

p r a t h a m a m v i d h e h . A t h a p r a t l p a n n e v i s a y a - s a m b a n d h i n i

v i a h y a r t h e , n i y o j y a m a n t a r e n a t a t s i d d h y a s a m b h a v a n n i -

- y o j y a k a n k s a . T a t h a v i s a y i b h u t e b h a v a r t h e k a r a n e

l a b d h e , v a i k r t a p u r v a n a m k a r a r p p a k a r a k a h k s a , l a b d h e

c a t a s m l n , t a j j a n a k a p a d l f e a r t h a k a n k s a t i . T a t h a c a * h u h —

P r a t i y o g l s u s a r v e s u h a ’ k a n k s o d e t l t a t k s a n a t .

k a r a n o p a n l p a t a n u p u r v y e n a t u y a t h a y a t h a m . i t l .

T a t k r am © n a 1 n v l t a b h i d h a n a m a p 1 k r a m e n a i v a .

S l o k a s c a ' t r a ^ h a v a t i —

J i j n i s i j a y a t e b o d d h u s s a m b a n d h i $ u y a t h a y a t h a .

T a t h a t a t h a i v a s a b d a n a m a n v i t a r t h a b h i d h a y i t a .

'H e r e i t I s s a i d — - t h e n o n - c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e d e n o t a ­

t i o n a n d t h e n o n - c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e d e n o t a b l e a r e t h e g r o u n d s

t h a t g i v e r i s e t o t h e e n q u i r y . F o r , w h e n o n l y o n e w o r d i s

u s e d , t h e r e , w i l l b e n o d e n o t a t i o n i n t h e u s e o f t h e w o r d s

l i k e ‘ d o o r * ( d v a r a m ) . I t c a n n o t b e s a i d t h a t t h e r e i s e x p r e s s ­

i o n o f t h e c o r r e l a t e d u n l e s s a n d u n t i l l t h e w o r d t h a t p r e s e n t s

t h e c o u n t e r - c o r r e l a t i v e m e a n i n g ( P r o t i y o g i ) i s u t t e r e d . A s
 104

i t is ascertained from the usage o f the elderly persons that

the words tend to denote correlated meanings, so the enquiry

(desire to know) the counter-correlative i s , indeed, proper.

Even in the opinion o f one whose conclusion is that there is

tlie correlation o f the expressed (meanings), due to lack o f

the capacity o f the meaning o f a word to be related without

the meaning o f another word, the enquiry (desire to l°arn)

into the counter correlative in order to obtain i t ( i . , the

counter-correlative) is proper. Ana that (enquiry) being there,

the importation being known in the common parlance, *as some­

thing that completes an incomplete sentence when there is

enquiry o f a word is imported on the strength o f the context

4

(prakarana) etc.

In the expressions such as "one should perform the

pindftpitr sa crifice in the afternoon on the New-moon day

(As. 1 . 3 . 7 Su. 1 .2), even there being the expression o f the

correlated because o f the use o f many words, there w ill be no

performablene-ss (Karyatva) without the performance o f the

stated action ( i . e ., the pindfipitr sa crifice ) in the form o f

unique resu lt (Apurva), and as that (performance) is not

possible without an Agent (Karta), and as that (the Agent)

 105

is improper without the righ t (Adhikara), and as there is

no assumption o f that (Adhikstfa) without the prompted person

* *

(Niyojya), so the enquiry into the prompted person compatible

for having a syntactical rela tion is , indeed, proper to

obtain that (performance in the form of unique re s u lt). Because

o f knowing the incompleteness (in the said expression) in view

o f there being the enquiry and even though the importation

«

should be done as in the popular (Sentence}, and thgre being

importance o f l i f e (o f the prompted person) andjas^the

Injunctive sentence (Vidhi) is related (to t?he sa crifice),, the

• •

im plication o f the performance should not be assumed anil as

such by way o f exhausting that (act o f enquiry), the ob je ct

desired'being the qualifying adjunct (Vise^ana) o f the

prompted person (and) only the heaven ( i . e . , the ot>j#cfc

desired) that pertains to a person desiring everything, being

capable o f becoming the qualifying adjunct o f the prompted

person desiring heaven is imported.

Likewise, the prompted person is not imported in the

case o f the performance done by other Agent in respect o f the

%

Injunctive sentence regarding the ^tudy tof the Veda). And

the expectancy does not stop without the importation o f the

 )

106

prompted person in respect o f the per-fownable in the form .of

unique re s u lt, because o f it s being a v.edic (alaukika) (r it * 0 .

Ana because o f being a vedic performance, .in the expression

l i k e "one should o ffe r a thin t i t l e con sistin g o f *whi£e r ic e -

grain mixed With ghee to the sun-gpd.* (Mai.S. the

attainment o f the In ju n ctive sentence f s not p ossib le without

the help o f the means (Karana) and-as such there arises expect-
* t , «. • *

ancy towards that (means) and also the enquiry into the a waning
# • *. •
• •
o f the word that generates that (means). Henc%* tfljp eh ending
» * „ .
the incompleteness (nyunata) o f the sentences without the

means, the author o f the Bhasya (Sahara) discarded i t . (i.e .,

• 4
incompleteness). But then, wh^e three words are used, as* fo r
• •
instance, in an expression l i k e "bring the white oow" in-oommon
. * •
parlance, because o f there being the im p o s sib ility <in r4?p®ct

o f the syn ta ctica l re la tio n ) o f two cases ( i . e.* ’ cow’ ana

’ white*) (in the same form) in respect o f the sbatence-meaning,

.
as there ean«et \>e n%fxpectancy (between, the tw® cases v i z . ,
•
'in cite1 and ’ cow1) how can th«$e fce the expression o f the
1 . ..
correlated ? For,. the#sentm ce I s c^ap lete with the portion,

v iz ., ’ bring the eft>w* only. (Indae^) i|, i# true. I t (sq happens)

# in case Hon-utterafece o f ano.ther word ( v i z . , w h ite), but

 1C7

(when) i t (a n oth er word) i s u t t e r e d , b e ca u s e o f i t s h a v in g the

»

c o n t in u it y w ith the v e r b 'b r i n g * , th e u n it a r y p a ssa g e (e k ?v a k -

y a ta ) i s u n d e r s to o d and as such i t demotes i t s own meaning o n ly

as r e l a t e d to the v e r b 'b r i n g ' and b e ca u s e o f th ere b e in g no

co n v e y in g o f the meaning w ith o u t e^ p egta n cy, th e exp ectan cy

towards th e v erb 'b r in g * i s assumed. Hence, i t i s s a id by th e

author o f th e Bhasya (Sahara) — "and t h e r e i s ex p e cta n cy f o r

th e r e d (r a k t a )" (SB ,P . 1 1 7 ). T h e r e fo r e , h e r e ( i n th e p r e s e n t

co n te x t), ex p ecta n cy i s adm itted o n ly in o r d e r to a t t a in tho

♦
%

e x p r e s s io n o f the c o r r e l a t e d . I f how ever, to n o t e i n p a r t i c u l a r ,

in the word 'd o o r ' e t c . , f o r th e sa k e o f e x p r e s s io n o f th e ■

c o r r e la te d , exp ectan cy i s towards th a t v e r y word o n l y , b u t in

0

the e x p r e s s io n l i k e " b r in g th e w h ite cow" e t c . , exp ecta n cy i s

towards an other word. (H ence, i t i s s a id ) —

T hat en qu iry in to the c o u n t e r - c o r r e l a t i v e (meaning)

which i s f o r the sak e o f e x p r e s s io n o f the c o r r e l a t e d

o r f o r th e c o n s is t e n c y o f the a lre a d y s t a t e d m eaning,

i s c a l l e d e x p e cta n cy . (c o lle c te d v e r «e ).
4 •
\
•

And t h is e x p e cta n cy b e ih g i s r e s o r t ? # to (a d m itted

* •

as an a u x ili a r y ca u se (U palaksana) in r e s p e c t o f know ledge ( o f

th e senteiac e-m ea n in g why again c o n t i g u i t y and c o m p a t ib il it y

t
H
 108

are not resorted to (admitted) as the auxiliary cause in

9

respHet pf knowledge (o f the sentence-meantng)? I t is because

the expression o f the coyrelated is not seen ( i . e . , obtainpd)

in respect o f unexpectant meanings (o f words). In an expression

lik e , "here comes the son o f the king* (le t) this person be

removed", the word 'king1 being unexpectant because o f its

relation with the word 'son*, is not syntactically related to

the word 'person*. How, again, even there being no difference

in the matter o f contiguity and com patibility (o f the word

king) with the words, son and person, the word 'kin g' is related

only to the word 'son* and not to the word 'p erson '. I t Is said

— As the understanding o f the meaning of* a sentence arires

from the sentence corresponding to lo g ic , (the word) 'king' is

related to the word ’ son' only which is ever dependent (on the

word conveying the person related to as father) and (the word­

meaning that comesto be unexpectant ( i . e . , the word 'k i r g ')

after being related with i t ( i . e . , the word 's o n ') does not

experience any relation with the word 'person* and as such

*

expectancy is resorted to as the a x illa r y causA/in respect

of the knowledge (o f the meaning of a sentm ce). (It is said)

/
 109

As there is no syntactical relation of (a word) compa-

tiblei»(,and) contiguous with another complete (sentence), so the

expectancy o f the words is accepted as the auxiliary cause in

respect o f the knowledge (o f the meaning o f a sentence).

(co lle cte d verse).

And that expectancy does not arise, at a time, in

respect o f a ll the counter-cojirelatives (o f the meanings), but

according to the particular order in which the causes occur.

So, as the performable i . e . , the unique resu lt cannot be known

(by a S acrificer) without the object ( i . e . , o f the sa crifice )

•nd as such the necessity o f the o b je ct which is the cause of

the attainment (o f the result) arises f i r s t from the Injunctive

sentence. Thus the meaning o f the Injunctive sentence relating

to the ob ject being understood, and because of there being the

im possibility o f attaining the performance without the prompted

person, there arises the expectancy towards the prompted person.

Thus at the attainment o f the means of the action which is the

ob ject, there arises the expectancy towards the u t ilit y o f tho

means of the unique results and when the u t ilit y of the means

is attained, then arises the expectency towards the meaning of

the words that produce t h ^ u t ilit y o f the means. So, i t Is

4
 110

said —

"The expectancy aoes not occur quickly, in respect o f

the counter-cof-relatlves (meanings o f words), but (occurs)

properly according to the particular order in which the causes

occur."

The expression o f the correlated also takes place in the same

order as in the order o f that (expectancy). And a verse (may

be put lik e this) —

As the enquiry o f the listen ers arises into the related

meanings, so (does i . e . , arises) the state o f denoting the

related meanings by the words# 1

In V text v iz ., 1a tro c y a te ................. 1 e tc ., Salikanatha

explains Akahksa in his own way. We have already stated that

Akahksa i s one of three factors in understanding the Vakyartha.

I t is stated by Salikanatha that Akahksa £s the enquiry o f a

person into another meaning and that aiquiry arises due to thP

non-completion*of the entire denotation or sometimes, only o f

a denotable. I t is because of the fa c t that when only one Pada

i s used lik e *dvaram* [door), there w ill be no denotation at

a ll. I f the Pada that presents the meaning o f the protiyogi,

is not uttered, then there can be no expression o f the correlated

 I ll

As I t is ascertain ed from the Vrddhavyavahara that the Padas

tend to denote the c o r r e la te d meanings, i t i s , Indeed, proper

to enquire in to the P r a tiy o g i. Even in the view o f the A bhihi-

-tanvayavadins who contend that th ere can be no s y n ta c tic a l

r e la t io n o f a Padartha without another Padartha, the enquiry

in to the P r o tiy o g i in order to atta in the sy n ta ctica l r e la tio n

i s deemed proper. I t is known in the common parlance that when

there i s Akanksa, there is Adhyahara and the appropriate

P ra tiy og i (meaning o f a word) i s imported through Prakarana

e tc . By the in clu sio n o f the word 1adi* in the word 'Prakaran-

-adivasena' in the tex t, S r u ti, Linga, Sama&hya etc. are also

on
in clu d ed . The word 'Prakarana* means mutual expectancy.' We

have discussed e a r lie r the Adhyahara o f the Mimamsakas. I t may

be repeated here that w hile the Bhattas accept the Adhyahara

o f the Padas In an incom plete Vakya, the Prabhikaras accept

Adhyahara o f the Arthas (ideas or m e a n in g ). The Prabhakaras

accept Arthadhyahara (im portation o f ideas) because o f th eir

I
advocating the theory o f Anvitabhidhana.

In the Jf te x t, again, i t is sta ted that as in the

popular sentences, there i s Adhyahara, so in the vedic sentences

97 prakaran am nama paraspar&tchksa. MP, p. 22.

 112
also, there is Adhyahara, As for instance, in the Injunctive

sentence viz,, ’amavasyayamaparihhe pindapitryajnena caranti’

<3

(dme should perform the Pindpitr sacrifice in the afternoon

on the New-moon day) the word conveying the Niyojya (prompted

persoi^ i.e., a person like Devadatta who desires the heaven

is imported. The Niyojya is imported as there arises enquiry

into it, because the Karya cannot take place without a

performance and without a Karta there can be no performance

and without the Adhikara, the Karta is improper and without a

Niyojya (prompted person) there will be no assumption of the

Adhikara and thus arises the enquiry into the Niyojya compati­

ble for having a syntactical relation.

••

In the V text atoove, we find Salikanatha's reference

to certain terms such as Karya, Apurva, Karta, AdhikSra and

Niyojya etc. which are important in connection with the perform­

ance of a particular Vedic rite. Here, it may be mentioned that

in the view of the Prabhakaras, Apurva and Karya are one and

the same thing. They are known as Niyoga.*This Apurva or Kitfya

or Niyoga (prompting) is a force which mediates between a

yaga (sacrifice) and its resultant benefit and which cannot

 113

98
be known by any other source o f v a lid knowledge. A Karta

i s one who a ctu a lly performs the a ction In d ica ted by the

p r in c ip a l r o o t in a V idhi. Adhikara (rig h t) i s one’ s ownership

99
to a r e s u lt . Adhikara secures always to him who is fta te d

as t ^ N iyojya. One who understands the Karya (p er form able) as

a llo t t e d to him is a N iyojya and the Karya i s known as the

Niyoga (prom pting).100 In some Vidhi vakyas, a svargakama

(one who is desirous o f heaven) i s the N iyojya as he under­

stands that Karya i s a llo t t e d to him or in other words, he

i s d ire cted to perform the Karya. We sh a ll take up these

terms elab ora tely in conn ection with our ex p osition o f text

o f the second sub#s*ction o f the VM.

I t Is also sta ted In th e te x t that Niyojya* is not

imported in case o f the performance done by oth^r Agent in

98. ato manantarapurvamapurvamiti g ly a te. PP, p. 441*

99. adhikirah purusasyaiscaryam karmani. RVL undnr BR, p .1 4 .

100. n ly ojy a sca sa ucyate yah mamedam karyamiti budhyat**.

NRM, p. 63
101. yasca karyamavabudhyate sa n iyojyah . svargakamasya ca
tasminneva karya bodhrtaya'nvayah. RVL under BR,p.288
n iyojyassa ca karyam yassvakiyatvena budhyate.
PP. p . 433.
 I 114

r e s p e c t o f t h e A d h yaya n a V i d h i (th e I n ju n c t iv e S en ten ce re g a rd ­

in g th e stu d y o f t h e v e d a v i z , , * sv a d h y a y o* d h y e t a v y a h * ) . T h is

V id h i i s c o n s i d e r e d b y t h e P r a b h a k a r a s a s l n c a p a b f e o f im p o s ­

in g th e s tu d y o f t h e V ed a a s a K a r y a , b e c a u s e t h e N iy o l y a i s

n o t n fe n t io n e d t h e s e and t h u s t h e r e c a n b e no A a h ik a r i to

u n d e rta k e th e stu d y o f th e V edas, B ecau se o f i t s b e in g a

V e d ie r i t e , w it h o u t t h e A d h y a h a ra o f t h e N i y o j y a , A k a n k sa d o e s

n o t sto p i n r e s p e c t o f th e A p u rvak arya.

S a L ik a n a t h a d i s c a r d s th e o b je c t i o n t h a t may a r i s e a s t o

how t h e r e c a n b e A n v ita b h id h a n a irt, w h ile i n an e x p r e s s i o n l i k e

'g a m a n a y a s u k tS ® ' ( b r i n g t h e w h i t e cow ) e t c . T h e r e a r i s e s no

A k a n k sa b e c a u s e o ? * % i e r e b e i n g i m p o s s i b i l i t y i n r e s p e c t o f

t h e S y n t a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n o f t h e two K anakas l i k e 'gam * and

' s u k la m '. I t is becau se, t h e c o m p le t e n e s s o f t h e V akya may

*
lie w it h th e p o r t i o n o f 'gam an aya* o n l y . B u t S a li k a n a t h a says

t h a t th e o b j e c t i o n is c o r r e c t o n ly in -the e v e n t o f t h e o t h e r
«
pada n o t b e in g u tt e r e d i . e . , th e 'S u ld tam *, b u t in c a s e o f its

u tte ra n ce , becau se o f its h a v in g t h e c o n t i g u i t y w it h th e v e r b

' a n a y a 1, t h e E k a v a k y a ta ( u n i t a r y p a s s a g e ) i s u n d e rsto o d and

tu X-
102. y a tra ¥j.$ n i y o j y o n a s r u y a t e s a t v a p r a y o ja k a h * ayam
tv a d h y jy a n a v i d h ih n i y o jy a ft* a v a n a d g p r ayo j ak ah .
NK under NBM, p# 4,
 %

as such i t d e n o te s 'its o»n meaning on ly as r e la te d to the

verb * anaya* and because o f there being no Akanksa, the

Akanksa towards the verb ’ anaya* i s assumed. In suport o f h is

argument, SaLikanatha, r e fe r s to the statement o f Sahara, which

i s as fo llo w s * 'b h a va ti ca raktain pratyaklnk^a' i t i (and

there is expectancy fo r the i e d ) . This is stated by Sahara

under MS, 1 ,2 .7 . Sahara states that in a sentence lik e ,

’ pato bhavati* (here i s a p ie c e o f c lo t h ) , there are two

unexpectant padas and as soon as another pada l i k e 'r a k ta '

(red) i s heard, then a rises the Akanksa towards the word

’ r a k t a '.104

I t Is said in V unaer e x p osition , that Akanksa is

*

admitted only in order to attain the Anvltabhidhana. In

support o f h is view , Salikanatha r e fe r s to h is own Samgraha

/■ , .
Sloka wherein the purpose o f adm itting Akanksa i s sta ted by

him. Akanksa i s the enquiry in to the counter c o r r e l a t i v e

meaning which i s fo r th e sake o f Anvltabhidhana or fo r the

103. ’ vidhina tvekavakyatvat stutyar thena vidhinim syuh’ .

104. yatha pato bhavati i t i , pata utpadyate ityarth ah ,
nirakanksanca padadvayam. yada ca tasmlnneva raktah —
ityaparam sruyate, tada ragasambandho bhava&tyarthal?,
bhavati ca raktam pratyakarikse. *SB under MS. 1 .2 .7 .
 116

consistency of the meaning already stated.

This Akanksa is , says Salikanatha, admitted as an

upalaksana (auxiliary cause) in understanding the Vakyartha.

Salikanatha also solves the objection as to why Akanksa is

admitted as an auxiliary cause in understanding the Vakyartha,

while Sannidhi and Yogyata alone can be accepted as such. In

his reply to the said objection, Salikanatha says that there

can be no syntactical relation without Akanksa even if Sannidhi

and Yogyata are present. In order to explain it clearly, he

cites an exan^le v i z ., Maiiyameti putro rajnah, puruso'yama-

panlyatamO'* (here comes the son of the king, let this person

be removed), wherein the word 'raja* (the King) being unexpact-

ant because of its relation with the word *putra* (the son),

is not Syntactically related to the word ‘ purusa* (the person).

This expression is also cited by Visvanatha. Of course, his

explanation is something different from that of Salikanatha

|ind he uses the verb as 1apasaryatam’ in s t e a d of ' apaniyatam’ .

According to Visvanatha, since there is apprehension of th<=

Tatparya (intention of the speaker) that the word 'raja* is

to be related to the word 'putra*, its relation is understood

to be that alone. But i f the Tatparya were so apprehended that

 117

i t was to be related €b the word ’.purusa', thm i t would

certainly be understood as related with that.10^

I t is also stated in tfte text tt^fc Akahksa does not

arise, at once, 1# respect o f a ll the Pratiyogis, but i t

arises according to*the particular order in which the <?huses

«*<*

occur. In th is context, Salikanatha refers to three essential

psychological Akanksaswhich are towards — (i) Visaya or the*

act enjoinedj ( i i ) Karana or the means o f performing i t ( i . e . ,

the act) , a£d ( i i i ) Niyojya i£io performs i t (the a ct). Thus,

in an expression lik e , ’ V isvajita yajeta' (one should perform

the V isvajit s a c r ific e ), as there is no mention o f the Niyojya,

the expression i . e . , the sentence i s #incomplete and as such

tjhe^arises Akahksa towards, a word conveying the NiyojV®

i . e . , a person lik e Devadatta e tc ., who is desirous o f heaven,

without whom, the act cannot befperformed. Salikanatha also

states trfat the AnvitibfcLdhl^la takes place in the same order

,#as in which Akahkpa also occurs. I t is clearly explained by

Salikanatha in a Samgraha Sloka which states —

105. afameti ptttro rajhiSh puruso’ yamapasaryatimityadau tu

putrena saha rajapadasya tatparyagrahasattvat ten aiva'-
-nvayabodhah purusena saha tatparyagrahe to sahanvaya-
- bodhah-syaieva# NSM under BP, p. 473.
 « 118

A s th e e n q u ir y ft t h e l i s t e n e r s a r i s e s i n t o th p r e l a t e d

meanings*, so a lso * t h e s t a t e o f d e n o t in g th e r e l l t e d m eanings

b y th e p a d a s . *

V (8 b ). A th a s a n n id h ih kah? y a s y a 'r t h a s y a ^ a v a n a n ta r a m a -

- k a n k sa -y o g y a ta b h y a m a rth a n ta r e b u d d h iv ip a r ie v r t t ih . sa c a

na sa b d a n ib a n d h a n a iv a k e v a la m a n v ita b h id h a n a v y u tp a tta -

- vup a la k s an am, adhy ahr te n a 1p i l o k e any i tab h i dhanadar s"*n&t .

n a c a vacyam — s'abda e v a 'd h y a h r y a t e , sa c a 'r t h a m u p a s -

-t h a p a y a t i — i t i , an up ay o g a t , a p ram a n a k a tv a cca . y a d y a -

- p y a rttia p a ttip r a ffla n a k o ' d h yah arah, t a t h a p i sa b d a k a lp a n a -

- manupapannam. y e n a h i v l n a 'n i ^ a p a t t i h , t a d e v a 'r t h a p a t t i -

-p ra m ey a m . na ca'rthetfiam s'abdam antarena’ n u p a p a t t ih .

syanmatam. a r t h a k a lp a n a y a iv a 'r t t i ip a t t ih p ravartam an a

t a s y i 1r t h a s y a s a v ik a lp a k a jn a n a v e d y a t v a t , s a v lk a lp a k a -

* -jn a n a n ^ n ca s a b d a p u r a s s a r a t y a t p u r o v a r t i n i s'abda eva

p a ry a v a sy a ti — i t i . ta d a s a t. y a th a iv a sab d a p u r£ a ssa re’ p i

s a v ik a lp a k a jn a n e l i n g a s y a ^ in d riy | a ia n ca n ir v l k a lp a k a d a -

- s a y im a r t h a ey a1v a ^ a r i ^ a s a k t i t y anna s'abdam atre p a r y a v a -

-sa n a m , t a t h a d r s t^ a r th a p a tta u sa k sa d u p a k a ra k e 1r t h e e v a '

r t h a p a t t e h pramaaiyabhyupagamat, s r u t a r t h a p a t t a y a p i

t a t t r a i v a ta sy a h pram any am yuktam , na s'abde. ta s y a

s akp adanuj^p a t t i s anmnas amar t h a t v a t .

't
*#
 _ # 119

klnca sa r v a tr a savikalpak'ajnane sabdassm aranavipari-

- v a r t i na prameyatam pratipatttPaJfftihati savikalpakajnineisu
purvapratiyam anata c a sabdasya n a 't iv a pramimavati, kin-t-
- var th a^ p ratitav ev a samaiiakaloEi sabdacmoranamltl p r o t it a -
v-ena sam&nakalam s'abdasmaranamltl pratityarudham . tena
na sru ta rth a p a ttissa b d a v isa y a . na ca s’abdanupapattya
s’abdakalpan aivocita, tasy a svato'nupapattyabhavat.
anvitabhidhanupapattya tu kalpana p ra sa ra n ti y o gy ap rati-
- yogyar th av isay aiv a’ v a t is t h a t e , ta sy a iv a k ih k slta tv a t,
dasamadyanyayma p a d irth a tv a t p u rv ap ratitasy a p i s'abdas-
- y opek san iy attv at.

na ca 1d v aram i'ti y a t r a 1 dhyaharah, taRa’ pyavriyatam ,

sa iv riy a ta m lti va kalpayitum arthapatteh prabhavisnuta,

sam any akalp anamatr ah e tu tv at. taSftadapar ipurnap ar Ip nr a-
-k a ta y a lo k a ta eva*dhyaharasya'pyx^apattih. t a t r a yogyr>taya,
prakaranadlvasena ca visesavadharanadartha «ra ca par i -
- pur aka i t i , anupayogl sabdasya1dhyaharah. Ato visvaji*'
- dadau niyojyenaj sa r v a tr a da karanopakarena, v ik r t ls u
ca p ak rtap adarth airasabrdop asth ap itairap l siadham anvita-
-bhidhanam. akanksavacca sannidhavapi sannidhapakakram e -
- n a lv a krgmo veditavyah, tadanusarena c a 1nvltabhldhanamapi
ta th a lv a iti.
*

sannidhissabdajanm aiva vyutpattau nopalaksanam^ adhyih-

- rtenV pyarthena lo k e sambandhadar san a^f sah asaiv a na
 . • 120

sarvessm sannidhih pratiyoginaffl/ sannldhapakasaraagrlkr-

-amena krafljyanasa^ yatha yatha sannidhanam jay ate p rati-
-yoginam^ tatha tatha kramenaiva-sabdairmnvitabodhanaB}^
i t l samgiahaalokah.

Ato y a thok t ak ahk s a —* sannidhipr ap tamakanksitam sanni-

“ hltam yogyanca y at padarthintaram, tena sangatamityar-
-thah.

* tfiat i s , than, the contiguity? (It is ) the trsn^jsrmation of

the in te lle c t from a meaning su b seq u en t^ the hearing of a

meaning to another meaning with (the help of) expectancy and

com patibility. And that (transformation) not being based on

only the words, is the au xiliary cause in understanding the

expression o f the c o r r e la te d , because in common parlance, the

expression o f the co$rrelated i s seen (attained) iy means of

•»

importation also. And i t should not be said that only the ward

i s imported AM that word (imported) supplies the meaning,

i t i s because of (the imported word> being not used (in the

sentence) and 4here being no proof (to that e ffe c t). Though

importation i s based on (proved by) postulation (A rthapatti),

y et the assump-tion of word i s not relevant. That without which,

there i s no relevehce o f the leaning (establish ed by v alid

sources of knowledge lik e perception) i s the object to be

 ' • *> !

known by way o f p ostu lation . And without the word there is

no relevance of the meanings. There may be (such) a view O -ik"

th is in th is connection). The p ostu lation operates only for

the assumption of meanings as that meaning can be known fron

the determinate cognition and as the determinate cognition is

preceded by words, so the p ostulation f i n a l l y s e ttle s in r e s ­

pect o f the preceding word. That {v iew ) is in correct. Just 's

o f probans (lin g a ) in case o f the determinate cognition though

preceded by word, and again of the sense*-organs in case o f

indeterminate cognition, the power is ascertained in respect

o f o bjects alone, so also in respect o f the p ostu lation from

the seen (d rsta r t h a p a t t i), because o f admitting o f admit. titer

o f the p o stu latio n in d ire c t ly presenting the meaning, the

v a lid it y o f the p ostulation is also proper there in respect of

the p ostu lation from the heard (S ru ta rth ap a tti) and not in

respect o f word. For, a word i s not capable o f averting the

irre la v a n c e obviously.

More3over, in case o f the determinate cognition in al

cases, the word a fte r being re c o lle c te d ( i . e. , heard) cannot

^ive rise to the knowledge of the o b je c t to be known. And in

 122

re sp e ct o f the aeterminate co g n itio n s, again, the ^tat.e o f

a word as being known (heard) e a r lie r , i s also without ary

*

p r o o f, but in the matter o f obtain in g by tha meaning, th®

r e c o lle c t io n (hearing) o f a word i's simultaneously under­

standable. Hence, the p o stu la tio n from thA heard also does

n ot p ertain to a w®rd. And in the event o f irrelovttnce o f a

word, the assumption o f a word i s not proper as i t (the word)

has no relevan ce o f i t s Own. But in the«event o f (adm itting)

*

the expression o f the c o rr e la te d , the assumption that proceeds

*
comes to r e s t in re sp e ct o f the com patible counter c o r r e la tiv e
*

meanings, f o r there is the expectancy towards that (meaning)

and because, the word- though known p rev iou sly comes to b °

worthy o f being n eglected l i k e the meanings the words accord­

ing to the procedure as stated at the beginning o f the tenth-

chapter ( o f the MS).

And where the word ’ door1 (dvaram) is imported, th«re

also the p o stu la tio n has no c a p a b ility to l°a d to th« assumpt­

io n o f the words, * avriyatam' ( l « t i t be open) and 1Ssmvrlya-

tam* ( l e t i t be sh u t), i t (th e p ostu la tion ) being the

cause o f only the assumptions in general. Hence, in common

parlance, there is relevance o f the importation only in orae

to complete the incomplete (sen tence). There, again, because

o f it s com patibility and on the strength of context e tc., as

i t leads to the ascertainment o f the p a rtic u la r (meaning), it

is the meaning that completes and as such only the word that

is not used (in a sentence) is imported. Haice, the expression

o f the eo'*-rrelated is e stablish ed by the prompted person in

(in s a c r ific e s lik e ) V is v a jit e tc ., and by the use o f the

means in a l l cases and by the meanings corresponding to thp

Archetype r i t e s (p ra k rt i) in the context o f the Ectyp« r i t

(v i k r t i ) though not presented by words, (but imported in th ^

form of meanings). As in the case o f expectancy, in contiguity

a lso , the p a rtic u la r order should be understood by the ord'-r

o f that which presents the meaning, and in accordance with

that, takes p lac e the expression o f the co^rrelated .

(Hence i t may be sa id ) ——

Contiguity caused only by the words is not the a u x ilia ry

cause in respect o f the knowledge (o f the sentence-meaning).

For, in common parlance, by the imported meaning also, tr.

re la tio n is seen (a tta in e d ). Contiguity of a l l the counter

c o r r e l a t i v e s , does not take p la c e at once and i t s order

depenos on the order o f the c o ll e c t io n o f those which present

meaning^. The knowledge o f the s y n ta c tic a lly re la te d (meanings)

by the words takes p la ce in the same order in which the ju xta­

p o s it io n o f the c o u n te r-co rrre la tiv e s (meanings) takes plf=c«.

( c o lle c t e d v e r s e s ).

Hence, (the meaning o f a word) i s co n siste n t with another

meaning o f a word which is possessed o f a foresa id expectance

and c o n tig u ity i . ; e . , expectant, contiguous and com p atib le.'

In the V te x t 1atha sannidhih kah' ................. * e t c ., quoted

above, the author o f the VMt d escribes Sannidhi (c o n tig u it y ).

Sanniahi is the transform ation o f the i n t e l l e c t from a mean­

ing subsequent to the hearing o f a meaning to another meann?

with the help o f Akahksa and Yogyata. But th is transform ation

o f the i n t e l l e c t i s not based on words on ly. I t i s because,

in common parlance, Anvitabhidhana is seen to a tta in by moans

o f Adhyahara a ls o . But i t should be borne in mind that, in tr »

presen t con text, by Adhyahara, Adhyahara o f ideas or mean> -s

and not that o f Sabaas or words i s meant. For Adhyahara is

re so rte d to when there i s in co m p a tib ility o f the Anvitabhidhana.

 125

Although Adhyahara is based on Arthapatti, (postulation), yet

the assumption o f Sabda i s inconsistent.

In the text above, we come to have two types o f

Arthapatti namely, Brstarthapatti (postulation from the seen)

and Srutarthapatti (postulation from the heard), tthile both the

Arthapattis are accepted by the Bhattas, the Prabhakaras accept

only Drstarthapatti and not Srutarthapatti. I t is because, they

contend, what is to be assumed is only the meaning o f closing

e t c ., in the utterance o f the words lik e ' dvaram’ (door) etc.

and as such there is^no assumption of word. 106 The Bhattas

accept Srutarthapatti where however in an incomplete sentence

<«■

there takes place the Adhyahara o f the Sabda in order to make

107
the syntactical relation .

In the J text, i t is also stated that where the word

'dvaram* (door) is imported, there also the Arthapatti cannot

lead to the assumption o f the Sabdas lik e ' avriyatam* ( le t i t

be open) and ' samvriyatam' (le t i t be shut). I t is for this

reason that the Arthapatti is the cause o f the assumption in

106. gurustu avaranadyarthasyalva kalpyataya

sabdakalpanabhavat sr u ta r th a p a ttirn ls ti ityaha. MM, p.130
107. yatra tvaparipurnasya vakyasyanvayasiddhaye
sabdo'dhyahiiyate ta tra s r u tir th a p a ttir is y a te . I b id , p.129.
 ]_pg
generai. Therefore, in common pprl?ncp, there is J'h' ‘

order to complete an incomplete sentence. Eecause of i t s

possessing Yogyata and on the strength o f the Prakarana and

Que to i t s ascertaining the p a r tic u la r meaning, the meaning

comes to complete the incomplete sentence. Thus the Anvita-

bhidhana holds good by the Niyojya in the s a c r ific e s li k e

1V i s V a j i t ’ etc. and by the use o f the means and by the mea^inrs

corresponding to the P ra k rt i yagas (Achetype r i t e s ) in the

context o f V ik r t i yagas (Ectype r i t e s ) though not presented

by the words. In the V text, we fin d Salikanatha1s reference

to the P ra k rt i and V ik r t i yaga. There are many s a c r ific e s with

regard to which the Veda does not p re sc rib e a l l the necessary

d e t a ils ; but lays down simply that such and such a s a c r if ic e

i s to be performed in a manner sim ilar to such and such another.

For example, with regard to the Is u s a c r i f i c e , after having

mentioned what i s peculiar to i t , the texts declare — ‘ the

r e s t i s l i k e the Syena s a c r if ic e . In such cases the Syena

would be c a lle d the P ra k r t i y ig a and the Is u i s c a lle d thp

V i k r t i yaga. The V ik r t i yaga i s to be performed in th ° manr-or

o f P ra k rt i yaga. 108

108. p rak rtivad v ik r tih kartavya. SB under MS. 7.1.22

 127

y*

Salikanatha also stated In the V text that as in the

•

ease of Akinksa Sannidhl works step by step in the order in

which the words are cognised and in this vsqf the Anvitabhi-
✓

dhana is also to be understood them th® Samgraha Slokas in

the 1 text above, i t is clear that Sannidhl is only the

contiguity o f cognition o f the meaning and not necessarily

o f words actually uttered* I t may be mentioned here that the

Prabhakaras understand Sannidhl as the immediate association

of the idea o f the meaning o f a related word. They do not

favour the defin ition o f Sannidhl as the proximity o f words.

In their concept of Anvitabhidhagna, i t is an accepted fa c t

that the sfaktl conveys only the related meanings o f the

words. Only an 1artha' (the meaning o f a word) can have a

rela tion with another ’ artha*. For one who believes in the

concept o f 'Anvitabhidhana*, 'Abhidhana* succeeds 'Anvaya*.

As such, one is to accept the position that there i s always

the 'Abhidhana* o f the ' Anvitartha*. Hence th® school of

Prabhakaras contends that i f by Sannidhl, we meet the Imme­

diate need o f something to complete the relation o f an

expression, then that 'something* Is invariably an ’ artha*

and not merely a Sabda. Here lie s the difference between the
Lhattas ana the Prabhakaras. While the Ehattas understand

Sannidhi as the c o n tig u ity o f a word or o f the idea o f a

word, the Prabhakaras accept i t only as the c o n tig u ity o f

the iaea o f the meaning o f a word.

In the Schools o f Nyaya and Vedanta and in the c i r c l e

o f the Alamkarikas Sannidhi is known as A sa tti.

V(8c) kim punaridam yogyatvam nama? ucyate - yat sambanch^r-

ham. sambandharhamidamiti kathamavagamyat®, samb-nahl t -
-vena drstatvad. nanvenam tarh i kathamapurve kgryo'
nvitabhidhanain vede, tena saha k a s y a ^ c it samb-ndha-
- sya‘ darsanat. /sucyate- samanyato yogyatavadhHnam
vis'esapratipattavupaya ityadosah. yadapi tadapurvam,
tadapi karyam^veti drstacarakaryasambandham y a t, tnda-
- yogyam ityavaslyate.

samanyenaiva yogyatvam lok e yadavadharitam.

£
tadanvitabhidhanasya vyotpattavupalakjJanam.
i t i Samferahs'loka^.

anye tu — yadayogyataya na1vadharitam, tadyogyam.

tena*laukiksna* p i vidhyarthena* nvitabhichanam
sidahyatityahuh. taaidamasaram. ya th i pramanantara-
-vedye vastuni kasyacid yogyatV vadhar ayitum na
s'akyate, tathaiva* y o g y a ta *p iti, sarvasya* pratit°na* r,i
sarvaprakarena tasmlnnanvayassyat. bhavarthasvaiva
visayatvena* nvayah niyojyataya* nvaya i t i niyamo
fa
nopaayata ityalam atiprasangena.
 129

1Irfhat i s , again, this compatibility? I t Is said —

( I t Is) that ^ ic h is capable o f making a relation . How i t

is known (that it) is capable o f being related? Because o f

it s being seen in common parlance, as having (this) relation .

How can, then, in the veda, there be the expression o f the

c o r r e la te d in case o f the unique resu lt as no rela tion o f

i t ( i. e ., unique result) with anything else is seen. I t is

said — there is no fau lt (in accepting that) as the ascert­

ainment o f the com patibility in general is the means o f the

knowledge o f the particular. That which is the unique resu lt

is the performable and as such that (cause) which is seen as

related with the performable that is ascertained as compa­

tib le . (Therefore, i t is said) —

That which is ascertained, in common parlance, as

possessing com patibility in general, becomes the auxiliary

cause o f knowing the expression o f the c o r r e la te d .

(co lle cte d verse).

But others (however maintain) — that (meaning) may

be said to be compatible w^ich is not ascertained due to its

incom patibility. Hence (they) say thsl^the expression o f the

co-rrelated holds good through the meaning o f e<ren vedic

 130

(Alaukika) In ju n ctiv e sentence. But that c a r r ie s no sens°.

As in the case o f a ce rta in o b je c t not knowib&e by any oth er

source o f knowledge, the com p a tib ility o f anything cannot be

ascertain ed, so also the in com p a tib ility (cannot be a s ce rt­

ained) and as such there may be, by a l l means, the s y n ta c tic a l

r e la t io n o f a l l in r e s p e c t o f that (o b je c t ) even though n ot

known. For on ly the meaning o f the verb to S y n ta ctic a lly

r e la te d to tiie o b je c t o f the meaning o f the word ch a ra cte ri­

sed by undesirable q u a lify in g adjunct S y n ta ctic a lly r e la te d

with the meaning l ik e one who d esires heaven e tc. in the

form o f the prompted person and as such th is accepted r u le

does not h old good and so there i s no need o f much elabor­

a tion in th is con text.

In t h e ! tex t ' kim punaridam yogyatvam nam a.............1

e t c . , quoted above, Salikanatha elu cid a tes his concept o f

yogyata, yogyata as sta ted by Salikanatha i s that which i s

capable o f making a r e la t io n . The Prabhakara Mimamsakas

understand yogyata as the s u it a b ilit y o f Padas to have

S y n ta ctica l r e la t io n with oth er Padas o f the same Vakya.

The knowledge o f th is yogyata occu rs i* f t h e mind o f the

speaker and the lis t e n e r in a p a rticu la r con text on the

 131

strength of the previous experience of seeing the words to

be in such relations. In the’ smtence, 1payasa sincati’

(t£e sprinkles it with water), There is yogyata of meaning,

since sec ana (sprinkling) is generally dose with a liquid like

water and there is nothing incompatible between the Idea of

secana (sprinkling) and that of water. But a sentence like

1vahnina sincati' (He sprinkles i t with fire) has no yogyata

since the idea of sprinkling is something Incongruous with

that of fire.

In the V text, Salikanatha also rejects an objection

that if yogyata is accepted as making a relation, then in the

veda, how there can be Anvitabhidhana in case of the Apurva-

•karya (unique result) as no relation of it with anything <=>lse

is seen. In his reply to this objection, Salikanatha says

that there will be no fault in admitting yogyata as a factor

in bringing about a relation between Padas. For the knowledge

of yogyata in general Is the means of understanding the

yogyata in particular. As the Apurva is also the Karya

(performable). So Its relation with Karya is seen and as such

it has yogyata. In his Samgraha sloka, Salikanatha explains

yogyata clearly. I t has been stated there that yogyati which

 132

i s ascertained in common parlance, in g a ie ra l i s the a u x ili­

ary cause in understahjding the Anvitabhidhana.

I t may he mentioned here tifat the Bhattas adnit yogyata

as an e s s e n tia l fa c t o r f o r understanding the Vakyartha as they

h old that there can he no knowledge o f a Vakyartha in sentence

l i k e 'Agnina s in c a t i' ob viou sly fo r la ck o f yogyata between

the words ’ Agnina' and 'S in ca ti*

In ' anye tu yadayogyataya ................. 1 e t c . , o f the

»

1 te x t, quoted above, the author o f the M » r e fe r s to the

view o f some thinkers regarding yogyata and then r e fu te s the

same. According to these th lhkersr yogyata i s that which is

n ot ascertain ed as being incom patible. In other words, those

meanings o f words may be sa id to be capable o f making a r e la ­

tio n , in which the la ck o f yogyata i s n ot ascertain ed. Thus

in th eir view* the Anvitabhidhana holds good through the

meaning o f even the Vidhi vakyas. This view i s o f th« Navya-

Naiyayikas. These Naiyayikas do not b e lie v e in the knowledge

o f yogyata as a necessary con d ition fo r the knowledge of

109. agnina s in c a ti tyadavayogyinamananvayat.

yogyatapi pafigrahya. MM, p . 99.
 133

Vakyartha. As they h eld , i t is a ctu a lly the knowledge o f

the Ayogyata (in c o m p a tib ility ) between two concepts that
stands in the way o f understanding o f a Vakyartha. As fo r
in stan ce, the knowledge o f Vakyartha does not occur from a
sentence l ik e 1Vahnina s in c a t i' on ly being prevented by the
ascertainment o f the Ayogyata existin g in the form o f the
absffice o f the instrum entality o f f i r e in resp ect o f sprin k-
ling.-^l® Silikanatha r e je c t s th is view o f the Navya Naiyayikas
as he thinks that the view c a r r ie s no sense. For, as in the
case o f c e rta in o b je c t not known by any other source of
knowledge; the Yogyata o f anything cannot be ascertain ed,
the Ayogyata also cannot be ascertain ed. Thus there may b*>,
by a l l means, the S y n ta ctica l r e la t io n o f a l l in resp ect
o f that o b je c t wen in i t s being n ot known.

nanvanvitabhidhanapakse vyutpa11avyjial akp an a si* ay anam*>va

• •

gauravamityatraha

• If i t i s o b je cte d that the r e co g n itio n o f the a u x ilia ry

cause in re sp e ct o f the knowledge in connection

110. navy as tn yogyataya j nan am na sabdajnane karanam

vahnina sincatiyadau sdce vahnikaranakatvabhava-
rupa'yogyataniscaysna pratibanahanna slbaabhoahah.
NSM under BP, p . 471.
with the expression o f the e o -r r e la te d in v olv es p r o lix it y ,

i t i s r e p lie d here' -*■

K(9) Padarthesvapl c a iv a lsa samagryanvayabodhane.

•And even in r e sp e ct o f the Meanings o f the words,

th is c o ll e c t io n (samagri) o f the a u x ilia ry causes (are

necessary) in understanding the S y n ta ctica l r e la t io n .'

V(9) yasyapi mate padartha eva' nyonyanvayamavagamayanti,

tena' p i pratiniyatanvayabodhasiddhyarthamidamasr a-
yaniyameva — akamksa - sannidhi - yogyatavanta
eva padartha vakyartham bo dh ay an ti, nsuiya i t i ,
etadeva kathamiti paryanuyuktena vrddhavyavahare
tathadarsanaditi parihiu’o vacyah. tasmadubhayapak-
-sasadharanatvannedai dusanam. i-t » H

‘ Even in whose views on ly the meanings o f words

g iv e r i s e to the knowledge o f the mutual r e la t io n , by him

a ls o , i t should be admitted that fo r the sake o f atta in in g

the regular S y n ta ctica l r e la t io n , only the meanings o f

words having expectancy, co n tig u ity and co m p a tib ility give

r i s e to the knowledge o f the meaning o f the sentence and

n o t o th e rs. Because o f i t being seen, So, in the process

of the usage of the elderly persons) by him who repeatedly

questions as to 'how Is this* non-admission (parlhara) of

prolixity is to be stated. Hence, because of the demerit

being common to both the views, i t may not be deemed as

demerit. 1

In 'padarthesvapi..................... 1 etc. and 'yasya'pi

m a t e ......................... ' etc. of the K and V text respectively,

quoted above, Salikanatha discards the objection according

to which there will be the involvement of prolixity even in

the theory of Anvitabhidhana i f the auxiliary cause is

accepted for understanding the Vakyartha. This is an object­

ion that is raised by the advocates of the Abhlhitanvaya

theory. In reply to the objection, Salikanatha contends

that even in the event of adnitting the theory of Abhihitan-

-vaya, one must accept that only those Padarthas aided by

Akanksa, Sannidhi and Yogyata give rise to the knowledge

of the Vakyartha. But the Padarthas devoid of these threp

factors cannot lead to the knowledge of the Vakyarthaj For,

it is seen in the Trddhavyavahara. There is no way to avoid

these three factors in case of Abhlhitanvaya also. Thus

 Salikanatha asserts that as the demerit i s common to both

the th eories o f Abhihitanvaya and Anvitabhidhana, So, the

fa u lt s h o u l d b e c o n n iv e d a t t h e sam e s h o u ld n o t b e r e p e a t e d l y

111
q u e s t io n e d .

nanvevamapi kena vlsesena* bhlhitanvayam p a rity a jy a , Anvita-

- bhidhanamasritamiti. Atra*ha

‘ W e ll even t h is b e in g so, w hat i s th e p a r t i c u l a r

ground on which, having r e je c te d the c o r r e l a t i o n o f the

exp ressed , th e e x p r e s s io n o f th e c o r r e l a t e d is accep ted

H ere i t is r e p lie d *?E

K(iO) kintu tesianadrstaisa slaktirmanantaradgatau.

kalpya visistarthaparapadasamsparslabhavita.

•But as the c a p a b ility o f the mutual r e la tio n i s not

seen in re sp e ct o f the meanings o f words attain ed by other

source o f knowledge, the c a p a b ility a ris in g from the asso­

c ia t io n o f words conveying q u a lifie d ( i . e . , re la te d ) mean­

in gs, i s to be assumed*1

111. yas'cobhmyoh samo dosah p a r ih a r o 'p i tadrsah.

naikah paryanuyoktavyah tadr gar tha~vicar an e.
V(lOa) ‘ padarthinai h i s'abdahyatah prananat pratiyamana-
-nanamanyonyanvayabodhakatvaii na p r a tita m iti,
s'abdabhidheyanaa tadavagamasaktih kalpayitavya.

tasyascotpattau sabdasamsparsa ewa h etu rityasra y-

- aniyaa. sabdo h i visistatftha|»ratipattlparataya
lokavyavahiresu prayujyamano drstah. na ca' sau
saksadvaiyiirthapratipadane sanartha iti,
padirthiuiavantaravyapitPikaroti. t e ca yadyanyonya-
-nvayabodhane samarthassyuh, tada tesamavantaravya-
-p a r a t a syanna' - n yath eti, ▼ isistarthavabodhaparas-
- abdasaisparsadeva tesamesa sa k tira v lrb h a v a tlti,
sabdasya' p i p adar thagatwivayabo dhaktv a_ saktya-

- dhanasaktirasrayaniya. syadevan — yadi manin tar a-

- vaseyanam padar thanaasanyonysnyavagajne samar thy a»
na syat. a s ti tu ta t svaityasya’ navadharitasrayavi-
- sesasya pratyaksadrstasya, asvasya'pratipannayuna-
-v is e s a s y a pratyaksahresasabdanuaitasya padanik?*-
- pasabdanumitasya, ajnatakartrbhedasya dhavanasya
ca , ' sveto* svo dhavati* tyanvayabodhakatradar sanat.
Tadgjmrvattikakiraffiisrah
A *
—

'pasyassvetaBarupai hresasabdam ca srnvatah.

khuraniksepasabdanca sveto'sV o d h a v a titi dhlh.
drstavakyaviniraukta' i t i . (SV. 7 .35 8 ).

Aripan — avyaktarupmityarthah. tena gunaviseso na

pratyaksamavaslyata ity a r th a h .'
 'For, tfae sta te o f conveying the mutual r e la tio n by

the meanings o f words ( i . e . , ideas o r concepts) known from

the source o f knowledge oth er than the Sabda i s not known

and as such the power o f conveying that (mutual r e la tio n )

is to be assumed in r e s p e c t o f the meanings denoted by the

words. And in the a risin g ou t o f that (power), on ly the

a s s o cia tio n o f the words i s to be accepted as the cause.

For, in common parlance, the word i s seen used as being

bent on conveying the q u a lifie d ( i . e . , re la te d ) meaning.

And th is (word) i s not capable o f conveying the meaning o f

a sentence d ir e c t ly and as such ( i t ) in volves the meanings

o f the words as interm ediate cause. And on ly i f they (th e

meanings o f words) are capable o f conveying the mutual

r e la t io n then they w ill have th© q u a lific a t io n o f being

the interm ediate cause and not otherw ise and as such th is

power o f tile meanings o f words a rises from the a sso cia tio n

o f the words denoting the q u a lifie d (th e r e la te d ) meaning

and o f the w°rd also is to be admitted the producing power

corresponding to the power o f the meaning o f word (Adhana

Sakti) in re sp e ct o f conveying the mutual r e la t io n . Yes,

such i s the case, i f in respect of giving r is e to uutua!

re latio n , there would have been no capability of the mean­

ings of words ascertained by other source of knowledge. Eut

th is i s there — because o f the observation o f the conveying

of mutual relatio n in the form of 'a white horse i s running*

among the perceived (directly seen) white colour, the p a r ti­

cular substratum o f which i s not yet ascertained, the horse

whose particu lar q u a litie s are Dot ascertained and which is

inferred from the (auditory) perception o f the neighing

(sound) and (the act of) running of which the particular

agent i s not known and. which i s inferred from the noise of

hoofs (arisin g out of giving step s). So, says the revered

varttikakara (the author of the v arttik as) ——

"Of one (a person) who sees something white, hears

the neighing (sound) o f a horse and the noise o f hoofs

(arisin g out of giving ste p s), obtains the knowledge that

a white horse i s running even in the absence of any such

sentence" (SV. 7/358). (The word) Arupam means that the

form or the shape o f which (is ) s t i l l unmanifest. Hence,

the particu lar feature i s not ascertained by means of

p e r c e p tio n .1

In "k in tu te sa m .........................." e t c . o f the K and

"paditrthanim h i ....................... " e t c . o f the 2 te x t r e s p e c t-

iv e ly , Salikanatha puts forward the view o f the Bhattas who

contend th at the conveying o f the mutual r e la t io n by the

Padarthas cannot be known by any oth er source o f knowledge

except Sabda (1. e . , the verbal testim ony). T h erefore, to

them, the power o f conveying that mutual r e la tio n Is to be

assumed in re sp e ct o f the meanings denoted by the words and

the a s s o cia tio n o f the words i s th e cause o f producing the

power. The words are not capable o f conveying the Vakyartha

d ir e c t ly and so they in volve the meanings o f the words as

interm ediate cause. I t i s a lso stated in the ]£ te x t that

the word has a power c a lle d AdhSna Saktl corresponding to

the power o f the meaning o f a word in re sp e ct o f conveying

the mutual r e la tio n .

In order to strengthen th eir view that the conveying

o f the mutual r e la t io n by the Padarthas can be known only

from the verb al testimony, the Bhattas r e fe r to the p ecu lia r

 Instance o f the running o f horse v i z . , the verse 'pasyattVi

e t c . 1 o f the Slokavairttika o f Kumarila. In a situ a tio n where

one sees a white fig u re without n o tic in g i t s s p e c ia l featu res

and hears the neighing sound and the n o is e o f h oofs, the

knowledge *a horse i s running* at once occurs in o n e 's mind.

The combination o f d iffe r e n t fa c ts is governed by the fa c to r s

v i z . , Akinksa, Yogyata and Sannidhi, though there i s no word

known to denote any one o f these f a c t s . From th is i t is clea r

that the meanings which are the fa c t s meant by the words much

have the c a p a b ility to combine with one another.

IIP

The word 'S vet amarupam' in the verse, ' pasyatasivetama-

-rupam e tc .* as quoted in the jf te x t above, i s found as

'Svetimarupam* in many works. Even in the Slpkavart tlk a to

which the v e rs e belongs, the word i s found as 'Svetimarupam*

Again the word 'Arupam* in the said verse, i s used by some as

' Arupam* . l l 4

112. nanu ' p as'yatass’Vtimarupam hresas'abdsm ca srnvatah.

khuraniksspaslabdam ca sveto'sV o d h a v a tlti d h i r it i
nyayadastyeva padar than am samsargabodhajanakatvam i t i .
CS, p. 256.

113. V id e , SV, p . 1148

114. V id e , KTS, p . 2 8 i.
 142

I t may be pointed out here that w hile in most of the

works, we fin d the word ' Svetimarupam* in the verse 1pasyatah

..........etc. as stated in the j£ te x t, in the and in th»

Tantrarahasva o f Ramanujacstrya, the word is used as ' Svetama-

- r up am*. The word 'Svetlrnarupam’ i s , however, considered appro­

p ria t e .

V (lO b) 'A trocyate — kim yenaiva purusena svaityasamanasr-

- ayau hresadhvanl - padaniksepa-sabdavavagatau, tasyai-

-veyam * sveto's'vo d h a v a t i't i dhih? uta yasya' padana-

- dhyavasayah, t a s y a 'p i it i? kimat ah S yadi tavadapr-

- atyakali tahresa-dhvani-padaviharanirghosapadanasypt-

- yucyate, tada p ra titiv iro d h a h . sa hyevaa pratipadyate

— bhavitavyamasmin dese nunamasvena, bhavitavyanca

kenaciddhavateti. atha* svasambandhinameva khuraputa-

-tankararavamabhyasapatavavasadavaiti, tada' savasva-

-vartirnfaaeva vegavatim gatimanuminotiti, na punah

kevalamsra, vagamya, tasya'nvayam padarthasamarthyena'-

vabudhyate. yopi tasmin dese na* styanyo' sV ad iti

n is c lty a , paris'esyidapadinadhyavasaye'pi hresadhvane-

- s'svaityasaminadhikaranamasvatvamapyadhyavasyatl,

tasya‘ p i grhabhavadars'anamiva bahirbhavavagatavar tha-

- p a ttih — 'yo'yam svetah, sa eso'svah 1 ity a t ra prama-

-nam. yastu sVaityasamanldhikaranau hresadhvanikhur-

- aputatankaravadhyavasyati, tasya'pyasvatve vegavati

 143

ca gamane svetavartlnyeva' numana*f na svatantrayoh

atah praminiuitarenasambaddhOTabhatinani padarthanam
na kvacldanyonyasambandhabodhakatvamanuiianar thapa-
- ttiv y a tirek en a pratltam*

api ca yadi padirthavagatimafcradeva parasparanva-

-yavagamah, tada kasmin pramane tasya' ntarbhava
i t i vacyam? na tlvacchabde, s^abdabhavat. padartha-
- bhidhanaviuitaravyaparena h i yacchabdadanvayajnanam
tacchabdamltyesa vo raddhantah. taaninna1 sya sabde*
ntarbhavah. pra®anantarabhyupagame tu sabdasyocche-
-dah , sabdavagatapadarthavisaye*pi tasyaiva prama-
- nyaprasahgat. tasmacchabiabhihitanam padar thanaman-
- y a tra 1drstam vakyarthabodhanasamar thyam k a lp a y ita -
- vyam. tada dhana slakti sea sabdananapiti k alp anal a-
- ghavacchabjsdanimeva* nvitasvar thavabo dhanasakttm-
- a tram k alp ay i turn nyayyaa. tena paramparyena padana-
-manvitesu samar thyam itl nirasta® 1.

'Hare i t i s said whether the knowledge o f the sentenc

"a white horse i s running” is obtained by the person who has

understood the neighing (sound) and the n o ise o f h oofs which

have a substratum in common with whiteness or (the knowledge

i s obtained) by him who has not ascertain ed the p la ce where

from the horse is running? What o f that ? If i t is said that

(the knowledge) i s o f the person who has not ascertain ed the

p la ce from which the neighing (sound) and the n oise o f hoofs

are heard, then th is w ill he the co n tra d ictio n to knowledge.

For, the person (concerned) w il l, indeed, think l ik e th is *—

c e r ta in ly there must be a horse in th is p la ce and someone that

that runs* Then due to the repeated sound o f the h o o fs, he

comes to know that th is sound belongs to the horse and then

he In fe rs the fa s t running o f the horse and not again knowing

on ly the motion (g a t i) he understands i t s (o f th e horse) r e la ­

tio n on the strength o f the c a p a b ility o f the im ports. He who

also, a fte r having ascertain ed that there is no animal other

than the horse in that p la ce , la t t e r on even in re sp e ct o f

knowing the p la ce from which the horse runs, ascertain s th<^

horse-hood, as p erta in in g to the same substratum in common

with the neighing (sound) and whiteness, (and) the p ostu la tion

i s the source ( o f h is knowledge) o f "th a t which is w hile, is

th is horse" as the case o f not seeing one in the house (i s the

source o f h is ) knowledge o f being o u tsid e . And he who a s ce rt­

ains that the neighing (sound) and n oise o f hoofs belong to

the same to which whiteness also belon gs, comes to have the

in fe re n ce that where there i s horse-hood, there i s the s ta te

o f running and whiteness and these are n ot independent (o f

 o
each o t h e r ), tienet^ i t I s known that without in feren ce and
p o stu la tio n , there can be no conveying o f the mutual r e la tio n
o f the meanings o f words which do n ot com# to be r e la te d by
any other source o f knowledge.

Moreover, i f the knowledge o f the mutual r e la t io n is only

from the knowledge o f the meanings o f words, then i t i s to be
asked as to in which means o f the v a lid knowledge, that (th e
knowledge o f the mutual r e la tio n ) w ill be inclu ded ? Not indeed
in the verbal testim ony, i t i s because o f the absence o f the
word (preceeding the knowledge o f the r e l a t i o n ) . This i s your
con clu sion that there i s v erb a l testimony where the knowledge
o f the r e la t io n a rises from words with the involvement as the
interm ediate cause o f the denotation o f the meanings o f words.
T h erefore, i t (th e knowledge o f €he mutual r e la tio n ) cannot
be in clu d ed in the v erb a l testimony* But in the event o f the
admission o f oth er means o f v a lid knowledge, verbal testimony
i s elim inated, because the v a lid it y o f verbal testimony is
con textu a l in re sp e ct o ^ the meanings o f words conveyed by
words. Hence, the c a p a b ility o f conveying the meaning o f the
sentence, which i s not seen elsewhere, is to be assumed in
r e s p e ct o f the meanings o f th e words denoted by the words.
And that producing power (Adhanasakti) belongs to the words
also and as such because o f there being s im p lic ity in the
matter o f assumption, i t i s proper to asstime that on ly the
words have the power to convey the r e la te d meanings. There­
f o r e , i t is discarded that the words have the power in re sp e ct
o f the r e la te d meaning* (on ly) in d ir e c tly .*
 In the J tex t v i z . , ' a t r o e y a t e ................. e tc . o f the
VM. Salikanatha r e je c t s the view o f the Bhattas who contend
that i t I s on ly the verbal testimony from*which one can under­
stand the mutual r e la t io n from the Padiarthas. He also r e je c t s
the Bhattas explanation o f the v erse v i z . , 'pasyatassvetaBarupam
..................... * e tc . which sta tes that the knowledge v i z . , 'a white
horse i s running* occu rs in one*s mind through verbal t e s t i ­
mony. But according to the Prabhakaras, the p ecu lia r in stan ce
11 s
o f the running horse i s the cases o f Anumana and A rth apatti.
Salikanatha sta tes that due to the repeated sound o f the h oofs
o f the horse, the peprmon comes to know that the sound belongs
to the horse ana then in fe r s the running o f the h orse. Thus
having ascertain ed that there i s no animal but the h orse, the
person ascertain s the horse-hood as p ertain in g to the same
substrum in common with the neighing sound and w hiteness. And
thus i t i s a case o f A rthapatti which i s the source o f the
person* s knowledge o f *th at which i s white i s the h orse” lik e
o n e 's knowledge o f an oth er's being ou tsid e by not seeing him
in the house. Thus according to the Prabhakaras the knowledge
o f the mutual r e la t io n conveyed by the Padarthas cannot be
attain ed without Anumana and A rth ap a tti.

115....................... .... anumanadarthapatterva ta tra samsargavagamat.

tathahl esam padarthanam ekadhikaranataya* vagatanam
pratyayakatvena* numanjuaytir eko visakalitavagatanam
va'rthantarabhive n is c it e 'r t h a p a tt ir e v a p a r is is y a te ,
an ls'cite tvanadhyavasaya era. CS, p . 256.
 In the J te x t, Salikanatha a le e r e je c t s the view o f the
Bhattas that the mutual r e la t io n i s unterstood from on ly the
Padarthas and he also o b je c t s th at i f th is i s so, then i t i s
to be sta ted as to in which Pramana the knowledge o f the mtitual
r e la t io n i s Included. According to Salikanatha, i t cannot be
>•

inclu ded in the Sabdapramana because o f th ere being no word

that preceeds the knowledge o f the mutual re la tio n * I t is
again because, in the view o f the Bhattas, that; is Sabda-
-pramana where the knowledge o f the mutual r e la tio n a rises
from the words with the involvement as the interm ediate cause,
o f the denotation o f the Padarthas. T h erefore, the knowledge
o f the mutual r e la t io n cannot be sa id to be included in the
v erb al testim ony. I f again i t i s said that the mutual r e la ­
tio n o f the meanings o f words can be understood from other
source o f v a lid knowledge, then the verbal testimony i s to bo
excluded. For, i f the meaning o f a word known from other source
i s admitted as the verbal testim ony, then other sou rce w ill
be known from the meanings o f words known from verbal testimony
i . e . , there w ill be v io la t io n o f the r u le that meaning which is
known from which source o f v a lid knowledge, w ill be the o b je c t
o f that source o f v a lid knowledge. As a r e s u lt , the power o f
conveying the Vakygrtha in r e sp e ct o f the Padarthas that are
denoted by the words i s to be imagined. For, th is power i s not
seen elsewhere. This power i s producing ca p a city , i . e . , the

Adhina Sakti and i t belongs to the words on ly and as such there

i s the s im p lic ity o f assumption and because o f there being
the s im p lic ity , i t i s proper to assume the power in re sp e ct
o f the words o n ly , i . e . , the words denote^ the r e la te d meanings.
In th is way i t is discarded that the Padas have the power in
r e s p e c t o f the r e la te d meanings in d ir e c t ly .

VClOc). 'nanvanantapratiyogyanvltasvarthabodhanavisaya
ananta eva sabdasya saktayah kalpayitavyassyuh.
•

abhihitanvayavade tvekasminnarthe ekasya s'abdas-

-y a ik a iv a s 'a k t ir it i. tanna — ekayaiva1kaiiksita-
sannihita - yogyarthanvitasvarthabhidhanasektyi
pr atiyogibhedena kjuryabh edop ap attescaksur adinamiva.
caksuryathaivaikaya darsanasaktya gh ata d ip ratiyo-
- gisahiyabhedaj jnanani bhinnani ja n a ya ti, tatha
sa bd o'p i p ra tiy og ib h ed a d lti mantavyam. kinca
padarthesvapi tulyam etaditi na k in c id e ta t. *

*But then (in that c a s e ), innumerable powers o f (a sin g le )

word sh a ll have to be assumed in favour o f conveying i t s mean­
ing as r e la te d with i t s innumerable counter - c o r r e la tiv e s .
9 *

But in the case o f the c o n g e la t io n o f the expressed there i s

on ly one power o f a s in g le word in r e sp e c t o f one meaning
on ly that i s n ot tru e. For, by on ly one powOr ( o f a word)
denoting i t s Own meaning as r e la te d with expectant, contiguous
and com patible meanings as in the case o f (sense-organs lik e )
eye e tc . in re sp e ct o f the action s by the d iffe r e n c e o f
co u n te r-p o sitiv e s may be obtained. Just as the eye by i t s
s in g le cap acity o f seeing, produces d iffe r e n t co g n itio n s on
the b a sis o f the d iffe r e n c e in the co n ta ct o f the cou n ter-
p ositi«B S such as jar etc*, so a ls o , i t i s to be admitted that
the word (produces the knowledge o f the re la te d meanings with
the d iffe r e n c e o f c o u n t e r - c o r r e l a t iv e s ) • I t w ill make no sense
i f i t is said that ju s t the same in the case o f meanings o f
words a lso .*

In the V te x t v iz . , *nanvanantapratlyogya...............'
e t c . , abeveu, the author o f the VM, r e fe r s to an o b je c tio n
r a is e d by some o f the fo llo w e rs o f Kumarila and discards the
same. According to the view o f these B h itta s, in the theory o f
S'

the Anvitabhidhina o f the Prabhakaras, innumerable Saktis o f

a s in g le Sabda sh all have to be imagined in favour o f conveying
i t s meaning as r e la te d with i t s innimierable c o u n te r -c c 0 r r e ls tiv e
meanings and thus the Anvitabhidhina o f the Prabhakaras in v o l­
ves the demerit o f having inm merableness and as such this
v ie w o f the Prabhakaras eannot be accepted. But in the case
o f the theory o f Abhihitanvaya o f the Bhattas, on ly one power
o f a word i s assumed in re sp e ct o f one meaning on ly and as
such because o f i t s ( o f the view) having s im p lic ity in the
matter o f assumption i . e . , because o f there being no assumpt­
io n o f inntaerableness in re sp e ct o f the view o f the B h itta s,
i t i s b e tte r to accept the Abhihitanvaya o f the Bhattas. Eut
s*
Salikanatha sta tes that the o b je c tio n r a ise d by the fo llo w e rs
o f the Abhihitanvaya does n ot stand to reason. According to
him, by on ly the Abhidhana Sakti o f a Pada denoting i t s meaning
 c
as r e la te d with the meanings having Akinksa, Sannidhi and
Yogyata as In the case o f sense-organs lik e efcre e t c . , in
r e s p e c t o f the action s by the d iffe r e n c e o f the co u n te r-p o si­
tiv e s may be obtained, with the help o f the example o f the
sense-organ l ik e the eyes, Sallkanatha explains the fu n ction
o f the Abhidhana Sakti o f the Padas. Just as the eyes with the
s in g le power o f seeing produces d iffe r e n t cogn ition s on the
b a sis o f the d iffe r e n c e in con tact with the counter p o s itiv e s
such as jar e t c ., so also a Pada by i t s s in g le Abhidhana Sakti
produces the knowledge o f the r e la te d meanings with the d i f f e r ­
ence o f the c o u n te r-ccP rre la tiv e s. Here, a Pada i s compared to
an eye, the Abhidhana Sakti o f the Pada i s compared to the
#>■*

Darslana Sakti or the power o f seeing o f the eyes and the

Padirtha i s compared to a ja r which i s the P ro tiy o g i or the
countes p o s it iv e o f the knowledge o f a ja r .

In th is way, Sallkanatha asserts that there w ill be no

assumption o f innumerable powers o f a Pada as the Bhattas
i.0
o b je c t and thereby,he r e je c t s the same.
A

1 (1 0 (d ) ' an ye tvahuh — akanksa- sannidhi- yogyatavantah

padirtha vakyarthibhavanti, na punarvakyirthameva
bod h ayan titi. tadidamatimandam - vakyarthavagateh
karanabhavaprasangat. anup ay at ve padanamanvayapratitau

padirtha api cenna karanam, akaranikaiva'padyeta.

syanmatam. kciyapadena, karakapadena va sakanks e* r the *
b h ih ite , yadeva padantarena yogyapratiyogipadarthant-
-ar^ii sannidhapyate, tadeva tasya sambanditveni' vatisth ate
 — i t i . satyamevam. avagatistu tatsambandhasya
kinnlbandhanetl vacyam. atba purvapadarthe sakan-
kse’ b h ih ite , ya t padantaramuccaritam, ta t tatsam-
-bandhitayaiva svarthamupanayati pratyayavat. yatha
prakrtyarthe purvapratlte pratyaya uccaryamanassva-
-rtham tadvislfestamev^bhidhatte, tatha padantaramapi.
jra
taduktam, "prakrtipratyayau pratfrarth&fc saha brutah"
(MB.) i t i . prakrtih svartham pratyayarthavisesanat-
- ven spanayatlti, pratyayena tadarthamahetyar tiiah.
tatha coktam —
•’nityam v i s i s t a w'a1rth e pratyayo yatprayujyate.
tatpurvataravijnataprakrtyarthavipesanat. I t i . 1

’ Others, however, contend — the Meanings o f the words

aided by expectancy, con tig u ity and c o n p a t ib ilit y become
(transform in to ) the meaning o f the sentence and do n ot, again,
give r i s e to the knowledge o f the sentence-meaning. But this
view i s rather worse. For, (in such c a s e ), there w ill be the
absence o f the cause in understanding the sentence-meaning.
I f the words are n ot accepted aft the cause o f the knowledge
o f the r e la t io n o f the meanings o f words and also the meaning?
o f words are n ot the cause, then i t must be admitted that there
w ill be the knowledge o f tbe sentence-meaning without any
cause. There may be view ( l i k e th is ) — the expectant meaning
having been denoted e ith e r by a verb o r a ca se, whichever
com patible counter-coPrr e la tiv e meaning i s conveyed in c o n t i­
guity by another word, then that (meaning) stands r e la te d to
the other (meaning). Indeed this is true. But i t should he
asKed as to o f what basis is the knowledge o f that relation .
I f i t is said} the earlier expectant meaning o f the word h^.'ir
been denoted, whichever other word is uttered that (very word)
brings about its own meaning only as being related to th *
other meaning as is the case with a su ffix . Just as the mean­
ing o f the stem (Prakrti) having been known ea rlier, tjip sof^i
(Pratyaya) that Is uttered, denotes it s own meaning only
qualified by that (meaning o f the stem). So (does) the oth^r
word. Hence i t is said —’’ the stem and the su ffix together

denote the meaning of the su ffix" (MB). I t means that the ct-.cr'
brings about it s own meaning as a qu alification o f the me«n1 n •
o f the su ffix and as such by the su ffix , the meaning (o f that
Prakrti) is conveyed. Similarly i t is said —►

"That the su ffix is always used in the sense o f qua’ >-

fle d meaning, because o f its being the meaning, the q u a lific ­
ation o f the stem earlier to that."

In the V text v iz ., 1anye tvahuh..................'e t c . ,

Salikanatha re je cts the view o f some thinkers who contend that
the Paaarthas having Akinksa, Sannidhi and Yogyata become

( i . e . , transform into) the Vakyartha ana do not give r is ° to

the knowledge <^f the Vakyartha. But SaliXanatha considers t.-.i^
view as the worst. For, there w ill be no cause o f unoerstandi ->
the Vakyartha. But i t Is known to a ll that most o f the thinker
o f the systems o f Indian Philosophy ana a ls o .o f the Alamkam
Sastras, accept that AkanksS, Sannidhi and Yogyata are th«
 - 117
causes o f understanding the Vikyartha. I f Pada or Paoart-n
i s not accepted as the cause o f givin g r i s e to the yaxygrth*,
then one w ill have to admit that Vakyartha can be understood
witnout any cause. But th is cannot be said so.

In the V tex t again, Salikanatha puts forward another

view which sta tes tnat the expectant meaning having been ueoo-
tefi e ith e r by the Kriyapada o r by the Karkapada, whichever
counter cd3-r r e la tiv e meaning i s conveyed in co n tig u ity by
another Pada, then that meaning becomes r e la te d to the other
meaning. Salikanatha says that,no doubt i t may be tr u e ,t it
i t i s to be stated as to what i s the basis o f the knowledge
o f that r e la t io n . I f i t i s sa id , the e a r lie r expectant meanir :-
o f the Pada having been denoted, whichever other Pada is
u tte re d , that Pada brings about i t s own meaning only as r e la ­
ted to the oth er meaning as in the case o f a Pratyaya. dost
as thp meaning o f the Prakrti having been known e a r lie r ,
Pratyaya that i s u ttered , denotes i t s Own meaning only as
q u a lifie d by the meaning o f the P ra k rti. Same is Hie case wi
the other Pada a ls o . In th is con text Salikanatha re fe r s to
the view o f P a ta n ja li that P rakrti and Pratyaya tog pth°r c enr> »
the meaning o f the Pratyaya. But th is is also found in tip
- 11 s
Bhasya o f Sahara under MS. 1 1 .1 .2 2 . . o f the meanings o f th^
two v i z . , Prakrti and Pratyaya, the meaning o f the Prntyoya

117. atrakinksa ca yogyatvam sannidhis'ceti tattrayairj/

vakylrthavagame sarvaih karanatvena kalpyate^ mm, p .'^ i

118. The Sutra o f the MS i s :

1sakrttu syatkrtarthatvadangavat 1.
i s more important.
n 9 P ra k rti transorms i t s own meaning to

the meanings o f the Pratyaya as a Visesana (qualification ',

o f the Pratyaya and as a r e s u l t o f that, i t is Pratyaya tnat

denotes the meaning o f the Prakrti and as such the meaning o

the Pratyaya comes to be the P rin c ip al one. The quotation

from the mahabnagya v i z . , 1prakrtipcratyayau pratyayartham

sahabrutah’ occurs under Sutra 3.1.68 o f tie Agtadhyayl o 7

'

P a n in i^ By t ie word 1Sahabruta1, mutual non-abandonment

o f PraKrti and Pratyaya i s to be understood.

V(lOe) 1angiKrtam tarh i dvitiyasya padasyanvitabhidhanam,

prathamasya ta th a 'p i n a ' s t i t i cenna. vakye padanam

prayogakramanlyamabhavat. yadeva kadacit prathamam,

tfcdeva kadacit d vitiyam iti, sarvapadanameva'nvita-

- bhidhanamapatltam. abhihitanvayavadi ca p r a k r t i-

pratyayayorpyanvaya-vayatirekavadharitavyatzkiktas^k-
* k

-tikayorabhihitanvayameva padavadicchati.

tatha ca —

1prakrtipratyayau brutah fratyayartham saheti y « t .

bhedenaiva'bhidnane'pi pridhanyena tathocyate.1

'pakara tu pacireva'h a kartaram pratyayo* pyakah.

pakayuktah punah karta vacyo naikasya kasyacid.'

ityah--.

119. (a) prakrtipratyayau sahartham brutah pradhanyantu

pratyayirthasyaiva. TP under p Lm , p. 112.
(b) Prakrtlpratyayoh praty^Srtha^pradnanyam. VB, p. 43-'.

120. The Sutra is — "sarvadnatuke y a k ".

 x i n c a p r a t y a y a s 'c e d a n v i t a b h i d h a y i , ta da t a d a v i '
padanam apyan vitabhldhayita k i m i t i na'bhyup e y a t ° , H.m^r-
- dhavfcis'asena. y a d i p r a k r t ip r a t y a y o r p y a n v i t a b h id h a n a m a s ^ l
na t a r h i a v a r a m i t y a t r a 1 n vita b h id h an an u pap attin ih en ah a n -
- y a 1kanksaya v i v r i y a t a m , samvriyata® vetyadhyaharah.
ucyate. d v a r a m i t i pratnameyam p r a t i p a d i k i r t h a v y a t i r i r -
- t a r t h “a b h i d h a y in i . te n a ' t r a xena saha' nvi t a s y a ' bhivhbnas.
v y a t i r i k t a r the p r a t y a y e praves'ayetjJyadau yo'dhyah or ah,
s o ' b h i h i t a r t h a n u p a p a t t y a i v a v i s a l v a j i d a a i v a d i t i na : ir.-n'

'If it i s s a i d , the e x p r e s s i o n o f the c o ^ r r e l a t ^ c t v ti

secona word i s , t h e r e f o r e , ad m it te d , y e t t h a t ( e x p r e s s i o n o f
th e c o r r e l a t e d ) does not o c c u r i n r e s p e c t o f thp f i r s t word.
JNo, i t cannot b e s a i d so . F o r , t h e r e i s no p a r t i c u l a r o r o er
r e g a r d i n g the u s e o f th e words i n a s e n t e n c e . That which i s
(used) sometimes, f i r s t ( i n a sen ten ce) may a g a in be sometimes
(used) second and thus t h e r e o c c u r s the e x p r e s s i o n o f ti e
c o ^ r r e l a t e d i n r e s p e c t o f a l l th e woras. And an ad v o c a te o f
tne th eory o f the c o r r e l a t i o n o f the e x p r e s s e d d e s i r e s vomit

o n ly the c c 0 r r e l a t i o n o f tne e x p r e s s e d i n r e s p e c t o f tn e s t r ­
and s u f f i c p o s s e s s e d o f an a d d i t i o n a l power a s c e r t a i n e d tv
means o f co n com itta n ce and non-conco mittance as (he) does in
the c a s e o f the words ( i n a s e n t e n c e ) .

So i t i s (said) —

" T n a t the stem and the s u f f i x t o g e t n e r s t a t e (apro

tne meaning o f the s u f f i x , i s s t a t e d on the srength o r i t s
( o f tne s u f f i x ) prominence n o tw it h sta n d in g t h e r e b<=in- t h e i r
denotation with a difference (maintained) i . e . , separately.
For, the root 'pac' denotes the cooking and the su ffix 'Aka1
denotes the agent. Again the agent connected with (the act of)
cooking i s not denotable by one alone (of the two i . e . , either
by the stem alone or by the su ffix alone ) . *

M o reo v er, i f th e s u ffix d en o tes th e r e la t e d m e a n in g ,

why th en i t is not a d m itte d th at th e w o rd s w h ic h do not d iffe r

from i t (su ffix ) denote related meaning, what i s gain by dest­

roying something in p art ? I f the stem and su ffix have also
the expression of the c o r r e la te d , then there w ill be no
ortatlon 0f the words lik e , ' l e t i t be open' or 'l e t i t be
shut* in respect of (the utterance) o f the word 'door' by
expectancy that re su lts from the non-attainam t o f the express­
ion of the c o r r e la te d . ( I t is ) replied — In the expression,
•d v araa', the f i r s t case-ending denotes the meanings not d if f ­
erent from the meaning o f the radical Odviura). Henee, here,
with ifrlch being related , i t can be said to be related ? while
the su ffix (lik e the second case-ending in the word 'dvaraa')
denotes a meaning d ifferen t from that U>f the r a d ic a l), that
importation such as 'p rav isa' (enter) lead s to no fa^ u lt as
in the case o f V isV ajit s a c r ific e e tc ., in order to remove
the inconsistency o f the denoted meanings.'

In the $ tex t v iz ., ' ahglkrtam t a r h i .................... ' e tc.,

the author of the J£M refutes an objection that though the

Anvitabhidhana of the second Pada is p o ssib le, yet that o f the
f i r s t Pada cannot be accepted. But according to Salikanatha,
 157

t h e A n v i t a b h i d h a n a i s p o s s i b l e e v e n i n r e s p e c t o f t h e f i r s t

P a d a , b e c a u s e t h e r e i s n o r u l e r e g a r d i n g t h e p a r t i c u l a r o r d e r

i n r e s p e c t o f t h e u s e o f t h e P a d a s i n a V a k y a . T h e A n v i t a b h i ­

d h a n a i s p o s s i b l e i n r e s p e c t o f a l l t h e P a d a s i n a V a k y a ,

b e c a u s e a P a d a i s s o m e t i m e s u s e d f i r s t i n a V a k y a a n d s o m e t A i e s

n o t i . e . , a P a d a m a y s o m e t i m e s b e t h e f i r s t a n d s o m e t i m e s t h e

s e c o n d i n a V a k y a . A n A b h i h i t a n v a y a v a d i a d m i t s t h e A b h i h i t a n -

- v a y a o n l y i n r e s p e c t o f t h e P r a k r t i a n d P r a t y a y a p o s s e s s e d o f

a n a d d i t i o n a l S a k t i t f i i c h i s a s c e r t a i n e d b y m e a n s o f c o n c o m i t t -

a n c e a n d n o n - c o n c o m i t t a n c e a s h e d o e s i n t h e c a s e o f t h e P a d a s

i n a V a k y a * I n o r d e r t o s t r e n g t h e n h i s e x p l a n a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e

f o l l o w e r s o f t h e A b h l h i t a n v a y a , S a l i k a n a t h a q u o t e s t w o v e r s e s

v i z . , ' p r a k r t i p r a t y a y a u .. ..................................................' e t c . i n t h e V t e x t . T h e i d e a

o f t h e v e r s e s i s l i k e t h i s — P r a k r t i a n d P r a t y a y a t o g e t h e r

d e n o t e t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e P r a t y a y a a n d i t i s s t a t e d o n t h e

s t r e n g t h o f i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e P r a t y a y a i n s p i t e o f t h e r e b e i n g

t l i e d e n o t a t i o n o f % h e b o t h ( i . e . , o f t h e P r a k r t i a n d t h e P r a t y a y a )

w i t h a d i f f e r e n c e . I t i s b e c a u s e t h e D h a t u ' P a c ' d e n o t e s P a k a

( c o o k i n g ) a n d t h e P r a t y a y a ' N v u l ' o r ' A k a 1 d e n o t e s t h e K a r t a

a n d a g a i n t h e K a r t a c o n n e c t e d w i t h P a k a ( c o o k i n g ) i s n o t d e n o ­

t e d b y o n e a l o n e o f t h e t w o i . e . , i t i s n e i t h e r d e n o t e d b y

P r a k r t i a l o n e n o r b y P r a t y a y a a l o n e . A c c o r d i n g t o K . S .
«
*

R a m a s w a m i S h a s t r i t h e s e t w o v e r s e s , q u o t e d b y S i d i k a n a t h a , a r e ,

- - . 121
f r o m t h e B r h w f c t i k a o f K u m a r i l a . I t h a s b e e n s t a t e d b y

S a h a r a t h a t t h e D h a t u i . e . , t h e P r a k r f t i r e f e r s t o t h e K r i y a

1 2 1 . V i d e , S l o k a n u k r a m a n i k a u n d e r H I M , p . 3 4 4 .
 1 58
1pp
and the Pratyaya r e fe r s to the Karta and th*» Karta is
Pradhana or the P r in cip a l and the Kriya is Upas«rjana ( i .
Ganna) or the Subordinate ana as such Pratyaya i s the Pradhana
and the P rakrti is the Gauna and th is is what i s seated ir +ho
verses quoted above.

In the V text again, Sallkanatha r e fu te s the view o f the

fo llo w e rs o f the Abhihitanvaya who contend that +*he Pratyaya?
denote the r e la te d meanings and not the Padas. But Salikanrithr.
argues that as the Padas do not d iffe r from th® Prstyayas, so
the Padas also denote the r e la te d meanings and as such the
fo llo w e rs o f the Abhihitinvayavida Should admit that the

Padas denote r e la te d meanings. I f again, i t is admitted that

P rakrtis and Pratyayas also have the Anvitabhidhana, than
there w ill be no Adhyahara o f the verbs l i k e 1Vivriyatam1
( l e t i t be) open or 1Samvriyatam* ( l e t i t be shut) in resp ect

o f the u tteran ce o f the Pada v i z . , * dveram* (th e door) by

means o f Akanksa which is due to the non-attainment of
Anvitibhidhana. 11 may be sta ted here that according to
the system o f Mimamsa, Adhyahara plays an Important
r o l e in understanding the Vakyirtha; but both the schools
o f Mimamsa d if f e r in adm itting Adhyahara. we have already
sta ted that while the B hittas accept Sabdadhyahara, the
Prabhakaras admit Arthadhyihara. The o b je c tio n ra ise d may be
met thus — in the expression, 1dvaram*, the f i r s e case­
ending denotes the meaning n ot d iffe r e n t from the moaning o f

122. dhatuni k riyocyate, pratyayena karta. tayoh k a r ta ^ n -

dhanabhutah, upasarjanabhuta k riy a . SB under M S .il.i.£ 2 .
the P ratipadika. T h erefore, with which can thej e be Anvitf.-
bhidhana i . e . , Anvitabnidhana cannot take p la ce . Thu? the
Abnihitanvayavadins contend that w hile the Pratyaya denotes
a meaning d iffe r e n t from that o f the Pratipadika, tho Aohya-
hara such as 'pravis"a' (en ter) in volves no fa u lt as in the
case o f the V is v a jit s a c r i f i c e e tc . fo r removing the incon­
s iste n cy o'f the denoted meaning. In the sentence, ' V is V ijita
yajeta* (one should perform the s a c r i f i c e ) , a Pada lik e
' SvargaKama' (one who u esires heaven) i s to be taken by m«-ans
o f Adhyahara in order to obtain the complete sense o f the
sentence. For, without the Agent, a s a c r if i c e cannot be
performed ana as such there is the Adhyahara o f the Paoa i . e . ,

‘ Svargakama1.

V (lO f) ' vartikakaram israstu — laksanikan sarvavakyartb ani-

-cehantah padadrthanamanvayavabodhasaktikalpsrim n ira -
-k u rv a n ti. ananvitavastho hi padartho' bhihito* nvi^avc-
-sthsffh svasambandhinim la k sa y a ti. avastha-vasthavstcr^i
sambandhat, avasthavatyabhihite, bhavatyeva'vasts V ri
budahistha. sarvatra ca sambandhini d rste, samt nrdhv-
- antare budahirbhavatiti kjilptameva. ten a nasti
paaanamanvitabodhane sa k tik a lp a n eti. t-adahnh —
"vakyartho laksyamano hi sa rv a tra iv e ti na*stnitih.':

'The revered (author) o f the V arttikas d esirin g ai" tb^

sentence-meanings to be obtained by means o f im p lica tion
(Laksana) repudiates the assumption o f denotative powpr in
r e s p e ct o f the understanding o f the sy n ta ctica l r e la tio n o f
the meanings o f words. For, the meaning o f a word which is ar
unrelated condition, when denoted, in d icates the re late d

condition o f i t s own. Because o f there being the (permanert'

re la tio n between the condition and that having that condition,

when tnat having a condition is denoted, the condition also

comes to be re c o lle c te d . And when some (thing or being) rela­

ted is seen, i t is proper that there w ill be the knowledge o f

tne other re la te d (condition) a lso. Hence, theee i s no ar sump­

tion o f the denotative power o f the words in respect o f tne

understanding o f the re la te d meanings. So, (he i . e ., Kumarila)

says c

" I t is our p o sitio n that the meaning o f a sentence is ,

indeed, im plied everywhere ( l . e , in a l l c a s e s )."

In the V text v i z . , ' varttikakaram israstu .................'

etc. stated above, Salikanatha presents the view o f V a r t i k a -

-k a ra humarila who contends that the words give the Vakyer^ha

through Laksana (im p lication ) i . e . , Kumarila accepts Laksana

in each and every Vakya* T herefore, he repudiates the a s s o p ­

tion o f Sakti in respect o f the understanding o f tne Syntactical

r e la t io n o f the Padarthas. I t is because the Padartha which is

in an unrelated condition, when denoted in d icates tne re la te .'

condition o f i t s o**i. The re la t io n between a condition anc.

that having the condition i s permanent and as such when that

having a condition i s denoted, the condition i s also r e c o lle c ­

ted. Theretose, there is no assumption o f Sakti in respect of

Ip O
the Padas in understanding the Syntactical re la tio n . rphis

123. asmanmate ni padarthanam ---------------vakyarthasyapi

<c3 „
laksnaririsiddhatvat saktyantarakalpanaiva n a s ti.
MM, p. 97.
 161
Is the view o f Kumarila and i n order to a ssert h is view, he
^ - 124
s ta te s in the Vakyadhikarana o f h is Slokavarttlka th at the
Vakyartha i s indeed) in d ica te d in a l l ca se s. Ramanujacarya,
i n nis Tantra-rahasvn mentions the exp ression 1vakyartho
laksamano h i ................. ' e tc . as belonging to the Brhattlka
o f Kumarila.125 This v ie * o f Kumarila i s merely the develop-
- * 19b
ment o f the id ea contained in the Sutra o f Jaim ini. The
Sutra i s explained by Sahara in h is Bhasya thus — the Padas
perform the task o f denoting th e ir own meanings and cmase
fu n c t io n in g when th is task i s fin is h e d and the Padarthas
thus conveyed l a t t e r on give r is e to the knowledge o f the
- - 127
Vakyartha. But th is view o f Sahara i s n ot t o t a l l y accepted
by Kumarila, because*in h is view , Abhidha (primary denotation)
alone cannot esta b lish the r e la t io n o f the Padarthas in a
Vakya. In order to e s ta b lis h th is r e la t io n , he contends, one
has to take r e s o r t to Laksana. According to him, Laksana is
1 98
the fu n ctio n o f the Padarthas and not o f the Padas.

Piarthasirathi M isra, a staunch fo llo w e r o f Kumarila,

concludes that n eith er Vakya nor the Padas d ir e c t ly give r is e
to the knoiiftedge o f th e Vakyartha. I t i s the Padarthas which

124. Vide, SV, p . 814

125. Vide, TR, p. 28
126. *adbhutana» kriyarthena samamnayo*rthasya tannim itta-
- t v a t . MS. 1 .1 .2 5 .
127. padanl hi svam svamarthamabhidhaya n ivrttavyaparan i,
athedinim padartha avagatassanto vakyarthamavagamayanti.
-iti. SB under I b id .
128. kumirilabhattamate laksana s'akyarthasyaiva vyaparah,
na tu Sab das ya. KTS, p . 75.
 162

by^means Laksana convey the Vakyartha. This view o f P irth a sarth l

A

i s in conform ity with th at o f Kumarila.^29

Thus it i s observed that a high status to Laksana i s

given by Kumiurila and h is fo llo w e rs as they accept Laksana in
each and every Vakya.

V(lOg) 'a t r a 'p r e bruvate — Neyam laksana, svarthaparltyagat.

svarthaparityagena hi gangadisu la k sa n l drsta — i t i .

te tu Minamsatantrantahpatavaikalyenaivamahuh. la k s a -
- niyavas'en h i k v a cit svarthasya tyagah, samgraho va.
•a H.

' srstiru p a d h g ti' t i laksanayassvikarah, guninam tcdgana-

__ .a
-pathitanam srstisabdarahitanamapi laksjramanatvat,
tadantargatatvacca srstyarthasya.

tatha ' paurnamasim y a ja te ' ityekavacananupapattya

paurmamaslsabdo ylgavacano yagasamudayalaksanarthah,
tadasrayatvattasya. tathetaretarayogadvandve dvivacana-
- b ahuvac ananup ap at te^ than tar as ahi t av as tha laksanaya' s*i«-
- y a te, na ca' vasthavatparityagah. tatha*nlsadasthapal/lN
-dhikarana (M.D. 6 .1 -1 0 ) purvapakse sasthyarthalaksana
syadltyucyate, na ta tra prakrtyarthasya tyago'pyapadyate.
tatha rathaghosenetyatrfc rath asya'parltyagah. tatha
•meghapataye meghaml' tyekavacanantasya mantrasya
laksanaya prakptau nivesafc. na ca gunlnoragnisomayo-
-s t a t r a hanamlti, sv irth a p a rity a g e 'p i yuktaiva la k sa n a .’

'I n th is con text however, oth ers observe — t h is i s not

im p lica tio n because o f non-abandonment o f the j/fim sry meaning.

129. t asmanna na vak^am na padan^ saksadv&KyartkialVlMjB Jana-

yan t^ kintu padasvampabhihlt&ih pad^rthai^ sarfflaksyate'
s ltv itl siddhameta^f NRM, p. . 125
F or, in the words l i k e ' ganga' (th e r iv e r Ganges) e t c ., im p lic­

ation i s seen because o f there being*%he abandonment o f the

primary meaning. But those (th inkers) say so because o f th eir
incompetence to grasp the inner s ig n ific a n c e o f the Minsmsa
system. For, the abandonment o r acceptance depends on the
meaning by Secondarily denotable. In the expression , v iz .
"S rstirupadadhati" (he spreads the c r e a t io n s ), there i s the
admission o f im p lica tion i n as much as the secondary meanings
o f words which are read in i t s (o f the word 'S r s t i ) c la s s are
im plied even where the word 'S r s t i ' (cre a tio n ) i s n ot e x p lic i­
t l y stated and as because the meaning o f the w®r# 'S r s t i '
' •

(cr e a tio n ) i s in clu d ed th erein .

Likew ise in the expression , "paurnamaslm y a ja te ' (one

performs the f u ll-« o o n s a c r if ic e ) by in con sisten cy i n re sp e ct
«*

o f the singular number, the word 'paurnam isi' which speaks o f

/■
a s a c r ific e i s taken in the sense o f a group o f s a c r ific e s
by means o f im p lica tion , itfien the group i s tak«n, there i s
no abandonment o f that which belongs to that (g rou p ), fo r
that (th e group) being the r e s o r t o f that Gmenber o f the group).
Likew ise, in an Itaretra-dvandva compound, in view o f the
in con sisten cy a r is in g from the dual and p lu ra l noaber#, the
sta te o f being together yLth another meaning i s conveyed
by im p lica tio n and there i s no abandonment o f that ih ieh i s
possessed o f that (s t a t e o f beijlg together with another mean­
ing^ In th is manner, in the Nisadasthapatyadhikarana, i t is
*
stated by oth ers that there takes p la c e th e im p lica tion in the
 I

• 164
sense o f six th (tatpurusa) compound and the real ( i . e . ,
primary) meaning i s not discarded there. So also , in the
expression, * rathaghosena* (with the rumbling of the chariot)
e tc ., there i s no abandonent of the (primary) meaning of the
chariot. Likewise, in the mantra (vedic) used in singular num­
ber v iz ., 'meghapatye megham* (the cloud to the lord o f the
cloud), by im plication i s conveyed the meaning o f nature
(prakrti) which includes the cloud also . And there i s no
abandonment of the primary meanings o f Agni and Soma ( i . e . ,
the d e itie s) there (in the full-moon sa c rific e ) and as such
there i s the propriety in making the im plication even in the
case o f the non-abandonment of the primary meaning.*

In the 2 text v i z ., ' atxa'pare b r u v a te ........................1

e tc ., Salikanatha points out that Laksana (by which, accord­
ing to the Bhattas, the Yi&yartha i s understood) cannot be
recognised in respect o f each and every sentence ln~asO»uch
as there i s no necessity for giving up the primary meaning of
a word or words in case of every sentence. In the expressions
lik e 1gahgSyam ghosah*, there i s Laks ana because o f there
being a case o f discarding the primary meaning which i s called
Svartha i . e . , the own meaning. SSlikanatha contends, therefore,
th at Laksani occurs only where there i s the question o f
Svarthaparityaga ( i . e . , the discarding of the primary meaning).
Thus Salikanatha refutes tht v ify o f Kumarila that every senten­
ce meaning i s a meaning denoted.by Laksana on the ground tnat
there i s no discarding of the primary meaning of a word or
words in every sentence. But, according to the Bhattas th is
 * , 1 6 5

i s n o t c o r r e c t . F o r , s o m e t i m e s , L a k s a n a c o n v e y s t h e m e a n i n g

o f a w o r d w i t h o u t d i s c a r d i n g i t s o w n m e a n i n g a n d s o m e t i m e s b y

r e t a i n i n g t h e s a m e . F o r i n s t a n c e , i n t h e e x p r e s s i o n , ' s r s t i -

“ r u p a d a d h a t l 1 ( h e s p r e a d s t h e c r e a t i o n ) , t h e r e i s L a k s a n a w i t h ­

o u t t h e d i s c a r d i n g o f t h e p r i m a r y m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r d ' S r s t i ' , .

F o r , t h e s e c o n d a r y m e a n i n g s o f t h e w o r d s w h i c h a r e r e a d i n t h e

c l a s s o f t h e w o r d ' S r s t i ' a r e s e c o n d a r i l y d e n o t e d e v e n w h e r e

t h e w o r d ' S r s t i ' i s n o t c l e a r l y s t a t e d a n d b e c a u s e o f t h e r e

b e i n g t h e i n c l u s i o n o f t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r d ’ S r s t i ' t h e r e i n .

M o r e o v e r , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e B h a t t a s , i n t h e V e d i c e x p r e s s i o n s

l i k e P a u r n a m a ^ l m v a i a t e . b e c a u s - e o f t h e r e b e i n g i n c o n s i s t e n c y

i n r e s p e c t o f t h e s i n g u l a r n u m b e r o f t h e w o r d P a u r n a m a s i . i t

b y m e a n s o f X i f t k s a n i k r e f e r s t o t h e g r o u p o f s a c r i f i c e s . T o b e

m o r e c l e a r i t c a n b e e x p l a i n e d t h u s * I n t h e e x p r e s s i o n ,

p a & L r .n a f la f ijjf t y a . 1 a . i g i t h e w o r d p a u r n a m a s i i s u s e d i n s i n g u l a r

n u m b e r a n d t h e p r i m a r y m e a n i n g o f t h i s w o r d i s t h e p s u r n a m e s a

y a g a o r f u l l - m o o n s a c r i f i c e . B u t I n M i m a m s a , a l o n g w i t h t h e

p a u r n a m a s a y a g a , a n o t h e r y a g a c a l l e d d a r s y a g a o r n e w - m o o n

s a c r i f i c e i s a l s o t o b e p e r f o r m e d . T h e s e t w o s a c r i f i c e s c a n ­

n o t b e p e r f o r m e d s e p a r a t e l y . S o o n e w h o p e r f o r m s t h e f u l l -

m o o n s a c r i f i c e m u s t p e r f o r m t h e n e w - m o o n s a c r i f i c e a l e o .

H e n c e , h e r e i n t h e e x p r e s s i o n a b o v e , t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r d

p a u r n a m a s i i s d a r s a p s u r n a m e s i a n d a s s u c h t h e w o r d s h o u l d b e

u s e d i n d u a l n u m b e r . A s i t i s u s e d i n s i n g u l a r n u m b e r , t h e

s y n t a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n i s n o t c o n s i s t e n t . A s a r e s u l t , a c c e p t i n g

t h e i n c o n s i s t e n c y o f t n e s y n t a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n a « t h e c a u s e ,
 * 166
Laksana i s re so rte d to and by means o f i t , tile word paur^amSai
r e fe r s to the group o f the two s a c r ific e s v i z . , th e fu ll-m oon
and the new-moon s a c r if i c e s . And when the group i s taken,
th at which has groups i s n ot discarded. For, the whole i s
inclu ded in p a r ts. SaLikanatha, in tne V te x t above, r e fe r s

to the MlsadasthftP.atya^lkaraBa- in order to Show to at in each

and every Laksana, the primary meaning i s n ot found to be
discarded. In the sa id Adhikarana, there is a ved ic in ju n ctio n
v i z . , ' etaya nisadasthapatim y a ja y e t' under MSt 6 .1 .5 1 . In the
Sutra i t i s sta ted that there in v olv es Laksana i f the word i s
compounded as a Tatpurusa. And in that ca se, the primary mean-
ing o f the word 'n isa d a ' i s n ot discarded. The Mimamsakas
give p referen ce to the expression 'nisadasthapatim ' in the
above vedic In ju n ction , as a case o f Karmadharaya compound
because o f there being no fu n ctio n o f any Laksana in i t . The
word 'n isa d a sth a p a ti' may be compounded as 'n isa d a eva stha-
p a tih ' when i t i s taken as a Karmadharaya compound, ttien
theme component p arts convey the id ea o f 'n isa d a ' and
'S t h a p a t i', i t becomes a case o f Karmadharaya compound. But
when i t i s considered as case o f Tatpurusa compound, the word
' nlsadt’ cannot d ir e c t ly mean ' o f the nisadas* and as such i t
must be accepted as a case o f Laksana. As in the case o f
c o n f l i c t between a primary meaning and a secondary meaning,
the Mimamsakas fin d i t proper to admit the primary meaning

130. tena vede yatra dars'as'abdo'mavasyasabdo va /ru ta s ta tr a

yagasamuaayopasthltifc.- MP, p . 12.
131. nisadanam sthapatih i t i sasthisamaso b h a visy a ti,
sresth o nisadanam. SB, under MS. 6 .1 .5 1 .
 167

and so they recogn ise the expression ' nisadasthapati' as . a

L32
case o f Karmadharaya compound which in v olv es no Laksana.

Jaim ini, the authar o f the Mimamsasutras. p refers Karma­

dharaya compound in the above expression because o f there being
no involvement o f Laksana. He observes tiiat the word ’ Sthapati'
in tne sa id expression r e fe r s to a 1ni§ada' by ca ste because
i t is the primary meaning o f the word. This p o in t i s very
/ —
c le a r in Sabara's Ehasya from which we know that the Mimamsakas
p re fe rs th e expression ' nisadasthapatim' as a case o f Karma­
dharaya compound because o f i t s n o t in v olv in g a Laksana and
134
says that he who i s a nisada i s a sth a p a ti.

Visvanitha Nyiyapancinana, the author o f the Bha^ apart -

ccheday in order to show that there i s no Laksana in a Karma­
dharaya compound, in d ir e c t ly r e fe r s to the above p o s it io n o f
t h e M im am sakas b y i l l u s t r a t i n g th e ir a p p ro a ch w ith t h e h e lp
135
o f the skid example i . e . , the exp ression . L ikew ise, in the
exp ression l i k e ' rathagbosena Mahendra - stotramupakaroti'
( i . e . , with the rumbling o f the c h a r io t, Mahendra begins the

132. nisada eva sthapatirbhavitum arhati. kasanat?

s'abdasamarthyat, nisadam h i nisadasabdah saknoti
vaditum sravanenaiva, ni s ad anam tu sthapatim laksanaya
b r u y it. ffu tila k sa n a v isa y e ca srutirnyayya na laksana
— SB, under MS. 6 .1 .5 1 ;
133. sth apatirn isadassyat sabdasamarthyat, SB, under Ib id .
134. tasmat n lsid a eva sthapatih syat, I b id .
135. ata eva 'nisadasthapatim y a ja y e t' ity a tr a na tatpuruso
laksanapatteh, kintu kamadharayo, l aksanabhavat.
BP, p . 462.
 168
s t o t r a ), the primary meaning o f the word 'r a t h a ' i s not d is ­

carded. Here, the knowledge o f the meaning o f the sixth case-

ending o f the word 'r a t h a # io s a ' (l .e ., rathasya gbosah) is

o btained through Laksana. For, even after there bein g Sasthita-

tpurusa compound i n the word 1r a t h a g h o s a ', the word 'r a t h a '

becomes secondary and the word * gho^a' becomes the primary

and the case-ending always takes p la ce i n the primary one

and the case-ending o f the secondary word becomes h id d en . As

a r e s u l t , the knowledge o f the meaning of the sixth case-end­

ing which i s hidden, cannot be atta in ed through Abhidhl but

through L ak sana. So, the meaning o f the P r ak rti characterised

by sixth case-ending is not discard ed. Hence, the meaning of

the word 'ratha* o f Hie word 'rathaghosa* i s not discarded

even though the six th case-ending is understood through Laksana.

The expression above is found used in a d iffe r e n t word

v i z ., ' rathaghosena Mahendrasya sto tr a m u p a k iro ti'. There is

another sim ilar expression also v i z . , — ' dundubhignosena

Mahendrasya stotramupakaroti .'136 Though, the primary meaning

o f the word 'r a t h a ' in 'rathagh osa' i s not discarded, yet the

m eaning o f the sixth case-ending i s known through Laksana.

Thus i n the expression 'Meghapataye megham upanayata' ,

singular number is used i n the word 'M eghapatl' and the r e l a ­

tio n o f this case-ending is not with the word 'megha' and the

knowledge o f the related ness o f the meaning o f the word 'megha'

cannot b e gathered through Abhidha, but through Lak sana. Along

136. MK, V o l. VII, p. 3348

 169
wlth the knowledge o f the Meaning o f the word 'P a t i' , the
t

knowledge o f the r e la tio n between the Meaning o f the word

•megha' and that o f the word 'p a t i ' i s atta in ed through
Laksana. And thus in the exp ression , 'Agnisonau juhuyat*
( i . e . , one should o f f e r o b lta tio n s to Agni and Soma), the
word 'Agnlsomau' being a word o f Itaretaradvandva compound,
the knowledge o f the meanings o f Agni and Soma i s acquired
through Laksana. But the primary meanings o f the word are
n ot discarded. The name o f the s a c r i f i c e o f i^iich Agni and
Soma are the d e it ie s , is c a lle d 'Agnisomiya yaga* which i s
performed on the fu ll-m ood day. Though in the expression
above the Agnisomiya yaga i s in d ica ted througi Laksana the
primary meanings o f the words ‘ Agni* and 'Soma' are n ot
d iscard ed . From th is d iscu ssio n i t appears th at in case o f
Laksana the d iscard in g o f the primary meaning i s not a must
and as such without the d iscard in g o f the primary meaning
the knowledge o f the meaning o f a word can be acquired through
Laksana.

V(lOh) ' atrocyate - katham punariyam laksana ?

vacyasya'rthasya vakyarthe sambandhanupapattitah.

t at s ambandh av asapr ap t asya1nvayall ak s anocy at e .
i t i samgrahaslokah.

' gahgayim gh osah ', ity a d isu s'rautasya gariga-

- padarthasya vakyarthe'nvayasambhav a t, tam p a rity a jy a

137. 1 tabhyametamagnisomiyamekadasakapalam purnami?epraya-

cch a d i' tyagnisonlyayago v ih ita h . MP, p . 9.
 170

tatsambandhaLlabdhabuddhlsannidheh kuladyarthasya
vak yirth an vaytta' dh yavaslyate. Ata eva1huh —
" anupapattya, sambandhena ca lak sah a b h a v a t lt i."
ih a ca 1gaman aye' tyadau na sra u ta sy a ’ rth asy a'n v a-
- yayogyatvam, napyanvitavasth asya' nayanasambandharhata.
an v itarth asy a1nvayantarasambhavat. atha na bhudesa
la k sa n a , klntu k riy a v a g a tl karakanvayinimatmano dasana-

-vagam ayatl, av in abh avaditi. ucyate - sabdatvain ta v a d i-

-ttharaapahnutaraanvayavagamasya, kimtu sananyatodrstanu-
fell ^
- m anagocarata‘ bhyugata b h av ati. tath av isistan v a y av a -
- gatlranupapadyamana nirnm la'padyate. atha visesanvayaa
vin a vyavahar anavakalpanadanarthakaai sabdoccaranam lti
t a d is r ay an am, evamapi preksapurvakarinam sarthakavakya-
- mati*aprayoginam v ac anadvi s^es anvay avagamah. vede tvanar-
-thakyena na bh avltavyam itl, p r aman ab hav ann a sakyate
visesanvayo* vagantum. na ca loke* pyinarthakyamapadyatd
ity e t a v a t a kar anenop ay adv in a' p i v is e s anvayadhyavasinaai
yuktam. na h i dagdhukamasyo' dakop»adanaJHanaxthakamiti,
jalfcsya dihas’a k tira v irb h a v a ti. klmamanarthyakyam. na
punas sot anyatodrstasyo vis'esauivayavasaylta. ath a'kln k -
- sita-san n ih ltay o gy an v ay ap arata vrddhavyavahar e padanama-
- v a g a t e t i, vyutpattyanusarena visesanvayavagamah.

tanna t a t r a vrddhavyavahar a eva ta tp a r a ta padanam,

p an ar thinim va upayabhavena kathain nama n irv ah a ti?
c in ta sa h i padlnam* padarthanim va saktikalpanam v in a 1
nupapanneti many amah e. 1
 171

•Here ( i t is ) said — how again, i s this implication?

Tnat is ca lled the implication which is resorted to for

conveying a new sense that canes to have a syntactical relation
in respect o f the sentence- meaning and that which is obtained
on the strength o f it s relation with the primary meaning (o f
the word), when there is a fa ilu re o f lo g ic a l connection of
the primary meaning in sentence-meaning.
(co lle cte d verse).

In the expressions lik e ‘ gahgayiun ghosah1 (there is a

cowherd colony in the river Ganges), because o f there being
the im possibility o f the syntactical rela tion o f the primary
meaning o f the word 1gahga* (the Ganges) in the sentence-mean­
ing, (by) divaarding the primary meaning, the syntactical
relation o f the meaning o f the word 'kula* (the bank o f the
river) etc. is ascattained because o f its- contiguity as
occuring in the mind (o f the listen er) on the strength o f the
rela tion (lik e nearness e t c .) . Hence (they) contend — "there
is implication because o f inconsistency and on the
strength o f rela tion ". And here in the expression, ' gamanaya*
(bring the cow) e t c ., there is no in com j^tibility o f the
syntactical rela tion in respect o f the primary meaning and
also there is no fitness fo r the related meaning with the
word ’ gem1 to be related with the meaning o f the act o f
bringing, because o f there being no p o s s ib ility o f another
syntactical relation o f an (already) related meaning. I f i t
Is said that let this not be a Implication, but the verb
being known makes known its own condition which is related
by the case on the strength of their invariable association.
It is said — the state of pertaining to words is then conce­
aled in respect of the knowledge of syntactical relation, but
(its coming within the purview of the generically seen infer­
ence) stands admitted. The knowledge of the qualified meaning
(i.e .. the related meaning) being inconsistent comes to lose
its root. As there can be (even) no imagining of the uses with
the qualified meaning, the utterance of the words comes to be
useless and as such there is the resorting to that (i.e .,
implication). And there again, the knowledge of the specific
relation is possible only from the statement of those who
after due calculation use the meaningful sentences. But in
the case of the vedic sentences, there can be no question of
meaninglessness and so because of there being no ground, the
particular syntactical relation cannot be understood, only on
this ground (apprehending) that meaninglessness may occur in
common parlance, the ascertainment of the particular syntactical
relation is improper in view of any other^.regulating cause.
As for the person whe- desiring to Ivn , taking of water as the
material cause is useless*, so i t cannot be said that there
arises the burning capacity (even) of water. Surely there is
meaninglessness. Again the generically seen inference cannot
be taken as the ascertainer of the particular syntactical
relation. As the words occuring in the usage of elderly per­
sons are known to be bent on a syntactical relation with
expectant, compatible and contiguous, so the knowledge o f
the particular syntactical rela tion takes place in accordance
with the knowledge o f the denotative pow«*. That is not so,
fo r , even in the usage o f the elderly persons how that state
o f being on (a syntactical rela tion as stated above) the worflt
or the meanings o f words can work in absence o f the means?
Such a contemplation in respect o f either to words or o f the
meanings o f words i s not consistent without the assumption o f
a power (to that e ffe c t)) this is what we think.*

In the 2 text v iz ., *a tro c y a te ......................... * e tc .,

Sa ll kanat ha defines ana explains Lak$ana in the lig h t o f his
teacher Prabhakara. Khen there is the inconsistency in synt-
i

actical rela tion o f the primary meanings o f the individual

words, then i t is Laksana that removes the inconsistency. Now^
what is meant by the that Anupapatti (inconsistency) ? Along
with the ancient Naiyayikas and the later Alamkarikas, the
Prabhakaras say that this Anupapatti is only the im possibility
of establishing the lo g ic a l connection in a Vakya. we have
already stated that a VaOcyirtha, according to Khmarila, is

invariably a Lakpyartha. But ^alikanitha in support o f

Prabhakara* s view points out that Laksani cannot be recog­
nised in each and every sentence because o f there being no
necessity for discarding the primary meaning o f a wmrd or

words 1# every sentence. In the J text above, Salikanatha

has taken the expression 1gahgayam ghosah* as an example of
Laksana. In this expression there i s the admission of Laksana
 S '
0

1W
on ly because there i s r e a lly a case o f discarding the p riaary

meaning which i s termed by Salikanatha as 'Srauta Artha'

( lit e r a lly * the priaary meaning). In the above expression v i z , ,
' gangayam ghosah*, the immediate primary meanimg o f the word
f

1 ganga1 cannot make a s y n ta ctica l r e la t io n in the sentence and

so i t i s discarded and the Kula (bank) by the r e la t io n o f
proxim ity with the primary meaning i s accepted so as to make
a com patible sy n ta ctica l r e la t io n in the Vakyartha. Salikanatha
takes the expression ' gamanaya' as a counter example to show
th at th ere i s no o b s tru ctio n in the expression to fin d a
s y n ta c tic a l r e la t io n even with the meanings that are immedi-
a te ly and d ir e c t ly d erived . The primary meaning (which Sid-ika-
natha c a l l s srauta artha) o f the word ’ gam* su ita b le fo r a
r e la tio n s h ip with ‘ anaya'. The primary meaning o f th e word
1anaya1 i s taken to be An Anvita one.

In the j[ te x t , we fin d that Salikanatha accepts Anupa-

p a t t i (in con sisten cy ) and sambandha (re la tio n sh ip between the
primary and the secondary meaning) as the two fa c to r s fo r
determining the fu n ctio n o f Laksana. The Prabhakaras b e lie v e
o n ly in Anvayanfpapatti (in con sisten cy in S y n ta ctica l r e la tio n )
as the Laksanabija (ground fo r Laksana) and as such th eyfin d
no reason at a ll o f Laksana as belongftig to a sin g le word.
In p la ce o f Avinabhavasambandha (in v a ria b le a sso cia tio n ) and
Bkavakjhta (u n itary passage) o f the B hattas,138 Salikanatha

138. Kumarila d efin es , Ekaval^yata, as —

svarthabodhe swaptanamahgahgitvavyapeksayiu
vaijyanimekavakyatvam punah samhatya jiy a t e .
T V . 4 ^pder MS. 1 . 4 . 2 4 .
 #

17#
re co g n ises the above two fa c t o r s f o r promulgating a new
%

concept o f Laksana. The 'Anvayanupapatti* o f the Prabhakaras

came up as a r iv a l fa c to r o f 'Tatparyanupapatti' o f the
Naiyayikas and the vedantins, who accept 'Tatparyanupapatti*

( i . e . , the in con sisten cy o f the In ten tion o f the speaker) as

the Laksanabija.

Among the Naiyayikas, Ganges'apadhyaya, the author o f

the Tattvaclntam ani. seems to fo llo w the view o f the Prabha-
- karas so far as the con ception o f Laksana i s concerned as he
* * 139
quotes the Samgraha sloka o f the jQl above. He has d isca r­
ded 'tatparyanupapatti' or the in con sisten cy o f the in ten tion
o f the speaker as the Laksanabija. But la t e r Naiyayikas l i k e
Visvanatha, the author o f the Bhasanariccheda does not seem
to accept the view o f Ganges's in f u l l . In th is Slddhanta-
muktavall o f the Bhasapariccheda. Visvanatha while d iscard in g

the 'Anvayanupapatti' as the Lak?anabija says that I f ' Anvaya-

m papattl* i s accepted as the Laksanabija, then in the
expression 'y a s t ih pravesaya' (admit the s t i c k s ) , there would
be no Laksana; f o r , there is nothing in co n s is te n t In s tic k s
being r e la te d to admission. Hence, according to him, sin ce the
in te n tio n o f the speaker, v i z . , feed in g, i s not co n siste n t
with the admission o f s t ic k s , LaksanI I s with regard to persons
140
who carry tfie s t ic k s . Thus the Naiyayikas assert that the
'tatparyan u papatti' paves the path fo r the op era tion o f

139. Vide, TC, p . 6t>0.

140. parantu yadyanvayanupapattirlaksanabijam syat, tada
y a stih praves'ayetyadau laksana na syat, yastlgu prave-
^ —
. * * ^
sanvaymsya'nupapatterabhavat. tena y a sti-p ra v e se
bhojanatatparyanupapattyi yastidharfcsu la k sa n a .—
SM under BP, pp. 444-45.
Laksana and thereby d iscard s the view that Anvayanupapatti
i s the only ground that lea d s one to r e s o r t to Laksana.
Nagesabhatta also opines that ' tatparyinupapatti' i s the
Laksanablja. Otherwise, he says, in the exp ression 1gahgiyaa
gh osah ', through Laksana o f the words 'makara' e tc . in p la e e
o f ' g h o sa ', the in con sisten cy can be removed. Where 4 * l i e s
the n e ce ssity o f a d a ittin g Laksana o f the word 'gan gs' in the
sense o f ' gahgatira*? So, in order to avert th ese d i f f i c u l t i e s ,
the Naiyayikas say, the ground that paves the path f o r oper­
a tion o f Laksana i s n ot ' Anvayanupapatti' but i t s in con sisten cy
to brin g o u t the in te n tio n o f the speaker (tatparyan u papatti).

The Vedantins also do not accept 'Anvayanupapatti' as

th e Laksanabija,but they accept ' tatparyanupapatti* as such
l i k e the Naiyayikas. In the expression , 'kakebhyo dadhi rricsy-
atim' (p r o te c t the curd from the crow s), th ere i s no in co n sis­
tency in the s y n ta c tic a l r e la t io n , i . e . * 'Anvayanupapatti',
but there i s tatparyanupapatti. For, the word 'kaka' (crow)
im p lies ary creatu re that may s p o il the curd. H#*e the in te n t­
io n o f the speaker i s about p ro te ctin g the curd n ot on ly from
142
the crow but from a l l creatu res that may sp o il the curd.

L e t us now discu ss the Laksana from the view p oin t o f

the Alamksirikas. According to the Alamk&rikas Laksana i s

141. vastutastu t atp ar y anup ap at t i s an ddh an amev a tadbljam.

anythi gangayim ghosa ityadau ghosadipade m a makari-
d ilak san apattistavata'pyan yath an u papattiparih irat.
PLM, p . 45
142. laksanabiJantu tatparyanupapattireva, na tu anvayanupa-
p a ttih } 'kakebjiyo dadhi raksyatam' ity a tr a anvayanupar
pattyabhavat. VP, p . 105.
 I7f
Imposed on a word, the primary meaning o f which i s incom patible

with the meaning o f oth er words in the sent m ice), whereby

another meaning than the prim ary), connected therew ith, becomes
* 143
apprechended, e ith e r through usage o r through some m otive.

From th is d e fin it io n , w« get three r e q u is ite s f o r the op era tion

o f Laksana v i z . , Cl) in con sisten cy (bada) o f the primary

meaning, (2) some d e fin ite r e la tio n between the primary and

the secondary meanings and (3) usage or purpose (rujfdhl or

prayojan a). Laksani, the Alamkarlkas contend, i s a fu n ctio n

capable o f making secondary meaning. An Alamklrika does not

d efin e Laksana in terms b f a r e lq fio n e x is tin g between the

primary and the secondary meanings but con siders th is r e la ­

tio n as a fa c t o r needed fo r th e operation o f Laksana.

Visvanatha, the author o f the Sahltva-darpana. puts

forward the expression, *Kalingah sahasikah* as an example

o f Laksana based on usage. In th is expression which means

•the Kalinga i s brave' the term ' Kaliiiga' i s said to in d ic a te

through Laksana the id ea o f a man liv in g in Kalihga. Here

the r e la tio n between the primary and the secondary meaning

i s that o f a container and the thing contained*- The p a rticu la r

143 . mukhyirthabidhe tadyukto yaySnyo' rthah pratiyat^C

ru^dheh prayojanadvasau laksana saktirarpltafC S D .II.5 .
 I ’m
term i s used in the secondary meaning because i t i s th*
usual p r a c t ic e o f tbe p eop le to u se that p a rticu la r term to
convey the p a rticu la r id e a . J*
t

The expression *gangaySm ghosah' i . e . , ‘ a cowherd

colon y on the r iv e r Gahga* i s c it e d by the author o f
the Kavyaprakisa as an example o f LaksanA based on m otive.
• •
Mammata says that as l o g i c a l connection o f the flow in g waftor
Cjalapravah a), the primary meaning o f the term 1 Ganga' i s not
ffp a b le o f bein g esta b lish ed with a cowherd colon y , Laics ana

conveys th e id ea o f the bank o f the r iv e r Ganga.144 This

expression i s also c it e d by Vlsvanatha as ah exanple o f
Laksana based on m otive. According to the A laak irik as, Laksana
i s a fu n ctio n belonging to the primary meaning. The Alamkarikas
seen to be in flu en ced by the Mlmimsakas who consider Laksana
as a fu n ctio n belonging to the primary meaning conveyed thro­
ugh the fu n ction o f Abhidha. According to the Prabhakaras,
the meaning o f a word i s what i s conveyed by Abhidha. TheAe
i s , they contend, no r e s t r ic t io n f o r the Sakti o f a Pada. In
a sentence, a word conveys n ot on ly i t s own meaning, but a lso
i t s r e la t io n to the other meanings o f words i n the sentence.
But K m ir ila does not accept th is and says that Abhidha alone
cannot e sta b lish the r e la tio n s h ip o f the meanings o f the words
in the sentence and fo r that purpose one has to r e s o r t to
Laksanl.

144....................... 1gangayam ghosa' ityadau ca gahgadiriim ghosad-

yadharatvasambhavanmukhyarthasya badhe vivecakatvadau
samipye ca sambandhe ru^cttiitah p ra sid d h e s ta th a ...........
laksana. KP, p. 45.
 Wwi-

179

The Naiyayikas, however, do rot admit Laksana in a Vakya

145
and they claim that i t might belong to a Pada and Pada alone.
Gahgesopadhyaya refu tes the above view o f the Mlmarnsakas on
vakyalaksana. According to him, the words 1gabhlra* and 'nadi*
in the expression ' gabhirayam nadyam ghosah* f i r s t g et them­
selves in volved in a syntactical r e la tio n (Anvaya) and convey
the meaning o f ‘ a deep r iv e r * . Then either o f the two words
conveys the meaning o f * the bank o f a deep rive r* as a Laksy-
-artha, Thus i t is not the Vakya but the Pada only that conveys
the Laksyartha.146

In hie Muktavali o f the Bhasapariccheda of Visvatiatha

ve fin d the re fu ta tio n o f Laksmna in a Vakya. Visvanatha

*

contends that owing to the absence o f Sakti, there is ham

Laksana in a Vakya, which is a kind o f r e la tio n to the thing
denoted by the primary meaning. He has also c ite d the express­
ion * gabhiriyam nadyam ghosah* afebve as an example. The word
* riv e r* im plies the bank o f the r iv e r and the meaning o f the
word * deep* is connected by a r e la tio n o f Id e a lity with the
r iv e r ; fo r , sometimes, connection with one part (o f a word)
is also admitted. Bven i f th is sort o f connection is not

145. vastutastu padalaksanayaivopapattsu na vakyalaksana.

TC, p. 722
146. tathahi gabhiranadyoranvayabodottaram nadipadam
gabhlrapadsm va ivajnapyagabhiranadyastiram lak sayatl
na vakyam. Ib id .

»
 ISO
admitted here* then the word ’ deep* in d ica tes the in ten tion
o f the speaker (tatparya) . 147

The Vedantins, however, accept Laksana in both the Pada

and the Vakya as y e ll* They also c i t e the expression 'g a b h i­
rayam nadyam ghosah' as an example o f Vakyalaksana. Here, the
group co n s is tin g o f the Rwdas 'deep* and 1r iv e r ' r e fe r s by
Laksana to the bank o f the r iv e r . Here the Naiysyikas may
urge s in ce a group o f Padas does not possess S ak ti, how can
i t have Laksana which i s a r e la t io n to what is conveyed by
Sakti? The vedantins answer by saying th at Laksana i s a r e la ­
tio n to what i s conveyed by S akti, which i s a r e la t io n of
Padas with the Padarthas. Just as the meaning o f a Pada is
conveyed by S a k ti, So a lso is that o f a group o f Padas.
The d e fin it io n o f Laksmna o f Sallkanatha i s re fu te d by fa c a s -
-p a t i Mis'ra in h is Tattvabindu. He fo llo w s the views o f Kumarila
and as Kumarila d if f e r s from Prabhikara Misra in explaining
the ten ets o f Mimimsa. So autom atically i t is not su rp risin g
to have SaLikanatha* s d e fin it io n o f Laksana been r e fu te d by
V acaspati. According to V acaspati, there is no in con sisten cy
o f the r e la t io n o f the primary meanings i n the sentence-meaning
as con ceived by Sallkanatha in h is d e fin it io n o f Laksana and

147. vakye tu sakterabhavat s'akyasambandharupa laksana1p i

n a s ti. yatra tu gabhirayam nadyam ghosa ityuktam, tatra
nadipadasya n a d itir e laksana..................................................
. . . . . . . nadipadasya gab h iran ad ltire laksana, gabhira-
-padam tatparyagrahakam. NSM under BP, pp. 453-54.
148. laksana ca na padam itravrttlh, kintu va k ya vrttira p i.
yatha ' gabhirayim nadhys® ghosah* ity a tr a 'gabhirayam
nadyam* i t i padadvayasamudayasya t i r e laksana. VP, p . 106.
 18ft

as such the vprd ' sambandhanupapattitafc' in the d e fin it io n

i s improper. In the expression ’ odanam p a ca ti ca itra h p ith a re'
( i . e . , C aitra cooks r i c e in the v e s s e l ) , th ere i s no In con sis­
tency o f the r e la t io n o f the meanings o f the words ’ c a it r a '
and 'p it h a r e ’ e tc . in the sentence-meaning nor there Is •ther
r e la t io n o f the con d ition o f the rmLated attained- through
the r e la t io n o f meanings o f tile words in any sentence-meaning.
So, i t cannot be an instan ce o f Laksana.

Thus the word ‘ Sambandhanupapattitah’ in the d e fin it io n ,

says Vacaspati, may be rep la ced by ' vacyanupapattitah' and
# — | . , 1 aq
the words 'vakyarthe' and ’ anvayat' should not be used.
The defin ition o f Laksana given by Salikanatha Is also refuted
h -

by Citsukicitfya in h is Cltsukhl in the same manner as Vacaspati

d o e s .150

We have already said that Gange so padhy ay a s e « s to fo llo w

th e view o f the Prabhakaras so fa r as the conception o f Laksana
i s concerned. In th is con n ection he has quoted Salikanatha’ s
d e fin it io n o f Laksana in h is Tattvaclntim anl (Vide, p. 6 6 0 ).

149. na ca 'odanam p a ca ti ca itra h p ith a re ' ityadau c a it r a p i-

- to aradin sonar than am vakyio'the sambandhanarhatvam, na ca
t a lla k s it a y i anvitavasthaya anvayantaras'alita, na
caivam la k s a n a .............................................................................
.................................... taaidamucyate - ’ mrsyamahe vacyanu-
-p a p a ttita h ’ i t , sambandhavasapraptasya’ i t i ca , na
punah ’ vakyarthe sambandha’ i t i ca ’ anvayat’ i t i ca.
T B , p . 89.

150. nanu nay am laksana bhavitumarlUrti, tathahi -

’ v a cy a sy a rth a sy a ............................ laksanocyate’ i t i
............... .... na ca ’ odanam ca itra h p acati p ith a re ’
ityadau .................punaranvayantaraslillta. CS. p p .261-62.
 sa ca padanamevocitetyaha —

'And that (denotative power) should be admitted in

r e s p e ct o f the w°rds on ly and so says (th e author)' —

K (ll) prithamyidabhldhatrtvad tatparyavagamadapi.

padanameva sa s^tirvaramabhyupagamyatam.

'Because o f th eir denoting the meanings f i r s t , a lso

because o f th eir conveying the purport ( i n the sen ten ce),
b e tte r adnittAag that d en otative power in r e s p e c t o f the
words o n ly . 1

V ( ll) prathamabhivini padanyatilahghya, na'rthe?u

va^yarthabodhanas’aktirasrayitum yukta. kinca
padani tavadabhidheyaklniti nirvivadam. tena
tesamabhidhanasaktissampratipannaiveti, tasya
eva'nvayaparyantata kalpayitum sukara.
padarthanantu bodhansaktireva kalpya. tena
1dhirmikalpanato varam dharmakalpani la g h iy a s i'
tyanvitabhidhanasakti padinimeva kalpayitum ucita.

kinca padanyabhidhayakanisyante, ta tra yadi

sv ar up ama tr avis ay ameva p adar thabuddhimadadhyuh,
tada*pyabhidhayakata h iy eta , tasya buddhessamban-
- dhagrahanassmayajatapadarthabodhasamskaromesaprabha-
- v atv at. qfasyam h i sambandhasmaranasidhyartham samban-
- dhibhutarthasmar anasamskarodbodho* ngikaraniyah.
 tasmat sambandhagrahanasamayanadhigatanvitarthaprati-
- padanabhyupagama cva sabdanamabhidhayakateti, tamahgi-
-ku rvata padanamanvitabhidhayakata* srayantya.
yastu. —.

'paaamabhyadhikabhavat smarakanna v is is y a t e '

(S I. V.Adhi. 6 . S I. 107)
tatha
' bhavanavacanastavat tam smarayati lok a v a t*.
(S l.V . Adhl. 7. S I. 208).

i t l ca'caryavacanadarsanat smar akatameva p ad an ama-

- bhldhayakatvamaba, tail pratyaha -
' tatparyop agamadapi' t i .

y e n a 'p i vad ln i pad an am sufar akatvatir lk tarn padarthesva

-h glk rtam , so’ p i vakyartha- pratipattiparatam padanam a-
- bhyupaityeva, anyatha vakyarthasya* sabdatvaprasangah.
evancet padanameva saksadvlkyarthabodhana- sa k tira stu ,
kim paraspargsrayanena.

tena padarthesu p adanam smssTaka tv at Irik tarn y e'b h ld h a -

- yakatvamahuh, tesam s'aktitrayakalpana. eka tavat padana-
- mabhldhayakatvasaktih, apara ca padarthagatamvayabodha-
- naSaktyadhanasaktih, p adar thananca' nvaya j nap ana- slaktir i t i .
smar akatvavadinastvabhidha^iasaktim h ltv a saktidvayakal-
- panalighavat, uktainaiva nyayena padanameva sa k tik a lp a-
- ngya u c ifa t v a t , anvitabhiahayini p ad gn iti sthapitam .-frt}.

'Surpassing the words that come f i r s t , i t i s not proper

to admit in the meanings o f words, th e pow«r that conveys the
sentence-meaning, yhat more, ' i t is beyond dispmte that th*
words denote the meanings. Hence, their (o f the words) the
denotative power stahds established and so i t is easy to assume
that (denotative power) to the extent o f the syntactical rela ­
tion. But i f any pover o f conveying is to be admitted in
respect o f the meanings o f words, i t is to be assumed fresh.
As because the assumption o f the property is simpler than the
assumption o f tne proprietor, so the power o f expressing the
ce0rrelated is to be imagined in respect o f the words only.

Moreover, the words are desired as to be the denoter o f

the meanings, i f in that* case (the words) convey the cognition
o f the meanings of the words only as they are ( i . e ., in an
unrelated sta te), then also their state o f being the denoter
su ffers, fo r, that cognition has the competence in respect o f
giving r is e to the Impression that conveys the meanings # f the
V
words that occur at the time o f ascertaining the rela tion . For,
o f course, in order to establish the re co lle ctio n o f the
relation , the reviving of the impressions o f the related* mean­
ings is to be admitted, Hence, the state o f being the denoter?
in respect o f the words l i e s in respect o f the admission o f
conveying the related meanings not known at the time o f ascert­
aining the relation and as such by him who admits that state
o f being the denoters in respect o f the words, the state o f
denoting the related (meanings) by the words is to be accepted.

And he who after the words o f the preceptor ( i . e, KumarijpO

(says) — "a word is nothing more than what provides r e c o lle c t­
ion” (SV. 6.107) and (also says) "the word signifying the
I

181

urge (Bhavana)*reminds us o f that (the urge) ju # t as a word

does in comaon parlance ( i . e . , an ordinary w ord)": (SV.7 .2 4 8 ),

contends that the sta te o f being the r e c o lle c t o r s i s the s ta te

o f being the denoters o f the words, to him i t i s r e p lie d —
"because o f th e ir (o f words) giv in g r i s e to the knowledge o f
the purport o f the sen ten ce."

Even such an advocate who admits the s ta te o f words as

being the r e c o lle c t o r in resp ect o f the meanings o f words,
also admits that words are bent on givin g r i s e to tho knowledge
o f the sentenc e-meaning,^otherwise i t w ill in v olv e the p o s s i­
b i l i t y o f th e sfntenc e-meaning as not corresponding to words.
Such being the case, l e t the power o f conveying the sen ten ce- *
meaning d ir e c t ly be o f the words on ly , what i s the use o f
accpeting (the sta te o f conveying the sentence-meaning the
%

words) in d ir e c tly ? Thus th ose who accept the s t a t ^ fc f being

the denoter in resp ect o f the words a d d ition a l to the s ta te o f
being the r e c o lle c t o r in resp ect o f the meanings o f word§,
s h a ll have to assume three powers. One i s the denotative power
o f the words, the oth er i s the procJacing power ntfiich i s the
power that gives r i s e to the kmvledg’e o f the s y n ta c tic a l
r e la t io n o f the meanings o f the words and the power thaM;
*

dmnveys the sy n ta ctica l r e la tio n o f the meanings o f fie words.

But those who admit the s ta te o f being r e c o lle c t o r o f the
words by givin g up the power o f #denotation, assume two £oV«rt
m
because o f there being s im p lic ity # n assumption and as such

»
 • « »

186
on the strength o f the s a l 4 l o g i c o n ly , the assumption of
• * * •
the denotative pow«r in resp ect o f the words on ly being
proper, i t is esta blish ed that the words are the denoters o f
the c o r r e l a t e d ( i . e . f they denote r e la te d m eanings).'

In ' prathamyadabhidhatrtvat ..................... ' e t c . and

'prath am abh avin i....................... * e t c . o f the K and I te x t

r e s p e c tiv e ly o f the VM above, Salikanatha d iscu sses the view

o f the Prabhakaras th at as the Pada i s the cause o f understand-
<•»

ing the Vakyartha, Sakti must belong to the Pada and thereby
re fu te s the view o f Kumarila who maintains that the Padartha
i s the cause o f understanding the Vakyartha. In the K above,
y *

Salikanatha gives three reasons fo r accepting Pada as the

cause o f understanding the Vakyartha. These are — ( l ) the
Padas appear f i r s t in a Vaky§; (2) the Padas have Sakti ( i . e . ,
Abhldha S akti) and (3) the P%das lead to the purport o f the
, m
Vakya. For these three reasons one has to admit the Sakflri In
re s p e ct o f the Padas.

Regarding the question as to whether the Pada# or the

Padarthas are the causes o'f understanding the Vakyartha, the
Prabhakaras contend that i t i s t^ie Padas and not the Padarthas
* as stated by the fo llo w e rs o f Kiau'arlia that are the caUfes o f
* 0

v#de rstanding the Vakyartha. The Padas, the Prabhakaras con­

tend, denote the Vakyartha in the form o f an Anvaya ( r e la t io n ).
Tha4; the Pada i s the c® ise o f understanding the Vakyar ttia*is ‘
•
*
 18f

stated by SalikCttutha ii* K^O o f the present worjs. Again that

the Padirtha is the cause o f understanding the Vakyirtha, tccor-

ding to the Bhattas, can be gathered from Partiiasaathl'Misra* s

«
151
explanation.

According to the followers of* Kumar ila , the meaning o f

a -
the words directly becomes the KatfRa o f Vakyarthabodha or
vikyarthajnana and as the supporters o f the Abhihitiffivayavada,
they maintain that words denote unrelated meanings. Salikanatha
reje cts the view of the Bhattas* regarding the cause o f the
Vakyarthajnana and asserts that the Pada and not Padartha
should be regarded as the cause o f Vakyarthabodha. The Prabha-
karas contend that the Padas appear earlier to the meaning o f
the words Cpaaani pratharaabhavlni*) and the Padas sign ify the
meaning o f them and come to determine the purport in the
sentence. Hence, Salikanath#contends that the Padas should be
actaitted to possess the Sakti in producing the Vakyartl&jntna.
i

Salikanatha also in the text above, re je cts the view

o f those # o after Kumsurila* s statement contend that the Pada
is nothing more than what ■provides re co lle ctio n l . e . , the %ord '
does not d iffe r from the means o f re co lle ctio n and i f there is
anything more that happens to be cognised, i t cannot be d en ote
by the Pada. Since the Padarthas are made ^ut throu^i r e c o lle c t­
ion, there is no assumption o f another Sakti as the Prabhakai*es

151. padar thanam h i vakyarthe .... » ....................................... (

p ad air^bhi hi tab sv art hah vakyarthasyavabodhakah^
NRM, p . 120.
 its
15p * %
h old . Moreoy|ft, Salil|an^tha r e je c t s when the Bhattas contend
that the word sig n ify in g the Bhavana (urge) reminds us (i* e .
"gives us an idea) o f the Bhavana (urge) , Just as in common
parlan ce. And through p o s it iv e and n ega tive concom ittance,
Bhavana i s taken to be the denotation o f the a f f i x . Thus the

B hittas h old th at the act o f denoting by the Padas i s nothing

but the r e c o lle c t io n and as such the Padas do not have the
S a k ti. This view As d iscarded by Salikanatha by using the
expression * tatparyavagam adapt* in K£II) abd#e. As the Padas
* *

determine the purport o f the sentence, the Sakti belongs to

• ^
the Padas. According to the Prabhakaras i t is th e Padas that
g iv e r i s e to the knowledge o f the purport o f the sentence.
Hence, the p a rticu la r Sakti should be admitted in re sp e ct o f
the Padas on ly and not in re sp e ct o f the Padsrthas.

Moreover, Salikanatha o b je c t s that B hittas who fo llo w

the Abhihitanvayavada must admit three powers o f the Padas
v i z . , Abhidhayakatvasakti (th g power o f denoting the mutual
r e la t io n o f the P a d irth a s), Adhanasakti (the producing power)
and Anvayajnipana sa k ti (power to convey the r e la tio n o f the

Padarthas). But the Prabhakaras, as th e fo llo w e rs o f the

Anvltabhidhanavada admit o n ly two powers v i z . , Adhana sakti
and Anv ay aJnap ana sakti and they do not accept Abhidhanakes'aktt.
The Prabhakaras a*e c a lle d Smarakatvavadins as they contend
th at Padas c e r ta in ly make th eir meanings r e c o lle c t e d separa­
t e ly and meanings thds r e c o lle c t e d are denoted again as
------------------------------------ * -----------------------
152. asmanmate h i padarthanam s m r tis id d h s tv a t......... ............
saktylhtarakalpanaiva n a s ti. MM, p . 97.
 153
related to the Meanings o f other Padas. As the Prabhakaras
♦

admit two powers, so there is sim plicity in their view and

as such the Padas do not denote the unrelated meaning. This is
their established doctrine.
I

The Bhattas assert that the Prabhakaras also must admit

three powers as stated above. As a resu lt, the views o f
both the Mimansakas are not free from the fa lla cy o f mutual
interdependence. As we shall fin d in the explanation o f the
♦

K(i2) in subsequent pages, Salikanatha refutes the same and

asserts therein that i t i« the Padas from which we can acquire
the knowledge o f the Vakyartha i . e . , the Pada is the cause o f
understanding the Vakyartha and not the Padarthas as the
Bhattas contend.
<
Thus in the text above, Salikanatha establishes that
the Padas denote related meanings.

samprati purvoktamitaretarasrayadosam parihartum, yatha *

padebhyo vakyarthapratipattlh, tatha darsayati —•

’ Now, in order to avert the aforesaid fa lla cy of mutual

interdependence, (the author) (proceeds) to observe so as to
assert the knowledge o f the sentence-meaning as arising from
the words' — *

153. padani tavat prthak padirthan smarayantyeva. na tu tavata

viramanti. sairitameva svam svamartham punaritarapa-
- dirthanvitatverrabhidhayaiva virmanti. MM, p. 96.
154......................... saktitray&kaLpananvitabhidhane'pi tulya.
CSS, p . 260.
 190

&(12) p ad aj at am srutam sarvam smart tinanvitarthakam.

nyayasampadi t avyaktl pascadvakyirthabodhakam.

‘ The group o f words that are heard, the meanings o f

which are r e c o lle c t e d as u n related, o f which the case, person
and number are known through the usage o f the e ld e r ly persons
gives r i s e to the knowledge o f the sentence-meaning.*

V (l2a) yastivadagrhitasambandhah, yasya ca sambandhagrahatia-

-samskaro notpannah, praddhvasto va» sa v a k y irth a p ra tl-
-pattau n a 'd h ik riy a te. yastvanapabhrastasambandhagraha-
- ntfsamskarah, sa padam srutva nunam tavadidam sttaratl
— idamasya* kariksita-san nlh ltayogya-pratlyogyan vlt-
-a s y a vacakam lti. evanca smarata smrtameva ananvitamapi
svarupamanvayabhajam. na calkapadasravane vakyartha-
- v d g a t l r l t i kascinmanyate. abhihitanvayavadino'pi h i
yavat padantaramarthantarain nopasthapayati, tavadan-
- vayavagamo n a s tl. padarthasya* nvayavabodhinah padar-
- thaoitarap eksatvat, p ra tlyoglsa p eksatvadanvayasya.

atastanmate’ p l sarvapadairananvitasvarthi abhidhaniyah

p a sc S11 ebhyase arv ebhya ssmr tyarudhebhyo vakyirth apr a11-
- pattirahglkaranlya.

Tadahurvartlkakaramisrah

t e 'p l naiva* smrta yasmadvakyartham gamayantl nah.

tasmat tatsm aran^veva samhatesu pramanata.

(Brhattika) i t i .
► » *
 191
ata eva tatrabhavatah acaryasya vakyalaksanam
" *samhatya'rthamabhidadhati padanl vakyami'

(s'.B. Bala. A. p.824) t i .

'He who has not ascertain ed the r e la t io n (between the

words and tn e ir meanings) and whose im pression fo r ascertain in g
the r e la t io n i s not produced or destroyed (a ft e r being produced),
i s not e n title d to understand the sentence-meaning. Eut he whose
im pression fo r ascertain in g the r e la tio n stands undisturbed,
c e r ta in ly a fte r hearing the word remembers thus — th is word
denotes co u n te i£ co rre la tiv e s meaning which i s expectant, c o n t i­
guous and com patible. By remembering thus (he also) rembmbers
th e unrelated meanings (o f the words) ch a ra cterised by syntac­
t i c a l r e la t io n . Moreover, nobody con sid ers that the knowledge
o f the meanings o f a sentence*- a rise s by way o f hearing a word.
In v ie w o f the fo llo w e rs o f the c o r r e la tio n o f the expressed,
so long as another word does not present another meaning, there
w ill be no understanding o f the s y n ta c tic a l r e la t io n . For, the
meaning o f a word i s dependent on the meaning o f another word
in order to convey the s y n ta c tic a l r e la t io n , and because o f
the s y n ta c tic a l r e la t io n being dependent on the cou n ter-co­
r r e la t iv e (meanings). Hence, in th eir view a ls o , the unrelated
meanings are denoted by a ll words. Afterw ards, from a ll th^se
(meanings) obtained from the r e c o lle c t io n , the ascertainment

o f the sentence-meaning i s to be actoitted. Thus says the author

o f the V arttikas —
 1*2
" T h e m e a n i n g s o f t h e w o r d s i f n o t r e c o l l e c t e d c a n n o t

g i v e u s t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e s e n t e n c e - m e a n i n g a n d s o t h e

v a l i d i t y ( o f t h e m e a n i n g s o f w o r d s ) d e p e n d s o n t h e i r b e i n g

u n i t e d b y r e c o l l e c t i o n " ( B K ) . H e n c e , t h e r e i s t h e d e f i n i t i o n

o f a s e n t e n c e b y t h e p r e c e p t o r ( S a b a r a ) a s — " t h e w o r d s t h a t

u n i t e d l y g i v e r i s e t o t h e m e a n i n g s c o n s t i t u t e a s e n t e n c e "

( S V . B a l a , p . 8 2 4 ) . *
4

I n 1 p a d a j a t a m ...............................................................' e t c . a n d ' y a s t a v a d a g r h i t a -

s a m b a n d h a h , .....................................................1 e t c . o f t h e K a n d J T t e x t r e s p e c t i v e l y

o f t h e ]£ M a b o v e , S a l i k a n a t h a e x p l a i n s h o w t h e V a k y a r t h a c a n

b e u n d e r s t o o d f r o m t h e P a d a s . I t i s s t a t e d i n t h e K a b o v e t h a t

t h e P a d a s t h a t a r e h e a r d a n d t h e m e a n i n g s o f w h i c h a r e r e c o l l ­

e c t e d a s u n r e l a t e d a n d o f w h i c h t h e f a c a n a ( n u m b e r ) a n d V j r a k t i

( p e r s o n ) a r e k n o w n t h r o u g h V r d d h a v y a v a h a r a , g i v e r i s e t o t h e

k n o w l e d g e o f t h e V a k y a r t h a . T h e c o m p o u n d w o r d * n y a y a s a m p a d i t -

a v y a k t i * i n t h e J L a b o v e , i n d i c a t e s t h a t s o l o n g a s t h e

‘ B k a v a k y a t a 1 ( u n i t a r y p a s s a g e ) a n d 1 B h i n n a v a k y a t a * ( d i v e r s i f i e d

p a s s a g e ) e t c . a r e n o t k n o w n t h r o u g h V r d d h a v y a v a h a r a , t h e P a d a s

d o n o t c o n v e y t h e V a i y i r t h a . T h e c o m p o u n d w o r d ' n y a y a s a m p a d i -

- «t C C

t a v y a k t i * h a s b e e n w e l l e x p l a i n e d b y B a m a n u j a c a r y a . I t m a y

1 5 6 . n y a y a s a m p a d i t a v y a k t i t i v r d d h a v y a v a h a r a p r a v a r t i t a y a m

s 'a b d i r t h a p r a v r t t a u y e n y i y a h s 'a b d a r t h a g o c a r i h e k a v a k -

y a t v a b h i n n a v a d c y a t v a d a y a h p u r v o k t a s s a d h a r a n s h y e c a

d v a d a s a d h y a y i p r a t i p a d y a v e d a r t h a n i r n a y e p r a t i s v i k a h

s a b d a n t a r i b h y a s a d a y a h s r u t l - l i n g a v a k y a - p r a k a r a n a d a y a h

s r u t y a i t h a p a t h a n a s t h a n a d a y o v a c a n a n a m a d h e y a c o d a n a d a y a s c a

t m i r v i m a r s a d a s y a m s a m p a d l t e s 'a b d i r t h a n i m a n v a y a r t h a t v a v i -

^ b h l g e s ^ a t i p a s c a t s m r t y u p a n i t a i h p a d a i r y o g y a k r a m e n a

v a k y a r t h a v a g a t i r i t y a r t h a h . T R , p . 3 6 .
 in
be mentioned here that ^liefind variant readings o f the K
above. Pratyaksjvarupa Bhagavan has quoted the K above as
' sruyaminam pad am sarvam1 in s te a d o f rpadajatam srutam
+ * 156
sarvam1 as written by Salikanatha.

In the text, Salikanatha states that one wJ*> does not

ascertain the relation between the Pada and the Padartha and
one whose impression fo r ascertaining the relation is not
produced or destroyed after being produced, cannot understand
the Yakyartha. But on the other hand, one whose impression fo r
ascertaining the relation is not disturbed, can r e c o lle c t after
hearing the Pada, that the Pada denotes counter-co^rrelatives
( i . e. meanings) which have Akinksa, Sannidhi and Yogyata. More­
over, i t is not considered by anybody that by way o f hearing a
Pada one can have the knowledge o f the Vakyirtha. Bven in the
theory o f Abhlhitanvaya, so long as another word does not
present another meaning, there w ill be no knowledge o f the
Valsyartha. I t is because the meaning o f a word depends on the
meaning o f another word in order to convey the syntactical
rela tion and because o f the syntactical rela tion being depen­
dent on counter-cogrrelative {meanings). Thus in the view of
the Abhihitanvavadins, a ll the Padas denote unrelated meanings.
Then there takes place the ascertainment o f the Vakyartha
from the meanings obtained from the re co lle ctio n s. In support
o f thig view* Salikanatha quotes a verse from the Brhattlka

156. V id e , NPS u n d e r C S , p. 255.

* +
 194

o f Kumarila, which sta tes that the Paaarthas l £ no£ r e c o lle c t e d

cannot give r i s e to the knowledge o f the Vakyartha and as such

the v a lid it y o f the Padarthas depends on th e ir being united by

r e c o lle c t io n . In the t e x t , Sallkanatha also quotes the d e fi­

n it io n o f a Vakya given by Sahara in the Baladhikarana o f h is
Bhasva. which sta tes that the Padas that u n ited ly g iv e r i s °
to the meanings c o n s titu te the Vakya,

V(l2 b ) nanvanvitabhidhanavadlnam katham vakyarth apratipattih.

sruyananena hi padena y o 'r t h o na' vabodhitah, sa katham-
-a n ta rh ite tasminnavabhaseta. u cya te —* abhihitanvaya-
-v a d in o 'p i na‘ yam niyamah — sruyamana eva purvapurva
-varnajanitasam skarasahlto* ntyo varnah p adarthaprati-
- padaka i t i , valyadas"aiihltat praganavadhrtarthadariga-
-parijnanasamskarat pascat smrtadapi ve^darthavaggana-
-dars'anat. ten a snirtyarudhasya* vagamakatvamadosah.
sruyamanena h i padena p ratiyogisapeksatvadan vitabh i-
-dhanasya prak sahakarivirahadartho naf b h ih ita h ,
pascidabhidhiyata i t i kimanupapannam.

•But how do the fo llo w e rs o f the theory o f the expression

o f the « 3 r r e l a t e d , understand the meaning o f a sentence ? For,

the meaning which i s not conveyed by a word while being heard,
how can that (meaning) appear w hile i t is kept so hidden 1 I t
i s said — even o f the fo llo w e rs o f the c o r r e l a t i o n o f the
expressed, th is i s not a p rocess that as soon as i t is being
 196
u tte re d the la s t le t t e r along with the Impressions produced
by each o f the preceding l e t t e r s brings about the meaning
o f a word, as I t is seen that the knowledge o f the meanings
the r e c o lle c t io n l a t t e r on by means o f "the impressions cau­
sed by the knowledge o f the a u x ilia ry scien ces ( i . e . , the
vedahgas) although those were not understood p re v io u sly while

being read during childh ood. Hence, there is no fa u lt in

re s p e ct o f comprehending (the sentence-meaning) by the words
attain ed through r e c o lle c t io n . What i s ir r e le v a n t h erein i n ­
asmuch as a word on being heard being dependent on i t s counter
c o r r e l a t i v e meanings t i l l 1he exp ression o f the coIJrrelated
(meanings) i t does not convey i t s own meaning because o f the

absence o f the a u x ilia ry cause and i t comes to convey ( i t s

meaning) la t e r on (on ly when there is the expression o f the
c o S r r e la t e d ).1

In the V te x t v i z . , 1nanvanvitabhidhanavidlnim .........'

e t c . , o f the M i the author presen ts a query that may be made
by the fo llo w e rs o f the theory o f Abhihitanvaya as to how the
fo llo w e rs o f the theory o f Anvitabhidhana understand the
Vakyartha. I t i s because, the meaning which i s not conveyed
by a Pada w hile being heard, cannot appear w hile i t i s kept
hidden. Now Salikanatha, in order to meet th is query contends
that even in the theory o f Abhihitanvaya, th is is not a process
that as soon as the Pada i s heard the Antya varna along with
the im pressions o f each o f the preceding varnas brings about

• *
 196
the PaGartha. For, we see that the knowledge o f the meanings
o f the ved ic sentences a rises through the r e c o l le c t i o n l i t e r
on tiBi— by means o f the im pressions caused by the knowledge
o f the vedangas although those sentences v ere n ot understood
p rev iou sly during childhood. WLth the knowledge o f these six
*

vedangas v i z . , Siksa, Kalpa,'VjrikiTana, Nlrukta, Chanda and

J y o tisa the meaning o f the ved ic sentences can be understood.
We have already sta ted that the statement v i z . , ’ purvapurva-
- varnajanitasam skarasahito1ntyo varnah padarthapratipadaka iti*
as r e fe r r e d to by Salikanatha in the jT te x t above, i s stated
by Sahara under MS, 1 .1 .5 . Thus, there w ill he no f a u lt in
r e s p e c t o f understanding the Vakyartha from the words attained
through r e c o l le c t i o n . A Pada which depenc|F on i t s cou n ter-
c o r r e la t iv e and so long as there i s no Anvitabhidhana, does
n ot convey i t s own meaning w ithout an a u x ilia ry cause and i t
comes to convey i t s meaning la te r on when there i s the A nvita-
-bhidhana. Thus Salikanatha asserts that there i s nothing
in co n sisten cy in re sp e ct o f the theory o f Anvitabhidhana with
regard to the understanding o f the Vakyartha.

V (l2 c) ye*pi vaaina evamahuh — ekameva padamanvltabhidhaya-

-kamastu, ita ra n i ca padani pratiyogisannidhapanamatra
eva vyapriyantam. na c a 1grhyamanavis'esata, prathamyma,
pradhanapadatvena va vis*esagrahanat. ata eva ca'h u h s-

157. autpattikastu s*ab-asyarthena sambanahastasya

jnanamupadesah. MS. 1 .1 .5 .
 197

'padamadyam v i vikyam, pradhlnam padam va vakyami*

(Va.P.Ka. 2. S I .2) t i . tanpratyaha — 's a r v a m i't i.
prathamasyaiva syadvakyata y ad l, saTvapadarthanim
prathamapadarthansltata syat. na ca'yam niyamah.
' arunayaikahayanya pihgiJcsya somam k r in a t i1
(T ai. S. 6 .1 .9 ) t l krayamatranvayltvadarunyasya.
kinca vakye padansmanupurvyanlyamabhavat, kadaci ttadeva
prathamam sadanvltabhidhay akam, anyada n e tl na yuktam.
tatha pradhanapadasya*pi vakyatvamayuktam, somapadarthena
saha sarvessmananvayatvat. yadyapyarunyadinam sarvesam
somam pratyaidamarthyamasti. tatha*pyasmin vakye kraya
eva'runyadinamaidamarthyena, krlya-karakabhlvena ca* nvayah.
krayadvarena tu somam pratyaidamarthyamatram. atha y a t-
-prattpadanaparain vakyam, ta t pradhamityucyate. iha tu
kraya tva sarvakarmakaranavacchinah pratipadyate. tena
k rin atltyetadeva pradhanam padam, tadanvayita ca sarves-
-amarunyadlnimiti. atrocyate — vakyasya yat tavat ta tp a r-
-yam , tanna vyavasthitam. kvacidakyataparatvampva —
"agnihotram j u h o t i t i ." kvacid gunavidhiparatvam, "dadhna
j u h o t i t i " . tena pradhanaparatvasya* p i sarvesam padenam
sambhavat, sarvesameva padanamanvitabhidhanasaktirasra-
-y a n iy a . ta th i s a ti y a ttra * p l gunapar atvam, t a t r a 'p i
klptas'aktikataya tadanvitabhidhayakatvamaviruddham.
padar thesvapi c a it at tulyameva.

'Those thinkers who contend thus — l e t on ly one word

be the denoter o f the r e la te d meaning and oth<=r words be u t i ­
l i s e d to the exten t o f p resen tin g in proxim ity the co B rre la tiv e
 I9t
( I . e . , th«ir meanings). I t cannot be said that the particular

meaning ( i . e . , the rela tio n a l thought) o f the sentence is not

understood because o f it s being*conveyed by the f i r s t (word )

or by the p rin cip a l (word). And so (they) contend — "th e
fir s t word ( i t s e l f ) is the sentence or the p rin cipal word
(its e lf) is the sentence" (Va. P. 2 .2 ). With them in mind,
(the author) speaks ( i . e . , uses) — " a l l " c f. 'padajatam'
etc. unaer K ( 12) . I f the status o f a sentence Is given only
to the f i r s t word, then the meanings o f a ll the words (In the
sentence) should be relrfted to the meaning o f the f i r s t word.
But this is not the ru le. For, in the sentence lik e 'one pur­
chases soma (creeper) with the red-brown-eyed one year o ld
(cow) (T a i. S. 6 ,1 .9 ), redness is re la te d only to the act o f
purchasing. Moreover, i t is not correct to say that because
o f there being no such ru le regarding the p articu lar order o f
using the words in a sentence, the same word sometimes being
the f i r s t becomes the denoter o f the re la te d meaning and not
on other day. Likewise, i t is improper (to say) that the
p rin c ip a l word has the status o f being the sentence, fo r a ll
the (meanings o f) words are not rela te d to the meaning o f the
word * soma*. Though a ll the meanings o f the words beginning
with 'redness* (arunya) are used as meant fo r 'soma, y e t in
this sentence, the syn tactical r e la tio n o f the meanings o f
redness e tc . is because o f th eir being meant fa r the act o f
purchasing (aijji) by means o f the r e la tio n o f the verb and the
 199

cases. But the state of being meant for soma is through the

act of purchasing.

That is said to be the principal (in a sentence) which a

sentence aims at conveying. But here (in the said sentence)

only the act of purchasing together with all (necessary)

objects and instruments is established. Hence, 'purchases*

alone is , indeed, the principal word and the other (meanings

of words) like redness etc. have the status of being related

to that (i. e., purchases). Here it is stated — that which is

the purport o f a sentence is not yet settled. Sometimes, it

(the purport) is the state of (the sentence) being bent *pon

the verbal form (Akyata) as in the sentence "One should perform

the Agnihotra sacrifice", sometimes i t is the state of being

bent upon the subsidiary Injunction (Gunavidhi), as in the

sentence "one should perform with curd". Therefore, because

of there being the possibility of all the words to be the

principal word also, the power of expressing the co rrelated

is to be accepted in respect of all the words. Such being the

case, ^ e r e again, the word is aimed at conveying something

subsidiary, there also, because the denotative capacity being

(already) assumed therein, it is not inconsistent to admit its

state of denoting the co rrelated. That is equally the case

with the meanings of the words also . 1

In the text v i z ., 'y e 'p i vadina evamahuh ................. '

etc. above, Salikanatha presents the view of the Vaiyakaranas

 20#
according to whom eith er the f i r s t Pada or thp Pradhina Pada

(i.e ., the Pada which is more important) c o n stitu te s a Vakya

and then he re fu te s the same. In the V te x t, SSlikanath# makes
a r e fe r e n ce to the verse No, 2 o f the Vakyapadiya o f Ehatrhari
hy way o f mentioning on ly the f i r s t Pada o f the v e r s e .16** I n ­
stead o f reproducing verbatim, he simply presents the idea o f
the f i r s t Pada which i s , according to Bhartrhari, one o f th<~

e ig h t a ltern a tiv es that c o n s titu te a Vakya. The word

•Pradhana* as stated by Salikanatha in the V te x t, is perhaps,
added by Bhartrhari to mean the f i r s t Pada as such. I t may b®
mentioned here that the Prabhakaras advocating the A nvitabhi-
dhana, accept on ly three a lte rn a tiv e s that c o n s titu te a Vikva
v i * . , Akhyata pada, Adya pada and Prthaksarva pada.160

Salikanatha does not accept the view o f the Vaiyakaranas

and that is why he uses the word 'Sarvam' ( i . e . a l l the Padas)
in K ( 12) o f the VM. Salikanatha discards both the a ltern a tiv es
fo r the d e fin it io n o f a Vakya as stated by the Vaiyakaranas
one by one. He argues that i f i t i s held that the Adya pada

158. The 2nd verse o f the 2nd Eanda o f the Vakvapadtva. in

f u l l , is as fo llo w s *
"padamadyam prthaksarvam padam sak inks ami t,yap i /
vakyam p r a tl raatirbhinna bahudha nyayavadinam"//
159. In the 1 st and the 2nd verses o f the 2nd Kinda o f the
Vakvapadiva, the eig h t a ltern a tiv es are c ta t e d . The 1st
verse i s *
" akhyatasabdah samghato j i t i h sam ghitavartini/
yj|
eko' navayasabdah kramo buddhyanupasamhr t i h " / /
160. anvitabhidhanavaaimatena tu - akhyatasabdah,
paaamidyam, prthaksarvam parain sakahksam,
i t i t r in i laksanani i t i vivekah. FN.7 under PP, p.414
 • 2Cfc
( i . e . , tne f i r s t word) c o n s titu te s the Vakya, then the m in in g s
o f a ll oth er Padas in a Vakya w ill be denoted by the meaning
o f th e f i r s t Pada. But th is does not happen. In support ^ f h is
argument, our author c it e s an example from the T a lt t ir iv a -
Samhita. v i z . , "arunayaikahayanya plngaksya somam k r in a ti"
- I K **1
which i s also sta ted by Sahara under MS. 3 .1 .1 2 . The
meaning o f the expression i s th is 'o n e purchases Soma with a
red-brown-eyed o n e -y e a r-o ld ' (cow) ' which does not mention the
o b je c t to which these q u a lific a t io n s belong and i t i s argued
that according to th is te x t, these q u a lific a t io n s are a u x ili­
ary to the a ct o f purchasing, but on ly through the o b je c t v i z . ,
the ' cow' to which they belong. This is what i s explained by
Sahara under MS. 3 .1 .1 2 .

S ilikanath a says that " in the said expression, the

word ' arunya' is r e la te d to the act o f purchasing o n ly . More­
o v e r, there i s no hard and f a s t r u le regarding the p a rticu la r
order in using the Padas in a Vakya. I f a Pada when used as
f i r s t w ill denote the r e la te d meaning and when used in the
m iddle or at the end o f the Vakya, then also i t w ill perform
the same fu n ction .

A fter d iscardin g the f i r s t a ltern a tiv e i . e . , the f i r s t

*

Pada co n stitu te s the Vakya, Salikanatha t r ie s to d isca rd the

a lte rn a tiv e ( i . e . , Pradhana pada) as the d e fin itio n o f a Vakya.
He argues that a ll the Padas in the expression have no

161 . The sutra i s *

*ca
"a rth a ik atve dr avy agunay or aik armanniy amah sy a t."
%
 202

s y n ta c tic a l r e la t io n . Though a ll the Padas arp Important fo r

Soma, s t i l l they are r e la te d to the act o f purchasing ana the
r e la t io n between them is that o f a Kriya and a K a r a k a and the
4

Padas ' arunya' etc. become a u x ilia r ie s by the act o*” purchasing.

The Vaiyakaranas again try to make the conception o f tb-*

Pradhana Pada more clea r by saying that the Pradhana Pada is
that which i s bent upon conveying the Vakya. In the express­
ion c it e d already, the act o f purchasing is esta blish ed as the
Karana o f a ll the actions and as such the word 'k r in a t i'
becomes the Pradhana Pada. Again the words ‘ arunya1 ®tc. become
r e la te d to the act o f purchasing. However, th is explanation o f
the Vaiyakaranas i s not acceptable to Salikanatha. I t is said
that the purport o f a Vikya is the sta te o f being bent upon
an Akhyata (verbal form ). An example o f th is may be c it e d with
the Vldhi vaxya v i z . , 'Agnihotram juhoti* (one should perform
the Agnihotra s a c r i f i c e ) . I t is a Pradhana v id h i. Here, th®
Akhyata (th e verbal form) 'ju h o t i ' i s Pradhana. Eut in the cns®
o f Guna Vidhi or Angavidhi ( i . e . , Subsidiary In ju n c tio n ), Hie
o b je c t with which the s a c r i f i c e i s to be performed, becomes
Pradhana. In the Vidhi vakya v i z . , ’ dadhna ju h o ti' (one should
perform with cu red ), th® word ' dadhi' becomes Pradhana, wh il ®
the Akhyata v i z . , 'ju h o t i ' which was Pradhana in the e a r lie r
V idhi, comes to be secondary here. Thus i t may be said that,
a l l the Padas may be Pradbana and as a r e s u lt a l l th® Padas
have the Sakti to convey the r e la te d meanings. In th is way,
Salikanatha by d iscard in g the view o f the Vaiyakaranas,

ft
 203

procepus to esta bl ish his theory o f Anvitibhidhana in his 7M.

V(l2d) nanvevam 1garaanaye* tyadau parasparaparyayata

. sarvasabdariatn syato yatha 1garni’ tyanena' neyaft^tyn-
-nyitabhldhinam, tatha ' anaye1 tyanena'pi gavanvita-
- bhlahanamiti. ucyate —- dvavetavarthau, yadarayanar-
- vitarn gotvan, gavanvitanca* nayanaai t i. tenaikalk ®nal-
- kaikasya1bhidhanat kutah paryayatvaprasangah. paaar-
-thesvapi caitatsamananu nanu krinatyarthasya1rnnya-
- dyanekarthimvitabhldhanadavrttllaUfeano vakyavp j-^rsyat.
na. tantroccaranat. vairupye ca tantratanupapattervak-
- yabhedassyat.

' nyayasampaditavyakti* t i klmldam, yavannyayena

vacanayyaktlrna sampadyate, tavat padajatam v^kyartha-
- sya'vabodhakain na bhavati. lokavyavaharavartlbhirnya-
- yalryavat ■—• idam vldheyam, idamanuvadyam^ Iaam pr^dhl-
-nam, idam gunabhutam. Iaam vivaksitam, idamavivaksita-
- mityaai na sampradhej*yatp, tavanna kvacidv^davakvar-
- tii a' vabudhyate.

taduktain virtikakaramisralh —

* tavadeva hi sandeho veuavakye srute bhavet.

yavanna vacanavvaktistasya spasta* vadharvate.
jrnatva tu vacanavyaktim mimimsinyayakatarah
prallyante samastasca veaavakyirthasarasayah. i t i .

at$a eva mimamsaya vedavaky«rthaQpratipattaviti-

knrtavyatatvam.
taduktam taireva —
♦
t •
 204

' dharme^ramiyamane h i vedena karanatmana.

itikartavyatabhagam mimamsa p u ra yisya ti'
CBK) iti.
*
' I f such being the ca se , a l l the words w ill have (some
s o r t o f ) Synotymousness in a sentence l ik e 1brin g the cow'
e tc . As fo r in stan ce, with the word ' cow' (gsaa), the word
(verb) 'brin gs* (anayati) i s S y n ta c tic a lly r e la te d . Likew ise,
with the word 'b r in g ' (itfiaya), the word 'cow ' (gau) is r e la te d .
I t i s r e p lie d — (here) these are the two m eaning, th e cowhood
(gotva) as r e la te d to the a ct o f brin gin g (anayana) and 'b r in ­
ging* (anayana) as r e la te d to the cow (ga u ). Hence, because
o f the denotation o f one meaning by one word on ly , how can
there a rise the question o f mutual synonymousness? Same is the
case with the meanings o f words a ls o . I f however, i t i s urged
th at in the expression, 'o n e purchases soma with a rod one year
o ld (cow) * $ the meaning o f the verb 'p u rch ases' (K rin a tl) due
to i t s denoting many meanings s y n ta c tic a lly r e la te d with those
o f the words 'red n ess' (arunya) e t c . , there may a rise the
s y n ta ctic s p l i t (Vakyabheda) which is defined as r e p e t it io n .
Ho ( i t , cannot be ob^ ected^like t h i s ) . I t is because here the
words are u ttered as thpy are mutually r e la te d . The sy n ta ctic
s p l i t , however takes p la c e in resp ect o f the unrelated mean­
ings (vaixupya) wh#i there i s in con sisten cy in tho con text o f
mutual r e la t io n ( o f the meanings) o f the words.

What i s , thin (m4Kt by) the compounded word ' nyayasampa-

•ditavyakti' (as sta ted in h (i2 )? (Here i t i s said) — so long

*
 205

as the subject (vacana) and the Predicate (Vfrakti) in a

sentence are no1?understood by the principles (nyaya) o f
syntactical unity (ekavakyata) and syntactical diversity
(bhinnavakyata), the group o f words do not convey the sentence­
meaning. So long as the principles used in common parlance,
do not ascertain t£at this should be performed, this should be
restated (anuvadya), this is the principal, this is subsidiary,
this is intended and this i s not intended e t c ., none w ill under­
stand the meaning o f the vedic sentences. So says the revered
author o f tne Varttikas —■

” l#ien the subject and the predicate are not clearly ascert­
ained, doubt exists in the mind in respect of a vedic sentence
that stands heard. But in the event o f the subject and the
predicate being knotfi, then a ll tne doubts in respect o f the
meanings o f the vedic sentences, which weaken the principles
of Mimimsa come to disappear1’. Miraamsa, therefore, sa v es as
the modus operandi (itikartavyata) in giving r is e to the
knowledge o f the meanings o f the vedic sentences. Hence, by
them (themselves), i t is said —

’’ Irfien moral duty (Eharma) is to be authoritatively known

with the vedas as the means ( i . e . , chief source), then i t is
Mlmamsa that f u l f i l l s the r o le o f a modus operandi” . (BK).f

In J text v iz ., ‘ nanvevam..................... 1 etc. o f the VM

above, the author refers to some doubts that may arise and
then meets the same. 3t is already stated that according to
 206

Salikanatha a ll the Padas in a Vakya possess the Sakti to

denote the rela ted meanings. Now, an objection may be raised
here as to i f i t is admitted that a l l the Padas possess th»
Anvitabhichana S akti, then in the expression li k e *gamanaya*
(bring the cO*), a l l the Padas w ill be mutually synonymous.
For instance, in the above expression, the word ’ gam’ because
of being re la te d to *anaya' ( w ill convey the meaning 'b rin g
the cow1 . Again the word ‘ anaya* due to i t s being re la te d to
the word ’ gam* w ill convey the same meaning. Now Salikanatha
comes forward to meet th is objection and so he says both
the meanings v i z . , Gotva (cowhood) sy n ta c tic a lly re la te d to
Anayana (act of bringing), denote one meaning each and as such
the question o f the s ta te o f being synonymous in respect of
the Padas does not a rise . Likewise, the mutual synonymousness
among the Padarthas does not take place. There a rise s, again,
doubt — In the expression, * arunayaikahayanya pingaksya somam
krinati* already cite d above, the meaning o f the verb 'k r in a ti'
(one purchases) denotes many sy n ta c tic a lly re la te d meanings of
the Padas 'arunya* etc. and as such i t r e s u lts in vakyabheda
(syn tactic s p lit) which i s of the nature o f re p e titio n . In the
said expression which is a vid hi vakya, there are rep etitio n s
l i k e ‘ arunaya somam k rin a ti* , * ekahiyanya somam krin ati* and
•pingaksdti somam k rin a ti* . Vakyabheda i s a demerit that belongs
to a vakya, while Laksana i s a demerit that belongs to a Padai62

162 laksana hi padadostfi, vikyabhedastu vakyadosah.

MNP, p. n .
 207

In ' samesu vakyabhedah1 (MS. 2 .1 .4 7 ), we fin d Jaim inl’ s r e fe r ­

ence to vakyabheda. Sahara in h is Bhasva explains vakyabheda
c le a r ly . tfien the vakyas are independent o f one another (e ach
vakya having no requirement or expectation o f Padas ou tside
i t s e l f to complete I t s meaning), they should be treated as
d is t in c t Vakyas ( I . e i , i t s p lit s the sy n ta ctica l r e la t io n with

the o th e r ).

In K£l2) o f the VM, we have already discussed the S a lik a -

-natha makes the use o f the compound word ' nyayasampaditavyktl’ .
Now he explains the s ig n ific a n c e o f the same. The word may
be expounded as ' nyayaih sarapaditi vyaktih yasya t a t '. The
word 1nyaya' r e fe r s to the p r in c ip le s o f ' ^ a v a k ya ta *,
*Bhinnavakyata* etc. a risin g out o f the Padarthas. Sallkanatha,
in b r ie f , says that so long as Vac ana and Vyakti are not c le a r ly
sta ted by the p r in c ip le s known from vrddhavyavahara, the
Padarthas cannot lead to the knowledge o f the Vakyartha.
Ramanujacarya explains the compound word *nyayasampaditavyekti'
verb c l e a r l y . U n l e s s one understands with c e rta in ty the

163. ..................... samesu vakyabhedalj syat, samesu paraspa-

-rahakanksesu vakyam bhidyate. SB. under MS. 2 .1 .4 7 .
164. vrdahavyavaharapravartitayam y e nyayah sabdarthagocarah
ekavakyatvabhinnavakyatvadayah purvokfcissadhar an ah y °
ca dvaaasadhyayipratipadya vedarthanirnaye p rltisv ik a h
sabdantarabhyasadayah s t u t il ingavakyaprakaranadayaji
srutyarthapathana - sthanadayo vacananamadheyacodanisca
tairvim ar s'ad as^aylm campadl-t e sabdarthonamanvoyarhatva-
dacayaa sampadite s'abdarth anam anvayirhatvavibhagsati
p ascatsmr tyup ani taih padairyogyakramena vaky^rtnavaga-
tirity a rth a iy •— TR, p. 36.
 208

principles in daily l i f e , such as this is to he done, this is

to be restated, this is principal 't h is is subsidiary, this is
what is intended and this is not e tc ., one cannot understand
the meaning o f the vedic sentences. Vacana and the Vyakti-are
therefore, indispensable fo r understanding clea rly the meaning
o f the vedic sentences. Without the knowledge of these two,
on e's knowledge of the vedic sentences remains doubtful* In
support o f his view Salikanatha quotes two verses o f Kumarila.
Of these two verses, the f i r s t one may be traced back to the
hrhattika which is very often quoted by many writers o f Mimamsa.
But this w°rk is not available in print upto date. The
second verse may also, on the strength o f its having link in
meanings with that o f the f i r s t one, be said to belong to the
same work. Theste verses state that a ll sorts of doubt that may
arise regarding the meanings o f the vedic sentences can be very
well. Because o f this reason, Mimamsa serves the purpose of
Itikartavyata fo r acquiring the knowledge o f the vedic sentences.
kijs
The author o f thw M i in order to receive support, for^view,
quotes another verse, which is from the Brhattika o f Kumarila.
The idea o f the verse may be explained as —

165. That the Brhattika remains unpublished, can be known

from the A rticle "Kumarila and Brhattika", in ^iich
i t i s stated as —
'I t s very name and the references to i t in the
catalogues show that i t is very voluminous and probably
it s enormous size had stood unfdrtunately in the Way
o f it s being preserved to p o s te r ity '. Proceedings o f
the 3fid Oriental Conference, Madras, 1924 (p. 528).
 209

tfien a d iscu ssion i s to b e held on Dharma or the moral

duty, then i t is the vedas that p la y the r o l e o f a Karana or
the instrument and i t is Mimamsa that helps in conducting the
d iscu ssio n by taking the p a rt o f the I tikartavyata. The w » d
11 tikartavyata* may be expounded as ' i t i kartavyam yasyah sa
iti-k a r ta v y a ta'syah bhavah itik a rta v y a ta (kartavyavisp^a
ityarth ah ) I t is Mimamsa that explains the d e ta ils # f
procedure o f the vedic r i t e s .
•

V(1 2 e) nanu lo k e drageva vakyarthavagatirneyatlm

simagrimap eksate. ucjljrfcbe — atyantabhyastesu
vakyesu syadevam, adrstarthesu smrt&yadivaky esu,
l o k e 'p i nanavidharivadmtthanat kuto drageva*
rthan#s#ayah. api ca karanabhavena* p i lokasya* yam
viveko riasti.

taduktam -*■
' hahu jatigu n a-dr avya-karma-bhedavalambinah.
pratyayan sahasa j a tan sr au t a-1 ak s anik atmak an.
na lokah kar anabhavannir dhar ayiturnarh at 1
balaballdisiddhyartham vakyajnastu v icin v a te .*
CSV, p . 605) iti.

yaottdam sarvapadanamanvi tabhidhayitvamucyate,

ta t sarvesu srautarthesu padesu. laksanika-gaunar-
-thapadaprayoge tu yadeva ta tra srautartham padam,
tadevVnvitabhidhayakam, ita r a t tu padam p r a tiy o g i-
Oil

- sannidhanaparameva. ta tra vacakat^as*aktyanavadharan

166 f*N. 4 under MP, p . 54

Al so ' kathambhavakanksaparipurakatvamitikart-
- avyatatvam! «ii&>Ibld.f p . 54.
 svarthasyapi tattadanimavacakam, anvayayogyatvat.
' kintu tadarthena smrtena y a t svasamband^L, svasadr-
- sa i va svayamanvayayogyamupasth$pyate, tena' n*itam
srautarthameva pada® svarthamabhidhatta l t i dardfe-
- narahasyamidam. na ca sarvapadanyeva lik sa n ik a n i,
gaunani v i vaky e sambhavantiti niravadysm. kv a c id -
- abhidhanam nlaittam , kvacidabhihito*r-tiia i t i <%a
4ft

yaduktan, tacchabdopasthapitatam darsayiturn gaunama-

- bhihitatvagrahanam.

'I n common parlan ce, i t may be argued, the knowledge o f

the meaning o f a sentence does n ot depend on so much o f req u i­
s it e s (as i t takes in re sp e ct o f v e d ic sentence) q u ick ly . I t
i s said — th is may so hapgen-on in case o f those sentences
which are repeatedly used, (but) in the case o f the unseen
o b je c t s in the sentences belonging to the Smrti s'astras, eren
in common parlan ce, where does take p la ce the ascertainment o f
the meanings o f the sentences qu ickly in the fa c e o f the v a r i­
ous co n trov ersies that are found to a rise? Moreover, th is
d iffe r e n c e (the a risin g ou t o f the knowledge i^th ou t the help
o f a ll the r e q u is ite s ) does n ot occur qu ick ly in common par­
la n ce , in the absence o f (p a rticu la r) cause. So, i t i s said —

"A person is n ot competent to a scerta in the know l^ge

o f the meanings both primary and secondary Immediately a risin g
ou t o f many such as gen eric a ttr ib u te , q u a lity , substance and
action without any cause. The E arn ed sch olars o f the sentence
( i . e ., Mimamsakas), th e r e fo r e , divid e the meanings in to two
 • '

« «

211 '

* ♦

In order to understand 'which o f #them I s powerful and which

i s n o t ." * . «

•Moreover, what has been said that a ll the words have the
#

state o f denoting the r e la te d meanings, i s r e la t in g to a ll

the words denoting the primary meanings. But when the word i s
used to denote the secondary meaning, th e word which denotes
the primary meaning i s the denoter o f the r e la te d meaning and
the other word i s used as being on conveying in proxim ity the
counter cc0r r e la tiv e s . Because o f the non-ascertainm ent o f
the denotative power there (in the ca se o f the word), that
does not become the denoter, then, o f i t s own primary meaning
a l s o ,f o r , i t s in co m p a tib ility fo r the s y n ta c tic a l r e la t io n .
But i t is the s e c re t o f th% (Mimimsakas*) l o g i c that a word
denotes as i t s meaning only a primary meaning which is r e la te d
tQ th at (meaning) which i s presented as one com patible fo r a
s y n ta c tic a l r e la t io n and r e la te d or sim ilar to i t s e l f by that
meaning which is r e c o lle c t e d (bu t is not denoted) (in the t^ase
o f a sentence in volvin g secondary word-meanings). I t w ill not
be f a u lt le s s to admit that a l l the words in a S en ten ce are
in d ic a tiv e and secon d a rily s ig n ific a n t . The statement that
sometimes the denotation and sometimes the primary meaning are
the causes ( o f the knowledge o f the sentence-meaning) i s to
understand that a meaning i s denotable from a word on ly (and
hence), the expression "denoted" i s to be understand second­
arily* • ^
#

• •
 In the V text v i z ., 1r^anyi loke a r ig e v a ....................... ' ^ c.
SMikanati a rejects an objection that may be raised as to ii.
popular sentences, the Vakyartha does not depend on all th e
requisites immediately as i t takes in the case o f vedic s°n-
tences. We have already stated that in order to understand
the meaning o f the vedic sentence, one must ascertain th^
Vac ana and Vyakti along with a ll other principles known throu-r
Vrddhavyavahara. But in case of the popular sentences, i t may
be argued, all these requisites are not necessary fo r undcr -
standing the Vakyartha. Salikanatha, states that a ll the
requisites may not be necessary in respect o f those sentences
which are repeatedly used but not in the case of th® objects
in the sentences o f the Smrti works. The arising out o f the
knowledge of the Vakyartha without the help o f a ll the requi­
sites does not occur quickly in popular sentences also, b®c-urp
o f the*e being no particular cause. In support of his ®xpl?r.a-
tion, Salikanatha quotes two verses from the Slokavar t tika r:'
Kumarila. What is stated there in the verses is this —

Nobody is competent to ascertain the knowledge o f the

meanings both primary and secondary immediately arising out
of many such as Jati (generic attribute), Guna (quality),
Dravya (substance) and Karma (action) without any cause. mhe
Mimamsakas who are known as Vakyavid, diviae tie meanings i d o
two in oruer to unuerstand which o f them is powerful and w ild
is not.

I t may be pointed out here that the two verses viz.,

' bifcahujati . . . . *............... 1 e tc ., are stated to be from th®
T a n tra v irtilk a o f kumarila. Eut these verses a ctu a lly belcr;-
to the Slok at ar 11 Ik a^ ^ o f huma r il a.

In the V text above, again, Salikanatba contends that

the sta te o f denoting the r e la te d meanings by the Padas is
with regard to a ll the Padas that denote the primary m^anin. s .
But, on the other hand, when the Pada is used to convey the

secondary meaning, the Pada which denotes the primary m^ariv

denotes the rela ted meaning and the other Padas ar* used ^s
being bent upon conveying in co n tig u ity the cou n ter-co3 rT-el-t,iv
(meanings).

I t i s also stated by Salikanatha in V text abovp that

i t w ill be erroneous to conceive that a ll the Padas in a /--
are in d ic a t iv e and secon d a rily s ig n ific a n t .

katham punaranvitabhidhiayina padena

svarupamatram smarayitum saky amity ah —

' How again by a word denoting r e la te d meaning can r°c- ; 1

i t s meaning as i t is ( i . e . , in an unrelated sta te)? (In th is
connection) Says, (th e author)' —

k (l3 ) anvitasyabhidhane1p i svarupam vid ya te sada.

tena svarupamatre'pi s"abdo janayat.i s-irtim.

'The meaning o f a word as i t i s , remains always (unaf fv-rt'-'

even in re sp e ct o f the expression o f the cor^relatn d. rlenc , a

167. The vers®^ (no. 80 & 8 i) are to be found in the

.rakyadhikai*sna o f the work. SV. p. 605.
word produces r e c o lle c t io n even in re sp e ct o f th « meaning as
i t is * . v

In 1a n v ita sy a b h id h a n e'p i......................... ' etc. o f the K o f

>•

the VM above, Salikanatha r e p lie s to a qu estion that may be

put as to how a Pada denoting r e la te d meaning, i s capable o f
r e c a llin g i t s meaning as i t is ( i . e ., in ah unrelated s t a t e ).
In h is re p ly to the question Salikanatha, in the K abov*»,
asserts that even in resp ect o f Anvitabhidhana, the meaning
o f a Pada as i t is ( i . e ., i t s own nature) remains always
unaffected* T herefore, a Sabda or a Pada can produce r e c o l l e c t ­
ion even in the case o f i t s meaning as i t i s . According to th°
Prabhakaras, a Pada conveys an Anvitartha ( r e la te d meaning)
i t e . , an is o la te d meaning o f a Pada). The Prabhakaras contend
that the Padas ce rta in ly r e c a l l th eir meanings sep arately, but
they do not stop a t that. Their r e s p e c tiv e meanings already
r e c a lle d , denote'again as r e la te d to the meanings o f other
words and then alone they stop. Thus, in the view o f the
Prabhakaras, Vakyartha in the form o f a r e la t io n is denoted
by the Padas themselves and not by the P adarthas.^^

The word , Sv3rupa* in the JC above, means the meanings o f

a Pada as i t i s , or the own nature o f a Pada, i . e ., the i s o l ­
ated or the unrelated meaning o f a Pada. The in c lu s io n o f the
p a r t i c l e 1a p i' in the word ’ Svarupamatr e'pi* in the K,

< j> r

168. padanl tavat prthak padar than smaranty eva.

na tu tavata viramanti srairitameva tu
svam svamartham pun aritarapadirth in vitatven a-
bhidhayaiva viram an titi radhintah. MM, p . 96.
asserts that even in re sp e ct o f i t s meaning as i t i s , a Fad
can produce r e c o lle c t io n ,
4

evam tavat sambandhagr ah an an tar gatam

pvarupasmaranamuktam, samprati sva.rupam-
- atrasmaranamapi pad adev a nV nupapannamityaha —

’ Thus the r e c o lle c t io n o f the meaning o f a word as i t

i s , included in tne ascertain in g o f the r e la t io n i s stated,
how (the author) sta tes that even the r e c o lle c t io n o f only
the meaning as i t is from the word i t s e l f is not in con sist
(and) hence Says (the author)1 —

h (l4 ) yati a‘ rthena* pramanena svapadam smaryate k v * cit.

j
paaena pyapramanena tatha rthssm arayisyate.

"As, sometimes, the concerning word i s r e c a lle d by a

meaning without any source o f v a lid knowledge, so also a
meaning w ill be r e c a lle d by a word without the source o f
v a lid knowledge.'

V (l4) na hi yatpramanam, taoeva smar anakaranam,

apramanamsva h i ta t. yasya tu yena saha
k a ca citp ra tya sa ttih p ra tita p tjrv i, sa tatra
samskaroobodhadvareria s"aknotyeva smrtim
janayitum. a sti ca svarupasya'pi tadabhiahp-
yintargatya sabaena pratya’s a t t i r i t i , saknoti
tatraJ>i sabaassmrtim janayitum, arthavat.
y atha nir vikalp akadasapr a ti tamar thasv ar up ama-
- tr amanabhi ah ey amap i s^ab dam smar ay at i , t ath a
 s'abdo'pyarthamapi, kimanupap annam. Btena —
padoccarananantarain p a d a r t h a s v a r u p a p r a t i t i s s ^ -
-m arthita. a b h i h it a n v a y a v a d i n o ' p i s a na pram'nnm,
abhvaahik arthap a r i c c h e d a b h a v a t . " a n a d h ig a ta r t. b r ^ '
prananami1' t i siddhlmtabnyupagamat.

taauktam —
' s a r v a s y a ' n u p a l a b c h e ' r the pram any am smr t i r pnvathV

CSV, Au.Su. I D iti.

a t a eva sm r tir iy a m , y a d i p u n a r s m r t i r e s a
ria'bhyup e y e ta, ta d a pram a n a-sm rti-sa m say a-
v ip ar y ay ebhy aji pr a t ip a t ty antaranabhyup a.gama t
p a d a t p a d a r t h a p r a t i t i h k v i ' n ta r b h a v y a t e m i t i
vacyam. a t a evV b h i h i ta nv ay av ad e 1p i sm arakatv a-
- m evi1 smabhyam r o c a t e .

' F o r , i t i s not a v a l i d c o g n i t i o n t h a t whatever ip

p o s s e ? F e d o f a so urce o f v a l i d knowledge can be the cause o
r e c o l l e c t i o n , becau se t h a t i s devoid of any source o f v?] i c
knowledge. But I f sometimes, th e c l o s e p r o x i m it y o f on» v i t a
an o th er, s t a n a s known p r e v i o u s l y t h a t ( c l o s e p r o x i m ity ) is
c a p a b l e o f pro d u cin g th e r e c o l l e c t i o n by mQans o f r e v i v i n g
i m p r e s s i o n s . And as there i s c l o s e p r o x i m i t y o f the m-^anir •
o f a word as i t i s , with th e word by v i r t u e o f i t (i.e ., ^
meaning) b e i n g in c l u d e d in the a en o te c s e n s e ( i . e . , the r e l a ­
t e d meaning) and as such the word cah produce r e c o l l e c t i o n i
r e sp e c t of that ( i . e . , the meaning as i t i s ) as does th =,
meaning. As th e meaning a s i t i s , known through In d e t e r m ir a^
c o g n i t i o n and not b e i n g denoted a l s o r e c a l l s the word, so
 the word r e c a lls the meaning and so, what Is in con sisten t
therein? Hence, the knowledge o f the meaning o f a word as
i t i s , immediately after the utterance o f a word is admit tea.
Even according to an advocate o f the c c 0 r r e la tio n o f the
expressed, that ( i . e . , the knowledge o f the meaning o f a
as i t is ) i s not a source o f v a lid knowledge, because o f th
being the lack o f ascertainment o f anything more than r e c o i - ^
(word-meaning as i t is) meaning. For, because o f there being
the conclu sion by a l l that "a source o f v a lid knowl^d- e is
that which comprehends what i s not known.” So, i t i s r^ia —

" A ll sources o f v a lid knowledge) apply with e f f e c t ,

only such o b je c t s as have not been perceived (by any othnr
source); otherwise i t i s only a case o f r e c o l l e c t i o n . "
(SV.AU.SJ. 11). Hence, i t is r e c o l l e c t i o n #nd i f this
r e c o l l e c t i o n is not admitted, then i t i s to be s ta g 'd as tn
where i t should be included that the word gives r i s e to tin-
knowledge o f the meaning, the word, the knowledge o f w i e h Is
not recognised as being acquired from source o f v a lid know-i'Q-
(pramana), r e c o l l e c t i o n (Smrti), doubt (Samsaya) and error
(viparyaya). Thus the act o f r e c a llin g the moaning? (by
r e sp ectiv e words) even in the vi^w o f the co&rr e la tio n o f t. ~
expressed recommends i t s e l f to u s . 1

In 1yathartherm ............................. 1 etc. and 1na hi y^tr-

-ramanam ..................................1 e t c . , o f the K and I te x t re s p e c t­
iv e ly o f the VM, the author states that even the r e c o l le c t i o n
o f the meaning o f a Pada as i t is i . e . , i t s own nature, i-e
 218

i s from the Pada i t s e l f . He also sta tes that as a meaning

r e c a lls a Pada without any source o f v a lid knowledges so a lso
a Pada r e c a ll s i t s own meaning. As there i s c lo s e proxim ity
o f the meaning o f a word as i t i s , with the word by way o f
the meaning being in clu d ed in the r e la te d meaning, so, the
word produces r e c o lle c t io n in r e sp e ct o f the meaning as the
meaning produces r e c o lle c t io n in resp ect o f the word. Moreover,
as the meaning as i t i s , known through Indeterminate c o g n itio n
and without being denoted r e c a lls the word and thus the word
a lso r e c a ll s the meaning. Thus in the view o f the Prabhakaras,
the knowledge o f the meaning o f a word as i t i s , Immediately
a fte r the u tteran ce o f a word i s ad a ltted . Silikanatha also
sta te s that even, according to the Bhattas who advocate th*
theory o f Abhihitanvaya, the knowledge o f th$, meaning o f a
word as i t i s , is not a Pramana, because o f there being no
ascertainment o f anything more than the r e c o lle c t e d meaning.
I t i s again, because o f there being the con clu sion that 'a
Pramana i s that which comprehends what is not known.* This
d e fin it io n o f a Pramana i s accepted by most o f the thinkers
o f the schools o f Indian P hilosophy. In support o f h is a ssert­
io n , Salikanatha makes a r e fe r e n c e to a verse In h a lf from
the S iokavarttika o f Kumarila,169 which sta tes that a ll
£ramajnas apply with e f f e c t , to on ly such o b je c ts as have not
been p erceiv ed by any other pramina. Otherwise i t w ill a
case o f r e c o lle c t io n .

169. the second h a lf o f the verse i s as fo llo w s *

coaana copades'asca vidhiscaikarthavadinah,
SV.AU.SU. l i .
 In the J text above, Salikanatha r e fe r s to the four
types o f knowledge recogn ised by the th inkers. They are
Pramana, Sm rti, Samsaya or Sandeha and Viparyaya.1^0 Of
them, the f i r s t tv < ^ v iz., Pramana and Smrti are the v a lid
knowledge, w hile the la t e r two v i z . , Samslaya and Viparyaya
are regarded as in v a lid knowledge.

Thus Silikanath a asserts that the fo llo w e rs o f the theory

o f Abhihitanvaya who contend that a Pada i s the Abhidhiyaka

- 171
and not Smaraka , cannot but accept that the Padas r e c a ll
th eir meanings i . e . , the a ct o f r e c a llin g the meanings by
r e s p e c tiv e words.

ltaretarasrayam idinim p a rih a ra ti —

*Now (th e author) gets r id o f the f a lla c y o f mutual

interdependence' ——

K (i5) smr tisa n n ih ita ir evamarthairanvitamatmanah.

arthamaha padain sarvam iti na'nyonyasamsr$ayah -

'Thus a l l the words speak o f (convey) a l l meanings

r e la te d by th eir own meanings (coming) to be proximate
through r e c o lle c t io n and as such there i s no (involvement)
o f the fa lla c y o f mutual interdependence.'

V (i5a) _ _
svarthasvarupamatrasmarane h i na padam
padantaramapeksate. smrtisannihitamapidam
bhavatyeva sannihitam. - n a sti tenetaretarasrayatvam.

170. pram anam smrtih sandeho vip a ry a ya sceti caturvidham

j nan am. PP. p. 43.
171. tasmadabhidhlyakameva padaa na soarakam iti. NBM, p.107.
 220

Nanu vraahavyav aharena vyutpattih, anvitarthapra-

-tipatinibandhanasca vyavaharah, atastaddars'anat, anvita-
- pr atip attirevV numaturn s”akya, na tvananvitapadartha-
- matr asmar anam^ ucyate — vyavaharanumitanvitapratip a tt-
- yanyathanupapattireva* nanvltasvitfthasmaranasambhave ^
pramanam, darsitam hyetat — na' nanvitapratipattimant-
- arena* nvitapratipattirupapadyata i t i .

*For, a word does not require an another word in respect

of re co lle ctin g its own meaning as i t is . I t (the meaning) -•>"
also being brought in contiguity through reco lle ctio n ,
indeed, comes to be (mutually) contiguous. Hence, there does
not occur the fa lla cy o f mutual interdependence.’

But, as the knowledge o f the meaning of a sentence arises

from (observing) -the usage o f the elderly parsons and the
usage o f the elderly persons is based on the knowledge of the
related meanings, so, because o f observing that (usage o f the
elaerly persons) the knowledge o f the related meanings is
capable o f being inferred and not only the re co lle ctio n o f the
unrelated meanings o f the words. I t is said — otherwise non­
attainment o f the knowledge o f the related meaning inferred
from the usage o f the elderly persons is the source o f there
being the p o s sib ility o f the re co lle ctio n o f the unrelated
meanings. Therefore, i t has been shown that the knowledge of
the related meanings cannot be attained without that o f the
unrelated ones.*
 221

In 1sm rtisa n n ih ita ireva m ............. j .....................* e tc . and

' svarthasvarupamatr asmarable..................................1 e tc . o f the
h and X te x t r e s p e c tiv e ly sta ted above, Salikanatha discards
the o b je c tio n that foe theory o f Anvitabhidhana s u ffe r s from
the f a lla c y o f mutual interdependence (I ta reta ra sra y a ). For,
according to the Prabhakaras, a ll the Padas convey the mean­
ings r e la te d by th eir own meanings that come to be proximate
through r e c o lle c t io n . As th^r contend, a Pada does not depend
on another Pada in the matter o f r e c o lle c t in g i t s own meaning
as i t i s . I t is because the meaning brought in c o n tig u ity
through r e c o lle c t io n , comes to be mutually contiguous.

In the J tex t above, again Salikanatha r e p lie s to a

query that as the knowledge o f a VakySrtha a rises from observ­
ing Vrddhavyavahara and as Vrddhavyavahara is based on the
knowledge o f the r e la te d meanings, so, from the observation
o f Vrddhavyavahara, one can a tta in the knowledge o f the
r e la te d meanings by means o f in feren ce and not the f e c o l l e c t -
ion o f the unrelated meaning* o f words o n ly . But Salikanatha

in order to meet th is qu«*y, states that the knowledge o f thp

r e la te d meaning in fe rre d from VrddhavyavahaTa i s the source
o f r e c o lle c t in g the unrelated meanings. Hence, the knowledge
o f the r e la te d meanings cannot be acquired without the know­
ledge o f the unrelated meanings.

Thus in the V te x t, the author avoids the fa lla c y o f

mutual interdependence in r e s p e c t o f the theory o f Anvitabhi-
-dhana,.
V(i5b) atra kascidaha — yadi smrti%annihitamasritya'
nvitabhidhinam paralh kriyate, tada sraaranasya
pratyisattinibandhanatvat, anekesanca' rthanam
pratyasattisambhavit, tesu gurtisannihitesvagrhya-
-manvisesatvat, "ukhayam p a c a t i't i nokha pacatyar-
-thanvitaiva kevala'bhidhiyate. sa hi kul&Ladyanvita'
- p i pratipannaivetl, smaranat tadanvita' pyuktia1bhi-
dhiyate, tatha pacatyartho'pi pistakadikaranakova-
gata i t l tatsmara^annaudananvita eva'bhidhiyeta.
abhlhitanvavade tu riayain dosah. ekaikasya'rthasva-
- bhidheyatvaditi.

'Here someone contends —■ I f by others, the expression

o f the c o r r e la te d is accepted by resorting to the meanings
found to be proximate through recollection , then because o f
the re co lle ctio n being based on close proximity and because
of there being the p o s s ib ility o f the close proximity o f
many meanings, because of there being no par ticulai^ (meaning)
being acceptable for the sake o f rela tion in respect o f the
meanings found to be proximate through re co lle ctio n , in the
expression, "ukhayam pacati" (one cooks in the p ot),*tb e
'ukha' (the pot) is not denoted as related only with the
meaning o f (the word) 'p a ca ti' (cooks). For, that (ukha) is
also known as related to the potter etc. and because o f the
reco lle ctio n (o f the meaning o f the p o tte r), the word 'ukha'
is stated as related to the potter. Likewise, the meaning
o f (the word) 'p a ca ti' which is known to have cake etc &s
the auxiliary cause, i s , Indeed, denoted as related with
 p..

!
2ta
r ic e , because o f there being the reco lle ctio n o f that (ric^ ).
But this is not a fau lt in the view o f the correlation o f
the expressed. For, (in the case of correlation o f the expressed)
one meaning is denoted by one word only.*

In the V text v i». ’ atra kascidaha..................... 1 etc.

as stated above, Salikanatha presents the ob jection raised
by a follower of the theory o f Abhihitanvaya against the theory
o f Anvitabhidhana. The ob jection states that i f the Prabhakaras
admit Anvitabhidhana by means o f resorting to the meanings
which are found to be in proximity through re co lle ctio n , thsn
because o f the recollection which is based on close proximity
and as so many meanings have close proximity, in an expression
lik e 'ukhayiyam pacati' (one cooks in the p o t), the ’ ukha'
( i . e ., the pot) w ill not be denoted as related only with the
meaning o f ‘ Pacati1. I t is because the ‘ ukha1 is also under­
stood as related to the potter etc. and because o f r e c o lle c t­
ing the meaning o f the potter, the word 'ukha* is seated as
related to the potter. Same is the case with the other factors
lik e earth etc. o f making the pots. In this manner, the
meaning o f ’ pacati1 which has cake etc. as the auxiliary
#

cause is denoted as related with &ice because o f i t s being

recollected . Thus in Anvitabhidhana, from all the meanings,
the related sentence-meaning should be understood. But this
sort o f fau lt does not arise in the case o f Abhihitanvaya
as in this view only one meaning is denoted from one word
only and as such the syntactical relation w ill take pla%e
only from one denotea sense. Thus the Bhattas prefer the
 224

theory o f Abhihltanvaya to the theory o f Anvltabhidhana.

V (l6 c) atrocyate — padattavat padarthapratitissm aranad-

bhinni vaditum na s*akyate. tena smr tan amev anv aya-
-b o dhakatv amity a?r ay aniy am. tatha ca tu lyo dosah.
atha sabaaissm aritanamanvayabodhakatvam vrddhavya-
- v ah are tathadarsanadityadosah. raatantare’ p i tu ly a -
-m etat. na c i ’ yamekantah. vr ddhavyavahare' dhyahrt°na' -
- pyarthena' nvitabhidhanadars*anadi tyuktam. atha
„ a
sabdairbhav*'rthassmaryante. kintu tesim katamwia'
nvayavabodhakatvamiti na vidmah. abhihitanvayavade
tvabhihitenaiva* nvayabodhakatvam yuktameveti.
tadasat. smga*akatvatirekini ka* nya'bhidhayakata,

ya vyavasthanibandhanam. athocyate^mirakatvam nama

Pr atyasttinibandhanam. tena tadatirekinyabhidheya-
4. -
- bhidhayakatalaksana p ra tty a sa ttirn g ik a ra n iy e ti.
naitadevam. smarakatvenaiva vrddhav^avahare darsanat
smaraktvopapatteh. pratyayya- pratyayakata h i
vacyavacakataj sa ca yadyagjagni — dhumadlnam
sambandhantarapurvika drsta tathapi sabde tatha
n a sriy a te, kintu vacakatvavagamadeva vacakatvam.

evam smarakatvavagamadeva smarakatvamiti, kim

- - ^
pratyasattyantarasrayanena.

apl ca* nvitarthavadina evedam p ra tin iy a ta n v a y it-

- vamupajladyate — y atp adar than t ar suivi t abhi dh ay ak at ay a
smaryate, tadaiw ltasyaiva vrddhavyavahare v ic y a t-
« - vadarsanat. yatrapyadhyaharah, t a t r a 'p i sannidhS-
 225

-pakavasena visesanvitabhldhanalabha i t i lokata

eva jn ata m iti, na kasciddosah. api ca jnatam
tavadetad yadanena padena'yam artho'nvito v icy a
iti, ta tta yadyanyena'pyanvitabhidhanam syat,
ta d i vakyabhedo bhavet na cV savekavakyatvasambhave
nyayyah.

taduktam —
"sambhavatgekavakyatve vakyabhedastu nesyate”
(SV.Pra.SU. 9) i t i .

'Hare i t i s said (re p lie d ) — the knowledge o f the

meanings o f words from the words cannot be sa id to bp other
than r e c o lle c t io n . Hence, i t should be admitted that the
words r e c o lle c t e d convey the r e la te d meanings. Thereby the
demerit remains a lik e (in both the v ie w s). I f i t is contpnded
that the understanding o f the sy n ta ctica l r e la t io n o f the
meanings r e c a lle d by the words le a d to no fa u lt as i t i s
seen in the usage o f thp e ld e r ly persons. Same w ill be the
case in the other view a ls o . I t is also not absolute co n d itio n ,
f o r , i t i s said that the expression o f the coS rrela ted i s
observed as being maae by the imported ideas in course o f
the usage o f the eld e rly persons. Again ( i t may be argued),
many meanings are r e c a lle d by the words, b u t ' (we) do not
(cannot) know by which o f them is conveyed the knowledge o f
the s y n ta c tic a l r e la t io n . But in the v ie w o f the c o r r e l a t i o n
o f the expressed, the conveying o f the s y n ta tica l r e la t io n
^ on ly by the denoted meanings is found to be c o r r e c t. That i s
 22 *

in correct. #iat is i t that denotes as being d ifferen t from

that which re c a lls , which is (again) the basis o f the process
(of syntactical rela tion ). I f i t is said, the state o f that
which re ca lls is that which is the close proximity. Hence,
close proximity which is different from the state o f that
V

which r e c a lls , should be admitted as characterised by the

rela tion o f the expressed and that expresses. (But) this is
not as such. For, the state o f that which re ca lls is obtained
by means o f the state of that which re c a lls , as is observed
in course of the usage o f the elderly persons. The state of
the conveyed and the conveyor i s , indeed, the state o f «xpr«»ps-
ed and that expresses. And though that (the state o f the
conveyed and the conveyor) is seen as preceded by (the know­
ledge o f ) . Some other relation , in respect o f fir e and smoke
e tc ., yet in the context o f verbal testimony, this is not to
be admitted. But from the knowledge o f the state o f that which
expresses is (understood) the state o f that which expresses.
Thus as the state of that which r e c a lls , is (understood from)
the state of that which r e c a lls , so where l i ° s the necessity
o f accepting some other thing v iz ., close proximity?

Moreover, in the view of an advocate o f (th ° theory of)

the expression o f the cdgrrelated, this syntactical relation
occurs invariably because of observing in course o f th» usagp
of the elderly person, the expressiveness (o f some meaning)
as related with another meaning o f a word in relation with
which, i t is recalled as being denotative. I t is known from
 *
227

common parlance, again where there is importation, there is

the obtaining of the denotation o f the (particular) coSrrelated
(meaning) on the strength o f that which places other meaning rn
proximity. Again i t is known that such a meaning as related
is expressed by such a word and as such i f there (again) the
expression o f the related meaning is denoted by other meaning,
then i t w ill involve syntactical s p lit . Eut that (syntactical
sp lit) is not proper (in a case) where the syntactical unity
(unitary passage) is possible. Hence, i t is said ——

"But where, however, the syntactical unity (unitary

passage) is possible, the syntactical s p lit is not desired 0
there" (SV. Pra. SU. 9)* In the V text v i z ., ' atrocyate —-
p a d ltta v a t......................... * etc. stated above, Silikanatha
refutes the objection raised by the Abhihtanvayavldins that
i f the Anvitabhidhinavadins acctpt the theory o f Anvitabhi-
-dhana by means of resorting to the meanings found to be
proximate through re co lle ctio n , then because o f the r e c o lle c t­
ion which is based on close proximity and because of ther*
*

being close proximity in many meanings in the expression

•ukhayam p a c a ti', the 1ukha* is not denoted as related only
with the meaning o f 'p a c a t i'. But £^&Likanatha contends that
the knowledge o f the Padarthas cannot be said to be differ^fit
from reco lle ctio n . I t has already been stated that in the view
o f the Prabhakaras, the Padas re ca ll their meanings. Thus the
Paaarthas already recalled, they express again as related to
the meanings o f other Padas. Hence, it should be admitted,
say the Prabhakaras, that the Padarthas when recalled convey
 228

the syntactical relation* Thus i t is better to admit that the

syntactical relation is o f the meanings o f words that are
recalled and not o f the meanings that are expressed. But the
follow ers o f the theory of Abhihi tanvaya argue that i f i t is
admitted that the meanings reca lled by the Padas convey th->
syntactical relation as is seen in Vrddhavyavahara, then i t
w ill be applicable in the case o f the theory o f Abhibitanvaya
to
also. Moreover, the Abhihitanvayavaains object^by saying that
the words re ca ll many meanings and as such i t cannot be ascert­
ained which o f than conveys the syntactical rela tion . Thus it
w ill be d if fic u lt on the part o f the followers of the Anvit^p
-bhidh'ana to solve such problem. But on the part o f the followers
o f Abhihitanvaya* i t is not a problem due to their admitting
the expressed meanings as the conveyor of the syntactical
tela tion , But this argument o f the^opponents has been consi-
dered by Salikariatha as baseless. For, Abhidhayakata or th«>
denotativeness is not differen t from Smarakata or the state
o f reco lle ctio n . Again, i t is admitted that Smgrakatva or the
state o f re co lle ctio n ts due to close proximity *nd as such
close proximity which is characterised by the relation o f the
denoted and the denoted as separate from the state of tpco-

lle c to r should be recognised. This what is argued by the

•
Abhihitanvayavaains. But according to Salikanatha, this view
o f the Abhihitanvayavadins is incorrect. What is that denotes
as being differen t from that which r e c a lls , which is the basis
o f the process o f syntactical relation . I f i t is said, the
state o f Ijhat which reca lls is that which is tho close proxi­
mity. Hence, close proximity which is differen t from the state

s
• «
 t

229

o f that which r e c a ll s , should be admitted as ch a ra cterised

by thp r e la t io n o f Vacya and Vacaka. This i s n ot so. I t i s
because the sta te o f th at which r e c a ll s i s obtained by means
o f the sta te o f that which r e c a lls as i s seen from Vrddhavya-
-vah ara. According to the Prabhakaras, the combination o f
separate meanings o f words is e ffe c te d by r e c o lle c t io n sin ce
the Padas aPPear i n su ccession and th e ir meanings are r e c o - 4b
172
l l e c t e d by us when we come to the end o f the Vakya.

In the V te x t above, SSlikanatha r e fe r s to two p r in c i­

p le s o f Mimamsa v i z . , Kkavakyata ( i . e . , the p r in c ip l° o f
s y n ta c tic a l u n ity) and Vakyabheda ( i . e . , the p r in c ip le o f
s y n ta c tic a l s p li t ) and contends that Vakyabheda is not d e s ir ­
able where there i s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f Ekavakyata. In support
o f h is statement, Salikanatha quotes a verse in h a lf from the
S lo k a v irttik a 173 o f Kumarila.

Jaim ini sta tes these two p r in c ip le s under MS.2 .1 .4 6 &

174
2 .1 .4 7 r e s p e c tiv e ly . The meaning o f thp e a r lie r sutra Is
—- so long as a s in g le purpose i s served by a number o f words,
which on being separated, are found to be wanting and incapable
o f e ffe c t in g the said purpose, they c o n s titu te one s y n ta ctica l

172. Vide NTK, p. 344

173. The f i r s t h a lf o f the verse i s as fo llo w s :
na hyekam laksayedesu buddhipurvain kathanfcanH
174. The sutras are :
(i) * arthaikatvidakam vakyam s^anksam ceJvibhage s y a t .'
(ii) 'samesu vakyabhedah syat'

t4
%
 230

unit — one complete yajusmantr a.

According to the Bhasya of Sahara the prin ciple is meant,

to be applicable to vedic words only, in the form of yajus-
mantra. But PrabhakaTa, in keeping with the Bhasya, explains
the word 1Arthaikatvat' as serving the purpose o f indicating
or reminding o f what is to be done; he clearly states that
the term 'Artha* in the Sutra stanus for purpose as i t is the'
most important factor and the words o f the sentence must be
related to that Important factor. Parthasarathi Misra, a
follower of kumarila favours the Bhasya view and takes
17g
'Artha1 in the sense of purpose.

The latter Sutra above lays down the prin ciple o f

Vakyabheda (Syntactical s p lit ). I t states thus — 'when the
sentences are independent o f one another (each sentence having
no requirement or expectancy o f words outside i t s e l f to comp­

le te it s meaning). They should be treated as distin ct sentences*.

In connection with such Mantra texts such as ' Ayuryajn«na

kalpatam*, 'prano yojnena kalpatam', there arises the question
as to whether these two can be taken as one sentence i . e . , a
'sin g le syntactical unit or as two distinct sentences? The
conclusion is that such set of words which stand independently
by i t s e l f and does not stand in syntactical need of another
set o f words, should be treated as two d istin ct sentences.

175. PIS, p. 190

176. Ibid.#, p. 190.
 331

V(l5d) ata eva y athakathaKcl aekavakyatvopapa ttau

vakyabhedasya1nyayyatvam. lo k e ca laksaha,
gauni ca vrttirvakyabhedabhayadeva. anyatha
vakyam bhitva kimityadhyahr tya yogy A a r than tar am
sarvapadanyeva mukhyarthani nasriyante. vedepyo-
- kavakyatvabaladevarthavidesu gunavadadyasrayanam,
sammargadhikar azie (MS. 2 .1 .4 ) vibhaktivyatyaya-
-varnanam. audumbaradhikaranapurvapakse ca kathancit
pasuphalakatvasrayanam. c l t r adhlkarane (MS. 1 .4 .2 )
rudhiparitylgena '‘pancadasanyaiyani bhavantl
(Ta.Br. 2 0 .1 .1 ) t l kathancinriamadheyatva^ca' neka-
- gunavidhane v"akyabhedapattessamudaylnuvidakatva$:i-
- ddhih. prakaranantaradhlkarane (MS. 2 .3 .1 1 ) ca
vakyabhedadosadeva’ gnihotrapadasya gaunatvavarnanam.
gr ah adhlkarane (MS. 1 .3 .7 ) caikatvasya'vivakeltatvam .
- a - **
1ardM&iamantarvedi m in otl, arddham bh airvedl'
(Mai. S. 6 .4 .6 ) cobhayapadasya’ vlvaksa. 1virunya
niskasena tusaisca'vabhrtham y a n ti (M*. 7 .3 .5 )
ty a tra nirap eksatvatyagah. paryuaas adhlkarane
(MS. 1 0 .8 .7 ) ca nanafeiithasya laksanikatvam ityadl
bahutarai drsyate. ta tra yadi samabhivyahriyaminasya
padasya'bhidheyam p a rity a jy a , anyena saha'nvayo
lakgyate, tada tadekavakyata h iy e ta . tadarthamave-
- damuktam, *nyayasam paditavyaktiti."

ekavakyatvam h i nyaya^i. tadanusarena y o'rth a h ,

so 1 tra vakyasya* srayanlyah. vrddhavyavaharavyutp-
- attlnlyantritayam sabdarthiavagatau y e nyiyah
 232

vrddhavyavahare vakyarthavagatihetutaya v id ita h ,

tanaparij ahata vakyarthfi bodhavya i t i — sarvasa-
meva’ nupapattinamanavai^sah.

'H ence, i t i s improper (to admit) S y n ta ctica l s p l i t even

when there a rises somehow, the sy n ta c tic a l unity ( i . e . , the

unitary p assa ge). In common parlance, Im p lica tion (Laksana)
and Secondary denotation (GaunI v r t t l ) are (admitted) out o f

fear o f s y n ta c tic a l s p l i t . Otherwise, by s p lit t in g the sent­

ence, why a l l the words are n ot admitted as conveying primary
meanings ( i . e . , primary denotation) by way o f importing comp­
a t ib le meanings. In the case o f the veda ( i . e . , in the v ed ic
sentences) also there i s the admission o f Secondary denotation
in r e s p e c t o f the co rr o b o r a tiv e statements (Arthavada) on the
strength S y n ta ctica l u nity. In the sammargadhikarana (MS.2 .1 .4 ) ,
there i s the d e scrip tio n o f the exceptions o f the case-en din gs.
And in thp prima f a c i e view o f the Audumbaradhikarana, th ere
i s the admission somehow o f a s a c r i f i c e the attainment o f
which is an animal. In the citradhikarana (MS. % .4 .2 ) , there
Is the admission o f the name o f the s a c r i f i c e c a lle d 'c i t r a '
by way o f d iscard in g i t s conventional meaning. The example i s
— ’ pancadasanyajyani bhavanti* (The ajya (la u d )s are f ift e e n
versed) (Ta.Br. 2 0 .1 .1 ). Again, in the Vajapeyadhikarana
(MS. 1 .4 .5 ) , there i s the admission o f names due to there
being the fe a r o f s y n ta c tic a l s p l i t . In the Paurnamasyadhi-
karana (MS. 2 .3 .2 4 ), again because o f there being the syntac­
t i c a l s p l i t in re sp e ct o f admitting many su b sid ia rin ess,
 233

there i s the attainment o f the state o f restatement o f the

sa crifice s as a whole. In the Prakaranantaradhikarana (MS.2.3.
l l ) , i t is stated that due to the fa u lt namely. Syntactical
s p lit, tiie word 'Agnihotra' is admitted as subsidiary. In
the Gkahadhikarana (MS. 1 .3 .7 ), only one (TIthi) is not
intended. In the Injunctive sentences lik e , ' Arddhamantarv^di
minoti' (Mai.S. 3 .9.4) (one should measure h alf within the
altar) and ' Arddham bahirvedi' (Mai.S. 3.9.4) (on* should
measure half outside the altar) . The particular place for
the s a c r ific a l altar (ved!) is to be understood by means o f
implication. In the Kaaumadhikaraha (MS. 6.1.6) again, the
performance o f a sa crifice by both the persons v iz . husband
and wife is discarded. And in the Havirartyadhikarana (MS.
6.4.22) both Havi and Arti are not intended. In the Injunctive
sentence v iz ., 'Varunya nlskasena tusais'ci' vabhrtham yanti
(MS. 7.35), [(They go) for bath called Avabhrtha with the
remaining portion o f the ghee offered to Lord Varuna and with
the husks^ there is the discarding o f non-dependence. In the
Paryudasadhikarana (MS. 1 0 .3 .7 ), the state o f implicating the
sense o f ‘ nan is seen many times. The denoted meaning o f a
simultaneously uttered word having been discarded again i f
the relation with oth°r word Is indicated, Is then there th*
p o s s ib ility o f losing the Syntactical unity! With this ir^
view, i t was stated- ( i n K(l 2)} — ’ nyiyasampldltavyakti*.
Syntactical unity Is a prin ciple. In accordance with that
(principle of Syntactical unity) whichever meaning is attained,
that is to be accepted as the meaning o f the sentence here
 • *

to

234

(in the present context). The principles admitted in respect

o f the understanding o f the meanings of words controlled by
the usage o f the elderly persons are understood by him who
has not discarded these (principles) and as such there i s no
scope for all the in con sisten cies.1

In the jf text v iz ., 1ata eva yathakathancid..............

/•

........ • etc. stated above, Salikanatha states that where there

i s the scope o f the p rin ciple o f Bkavakyatha, i t is not proper
to apply the principle o f Vakyabheda. In connection with this,
Salikanatha contends that in common parlance ( i . e . , in popular
sentences), because o f there be^ig the p o s s ib ility of th«
arising out of Vakyabheda, Laksana (im plication) ana Gauni
7 r tti (Secondary denotation) are admitted. Gauni v r tti is.
accepted even in respect of the Arthavada vakyas (corroborative
statements) in the vedic sentences. I t may be mentioned here
that the Mimamsakas recognise GaunI as a separate v r tti in
stead of recognising i t as a type o f Laksana. This they do,
because they think that Laksana is competent to bring only
that ob ject into lig h t which bears an intimate connection
with the thing sign ified through denotation. Kumarlla states
that when the acceptance o f a primary meaning com^s to be
impossible being opposed to our ordinary sources o f valid
knowledge such as pratyaksa e tc ., then that function whi#
brings an idea related wi "h the expressed one is regarded as
Laksana and the other function which conveys the sense o f an
ob ject connected with i t s #attributes sign ified through Laksana
177
is called Gauni v r t t i. 0

177. abhidheyavinabhute prav?ttirlak§an*ey*te/

laksamanagunairyogad vytterijgta tu gaunata//
TY under MS. i.4 .2 2 .
 23o

Kumarila fin d s scope under MS. 1 .4 .2 2 to give h is own

idea o f Laksana and GaunT v r t t i . Prabhakara Misra also deals
» • • *

with GaunT v r t t i in h is Erhatl . He illu s t r a t e s GaunT vrt*:i

* • ~ • ' 9

178
with 1 Gaurvahikah' as the example. Thus in th© Arthavada
tex ts a lso , Gauni v r t t i i s acknitted. According to the Prabha-
-karas, the Arthavada tex ts cannot be regarded as a trustworthy
means o f knowledge because they are in*gcpressive.

In the V te x t above, i t i s sta ted that in th© Audumbara-

-dhikarana, there i s the admission o f a s a c r i f i c e the r e s u lt
which is an animal. In Sammargadhikarana (MS. 2 .1 .4 ) , we fin d
I ~ ?Q k

the d e scrip tion s o f the exceptiqfi o f the Vibhakti. In the

citradhikarana (MS. 1 .4 .2 ) we fin d the Vldhi vakya v i z . ,
•citraya y a je ta pasukamah* • In th is ca se, the term 'c i t r « *
ip w ell known as connoting a female animal o f variegated
colou r and accordingly the te x t may be e a s ily taken as meaning
that 'o n e should perform the s a c r i f i c e with a female animal
o f v ariega ted colou r*. But th is w ill in v o lv e Vakyabh^da and
so, i t is establish ed that the term 'c i t r a ' should be taken
as the name o f a s a c r i f i c e and the te x t, th erefore, should be
taken to mean that 'o n e should perform that s a c r if i c e which is

178. nanu canyatvopalabdhau satyam gaurvahikasya ca

gauna nirdesa upapadyate — gaurvahika l t i .
BR, p. 147.
179. samm£d*sti sruca ity a t r a kim pradhanakhyakarmata/
gunakarmatvamathava drsta bhave' a va g h a tiv a t//
gunatvam n a h i ................... syad d v itiy a y a / MNP, p. 12.

«
 236
179 *
named 'c i t r a * . ' Same I s the case with the Vajap eyadhikarana
(MS. 1 .4 .5 ) a ls o . In that Adhikarana, ire fin d the te x t v i z . ,
1vajap eyena svar ajyakamo yaj eta* ( i . s . , one should perform
the s a c r i f i c e c a lle d vajap eya). Here, the word, *vajapey ena*
i s to be takm in the sense o f the name o f the s a c r if i c e and
i 0 /\
n ot i t s q u a lit ie s . w Again in the Paurnamasyadhikarana
(MS. 2 .3 .2 4 ) , because o f there being the p o s s i b i li t y o f so
many performances o f many subsidiary r it e s and as such the
Vakyabheda, th e s a c r ific e s as a whole are to be understood.
In the said Adhikaraija, we fin d the Vidhi vakyas v i z . , *ya
evam vidvan paurnamasim y a ja te * , *ya evam vidvan amavasyam
yajate* — or we fin d these two Vidhi vakyas in one v i z . ,
’ darsapaurnamasibhysm svargakamo yajate* ( i . e . , one desirous
o f heaven should perform the New and Pull-Moon s a c r if i c e s ) ^
By the use o f the word in dual number ( v i z . , dars'apaurnama-
sabhyam in the said v id h i) , the group o f s a c r ific e s i ? to be
t a k e n . I n the Prakarana^taradhikarana (MS. 2 .3 .2 4 ) again,
we fin d the d e scrip tio n o f the word 'Agnihotra* in the

179. *citra y a yaj eta pasukamah* ltyannayate. ta tra citrasabdo

nodbhidavadyaugikah, kintu rudf£h.ya citratvam $tritvam
cabhidhatte.................tasmat cltrisa b d a h p u rv a v ld y a ji-
samanadhikaranyena yiganamadheyam bhavati. Ta.B. 2 0 .1 .1 .
180. tasmid vajap eyasabdo na gunavidhayayakah, Mntu yathok t-
adTavyam nim ittikrtyagnihotras'abdavat karmanamadheyara.
NMV, p . 54
181. *darsapaurnamasabhyim svargakamo y a j eta* ityasmin
phalavakye sadyagavivaksaya dvivacana-nirdesa
upapadyate. T a i.S .^ 2 .6 .1.
 237

v id h iv a k y a v iz ., ‘ masamagniho trait j u h o t i * (o n e sh o u ld perform ^

th e A g n ih o tra s a c r i f i c e f o r th e w hole month) as b e in g u sed

S e c o n d a r ily . A gain in the (kahadhikarana (MS. 1 . 3 . 7 ) , vre fin d

i h
the v i d h i vakya v i z . , 1 sarvasu t«ftg is u amavasya k a r ta v y a ’

( i . e . , th e New-Moon s a c r i f i c e sh ou ld b e p e rfo rm e d on days)

and th ereby the s a c r i f i c e on a p a r t i c u l a r T i t h i i s n o t in t e n ­

ded to b e perform ed.^"83 By th e V id h i vakyas v i z . , 1 erddhaman-

- t a r v e d i m in o t i, ardham b a h ir v e d i' (o n e sh ou ld m easure h a l f

w ith in th e a l t a r , o n e sh ou ld measure h a l f o u t s id e th e a lt a r )

as s t a t e d under MS. 3 .7 .1 3 & 1 4 .1 8 3 , th e p l a c e i s s t a t e d by

means o f Lakfana and n o t th e a l t a r . I n th e Ksaumadhikar ana

(MS.6 . 1 . 6 ) , by t h e S u tra , , lin g a # v is ‘ esan irddes/§ t pumyuktamai-

- tis a y a n a h * , th e p erform a n ce o f a s a c r i f i c e b y b o th th e p e rso n s

i.e ., th e husband and th e w ife , i s a v o id e d . In th o H a v ira r^ ty a -

-d h ik a r a n a (MS. 6 .4 .2 2 ) w herein we f i n d S u tra v i z . , 1yatha

* m. ^

S r u t i t i c e t 1, b oth Havih and A r t i are n o t in te n d e d . I n th e

P aryudasadhikarana (MS. 1 0 . 8 . 7 ) , we f i n d th e S u tra v i z . ,

• pratised h ah prades'e harabhyavidhan e c a p r a p ta p r a t is id d h a tv a a

v ik a lp a h s y a t * . Under t h is S u tr a , th e s t a t e o f in d i c a t i n g the

s e n s e o f 'n a n 1 i s seen many tim e s . The Mlmamsakas r e g a rd a

18 2 . k a lp e s a r v a tith a u d a rsa k a ry a tok teh ......... JAM. 1 . 3 .7 .2 5

183. The S u tra s a re *

(a ) ’ ta th g yupasya vedlh*
(b ) ' desamatram v a ' s is y e n a ik a v a k y a tv a t* .

184...................tasmat laukikades"a e v a tra yuplthgatvena v id h iy a t e ,

na tu samskr t a v e d i' bhagah.
• N—* •
JNM, 3 . 7 . 6 .

«
 238

n e ga tive clause as a ' parjudasa* only when there is either

o f the two fo llow in g o b stacles standing in the way o f regard-

T Q C
ing the p ro h ib itio n as a p ro h ib itio n proper. Where the

leadin g clau se in a certain connection i s a d irectio n fo r the

performance o f some p o s it iv e duties and there i s a subordinate

n egative clause regarding the non-performance o f some o f these

a cts, the n egative clause i s not to be regarded as a p ro h ib i-

*1 O jS '

tio n proper, but as a ‘ puryudasa’ (exception).

In the jf te x t above, the author sta te s th a t Bkavakyata

i s a p r in c ip le which we have already elaborately discussed

% arll er.

V ( l5 e). bhavatu tarh i padarthintarena tivad an vitib h id h a-

- hamekavakyatvabal at tatsmar lte n a , svayam smiritena

ca tadekavakyatvanugunenV r thantarm api kiraitya-

- nvitabhidhanam na bhavati. u cyate padadvayenaiva*

nv i t abhl dh ana s i ddherak anksop a san t di. 4 th a nop a sants

- kanksa, ta rh i ko nama ta trV n vitab h id h in aa varayet.

ata evaikapadoccarane tadarthasambandhamukhena

vahusvapi sm rtisannihitesu yasya*rthasya k e n a c it-
- prakaraia v ise so grhyate, ten aiva’ nvitabhidhanam,

agrhyamane tu visese^nadhyavasayadapratitireva. ata

eva v ik r tis u tatsadrsyena yadapurvam smary aman am

svopakarakam smarayati, tadiyenaivopakarena paripuranam.

185. apradhanyam vidheryatra pratisedhe pradhanati/

prasajyapratisedho'sau kriyaya saha y a tr a naiT.//
as quoted in SD, V II,p p .481-82

186. pradhanatvam vid h eryatra pratisedhe'pradhanati/

paryuaasa sa v ijn e y o ya tr o t tar apadena nan// I b i d . , p . 482.
 239

ato yatra bahutar adharmasadharanyanibandhanam.

sadrsyaraatyant<|bhatam, tatraiva slghrara smrtupa-
pattestadlyopakar aparigr aha eva. darvihomesu tu
sarvapurvanamavis’esad vis'eso grahitumas'akya ityan-
- adhyavasaya eva prakrtasyopakarakasyeti, tatraivo-
- pakarakalpaJia.

’ Let there be, then, the expression o f the correlated

on the strength o f the syntactical unity (unitary passage)
by means of the meaning of other word recalled by the wjjfd
i t s e l f , but why there cannot be the expression o f the
correlated by means of the meanings o f other words recalled
by themselves fa c ilita te d by the syntactical unity? I t is
said (replied) — For, the expectancy ceases after there
being the expression o f correlated by both the words. I f
( i t is said) the expectancy does not cease, then who can
obstruct the expression o f the correlated? Hence, in the
utterance o f one word, by the rela tion o f the meaning o f
that being many meanings coming to be proximate through
recollectio n , with only that (meaning) the particu larity of
which is understood somehow, there arises the expression o f
the correlated, but in the case of non-acceptance o f th<=>
particu larity not being understooa because o f the non-ascert­
ainment, there occurs no knowledge. Hence, in the case of
the Bctype sa crifices (v ik r t i), because o f its having simila­
r ity with that ( i . o ., Achetype s a cr ific e or Prakrti), the
unique resu lt which is being recalled, re ca lls its own helping
 240

factor (upakaraka), by the help of that,, there Is the comple­

tion (o f the Be type s a c r ific e ). Therefore, where, howwer,

the sim ilarity based on many common attributes, is conspicu­
ous, there only, because o f quick arising of the re co lle ctio n ,
there is the acceptance of Its help. But in the case o f o ffe r ­
ings called Darvi Homa, because o f there being no differen ce
o f a ll the unique resu lts, the p a rticu larity cannot be accep­
ted and as such there is unascertainment of only that which
comes to be helpful for the Achetype s a c r ific e and so there
is (the necessity) o f the assumption o f that help.*

In the J text v i z ., ' bhavatu tarhi padarthantarena

......................... ' e tc ., the author asserts that there cannot be
Anvitabhidhana by means o f the meanings o f other words recalled
by thsnselves fa c ilita te d by EkavakyatS. I t is because, says,
the author, Akanksa ceases after there being the attainment
o f Anvitibhidhana only by two words. Moreover, i f i t is argued
that Akanksa <k>es not cease, then who can prevent the theory
of Anvitabhidhana? That is why in the utterance o f one Pada,
by the relation o f the meaning o f that even there being many
meanings coming to be in proximity through reco lle ctio n , only
with that meaning the particularity o f which is uncerstood,
there occurs the Anvitabhidhana. But in the case of non-
acceptance o f the particu larity not being known there arises
no knowledge. Hence, in the Vikrti yagas (Ectype sa crifices)
because o f there being commonness in respect o f the procedure
between the V ikrti and Prakrti yaga (Achetype s a c r ific e ),
 241

the Apurva which i§ being recalled, reca lls its own upakarska
(helping fa cto r), there is the completion o f the Vikrti yaeas.
we have already stated the two yagas v iz ., Prakrti yaga and
Vikrti yaga. In the jf text above, Salikanatha refers to the
speciality in respect of the Darvi Homas (the sa crifices
called Darvi). The Darvi Homas are neither the Prakrti ya?a
nor the Vikrti yaga and as such they are ca lled Apurvas. I t
may be mentioned here that the vedic sa crifice s are c la s s i­
fie d into four classes — (l) Prakrti (Archetype), for
example, Agnihotra yaga? (2) Vikrti (Keytype), for example,
Masagnihotra yagaj (3) P rak rti-vikrti (partaking of the
character o f both i . e . , Prakrti and V ik rti), for example,
the Agnisomiya yaga and (4) Na prakrti Na va v ik rti (Neither
Archetype nor Retype), for example, Darvi Homa. The word
•Darvi-Horn a' is explained by Sahara as 1darvau homo
darvihomo, darvarva homo darvihoma iti* is the s a c r ific e
187
performed in daru woods or of the daru woods. we shall
find scope to deal with the Darvi Homa at length in our
exposition o f the 2nd chapter o f the VM in subsequent
pages.

am
V (l5f) api ca yathafcrddhavyavaharavagamAvakyarthavabodhah.
tatra yadeva padena anapabhrastasarabandhagrahang>-
-saraskarasya purusasya niyamena smarjjate, tanniva1
0
nvltabhiohinam padantarasya drsyate, na* nyena.

187. Vide, SB under MS. 10.4.8

 242

sarvam padam svartham hi nlyamena sambandhagr abenat.

smarayati, na‘ rthantaram tatasca tw iaiva1 n v ita s-
- svarthabodhakateti, na kasciddosah.

kinca yadyabhihitenaiva* nvitasvarthabodhana-

-bhyupagama eva pr atiniyatanvaymbodho ghatate,
na'nyatha, tarh i kalpyatam padanamanvitabhidhana-
-s 'a k tir a p i. dvirabhidhanamapadyata i t i cedapadyatam,
na kasciddosah. purvam kevalam padamananvitam
svirthamabhidhatte, pratiyogipadantarabhihj ta v a st-
-vantabasahayapraptya tu tattadanvitamarthamaha, i t i
na kasciddosah. itthamapi ca'smanmate s'aktikalpana-
"laghavam asti, p ad£r th ag atanv ay abo dh anas'ak tyadhina-
- saktikalpanatyagat. tulyiyamapi saktikalpanayim,

padanameva’ nvitabodhanasaktirasrayitum ucita, na

p adar thanam, prathamavagatatvat, vakyar the ca
tatp ary asyop agamaditi.

'M oreover, in accordance with the knowledge o f the

usage o f the e ld erly persons, there a rise s the knowledge o f
thp sentence-meaning. There (in r e sp e ct o f thp knowledge o f
the sentence-meaning) whatever i s r e c a lle d re g u la r ly , by a

word in re sp e ct &S a person whose im pression o f the a s ce r t-

,in
ainmpnt o f the r e la tio n Jr*/no way d e fic ie n t ( i . , f u l l or
in t a c t ) , by that alone i s seen the expression o f the
c o rr e la te d o f another word and not by oth er. For, a l l the
words a fter the ascertainment o f the r e la t io n r e c a ll th °ir
 243

own meanings regularly and not any other meanings. And

thereby a rises i t s sta te of conveying respective correlated
meaning of i t s own and as such there i s no demerit (at a l l ) .

And agaih, i f the knowledge of the invariable syntactical

relatio n merges only in the case of admitting the conveying
of the related meaning only by the denoted meaning and not
otherwise, then ( le t you) imagine the power of denote ting the
correlated (meaning) in respect of the words. I f i t is said
that i t w ill involve (the admission of) two powers of denot­
ation, allow the involvement, I t will lead to no fa u lt. The
word f i r s t denotes only unrelated meaning o f i t s own, but
(la te r on) i t conveys i t s respective related meanings attain ­
ing the aid of other object ( i . e . , other meaning) denoted by
counter - correlative word , so, there a rise s no demerit.
Thus in our view also , there i s sim plicity in the assumption
of denotative power, because of the discarding o f assumption
of producing power, (which is ) the power of conveying tJfce
mutual re la tio n o f the meanings of words. Even in thp case
of there being the equal assumption of the denotative power,
i t i s proper to admit the power of conveying the related
meaning only in respect of the words and not in respect of
the meanings of the words. For, the words are understood
f i r s t and because o f their ( i .e * , of the words) import towards

(conveying) the sentence meaning.*

 ,0
244

In the V text v i z ., * api ca yathavrddhavyavahar avagamatk

..................... 1 e t c ., the author asserts .that the Sakti o f
•
conveying the related meaning should be admitted in respect '
o f only the Padas and not in respect o f the Padarthas as the
follow ers o f the theory of Abhihitanvaya contend.Salikanatha
states that i f there w ill be the admission o f two powers of
denotation even in the case of admitting the power of denoting
the related meaning in respect o f the Padas, then also there
w ill be no fa u lt. I t is because, says Salikanatha, f i r s t the
Padas denote unrelated meanings and thereafter they convey
their respective related meanings with the help o f meanings
denoted by the counter-correlative words. Thus SIlikanatha
asserts that in the view o f the Prabhakaras, there is the
sim plicity in assumption in respect o f Sakti because of
discarding the assumption o f Adhana Sakti which conveys th*
relation o f the meanings of words. We have already stated that
the Bhltrtas admit Adhana Sakti o f the Padas and the Prabhakaras
do not.Silikanatha also contends that even i f there i s ^ l s *
of the equal assumption o f Sakti, then i t is to be admitted
in respect of the only the Padas and not in respect of the
Padarthas. For, the Padas are understood f i r s t and the Padas#
convey the purport o f the Vakyartha. This is the repetition
o f what has been stated by the author under K (li) o f the VM
and as we have discussed the same at length there in the
relevant K text, we refrain from discussing the issue here
again.
 katham tarhidam bhasyaffl — "padani h i"ty a d i tatra*ha

’ How, then, is ( i t i s sta ted in ) the Bhisya ( t e x t ) —■

” the words, indeed” e tc ,? There (in that con text ) i t is
said (rep lied )* —

i£(l6) anvitesu padairevam bodhysmanesu saktibhih.

anvayirthagrhitatvinna’ nyam s'aktimapeksate.

*The r e la te d meaning having been understood by the tord s,

by the meanings by means o f th e ir r e s p e c tiv e denotative
powers and the id ea o f the r e la tio n also being understood,

there is no requirement o f any other denotative pow er.’

V (l6 ) aWahkitottaramidam bhasyam. kimisankitam?

yadyanvitabhidhiyini padani, ta rh i na‘ nvaya-
- bh idh ayin i. tatsiddhyartham padani® saktyantaram
kalpyam iti, atredamuttaram. yatpadamanvitabhi-
- dhayakam, tadanvayabhidhayakamevra. anyatha*nvita
~ eva* sau na’ b h ih ita h a ssy a d itl, anvitarupena* rthena*
- nvayassvikrtah. tam vina tadasambhavaditi, na'para
tadvisaya pa dan sun s'aktih kalpaniya.

’ This Bhasya tex t ( i . e . » padani h i svam svaa e t c .) is

the re p ly in apprehension, ijhat was apprehended? I f the
words denote the r e la te d meanings, then they w ill n ot
denote the r e la t io n . In order to a tta in th a t, another,
d en otative power o f the words should be imagihed. Here is
this reply, whichever word is the denoter o f the related
meaning, is also the denoter of the syhtactical rela tion .
Otherwise i t w ill only be the related and not denoted and
as such in the form o f related meaning, the syntactical
relation is also admitted (as denoted). As because the that
(meaning) is not possible for that (related) without that
(rela tio n ), no other denotative power of words is to be
imagined in respect of that (r e la tio n ).'

In the * anvitesu padairevam......................... 1 etc. and

' asahkltottaramidam ..........................1 etc. of the K and V

text respectively above, Salikanatha asserts that in order
*
to understand the Anvaya from the Anvita, no other Saktl
as the Bhattas think, should be assumed. We have already
come to know that Sahara under MS, 1.1.25. states that the
Padas perform the task o f denoting their own individual
meanings and cease functioning when this task is finished;
the padarthas thus conveyed later on produce the Vakyirtha.
In connection with this Bhasya text, i t may be argued that
this Bhasya is the reply in apprehension. What is appre­
hended? I t is said *•» i f the Padas denote the related mean­
ing, then they w ill not denote the relation and as such in
order to understand the rela tion , another Saktl is to be
assumed in respect o f the Padas. This is not in favour of
the theory of Anvitabhldhana. But Salikanatha rejects this

opinion o f the follow ers o f Kumarila by stating that the

Pada which denotes the r e la te d meaning, a lso denotes the
s y n ta c tic a l r e la t io n i . e . , to be a r e la te d , a Pada must
have the r e la t io n . I f i t i s n ot accepted, then i t w ill only
be the r e la te d and not denoted and so , the sy n ta ctica l
r e la t io n i s admitted in the form o f a r e la te d meaning. Ae
As there can be no r e la te d meaning without the r e la t io n , so
no oth er Sakti o f the Padas i s to be assumed in re sp e ct o f
that mutual r e la t io n . Thus, according to SHikanatha as
Anvaya i s included in the Anvita so, when i t i s said that
the Padas denote r e la te d meaning, i t i s to be understood
that they also denote the sy n ta ctica l r e la t io n . Thereby
Salikanatha r e je c t s the idea o f assuming another Sakti in
re s p e ct o f the Padas and thus be advocates the theory o f
Anvitabhidhana.

katham punarasvartha grh ita ity a tr a 'h a —

'How, again, th is meaning i s understood? (In re p ly )

i t i s sa id ' —

K (l7) pratiyannanvayam yasmat pratiyadanvitam puraan.

vyaktim jit lm iv a 'r t h e ' s a v it i sam parikirtyate.

•A person (knower) understands the r e la te d mmmning by

may o f understanding the s y n ta c tic a l r e la t io n in the same
way as he does (understands) the u n iv ersa l (J a ti) by
knowing the in d iv id u a l (v y a k ti).*
V (l7 a). anvayavaneva byanvitah* so*nvayapratltau na
p ratita ara syat, kintu svaTup ana train era.
na ca tadanvitamucayate. tasnadanvayam p ra ti-
-padyamana erVnvitain pratipadyate. yatha vyaktim
pratipadyanana era jatim. ayantu vises ah. anvaya-
- vaneva'nvita ucyata I t i , anvayo'pyabhidhananupra-
"V ista h . vyaktlmattaiva jatisvarupam na bhavatl,
kimtu vyakterakargjitarabhuta jatistato bhirrna.
sa cedejETtlssabdabhidheya, na vyaktirapyabhidha-
- rianupraves'lni, kimtvakirabhuta jatirvyaktprvya-
- tirtkta*pi vastusvabhavena vyaktimantarena na
pratitimanubhavati, etavata ea samyena drstantah,
na sarvatmana. nanvekavi jnanarudha kathaaa vyaktl-
- ranabhidheya, sabdatthapltavljnanavlsayata hyabhi-
- dheyata, asti ca vyakterapi tathabhava i t i ,
kathananabhidheyateti. sruyatijaavadhanena
sarvasvaji prabhakarinan, satyamekasanvittivisayata
jativyaktjoh. tathapi dntyaniyamida® — kathampsa
saavittirubhayavlsaya jayat i t i . kimasyobhayavlsc-
-yatve sabdamltrasyaiva vyaparah? uta jitim atravi-
-sayatare jatyanabhidhayakataya jates*anyatha bodha-
- yitumasakyatvat- i t i , tatra tavadanantasu vyaktisu

sa»bandhagrahanasakteh, "akrtyupalaksitasn ca yaayapi

sanbandhagrahanam snkaram, tathapi tadrupavattv*-
- naiva fabdadvyaktyavagamat, upalaksanatve karana-
bhavat, cihnabhavena ca kriyanvayasanbhavadakrti-
- visayatvam t avacchabd asv ar up anlb andhanam. p v a n c p -
Jd
. - ttabhidhayakatayaiva vyaktivlsayatve sabdavyapara

#
 i t i n isciyate. tena'krtirna vyaktim gamayati,
kimtu sabda eva tadabhidhaqrakatayetyakr tito
vy aktirucyate. ato* nvi tabhldhanaya' nvayasya* rtba-
va
- grahitatvadasanvayo na, bhidblyate. tena vyatisik-
- tabhidhanavanna vyatisangabhidhiuiam, niskrstabhi-
- dhanantu na bhavati. vyatisiktato* vagatervyatisan-
- gasya, vyatisiktasya vyatisangam vina* bhidhaniuiu-
' papatteh.

‘ For, a syntactically related (meaning) is that which

is q u alified by a syntactical relation . That (the syntac­
tic a lly related meaning) is , indeed not known in the event
o f non-cognition o f -ei the syntactical rela tion , but only
i t is known as i t is (i.e .$ in it s Own nature). And that
(the own meaning o f a word) is not stated as related. Hence,
by knowing only the syntactical rela tion , one understands
the related meaning. As (one) by understanding only the
individual, understands the universal. But this is the
differen ce. Only that q u a lified by a rela tion is stated as
related and as such the relation also enters (I . e ., is
included) in denotation. Only the state o f that having
( i . e . , possessed of) individual is not the nature o f the
universal, but universal (though) being in the shape o f the
configuration (Akrti) is differen t from that (Individual).
I f i t is said, that (universal) is denoted by the word
•individual 1, then the individual will, not enter (w ill not
be included) into denotation, but the universal meaning,, th*
configuration though d ifferen t from the individual by way
o f its being the attribute o f the ob ject, cannot be known
without the individual (being known). And analogy is with
this much o f sim ilarity and not in toto.

How, then, the individual attained from one cognition,

is not denotable? For, the state o f the object o f the cogni­
tion presented by the word is the state o f being denoted

and same is the state there also in respect o f the individual

and as such how can there be the state o f not being denoted?
(Please) lis te n , with attention, to all the findings o f the
follow ers o f Prabhakara (in this context). (I t is ) true that
the universal and the Individual come to be the ob je ct o f
single subjective cognition (sam vitti). But i t is to be
thought of — how this subjective cognition i s with reference
to the both? Is i t that there is the function only of tho
word in the event of it s (subjective cognition) having both
(universal and individual) as it s ob je ct or the word as i t
is ( i . e . , by i t s own nature) operates only in reppect o f
the universal? For, in the case of the individual being the
o b je ct of denotation ( i . e ., verbal cogn ition ), and universal
not being a denotable, the universal cannot be known other­
wise. There again, because of the incapability o f the ascert­
aining o f the relation in innumerable individuals and though

in the objects indicated by universal, the relation can

easily be ascertained, yet because o f understanding the

individual from the word on the strength o f it s having only

(the form o f) that (universal), and because of there being
no cause o f (admitting) implications and because o f there
being the im possibility o f the rela tion o f the verb with
the ease and due to lack* o f appropirate sign, ( i t is
admitted) the universal comes to the ob ject o f the knowledge
o f the word as i t is ( i . e. in its own nature). This being
the p osition in the case o f the individual, the function o f
a word only as its denoter is ascertained. Therefore, the
configuration does not comprehend the Individual, but the
word i t s e l f (along with the universal in it s own nature),
as it s (o f the universal) denoter (conveys) the individual.
Hence, the individual is stated (to arise) from the co n fi­
guration, So, because o f the meaning o f the relation being
understood for the denotation o f the correlated meaning,
that syntactical relation is not denoted. Therefore, lik e
the denotation o f the related meanings, there is no denot­
ation o f the relation , but there can be separate denotation.
For, the knowledge of relation is from the related meanings
because of there being the non-attainmeOt o f the denotation
o f the related without the rela tion (being understood).*

In *pratiyannanvayam yasm at............................... * etc, end

* &nvayAaneva hyanvitah......................... * etc. o f the K and V
text respectively above, the author o f the VM states that
a person understands the related meaning by way o f under­
standing the syntactical relation as he understands the
J ati (universal) by way o f understanding the Vyakti (in d i­
v id u a l), Salikanatha compares the related meaning to the
J it i and the syntactical relation to the Vyakti. Thus
Salikanatha in the V text above, discusses the concept of
Jati and Vyakti. Before going to deal with these two,
Salikanatha explains the related meaning and the syntactics
rela tion . A related meaning is that which ,is qualified bv

a rela tion . I f the rela tion is not known, then the related
meaning w ill also not be known, but only the meaning as it
is known and the meaning as i t i s , o f a word is not etatec
as related. I t is because one can understand the related
meaning after understanding the relation as one can under­
stand the Jati after knowing the Vyakti. Here lie s the
difference — a related is that which is qualified by a
rela tion and as such the Anvaya (relation) is also included
in Abhldhana. But yet i t cannot be said that rela tion and
related meaning are not differen t from each other. Only th«
state of that having Vyakti is not the nature o f J ati, but
the Jati even being in the shape o f Akrti (confuguration) i
differen t from the Vyakti. I t may be pointed out here that,
the compound word v i z ., 1VyakterakiSitarabhuta' in V text
above, is wrongly printed and so, the correct reading will
be ‘ Vyakter akarabhuta'. I f i t is said that the Jati is
denoted by the word ‘ Akrti1, then the Vyakti w ill not be
included into denotation. But the Jati meaning the Akrti
though differen t from the Vyakti by way o f its being the
attribute of the object cannot be known without the Vyakti.
 I t may be argued here i how the Vyakti attained through
one cognition is not denotable? I t is because the ob ject of
cognition presmted by the Sabda is the state o f being deno­
ted and same is the case in respect of the Vyakti also and
so how Vyakti is stated to be undenotable? In order to avoid
/* *

this objection , Salikanatha states the findings o f the Prath

-karas in this regard. Although i t is true, that both the
Jati and the Vyakti are the ob ject o f single Samvitti
(subjective cognition), yet i t is to be considered as to hov
the Samvitti is with reference to both the Jati and the
Vyakti. Whether there is the function o f the Sabda only in
respect o f the Samvitti the ob je ct o f which is both the J«f i
S’

and the Vyakti or the Sabda by it s Own nature operates only

in respect of the J ati. I t is because in the case o f the
Vyakti being the ob ject o f denotation i . e . , verbal cognition
and the Jati not being denotable, the Jati cannot be known
otherwise.

In the X text above, Salikanatha statesthat the Alerti

does not comprehend the Vyakti, but the Sabda i t s e l f along
with the Jati in its own nature as the denoter of th* JSt.i
conveys the Vyakti and as such Vyakti is stated to arise
from the Akrti, Thus because of the meaning o f the rela tior
being uncerstood fo r the denotation o f the correlated ra«arir
the syntactical relation is not denoted. I t may be mentioned
here in the present context that the issue of the exact
s*

natdt>e o f Sakyartha has drawn the attention o f a ll most all

the thinkers o f ancient India working in various f i e l d s o f
philosoph y, Grammar and R h etorics. The problem is whether
a word through Sakti im plies a J a ti (ce r ta in generic meaning)
o r the iu e a o f a Vyakti (a p a rticu la r o b je c t ) or an A krti
(a con fig u ra tion ) or more than one o f th ese e n t it ie s . This
has become a c o n tro v e rs ia l issu e amongst the scholars who pan
be broadly divided in to seven groups in th is regard j

( l ) Akrti vadinah; (2) J i t i vadinah} (3) Vyaktivadinah;

(4) Jatyakr tivy a k tivid in a h j (5) J a tivisista v ya k tiv a d ln a h
and J a ty a k rtivisista v a d in a h ; (6) Apohavadinah and
(7) Jatyadivadinah.

The Jainas may be id e n t ifie d as Akrtivadins because o f

th eir adm itting that the words denote an A k rti which i s
nothing but an avayava that every Vyakti must possess*

The Mimamsakas, both the Bhattas and the Prabhakaras as well

as the Vedimtins may be id e n t ifie d as the J a ti vadins duo to
th eir accepting on ly the J a ti as the import o f a word. Thp
Samkhya philosophers may be id e n t ifie d as the V yaktividins.
For, they think that a word cannot convey a J a ti inasmuch
as p o r t r a b ilit y , growth, co lo u r, s e n s ib ilit y etc. ara
Superimposed on the Vyakti MM. P.V. Kane r e fe r s to a s p ctio r
- 188
o f Naiyayikas who can be id e n t ifie d as V yak tivid in s.

Gotama, the founder o f the Nyaya system o f Indian p h ilo ­

sophy, may be said to have in it ia t e d the Jatyakrtivy*ktiv*da.

188. Vide, SD, pp. 41-43

For, according to him the three | p t it i e s v i z . , J a t i, A krti

and Vyakti get themselves combined to be the import o f a

wor d. 189

The Navya N aiylyik as can be divided into two groups anc

as such they may be id e n t ifie d as J a tiv is is ta v y a k tiv id in s end

J a tiy a k rtiv isista v y a k tiv a d in s. The thinkers of the firs t , grour

ao not give importance to the view that A k rti i s the import

o f a word. Be gar ding J a ti ana Vyakti, they accept a balanced

view and thus they contend that the A krti as determined by a

1on
J a ti is the import o f a word.

The Navya thinkers o f other group may be id e n t ifie d as

J at^ ak rtiv isista v a d in s because o f th eir admitting A krti along

with J a t i as q u a lify in g the Vyakti Visvanatha Nyayapanc an ana

also advocates th is view.

The Buddhists are c a lle d Apohavadins as they believ e tin t

the import of a ll the words is Apoha or Atadvyavrtl (d is t in ­

c tion from other d iffe r e n t o b je c t ).

The Vaiyakaranas and the Alamkarikas may be id e n tifie d

as Jatyadivadins inasmuch as they contend that the import

O l
o f a word i s either a J a ti or a Guna or a Dravya or a Kriya.

_ __ ya ”

189. V yaktyakrtijatastu padarthah. NS. 2.2.68

190. Vide, Pi#l, p. 142

191. sanketo grhyate jatau gunadravyakriyasu ca. ED. 1 I . /-.

 I t may be added here that on the question o f the denot­
ation o f words, the Mimamsaka’ s view i s that the word der.o t
the J a ti ( i . e . , u n iversa l) which is also c a lle d A k rti.
Jaim ini under MS.1 .3 .3 3 . 192 sta tes that A krti is what is
1 93
denoted by the word. Kumarila poin ts ou t that i t is Jati
i t s e l f which has been c a lle d Akrti in the sense that i t i s
what serves to d e fin e the Vyakti.

According to Prabhakara, the J a ti is something rea l

d is t in c t from the Vyaktis which are i t s su bstrata, re^ ep t-
a d e and is p e r c e p tib le by the senses. In the J a tin irn a -
vaprakaraha o f th e Prakarana-panclka. S al Ik ana th a has h *1 d
a d e ta iled d iscu ssion on J a t i. Thus the Mimamsakas o f the
Prabhakara school a ssert that a word denotes a J a ti on ly aru
i s not fu rth er competent to denote a Vyakti or Vyaktis b elon ­
ging to that J a t i . 195

I t may be concluded here ti a4 o f r e a m sch olars,

Jr. Qaurinath S a stri has discussed a t length the en tire

1 06
it t u e c r i t i c a l l y and a n a ly tic a lly .

192. ak rtistu k riyarth atvat.

193. 'akrtih s'abdarthah. SB under Ib id .
194. ja tlra s ra y a to bhinna pratyaksajnanagocara. PP, p. o4.
195. pr'abhakaristu ja tisa k tijn in a d e v a jatiprakarena
vyakteh smaranam. SKV. 190
196. Vide, PW1, pp. 136-71.
V (l7 b ). bhasy aks ar anamay amar t 'nah — padanyanvitamabhidhav'*
da
nivrttavyap'arani ria* nvayain prthagabhidhatii
* * A

athedanimanvithh pratipanna anvayamapi pratitam

sainpadayanti- i t i . lo k e ca padarthariai sambandha-

- grahanasamaya eva v id ita tv a t, vakyantare c V nvayri

- tarasyaiva pratipannatvat, tatp arataiva vakyasyeti

vakyar thasabdena bhasyakaro’ nvayamaha. vodp

tvapurvatma* nvlto vakyartha I t i vaksyamah. tasya

ca svarupamanavagatamityasyaiva vakyartha tv am.

evamuktena nyayena vis'esaneaalva' nvitabhiahanam

samarthitam.

"Tnis is the meaning (id e a ) o f the text o f the Bhasya

S’

(o f Sahara) — the words denoting the re la te d meanings and

with th eir (resp ective verb al) functions ceased do not c°n^

the re la t io n sep arately. Then the re la te d meanings thus

having understood, give r i s e to the knowledge o f the r<=lnt>

And in common parlance, as the meanings o f words ar® under­

stood at the time o f ascertaining o f the re la t io n and bee so

of understanding o f other re la tio n in another sentence, thr

sentence i s being bent upon that (r e la t i o n ). By the word

‘ vakyartha1 (meaning o f a sentence), the author o f th » Bhar

speaks o f (means) the re la tio n . But in the case o f th^ 7ea-

( i , e ., in the veaic sentences), (we) s h a ll sta te that t.n°

unseen potency (Apurva) in the form o f re la te d meaning is

the meaning of the sentence. And as i t s (o f the unseen

potency) own nature cannot be known, so, that (unseen

potency) is by i t s e l f , the meaning o f the sentence. Thus,

on the strength of the afo resaid p rin c ip le , the expression

of the correlated i s sp e c ia lly accepted' .

In the 7 text v i z . , 1bhlsyiksaranimayamar t h a h ......... '

e t c ., Salikanatha explains the idea of the text o f the

v iz ., 'p a d in i h i svam svamarthamabhidhaya

nivr ttavyapar ani v aky ir thamava g amay an

etc. stated under MS. 1.1.25. According to Salikanatha th*

idea o f th is Bhasya text is that the Padas denote r e l a t 'd

meanings and then cease functioning and do not denote th«

r e la t io n sep arately. Thereafter the re la te d word-moanlngs

when understood give r i s e to the knowledge o f Anvaya (r e l a ­

t io n ). In common parlance ( i . e . , in popular sentence), as

the Padarthas are unaerstood at the time o f ascertain in g

the r e la t io n and because o f understanding oth'-r re la tio n i?

respect o f other Vakya, the purport of the Vakya l i e s in t-

Anvaya.

In the V text above, Salikanatha states that Sahara,

the author of the Bhasva. by the word 1Vakyartha* in the

said Bhasya text, means Anvaya ( i . e . , r e la t i o n ). I t may b =

pointed out here that the Prabhakaras explain th is Bhisva

text as supporting their theory o f Anvitabhidhana. Accordi^

to them, what is brought about by the meaning o f a word Is

the notion o f a q u a lifie d thing — the meaning of words as

137
q u a lifie d by one another.
 In the 2nd pariccheda o f the J£M> w© sh all fin d Seli.-ca-
-natha* s view that in the Vedic sentences, Apurva (uneven
potency) in the form o f re la te d meaning is the Vakyirthe.
In the said chapter of the VM, w© fin d that the Prabhakarsr
admit Apurva or Niyoga or K£rya as the Vakyartha and as such
they are known as Apurvavakyarthavadlns or the Niyogavakyar th
vadins or Klryavakyarthavadins. In course of our exposition
o f the 2nd pariccheda o f the VMj we sh all take up the is s u ->
on the Apurva and the Apurvavakyarthavada fo r discussion.

V (l7 c) ye'anvitabhidhanavadina evamahuh vrddhavyavah" -

— prasiddhasambandHssabdo1rathasya vacakah, anvay^v
-vyatirekabhyanca sarabandhavadharanam. na ca vis^son-
- vayavis’esau tau sambhavatah. kriyapadam hi karakar-
amanyavya^Lcarinjra kriyaysT sahanvaya - vyatirekau
s _ loK _
bhajate. visesanvayantaravyavicarat. mm karaka-
- pade'pi yojyam.

*Tnose advocates o f the expression o f the correlated say

(contend) thus — the word, the r e la tio n o f which is estab­
lis h e d through the usage o f the e ld e r ly persons, is that whic
expresses a meaning and by means o f concoraittance and non-
concomittance, there Is (can be) the ascertainment o f tho
re la tio n . Those two are not possible in case o f the par t ic >1
syn tactical re la tio n . For, a verb al word attains the conco-
mittance and non-coneomittance with a verb which is not
in variab ly present with the cases in general. For, there is
the irregularity in the case o f the particular relation .
Thus, ( i t is) applicable to a case-word also .1

In the J text v i z ., 'ye'anvitabhldhanavadina evamahub

.......................* etc#, the author o f the .M presents the v iew
o f a section o f thinkers who also advocate Anvitabhidhana.
According to these thinkers, the Pada, the relation of whi~o
is established through Vrddhavyavahara, denotes the meaniv
and tlie relation between the Pada and a Padartha can be
ascertained by means o f the process of Anvaya and Vyatireu
But both Anvaya and Vyatireka cannot be said to be the obj-->c
of the particular syntactical rela tion . I t is because, these
scholars contend, the kriyapada attains both Anvaya and
Vyatireka with a hriya which is not found to be invariably
present with the karakas in general. I t is again because,
there arises the irregularity, in the case o f particular
relation . In this manner, the harakapada also attains both
Anvaya and Vyatireka with a Karaka which is not found to b»
invariably present with the Kriya in gmeral.

In the V text above, Salikanatha presents the view of

a section o f thinkers as a prima fa c ie view and in succedin?
K and J text, he re je cts the same.

t annir akar anayI *h a —

‘ in order to r e je c t that, (the author) says* —-

K(]8) samanyena’ nvitara vacyam padanam ye praeaksat®.
niyatena vises an tesam syadanvayah katham.

‘ Those who s ta te (admit) the denoted meanings o f th*» worar

as being re la te d with general senses, how, in th eir (vi^w ),
there can be the (s y n ta c tic a l) r e la tio n r e g u la rly with th*
p a rticu la r (s e is e s )?*

V (l8 ) darsitamidam — vis^esanvaye‘ pyakihksa-sannidhi-

-yogyatopadhivasena sambandhagrahanam sukaramiti,
tadabhiahayakataiva yukta padanam. yadi ca* sau
nesyate, tada vakyarth apratipattir eva nopapndyat®,
vis'es anvayarup atv advakyar thar sya.

‘ I t i s shown (sta ted ) — even in the ca se o f th® p a r t lc ii-

r e la t io n , by means o f the lim itin g adjunct (upadhi) in th®
form o f expectancy, co n tig u ity and co m p a tib ility , th® r e la ­
tio n can e a sily be ascertained and as such, the sta^e o f
denoting the p a rticu la r (meaning) by the words i s proper.
And i f i t is not desired, then the knowledge o f th® s®nt-ui-
meaning w ill not be attain ed . For, the sentence-meaning is in
the form o f p a rticu la r r e la tio n * .

In ‘ Simanyena*nvitain vacyam ............................. 1 etc. o f t ie

k and Jf text r e s p e c tiv e ly as stated above, Salikanatha
r e fu te s the view o f the se c tio n o f the thinkers who advoe® +®
s'

visesan vitibhidhana. In the K above, we fin d Salikanatha

p u ttin g question to those thinkers as to how in th eir v ie w
 There can b e the s y n t a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n r e g u l a r l y with t.hp
p a r t i c u l a r meanings as they admit the denoted meanings o f
t h e Pad as as b e i n g r e l a t e d with th e g e n e r a l s e n s e s . S a l J > g -
- n a t h a contends t h a t even in r e s p e c t o f V is e s a n v a y a , th e
r e l a t i o n can e a s i l y be a s c e r t a i n e d by means o f Upadhi Oirri

i n g a d ju n c t) i n th e form o f t h e t h r e e f a c t o r s v ia :.., I k ark s '

San n idh i and Yogyata. T h e r e f o r e , i t i s pro per to admit th -*

the Pad as den ote the p a r t i c u l a r meanings. I f a g a i n , j t i s
n o t a c c e p te d t h a t the Padas denote th e p a r t i c u l a r meanings ,
then th ere w i l l a r i s e no knowledge o f th e V /a k y a r th a . I t i '
b e c a u s e o f the f a c t t h a t t h e Vakyartha i s taken in th e form
o f V is e s a n v a y a . It. h a s a l r e a d y been s t a t e d by S a l i k ar ~ t ’r •
t h a t S a h a r a t a k e s the word Vakyartha in th e s e n s e o f Anv>y

nanu c a samlnyanvayo’ b h i h i t o v is^ esin vayam akse psy ati,

n i r v i s e s asy a samanyasya pratye tu m a s a k te r v is"e s a n v a y a -
- pratipattiru papan n aivetyatra'h a —

’ I t i s argued, the g e n e r a l s y n t a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n b e i n :
d en o tea, w i l l i n d i c a t e th e p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n and a s such
b e c a u s e o f th e g e n e r a l not b e i n g p o s s i b l e to unde rstand t> e
g e n e r a l without the p a r t i c u l a r , the knowledge o f the p a r t i ­
cular r e la t io n i s , indeedj c o n s i s t e n t . So, (thp author)
here r e p l i e s ' —

K(i9) y a d y a p y a k ? ip y a t e nama v i s e s o v y a k t i j a t i v a t
n i r d h a r i t a v i s ' e s a s t u tadvadeva na gamyate.
 'Though a p a rticu la r (e ith e r a verb or a cnee) is ir;j
ated (by a general) as an in d ivid u a l (is by) tho univ^rs^l
but y e t,th e p a rticu la r which is ascertain ed, is not under?
as that ( i . e ., the p a r tic u la r ).*

V (l9 ) yatha — jatirvyaktinfijcsip antyapi, na p r e t in i-

- yatavisesalabhanniyatavisesatm akavakyarthaprati-
- p a t tir anupap anna.

'J u s t as the universal even in d ica tin g the individual

does n ot in d ica te in va ria b ly the p a rticu la r (in d iv id u a l),
sim ila rly here ( i . e . , in the present context) a lso, t°c--u?
o f not obtain in g the in v a ria b le p a rticu la r ( i . e . , a verb ->
a c a s e ), the knowledge o f the sentence-meaning embodying

in v a ria b le p a rticu la r does not, a r i s e .1

In 'yadyapyakspyate nam a............................. X etc. ana

’ yatha - jatirvyaktim ..................... * e tc . o f the K and V tey
r e s p e c tiv e ly Salikanatha r e p lie s to the o b je c tio n ra ised i
the fo llo w e rs o f the Visesanvaya that the knowledge o f fh'
Visesanvaya i s co n siste n t. For, the Samanyinvaya being
denoted w ill also imply the Vis"esanvaya and because o f th«-
general n ot being understood without the p a r tic u la r . Put
according to Salikanatha the Visesanvaya i s in co n siste n t ■

as such he sta tes that though a p a r ticu la r is in d ica ted -r

the Vyakti is in d ica ted by the J S ti, y e t the p a rticu la r i
not understood as such. As the J a ti even in d ica tin g the
 264

Vyakti doe* not in d lca tf the particular Vyakti regularly i . e . ,

invariably, so also becaus# o f the non-attainment o f the
'invariable particular, the Vakyirtha in the form o f invariable
0

particular is inconsistent. In other words, the invariable

particular cannot be obtained.

As the advocates o f JStivada, the Prabhakaras do not

accept Vlsesanvaya, in stead, they forward Samanyinvaya.

atha visesamatraksepe*pyakanksitassannihito yogyasca

yogaviseso yah padintarena samarpyate, sa eva grhyate.
tadatikrame pr amluiabhavidltyatra^a —

‘ I f i t is said, %ven in respect o f the indication only

o f the particular, whichever expectant, contiguous and compa­
t ib le meaning is offered by other word, only that (meaning)
is offered by other word, only that (meaning) is accepted.
Because o f there being no v alid ground fo r going beyond tfcat,
then here i t is said1—

K(20) yadyapyakahksito yogyo visesassannidhau srutah.

sambandhabodhakabhave grhyate na tatha'pyasau.

‘ Even though a particular (meaning) comes to be expect­

ant, compatible and is heard ( i . e . , uttered) in contiguity,
but yet i t is not understood because o f the lack o f the
factors conveying the relation .*
 265

V(20) s amanyanvltabhldhanavadMa mate padani tavat

tanmatra eva par^avasitaslaktini, padirthanima-
-pyanvayabodhaj^asaktlrnahgikrlyate. na ea saman-
-yaksepo'pi niyatain visesamaskandati. tena' kinksite
yogye ca vises* padantarena sannidhipite'pi, tadan-
- vayabodhakapramanibhavat tadanvayo na pratiyetaiva.
ata akanksa - sannidhi - yogyatvanyanupayoglny eva.
visesanvayavadinastu mate s ambandhagr ahanam pratyu-%
- padhitvena pravistani tani vakyarthapratipattavu-
- payujyante.

'In the view o f the advocates o f the expression o f th*

(general) correlated meaning, again, the denotative power of
the words cease in (conveying) that (the general) only and
and the power o f conveying the mutual relation o f the mean­
ings o f words is not admitted. The act o f indicating by the
general (meaning) invariably does not reach the particular.
Hence, even in the case o f the expectant and compatible
particular (meaning) brought in proximity by another word
because o f lack o f the valid factors conveying the mutual
rela tion , the relation is not at a ll understood. Hence,
expectancy, contiguity and com patibility are not also useful
(for conveying the sentence-meaning). But in the view o f the
advocates o f the expression o f the (particular) correlated
meaning, these (expectancy e t c .), anerging as the lim iting
adjuncts towards ascertaining the relation , are used in th*
matter o f understanding the sentence-meaning.'
 266

In ' yadyapyakanksito y o g y o ..............................* ete. o f the

K and J tex t above, the author o f the VM> r e p lie s to an ob­
je c t io n that even in the case o f the in d ic a tio n o f tho p a r t i­
c u la r, the meaning which has Akahksa, Sannidhi and Yogyata is
o ffe r e d by another Pada, i s accepted. There i s no p ro o f in
the acceptance o f any other meaning beyond that meaning. But
S alikanith a in order to meet the o b je c t io n sta tes th at although
a p a rticu la r meaning has Akahksa and Yogyata and i s u ttered
in c o n tig u ity , y e t i t i s n ot ascertained due to there being no
fa c t o r o f conveying the r e la tio n .

Those who accept the theory o f Samanyanvltabhidhana,

*

contend th at the Sakti o f the Padas ceases in conveying the

general meaning and they also do not admit the Sakti o f con­
veying the mutual r e la t io n o f the Padarthas. Moreover, even
in re sp e ct o f the in d ica tio n by the general meaning the act
o f in d ica tin g i s n ot the cause o f the p a rticu la r meaning.
T h erefore, in the case o f the p a rticu la r meaning having
Akahksa and Yogyata and having been brought in co n tig u ity by
another Pada due to there being no v a lid Pra®ina conveying
th e r e la t io n , the mutual r e la t io n wl l l not be understood.
Thus in the view o f the fo llo w e rs o f the Samanyinvitabhidhana,
Akahksa, Sannidhi and Yogyata also do n ot come to be u sefu l
fo r conveying the Vakyartha.on the oth er hand, In the view
o f toe fo llo w e r s o f the Vis'esanvayavida, these th ree fa c to r s
v i z . , Akinksi, Sannidhi and Yogyata snerging as the Upadhis
towards ascertain in g the r e la t io n come to t*e u sefu l fo r
 267

understanding the Vakyar tha.

Thus in the Jf te x t, Sallkanatha fin d s fa u lt in r e sp e ct

o f the SamaB^-anvitabhidhana and thereby r e je c t s the same.

taaaha—

•So, (the author) says' —

K (2l) sambancfabodhe vyutpattavupadhitve samavis'at.

visesanvayavade tu yogyatvadyupakarakam.

'I n the case o f understanding the ascerta in in g o f the

r e la t io n o f the meanings o f words, com p a tib ility e t c . in the
form o f lim tin g adjunct entered (are admitted) as a helping
fa c to r in the view o f the expression o f the p a rticu la r
c o rre la te d meaning.*

V (2 l) padaham padarthantarasambaddhassvirtho bodhya

ity a sy a i vyutpattavupadhitvena yogyatvadlkamanu-
- p r avis tarn v ises anvitabhidhiaiavadipakse upakarakam,
__ ___^

ha samanvitabhldhane
A
i t i darsitam prak.

'The Own meaning o f a word r e la te d with the meanings o f

other words i s understood and in the case o f th is understand­
ing , the co m p a tib ility e t c . in the form o f lim itin g adjunct
enter as the helping fa c t o r in the view o f the expression o f
#•
the co rr e la te d meaning and n ot in the view o f the Expression
o f the general co rre la te d meaning. I t has be«n shown e a rlie r
( i . e . in K (i8) above)1.
>
 26 S

In 'sambandabodhe v y u tp a tta u ..................... ' etc. and

1padanam padir thiyrtarasambaldhah......................... ' etc. o f the
k and 1 te x t res p e c tiv ely stated above, Salikanatha states
that In understanding the ascertainment o f the r e la tio n among
the Padsrthas, the three factors as already stated v i z . ,
Aklriksa, Sannidhi and Yogyata emerging as the Upidhis are
admitted as Upakarakas (helping fa c to rs ) by the follow ^ fs o f
the view o f the Visesanvltabhidhana. But on the other hand,
in the case o f the view o f the Samanyanvltabhidh ana, these
fa cto rs are not accepted as the IJpakarakas in understanding
the ascertainment o f the r e la tio n o f the Padarthas. This has
already been stated by the author, unuer K (i8 ) o f the ]£M
above. That is why he has not elaborated this issue here in
y»

J text again. Moreover, in the J text above, Salikanatha

has simply repeated the K tex t in prose.

dusanantaranca' ha—
’ (The author) shows another lacuna' —

K(22) kinca vastubalenaiva siddhe samahyasarigam e.

tasya vacyatvamicchadbhirvrtha sabdali prayasitah.

'Moreover, as the knowledge o f the general (meaning)

can be acquired on the strength o f ob jects, by those who are
desirous o f the expressiveness o f the general (mealing) make
e ffo r ts , in vain, in respect o f the word.’
 » '4

269

V(22) kriya-kir akasvabhavaloc anaya' p i kar akama tr ana

cVnvayavagamasiddheh, vrtha samanyanvayabht-
-dhayakata sabdasya1nglkriyat i t i .

‘ Even by way of discussing the nature of the verb and

case, because of attaining ‘ the knowledge o f the relatio n by
means of only the verb and only by the case, the word is
admitted, in vain, as the denoter of the general related
meaning.1

In ' kinca v astu b alen aiv a............................ * etc. and

• kriyl-karakasvabhava ............................' etc. of the K and V
tex t respectively, the author shows anothpr lacuna in the
view of the Samlnyanvltabhidhana. Salikanatha contends that
as the knowledge of the general meaning can be obtained by
means of the ob jects, so, the thinkers of the Seminyanvitabhi-
-dhana who accept the denotativeness of the general meaning in
respect of the word endeavours in vain.

I t i s stated in the V text again that even by means of

discussing the nature of Kriya and Kar aka because of obtain­
ing the knowledge of the relatio n by means of only the Kriya
and the KSraka, the advocates of the theory of Simanyanvlta-
-bhidhana, accept, in vain, the word as denoting the general
related meaning. I t is because, says Salikanatha, in the
matter of admitting Samanyanvltabhidhana, I t i s not possible
to attain the relation of the Padarthas. This is already
stated by Salikanatha under K(l8) o f the JJM In the preceding
 270

pages. Thus S&likanatha finally rejects the theory of

Ssunanyanvi tabhidhana.

We have already stated that while the Bhitta Mimamsakas

advocate the theory of Abhihitanvaya,, the Prabhakara Mimamsakas

advocate the theory of Anvitabhidhana. we have already made

discussion on these two theories. Latter writers of Indian

theories of meaning tried to reconcile the theories of verbal

comprehmsion v i z ., Anvitabhidhana and Abhihitanvaya. Mukula-

-bhatta states that both these theories contain partial advant­

age. Considering from the point of view of the Padas, the

theory of Abhihitanvaya is preferable and from the point of

view of the Vakya preference must be giv#i to the theory of

Anvitabhidhana. In this way, Mukulabhatta accepts a combin­

ation of both the theories and names the theory as Samuccaya-

, , 197
-vada.

Jayanta Bhatta rejecting both Anvitfebhidhana and Abhi-

-hitativaya theories, presents his theory of Tatparya by way

of bringing about modification in the Bhattas' theory of

Abhihitinvaya. According to this Tatparyavada, tfie Padas

express their isolated meanings through Abhldha, but so far

as the comprehension of the Vakyartha is concerned, it is

197. anyesam tu mate padinam tattatsamanyabhuto vacyo'rthah,

vakyasya tu par asp ar anvi tah padirtha it i padapeksaya-
-bhihitanvayah, vakyapeksaya tvanvitibhidhanam. evam
caitayoh samuccaya i t i . AVM, p. 41
 271

* 1 OR
accomplished through another Sakti c a lle d Tatparyas'akti.

Of the modern scholars Dr. Gaurinath S a stri maintains

that the d iffe r e n c e between the two th eories v i z . , A nvita-
-bhldhana and Abhlhitanvaya l i e s in their conception o f the

medium o f sy n ta c tic a l r e la t io n . The Prabhakaras as the

fo llo w e rs o f Anvitabhidhana, make the Padas and the Bhattas
as the fo llo w e rs o f Abhlhitanvaya, make the Padarthas as the
199
medium. He also contends that the theory o f Anvitabhidhana
has the m erit o f s a tis fy in g the law o f economy. I t asserts
that a word denotes a r e la te d m eanin g.*^ P r o f. S.C. Chatter jee
i s o f the view that o f the d iffe r e n t views about the mpaning
o f a sentence, that o f the Prabhakaras sterns to the b e s t .^ ^
Dr. K.K. Raja is also o f the v ie w that the Anvitabhidhana
theory seans to be an advance on the Abhlhitanvaya theory o f
the Bhattas, I t may be added here that P r o f. C.K. Raja in
h is work v i z . , *In defence o f Mimamsa1 states that the Anvi-
-t&bhidhana i s a very ancient theory in Indian thought. Yaska
203
a ttrib u tes th is theory to Audumbarayana.

198. abhidhatri mata saktih pad anam sv irth a n isth a ta /

tesim tatparyas'aktistu samsargava'gamavadhih// NM,p.372
199. Vide, PW, P» 235
200. Vide, I b id » P . 179
201. Vide, NTK, P* 344

202. Vide, ITM, P. 212

203. Vide, I DM, P* 33
 272

We may conclude here with the words o f Dr. G.N. Jha

that the Anvitabhidhina forms a d is t in c t iv e fea tu re o f th°
Prabhakara school o f thought and i t has the t a c i t support o f
the Sutra (1 .1 .2 5 ) and also o f Sahara.^®4

vakyamekam na nirbhagam vadcyantya~ varna eva va/

padavrndam smrtistham va prathamam padameva v a //
akhyatapadamatram va padartha v a ’ pyananvitah/
s amany anvay abodhe va heturvakyirthabodhane//

padinyeva samar than! vakyartha^a* vaboahane/

visesan vayavidin i bhigaso bhagasalinah//
i t i samgrahslokah.

*A sentence i s one (and) n ot in d iv is ib le or the l a s t

le t t e r o f a sentence (is the meaning) o f a sen ten ce). The
group o f words or the words obtained by r e c o lle c t io n or the
f i r s t word ( i s a sen ten ce). Or tr on ly the verbal form
(Akhyata) or also the unrelated meanings o f words are the
cause o f understanding the general s y n ta ctica l r e la t io n or
the cause o f understanding the sentence-meaning. Only the
words are capable o f conveying the sentence-meaning. In th«=
view o f the advocates o f the p a rticu la r c o rr e la te d meaning,
the words by parts (are capable o f conveying) the sentence­
meaning p art by p art*.

204. Vide, PIS, p. 137

 273

V(23) tatha coktam. a s t i va padasya* r thah?

. •

bi^dhamasti, kathain tar hi vaky a-vakyar thayo -

- r autpattikatvam^ vrddhavyavaharat. satyam.
satvavayavasa ityuktam.

‘ And ( i t is) also said -*• I s there the meaning of a word?

certainly there i s . How then there can be the sta te of being
produced in respect of the sentence and sentence-meaning?
I t i s (admitted only) for the usage of the elderly persons.
( I t i s ) true* But i t i s said that, that takes place as p s t ­
aining to the constituent parts (particular meanings).*

In ‘ vakyamekam na nirbhagain...................... * etc. and

* tatha coktam........................* etc* o f the*>Samgrahaslokas
(collected verses) and text respectively as stated above,
Salikanatha sums up the views of d ifferen t thinkers as to
how the Vakyartha i s understood. The author presents these
views and then re je c t them at the beginning of the JJM and
we have also discussed a ll th is in course o f our exposition
of the relevant tex t.

By ‘ vakyamekam na nirbhagam*, the author r e je c ts the

view of Bhartrhari who in h is Yakvapadlva. maintains that a
Vakya i s not a d iv isib le unit. Silikanatha sta te s that Vakya
i s one and not in d iv isib le .

By 'vakyantyo varna eva va1, the author of thP VM

r e je c ts the view of Sahara and of the Nalyayikas who contend
th at the l a s t le tte r along with the impressions of each of
 274

preceding le t t e r s convey th§€ vakyartha*

In f padavrndam smrtistham va*, Saiikanatha r e fe r s bo

the view o f some ancient Mimamsakas l i k e upavarsa etc. who
maintain that group o f Padas that are obtained by r e c o lle c t io n
s’

denote the Vakyartha. But Saiikanatha does not accept th is

v ie w

By 'p^thamjpadameva va*} Saiikanatha r e fe r s to the

v ie w o f BhartrhaTi according to whom, the f i r s t Pada i s one

o f the eigh t a lte rn a tiv e s that c o n s titu te a Vakya. But i t is
a lso r e je c te d by Saiikanatha.

In * akhyatapadamatrain va*, the author r e fe r s to the

view o f Katyayana, the author o f the V arttlkas who h ole#th at
Akhyata (verb al form) i s the Vakya.^®^ This Is a lso not
accepted Saiikanatha.

In 'padartha va*pyananvitah*, Saiikanatha r e fe r s to tho

v i e w o f the Bhatta Mimimsakas who contend that the unrelated
meanings o f the words denote the Vakyartha and he has a lso
r e je c t e d th is view.

In ‘ padanyeva sa m arth an !....................... 1 e t c . , Saiikanatha

presents his own view th at on ly the Padas denote the Vakyartha

and th is is the view o f the Prabhakara Mimamsakas.

205. akhyatam savyayakirakavisesanam vakyam.

Var, 9 under Pa.SU, 1 1 .1 .1 .
 275

IT I MAHAMAHOPADHYAYASRIMACCHALIK^Jt HAMISRAPRANITAYAM

PRAKARANAPANCIKAYAM SAVRTTIKAYA VAKYART HAMATRKAYA

UPODCHATO NAMA PRATHAMAH PARICCHBDASSAMAPTAH.

• •

•Thus ends th e f i r s t C hapter e n t i t l e d i n t r o d u c t io n o f

the Vakyartham atrka o f the Prakarana p a n clk a a lo n g w ith the
— ^
commentary w r itte n by Mahamahopadhyaya S a lik a n a th a M is r a .f
 Atha savrttervakyirthamatrkaya dvitiyah paricchedah

"NOW SECOND CHAPTER OF THE VAKYART H AM AT RKA ALONG WITH THE

COMMENTARY”.

v _ _ _
upodghatabhutamariitabhidhanarh prasidhya apurvam kiryarh

vedavakyanimartha iti sadhayitukimah purvapaksam ta'-adah -

"Having thus established the theory of the 3xoression of

the correlated (Anvitabhidhana) which forms the introduction

(to the Dresent chapter), (the author) desirous of establishing

the unseen potency (Apurva) in the form of oerformable(Kary^)

as the meaning of the vedic sentences, now presents the orima

facie view" -

K(l) nanu vyutpattyapeksesu s”abdesvarthabhidhayisu katham

manantaravedyam kiryamahurlinadayah.

"How do the Lins etc. speak of (denote) the oerformable

(Karya) which is not known by any other source of valid

knowledge inasmuch as the words that denote the meanings »re

dependent on their denotativeness".

V( 1) apurvardhikarane (MS. 2.1.2) lihadyartho’purvamityuk-1a-.

pramlnantarayagyanca’purvamisyate. yacca oramanantar^vo-

-gyam, tatra sambandhagrahanamas'akyam, sambandhigrahana-

-purvakatvattasya. visistarthavyavaharadars'anena hi

tadvisaya vyavaharo’vasiyate. tadanavasaye ca. na

tadvisaya buddhiranumiyate. tadanumane ca kutassahd ^-.ya

 saktih kalpyate. apurvanca na oraminantargocarah. na ca

sabdadeva tadavagamya, sambandhavadharanam, intarmras-

- rayaorasangat. avasitasakteravabodhakatvat. avabodha-

katvldeva saktyavagamat. syanmatam. linadessabdasya’yam

mahimi, yadanvasitasijktirapi svarthamavagamayatiti. tao'i-

damaoramanam, kriyamatravabodhakatvangikarena linaderlok -to

vyutoattisambhave, sabdantaravaijaksanyena.’ grhitasambr-n-

d*asyaiva vacakatvakaloaninupaoatteh.

vedavakyadapurvakaryavagaterjyam kalpyata iti cet.na.

tasya e v a ’ siddhatvat, kriyaiva karyataya vedavakyebhyo’

vagamyat iti, vyutpattibalenapraminikam manorat’

n amatra'b i-

rmbhitantvaQurvarn klryam nratiyate-iti. tasmadagrhi ta-

sambandho linadih kathamaourvam karyamabhidhatte, tatha -a

katham tadvakyarthah. abhidheya eva hyartho bhavati

vakyarthah.

"In Apurvadhikarana (MS.2.1.2), it is stated that 1rv

Lins etc. is the unseen potency (Apurva). And that which i s

incanable of being known by any other source of valid knowl- i «

is desired (called) as the unseen potency. Again in res^ec . o r

that which is incapable of being known by any other source of

valid knowledge the ascertaining of the relation is imoossi ie.

For, it oreceds the knowledge of the related. Because by wa /

of observing the usage of the particular meaning relation to

the ascertaining of relation is inferred and that, inde-'d, s

the ascertaining of the relation. And that which is known, thp

usage relating to that also is not known. And in the case of

it being not ascertained, the knowledge relating to it ( i.e.

the usage) is not inferred. And in the event of its being not

inferred, how the power of word is assumed Again the unseen

ootency is not known by any other source of valid knowledge.

And there will be no ascertainment of the relation by m^ans of

knowing the unseen ootency only from the world. For, it will

lead to the possibility of the fallacy of mutual interdepend 3nc<=

Because, the word conveys the meaning when its power is ascer­

tained and the power is known only when the meaning is known.

There may be view like this - such is the oower of the word

like Lins etc. that they, even their power being not ascertai­

ned, convey their own meanings. But this (view)is without any

valid ground. For, because of there being the oossibility or

the arising out of the denotativeness of the Ljns etc. fro^

common parlance by way of admitting their (i.e. of the Ljns'

conveying only the verbs, there arises, the inconsistency in

assuming the expressiveness (of the vedic words) the relation

of which is not ascertained and on account of its difference

from other word (i.e., the word of common parlance).

If it (the power of denotation) is thus assumed that

because of understanding the unseen potency in the form of

performable 4s understood from the vedic s^ntencest It is not

(cannot be) so. Because of its (of the power) not being

attained, only the verb (Kriya) in the the form of performaK.l■=

is known from the vedic sentences and as such on the strength

of denotativeness, the unseen ootency which has no source o:

valid knowledge and is nourished only from the mere wishcs,

is known in the form of the performable. Hence, how can the

Lin etc. the relation of which is not known, denote the

unseen potency in the form of performable and so how the

meaning of the vedic sentence is possible ? For, only the

denoted meaning is (can be) the meaning of a sentence".

In *nanu vyutoattyapek?esu ............................

....... ’etc. and fapurvadhikarane .........................

....... ’etc. of the K and V text respectively as stated abovp

/ J
Salikantha desirous of establishing the view, according to t'P

prabhakaras, that Apurva (unseen potency) or Karya (oerformabb*

as the meaning of the vedic sentences, presents the ourvaoaksa

(i#e. the view that may possibly be held by the opponents).

According to the prima facie view,ihow the suffixps L J ns etc.

can denote Aourva or Karya which is not known by any other

pramana. This Karya is called Apurva in the Sabarabhasya by

virtue of its being something new to all other means of valid

knowledge except the vidhi (injunctive sentence). In the

^purvadhikarana of the MS. 2.1,2. it is stated the meaning of

" - -r -

the ns etc. is Apurva and because of its not being known by

other source of valid knowledge, it is called Apurva,somethino

new, not known before. In the said Adhikarana, it is also

discussed that which is denoted by the Ljns is the Karya

(something to be effected or performable) which is inheren* 'r.

the Niyojyfi (^gent, the prompted person) in relation to him,

the Karya is indicated. The connection of this Karya with the

Agent and the action may be stated thus - the Karya by its

very nature is something brought about by krti or operation

and this operation is nothing but the physical effort of the

Agent.

According to the Prabhakaras, this Karya is not denoted

by Akhyata (verbal form) nor by the Injunctive Suffix nor by

any word in the Injunctive sentence, but it is denoted by a

sentence as whole. Therefore, the Prabhakaras are known as tne

206
karyaparavakyarthavadins. According to Kumarila and his

followers, Apurva is a force which mediates between the yiga

(sacrifice) and the desired result. This Apurva is also

207
called Niyoga. This Apurva exists as the result of the

actions till the production of the desired result. It is call'3

Niyoga because oersons desiring svarga (heaven) etc. are

directed to work it out. This is accented as the meaning of

Lin because the yiga, being of short period, cannot be called

Karya for the persons desiring svarga and the rest, which are

attained after a long period of time.

iti karye*rathe vedasya praminyam darsayati tallaksano

dharmah iti vadan karyarupa eveti darsayati, 37R., o.lb.
OCs*7 _
praminintaragocaro linadis'abdamatrilambanah karyatma
yagadibhavarthagocaro svargakamidiniyojyimatmani orerayanni
-yojyo vidhih. NRM, p. 63.
 This Apurva in view of the Bhittas is taken as expressed

by the Lins through its principal indication. It is also

accepted as produced by the yaga. But on the other hand it is

believed that the functionaries in respect of the non-vedic

injunctions understand the meaning of the principal root of the

sentence (Dhatvartha) as a duty enjoined on them, because of

there being no necessity to assume a Niyoga. But in these

cases, the vedic LJns express the kriyi as the duty by their
. ,. .. 208
indication.

everTca - "And thus" -

K(2). sabdantarinyapi katham tenidrstena kutracid/ vadisyantva-

nvitam svartham vyutpattioathaduragan^

"How by means of that unseen potency (Adrsta), the other

words will, also sometimts, speak of (convey) their own related

meanings which remain outside the domain of denotativeness °

V(2). tasminnapratiyamane tadanvitasya’pratite^, tatra

sambandhavadharananupapatterduranirastam sabdantaranam

tadanvitasvirthabodhakatvamiii.

"Because of that (i.e. the un seen potency) being not

understood, there can be no knowledge of the meaning related to

203 tasminsca kriyitirikte kirye vacye niscite linadlnam lo!<°

kriyayam prayogo laksaniko bhavati. anekarthatvasyinyayyat-
vat. evam ca naimittikani^edhadhikarayorasatyaoi ohalava-
t v e ’ purvameva vakyartho bhavisyati. Ibid.
that (i.e., unseen potency). There in that case, because of

there being the inconsistency in respect of ascertaining the

relation, there arises the state of conveying the meanings as

related to that (the meaning of the unseen potency) by other

words’»

In ’sabdantarlnyapi katham .........................

....... ’etc. and ’tasminnapratiyamine .....................

....... ’etc. of the K and V text above, Sal* kanatha oresents

the view of the pur^vapaksa, according to which Apurva is not

the vakyartha. According to this view of the purpaksa, ther^

is no Aourva which is expressed by the suffixes Ljns etc.

which constitute the vakyartha. In the view of these ooponents

by means of Apurva, the sabdas cannot convey their own related

meanings which remain outside the domain of vyutoatti

(denotativeness). These opponents who m a y b e identified as the

Bhattas accept Bhavana (urge) as the vakyartha and as such they

come to be regarded as the Bhavanavakyarthavadins. But the

Prabhikaras are called Niyogavakyarthavadins because of their

admitting Niyoga (prompting) as the vikylrtha. In course of

our exDOsition of the present chapter, we shall find scooe to

deal with, at length, these two theories.

ridhantamupakramate -

"(The author) proceeds to present the conclusion"-

K(3&3J^) atrocyate yada nama vrddhenaikena bhasite jalam caitri’

harasveti caitra iharate jalam. tad! vyutpitsamano,

nyastatraivamavagacchati.
 ::>di

"Here it is said- on asking by one elderly person ( i.e.

senior), caitra, bring water,, (then) caitra fetches water.

Then, in that (in the particular act of bringing water aft?i

the order) another desirous of learning understands thus

(i.e. that the sentence denotes something connected with an

action)".

V(3) buddhiourva mameva’sya pravrttiriyamidrsi. lihgadivak -a-

sravanasamanantaram vrddhasya visistarthavisayam

oravrttithi drstva, vyutpitsamano bala evamakalayati -

yeyam svadhina’sya pravrttih, sa madvad buddhipurvike :

punasca t a s y a ’yam vimarso jayate,aham buddhva prevrtto yat.ha,

tatha tadvadejsfl’pi.

yasyah pravrtterhetubhuta buddhih si yadvisaya sati

mama pravrttihetuh, tadvisayaiva’syapiti,punarvyutoats-

-oranuma jayate. tadevamanumanadvayametad vrddhasya

svatantra pravrttih - dharmini, buddhiourvika-iti sa-’hyo

dharmah, svatantrapravrttitvat madiyasvatantra-

-pravrttivaditi, tatha vrddhasya pravrttihetubhuta

buddhih - dharmini yadvisaya buddhirmama pravrttiheti.ohu+a

tadvisayaiva*syapiti - saddhye dharmah, pravrttiheti.bhu-

tabuddhitvit madiyapravrttibhutabuddhivat - iti. oun^s'ca

tasya’yam vimars’ah pravarttate. tadasya tu sabdena

bodhyate. anena m a m # manantarena tu yadvisaya sa buddhih

pravrtti^hetubhuta, tadvastvanena sabdena bodhyate.

tadbhave satyavagamat, m a m a tu manantarepa tad bodhyate

 iti - ayamavayorvisesah. tena yadbuddva pravrttirmama,

tadasya’nena sabdena bodhyata iti sabdasya pravrttihe-

k_
tubutarthavabodhakatamavadharayati."

"The inclination (to action) of his (i.e., of the

directed person) preceds the knowledge like that of me (i.e.,

the learner). Having observed the inclination of the senior

(i.e., the directed person) towards a particular action subse­

quent to the hearing of the sentence containing Lih etc., the

child desirous of learning thinks thus - the very inclination

of this person at his command is preceded by knowledge as is

the case with me. Again the thought flashes in his mind - just

as having understood, I am inclined (to an action), so does he.

The knowledge that is cause of (a particular) inclina­

tion, being the cause of inclination pertaining to some action

is also the cause of his inclination with reference to the samo

action. Again there arises the inference (in the mind) of the

child desirous of learning. Thus there is a couple of infer* nce-

the inclination of the (directed) elderly person that lies at

his command is the assertion (pratijna), (the inclination)

preceded by the knowledge is the attribute of the probandum

(sadhya), because of the inclination being at his command is the

cause (hetu), like my inclination that lies at my command is the

example (ud)jarana). Likewise, the knowledge which is the cause

of the inclination of the(directed)elderly person is the asser­

tion, the knowledge which is the cause of my inclination

oertaining to some action is also the cause of his inclination

is the attribute of the probandum, because of the knowledge

being the cause of inclination like the knowledge which is

the cause of my inclination is the example. Again this

thought arises in his mind, this knowledge arises by means of

word. The object pertaining to which the knowledge comes to

be the cause of my inclination is known by this word. The

knowledge of the (directed) elderly person regarding the

object is attained by the word, but in my case, that (the

object) is known by other source of valid knowledge and as

such this is the difference between both of us (i.e., the

directed elderly person and the child). Therefore, the object

knowing which my inclination arises, is known by him by means

of that (very word) and as such he (the child) ascertains the

state of being that which conveys the meaning of the word ac

the cause of inclination".

In *atrocyate yada nama ................................

....... ’etc. and *buddhipurvi maraevi’sya ......................

....... ’etc. of the K and V text respectively of the VM

above, Salikanltha contends how a person is inclined to an

action subsequent to the hearing of a sentence formed with the

sufixes Lins etc. In the V text, the author also states how

a child who is learning thinks by observing a directed elderly

p e r s o n ’s inclination to some action after hearing the sent^nc^

of the directing elderly person. Thus there arises a couole

of inference - ((1) the pravrtti of the directed elderly o°rson

that lies at his command is the prtijna (assertion); the

pravrtti preceded by the knowledge is the attribute of the

Sadhya (probandum); the pravrtti being at his command is the

hetu (cause), like the pravrtti of the child at his command is

the udahara^a (example), (2) The knowledge which is the cause

of the pravrtti of the prayojya vrddha is the pratijna; the

knowledge which is the cause of the pravrtti of the child ie

also the pravrtti of the prayojya vrddha is the attribute o v

the Sidhya; the knowledge of the pravrtti is the hetu like the

knowledge which is the cause of the pravrtti of the child is

the udaharana. Here, we find the five members of a Syllogism.

of inference. These are pratijna, hetu, udiharana, upanaya

(application) and Nigamana (conclusion)

It can be said in favour of the Prabhakara view in

this connection with the methods of denotative function, that

the usage of the elders is the first and best method. por,

natural is always superior to the artificial. According to the

Prabhakaras, expressions like, ’there is a blue jar on the

earth* lead to no verbal comprehension (sibdabodha). Since

words such as ’a jar* have been concluded to have the power of

denoting a jar etc. as connected with certain acts, and since

only Lin and other suffixes have the power to convey inclina­

tion to action, there will be no verbal comprehension as they

210
are lacking in this case. The followers of Prabhakara ar»

209 ~ _
pratijnahetudaharanopanayanigamanani pancavayavah. TS, ~.3o.
210 - _ _. _ _ _ _ _
ghatadipadanam karyanvita-ghatadibodhe sSmarthyavadharanad
kiryatabodham prati ca linadinam samarthyit tadabhavinn?
sabdabodha ityapi kecit. BP. p. 428.
 y**

not prepared to recognise directly a 'Saktigrahaka* other than

vrddhavyaVahara which facilitates only karyinvitasaktijnana

and not otherwise.

Butjthis v iew of the Prabhikaras has been discarded by

the Naiyayikas. For, though one may at first conclude, the deno­

tative function of words such as jar etc. is with regard to a

jar etc. as connected with certain acts, one should afterward-

212
discard this idea for the sake of simplicity.

Silikanatha, here, refutes the view of the Shittas,

according to which, the meaning of the ^idhi or injunction i<-

the pravartana or prerani (inducement) or Sibdi B h a v a n a (verbal

urge). Bhavana or urge is a stimulating activity for that whi:<

213
is to take place. It constitutes the effort or activity of

the Agent. It is of two kinds - Sabdi or verbal and Arthi or

214
objective. This Bhavana is expressed by the Suffix as the

part of the verbal form.

Oi l « . . . — y»

vrddhavyavaharapurvikaiva sarva sabdavyutpattih - VM. o . 3 79

prathamatah karyanvita-ghatadau saktyavadharane’pi

jtaghavena pascat tasya parityigaucityat - BP. o. 430.

Bhavanatvam nama bhavituh prayojakavyapiratvam, MP. o. 62.

2 ]A .— y-N fV MM.
ijia hi linadi,yukte$u vakyesu dve bhavane gamyete -
sabdltmiki* rthatmika ceti.'- TB., d . 12.
 In the subsequent passages, we shall find Salikanatha'=

oresentation of the view of the Bhattas regarding Sabdi

BhavanS which is, according to the 3hattas, the meanino of toe

Vidhi.

punas’ca ko’sau pravrttihetubhuto*rthasVabdabhidheya ivi

nirdhirayitum, svatmani oratipannam pravrttihetubhutam-'r

- thamanusandhatte -

"Moreover, in order to ascertain what is that meaning

that constitutes the cause of inclination as well as a denota­

ble by a word, (he) enquires the meaning that forms the caus^ o

inclination admitted by himself" -

K(4). tatra buddhvi pravrtto’ham kirn tavat svayamanyada.

"The other day knowing what I myself was inclined (to an

actiorjp’

V(4a) s^abdanirapeksassvayamaham pravartaminah kirn buddhva

pravrtta iti jijnasate. anyadetyanena - vyutpattitah

oragavasthocyate. vyutpannena bilena yadatmani pravrtM-

- karanataya pratitam, tadeva vyutpannasya’piti kalpyat-.

na’nyadityarthah. tena sabda eva pravrttihetubhuto vidhi

tadvyapiro veti nirastam bhavati. tayorbilena’ tmani

pravrttikaranatvenadars'anat. atiman?Jdatay5 cemau oakseu

na saksaduoanasya nirastau. tathahi - linidisabdasvaru a

- sya oravartakatve sarva eva tacchrivanio niyamena

Dravartteran, na caivam drsyate, kasyacit kadacit pravr-

- tteh, lihadivyaoarasya tu pravrttihetutvasrayanam devah

 pratipadyantam, oisitacaksuso manusa vayam neyatim

pramanabhumimavagahitum ksamah.

“Regardless of word, knowing what I myself being inclined

(to an action) came to be engaged ? (he) desires to know. ly

this expression ’the other day* the state prior to the know­

ledge is stated (meant). Whatever is understood by the

conversant child as the cause of his inclination, (it) is also

assumed in the case of the (directed elderly) person and not

v r'*W

other. This is the meaning. Hence, only the word which is the

cause of inclination is the injunction or the function of toe

injunction stands rejected. For, these two (viz., injunction

or the function of injunction) are not seen by the child es

the cause of the inclination.

Because of being too worse, these two views are rejected

without directly placing them. For, if the words Lin etc. =>r^

inducive, then all the persons after hearing them, by rule,

would have inclined (to actions). But it is not seen that

sometimes somebody inclines to an action. But the functions

of Lin etc. as the cause of the inclination are determined

by the gods. We, the human beings whose eyes are closed, =re

unable to grasp such authoritative statement.”

In ftatra buddhva .......... ’ etc. and rsabdaniraneks-

assvayamaham......... ’ etc. of the K and V text resoect* vefy

stated above, the author of the VM explains how a child in

order to ascertain what is that meaning which forms the cause

 , Q O

of pravrtti and what is the denotable by a word, enquires the

meaning that forms the cause of pravrtti admitted by himself.ee

The child puts a question to himself as to without depending on

Sabda knowing what he was inclined to an action. By using the

word ’anyada’ in the K, the author means the the state prior to

one's knowledge of the action.

/ —
In the V text, Silikanatha also rejects the view of the

Bhattas that Sabda which is the cause of pravrtti is the Vidhi

or the function of the word is as such. It is because a child

desirous of learning thus findsthese two (i.e.t Sabda or the

function of a Sabda) as the cause of the pravrtti of a person.

*+■ ■

According to Salikanatha, these two views are worst and as such

he has rejected the same without directly presenting them.

, his
It may be stated here that Kumarila and some of followers
A

admit the meaning of the Vidhi as the pravartana or prerana and

is understood as the Sabda BhavanS. Thus the Bhattas contend

that the knowledge of the Vidhi is the Sabda Bhavana.

We shall find scope to deal with Silikanathas refutation of

the view of the Bhattas^on Sabda Bhavani in subsequent pages.

V(4b) keyam sabdabhivani - ucayate - lihadivyapara^upa

purusapravrttibhavananukula svajnanakaraniki, arthavadodi-

_ - ■ $ _ * _
- taprasgtyalaksaneti - kartavyatayogini preranatmika

kalpyate. "svadhyadhyanavidhina hi sarve vidhlyakih,

svadhyayapadopat^sca’ tma niyujyante bhavayedi’(T.Va.o.114)

ti tatra kimityapeksaylni purusapravrttissambadhyate.

 kenetyakanksayam vidhijnanameva yogyataya karanatvenari-

-gikriyate. jnati hi s'abdabhavanSTpravrttim prasute,

yogyatayaiva’ rthavldasarautthaprasastyajnana-

-mitikartavyatamse nivis'ate. avasjSdanti hi vidhisaktih

prisastyajnanenottabhyate. tasyas^ca purusavyapararupa

svargadibhavyavacchinna bhavarthakaranika srautasmlrti-

-carapraptapadlrthaj anitakaranopakiravatyarthabhlvin^

samanapratyayavicya visayabhuta iti.

"What is this verbal urge (Sabda BhivanS) ? It is said —

that which is in the form of the function of the Lin etc.,

(that which) is the cause of producing the knowledge of a persorfs

inclination (pravrtti) (to some act),(which is) connected with

’modus operand!’ (Itikartavyata) of the nature of praiseworthi­

ness stated by the corroborative statements (Arthavada), is

assumed (as the verbal urge) in the form of inducement (prerana-

tmika). The injunction of the study of the veda serves the

purpose of employing all the injunctions as also the self (sva)

(mentioned in the word ’Svldhyaya’) and this employing is in the

form of - ’should think of accomplishing’ (TV, p. 114). And in

putting the question as to ’what is to be thought of the

inclination of a person is indicated. When there is expectancy

as to ’by which one should think of’, the knowledge of the

injunction is admitted as the means due to its being efficient.

For, the knower produces the verbal urge which makes a person

incline to an action. The knowledge of praiseworthiness stated

by the corroborative statements arises on the part of modus

 292

operand! because of its being efficient. For, the injunction

that is exhausted is unheld by the knowledge of the praisewor­

thiness. Heaven etc. is to be thought of in respect of the

verbal urge which is of the form of action of a person. The

knowledge of the object that is to be thought of, is its means

and the objective urge connected with the mearjs in the form of

the knowledge of the object that is to be thought of,attained

✓

by conduct enjoined in the Sruti and the Smrti is the object.

The knowledge of the objective urge also arises from the same

means as that of the verbal urge".

In the V text viz., ’keyam sabdabhavanl ............. ’etc.

stated above, Salikanitha presents the view of the Bhittas on

Sabda Bhavana (verbal urge). It is also known as Sibda 3hivani

and Sabdi Bhavana. Bhavana (urge) as defined by the Bhattas is the

215
stimulating activity for that which is to take place. According

to the Prabh3karas,it is the activity of a person towards a cer­

tain course of action. That is to say,the injunctive affix in the

word ’yajeta* indicates that the person must put forth his effort
_ __
towards a definite end. In addition to the Sibdi Bhavana both the

schools of Mimamsa' accept another Bhavana called Arthi Bhavana

(objective urge^f^ Of these two Bhavanas,say the Kumarilas, the

objective urge is common to all the verbs and the verbal urge is

215
iha hi linadiyuktesu vakyesu dve bhavane gamyete -
s’abdatmika’rthatmika ceti. TV., p. 114.

216 —
bhavanitvam nama bhavituh prayojakavyaparatvam, MP, p, 52.
%
 29 ' !

217
to be expressed by the Lin etc. The knowledge of the Vidhi

is, according to the Kumarilas, the verbal urge. Being an

action inherent in words, it is called the Sabdi Bhavana and

being the cause of an inclination towards matters like sacrifi-

ces and homa, it is also called pravartana or prerana. This

Sabdi Bhavana consists of three factors - (a) what is to be

thought of (kim bhivayet), (b) by what instrumentality it is to

be thought of (kena bhavayet) and (c) how it is to be thought

of (katham bhavayet) or modus operandi (itikartavyata). The

Arthi ghavani represented by a person’s inclination, comes into

relation as the thing to be achieved, the optative suffix etc.,

known through study, comes into relation as the instruments lity

and the knowledge of praiseworthiness that is conveyed by the

Arthavada Vakyas comes into relation as the Itikartavyata. It

can be said here that Kumirila names the Slbdi Bhavana as

.. _ 219
Abhidha Bhavana also. . In connection with the discussion on

Bhavana by the Bhattas, we deem it proper to write a few lines

on the Bhattas’ theory on Bhavana entitled BhSvanavakylrthavada.

According to this theory of the Bhattas, Dharma is neither

Apurvakarya as interpreted by the Pribhikaras nor it is an

217 - - -
tatrSrtha_jbhavana sarvakhyatasadharani anya tu lihadyabhi-
-dheya. MM., p. 271.
A |O

sabdanisthavyaparatvicchabdi bhavanetyucyate,
yigahomadivisayakapravrttihetutvat pravartana preraneti
cocyate. MP., p. 56.
Otft
abhidhabhavanamahuranyameva linadayah. TV under MS. 2.1.2.
imperative command expressed by Codana as stated under MS.1.1-2-

The vedic Lins have a capacity for two-fold expression viz.,the

capacity to impose an action on the persons and the capacity of

the persons which is reactive and internal. The former is

called pravartana or Vidhi resting in vedic Lins and the latter

is called pravrtti of a person to some action. Both of them

are known by a common term called Bhavana because of their

leading to the same result. Pravartana leads to pravrtti in a

yaga and pravrtti in yaga leads to the desired result from the

yaga. It may be inferred from the Vidhi or pravartana when yaga

and pravrtti for it are connected with Vidhi that such pravrtti

to yaga must come as a result. The knowledge of Vidhi or

Bhavana and pravrtti or Bhlvani coupled with a sense of result

makes a person to undertake an action. In case of vidic injunc­

tions, the result of sacrifice based on injunction is svarga

itself as indicated by the words Svargakama etc. Sacrifices are

221
therefore only the means to produce such results. Sacrifices

being momentary do not continue up to the time of the production

of the desired result. It is, therefore, necessary for the

Bhittas to invent an unseen potency called Apurva as a link

between the sacrifice and its result.

222

220
codanalaksano’rtho dharmah.

yatha ’agnihotram juhuyat svargakama’ti. atrignihotrahomena

svargam bhavayet.t'ityarthah pratiyate. MP., p. 5.
ooo
* ..... asutaravinasinafn karmanam kaiantarbhaviphalasadhanatvo-
papattyartham-antara punyapaparumapurvam kalpyate.Ibid, o.3.
 ’Q r;

As the pravrtti or Bhavana is connected with three things

namely, a result, an instrument to the result i.s., sacrifice and

the method of performance of the sacrifices - this BhavanI is.

according to the Bhattas,important in all vedic and non-vedic

sentences.

The Bhivanavakyarthavada of the Bhattas is condemned by

the Prabhakaras who accept Niyogavakylrthavlda which we will

discuss in course of our investigation.

V(4c) tanna. lihadestadrso vyaparo vidyata ityatra na kincana

^ _ £ __
pramanam. lihadisabdabhavinanantrabhivini p u r u s a p r a v r t -

reva pramanamiti cet. na. tannibandhanatvena pravrttera-

nyatra dr^tatvat. yannibandhanl hi pravrttirdrsta,tad»va

tim drstva sakyamanumatum, na punarapratipannapurvakara-

- nabhivassabda-vyipiravisesah. atha linidisabda eva

»
pramanamiti sahasam, agrhitasambandhasya* vacakatvat.

Anavadhlrite hi sambandhini, sambandhabodhavaidhuryat.

kathanca tra svadhyadhyayanavidhina sarve vidhiyakah

svatmi ca viniyujyante. purusam vidhirathabhavanayim

prerayati. yasca yena preryate, sa tena niyujyate. Na ca’

cetananim vidhinam niyojakatvamapi sambhavati. atha na

niyojyante. tadapyanupapannam - sabdabhavanasu

sarvas'abdinam svata eva kartrtvat viniyoganapeksatvat.

atha na purusah prerane viniyujyante, kintvartha-

vabodhane. tadapi na ghatate. tartrl’pi niyojyanapeksa-

yistulyatvit. adhyanavidhes'caTksarasamskararupidhyaya-

- navidhayaktvibhyupagamat.
 tatha cihuh -

"dravyadinam punah kasmin svadhylyo’ntargato bhavet.

tredhl’pi pratibhatyasmin samsklratvasya nirnayah,

samskiragananiyanca yuktaiva’ksarasamskriya. svadhyayo

hi sphutam karma saksat samskriyate hi sah.iti.

samsklravidhisca na samskaryam viniyuhkte, pramanan-

tarivasitopayogasya sesitatvat. samskaraparyavasaye tu

samskaravidhirna samsklryasya karyam kalpayet. atima

ci'dhyanavidhina viniyujyate, na viniyujyate veti

pratipattidvayasyi’pyasambhavadanupannam. kathanca

purusavrttistasya bhavyam, na tivadanantaranispatteh,

m* «■ » mm mm

vidhijnasya karanatvabhavaprasahgat. kriyaphalam hi tada

purusapravrttissyat. na ca kriyi svaphalaprasavaya

karanamapeksate. na ca gamanam sarnyoga-vibhagirambhe

karanapeksam. syinmatam. lihadisabdo vidhijnanam

janayitvi, karanlnugrhitah prerana ruparh svavyaparamara-

-bhate iti. na ca kiranatvabhavah, kriyanispattaveva

karanatvat. tadidama^laukikam. na hi kasyacidvastunas-

svajnanamutpadahetuh pratitam."

"That is not (correct). For, there is no any proof that

the Lins etc. have such function (of producing inclination of a

person to an action). If it is argued, only the inclination of

of
a person subsequent to the hearingxthe words Lin etc. is the

proof. It also cannot be said. For, the inclination is se^n

nowhere as being produced by the Lin etc. The cause which is

 lQ ' . ’

the basis of inclination can be inferred by observing that

(inclination) and not again the particular function^the

relation as a cause is not previously known. If it is said

that the words Lin etc. are the proof, then it is a mere

(show) of courage. For, without the knowledge of the relation,

the Lins etc. do not denote function. Moreover, unless the

related is known, the relation is also not known. And how,

then the injunction of the study of the veda serves the

purpose of employing the other injunction, as also the self

(sva) mentioned in the word ’svadhyaya’? The injunction

induces a person in the objective urge. And he who is induced

by one is also employed by one. And the injunctions that are

inanimate are not capable of being the employer. If it is

said that the persons are not employed (in certain action) oy

the words, then also it is not proper. For, the employment is

not required because of the direct agency of all the words in

respect of verbal urge. Again if it is said that the persons

are not employed in respect of inducement but in respect of

understanding the meanings, that also does not happen^ the

disregard towards the prompted person (Niyojya) being equal

therein also, also for, the injunction of the study in the

manner of the impression of letters being admitted as the

state that gives the injunction of the study. And, so (they)

saj-
"In which of the sacrificial material etc. is included

(in injunction of) the study of the veda ? The three

(injunctions viz., relating to the sacrificial material,deitv

and the modus operand!) appear (i.e. are available) in connec­

tion with a sacrifice. In the case of the determination of

the impression, the impression of the letters is proper. The

study of the veda is a visible act. For, it is directly

impressed.’ And the injunction of the impressions does not

o
emply that which is to be impressed. For, the utility of the

injunction being the whole is exhausted by other source of

valid knowledge. But the injunction of the impression which

is finished in producing impression cannot assume (be the

cause of) the function of that which is to be impressed. And

the self is employed by the injunction of the study of the

veda or not employed, the two cognitions being impossible,these

two alternatives are inconsistent.

And how the inclination of a person is an object to be

thought of from the verbal urge ? It cannot be thought of

subsequent to the completion of the function of a person. For,

there is the scope of absence of the means of the knowledge of

the injunction. For, in that the inclination of a person

would be the result of an action. Moreover, the action does

not require any instrumentality for the production of its own

result. The act of going (gamana) does not require any

instrumentality for conjunction and disjunction. There may be

other observation like this - the words Lin etc. after

producing the knowledge of the injunction and with the help of

that having the instrumentality begin their own functions in

the form of inducement (prerana). In this way, there is no

absence., of instrumentality, because the instrumentality is

meant for the accomplishment of the action. But it is

improper. For, it is not known that the knowledge of a

particular object is the cause of its production.’

In the V text viz., ’tanna linadestldrso vylparo ....

etc. as stated above, Salikanltha refutes the view of the

Bhattas with regard to the Sabda Bhavana. We have already

stated that the Bhlttas advocate the theory of Bhavana -

vakyartha according to which states that the vedic Lins express

the Bhlvana. This Bhivani is also known as pravrtti or

pravartani. The Bhattas contend that Bhavani is in the form of

a function of the vedic Lins which make a person incline to an

action. It is also stated that being an action inherent in

words, it is called Sabda Bhavani and being the cause of pravrtti

- 223
towards matters like yagas, it is also called prerana.

Silikanatha refutes the view of the Bhattas by stating

that there is no proof that Lins etc. have functions in the

form of prerana and the pravrtti of a person towards certain

actions subsequent to the hearing of the words Lin etc. is not

the cause of this Bhlvana. For, the pravrtti arising out of

such Lins etc. is not seen in other places. The Bhattas on the

strength of the injunctive sentence, *svadhiyo’dhyetavyah’

223 > -.
linadayojhi preranam kurvanti cabhidadhati ca’ iti
varttikariyah. TR., p. 43.
 3 ~ir

(i.e., one should study ones’ own branch of the veda), as an

example of the verbal urge maintains that the injunction of the

veda serves the purpose of employing all other injunctions as

also the self (sva) mentioned in the word ’svidhyaya’ and this

employing or urging is in the form - *should think of accompli­

shing’ this is what is stated by Kumarila in his Tantravarttika.

According to the Bhattas Sabda Bhavani is comprehended as

something to be done only in the sentence, ’one should study

one’s own branch of the veda’. ^ ^

This view of the Bhattas is not accepted by the Prabhika-

-ras and so Sllikanatha says that it is the injunction that

inspires a person in respect of the objective urge (Artha

Bhavana). And he by whom is inspired is also employed. It

cannot be said that the insentient* injunctions can serve the

purpose of employing. Here it can be mentioned that in the viaw

of the Prabhakaras, the study (adhyayana) of the veda is f r

teaching (adhyipana).Prabhakara maintains that the expression

’svadhyaye’dhyetavyah’ does not express a complete injunction as

no specific Adhikarin is mentioned here for whom the order is

intended. It does not indicate whether the person desires to

know the meaning of the veda or desires to attain heaven or

anything else. He further argues that there is no necessity ror

the addition of such words to complete the injunction in order

to put it into action, since the other injunction’tamadhyapayita

A A J ' r 1 1 ___ ' ' H” - " " ' " ' ' ' — - —

^ iyarfca sabdabhavani .......... kintu ’svadhyayo’dhyetavyah’

iti vakye eva kartavyatvena pratlyate. MP., p. 58.
 30

acaryah* indirectly requires persons to study. So,Prabhakara

observes that the study (adhyayana) is to be done only by the

force of that injunction which is complete with the Adhikarin

who is desirous of being a preceptor (adhyapaka). The disci­

ples should learn the vedas in order to comply with the

Adhyapana Niyoga or the command of teaching prescribed for the

. 225
preceptors.

Parthasirthi Misra in his Nylyaratnamala took great

pains to show that the view of Prabhakara in connection with

the interpretation of the expression ’svadhyaye’dhyatavyah’ is

not favoured by the Bhasya of Sahara and he denied the existen­

ce of Adhyapanavidhi with Adhikarin or Niyojya (prompted

person) and showed that the Svadhyaya vidhi alone with an

Adhikar^in such as a person desirous of knowing the meaning of

the veda, added to it is capable of prescribing the learning

of the vedas.
_
Salikanatha, in the V text above, discards the injunc­

tion of the study (adhyayana vidhi) as viewed by the Bhlttas

who contend that the expression ’svidhyayo’dhyetavyah’ is for

X
adhyayana. Salikanitha has refuted the said view citing the

verse from Kumarila viz., ’dravyadinam etc.’ above. The verse

states that as the injunction of study may be included in the

three injunctions relating to the sacrificial material(dravy)

225 adhyapanavidhiprayuktatvadadhyayanasya tat siddhireva

prayojanamityarthah, NRM,, p, 3.
deity (d>=vata) and modus operand! (itikartavyata), it is

better to include it in purification (samskara) and it our1

*' r*-

the letters. Svadhyaya is clearly an object (karma) and ac

such it is directly ourified. The Bhattas admit the Adhyayap -■

Vidhi as an injunction of ourification (Sam^skara vidhi) and

they take the expression ’svadhyayo’dhyetavyah’ as a cas- of

226 '
purification. In this regard Salikanatha states that

samskara Vidhi does not emoloy that which is to be o u r i f i » H

because of the principal injunction having its utility been

exhausted by any other source of valid knowledge. But a sams^r

Vidhi finised in the act of purifying cannot be a cause of

producing a Kirya of what is purified. So, because of both the

views being incapable of stating as to whether the selc is

employed or not by Adhyayana Vidhi, the Adhyayana vidhi as

interpreted by the Bhittas from the said expression is in^ro"c r

and what it proper is the Adhyapana Vidhi as interpreted by th°

Prabhakaras.

The discuscion on the expression viz., ’svadhyayo’

dhyetavyah* as to whether it refers to the Adhyayana vidhi ox

the Adhyapana Vidhi has been discussed in detail by Salikanatha

in the Ssstramukha Prakarana of the Prakarana-pahclka. In t'ne

V text again, Salikanatha presents the view of the Bhatta* woo

accent the inclination of a person as the function of cabda

BhivanI and then rejects the same. It has already been stat. d

aptisamskaro yatha - ■’svadhyayo’dhyetavyah’ (Tai. S.) iti

adhyayanena svadhyayo ipyata ityabtisarhskaro’yam. MP.o,4->.
 ' V v ’;

that the Bhattas consider verbal urge (Sabda Bhavana) in form

of an injunction and they contend that person’s inclination

(purusa-pravrtti) is the Karya of an injunction or the c incli­

nation of a person to an action is due to the Sabda Bhavana.

But it cannot be so. For, if it is admitted that person’s

inclination to action is the Karya of the injunction then +he

knowledge of the injunction cannot be the instrumentality. For,

227
an instrumentality is a cause which is peculiar and operative.

But this is not the case with the knowledge of the injunction.

It is because there is no function of the knowledge of the

injunction which can give rise to the inclination of a person

to certain actions. Moreover, instrumentality is not necessary

for the production of the result of an action. It can be

illustrated with an example. Going (gamana) needs no instru­

mentality for its leaving the first place and uniting with the

second place. Going (gamana) is defined by the Naiyayikas as

the conjunction of a place by leaving the earlier one.

Hence, for the act of going, nothing is necessary as its

instrument. Thus the person’s inclination is not tfce Karya of

the injunction. The Bhattas may again argue like this - the

words ’Lin’ etc. produce the knowledge of an injunction and as

such with the help of the knowledge of the injunction as an

227
asidharanam kiranam karanam, TS., p. 25.
also, - >sarvameva hi karanam kartrvyaparagocaram.NRM. c ,’b .
228
purvades”aviyogenottaradesasamyoga gamanam, TS., p.12.
instrument, these can start their own functions in the form

of inducement (prerani) and so there would be no absence of

instrumentality. For, instrumentality is for completing the

action. But this view held by the Bhattas does not, says

Salikanatha, stand to reason . For, it is seen nowhere that the

production of an object is due to the knowledge of that very

object.

V(4d) evamarthavidoditaprasastyasya’ pitikartavyatatvam

viddhvastam. yogyataya hi tasya tathirbhavah. na ca

preranotpattau s^abdakartrkiyam karanibhutajnaninugraha-

yogyata tasya s'akyate’vaganturn, purusakartrkayantu

pravrttau syat tasya yogyatavagamah, pras'aste purusanra-

vrttirdarsanat. sylmmatam. aprasaste purusapravrttyasa"n-

-bhave preranaiva nopapadyate. Tadasat. na phalasambha-

vayatta kriyanispattih, kriyinispattyayattaiva tu

phalasiddhiriti loke pratitam. ata eva tasminpakse

nisphale’pi preranasiddheh pravrttissyat. atha

phalamapltikartavyatipadanivesi, pris*astyavat,atastada-

-bhave na prerana nispadyate - iti. tarhi phalameva’

stvitikartavyatamsaparipurakam, kim prasastyena.

satyametad, asti tavad tadapiti na tyajyate. evam

tarhyasrute prasastye tadapeksa ma bhut. tatasca tadat -

- desldikalpanamaghatamanam kevalasya vidherdarvihoma-

vatkaranetikartavyatakalpana’pi kalpanamatrameva.

vidhlyako linadih karanam. NMV., p. 72.

 30-

darvihomavaditi c a ’siddho drstantah.

» * • *
ta t t r a ’oi

srautadravya - devati - smrtyacirapraptacamana-

ditikartavyatamatrenopakaraklpterabhimatatvat. nahy°kas-

-yaiva vastuno’nugrahakata, anugrahyata ca svatmanyupapa-

-dyate. atha s'abdah preranim karotyeva, pravrttistu na

tavanmitrena, kimtu tajjnane sati. evam tarhi jninaphala-

meva pravrttirastu, na preranaphalam, tasmin sati bhavat.

asati c a ’ bhavat. tatha ca na sabdabhavana vidhiriti

siddham.

"Thus the state of being the modus operandi of the prai'-

worthiness arising out of the corroborative statement(Arthavada}

is destroyed (disapproved). For, the knowledge of the

praiseworthiness may have that state of being that (i.e., modus

operandi) through compatibility. The compatibility for the

«

favour of the knowledge as being the instrument produced by the

words in respect of producing the inducement (prerana) cannot

be known. But that (compatibility) can be known if inclination

is admitted to be the action of a person. For, it is seen that

the persons are inclined to that (action) which is praiseworthy.

There may be view like this - ’there is no inducement in resnect

of the persons as the inclination of the persons to the

unpraiseworthy action is impossible. That is not true. For,

the accomplishment of an action does not depend on the possibi­

lity of the attainment of the result. But in common parlance,

it is known that the achievement of the result is through tn*

accomplishment of an action. Hence, according to that view.

 30b

even without the result, there may be indeoement and so, there

is the inclination of the persons also. If it is said that

like the praiseworthiness, the result also covers the word

’modus operandi’ and hence without the result, there will be no

Out
inducement. Then^ let the result beAthat completes the part

left by modus operandi. What is the use of praiseworthiness 0

Of course, it is true that there is result, yet it (i.e., the

praiseworthiness) cannot be avoided. Thus where the praisewor­

thiness is not heared (found), there should be no necessity for

it. Then the transference of details (Atides'a) of the

praiseworthiness will not be established and as a result like

Darvi homa, the assumption of the modus operandi of the

injunction will be an assumption only. It also cannot be said

that the example viz., like Darvi homa, is improper here. Por

even in the case of that (Darvi homa), the help (upakara)

served by the modus operandi in the form of sipping holy water

(Acamana) that comes as a custom (Acira) enjoyed ^smrti, the

> A

deities and sacrificial materials of the vedic sacrifices is

admitted. For, the stalt of being that which favours and the

state of that being favoured by one and the same object in

itself do not take place. The word does give rise to the

inducement of a person, but the inclination of a person to an

action does not depend on the inducement, but it is due to the

knowledge of the inducement. Thus let the inclination be the

result of the knowledge and not that of inducement. For, the

inclination takes place where there is the knowledge and not

 TT1

without the knowledge. Thus, it is established that the verbal

urge is not an injunction.’

In the V text viz.,‘evamarthavadoditapris'astyajrTahasyaoi .

....... ’ etc., Salikanltha discards the view that the know­

ledge of the praiseworthiness produced by the Arthavldas is the

Itikartavyata. According to the Mimamsakas, the Arthavadas are

authoritative as forming Ekavakyata (unitary passage or

syntactical unity) with a sentence including an injunction

leading to the impression that the thing enjoined (vidheya) is

praiseworthy. So, the function of the Arthavada vakyas is to

230
demonastrate the praiseworthiness of what is enjoined.^

Arthavada is-, according to the Prabhakaras, is as much

vedic text as the Vidhi itself as it also, like a Vidhi,

expresses the Karyata of certain actions. Although it is quite

true that according to the view of the Prabhakaras, the

Arthavada by itself cannot be expressive in the correct sense

of the term, yet this can be urged against only such Arthavadas

as are absolutely incapable of being construed with any injunc­

tion. Most of the Arthavadas, however, are actually found

capable of being syntactically connected with injunctions and

as such helping fey- the praise,the persuasive power of the

injunctive word, they serve a most useful purpose by expressing

231 -
the fitness of the act to be performed. The Bhattas say that

230
brahmanase^ascarthavadah. tasya vidheya prasastyapratitijana-
nadvara vidhivakyaikavakyatfayi pramanyamiti. MP.,p.2
231
PM.,pp. 122-23.
the knowledge of praiseworthiness arising out of the Arthavida

is the Itikartavyata of a sacrifice. Now what is Itikartavya­

ta ? The word ‘itikartavyata’ may be expounded as ’iti

kartavyam yasyah sa iti itikartavya; tasyah bhlvah itikarta■/-

yata’. So it means duty. Dr. Ganganath Jha in his works

"Prabhakara Mimamsa and Purvamlmimsa in its sources, has

translated the word ‘itikartavyata’ as details of procedure.

In common parlance, it is seen that the pravrtti of a

person is always towards the most praiseworthy one. But a view

may be there that the prerana does not, indeed, arise in

respect of a person as the pravrtti of a person is impossible

towards an unpraiseworthy action. Hence, due to the absence

of the Arthavida, there can be no preranl. But this view doe^

not stand to reason. For, the production of an action doe?

not depend on the possibility of the result. But we srae in

our daily life that the attainment of the result is due to the

accomplishment of an action. Hence, in view of the Bhattac

even at the failure of the person’s prerana, pravrtti to some

action may take place. If it is argued that like the

knowledge of the praiseworthiness, the result may also be

taken in the sense of Itikartavyata and as such due to the

absence of the result there can be no prerana of a person and

thus let the result complete the part played by the

Itikartavyata. What is, then the necessity of accepting the

knowledge of the praiseworthiness as the Itikartavyata ?

 4

It is correct. But though the result may be taken to complete

the part to be played by the praiseworthiness, yet the knowled­

ge of the praiseworthiness should not be excluded from the

range^Itikartavyati. Here an objection may again be raised

to where the praiseworthiness is not heard,meaning thereby the

context wherein the Arthavada is not clearly stated, the

Itikartavyata should not be there. As a result, the Atidesa

Staleyrumts
(transference of details) of the praiseworthy^cannot be assumed

and as such to assume the itikartavyati of the injunction only

will be only an assumption as in the case of Darvi homa.

In this present context, we like to write a few lines on

Atidesa (transference of details or extended application). In

the seventh chapter of the MS. Jaimini discusses the subject of

’AtidesV i.e., transference of details or extended application

of certain details from one action to the other. There are

many sacrifices with regard to which the veda does not prescrib''1

all the necessary details, but lays down simply that ’such and

such a sacrifice is to be performed in a manner similar to cuch

and such another*. This Atidesa or transference is a process

by which the details prescribed for one sacrifice are extended

and transfered to another sacrifice. For instance, with reoard

to the sacrifice called Isu - sacrifice, after having declared

its particular features, the vedic text declares that fthe rest

is like that of the syena-sacrifice’. In these cases, the

syena-sacrifice would be called the ’prakrti yaga’(Archetyo«)

and the Isu-sacrifice is called the *vikrtiyaga’ (Ectype).Thus

the transference of the Archetype (prakrti) to the Ectype

(vikrti) is what is called ’Atides'a’. SSlikana'tha, in the

Atidesaparayana prakarana of his Prakarana-pancika. has defi­

ned ‘Atides'a’ as rthat through which the Ectype becomes

connected with the details of the Archetypical sacrifice’ or as

‘the extension of the details of one sacrifice to another,when

there is no incongruity in such extension’. It has also be^n

stated that there is transference not only of Actions or

procedure but also of other sacrificial details such as subs-

232
tances and so forth.

In the V text above, we have a reference to Darvi homa

which is neither a prakrti yaga nor a vikrti yaga, but it i*

simply a sacrifice only. Here we can refer to a content of the

homa called ’vistospati* in the Tai.S. 3,4,10. There is vedic

sentence like ‘yadekaya juhuyat, Darvi-homam kuryat,

puronuvakyamanucya, yajyaya juhoti sadevatyaya iti’. The idea

of the sentence is - the callection of the mantras beginning

with ’asrlvayet etc.’ and ending with *astu srausat’ is

applied in the form of yajyi and ’Anuvakya’ and these ‘Yajya’

and ’Anuvakya’ are used in principal sacrifices. The homa

performed along with the principal sacrifices is the most

favourite to the deities. But the homa called Darvi ( i.e.,

* vyutkramenopakarena padarthglscaiva vaikrtailV

prakrtairvidhiranveti so*tidesasca sammataiy'atides'ah
praklarasya dharmanancaiva yujyate/ pp. Verse, 12 & 13'4,
p. 493.
 31

homa performed by the sacrificial spoon called darvi) does not

enjoy the same. As a result,it is not desired by the deities.

For, by simply uttering the mantra *Agnaye svahi’ without

doing 'asravana etc.’ i.e., ‘asravayet’ and lastu srausat’,•>the

oblation is offered by the sacrificial spoon called Darvi.

Again *one should offer oblation by a Darvi’ - according to

this Vidhi if the homa is performed without the mantras

‘asravayet’ and lastu srausat*, then it is called Darvi homa.

Hence ‘let there be no Darvi homa’ - by assuming this and

uttering the puronuvakya mantra viz., ‘vastosoataye pratijanihi*

one should offer oblation by the yajyi mantra called ‘vastosoa-

-taye sagmay^sagmaye svaha*. This being done so,because of its

being desired by the deities, it belongs to the deities.

Thus the offering of oblation with only one mantra oer-

formed by the word *juhoti* and by uttering the word ‘svaha’ is

called Darvi homa. These Darvi homas are neither prakrti yiaas

nor vikrti yagas of any homa or yaga nor both but like the

purusa of the samkhya system of Indian thought, it is Apurva.

Hence,the Darvi homas are Apurvas and without having the

233
itikartavyata.

233 -
vastospatihomavakya^ese ^ruyate -_’yadekaya juhuyit,darviao-
mam kuryat, puronuvakyamanucya, yajyayi juhoti sadeva1?yaya'
iti. asyayamarthah - asravayetyadirastusrausat ityant^h
mantrjsamghah ..... evan satyatra yadyekaya darvya juhuyat
tadanimasricvanadimantranamavakas'"abhavena darvihoma^syat.....
darvihoma ityucyante. te ca kasya’pi yagasya, homasya va
na prakrtayah, na vikrtayah na va prakrti-vikrtayo bhavanti.
TV., p.*115.
 31 ?

In this way, one cannot assume itikartavyata in case of

the injunctions only. It cannot also be said that the instance

of the DarvT homa in the present context of the discussion in

S'

the Vytti text above, is irrelevant. Thus Salikanatha refutes

^ — -

the view of the Bhattas that the Sabda Bhavana is the Vidhi.

V(4e) kinca s'abdo’mbaraguna iti, prlpyakSrindriya-vadina’

bhyuoeyam. anyathi nabhasassrautrabhutasya, s”abdasya

. . . .
ca praptyasambhavat samyoga-samavayoranyatarasya ca
A

praptirupatvlt, samyogasya’nyatara karmajasya.ubhayaker?

majasya, samyogasya ca dravyatve sati s^abdasya nabhac^

saha’sambhavat, tasya ca traividhyaniyamat,parisesyat

samavayah priptiriti, akasagunas's'abdah. na ca tasya

vyaparasambhavah,dravyisritatvadvyaparanam.

katham tarhi sabdasya’ bhidhiinalaksano vyapara

isriyate. yathi tattatha sruyatam - yattavadatmanyar-

thavisayajnanam sabdavisayajnanantaram jayate, tacchab-

* * A

dakartrkatayi yada vivaksyate, tada tadabhidhanikamity u -

cyate. parasthe’pi vyapare bhavatyeva kartrta,parisoanda

iva tmana iti, na kasciddosah.

kathanca’sau sabdavyaplra arthabHavanavisayah,

ekapratyayavicyatvat - iti

taduktaiin -

"vidhi-bKavanayoscaikapratyayagrahyata krtah.

dhatvarthiat prathamam tivat sambandho’dhyavasiyate".

(sl.vi.A.7.sl.79^, 30!4) Iti.

 ■i 15

tanna. pratyayasya bhavanabhidhanamasmin pakse du rq ’natarn

yatah.

"Moreover, sound as the attribute of ether should be

admitted by one who advocates the sense-organs effective on'y

when touched. Otherwise, because of the attainment of the

ether pertaining to the hole and that of sound being impossible,

because of attaining one of the two relations viz.,conjunction

and inherence and because of there being the impossibility of

the relation of sound with ether when sound is admitted as a

substance and because of there being three types of conjunction

viz., conjunction arising out of either of the action, arising

out of both of the actions and arising out of conjunction it­

self and at last there being the attainment of inherence, it is

admitted that sound is the attribute of ether. And of that

(sound) function is impossible. For, functions resort to the

substance.

How then the function in the form of denotation of wordr

is resorted to sound ? Please listen to how it occurs - the

knowledge that arises in the self relating to the meaning which

arises after the knowledge of the words, then it is stated as

being denotative. The agenthood does not take place even when

the function pertains to the other and like the function in the

case of the self, here is no fault.

Moreover, how this function of the word can be the object

of the objective urge (Artha Bhivani) ? It is because of its

being denoted by the same suffix. Therefore, it is said

"The injunction and urge are made to be known by the sam*

suffix. Prior to the meaning of the root, the relation between

these two is ascertained (SV, A. 7.79$$ and 80$$)". It is not

correct. For, it is not established in this view that the

suffix denotes the urge".

In the V text viz., ’kinca sabdo’mbaraguna iti ...... ’

etc., Salikanatha explains how Sabda can have no function. If

Sabda is admitted as a Guna or attribute then it cannot posses*^

function, because function always resorts to a Dravya

(substance). Even if it is accepted as a Dravya, then also it

cannot have function due to its being all-pervading.

In admitting the pravrtti of the persons as the Kirya of

Sabda, one of the causes is that the pravrtti or the persons

may be the Kirya of the Sabda when it has the function. But

here a question may arise as to whether there may be function

in the Sabda ? Before going to examine it is better to discuss

what a Sabda is;Whether it may be recognised as attribute or a

substance. The Naiyiyikas who contend that the sense-organs

become effective when touched by objects consider Sabda as a

attribute (guna) of ether and sense-organ of ears as the

holes in the form of ether. If Sabda as anjattribute and

akis'asya tu vijrfeyah sabdo vaisesiko gunah. BP., p.

sabdagunamakas'am. TS., p. 11.
Also, - srotram punah s'ravanavivarasamjnako nabho^des'ah.
PPB., p. 26.
sense-organ of ear in the form of ether are admitted, then

there will be no relation of Sabda with $ens°-oraan of °ar.

For, in this cas° there may be two tyoes of relation -

conjunction (Saniyoga) and inherence (Samavaya). If again

Sabda is admitted as a substance (dravya) then it will

have no relation with ether and as such there wil] e

inherent relation between this t^o. For, inherence cannot

take place in two substances without their oart and whole.

But Sabda and ^kasa are not admitted as having a rela-’on

of part and whole. Function (vyapara) due to its be inn in f

form of a Kriya, resorts to a substanc0 and not to aeattrib; t«^

Sabda being an attribute cannot have function (vyaoara). '''

In this context doubt may arise if it is admitted that

function (vyaoira) does not resort to nothing but th®

substance only and Sabda is an attribute and not a substanc-,

how then the denotative function (abhidhanavyaoara) is

possible in case of Sabda 0 Salikanatha solves the objection

raised by the oooonents by stating that the knowledge r^lat;n--.

to meaning is attained by the knowledge of the Sabda and that

is called as possessing denotation (abhidhanika) when it is

-
intended to be done by Sabda. So sabda can be taken as + • ••

cause of the meaning, because Sabda comes immediately be for®

236
the meaning and a cause always Dreceds the effect. Thouir
235 y ^
sabdo gunah,athava dravyamiti dvedha vikaJLoya,sabdasya
gupatvaoakse vyaoar^yattvam na ghatate. s'abdo na ^vyaoa’ravi
gunatvit ruoavadityayninam bodhyam. dravyatvaoakseo’ eVo'V'
na vyaparavan vibhutvadakasavadityanumanena sabdasya
vyaoarvattvam nopapadyata ityaha. FN.3 undcr VM, o. 42'-.
236 - - -
karyaniyataourvavrttih karanam. TS., o. 25.
the function (vyapara) resorts to other still it can have a ^ncv.

Though the movement rests in the elemental objects, vet thp

agenthood lies with the self. Hence, there will be no faul^

we admit that Sabda to which the function does not takejrt resort,

has denotativeness.

A question may again be raised as to how the functior of

Sabda (Sabda Bhavana) is related to the objective urge (Artha

Bhavana). If it is tried to solve this problem by saying that

because of their being denoted by the same suffix, the fun:t<on

s ^ ^
of Sabda (Sabda Bhavana) can be related to the objective urg®

(Artha Bhavana). The followers of Kumarila come forward to

pl ace or quote in support of their solution a verse from thr

vyakyadhikarana of the Slokavarttika of Kumirila(SV.7.79^ & dOK).

The idea of the verse in brief is this - Vidhi and Bhivani re

taken to be understood by one suffix only and the relation

between Sabda Bhavani and Artha Bhavani is held prior to thei

meaning of the verbal root (dhatu). Here it may be noted that

we have already stated that in view of the Bhlttas, Vidhi i'

Sabda Bhavana. The suffix that ascertains the relation bptween

the two Bhavanas is the vedic tLin’. But Salikanatha dor'

not accept this view of the Bhattas. He puts his argument bv

saying the suffix viz. *Lin’ cannot denote Bhavani, but ^purva.

237 - - - - _ _
vakyadhikarane varttikakarena dhatvarthatpra eva sabda-
bhavana*rthabhavanayossambandho bhavati. ekapratyayavacyat-
vena samina-bhidhanasruterityuktamityarthah. FN.4 und^r .
p. 424.
 31?

Thus Salikanatha rejects the view of the Bhattas that

knowledge of the praiseworthiness is the itikartavyata.

V(4f) nanu ca sarvakhyatanam bhavanavacanata karotisamanadhi-

karanyidadhyavasiyate. tathahi-bhavatyarthasya kartuh

prayojakavyaparo bhavana, saiva krtih. bhavyamanasyaiva

kriyamanatvat,tasya krtikarmatvlt. kimakarsit ? apakeit,

kim karoti pacati, . kim karisyati, paksati, iti

pras'nottaradarsanat, karotyarthassarvikhyatairabhi-

dhiyata iti gamyate. anyatha karotyarthavisayaorasne

taduttaranupapattih. tatra satyimapi prakrtau gharTantadi su

karotyarthanavabodhat, akhyitapratyayasannidhine ca

tadavagamat, akhyitinameva so’rtha iti nisciyate.

"It may be argued, the state of denoting the urge by all

the verbal forms is ascertained because of their being in

apposition with the verbal form ^karoti* (one does). For,the

stimulating activity of the agent of the verb *to be’ in the

sense of *bhavati’ (something or somebody exists) and that

(urge) is, indeed, the physical effort. For, only that which is

to be thought of, is to be done because of its being the object

of the physical effort. It is known that the meaning of the

verbal form (viz. karoti) is denoted by all the verbal form.

when we observe some questions and the replies thereto viz.,

what he did ? The reply thereto is - he cooked. What he will

do ? He will cook. Otherwise the aforesaid replies will be

inconsistent in respect of the questions regarding ‘karoti’

(one does). Though there is the verbal root (Dhatu), yet

because of the meaning of the verbal form ’karoti’ being not

understood in the case of the words formed with the suffixps

’Gharf’ etc. and because of it (i.e., the meaning of karoti)

being understood at the verbal form being in proximity, it is

ascertained that the meaning is of only the verbal forms.

In the V text viz., ’nanu ca sarvakhyatinam bhavanavaca-

nata ..... ’etc. as stated above, the author presents the

view of Mandana Misra, the staunch follower of Bhatta School,

who contends that all the Akhyitas (verbal forms) denote

Bhavani. In the present work we have already discussed Phavana.

As is rightly stated by Late Pt.A. Subrahamanya Sastri,Mandana

Mis^a in verse no. 27 of his Bhavanivlveka, deals with the

238 _ _ _
present issue under discussion. The word ’samanadhikaranya’

means bearing the same meaning. Bhavani is the stimulating

activity towards a course of action which is to take place.

Bhavana is the krti which means the physical effort of the

Agent. The word ’karoti* denotes *krti*. All the Akhyatas

denote the meaning of ’karoti*. To get a reply from a oerson,

one must start a question with ’karoti*. For instance, when

one puts a question like lkim karoti*, the reply will be

’pacati’, ’janati’ etcv leaning thereby the question is star­

ted by a verbal form with the suffix ’Tin*.

mandanamisrairbhavaniviveke sarvakhyatinam bhavanavac^tva-

ciivamuktam (verse no. 27) FN.5 under pp., p. 424.

The verse is -
anekirthatvamanyiyyam tenaikidhikaranyatah/ karotina
tinantesu bhavabhedo’numiyate^ BV under MK.,p. 3042.
 According to Mandana, the meaning of the verbal form

*karoti* cannot be understood when it is formed by the krt

suffixes *Ghan’ etc. For instance, when the suffix * G h a n ’ is

added to the dhatu *pac’f the form will b e ' pakah’ and aj, such

the meaning of 'karoti* cannot be attained from it.

It m a y be mentioned here that the term ‘Akhyata’ in the

V text above refers to the verb with lT i h ’ suffix. For example,

karoti, gacchati, pacati etc.

According to the v ie w of the Mimamsakas, the Akhyata i=

239
the most important part of a sentence.

The followers of Kumarila contend that the Akhyata is

common to all the ten tl a k a r a s ’ i.e., moods and ten s e s .Akhyata

is one of the two ways by which a vidhivikya performs its

function. The other way by which a vidhivikya performs its

function is the optative mood and because of its being a verb

it denotes the Arthi Bhavana consisting in pravrtti of a

240
person.

Ramanujacarya also takes this issue of Bhavanavacanata

of the Akhyatas as held by Mandana. But his exposition is

<T — —
easier than that of Salikanatha. Ramanuja explains the wort

‘samanadhikaranya’ in the text of the V M above, as

239 _ _
karmapradhanam kriyapradhanamityarthah - PR., p. 69.

Also - vakyam tadapi manyante yat padam caritakriyam.

Vi.P.11.326.
240 _ , _ _
tattrakhyatatvam sarvalakarasadharanam tadavacchedena
Linpratyayah purusapravrttirupamirthabhavanam pratioadayati.
MP.,pp. 51-52.
 - -n

bearing the same m e a n i n g . H e also discards the view of

Mandana and supoorts. the vie w of Prabhakara.

Madhavacarya also contends that the Akhyitas denote

_ a v t

Bhavana and all the Akhyitas is connected with the sense of ?he
a

verbal form ‘'karoti* and this is what is called Bhivana, ^11

242
the verbal forms are expressed by ‘ka r o t i ’. In the commentary

called ’V i s t a r a ’ by him on the Jaiminiyanyayamali, states more*

clearly that the sense of ® k a r o t i ’ applies to any verbal form.

For instance, when there is the verbal form ’pa c a t i ’, we

understand the meaning as cpakam karoti’ ( he performs the talk

of cooking). Thus the meaning of ’gacchati’ is to be taken

ganam karoti . The verbal form *p a c a t i ’ may be used as

A JA

•pakah’, ‘paktih*, ‘paca n a m ’.

In this manner, Salikanatha presents the Mand a n a ’s

concept of the Akhyata - as denoting Bhavana.

V(4g) tadasat. kirn karotityasya prasnasya yadyayamarthah-

yat karoti, tat kimiti, tatra cet pacatityuttaram syit,

tada pakam karotityasminnarthe pacatiti varttate. tat ha

ca siddhyedakhyatinim karotyarthata. na caitadevam.

1 samanadhikaranyarfcaikarthanimittam. T R . , p. 45

242 - _
dhatvarthavyatirekena bhavana neti cenna tat.
sarvadhatvarthasambandhah karotyartho hi bhavana. JNM, P2JLL6.
•■pacati’ ityukte *pakam k a r o t i ’ ityetamartham sarve janah
pratiyanti. tatra pakah , paktih pacanamityetaih
sabdairvyavahriyanano iingakarakasamkhyayogyo dhatvarthah
siddhasvabhavah. ’karoti* ityanena vyavahriyamano
sidhyasvabhavah - Vistara under Ibid., p. 71.
 anava/gate hi dhatuvicye vyaparavisese.tadvisesa eva -

evam prcchyate, tatra pacatityuttaram. tatha ca na

_ t-ic _ _ _
siddhyati dhatvarthariktakarotyartha vacanata khyatanarr.

sarve dhatvarthasca kasyacidabhufcasya tfbhavane’nukul atarr

bhajantah karetyarthajtamipannah karotina prastum, nirdes-

tunca sakyanta iti, tadvisesaprasnottare eva t e . kinra

— — «. , h
dhatu»acyaparavisesavisayatvena’pi prasnottarayoiiu-
• * fi

papattau, tadatiriktakarotyarthavicakata’ khyatanam na

sakyate vak.tuim

api ca saprayatnakriyesu devadattadisu vyapara-

bhedisambhavat ghatetam prosnottare. vyatirikta-

karotyarthavisaye ‘kim karoti’ti prasne, •gacchati’+i

cottare gamanatiriktavyipiribhavldanupapattireva syat.

dhiatvarthavisesavisayatve tu tatra’oyupapattih. atha

tatripi dhatvarthavyatirik^tavyapirlsaihbhavanna-

nupapattih. tanna. parispandasyaiva gamivicyatvat.

tathahi - na kevalam samyoge, vibhage/K va gameh prayer-nh

sthlnau syenena viyuktte, samyukj-itfce v a ’prayogat. n a ’ci

dvayoh, utpattyanipatite syene sthanau prayogaprasahaat.

eka-kriyavlcya, kimasavupadhikotau nivesyate. evam

hyupadhisamisrayagauravameva parihrtam bhavati.

api ca vrddhavyavaharacchabdarthanirnayah. na ca’khy-ta-

- naiin bh'avanavacanatvamantarena kasyacidvrddhavyavaharasyV

nupapattih. prashottare tu sambandhajnanottarakilahbavirv.

ato na tadvasena sambandhinirupani. kartrldisamkhya-

- matravicitayV^khyitaprayogopapattau , na’dhikam vacyam

 sakyam kalpayitum. api ca "pakam karoti devadattah"

ityatra tavatpacyartham pakasabdo braviti,tadanugu-

qantu purusaprayatnam karotiricaste, 'akyatantu

kevalakartrsamkhyam vaktiti, siddham tanmatravacitvam.

ato’nyatripi tatraiva vartata iti yuktam. evam‘oacati

devadattah’ ityasya yadvivaranam - pakam karotiti.

tadapyanupannam. pacatityatra yah purusaprayatnah,

yatsambandhena pacyarthassadhyabhutah, tarn karotina

prakrtibhutenopadaya vivaranopapatteh. yatra’oi

‘ratho gamanam karoti’ na prayatno’paro'sti, tatra’

- pi gamanasya sadhyatim darsayitum, gaunah karotiprayooo

drastavyah. paksadvaye’pi tulyatvat.

"That (view ) is incorrect. What it is that he doe? -

although this is the meaning of the question what he does, if

in that case, the reply is (he) cooks then (he) cooks is there,

in the sense of (he) does cooking. Likewise, the meaning o-

(he) does will be applicable to all the verbal forms. But nis

is no so. For, when the particular function denoted by the

verbal root is not known and likewise if it is asked with

reference to its particularity, then the reply thereto will be

(he) cooks. And as a result, it will not hold good that the

verbal forms denote the sense of (he) does which is other than

the meaning of the root. And the meanings of all the roots

give rise to certain meaning in the form of lbeing’ and thus

they mean certain things to be questioned and directed by

means of the verbal form (he) does. Moreover, it cannot be

 'X

said that even in the case of obtaining the questions and recites

as the particular object of the function denoted by thexerbal

root, the verbal roots denote the meaning additional to that

(i.e. verbal root) viz., (he) does.

Again let there be question and reply regarding the

activities done by Devadatta etc. with physical effort, because

of there being the possibility of difference in respect of the

operation. In the question, what does he do ? which is with

regard to the meaning other than that of *(he) does’ and in

the reply as well as the form (he) goes (gacchati) there will be

inconsistency due to the absence of the operation other than

,going* (gamana). But it will be consistent if it refers to the

particular meaning of the verbal root. Again if it is said that

conjunction and disjunction constitute the meaning of the verbal

root and the movement is the meaning of the suffix, then also

there will be no inconsistency because of there being the

possibility of the arising out of functions other than the

meaning of the verbal root. That is not correct. For, that

which movement is denoted by the verbal root *to go’ (gam).

Thus - the verbal root ‘to go’ is used not only in the case of

connecting something nor disconnecting the same. For, it is

not used when the hawk is away from the pillar or when it is on

the pillar. It is also not used in respect of the both,because

of the use in respect of the pillar when the hawk flys and then

sits on the pillar. If it is said that the conjunction and

disjunction made by single action in a moment is expressed by

«
 i .-'A

the verbal root *to go* (gam). Then let the verb be expressed

and why it is included in respect of the limiting adjunct

(upadhi). Thus the prolixity relating to the limiting adjunct

stands avoided.

Moreover, the meanings of words are determined by the

usage of the elderly persons. There will be no inconsistency

in respect of any usage of an elderlyjfjerson without the

denotation of the urge by the verbal forms. But the question^

and replies take place at a time subsequent to knowing the

relation. Hence, the ascertainment of the related is not

subject to that (verbal form). In the case of the obtainment

of the use of the verbal form as denoting the number only o r

the agent etc. nothing more can be assumed (from the verbal

form). Moreover, in the expression *Devadatta does cookinc’

(pakam karoti Devadattah), the word *cooking’ (pakah) denotes

the meaning of the verbal root *pac’ (to cook), but the verba!

form *karoti’ (one does) denotes the physical effort of the

agent, which is conducive for *"cooking’. But the verbal form

denotes only the number of the agent and as such it is esta­

blished that the verbal form denotes that much only (i.e. the

number of the agent). Therefore, it is correct that in other

cases also, the verbal form denotes the number of the agent.

Thus, the explanation of the expression,*Devadatta cooks’

(pacati Devadattah) as (he) does cooking (pakam karoti) is

inconsistent. For, that which is the physical effort of the

agent in respect of (he) cooks (pacati) because of the

 relation of that meaning of the verbal root ‘to cook* (pac) to

be made out is denoted by the verbal form ‘does’ (karoti).Hven

where in the expression like "the charriot does moving"(ratho

gamanam karoti), there is no other effort of the agent, the

secondary use of ‘does’ (karoti) is to be noted as for showing

the state of being made out of ‘going’ (gamana). For, equal

is the position in respect of both the views’.

In the V text viz., ‘tadasat kirn karoti ......... ’etc.,

Sllikanatha refutes the view of Mandana MisSa who contends

- - - 244
that all the Akhyatas denote Bhavana. According to Mandana,

in order to get a reply, one must put a question beginning with

the verbal form ‘karoti’ (one does). For instance, in order to

get the verbal form ‘pacati’ in reply, the question should to

put in the form of ‘kirn karoti*? (What does he do ?). Thus the

state of all the Akhyatas as denoting the Bhavani is ascertai-

- ned because of their being in apposition with the Akhyata viz.,

•karoti’. In other words, in the view of Mandana, the meaning

of the verbal root viz., ‘karoti’ is denoted by all the verbal

forms. But Salikanatha argues that the verbal forms do not

denote the sense of ‘karoti’ which is other than the meaning of

the Dhatu. The meaning of all the Dhatus again give rise to

certain meaning in the form of ‘being’ and thus they mean

certain things to be questioned and directed by means of the

verbal form viz., ‘karoti’.

In the V text again, Salikanatha contends that there

may be questions and replies in the case of the actions

 3:

performed by the persons with proper effort because of ther^

being the possibility of difference in respect of the func­

tions. But in the case of a question like 'kirn karoti’(what

he does b), if the reply is ‘gacchati’, then there will be

inconsistency because of there being no additional operation

to *gamana’ (going).

Moreover, Silikanitha states that as the meanings of

words are determined by means of vrddhavyavahara, there will

no inconsistency in the case of any usage of an elderly person

without the denotation of Bhavana by the Akhyatas. It is

because, says Salikanitha, the Akhyitas denote only the number

of the agent and as such they denote nothing more than that viz.

the number of the agent. As for instance, in the sentence,

•pakafn karoti Devadattah* (Devadatta does cooking), the word

‘paka* denotes the meaning of the Dhitu viz., *pac’ and tne

Dhatu viz., *kr’ denotes the physical effort and the Akhyat?

viz., ‘karoti’ denotes the number of the agent. Thus accord5no

to Salikanatha, the Akhyitas denote the number of the agent and

not the BhavanI as contended by Mandana.

V(4h) yastu - "davadatta odanam pacati’tyadau vrddhavyavahara*

eva prakrtyarthatirikt/te prayatne prayogidikhyatanam

tadarthatamaha. sa ittham siksayitavyah - vatsa 1 kirn na

vetsi "ananyalabhyas-sabdarthah" iti. iha ca

prakrtyarthaksepena’pi prayatnapratipattyuoapatteh, na

sakyate tadvicakatikhyatinamisrayitum - iti.

 "But he who speaks of (contends) that in the express­

ion like "Devadatta cooks rice" in the usage of the elderly

persons, because of there being the use of the verbal form n

respect of the physical effort additional to the meaning oi

the stem, the verbal form denotes the meaning of the urge, hr>

should be taught like this - oh . child, d o c n ’t you know th«=>

maxim which states that "the meaning of a word is to be

obtained from no other source than the word itself". And her^

even beaause of acquiring the knowledge of the physical effort

even through the implication of the meaning of the stem, the

state of being that which denotes cannot be admitted in

respect of the verbal forms".

In the V text viz., ryastu - "Devadatta .......... ,<atc.

the author of the V M presents the view of Mandana and then

the author refutes the same. According to Mandana in the

expression like fDevadatta edanam pacati* (Devadatta cooks

rice), the verbal root viz., * p a c ’ gives rise to the knowledge

of the physical effort. Hence, Akhyata denotes, in addition t

the meaning of the stem, the Bhavana. But Salikanatha does no

accept this v iew of Mandana and so he reminds Mandana of the

principle of MimamsI according to which the meaning of a word

is to be attained from no other source other than the word

itself. In other words, the power of a word is to be admit red

in such a meaning that cannot be attained by means of inmlica­

tion. Thus the physical effort is to be understood from the

 3/:>

verbal root lpac’ and not from the Akhyita a* Mandana asser-s.

Mandana asserts this because of the fact that in his view.ali

the Akhyatas denote Bhlvana. But Salikanatha because of his

admitting Karya as the vakyartha, cannot accept the view or

Mandana.

V(4i) nanu prabhikara api bhavanivacakatam na kathamakhyati-

pratyayasyecchanti. ucyate - na sarvakhyatapratyayinam

bhavanavacanatvamabhyupemah , kihtu kiryibhidhayino

li’
nadayah karyasya nyatha’nabhidhanit krtyabhidhiyinn

isyante. krtisambandhi hi karyam krtyanabhidhine na’

bhihitam syat. nahyasti sambhavah, krtisca na.bhidhi-

yate, karyanca’bhidhiyate - iti.

atha matam. yatha dandityatra pratyayena dando na’bhi­

dhiyate, atha ca tadvisistaourusapratitih , evamihap'

bhavediti. tanna. tatra’pyapratite dande, na tadvati

pratyayah. asti ca tatra prakrtibhuto dandas'abdah, a

ca tasya pratyayayitl. na ceha tathi sambhavati,

prakrtinlm purusavyaparabhidhinaniyamat. puruso hi

cetanah kiryam linadibhiravabudhyate. na ca’sau

parakrtisambandhi svayam karyam boddhumalamiti,

tadiyakrtyabhidhanamesitavyam. tasya ca krtih orayatnar-

-upi.na ca sarvathi tadananubhave tadabhidhiyioa iti, na

dandinylyasya’yam visayah. syinmatam. yathi liham

kartridisamkhyamatravacanatl, kriyaksepena ca

kartridinam pratitih. tathe’hapi kriya prayatnamaksinat

 m3 bhuttasya linvacyati iti. tadasat. yadyapi

prakrtyarthabhutaya kriyaya prayatna aksipyatej

t a t h a ’pi tadayattasiddhikataya kathamapurvam gamyate.

prayatnabhidhana tadavacchinnatayi pratiyamanam

tadayattasiddhikamavagamyate, n a ’nyatha. na ca

krtyanavaccchinnasvarupamaitrena’purvamabhihitam krtime-

- kseptumalam. avagatasambandham hi vastviksipyate. na

ca sabdamantarene’purvasya prayatnasambandhavagame

karanamasti. atah katham tat prayatnamiksioet.

tasmadapurvakaryabhidhayinim prayatnabhidhanamava^vama-

- srayaniyamitj/, visayakaraniye nipunataramupa-

-paditamityalamatiprasangena.

"It may be argued why the followers of Prabhakara also

do not desire (admit) the verbal forms as the state of being

the denoters of the urge ? (it is ) said - we do not admit a l l

the verbal forms as denoting the urge, but the Lins etc. that

denote the performable are desired (admitted) as denoting the

effort because of the performable not being denoted otherwise.

Again for, the performable relating to the effort stands

denoted in the case of the effort is not denoted.

There may be v i e w (like this ) - As in the case of the

word ’Dandi* (a person with a stick), the stick is not denoted

by the suffix, yet is the knowledge of a person qualified by

that (i.e. possessed of a stick)j so also is the case with the

present context. That is not correct. In that case also it

the stick is not known, then there will be no knowledge of a

person having that (stick). Moreover, there is the word

’Danda’ that is the stem and that is the conveyor of that

of the meaning of the word Danda). But here, it is not possi­

ble, for, there is no rule that the stems denote the function

of a person, for, the person being a sentient being understands

the performable by the suffixes ’Lin* etc. Again there is no

need on his part to know that his own Karya as being related

to other’s effort and as such the denotation of the effort of

his own is to be noted. And his effort is in the form of

right effort. It cannot also be said that without the denota­

tion of related, it (the effort) is denoted. And this is not

a subject ( to be covered) by the analogy of the maxim of(the

word Dandi). There may be view (like this ) - just as the

’Lin’ etc. denote the number of the agent etc. and the agent

etc. can be known by the action, so also in the present

context the action implies the effort and so let it not be

denoted by the suffixes ’Lins’ etc. But this does not hold

good. Though the effort is implied by the verb being the stem,

yet how the unseen potency is understood as its attainment is

dependent on that (effort). In the case of the denotation of

the effort, its meaning which is known as related to it and

which is attained as dependent on it can be known and not

otherwise. Moreover, the unseen potency is not canable of

implying the effort, as it (the unseen potency) is denoted only

by the nature as not being related to the effort. An object is,

indeed, implied when its relation is known. And there is no

cause in respect of understanding the relation of the unseen

 potency with the effort without a word. How, then that(unse»n

potency) implies the effort. Hence, it should be admitted

that those (i.e., Lins etc.) that denote the unseen Dotency,

the performable necessarily denote the effort and it is more

ably presented in the visayakaraniya (prakarana of the

Prakarana-pancika) and hence, it is needless to elaborate the

context’.

In ’nanu prabhakari api........... ’ etc. of the V

text above, Salikanatha presents the view of the Prabhlkara^

that the suffix Lins etc. that denote the performable also

denote the physical effort. According to them, the performablp

related to the physical effort does not come to be denoted in

the case of the physical dffort being not denoted. It cannot

be said that while the krti is not denoted, the Kirya is

denoted. In other words, it may be said that without the kr*i

being denoted, the Karya also cannot be denoted.

In the V text again, Salikanitha also discards another

view according to which in the case of the word ’Dandi’ (i.c .,

a person with a stick), ’Danda’ is not denoted by the suffix

but the person with a stick is denoted. According to Salika-

-natha this view is not proper, because if the Danda (stick) is

not known, then there can be no knowledge of the person

characterised by the Danda and also there will be no knowledge

of the suffix ’vati’ in the sense of having the stick. Again,

there is the word ’Danda’ which is being in the stem and at

the same time it conveys the meaning of the word ’Danda’. But
in the present context in the case of the use of the verbal

forms ’pacati’ and ’yajeta* etc., this is not the same. Iti,
because, there is no rule that the verbal roots viz., *pac’

and ’yaj’ etc. denote the function of the person. The person

as a sentient being, understands the Karya by means of the

Lins etc.

The example of Danda and Dandi as stated in V text

above, is found in Sabaras Bhasya. There in the Bhasya,Sahara

states that without the visesana, the visesa cannot be known.

In the V text again, Salikanatha also refutes another

view. According to this view, the suffixes Lins etc. denote

the number of the agent and the agent etc. can be known by the

Kriyi and thus in the present context as the KriyS implies -jhe

krti, so it should not be denoted by the suffixes Lins etc. 'ut

Salikanatha is not prepared to accept this view. He contends

that though the krti is implied by the Kriya, yet Apurva cannot

be understood, because the attainment of the Apurva depends on

the krti. This issue is discussed at length by Silikanitna in

the Visayakaraniya- prakarana of the ftrakarana-pancika.

V(4h) tatra na kriyimatram tavadaham buddhvi pravrttah.na’ci

phalamatram, na kriyaphala3ambahdhamitram va. kriyi -

phalayossadhya-sadhanativagame’pi na pravrttiruoaoanyate.

satyam dandasabdena dapdo nabhidhiyate,nanvaoratite dande

dandipratyayo’sti, asti tu dandi sabdaikades'abhuto
danf-iasabdahj yena dandah pratyjyitah. tasmat sadhu etat.yat
pratite vi’sesane visistah pratiyate iti.SB under MS.1.3.33.
 0 ^0

trptihetau bhojane’tlte, vartamane va’nravrtteh,

bhavisyatyapi tatsidhane samudravidakhyata iva’nusthana-

bhavit. purusasayivagamastu pravrttihetutvena ’sankito’

ni,

svatantrapravrttau vyutpitsordurotsiritatvat. kintu

karyatam buddva pravrtto’hara, mamedam karyamiti pratitva-

aham sarvartra pravrttah.

tatha’hi -

K(5&6) astim tavat kriya loke gamanagamanadiki

antatasstanyapanadistrptikarinyaoi kriya

sa yavanmama karyeyamiti naiva’vadharyate

tivat kadipi me tatra pravrttirabhavanna hi.

"There (in respect of action) knowing not only the a^t

nor only the result nor again the relation between the act and

the result, I was inclined (to the very act). Even in the c k f

of understanding the relation of that what is to be made out

(Sidhya) and the means in respect of the action and the result,

inclination( of a person) does not take place; for, there

no inclination in the past or at present in the case of eating

which is the cause of satisfaction, even in future, its m^ans

being there as in the ease of the verbal forms used by an

astrologer. But the knowledge of the intention of the person

even though apprehended as the cause of inclination, the lear­

ner to driven away in the case of the inclination being at hi =

command. But by way of understanding the performability, I

was inclined (to some action ) and thus having known this ac my

performable, I am inclined everywhere (i.e.,in all actions). So.

says (the author) -

 Let there be, in common parlance, the actions like goino

and coming. But at least, so long as the action like the

sucking of milk (from mother’s breasts) etc. although capable

of giving satisfaction are not understood as my oerformable,

there will be no inclination of mine in resoect of that

(action).’

In ’tatra na kriyamatram tivadaham ........ ’ etc. a^d

’astlm tavat kriyi loke .......... ’etc. of the V and K tex^s

respectively above, Salikanatha states how a oerson is

inclined to action or in other words, it may be said - ,

knowing what the pravrtti of a person to an action takes ol'1

Salikanatha contends that a person is not inclined to action

by knowing the kriya only or only the phala or only the

relation of the two (viz., the kriya and ohala). The pravrtti

of a oerson does not occur even in resoect of knowing the

relation of Sadhya and Sadhana from the action and the resu 1

resoectively. But on the other hand, the pravrtti of oerson

to certain acts takes place from the knowledge of the karyari.

In other words, a person prior to his pravrtti to some act,

must have the knowledge like - ’This is my Karya’. This i?

clearly explained by Salikanatha in the KS above, It is

stated there (viz., in the above two K texts) that although

there may be actions like ’gamana* and ’igamana’, yet so lonq

as the actions like the sucking of milk from mother’s bre=>ctc

though gives satisfaction to the child are not understood a^

this performable (i.e., this is my Karya), the pravrtti of

child to that act will not take place.
/
Thus Salikanatha asserts that the knowledge of the

karyati is the cause of the pravrtti of a person to action.

V(5&6) atra’para aha. satyam - karyavagamadev pravrttih.

istasadhanataiva tu karyati, na pari kacit, saiva

pravrttiheturvidhirucyate.

tadata-

’apeksitooayataiva vidhiristo mani^ibhih/

ato hydhyavasayadirna’kasmanni'bhidhanatah’/ x

(B.S.Ka.3.,103^,104'/,p,115) iti.

tathi -

’pumso nestabhyupayatvat kriyasvanyah pravartakah/

pravrttihetum ca dharnca pravadanti oravartanam.’//

(V.V. SI.26, p. 243) iti.

karturistabhyuoaye hi kartavyamiti lokadhih /

viparite tvakartavyamiti tadvisaye tatah //

(V.V. si. 30., p. 302) iti ca.

tatra tavadidameva vaktavyam. atitasya, vartamanasya

cestasadhanati" sti, na ca tat karyataya"vasiyate.

tena’nya karyati, anya cestasadhanati - iti

"Here (in this context) some other (thinker) states -

(it is) true (that) only from the knowledge of the oerformanl

there arises the inclination (of a person to an action). Pot

the achievability of the desired object (Istasidhanata) is,

indeed, the performable and nothing other, only that (i.a.,

the achievability of the desired object) is (called) the cans

 3

of inclination (and) that is called the injunction. So (he

says -

"The achievability of the desired object is, indeed,

desired (stated) by the thinkers as the injunction. Hence,

the physical effort etc. cannot be known from that

(achievability of the desired object) nor from the denotation

(by the Lins etc.)".

£"BS.103^t 10454, p. 115.7

Moreover -

" Because of there being the means ( of attainina thc>

desired object), there is nothing like that makes (one)

incline to actions in respect of the persons and (the thinkers

state moral duty (Dharma) and inducement (pravartana) as th-*

cause of inclination".

c V.V. 26, p. 243 J

(Again) -

"For , it is in resoect of what is the means of

(attaining) the desired object that there is the poDular

knowledge viz., ’this is to be done*. But contrary to that

(i.e. , in respect of what is not desired), there will be the

popular knowledge, viz., ’this is not to be done’ reaardino

that".

£W . 3 0 , p. 302 _ 7

There (in that context) it is, indeed, to be stated.

There is the achievability of the desired object in resoect

 3 ' •

of the actions (done) in the past and at the present, but tha+

(i.e., the achievability of the desired object) is not ascer­

tained as the performability. Hence, performability is one

thing and achievability of the desired object is also another

thing,’

In the V text viz,, *atra* para aha .............’ etc.

above, Salikanltha presents the view of Mandana Misra and

then he refutes the same. The word ’apara* in the V text

refers to Mandana Misra. According to him, the karyata of the

Prabhakaras is nothing but the Istasadhanata as held by him.

Thus Mandana makes no difference between kiryata and Tstasadha

nata is the cause of the pravrtti of a person to an action and

not the karyata. In support of his assertion, Mandana quotes

a verse from his work Brahmasiddhi« The verse viz.,

’apeksitopayataiva ......... * etc, states that Istasadhanata

is accepted by the thinkers as the Vidhi which is, according

to Mandana, the cause of the pravrtti of a person to an a c t :on

The word ’apeksitooayata’ in the said verse is used as a

synonym of ’Istasadhanata’. The word *ato’ in the said vn r

is found as ’t a t o ’.^4 ^

In another verse viz., ’pumso ....... 'etc. stated

above, Mandana states that Dharma and Pravartana are also tn^

causes of the pravrtti of a person to an action. There is no

other Pravartaka (i.e., that which makes one incline to an

246
Vide, B S . , p. 415
action) in respect of the actions

Again in another verse viz.,*karturistabhyupaye hi ...

.... * etc., Mandana contends that the knowledge viz., ’thir

to be done’ etc. arises only in respect of there being the

Istasadhanata.

In the portion of the V text viz., ’tatra tavadidam^va

v a k t a v y a m ......... ’ etc. above, Salikanatha refutes the v-'^w

of Mandana. Salikanatha states that although there is the

IstasadhanatS in respect of the actions of the past and the

present, yet that Istasadhanata is not ascertained as the

Karyata. Thus Silikanatha shows’ the difference between the

Karyata and the Istasadhanata and thereby rejects Mandana’s

assertion that both these are one and the same. In subseau-nt
«•**

pages we shall find Salikanatha showing the difference betw^n

the Kiryata and the Istasadhanata.

tathi pravrttirapi tanmatrivagamayatti na bhavatityu-

peksyaiva tavat tam, phalasadhanata - karyatayorbh*3

vinirdisati -

"Likewise, the inclination also does not occur only in

respect of there being that (i.e., achievability of the

desired object) and so (it arises) without caring for that

(i.e., achievability of the desired object) and therefore,

(the author) shows the difference between the achievability of

the desired object and the performability*-

K(7&8^). phalasidhanati nama yl sa naiva ca karyatay/karyat;

krtisadhyatvam phalasidhanati punai^ karanatvam

phalotpade bhidyete te parasparam^

"That which is known as the achievability of the

desired object is not indeed, the performability. Performed -

lity is what is brought about by the physical effort and the

achievability of the desired object is again the instrumenta­

lity in respect of the production of the result (i.e. the

desired object) and (thus) both (i.e. the achievability of the

desired object and the performability) differ from each otoe’.’

V (7) yadyapjiyekavastunivesiti dvayoh, tathi’pi

svarupabhedo’styeva. tadeva hi vastu phalam oratyu-

payabtiavat phalsadhanamityucyate, krtyadhinat

malabhataya|ca karyamiti.

"Although these two (i.e. achievability of the desired

object and performability) have the single object as their

substratum, yet there is, indeed, difference in respect of tnei-

own nature. That very object because of its being the means or

the desired result, is called the achievable of the desired

object and because its being dependent on the physical effort

for the self-attainment, (it is called) the performable.’

In ’phalasadhanata nama .............. ’etc. and

’yadyapyekavastunivesiti ........... * etc. of the K and V text

respectively above, the author shows the difference between

phalasidhanati or Istasadhanati and Karyata. At the first line

 0.-1 o

of the k (7) above, the author states that the phalasidhanar.i

is different from Karyata though according to Mandana Mis’ll

they are not so. Karyata as stated by Salikanatha is that

which is made out (i.e. brought about ) by krti. But

phalasidhanata is, says Silikanatha, the intrumentality in

resoect of producing the result (i.e., the desired object)and

thus these two differ from each other.

It may be said here that although both phalasidhanata

and Karyata aim at a single object, yet they have difference

in respect of their own nature. That object because of its

being the means of producing the desired object (i.e,, the

result) comes to be known as the phalasidhana or Istasadhana

or comes to have the phalasidhanati. But that object because

of its attaining the result by means of krti comes to be know,

as Kirya or comes to have the Karyati. Thus Salikanatha

presents the difference between Dhalasidhanata and Kiryata.

kimitistabhyupayesveva kartvyatavagamah, anyatra

netyatra’ha - —

-Is it that the knowledge of the performability arisen

in respect of the instrumentalities of the desired object and

not in respect of other ? So, (the author) says here* -

K(8^&9) . kintu svayam klesarupam karma yatkaryatam vrajet.

phalasadhanata tatra karanam tena kiryati.

tadbhivabhavini nityam tadi saiva prakis^ate.

 "But that the action by itself being in th« form o’

labour attains the state of being the performability i<; du ’ t-o

its being instrumentality of the desired object and as such

the performability manifests always as being the action".

V(8^ & 9) svabhavena hi karmlni dukhotpadahetubhutlni. tesu

karyatvavagamah phalasadhanatavagamanibandhanah.

kiryata hi na krtyadhinasiddhitamatrarupa, kihtu

krtim prati pradhanabhutam sat yat tadadhinasattak rn,

tatkaryamucyate. tacca krteh hradhanam,yadadhikrt /a

b
krtih pravartate. na ca duhkham dukhahetum v a ’

dhikrtya krteh pravrttirupapannl, n a ’pyaduhkham,

aduhkhahetum va. kihtu sukham sukhahetum va. tatra

na tivat svayam sukharupam karma, sukhasidhanama^i

cenna syat, na tasya krtim prati pridhanyivagamo

ghatate. atah karmasu karyatvavagamah phalasadhana-

tivagama-nibandhana iti* jnapakakotinivista

phalasadhanata karyatamanurudhyate, na tvasau tad v -

maiva. tathi ca’ sadhanasyipi sukhasyaivi’sti kiryata

sukham hi sarvah karyataya’vaiti, na tasya phalasi iha-

natimareksate. tena phalasadhanatottirna-

karyatavagamena me pravrttiriti niscitya, vyutnit*ama-

nascaitram oravartamanam drstva’numinoti - caitro'oi

karyabodhat pravartate iti. caitrasya oravrttih -

dharmini, karyabodha-purvika - iti sadhyo dharmah.

buddhinurvakatve sati pravrttitvanmadiyaoravrtt^ v *1-i td

linadayasca pravrttihe tubhiutarthabhidhayinah karyam^v?

 342

-bhidadhate. tasyaiva’vagatasya oravrttyanantara-

klranatvat.

iccha yadyapi pravrttihetuh, tathapi si lihadivacy-

na bhavati. tadavagamasya pravrttivanapeksitatvat,

utpanna hi sa oravrttikaranam, nl ’vagata.

"For, actions by nature are such that they give ri

to the (physical) pain. The knowledge of the performability

in respect of the actions is the basis of the knowledge of tha

instrumentality of the desired object. Because performability

is not only in the form of attainment,dependent on the physical

effort, but that which being the principal (element) toward'

the physical effort becomes dependent on the result is called

the performable. And that (performable) is the princioal

(element) in resoect of the physical effort on which the

physical effort takes place. It is proper (to say) that the

physical effort does not take place in respect of oain or t rv

cause of pain or in resoect of the absence of the cause of p a i n

but (takes place) in respect of pleasure or the cause of

pleasure. If the action is not by itself in form of pl°a?ura

and if there is no means of producing pleasure, then the

knowledge of that (performability) will not take place as the

princioal element towards the physical effort. Hence, the

knowledge of the performability in reSnect of the actions ic

the basis of the knowledge of the instrumentality of the d a •'r=

object and as such the instrumentality of the desired objec*

being the deciding factor leading to knowledge causing somethin

 3-13

t o k n o w a d h e r e s t o t h e p e r f o r m a b i l i t y a n d t o i t s e l f . A n d t M s ?

p l e a s u r e w i t h o u t b e i n g a m e a n s i s a d m i t t e d t o p o s s e s s p e r f o r -

m a b i l i t y ; f o r , a l l ( p e r s o n s ) u n d e r s t a n d p l e a s u r e a s t h e o e r n r -

m a b i l i t y a n d d o n o t r e q u i r e i t s ( o f p l e a s u r e ) i n s t r u m e n t a l - ' t y

o f t h e r e s u l t . H e n c e h a v i n g a s c e r t a i n e d t h a t m y i n c l i n a t i o n

i s d u e t o t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e p e r f o r m a b i l i t y w i t h o u t c a r i n g

f o r t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y o f t h e d e s i r e d o b j e c t a n d a s s u c h b v

m e a n s o f o b s e r v i n g c a i t r a a s b e i n g i n c l i n e d ( t o a c t i o n ) . O n “

w h i l e l e a r n i n g i n f e r s t h u s - c a i t r a i s a l s o i n c l i n e d ( t o

a c t i o n ) d u e t o ( h i s ) k n o w l e d g e o f t h e p e r f o r m a b l e . H e r a t h < >

i n c l i n a t i o n o f c a i t r a i s t h e a s s e r t i o n ; t h e i n c l i n a t i o n p r e c e ­

d e d b y t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e p e r f o r m a b l e i s t h e a t t r i b u t e o r t

p r o b a n d u m , b e c a u s e o f h i s i n c l i n a t i o n b e i n g p r e c e d e d b y t h «

k n o w l e d g e o f t h e p e r f o r m a b l e i s t h e c a u s e , l i k e m y i n c l i n a t i o n

i s t h e e x a m p l e . A n d t h e L i n s e t c . b e i n g t h e d e n o t e r s o f t h "

m e a n i n g o f t h e c a u s e o f i n c l i n a t i o n d e n o t e o n l y t h e p e r f o r m a b l e .

f o r , t h a t ( p e r f o r m a b l e ) b e i n g k n o w n t h r o u g h L i h e t c . b e c o m e s

t h e c a u s e o f t h a t i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d e s .

A l t h o u g h d e s i r e i s t h e c a u s e o f t h e i n c l i n a t i o n ( t o

a c t i o n ) , y e t t h a t ( d e s i r e ) i s n o t e x p r e s s e d b y t h e L i n s ^ t c . ,

f o r , t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h a t ( d e s i r e ) i s n o t r e q u i r e d i n r « s - * r

o f t h e i n c l i n a t i o n . D e s i r e i s , i n d e e d , t h e c a u s e o f t h e

i n c l i n a t i o n ( o f a p e r s o n ) w h e n p r o d u c e d a n d n o t w h e n b e i n o

k n o w n . ’

I n ’ k i h t u s v a y a m k l e s a r u p a m ................................... ’ e t c . a n d

’ s v a b h a v e n a h i ’ e t c . o f t h e K a n d V t e x t r e s n o . ' t i - e l v
above, Salikanltha explains Karyata and phalasadhanata and

asserts that the knowledge of the Karyatl is the basis of

phalasadhanata. We have already discussed that Salikanatha

makes the difference between Karyatl of the Prabhakaras and the

phalasadhanati which is stated by Mandana Mis'ra in his well

known treatises Brahmasidhi and Vidhiviveka. Accordino to

Mandana Misra phalasadhanatajnana or istasidhanatajna'na (the

knowledge of instrumentality of d'a desired object) from any

action can alone induce a person to take up an action. The

second half of the K(8) and the first half of the K(9) of th*

VM above, are found quoted by Citsukha in his Citsukhi(o.162)

and the same is explained by Pratyaksvarupa Bhagavan in hie

commentary called Nayanaprasadini on the Citsukhi . This is thQ

refutation of Mandana’s view by Salikanatha regarding

phalasadhanata as the cause of pravrtti of the persons to

actions. The idea of the passage of the Nayanaprasadini may be

explained as : A karma (action) which is called a Karya

(performability) produces pain to persons. How, then karma

(action) can be called a Karyatl (performability)? It is

because that which generates distress is not performed. It i

said in Mimlmsa - ’akartavyo duhkhaphalah’ (that act should not

be performed which bears a painful result). Hence, the phr=>s»

is used in the Karika. - ’phalasidhanata tatra’ etc. Because of

being the phalasadhanati (instrumentality of the desired obte-t

the karma (action) is admitted to have Klryata (performability)

Again it may be urged here - how phalasadhanati is the cause of

karma (action) ? For, the phalasadhanati is the cause of

pravrtti (personV inclination). So, the Kiryata (performaM-

lity) belongs to the Karma (action) and not to the pravrtti

(person’s inclination). Thus in Prabhakara^s* view, pravrt^'

(person’s inclination) arises out of the karyatajnana

(knowledge of the performability) and not out of Istasidhan ^a-

jnana (knowledge of the instrumentality of the desired o'oje-+)

as held by Mandana Misra, a follower of the Bhatta School.

Prabhakarag maintains that the verbal comprehension

(Sabdabodhah) is obtained only by observing the ’Lih’ which

denotes always a Karya that is required to be performed. On

hearing a *Lih’ one learns certain action as his Karya whic < ;

nothing but the undertaking of that *1 should do the work a=

directed.’ Karya, therefore, is most important in a sentence,

and the imports of all other $ words are subordinate to that

Karya. Accordingly the word ’svargakama’ in the expressions

like 'svargakamo yajeta’ etc., indicates only a Niyojya

(promoted person) on whom the Karya is imposed and the verbal

root denotes a sacrifice which is to be performed. The

247 -
ayamarthah - hitasadhanatakaryatayoh purvam bheda uktan,
anantaram hitasidhanesveva kimiti karyatama^irnanyatreti
sahkarh pariharanta ahuh salikanathah kimtviti.' satyamas"-
vayam niyamah, kinitvayam tatra^visesah - yatkarma
karyatam vrajet tat svayam kles'arupameva. katham tarhi
tasya_karyatvam ? na hi duhkhakarasya karyatvamupaoadyat:^.
yatthi’huh - ’akartavyo duhkhaphalah’ Uyatata-aha -
phalasadhanati tatreti tasyaiva vivaranawtf na karyatetl.
athava phalasadhanata tatra katham kiranam ? yavata
pravrttim pratyeva karanam taditi kecittatrahtiA - tenet! .
tena karyatasya bhavati, na tu pravytteriti, ata eva
tairuktam ’jnapakakotinivista phalasadhanati karyatamanuru-
dhyate. na tvasau tadatmaiveti’ - Hayanaprasadini unber
CS, p. 162.
karyatajrTana (the knowledge of the performability) alone, a c

contended by the Prabhakaras, can impel one to do a sacriH'~

and not necessarily the desire of svarga or any other d e s i r e d

result. This theory regarding the vedic injunctions (Vidhi!

248
was first advocated by Badari and latter on it was u p h e H

by Prabhakara Mis'ra. Thus according to Prabhakaras the word

svargakama’ means only a Niyojya (prompted person) who is

subordinate to the Kirya which is denoted by ALi n ’ and tha~

is stated by Silikanatha in the V text above.

The Prabhikaras contend that verbal comprehension is

obtained by juniors only through conversation when one

commends another to do something. The juniors who observe the

seniors to command others to do something and also thus

commanded to act accordingly learn that particular Karya is

the meaning conveyed by the sentence. Thus the meaning or ♦he

tLin’ in that sentence, is learnt by juniors as Karya. T.n

this way, the persons are inclined to do the actions after

understanding the Karya. Salikanatha has shown in the Vr%t>

text above, the nature of influence (anumanasvarupa) as to how

\ 240
one infers the pravrtti (inclination) of another to actions.

At the end of the vrtti above, the author of the VM

refutes the view of a section of the followers of Kumarila

Bhatta which states that the Istasadhanati (instrumentality o r

248 - -
dravyagunasamska»esu Badarih, MS. 3.1.3.
purvoktamevartham paksasadhyanirdesena’bhiniya dars’ay^ti
caitrasya pravrttirdharminiti - FN.I,VM., p. 430.
the desired object) is the Karyati (performability) and not

anythingfelse. Only the Istasadhanati is the cause of pravrt t-.i

(person’s inclination to actions). Raminujacarya in his

Tantrarahasya also, discards the view that desire (iccha; i:

the cause of pravrtti (person’s inclination to actions).

- 250
discards the same in the manner of Salikanatha.

Citsukhicirya in his Citsukhi has refuted the view of th.-

Prabhakaras, according to which the knowledge of karyati

(performability is the cause of pravrtti (person's inclinat iQn

to actions). Citsukha contends that the view of the

Prabhakaras may be accepted, provided a junior understands hi p

knowledge of karyata (performability) as his own pravrtti

(inclination to action). But his state of being inclined +n

action is ascertained by Istasadhanatajnina (knowledge of +

instrumentality of the desired object) and not by the

karyatajnana (knowledge of the performability). It cannot \--p

said here that there will be inconsistency in resoect of

admitting the Istasadanatajnana as the cause of pravrtti

(person’s inclination to actions) as in the past actions t: O

there is Istasidhanata, yet the pravrtti (person’s inclina+ ■OP

to action) is not seen. This objection of the Prabhakaras a c

met with by Citsukha by arguing that he who admits karyataf

(knowledge of performability) as the pravrtti (oerson’s

250 — - -
nanu tarhi iccha pravrttihetuh_janati icchati iti hi
nyayasastramaryada. sa linadivacya ,syat. maivam. iccha
hyutpanna pravrttinimittam. na tu jnata. TR., o.57.
inclination to actions) admits the Istasidhanatajnana b c -

the cause of karyatajnana. It is because, there can be no

karyatajnana without Istasidhanatajnana. °

nanvevamapi katham lihadinlrh karye vyutpatti - rityatra’

ha -

’It may be argued, this being such, how the Lins etc.

give rise to the knowledge in respect of the performable ° Herp

(in this context) says (the author)

K (10) sabdlntarani svarthesu vyutoadyante yathaiva hi.

avapodvapabhedena tatha karye linadayah.

’Just as other words are understood in their own meanino^

by the process of the inclusion and exclusion, so do (ie., ere

understood) the Lins etc. in the case of the performable’.

V (10) linadiyuktavakyasravane tadbhavabhavinya pravrttya

visistakaryavagatimanumaya, vakyasya hetutamadhyava-'v^ti

tatra’pi ko’rthah kena sabdenl’bhihita iti vivecane,

Lihadyavape,karyavagatidarsanat, tadudhlre c a ’darsanet,

ta eva karyavagatim kurvantiti sabdlntaravallina-

dina)( karyavacakatvavyutpattisiddhih.

251 _
atrocyate - bhavedistamanoratho yadi svjtmanyapi karyabo-
dhasya pravartakatvaniadhyavasiyate, samihitasadhanataya
evfi./tu svatmani pravartakatvadhyavasayat na ca bhutadau
vyS^ficarah, yatah -
karyasyavagaterheturyadr^am hitasldhanam /
pravrttestadrsam heturvya^icarastatah kutah .// 16
yenapi hi karyavabodhasyaiva pravartakatvamabhyupeyate’
bhyupeyate eva tenaoistasadhanatavabodhasya karyavabodharr-
prati hetuta,tadabhave karyabodha^. nupapatteh - C.^o.l
 3 -*.Q

"One can ascertain the sentence as the cause by way o 1

inferring the knowledge of the particular performable throu h

the inclination which arises subsequent to the hearing of tv-

sentence formed with the Lins etc. In that case also, in t n e

case of discerning which meaning is denoted by which word a n d

because of observing the knowledge of the performable in tn°

inclusion of the Lins etc. and not observing that in the

exclusion of that (i.e. Lins etc.), these (i.e., the Lins e>

indeed, give rise to the knowledge of the performable like vie

other words (that convey the knowledge of the sentence m e a n 1 n o '

is established."

In *Sabdantarani svarthesu .........’etc. and *lin^adivu-

ktavakyasravane ........... * etc. of the K and V text respec-

tively above ,SalikanStha explains how the suffixes Lins etc.

denote the Karya or in other words, how these Lins etc. are

understood in respect of the Karya. As we have stated in o u r

exposition of the first section of the VM, the Prabhakaras lay

emphasis on the natural method of learning the words b y a c h i l e .

It is by way of watching the usage and activity of the elders

in day to day life that a child comes to understand the word-

meanings. One person asking another, says •gamanaya’ (briro

the cow), the latter thus asked at once brings the cow. \

child who hears the sentence uttered by the former and obsf-rvf

the action that follows, infers vaguely that the meaning of tv-

sentence is a command to carry out the act of bringing the c o w .

In the present stage, what the child understands is only that

the whole of that statement means the whole of what is

signified. Later on, the child hears another man asking anothp’

*asvamanaya’ (bring the horse) and observes the latter brinoino

the horse. From this, the child infers that the meaning of this

sentence is a command to carry out the act of bringing the

horse. Now by making a comparison between the two sentences,

the child understands that the verb *anaya’ (bring) common to

both the sentences must mean the command to lanaya’ (bring) anc

that the two terms *gam’ (ycow ) and casvam’ (horse) must m^an

two different animals. In this way, by making comparison amono

various sentences and by observing the actions performed, a

child becomes caoable by the process of inclusion and deletion

(Avapa and Udvapa or Anvaya and Vyatireka) of understanding the

meaning of individual words. This is also same in case of the

lLihs’ that give rise to the knowledge of the Karya. The

meaning of the lL4h’ in the sentence, is learnt by a chile =s

Karya since people do some action on hearing the ‘Lin’ of the

elders. Similarly the other words of that sentence also are

understood to denote actions such as bringing the cows etc.

required by that Karya.

The Prabhakaras also contend that verbal comprehension i

possible only due to observation of actions and none can have

verbal comprehension from the words that denote the accompli­

shed facts as they cannot be understood by others during the

conversation.
 351

Prabhakara says that Karya is the meaning of the *Lih*

everywhere by its principal power of expression. But outside

the vedas where there is no necessity of Karyas, the *Lin*,

according to him, denotes the actions such as bringing the

cow etc. as the Karya by means^Laksana.

M
The same idea of the above V text of the V£+. can also be
A

gathered from Salikanatha*s Rjuvimala. the commentary on the

Jrhati of Prabhakara.

nanu lokavyavaharit linidayo vacakatayi vyutpadyamana

praisidisveva vacakataya vyutpattimarhanti. tatraiva

tesam prayogadarsanidityasankya’ha -
be
"It may^argued here, that from the usage in common parlan­

ce, the suffixes Lins etc. being known as being the denoters

deserve to be understood in respect of the command (praisa)etc,

for, the use of those (Lins etc.) is seen there only (i.e., in

respect of command etc. ) and apprehending this (the author)

says" -

K(ll) kiryameva hi vaktrnaiiu jyiyahjsama^kaniyasam.

va _ . ’ . „ w
prarttyapurusapeksaya bhedatpraisadivyapadesabhak.

*Only the performable from the difference of the speakers

such as a senior, one of equal age and an inferior (i.e., a

Junior) as compared with one who* is inclined is named as command

(praisa) etc.*.
252
ucyate - lihidisabdastivat praminantaravijsayam karyamartha-
njyabodhoyati s'abdintaranyapi ca karyasyanjhyirhatvat.
tatparaneva svarthanabhidadhati - RVL under BR., p. 35.
 352

V(11) pravarttyapurusapeksaya jyayasi vaktra pratipadya -

manam karyam praisa iti vyapadisyate. samena’ mantramam,

hineria’dhyesanamiti, praisSdipratispadaka api linadayah

karyameva pratipadanti, na’rthantaram.

"The performable stated by a speaker senior to one who

is inclined (to an action) is called a command, that

(performable) stated by one of equal age is called an invita­

tion (Amantrana) and (that) by an inferior (junior) is named a

request (Adhyesana) and thus the Lins etc. even being the

denoters of the command etc. denote only the performable and

not any other sense".

In McSryameva hi ........... ’ etc. and ’pravarttyapuru-

sipeksaya ........... *etc. of the K and V text respedtlvely

above, Salikanitha asserts that the suffixes Lins etc. are

understood as denoting the praisa (command) etc. The inclusion

of the word *adi* refers to Amantraqa (invitation) and

Adhyesana (request). That Karya performed by a senior compared

to the person inclined to an action is called praisa(command);

for, a senior always commands an inferior (i.e., a junior) to

do some work. When it occurs in the case of both the persons

of equal age, then it is called an Amantrana (invitation). In

common parlance, what happens, is that a person never commands

nor requests another of equal age to do some action but

invites. Again when the Karya comes from the inferior, is

called Adhyesana (request). An inferior (i.e., a junior)

generally makes a request to a senior in order to do something

 353

Otherwise, it will be a dishonour to the senior.

This can be explained here - the praisa (command) etc.

is understood, in common parlance, as the meaning of the ’Lins’

etc. The actions performed by the senior, one of equal age and

a junior are respectively known as praisa, Amantrana and

Adhyesana. In all cases, in the use of the senior, one of

equal age and junior, as the Karya is not abandoned and as

there is no violation of the actions, so it is proper that

Karya is the meaning of the cLins* etc. Hence, it is called

the denotation of the Karya as a synonym to Niyoga (prompting).

But the praisa etc. are only the upidhis (limiting adjunets).

An upadhi (limiting adjunct ) is that which not being in

denotation, establishes the meanings of words in particular

place. For example, the word *drtihari*. Here, pasutva

(adnimalhood) is the upidhi (limiting adjunct). When the act

of stealing is relating to the pasu (animal), then the subject

of this act of stealing is called ‘drtihari*. Likewise, in

the present context, when the ‘Lins’ etc. denote Karya,then

praisa, Amantrana and Adhyesana are termed as upidhis

(limiting adjuncts). This is what is stated by Salikanatha by

the Kagjfca above.

553 , ,. „
atredam bodhyam - linaderathah praisadirloke’vagasmyate.
tatra sama-hina-jyiyobhih prayoktrbhih prayujyaminah praisa-
divyapades'am bhajate. sarvatra sama - hina - jyayasagprayoge
karyatvasyiparityagat avyavabhicaricca karyameva linadoartho_
yuktah. ato uiyogaparaparyayakaryabhidhanameva.praisad^fayaslu-
padhaya ityeya yuktam.upadhirnima - yo’bhidhinaninu-
pravesl san sabdarthin vis'ese’bvasmipayati. yathi -
drtiharisabdah. atra pasutvamupadhili. yadi haranakriyi pasusa-
mbandhini,tadj tasyah Tcarti drtiharisabdenocyate. tatha,
prakrte lihadinam karye vacye ’praisadaya upadhaya itfis”ayena’
ha karyameveti - F.N.7, VM., pp. 430-31.
 0 ‘

Parthasirathi Misra, a follower of the Bhatta School o ’

_ j _, -
Purvamimamsi, in the vidhinirnaya section of his Nyayar t n a m H a

says that it is not correct to state that the Karyas accom­

plished by the senior, one of equal age and a junior are

respectively called Presana, Adhyesana and Abhyanu jnana,: for. ; t

is said that the lL i n ’ is used in case of yiena (beggin ;)tho; h

it is not admitted as a Karya. So, the meaning of a word is

exoressed by Pravartani (inducement). Here it may be noted

Y -
that the words namely Paisa, Amantrana and Adhyesana us“ d by

Salikanatha, have been used by Ramanujacarya in his comm^nt^~v

called Nayakaratna respectively as presana, Adhyesana and

Abhyanujnana i.e., what is called Amantrana by Silikanatha

- - - - 255
named as Adhyesana by Ramanujacarya. But in his Tantr a r ^ n a s y g .

Ramanuja follows Salikanatha’s exoositioh in this resoect.

That the praisa etc. are not the meanings of words but l i m i * :n.

adjuncts (uoadhi) only are seen in the Brhati of Prabhakara

- - - 257
and the Rjuvimala of Salikanatha.

katham punaravasiyate - karyameva oraisadivyapa -

desabhaoityatra’ha -

'How, again, it is ascertained that only the performafl-

is named as command etc.'7 Here (the author) replies’ -

254
na ca k a r y a m e v a J y i y a h - samakaniyobhih p r a t i o a d y a m a m m
praisidivyapadesabhak sarvanugatam sabdirtha iti sarnnra a f
akaryatvabhyuoagamenaiva yasnayam linorayogadltyuktam.
N R M . , p. 83.
255
jyayasa hinasya niyogah oresanam. samena samasyadhy'1-
sanam. hinenottamasyabhyanujnanam. N K on NRM, o. 35.
256
TR., p.57.
257
BR.,p.289.
 355

K(12) karyameva*hi sarvatra prav^ttavekakaranam.

pravrttyavyabhitfritvallihgadyartho’vadharyate.

"For, only the performable is the single cause in res­

pect of all inclinations (to actions) . Because of the

inclination being invariably present, it (i.e, the performable)

is ascertained as the meaning of the Lins etc."

V(l2) pravrttirhi balena svatmani karylvagamapurvika pratti-

panneti, sarvapurusanapi pravar^taminln drstva

karyavagamameva balah kalpayatiti, praisadinamapi

pravrttih karyavagamanibandhaneti,karyameva

praisadivyapadesayogiti siddham.

vastutastu praisadinamapi pravrttyavyabhi-E^caritvit

klryasya ca pravrttisu sarvasu hetubhutatvit praisadis-

vapi lihadinam karyameva’rtha iti nisciyate.

’‘For, the inclination is understood by a child in mind

as being preceded by the knowledge of the performable and as

such by observing all the persons inclined (to actions) a

child infers the knowledge of the performable (as the cause of

their inclination and as such the inclination in respect of

the command etc. is also due to the knowledge of the performa­

ble and so, it is established that the performable is,indeed,

known as the command etc.

As a matter of fact, because of the commands etc.being

invariably present in the case of inclination and because of

(there being the knowledge of ) performable as the cause of

 ? '• ' 6

all inclinations (to actions), it is ascertained that nprfor-

mable is the meaning of the suffixes Lins etc. in re-o^ct o;

the command e t c . ’

In lkaryameva hi sarvatra .............. ’ etc. and

tpravrttirhi balena ............ ’etc. of the K and V text

respectively above, Silikanatha asserts that Karya and Kary-

alone is the single cause of the pravrtti in all cases and

also lays emphasis in stating that the meaning of the sufp!v'e

Lins etc. is only the Karya. It is also stated in the K and

text above that even in respect of the praisa etc. the

meaning of the Lins etc. is the Kirya. A child understands

that pravrtti is due to one’s knowledge of the Karya and by

observing the persons engaged in actions, the child assumes

the knowledge of the Karya.

kena punah pramanena balassvayam karyamavaaacchat'

yatah Dravarttata ityatriha -

*By which source of valid knowledge, again, a child

himself understands the oerformable to which he is inclined 1

(To that) says here (The author)’ -

K(13) krtisadhyam pradhanam yattatkaryamabhidhiyate.

tacca manantarena’pi vedyamodanaoakavat.

*That which is brought about by effort (krti) and

the principal element is called the performable. And that

(oerformable) is to be known by other source of valid knowl ---do*'-

 357

just as the cooking of rice (can be known by any other source

of knowledge).

V(13) krtau satyim bhivit, asatyancl'bhavadanumihatah

krtisadhyati tavadavagamyate. yadadhikrtya isrtih

pravartate, t«t krteh pradhanam, prayatnasca krtih.

sa ca minasapratyaksavedya iti, visistaprayojana-

tapi prayatnasya pratyaksavedyaiva. tena pftatyaksi -

-numinabhyam karyamavagamyate. yathi ca odana -

-pakayoriti, na kincidanupapannam.

because of there being that (performable) when there is

the physical effort and because of there being the absence of

that(performable)without there being the physical effort, it is

then understood by means of inference that (performable) is

brought about by physical effort. That for which physical

effort takes place is the principal element of the physical

effort and the right effort (prayatna) is the physical effort.

And that (right effort) is to be known by mental perception and

so the particular necessity of the right effort is also to be

known by perception. Hence, the performable is known by means

of perception and inference. As in the case of the cooked

rice (odana) and cooking (pika), nothing is i neon si stent (he re ) l

In ^rtisldhyam pradhinam ........ * etc. of the K an#

Mcrtallp satyim........... * etc. of the V text above, the

author defines Kirya and how it is known. With the two

adjectives (i.e., qualifications) viz., ’krtisidhyam’ and

 358

‘pradhlnam* as stated in the K above, Salikanatha defines

Karya. Karya is that which is brought about by krti and it is

the principal element of the krti. It has already been stated

earlier that in the view of the Prabhakaras, Karya is what is

expressed by the suffix Lin. Again it is krti that brings

about the Karya i.e. for the Karya, the krti takes place. Now

what is the krti ? The author says that krti is the prayatna

and thus what is brought about by the krti is what is called

Karya that becomes principal element for the krti . In order to

avoid ati/yapti, the word 'pradhinam* is used in the definition

of Karya. Otherwise dhStvartha (meaning of the verbal root)will

also be meant. Here prominence is desired to be given to

Karya. Again the compound word ekrtisadham* in the definition

is used in order to avoid the result svarga (heaven) etc. The

krtisidhyata (bringing about by the krti) is understood by the

process of Anvaya and Vyatireka of the inference of the krti,

and the krtipradhanatva (prominence of the effort) is known by

the mina$?a-pratyaksa (mental perception). As a matter of fact,

Karya is known by both perception and inference and this, is

what is indicated by the word *mSnantarena* used in the K above.

Here, doubt may arise as to while the object of perception is

one and that of inference is another, how it is possible to get

a compressed meaning by these two sources 7 But it is not

correct to object to. For the knowledge produced by perception

and inferenco inhering in mind gives rise to a knowledge like

recognition (pratyabhijna). This has been clearly explained by

 359

^Slikanltha with the help of an example - ’odanapakavat’

(meaning thereby like the cooking of rice). Odana (rice) is

known by perception and pika (cooking) which is a sidhana

(means) is known by Anvaya and Vyatireka inference. That

where there is rice, there is cooking (tatsatte tatsattiT

anvaya) and where there is no rice, there will be no cooking

(tadasatte tadasatti - vyatireka). In the example, one part

of the knowledge is attained by perception and the remaining

part is by inference. But Still, there is no harm in getting

258
the compressed meaning.

According to the Prabhakaras, Karya is the import of

the ’Lins* and is also known by the terms 'Niyoga', ’Apurva’

and ’Dharma’. This may be noted here that Apurva of

Prabhikaras is different from that of the Bhi^tas who accepts

yaga (sacrifice) as Dharma and Apurva as a connecting link

between the yaga (sacrifice) and the phala (result). The

Prabhakaras hold that Apurva, which is a product of the sacri­

fice and the meaning of the ^Lin* is the Karya to svargakama

ayamas'ayah tathahi - krtih puru?aprayatnastatsIdhyao^,

kyteh pradhananca yat,’tat karyamiti karyasvarupamu-
ktam bhavati. _k£tisadhyam kiryamityuktau dhatvarthasyapi
kptisadhyatvenaHivyaptistatra syat, atastadvarapaya
pradhlnamiti visesanan^ atra pradhanyanca kptyuddes'yatvar-
upam vivak$itam. etavanmltroktau svargadiphale*
tiprasaktissyati atastadvyavrttyartham kftisadhyatvamiti
visesanadalamupattara...... .. tatra krtisadhyatvam
kptyanvaya - vyatirekarupanvlwanapramanena’v^gamyate.
kptipradhlnatvalTca - manasapfatyak^ena pratiyata iti,
pratyak^S^- numlnapramanagamyam karyamityu3^cyate ....
tattraiva’nukSladr^tantamaha - odanapakavaditi. odanah
pratyak^ena’vagamyate, pikasya tatsadhanaCH:tvamanvayavya-
tirekabhyamavagamyata ityarthah. FN.5 under VM.,pp.431-32.
 360

(person desiring heaven) and this Apurva is not a temporary

act like a sacrifice, svargakinta (person desiring heaven)will,

therefore be induced to perform this Karya as it will conti-

259
nue till the production of svarga (heaven) from yaga.

That a Karya is krtisadhya (to be brought about by

effort) and krti (effort) is also called prayatna (right

effort) is also stated by Salikanatha in the sastra-pariccheda

of Pramanaparayana-prakarana of his Prakaraoa-panclka.

Again in the Vi$ayakaraniya prakarana of the same work,

Silikanatha says that Kirya is that which is desired to be

attained by krti (effort). Krti (effort) is the function of

Atman (self) and krti is another meaning of purusaprayatna

261
(right effort of the person).

According to the Prabhikaras, kriya is, in common

parlance, denoted by the term *Kirya* and Karya is the import

of the *Lih* etc. and Karya is denoted generally by these

yasca karyamavabudhyate sa jiiyojyati. svargakamasya ca

tasminneva_karye boddhrtaya’nvayaft yadeva tasya
kimyamanasadhanatamanubhavitum k§amate. na ca kriyi
ksanabhangini kalantarabhivini phale heturbhavati. tena
sa icaryataya niyojyena saha nanviyate. yattu kalantaras-
thiyi karyam iadeva tena sahinvayam ganturaarhattti
kriyatireki aanantaravedyameva linidayah karyamabhidadhati
tacca minantarapurvatvadapurvamityucyate. RVL.under
BR., p. 288.
260 — -
ucyate - karyameva vidhyarthah karyanca krtisadhyam.
krtis'ca prayatnah. PPt p. 256*

261 ^ ^ ^
karyanca krtip$itamucyate. krtih - atmavyaparah -
purulprayatna ityanarthantaram. I b i d . , p. 452.'
x
 361

!Lih* etc. and the meaning of the dhltu (root) is denoted

particularly in ordinary sentence. For example, pakah(cooking)

gamanam (going) etc. Thus the Prabhikaras contend that Kirya

is the meaning of sentence. But according to the Bhattas, the

meaning of root is not the kriya. It is either a karana kiraka

or a karmakaraka. sometimes, the kriya becomes secondary in case

of a dtiatvartha (meaning of the root). But the principal kriya

is what is called Bhavani (urge) and thii Bhivani is the meaning

262
of a sentence.

We have already discussed in our exposition of the

karika 7 of the VM wherein Salikanatha defines kiryati

(performability) as krtisadhyatva (brought about by effort) and

it has been shown how kiryati (performability) differs from

phalasidhanati (achievability'■ of the desired object) which is,

according to Mandana Misra, the author of the Vidhiviveka, the

cause of pravrtti (person's inclination to actions). But

Salikanitha describes it as the cause of producing the desired

result.

262 ^ ^
prabhakaristu_- karya’
m lihaderarthah, tacca saminyarupena
linidinabhidhlyate. visesatastu - tattadhatvaratho loke.
yatha - pikah, gamanamiti. ato loke tarCmate kriyaiva
karyasabdena’bhi3 dhiyate. X

bhattamimamsakistu - dhatvartho na kriyi, kiritu

karapakirakam, karmakarakam vi bhavati dhatvarthe
kvacitkriyavyapadeso iiksanikah, mukhya kriyi tu
bhivana, sa ca’khyajtaprat^arthah, na prakrtyarthah. saiva
vakyarthe mukhyavis'esyataya bhasata it sahgirante! tatha
coktam -
M — ^ _
bhivanaiva hi vakyarthassarvatra"khyatavattayi.
anekagunajatyadikarakarthanuranjite".(TV.,p.445)
FN.2 under PP.p.376.
 362

Acirya Citsukha, a vedantin refutes the karyata of the

Prabhakaras and criticises the definition of Karya as given by

>* _
Salikanatha . According to Citsukha,the definition of Karya is

improper as it involves ativyipti (wide application). For,

even the result like heaven etc. there is krtisadhyata. ■¥$ it

is argued that in case of Karya, krtisadhyata is directly

there. But the result is not directly brought about by krti.

There is Apurva which is a mediator between the action and the

result. So, thepe can be no question of ativyapti (wide

application). But Citsukha says that it cannot be argued so.

For even in case of Niyoga, there is no direct bringing about

by effort (krtisadhyata)^ but it is there in case of the acts

like yaga etc. Thus Citsukha criticises Salikanatha’s defini­

tion of Kirya and refutes karyatajrfana (knowledge of

performability) as the cause of pravrtti (person’s inclination

to actions).

As a follower of vedanta, Citsukha contends that

Istasadhanatajnina (knowledge of the achievability of the

desired object) is the cause of pravrtti (person’s inclination

to action). The significative capacity of the lLihs’ is

ascertained in the Istasadhanati (achievability of the desired

object) and not in Karya as held by the PribhSkaras. The

263
na ca kptisldhyampradhinamiti karyalaksanam yuktam,
phale’tivyapteh. atha saksatkrtisldhyatvam vivaksitam. na
ca tatphale ’stlti mat.am, maivam. ni^oge tadavh&venavylpteh,
bhavarthasyaiva saksat krtisadhyatvat. - CS. p, 167.
 ' -1

vedantins contend that those who accept karyatajnana (know]

of performability) as the cause of pravrtti (person’s inclina­

tion to action also accept Istasadhanatajoana (knowledoe of

achievability of the desired object) as the cause of karya'r-odha

(knowledge of performability). For^, there can be no karyatainee

(knowledge of performability) without the Istasadhanatajnana

264
(knowledge of the achievability of the desired object). ' hic

view of the vedantins seems to follow the view of Mandana «fr=>

and that of Parthasarthi Mis’ra.

upasamharati -

•-(The author) concludes’ -

K(l4) evam karyatmake’pyarthe vyutpadyante linadayah.

tadanvitesu svarthesu tatha sabdantaranyapi.

’Thus the Lins etc. are understood even in the sens» of

the performable just as the other words are (understood) in

their related meanings’.

In *evam karyatmake ........... ’ etc.of the K text

above, Salikanatha sums up what has been stated by him in tha

immediately preceding K (12 and 13). It is why he uses th* ’hr-

word ’upasamharati’ just before the K above. In the precede no

K texts, it is stated that the import of the suffixes Lins '

atrocyate - bhavedistamanoratho yadi svatmanyapi karyabo-

dhasya pravartakatvamadhyavasiyate, samihitasa3dhanat.avh
eva tu svitmarUpravartakatvadhyavasayat............... .

yenapi hi k’aryavabodhasyaiva pravartakatvamabhyupeyate*

bhyupeyate eva tenagistasadhanatavabodhasya karyav bodham
prati hetuta,tadabhave 'karyabodhanupapatteh -Ibid, P.lbf.
 364

is the Karya. This is again concluded in the preseht K above

with the help of a comparison. The coigparison is this - just

as the popular words denote related meanings^ So also the

Lins denote the meaning of the Karya. We have already stated

it in our preceeding exposition gf the V text of the VM.

< —
Salikanatha did not write the vrtti on the aforesaid K,possibly
-H .
because he wanted to avoid repetion. The word tatha in the K

above should be ’yatha’. It is, perhaps, wrongly printed.

evamapi kathaiin manantaravedyakaryavacita

linadini^mityasankya, mimamsimavatarayati -

’Thus how can there fctae the state of the Lins etc. as

denoting the performable which is not known by any other source

of valid knowledge - apprehending this (the author) presents

the judgement’ -

K(15^) sampradharyamidantvatra tatkiryam kirn kriyatmakam.

yadvl tadvyatirekiti ............................

’Now, here it is to be ascertained whether that

performable is in the form of action or different from that

(action)......... *.

ko nu nirnaya ityatra’ha -

’What is, then the solution ? (The author) says here -

K(-15 & 165$) ......... ........... tatra lokanusaratah

pramantaravi^neya kriya karyeti yadyapi.

’There, following the common practices, although the

 365
action known by other source of valid knowledge is the perfor-

mable’.

V(l5(fl6’
A) loke hi li'nadiyuktavakyasravane visistakriyinusthina-

darsanattadvisaya karyavagatirlihadibhih kriyata iti

yuktam, avagati'3iPravr ttyorelcavisayatvit. nahyanyat

karyataya'vagamya, anyatra balah pravarttate. kinca

kriyayam karyabhutayam linadlyuktavakyapratipadyayama-

bhyupagamyamanayam saktikalpanalaghavam syideva.

- - e. _
tathahi - dhaturva karyabhutam svartham bravitu^

tathabhutarthavacinastu dhltoh pare linadayo bhavantf-

tyasriyate. linadisravane tu tathabhutirthaparataya

dhatuh prayukta ityavagamya,k”aryabhutadhatvarthavaga-

massampadyate. yathia ladadibhyo vartamanadhyavasiyah

tesvapi vartamine’rthe vartamaniddhatorladityeva

sutrarthah.kartridisamkhyamatravacitvameva kevalam

ladidinameva linadinamapyarthah iti, kriyaiva karyataya

vede'pyavagamyata iti, yadyapi vivekasamarthanima-

vagatirbhavati.

*-As the performance of a particular action is observed,

subsequent to the hearing of the sentence formed with the Lin

etc., the knowledge of the performable relating to that (i.e.,

the particular action) is conveyed by the Lins etc. for, the

knowledge and inclination have the single object for them. It

is not that a child by knowing something else as the perferma-

ble, is inclined to something other. Mofeover, the simplicity

in the matter of assumption lies in admitting that the sentence

with the Lin etc. denotes the action as being in the o^rfor^-

ble. Again let the verbal root (dhatu) exoress its own mparmo

as belongina to the performable and it is admitted that th°

Lins etc. are used after the verbal root that denotes such

meaning as belonging to the performable. But in the case o ’

hearing the suffixes Lins etc. knowing that the verbal root 'c

used as being bent on that meaning being the performable, oo^

obtains the knowledge of the meaning of the verbal root as

being the performable. As there is the ascertaining of tru*

oresent tense etc. from the suffix Lat etc., so in respect os

them (i.e. of the Lins) also, there is ( to be used) indeed,*h

suffix Lat after the verbal roots being in the present t^ sp

(and) this is the meaning (idea) of the aphorism (i.e.

lvartamane lat’). Like the suffixes Lat etc., which exor«s?

only the number of the subject (Karta) etc,? So also is th^

meaning of the Lins etc. and as such in the vedic sentence1?

also the action is, indeed, understood as the performable

although the knowledge arises in respect of the person? who

unable to discriminate the two (i.e. the action and the

oerformable)’.

In *sampradharyamidantvatra...... ...... ’etc., o

the K and ’loke hi linadiyuktavakyasravane ........ ’ °tc. o

the V text above, Salikanatha asserts that the Lins etc.

denote the Karya and also the number of the Karta etc. as tf>>

suffixes Lat etc. do. Salikanatha states that in casp of

 36

ordinary sentences Karya which is known by other source likf

inference etc., is Kriya. We have already stated that in the

view of the Prabhakaras, the Kriya is known by the Karya i.~,. .

the Kriya is the Karya and as such both are not different

from each other. It is also stated by the Prabhakaras *■n +

» — -

the ’Lins’ denote the Karya. Salikanatha explains it as -

When the younger hearing the sentence with the suffix^

fLin’ etc. uttered by an elder performs an a~t and as such

knowledge of the Karya relating to his act is denoted by the

suffixes 'Lins’ etc. It is because of the fact that the

pravrtti (inclination to action) of the younger and the

knowledge of the Karyata (oerformability) by the 'Lins' etc.

are related to the same object. It is nowhere seen that a

child knowing an act, is inclined to another act. What haoo°n-

is this - a person is inclined to an action when he attains "hr-

266
knowledge of the Karya. It may be argued here : let the

verbal root (dhatu) denote the meaning of the Karya. It is

admitted that the suffixes **Lins’ etc, are used in resopct v

verbal root (dhatu) that denotes the meaning relating to Kar/i.

When the sentences with 'Lins’ etc. are heard, one may

understand that the verbal root (dhatu) is used as denoting -Mv

tena loke kriyaiva karyataya sabdenabhidhiyate. - BR,o.36.

.... vyutoitsamanascaitram oravartamanam drstva’numinot'-

caitro»oi karyabodhat oravartate - iti - PP . o. 430.
the meaning of the KIrya and thus the meaning of the verbal roof

(dhl'tvartha) is understood as belonging to the Karya. cor

instance, the suffixes eLat’ etc, ascertain^ the present t^n^e

i.e., in order to mean some act to be performed in the present

tense, the suffixes 'Lat* etc, are used. Pinini, under the

sutra #vartamine Lat’(3,4,54} of his Astadhyayi, states the

use of the suffix 4Lat’. According to this sutra, in case o*

the present tense, the suffix lLat’ is used after the verba

root (dhatu). ^or examole, bhavati, pacati etc. Here, the

suffix *lih’ indicating singular number, is used after the

verbal roots viz., *bhu’ and ‘pac’. These suffixes LLat’ et .

denote only the number of the Karti (subject) and Karma (obi J

etc. To be clear, these suffixes denote all the three number

viz., singular, dual and plural. Again these suffixes may b-

used both in active and passive voice. In active voice, the

verb is used in the number according to the corresoondina num

of the Karta (subject) and in case of oassive voice, the number

of the verb is in accordance with the number of the Karma

(object). That is why the word lAdi’ is used in the compoun 1

word, ^kartridisamkhyamatravacitvameva* in the V text above,

Like the suffixes *Lat’ etc., the suffixes *Lin* etc. are al^o

used in thQ same sense and as such in case of the vedic

sentences also, the kriya is understood as the Karya.

K(16!^8.17) tathapi vede sasthadyasi^dhante ’vasthite sati.

svargakamadayah klrye niyojyatvena sammatah.

svargakamadibhissabdairvaktavya ityavasthitarn.
 369

*-Yet the conclusion at the beginning of the chapter VI

(i.e. of the Mimamsa-sutra) being there that in the case of

vedic sentences, the persons desiring heaven etc. are called

the prompted person in respect of the performable. It is

stated by the words svargakama etc. (persons desirous of heaven

etc.). (The prompted persons) are to be described*.

V(17) sasthadye hyetaduktam - linadiprayoge tavat karyavagatir-

astiti nirvivadam. krtisadhyaTica karyam bhavati. sati

kartari tasyatmalabhah. kartrlabhasca svasambandhi-

karyavabodhe sati bhavati, na'nyatha. tena yadyapi

lokanusarena kriyaya eva karyataya bodhyamanaya

vakyarthatvat, tadanvayitvat cetaresamapi padarthanam,

karakatvadrte c a ’nyasya kriyanvayitvasambhavallohitosni-

sanyayena visesana^,bhutasvargakamanasamarpanaparataya

kartrvisesasnatvena svargakamasya’n v a y o ’v a g a m y a t e .

tathapi svasambandhikaryaboddhrtvenaiva*nvayo varnaniya

iti, niyojyasmarpakatvameva*sriyate - iti.

*-For, at the beginning of the chapter VI (of the Mimamsa-

sutra) it is stated - there is no controversy that in the use

of the suffixes Lins etc.^ the knowledge of the performable

rises. And that which is brought about by effort is the

performable. And the performable is known in the case of the

agent being there. And the attainment of the agent is possible

in the event of there being the knowledge of the performable

relating to himself and not otherwise. Hence, though in common

parlance, the action which is known in the form of nerf ormav-lr

is the meaning of the sentence and because of the meaninos o‘

other words being related to that (verb) and as nothin can

be related to th^ verb except the case, the word *svargakama’

(one desiring heaven) is understood as a qualifying atiribut^

to the agent, because of its being entrusted with the act o f

v»

oerforming sacrifice as related to the verb through the maxi™,

red-turbaned (lohitosnisa). Yet the relation is to be stated

in resoect of conveying the oerformable relating to ons^lf an -

as such the state of being entrusted with the promnted person

admitted*.

In *tathapi vede ......................... ’etc, ano

’sasthadye hyetaduktam .....................’etc. of 'n° K ane

V text as stated above, the author Of the VM states that in

accordance with the conclusion at the beginning of the sixtr.

Adhyiya of the MS, the words svargakima (one who desires

heaven) etc. are called Niyojya (the promoted person) in the

sacrifices like ’Agnihotra* etc. The MS. 1.1.2 has shown the

of the Kirya denoted by the injunctive sentence, the Mivojya

(the prompted person) is one who is desirous of acquiring for

himself some desirable result in the form of heaven or some

such thing which is thus related to the said Karya. ^ccordin

Prabhakara and his followers, the second sutra of the (i.°.

’codanalaksanorthah dharmah’) what the injunctive s ntence

(vidhi) denotes is Karya. In his Rjuvjmala on the Br’

natl aho.
^ mm —
Salikanatha contends that as it is established that Karya is

denoted by the related, in the sentences like Agnihotram

 a

juhuyat svargakamah’ (he who desires heaven should perform

Agnihotra sacrifice ) according to the contents of the sixth

chaoter of the MS, the word ’svargakamah’ is stated as a

Niyojya (prompted person) by the oerson who is s v a r g a k a m a h

(i.e. he who desiris heaven). A Niyojya (promoted person) is

one who understands the Kirya as alloted to him. tn the

K=(13) of the VM, the author has defined,’Niyojya’ and in +ba^

connection we.\ will deal, at length, with Niyojya. Prabhakara

calls this Kirya as Niyoga (prompting) because of the fact t - •

it acts as an incentive to the Niyojya (prompted person) and

makes him put forth effort towards the action denoted bv the

verbal root contained in the Injunctive word. Sahara call<=

Karya as Apurva (unseen potency) by virtue of its being

something new to all other oramanas (sources of valid knowl3 ■

except the Tnjunctive sentence. The Prabhakaras take Niyo

(Promoting) Karya and Aparva (unseen potency) in one sense.

Literally, the word 'Niyoga’ means a Karya imposed on a par- n

It is called Apurvakarya as it has been imposed by vedic

Injunctive sentence and not by other agencies. Niyoga(oromc;

is_, according to the Prabhakaras, the most important factor i

an Injunctive sentence. Niyoga or Karya of the Prabhakara-

expressed neither by the verbal root (dhatu) nor by the

267 _ v ,
tacca karyamanitamabhidheyamiti sthite ’agnihotram juhuy3-.
svargakamah’ ityadisu vakyesu sasthadya- raddhantanusar^a ’
svargakamapadena niyojyataya svargakamah samaroaniya it’
sthitam. yasca karyamavabudhyate,sa niyojyah.SVL under c •;.
263
tacca manantaraourvatvadapurvamtyucyate- D,t '*
A Ibid, p.233.
Injunctive suffix nor by any other word in the sentence,but 4

is expr°ssed by the sentence as a whole. That the Niyoqa

(orompting) is exoressed by the sentence is also oroved by tf

fact that the general rule is that - that which is the Drincw

thing made known by the sentence forms the denotation of the

sentence. Detailed discussion on Niyoga has been made in th^

works like Purvamimamsa in its sources and Prabhakara Mimamea

of Dr. Ganganath Jha.

It may be mentioned here that while the Bhattas advance

the theory called Bhavanavakyarthavada, the Prabhakara-

forward the -tho4 p theory called Niyogavakyarthavada. We hav

already discussed the Bhavanavakyirthavada and now as w° are

statin'; about Niyoga, it will be prooer to write some lines i

the Niyogavakyarthavida of the Prabhakaras.

The Niyooavakyarthavada, it is said, w ^ starte d by

Badari, an ancient Mimamsaka. According to Badari, the Ved’

injunctions, refer directly to sacrifices prescribed for the

oersons desiring heaven etc. He, therefor0 , differed fro™

Jaimini who held that vedic injunctions refer to the sacrif:~

only as an instrument for attaining the heaven desired by

oersons.

The Niyogavikyirthavada of Badari wae latter on dev°lo

and improved by Prabhakara. Prabhakara says that *Lin’

indicates Karya or Niyoga (promoting). The Niyoqya(oromot0^

oerson) is directed to function that Karya or Niyoga(oromtieg

Niyoga (promoting) continues to exist till the attainment of

 3 73

svarga (heaven) from the sacrifice (yaga)

It appears from the above that Badari accepted sacrif^c° =

as Karya, while Pr a b h a k a r a held that Apurva, a product of +hp

sacrifice and the mea n i n g s of the cL i n s ’ are the Karya to a

svarga k a m a (one who desires heaven) and the Aourva is not a

m o m e n t a r y act like sacrifice (yaga). A Svargakama, will ,

therefore, be a t t racted to p e r f o r m this Karya or Niyoga

(prompting) as it will continue till the p r o d u c t i o n of h^av^r

(svarga) from sacrifice (yaga).^^

Thus, a c c o r d i n g to Prabhakara, the vedic tL i n s ’ denote, .y

t h e i r first d e n o t a t i v e pow e r the Karya or N i y o g a (promoting)

w h i c h differs from sacrifice (yaga) and other actions m e r e l y

due to the p r e s e n c e or words viz., svargakama etc. in the cam-

sentence. Niyoga is accented as the mea n i n g of * L i h ’ because

the sacrifice, b e ing of short d u r a t i o n cannot be called Karv~

for the persons d e siring heaven (svarga) etc. w h i c h are

obtained after a long period. This is not, however, the c a se

in the n o n-vedic sentences w h e r e i n the suffixes ’L i n ’ etc c^n

de n o t e the actions e x p ressed by the principal roots as the

K a r y a to be performed.

yasca k a r y a m a v a b u d h y a t e sa niyojyah. s v a r g a k a m a s y a ca
tasminneva karye b o d d hrtaya ’nvayali, yadeva tasya
k a m y a m a n a s a d h a n a t i m a n u b h a v i t u m ksamate. na ca kriya
k s a n a b h a n g r n i k i l a n t a r a b h a v i n i ohale h ° t u r b h a v a t i .tena s^
kiryataya ni y o j y e n a s a h a ~ n a n v i y a t e . yattu_kalintarastha\r
karyam tadeva tena s a h a nvayam gantu m a r h a t i t i kriyatirp'K1 '
m a n a n t a r a v e d y a m e v a li n a d a y a h karyamabhidadhati. tacca
m a n a n t a r a o u r v a t v i d a p u r v a m i t y u e y a t e . nanu tasyapi karyasv->
k u t a h siddhih. yagadeh - RVL., p. 288.
 It is agreable that according to K.S. Ramaswami iastrl

£iromoni, the Niyogavikyirthavida of Prabhiakara decidedly goes

" _ 270
against the views of Sabara and Kumarila. According to the

Prabhakaras, Kirya that is imposed by the vedic injunction

(Vidhi) is called Dharma and this is nothing but the Niyoga

which is imposed as a Karya on the Niyojya (prompted person)

271
through the vedic ‘Lins’.

In the Vrtti text above, we have a reference to the maxim

’Lohitosnisanyiya*. Sabara under MS,3.8.12. states this

’Lohitosnisanyiya’ which is nothing but a Vidhi. It ?u»s thus

’Lohitosnisah rtvijah pracaranti* (i.e., Here do the red-

turbaned priests move). This Vidhi is found in context of the

- - 273
syena-yaga. . Here in the Vidhi-vakya, the word ’Lohitosnisa

is to be understood as a visesana of the person and as a duty.

that
The Vidhi authorises the PredicationAthe priests must wear red

turbans in respect of those particular sacrifices.

A known thing or an accomplished fact indicated through

the various cases (kiraka-padartha) is incoroorated into the

predicative sense, when the two i.e., the subject and the

predicate are stated together in a vakya. Whatever is not

directly related to the predicate of a sentence, becomes

270
Vide, Introduction to NRM, p. XXXVIII.
271
ayamabhipriyah - dharmo hi niyogah. sa ca svanistho na
kirfcit prati gunabhuta iti - RVL,’p. 14
272 gunatvicca vedena na vyavastha syat.
273
Ibid.
 • 375

obviously the yinvariafcle part of the predicate by the hypothe­

sis, *
*-adagdhadahananyiya* (i.e. burning of what is unburnt).This

is what is stated by the tLohitosnisanyaya*. Alamkarikas like

Mammata raakejl use of this M-ohitosnisanyaya’.

With help of this maxim, A Salikanatha, in the V text

above states that the word tsvargakama* (a person desiring

heaven) is understood as a visesana of the Karta.

Mandana Mis'ra, a staunch follower of the Bhatta system,

contends that though the words *-svarga’ etc. are understood as

the visesana of the person, still these are mainly concerned

with the Mcimana’ or the desire of the person doing sacrifice.

To illustrate his idea, Mandana cites the Vidhi-vakya,

<-Lohitosnisa rtvijah pracaranti’. It is because, says Mandana,

in case of Bhavana, the bhivya (i.e., that which is thought of

or desired) is always required. Svarga etc. is also understood

275
as a bhavya because of its being desired by a person.

" 276
Srimat Pratyaksvarupa Bhagavan in his Navanaprasidinl

KP, p . 227
275 ^
yadyajpi svargldayah purusavisesanatvena sruyante,tathapi
kamasrutayastatpradhSnah," ’dandi prai?ananvaha’,
*lohitosni?a rtvijah pracaranti’ iti darianat. kutah
bhlvanaylm bhavyasylpek?itatvat. svargadinim ca kimyataya
bhavyatvapratlteh. - VB under MK, p. 3055.
svargakamo yajetety^ni^ojyasamarpanaparam na tu phalapara-
miti gurumatam, tatfi^ ca sa§thadye raddhantitam -
atastatsamarpakapadena samabhivyaharat sahapathat
kriyatiriktamyrfyogamavagamayanti.lihadaya ltyuttarena
sambandhah - CS, p. 163.
commentary, very clearly explains1the idea of the abo'-'e V text

Of the VM , He states t*hat the vakya *-svargakimo yajeta’ r« ^

to the Niyojya and not to the result and this is what is want'

by Prabhakara.

evamaoi kimityaha -

{Cven (it) being so, what (it) is ? (in this context

says (the author)

K (13!4) niyojyassa ca karyam yassvakiyatvena budhyate.

*And the promoted person (Niyojya) is he who u n d « r s

the performable as his o w n ’.

tatha’oi kimityaha -

eYet what is this 7 (the author) says’ -

K (13) svargadi kamayogicca sadhyatvenaiva gamyate.

'And heaven etc. because of their being r°lated with

desire is understood as (something) to be brouoht above(sadhy*

In the K viz., ‘niyojyassa ca ........... ’etc. as

stated above, Salikanatha defines Niyojya (orompted person).

our exposition of the preceding V text, we have already

discussed Niyojya. One who understands the Karya to be

oerformed by oneself is called a Niyojya. This definition of

Niyojya is also given by Plrthasirathi Misra which is quite

<1 _ 277
similar to that of Salikanatha. In some vedic injunctions.

niyojyasea sa ucyate yah karyam mamedam karyamiti budhyat-

NRM, o.
AlsO|- vidhivakyesu mamedam karyamiti karyapratyeta
niyojyah - NK.under Ibid.,o.“4.
 277

svargaklma (one who desires heaven ) is Niyojya as he under­

stands that the Karya is imposed on him or as he is directed to

perform the Karya. In case of the vedic injunctions, th°

Svargakama cannot consider a Karya as his own, unless it ha^

278
the pow. r to produce the result desired by him. He cannot

take, therefore, the vedic sacrifice as his duty, becauco it

does not last till the production of the result. The r°lat‘on

of such a Niyojya as svargakama etc. in these injunctions

it necescary to invent Niyoga otherwise known as 4ourva(uns^-n

notency) as his duty.

The above definition of Niyojya is also stated by

Silikanitha almost in the same manner in his commentary call- n

279
Rjuvimala on the Brhati of Prabhakara.

Following Salikanatha, the author of the Tantraraha=va

3 280
also defines Niyojya in^similar manner. Por example, in •rv'

278
svargakimasya ca tasminneva karye boddhrtaya’nvayah-yadov*
tasya kamyamanasadhanatamanubhavitum ksamate. -RVL under

279
yasca karyamavabudhyate sa niyojyah - Ibid.

niyojyassa ucyate, yo mamedam karyamiti

svasambandhitayi karyamavaiti ........................... .
. ................................. ... tathahi - pustikam>n
ksiram oivedityadau pustikamah ksirapanam maya karyamit’
bod^hrtaya’nveti -TR, p.- 84.
 i 7 ■

exoressions like ’oustikamah ksiram pivet’ etc. (one wo dr ^

to be fat should drink milk), a oustikamah (one who de=lrec *>

be fat) makes the relation by way of his understanding that ’T

should drink mil k ’.

It can be mentioned here that Niyojya is the ^ost i^-or-

tant oerson as without him a Niyoga cannot be a true Niyooa,

Dr. Ganqanath Jha, in his Probhakara-.Mimamsa, has very

oA 1
intelligently discussed Niyoga and Niyojya.

Salikanatha defines Niyoga in K (26) of the VM wp.ic”, •••*»

shall discuss in course of our exoosition of the correspond-* p .

■

K text.

In the second half of the K(18) above, th° author of th'

VM states that svarga etc. in exoressions like ’\qniho+ram

juhuyat svargakamah* is understood as the sadhya (to br brou

about) because of its being desired by the karta (oerson).

all sacrifices, kimana (desire) becomes the object which is ’o

be brought about tand svarga etc. which is the sadhya(which c

to be brought about) due to its being related to kamana(desi .w

promots a oerson to action. Svarga etc. promots a oerson to

281
"To explain - the Niyoga cannot be a true Niyoga, untill
there is a Niyojya, the person to be prompted to exertion,
as without exertion there can b° no Niyoga, then again,
without the agent there can be no exertion, nor can an
agent DUt forth exertion - and be a Niyogya - untill hr *c
entitled to the und°rtaking resulting from that exertion” .
PSP, d . 164.
 379

actions because of being desired by him.

The definition of Niyojya given by S§likanatha has been

ci - _
critised and refuted by the vedantins like Citsukhacarya, Citsukha

while refuting Niyojya of Salikan5tha puts a question as to

whether Niyojya is secondary (gauna) to karya or the primary

(i.e. the enjoyer of the result) to it ? If it is said to be

secondary, then it will be related to the kriya by reason of being

the agent. For, the relation of the karta arises only through

the kriya and as such how is it possible that karya which is

other than the kriyi gets it related through the Karti ? If again

it is said that Niyojya is the primary to Niyoga or KIrya, then

it can be included in Adhikari by which also Karya which is

different from kriyi cannot be brought about and no third type

other than the guna and pradhana is not possible. The definition

of Niyojya is not proper as the prompted person must be either

gauna or pradhina. Again if it is said that the state of being

the secondary is the agent of the Karya which is nothing but the

kriyi and the same is the Niyojya of the Karya which is different

from the kriya^ then it has no justification. For,when the

Karya as different from the kriya is made out^then the relation

of Niyojya cannot be made out and vice versa. Thus it will

/ 282
involve the fallacy of logical see-saw (anyonyasraya).

kasclyam niyojyo naraa yadanvayitkriyatiriktaniyogasiddhih 7

sa kim kiryam prati gunabhutah ? pradhanjjjbhuta va ? nadyit>,_
gunatve kartrtvanvayantarbhavat. na dvitiyah.pradhinye’dhikarya-
nvayapatat,.1.... karyamatmlyatvena yo*vabudhyate sa niyojya
iti cet....... niyojyatvamiti vi^ayabhedadbheda iti cet,
maivam ..... parasparasrayaprasaftgat. CS, pp. 175-76.
 380

sadhyavisayaiva hi sarvatra kamani bhavati, tena

tatsambandhatsadhyabhutam svargadi kamyamanatayi

purusam visinasti -

'Desire (kamana) is, indeed, in all cases with regard

to that object to be brought about, so, heaven etc. being the

object to be brought about because of their being r-'.la ted to

that (desire) and because of its being desired specifically

characterises a person’ -

K(19) tena sadhyatvaparyantasvargadicchavisesitay tadeva

saknuyitkaryam boddhum yatkirayasadhanar^

'Hence, the person characterised by the desire of

heaven etc. being that which is to be brought about,can unders

tand only that performable which is the means of (attaining)

the desired object’.

V(ig) atra kascidaha - yadyapi kamanayogatsidhyata

svargadinamavagamyate, tatha’pi prakrtakaryasidhyatva-

vagamo nispramanaka eva, anyasadhyasylpi sadhyatvlsam-

bhavit. na ca yat kimyate, tasya’vasyam sidhanamasti.

manorathaparamparahrtacetaso hi tannasti, yanna

kamanavisayibhavati. na ca tasya sarvasya sidhanam

bhavati, sarvajnatvamapi kecit kamayante, na ca

tasyopayasambhah. atha tadicchavato’tatsidhane kartrt

nopaoadyate. katharii nooaoadyate. drsyante hi

gramibhigamanakama api yadrfcc>iikisu kriyasu pravartamanah.

 381

api ca sarvo’bhyudayarthyeva purusah, tathipi priyasasta-

dvirodhis^vendriyarthesu pravartamlno drsyate - iti.

atrocyate - svargadikam kamyamanasya tadeva karyatayi

boddhumavakalpate, yadeva tasya kamyamanasya

siddhyanugunam. anyathi hi tatklmina sata tatkaryataya’

navabuddham syat. aparityaktatatkamani^ sambandho hi

tatsadhanam karyataya’ vabudhyate. tasmadyatkamino

yatkaryatayopadisyate, tattasya kamyasya sadhanamiti

jpiyojyakaryanvayinupapattyaiva gamyate.

lHere (in this context) someone says (bbserves) - aifehoOgh

although the bringing about of heaven etc. is understood because

of its being desired, yet the knowledge of the bringing about of

the true performable is without having any source of valid

knowledge, for, there is the possibility of the bringing about of

that which is brought about by something other. And it is not

that whichever ^is desired has necessarily a means, for, one whose

mind is stolen away by desire has not that which does not become

the object of the desire. And all his desires have no-the-means.

Even someone desires omniscience (the state of being omniscient)

and its (of the desired) means is impossible . Then the agenthood

of one desirous of that (omniscience) does not arise in respect of

bringing about that (omnscience). How it does not arise ^

Because persons even being desirous of going to the village are

seen (found) engaged in unanticipated actions. Moreover, all

oersons seeking prosperity are often seen engaged in such sensual

 382

objects as are opposed to that (prosperity).

Here (it) is said (replied) - the person desirous of

heaven etc. prepares to know that as the performable which is a

help for his attainment of the desired (object). Otherwise by

him is desirous oftthat (heaven), that (heaven) as the performa-

ble is not understood; for, the means of attaining that(heav°n)

as related to that desire which is not given up is understood as

the performable. Hence, that which is directed as the

performable in respect of one desirous (of something) is the

means of that desirable and so, it is understood because of the

non-obtainment of the relation with the performable of the

prompted person’.

In ’sadhyantaparyanta............ ’etc. of the K and

’atra kascidaha ...... ..’etc. of the V text above, Salikanatha

presents the view of Mandana Misra and then the author rejects

the same. According to Mandana, although because of its being

desirable, the heaven etc. is to be brought about (i.e. to be

made out), yet there is no prod'f in respect of the kriya as

stated by the Vidhi, as being the Sadhya (i.e., to be brought

about). It is because there is no such rule that the object

which is desired has necessarily a means. A man whose mind is

stolen away by desire, for him there is not a single object

which is noidesired by him. But all his desires have no

283
na jatu^klmah kamanamupabhogena samyat^havisaM krsnavart-
meva bhuya evabhivardhate^ MT, p.2/94.
 383

means for their attainment. It is for this reason that someone

m a y be desirous of being ommscient, but it is not possible for

having a means of obtaining the omniscience. Thus he who

desires omniscience has no agenthood in respect of the attaining

the state of being the omniscient. It is because of the fact

that the persons desirous of going to the village are seen

engaged in unanticipated actions. As for insta n c e ,’gramam

gacchan trnam sprs'ati* (one going to the village, touches the

grass). Here, footing on the grass is an unantidipated action,

because the intention of the person is to go to the village and

not to touch or to give steps on the grass. Thus in the view of

Mandana Mis'ra, there is no proof in respect of the knowledge

regarding the bringing about of the kirya.

But this view of Mandana is not acceptable to

•*»*

Salikanatha. In ’atrocyate ........... * etc. of the V text

^ ■c _
above, Salikanatha rejects the view 6f Mandana Misra. Salikanatha

opines that a person desirous of heaven etc, is prepared to

admit that object in the form of Karya, which (object) is

conducive for the accomplishment of the desired object. If it

is not admitted then a person desirous of something will not

%
understand that desired object as his Karya. That which is the

Kirya of the person desirous of something is the means of the

>«•

desired object. Thus Salikanatha refutes the vie w of Mandana.

evam sati kirn p h a l a m i t y i ’ha - 'such being the case

what is the result ? (in this context) says (the author)-

 384

X(20) linadistatra kiryancet kriyimevi’vabodhayet.

samanvayo niyojyena tadanimeva hiyate.

’If the Lih etc. is the performable, (then) (it) will

convey only the action. Then only (its) unity with the prompted

person may be avoided’.

In the K text viz., ’linadistatra....... ’etc. above,

Salikanatha states the result that may arise in respect of

admitting the Lins etc. as the Karya. Salikanatha contends that

if the Lins etc. are admitted as the Kirya then the Karya w i l

convey the Kriya which is, according to the Prabhakaras,

different from the Karya. Salikanatha in K (25) of the VM IT,

states that the KriyI is different from the Karya. It is

stated in the K above, under discussion that if the Karya

conveys the Kriya then the unity of the Karya with the Niyojya

will be lost i.e., it will be impossible to maintain the unity

between the Kaya and the Niyojya, We have already discussed the

relation between the Karya and the Niyojya-

kathamityaha -

’How is tt ? Says (the autho^* -

K(21&22) kriya hi ksanikatvena na kalantarabhivinaiysvargadeh

kamyamanasya samartha jananam pratijt istasya’janiki sa

ca niyojyena phallrthina/’ karyatvena na sambandhamarhati

ksanabhangin}

'For, the action because of its being momentary is not

capable of producing the heaven etc. which being desired,takes

 335

place at a subsequent period? That (action) perishable within a

moment in the form of performable, because of its not producing

the desired object does not deserve relation with the prompted

person, the one desiring the result*.

V(21 & 22a) karyavirodhi karmeti pramanantarasiddham. parisnando

hyuttaradesasamyogodayapavargityasutaravinisi,

svargasca niyatadesantara - kalantarabhogyah.

’It is known by other source of valid knowledge that

the performable is opposed to the act, for, the action is

immediately perishable as because there is the (process of ) its

connection with the latter stage (i.e. the result).’

In ’kriya hi .............. 'etc. and ’karyavirodhi..

...... ’etc. of the Ks and the V text above, Silikanatha explains

how the Kriyi is not capable of producing the desired result and

how it cannot make relation with the Niyojya. It is stated in

the K above that the Kriyi is momentary (i.e., it perishes

immediately after being performed) and the phala in the shape of

heaven etc. is to take place at a subsequent period and as such

the Kriyi cannot bring about the desired object. Thus the Kriya

because of its not being the producer of the desired object

cannot be the Kirya and as such it cannot be related to the Niyo­

jya who is desirous of getting for himself.a result in the shaoe

of heaven etc. Hfe have already stated that whichever is a Karya

is, in the view of the Prabhakaras, worthy of being related to

the Niyojya.
 386

In the V text above, the author states that the Karma

(i.e., the Kriya) is opposed to the Karya. It is because the

Kriyi perishes after connecting the latter stage and the heaven

the desired object is enjoyable in a different olade at a

different time and as such there can be no relation between the

two (i.e., the Kriya and the Phala).

V(218.22b) nanu pritimatravacanasvarga iti sasthidye sadhitam,

pritisadhanesu dravyesu svargasabdaprayogat. na ca

tesu svarupanibahdhana eva tatprayogah, prityavagame

tadabhavat, na ca tatsadhanavacanata tadanabhi-

dhine ghatate, tadabhidhanabhyupagame tadvacakataiva

laksanaya tatsadhane prayogopapatteh, tatra

saktikaloanapariksayat. akhandasabdataya ca

dandinyiyasylsambhavlttadantargatasya dandasabdasya

dandapratyayakatvasambhavit. prites'ca karmlntarabhavi-

tvamapi na saihbhavatyeva.

’In the beginning of the chapter VI (of the Mimamsa-

sutra). It is established that heaven denotes only satisfaction,

for, the word heaven is used in respect of the materials that

bring forth the satisfaction. And the use of that (i*e,, heaven)

is not in respect of the materials ohly as they are, for .there

is the absence of the use of that (heaven) in respect of there

being no satisfaction. And in the absence of the denotation of

that (heaven) , the state of denoting the means of that (heaven)

does not arise. In the the case of admitting the denotation of

that (heaven), there takes place the state of denoting that

 387

(satisfaction); for, the use can be knj*pn in respect of bringing

about that (i.e, heaven) by means of implication (Laksani) due

to there being the exhaustion of the assumption of the denotative

power. And also because of the maxim 'one having a stick* being

incapable due to its being indivisible and because of the word

’stick’ included therein (i.e., in dandi) having the possibility

of being the conveyor of the meaning of the stick. And it is

impossible for the satisfaction to arise subsequent to heaven.

In ’nanu pritiraatravacanassarga........ ’etc. of the ¥

text above, the author presents the view of Mandana Misra who in

his work Bhavanavlveka. states that the heaven denotes

satisfaction and also asserts that his view seeks support from

the Bhasya of Sahara. Sahara under MS.6.1.5, states that the

word heaven stands only for a form of satisfaction and it is only

in its secondary figurative sense that it is applied to the thing

or substance that produces satisfaction (priti). As a matter of

fact, people always describe heaven in the sense of satisfaction

or happiness. Mandana Misra in his work Bhavanaviveka has

discussed tne present issue under discussion at lengtu. According

to Mandana, the word ’svarga’ is used in the sense of only the

priti (satisfaction) and this is, he says, what is stated in the

284 - _. . .
dravyanam karmasamyoge gunatvenabhi-sambandhah. MS. 6.1.5.,

tasmat anvayavyatirekabhyam etadavagamyate, pritau

svargasabdo vartate iti. SB. under ibid.
 I

388

beginning of the sixth Adhyaya of Mimamsa - sutra. The word

.
’svarga’ is used, says Mandana, in respect of the substances

that can bring satisfaction to a person.

It may be pointed out here that according to Mandana,

because of the object thought of being desired, the words

svargaklma etc. are bent on the word svarga. The state of the

visesana (qualification) being the principal is shown in respect

_ 285
of the words ’Dandi’ (one having a stick) etc.

V(21 & 22c) ucyate. na pritimltravacanataya jyotistomadicodanasu

svargasabdasya prayogo’vakakpate, arthavidesu

duhkhasarnbhinnacirataropabhogyabhijfcasopaneyapritis'rava

nat. tatra yadi vidhyuddQsagatassvar£as*abdastatha-

vidhapritiparatayi na varnyate, tadi’tiparoksa’rthavi-

dapadanam vrt1?radrt§ na bhavediti, tadanugunyena

tadrsyimeva pritau svargasabdah prayukta iti nisciyate

tathabhuta ca sa niyatameva desantarabhogya. ato na

karmanantarabhaviniti, na tatra karmana asutaravinasi-

nassadhanata’vakalpate, yasmin hi pu^varttini

yannispadyatej tattasya sidhanamiti lokapratitih. ata

eva ca vinastasya’pi karmanassastrena sadhanatvam

- ^ -
bodhyata iti ye bruvate, te*pi nirastah. evam ca

svas*utaravinasinj kriya svargakamini niyojyena saha

karyati sambandhum nirhati,svargam prati sadhanatva-

nupapattth.
gigR ....... 1 ....... ..........................“ ~
’apeksitatvat bhavyasya svargakima hi ttatparlh/
visesanapra^K^dhanatvam dandityidisu darsitam //
‘ ‘ BVl57, vide MK, p. 3055.
 389

*(lt is) said - one does not assume the use of the word

heaven in respect of the injunctions like Jyotistoma as denoting

only the satisfaction; for t the satisfaction which is attained

being not connected with pain which is enjoyable forever and

which is attainable by the desire in respect of the corroborative

statements. If there again, the word heaven as stated in the

injunction is not described as being bent on such satisfaction,

then the indirect function of the words of the corroborative

statements does not stand wanted and as such it is ascertained

that the word heaven is used in respect of such satisfaction as

being helped by that (i.e. corroborative statement). And being

in that (heaven) that satisfaction is invariably enjoyable in a

different place. Hence, (the satisfaction) does not arise

subsequent to an act and so, in that case, one does not assume

the quickly perishable act as being the means that which,indeed

preceding something is performed, is the means of that (action),

this is the popular knowledge. Hence, they are also rejected who

maintain that the state of being the means is understood by

means of scripture in respect of the immediately perishable act.

And thus that quickly perishable act does not deserve to be

related in the form of the performable with the prompted person

who is desirous of heaven, for, it cannot be the means towards

heaven*.

In ’ucyate. na pritimatravacanataya ......... * etc.

■c . - -
Salikanatha rejects the view of Mandana Misra who contends that

the words svarga etc, denote only satisfaction. But Salikanatha

 390

contends that the word ’svarga* is not used in respect of the

sacrifices viz., ’Jyotistoma’ as denoting only the satisfac-

x 1 *

tion. According to SSlikanatha, even in the case of Arthavadas

( i.e. the corroborative statements), we find that there is the

satisfaction attained from the desired object devoid of pain

and which is enjoyable forever. It is also stated in the V

text above that the K^r[ya, because of its being perishable

immediately after its performance, cannot be the means of

producing result. Because it is a popular belief that whatever

is performed in the presence of which becomes its means. Thus

the Kriyi cannot make any relation as being the performable

with the Niyojya who is desirous of (obtaining) heaven. It is

because the Kriyi is not the means of obtaining the heaven.

It may be added that Sahara and Kumarila state that the

persons can only be inclined to do any action owing to its

beneficial effects and no injunction or the knowledge of Karya

as the Prabhakaras contend, can actuate any person to undertake

the action. It is also stated that whatever is the object of

Satisfaction is that to be brought about. According to

Sahara and Kumarila, the words svargakima, etc. denote only

svarga as important and other things are as subordinate to it.

But Silikanatha contends that according to the Prabhikaras the

Karya is the imoortant and svargakama is subordinate to it.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
A Q / m

yadi ca yago na prityartho bhavet.asadhakam karma bhavet..

...... yo hi prityarthah sa sldhyate. SB, under MS.6.1.2.
K(23) tasmanniyojyasambandhasamartham vidhivacibhilV karyam

kalantarasthiyi kriyato bhinnamucya

’Therefore, by (tha sentences) denoting injunction is

stated the Derformable caoabl=> of making relation with the

orompted person, which lasts for a subsequent period and which is

different from the action.

V(23a) nanu kriyaiva karyatayocyatam, astu saiva o h a l a s a d h a n a m ,

tena tasya api niyojyasambandho ghatata eva. na tvasau

ksanabhangini dehantarapabhogyasvargasadhanatam

k a thamava1ambisyate. ucyate. varam tasya eva tadanuoa-

pattya ci rataravasthayitakalpana, na p u naradrstasy?srutaevj

tadatirekino’rthasya kalpana.

yadi va karmana eva saktiravasthayinityabhyugamyatam.

pramanantaraviruddhi.

’(Please) state then the action in the form of the

performable and l=>t it be the means of (producing) the result. Or

that act, the relation of even of that (action) with the oromot^n

person does not take olace. But that (action) is not immedi c • 1\

perishable and how it will be adooted as the state of brino t r

means of (producing) heaven which is enjoyable by a seoar^t° ->odv

after the perishing of the present body. (It is ) said - rat v>r

there is the assumption of the permanent existence of t h a t

 392
(action) because of there being the non-obtainment of that

(heaven) and not again there is the ao oumption assumption of

that object other than that (action) which is unseen and unheard.

If again it is said that, admit then the power of the

act as lasting forever, that is also, both because of being

contradictory to other source of valid knowledge do not deserve

to be assumed, for, that which is uncontradictory is capable of

being imagined for the attainment of the known (object). And

the state of the quickly perishable act as lasting forever is

contradictory to the source of valid knowledge*.

In ’tasmanniyojyasambandha ^ samartham ............ *etc.

and *nanu kriyaiva klryatayocyatam, ........................ ’etc

of the K and V text respectively as stated above, Salikanatha

asserts that Karya which is capable of making the relation with

the Niyojya and which lasts for long, is different from the

Kriya. Thereby £he rejects the objection that the Kriyi may be

called as the Karya. According to the objection, the Kriya is

capable of being the means of bringing about the desired result

and as such the Kriyi can be related to the Karya and the Kriya

is not perishable within a moment. But Salikanatha does not

accept this view and he also discards another objection that the

power of the Kriya or Karma lasts long. According to Salikanatha

it cannot be admitted so. Because it will be contradictory to

the source of valid knowledge. Whatever is uncontradictory is

capable of being assumed for the bringing about of the known

object and as the Kriya is perishable within a moment, so its

 393

power also cannot last long. That the Karya is different from

the Kriya is also stated by Salikanitha in K- (25) which^shall

find in the subsequent pages. The word ’vidhivacibhih* in the

K above is used by Raminujacarya as ’vidhividibhih’ which seems

, . 237
to be appropriate.

V{236) saktimati ci’tite saktirapyatiteti pramantarasiddhamiti

na sa’pi sthayinj sakya kalpayitum. api ca’sfraye

qjvrtte, kimisraya saktiravatisthatam. atmas^riteti

cet. ni’nyadiya saktiranyatra vartate, pramananta-

ravirodhideva. kirTca s'aktimatyasati, sakteh, phalam na

yuktam. saktimaddhi sidhanam, na s*aktih kevali,

anyathia saktitvam na syat.

’And one possessed of power having passed, the power

is also passed (and) as such it is established by other source

of valid knowledge (and) that (power) also cannot be assumed as

lasting for ever. And again, in the event of the substratum

not being there, resorting to which the power will exist ? If

it is said that it is there as pertaining to the self. The

power belonging to something other cannot exist in something

else, for, incontradictory to other source of valid knowledge.

Mpreover, when that having the power being not there, the

result from the power should not be therefore, that which ha?

power is the means and not alone the power, otherwise there will

be no state of being the power.’

In ’saktimati ca’tite .......................... ’etc,

287 Vide, TR, p.55

 394

of the V text above, Salikanatha rejects the v i e w of Kumarila who

contends that when that having a power is lost, the power belong­

ing to it is also lost and it is established by the sourlie of

valid knowledge. Therefore, the power that belongs to the Karya,

says Kumarila, cannot be imagined as lasting forever. Moreover,

he says that without the Asraya, the Asrayi cannot exist.

According to Salikanatha this power cannot resort to the self as

Kumarila argues. Because, a power belonging to one object

cannot exist in another, for, it will be contradictory to the

source of valid knowledge. Again, when there is not the object

having power, the power without its object, the v e r y substratum,

cannot produce result. Otherwise, the result will be obtained

without a means. As we know, that which has power or capacity is

the means and not the power alone. Same is the case the Karya

also. The Karya which is also the substratum of its power, lasts

forever. Thus Salikanatha asserts that without the Karya, its

power cannot bring about the result.

V(23c) nanu yagadikriya devataradhanepayabhuta sat! karyatayocya-

-tam, sa tatpratyasattidvarena kalantare’pi phalam

janayitum®lameva. devata phaladanasamarthi karmabhirara-

-dhyate, s a ’radhita prasidatl, prasanna ca kartrnkalantarepi

phalena yojayatyeva - iti.

’Let the actions viz., sacrifices etc. because of their

being the means of worshipping the deity be called in the form of

performable (and) that (action) by way of its being in close

proximity with the performable is indeed, capable of producing

the result even at a subsequent period. The deity capable of

giving fruit (result) is worshipped by actions. That (deity)

being worshipoed becomes pleased and satisfied 4 N make* the

doers (i.e., the worshipers) possessed of result even at a

subsequent period*.

In lnanu yagadikriya ............. ...*etc. of the V text

above, Salikanatha presents a purvapaksa according to which the

actions like yaga etc. can be accepted as the Kirya and not as

different from it. In support of their view, the advocates of

the purvapaksa, contend that the yagas etc. are the means of

worshipping the deities. They also contend that the action viz.,

yaga etc. can produce the result in future. The deities are

worshipoed by the actions because of their being capable of

bringing about the result to the sacrificer . The deities when

ie
worshipped become pleased with the sacri^er and in return bring

the award in the form of heaven etc. to the sacrificer. Of

course, not simultaneously with the performance of the action but

at a subsequent period.

It may be added here that from the injunctions viz.,

*jyotistomena svargakimo yajeta* (i.e. one who desires heavnn

should perform the Jyotistoma sacrifice) etc.^ the bringing

about of the heaven of the Jyotistoma sacrifice is understood.

But there is divergent opinion among the philosophers. Mandana

Misra who accepts the istasadhanata as the vakyartha, contends

that the relation of that to be brought about and that brings

 396

about .of the heaven and the sacrifice is the primary sense.

According to Parthasarathi Misra, there is no relation of the

sadhya and the sldhana of the heaven and the sacrifice. But

according to the Prabhakaras the relation of the sadhya and the

sadhana of the heaven and the sacrifice is not understood from

the verbal testimony but from the upadana (i.e., the necessary
v 288
requirement of an injunctions).

Thus sllikanatha in the V text presents the view of

the opponents that yaga etc. can be called the Karya.

V (23d) naitadevam, yagSdinim devataradhanahetutve pramana-

btiavit. na hi devatiridhanopaypbhutoyaga ityatra

kincitpramanamasti. nanu devapujartha eva yajissmar-

yate. puja" ca sarva pujyaman'aradhanarthetyavagatam.

_ ti _
ucyate. na smrtih pramanam, smritvadeva.

pramanantarapeksayi, ca smrtinamarthavarnanam, tada-

nujfvarttittasam, na ca pramanintarena devataradhano-

payata yigasya’ vagamyata ityuktam. ato devatoddes'ena

dravyatyago yaga iti, gaunam devatapujatmakatvamavaga-

ntavyam, puji ’pi pujyoddes“enaiva hi pravarttate - iti

api ca sa karmabhiraradhyate, y a ’radhanam pratipadyate

nanaderagamina p u r u s e n a ’nustheyamanayagatmakabujavaga-

masca devataya iti, pramanaviruddhameva,vigrahavatasca

p r a t i p a t t i - ' y o g i t t a s y a ca vedena ’n a d i n a ’radhyataya

pratipadanamapi pramanantaraviruddhameva, tasyi’

riaditvanupapatteh. devatadhikarane (MS. 9.1.4) ca

288 Vide, FN.6 under PP, p. 436.

 397
prapancenS’yamartho nirasta iti, n a ’tivatra yatitavyam.

•-This is not as such. For, there is no source of valid

knowledge in respect of the sacrifices etc. as being the cause

of worshipping the deity. Because, there is no any proof (coming

from any valid knowledge) that the sacrifice is the means of

worshipping the deity. If it is argued, that the meaning of the

root *yaj’ (to worship) is remembered (known) in the sense of

worshipping of the deity. And it is known that all the worships

are meant for obeisance that which is worthy of being worshipped,

(it is) said - recollection is not the source of valid knowledge

because of its being the state of recollection. And compared to

other source of valid knowledge, the recollections are the

descriptions of the objects. Because, they (recollections)foll6w

those (i.e., other sources). It is said that the sacrifice is

not understood as being the means of invoking the deity by any

other source of valid knowledge. Hence, a sacrifice is the

offering of the materials to the deities and as such, the worship

of the deity is to be understood as secondary, worship also takes

place in favour of one who is to be worshipped. Moreover, that

(deity) is worshipped by means of actions, which deserves

worship. It is also contradictory to the source of valid

knowledge that the knowledge of the deity proceeds from worship

in the form of sacrifice being performed by a person visiting

different directions and that having a body has 4jhe compatibility

for knowledge. And the presentation of that (having a body) as

being worshipped by the vedas which are without a beginning is

 398

contradictory to other source of valid knowledge, because of the

non-obtainment of the beginninglessness of that (having a body).

In the Devatidhikarana (MS. 9.1.4), this idea has been rejected

in details and as such nothing more is to be attempted here.

In *-naitadevam. y a g a d i n a m ......... 'etc. of the V text

as stated above, Salikanitha refutes the view that the action

like sacrifices because of their being the means of worshipping

the deities, can be called the Karya. According to Salikanatha,

this view of the opponents cannot stand to reason as there is no

pramana in respect of the sacrifices as being the means of

worshipping the deities. Also there is no pramlna in respect of

H ie
the sacrifice as being JL«- means of worshipping the deities. It

is known to us that it is accepted by most of the Mimamsakas

that the sacrifices are the means of producing results. It may

be urged here that the verbal root eyaj' is recollected in the

sense of worshipping the deities and it is also known that all

sorts of sacrifices are meant for the worshipping of one who is

worthy of being worshipped. But Salikanatha argues that

whichever is the recollection,is not a pramana because of its

being recollected and also because,the recollection describes

only the objects of the pramanas which the recollection follows.

Again by no otjher pramana it is k n o w that the sacrifices are the

means of worshipping the deities. And a sacrifice is nothing

but the offering of the materials to the deities. Thus,according

to Silikanatha, the worshipping of the deities is to be understood

as secondary . This is also stated by Sahara in his

 399

BhSsya’?89
£ —
In the V text above, Salikanatha makes a referende to the

Devatidhikarana (MS, 9.1.4,) and states that in that Adhikarana

it is shown that the Karya which is to be effected cannot be held

to lead to result through the worshipping of the deities to whom

the sacrifice is offered.

Thus Silikanatha rejects the view that the Kriya because

of its being the means of worshipping the deities, can be called

KSrya.

V(23e) atha’pi syatpurusasamskarahetubhutaiva kriya'jsabdena

karyatayocyate, tasyasca svargakimadipurusasambandhat

purusasamskaradeva kalantare ohalam bhavisyati - iti.

tanna. purusasamskarkatve pramanabhavat. na hi

pramanantaratah, sabdato vi purusasamskarahetuti

_ -

yagadinamvasiyatAit/ H karmanyarambhabhavyatvadi"

(MS. A. 11. pa.l Su.20) ityatroktam.

4Even then, if it is said that the action being the

cause of the purification of the person (sacrificer) is called

the performable and because of that (action) being related to

the person desirous of heaven etc. will be (bring) the fruit

from the purification of the person at a subsequent period. It

is not (cannot be) so. For, there is no proof as to the state

of being the purification of the person.’ It is stated in the

sutra "karmanyarambhabhiavyatvat" (MS.11.1.20) etc. that it is

not ascertained from the other pro6i or from verbal testimony

api ca yigo nama devatlpuja. puja ca pujaniyam prati

gunabhuta loke drsVate. SB under MS. 9.1.4.
 400

that the sacrifices *etc. are the causes of the state of the

purification of the person (i.e., the sacrificer)’.

In eatha’pi syat purusasamskarahetubhutaiva ....... ’etc.

of the V text above, Silikanatha rejects another view that the

Kriya being the cause of the purification of the person (i.e.,

the sacrificer) is called the Karya. According to this view

again, the Kriya is related to the person who is desirous of

(obtaining) heaven etc. and as such from the samskira of the

person, the Kriya can produce the result at a subsequent period.

The word ‘purusa’ in the V text refers to yajamina (i.e., the

sacrificer). Silikanatha as an advocate of the Karyavakyarthavida,

does not accept this view. It is becuase he says, there is no

proof regarding the purification of the person. In support of

his assertion, Silikanatha quotes a sutra in half, from the

- _. _ _ 290
Mimamsa-sutra, viz., MS.11.1.20. Under this sutra, Sahara,

in his Bhasya, it is said, contends that the sacrifices etc. are

not the causes of ourifying the sacrificers. From no other

pramlna or from the sastra it can be ascertained that the

sacrifices etc. have the state of being the means of purification

of the persons. Hence, the actions viz., th^ sacrifices etc.

cannot be called the Kirya. In the view of the Prabhakaras,the

Karya is different from the Kriya. We have already found in

K(23) of the VM, that the Karya is different from the Kriya and

The sutra in full is as follows

" karminyarambhabhlvyatvat krsivat pratyarambham phalani
syuh"’
.
 401

again in K(25) of the present chapter of the VM , we shall find

fo ;
that the Karya is stated^be different from the K^rya.

It may be mentioned here that Ramanujlclrya also takes

291
the present issue under discussion in a simpler way.
>*

Thus Silikanatha refutes the view that the Kriya purifies

the sacrificer and is the Karya.

K(23f) nanu kriyaiva karyatayecyatam, phalasldhanata ca tasya

eva*sriyatam. tadanyathanupapattya tu kincidapyaram

tajjanyam phalodayanugunam k“alintarasthayyatmasrayam

parikalpyatam, ma bhuttasyl lihadivacyata - iti.

ucyate - taddhi tadanupapattyi kalp^ate.yadyasyepapadakam.

na ca kriyajanyena’nyena phalajanakena kalpitena kriyayah

phalasadhanatopapaditi bhavati.na hi sadhanasidhanam tasya

sidhanam bhavati, avantaravylparo va, saktirva tatsidha-

natam nirvahayati. vyaparayogitayaiva saktimatam sadhanata

yatah, na ca'tmasamavayyarthantaram karmanamavantaravyi-

parah, na’pi sakiiriti, na tasya'rthipattigamyata yuktS*

kihtvanviticbhidhSne sthite, niyojyanugunyicchabdjrtavacya-

taivociteti suktam - niyojyasambandhasamartham

kalintarasthayi karyam kriyatiriktam linidibhirevocyate -

iti.

*-Let then, the action be called the performable and let

the state of being the means of (producing) fruit be with that

tarhi yajaminapurusamskarataya kriya karygtayocyatam.

samskrts'ca purusah tfalantare phalabhlgbhavisyatlti. maivam.-
samskirakatve pramanabhavit. TR, p. 55.

9
 402

(action). But in the case of not otherwise attaining that(fruit)

please assume other something being produced by that (action) as

conducive for the production of the fruit, which lasts for

another time and resorts to the self. That (action) should not

be expressed by the Lih etc.

(It is) said (replied) - that (object) is assumed by the

non-attainment of that which causes it (the object) to occur. The

instrumentality of the desired object of the action does come

to be effective by means of assumed producer of the fruit, which

is produced by the action. For, a means of another means cannot

be its (i.e., of the instrumentality of the desired object)

means or the intermediary function or the power accomolishes the

achievability of that (i.e., desired object). For, those having

the power can have the state of being the means by means of being

possessed of function. And the other object inhering in the self

cannot be the intermediary function of the actions nor also the

power and so it is not proper to understand that (other object)

by means of postulation. But in the case of the expression of

the correlated being there, it is proper that its (i.e., other

meaning) state of being expressed by other words because o*f their

being conducive to the orompted person and so it is stated very

well - the performable which is capable of making relation with

the promoted person, which lasts for a subsequent period and

which is different from action,is expressed by the Lins etc.'

In the V text vir., *nanu kriyaiva karyatayocyatam ....

........’etc. of the VM above, the author presents an objection

 403

according to which, the Karya should not be stated to be denoted

by the suffixes Lins etc. and then the author rejects the

objection. According to the objection the Kriya is, indeed, the

Karya and the substratum of the phalasadhanati (i.e., the

achievability of the desired object). And in the case of the

non-attainment of the desired object otherwise, something other

produced the Kriyi as conducive for the production of the result

may be assumed and something ever remains and resorts to the

Atman. Thus according to the objection,the Lins etc. do not

«**

denote the Klrya. But Silikanatha as a follower of the

Prabhakara school, does not accept this view and as such wit^h

the V text viz., lucyate-taddhi tadanupapattyi kalpyate .....

..... etc. as stated above, discards the objection. We have

already stated in several occasions that Salikanitha contends

that the Lins etc. denote Klrya and that Karya is caoable of

bringing about the desired result. According to Silikanatha,by

means of something produced by the Kriya, the Kriya comes to

be capable of producing the phalasidhanati. It is because, in

that case there will be two sadhanas (means) - one is the Kriya

and the other is that which is produced by the Kriyi and which

will lead to the final result. But it cannot be said so,

because a means of a means cannot be the means. So, the Kriya,

says Silikanatha, cannot be a means of bringing about the

desired object but the Kirya which ever remains. Again that

Karya is denoted by the suffixes Lins etc. and thus the Karya

can make a relation with the Niyojya. The last line of the
 4 04

V text viz., iniyojyasambandhasamartham......... ’etc. as stated

above, is not a Quotation from some other work but is the

repetition of the text of the K(23) with slight difference.

It may be added here that the present issue under discu-

- -
ssion has also been taken up by Ramanujacarya in an easier way.

V(23g) atraisi orakriya codanasutre karyarthati orati'eadita,

sasthadye tasyaiva kiryasya svasambandhitaya bodhyas-

svargakamadimiyojya iti vyutoaditam. svargakamana ca

niyojyavisesanamityekidasadye (M.D. 11.1.1) vyutoaditam.

tasya ca karyasya niyojya^J"visesanibhutakamyotoattih^-

tutvamiti badaryadhikarane (M.D.3.1.3) raddhantitam.

tacca tathabhutam karyam kriyarueam na bhavati, tasya:;

phalasadhanatvayogat. devatiradhanamukhena tivat

phalasadhanata nastiti devatadhikarane (M.D. 9.1.4)

vyutpaditam. purusasamskaramukhena nastiti

"karmanyarambhabhavyatvadi" tyatroktam. karmanan,

tacchakterva sthlyita neti ca’purvadhikarane (M.0.2.1..;

pra-Upaditam. ato niyojyinvayamukhena manantaraourvan'at-

masamavayi kiryam li’nadibhirabhidhiyata ityanekanylya?-

adhyam . karyarTca krtisadhyam. krtisca oumsam oravatr.=

eva. na ca’sau bhavlrthamantarena’stiti, tatsambaddha

nanu krlyaiva karyatayocyatam. tasyasca phalasadhanatvasra

nanyathanuoaoattya.. ............. naiva-1 - na ca .......
‘........... . na hi sadhanasaBhanam (tasya sadhana")
syat. TA, o. 55.
 4

©vocyata iti bhavarthldhikarane (2.1.1) sthitam. sa c?

bhavlrthassambadhyamanastamavacchinattiti,sabdantara-

dhikarane (M .D. 2.2.1) nirnitam. visayabhutasca

bhavarthah karanibhavatiti badaryadhikarane evoktam,

svakaryasadhane bhavarthe purusasyaisvaryamiti ca

tatraivoktam.

lHer© (is) this process - In the codanasutra (i.e.,

MS. 1.1.2), the meaning of the oerformable is e stabll d. Ti

the beginning of the sixth chanter (i.e., of the Mimamsi- sntra ;

it is stated that the prompted person is one who is desirous ■>'

obtaining for himself som^ desired object in the form of he aV s

etc. and is denoted by the sentence because of his being

related to the oerformable. And in the beginning of the

eleventh chanter (M.S.11.1.1), it is shown that desire for

heaven etc. is the attribute of the orompted oerson. In the

Badaryadhikarana (MS. 3.1.3), it is concluded that it is this

oerformable which is the cause of producing the desired objecf

which qualifies the promoted person. And that oerformable be;n

such is not the action; for, the action is not capable of

producing the result. In the Devatadhikarana (MS. 9.1.4),

however, it is stated that the action cannot possible be the

direct means of bringing about the desired object by means of

the invocation of the deity and in the karmanyarambhabhavyat-

vidhikarana, it is stated the auction cannot be regarded as

having the instrumentality of the desired object through the

purification of the person (i.e., the sacrificer). In the

 406

Apurvadhikarana (MS.2.1.2), it is shown that the action itself

or the power inherent in itself does not last long to bring

about the desired object. Hence, it is to be established by

many principles that performable inhering in the self is

denoted by the suffixes Lins etc. by way of being related to

the performable and as this performable is not known by any

other source of valid knowledge, It is called unseen potency.

And the performable is brought about by the physical effort.

The physical effort again is the right effort of the persons.

In the Bhavarthidhikarana (MS.2.1.1), it is established that it

(the right effort) does not occur without the meaning of the

verbal root and as such it (right effort) is stated as being

with that (meaning of the verbal root). And that (right effort)

being related with the meaning of the verbal root distinguishes

that (the right effort) and it is determined in the SabdantarS-

dhikarana (MS.2.2.1) and in the Bldaryadhikarana, it is stated

that the action denoted by the verbal root being the object

(of that performable) becomes the means arid it is also stated

therein that it is the right of the person in respect of

performing the action of his own denoted by the meaning of the

verbal root.'

In the V text viz., ’atraisa prakriya ................’etc.

above, the author gives a short account of the meanings of some

of the Adhikaranas of the Mimimsa-sutras in the light of the

explanation of Prabhakara. This can better be said a summary

of what has been stated by Salikanatha in the preceding pages.

In the Codanasutra viz., ’Codahi-laksano’rtho dharmah(MS.l.l.2),

 407

it has b°en shown that what the Vidhi denotes is th‘~ Karya.

According to the Prabhakaras, by this sutra it is taught the-

the meaning of the Veda is the Karya and not something that

already known. The word ’codanilaksana’ in the sutra means

Karya and the word ’dharma’ means vedartha (vedic import).

Thus Prabhakara is of the view that the codanasutra is mr-ant to

establish the validity of those vedic oassages "'hich ex-ore-s

only Karya. The Rhasya oassage of Sahara, however,exolainim-

the word ’Artha* in the sutra is not favourable to the vie-" or

Prabhakara. The Bhlsyakara states that ’artha’ means useful

and ’anartha’ means harmful. This kind of Dharma and \dharma

should be learnt only from the vedic codana. ihus the -h??y^

goes against the view of Prabhakara who tak^c the word ’Arthe’

in the sutra to mean only the vedartha {vedic imoort). But

Prabhakara and Silikanatha changed the meaning of the hagva

passage very skillfully in order to secure supoort for their

295
views.

293 * _ _
tallaksano dharma iti. asyarthah - codanalaksanasutrnna
codanalaksanah karyaruna evartho na siddha£rOoa iti
pratijnatam. tadanena bhasyena vyakhyayate dharma sVrodas'c-
vedartnamitraoarah. RVL under 3 1 , o.l6.
294 «, M
tasmaccodanalak$ano’rthah srevaskarah. ya eva sreyaskara1
sa eva dharmas'abdenocyate. k o ’rthah yo nifysreyasaya,
ko’narthah.yah pratyavaya. SB under MS. 1.1.2.

295 katham kirtavyataya’nuoadisyamano’rthas'codanajaksano

bhavati, katham codanalakfanasya sato dharmatvanivrtya-
rthamartoas'abdanvaya uoaoadyate. kartavyataya
nonadis'yante codanaleksanas'ceti sankatamivooalaksyet-.
BR, o. 23.
 40o

According to Kumarila, however, it is the knowledge o

Dharma and not vedarthavicira that is considered to be the

suoreme goal. He, therefore, tried to establish that each

Dharma based on vedic Injunctions confersa result and reforms of

296
this kind vrre introduced by him.
^ —
In the vrtti text above, Salikanatha states that in th^

beginning of the sixth adhyaya of the MS.6.1.1 viz.,’dravyanAm

karmasamyoge gunatvenabhisambandhah’, it is shown that o c thic

Karya denoted by the Injunctive sentence, the Xiyojya (the

promoted oerson) is one who is desirous of acquiring for himself

some desired result in the form of svaraa (heaven) etc. which :c

thus relat'd to the said Karya.etc.The beginning of the sixth

Adhyaya is called the ’svargadiphalasadhanatadhikarana ’ •"hic:o

consists of three sutras including the first one stated above.

The other two sutras are - ’asadhakam tu tldarthyat’ (6.1.2) and

’prityartham cibhisamyoglt karmato hyabhisambandhah,tasmat

karmooades'*ah syat’ (6.1.3). Again in the beginning of the

eleventh Adhyaya of the MS 11.1.1. viz.,’prayojanabhisamban 'h~-

orthaksatam tatah syadaikakarmyameka sabdabhisamyogat’, th° nano

of +he Adhikarana of which is ’tantrena svaroaohalatvam’, i*

stated that desire for svarga (heaven) etc. is the attribute o'

the Niyojya (oromoted oerson). It has already been stated by

Salikanatha in K(17).

296 "b- _ ,
moksarjai na oravarteta tatra kamyanisiddhayoh/
nityanaimittike kuryat oratyavayajihasaya // SM. 5.110.
 409

In the Badaryldhikarana which consists of four sutras

viz., ’dravygunasamskaresu Badarih’ (3.1.3); ’karmanyapi

Jaiminih, phalarthatvat* (3.1.4); ’phalam ca ouruslrthatvit’

(3.1.5); and ’purusasca karmarthatvat’{3.1.6) of the MS, it

has been concluded that it is the Karya which is the direct

cause of producing the desired object of the Niyojya(prompted

person) and which qualifies the Niyojya. That Karya again

cannot be the Kriyl; for, the Kriya is not. capable of producing

the desired result. Badari is of the ooinion that vedic and

non-vedic injunctions indicate only Karya to be performed by

mankind and every~one who is a functionary to that/karya should

undertake that without" questioning its authority and without

any idea of the desired result to be achieved. Badari contends

that vedic injunctions verbally do not indicate yagas as the

means of acquiring svarga etc./Even in non-vedic injunctions,

says Bldari, knowledge of Kirya alone induces a man to perform

the Karya but not its desired result. But this view of Bldari

was criticised by Kumarila on the lines of Jaimini and Sahara

297 298
who have stated under MS 3.1.4-6 and 6.1.2 that vedic

jaiministu khalviciryah karmanyapi s^sabhutini manyate sma

na hldaririvlvadharanamanumene. sa hi dadars'a, na yagah
karfjjvyatayl codyate. phalakamasya tu tatsadhanooayatveneti
evam stato*rathah parigrhito bhavisyati. SB under MS.3.1.4

asadhakam tu tidarthyat (MS.6.1.2). yadi ca yago na

prltyartho bhavedasldhakam karma bhavet. sadhayitaram
nldhigacchet. yo hi prit^arthab sa sadhyate, nanyah.
yadyapi yagah kartavyah sruyate tathapi na kartavyah -
Ibid under Ibid.
and non-vedic Injunctions actuate persons by sho'-'in. toe d ci

results such as svarga etc.

The '-.hasya in the Devatadhikarana consisting of fiv

sfitras namely ’Dpvata va orayojayedatithivat’(9.1.6};

bhojanasya tadarthatvat ’(9.1.7); ’arthaoa-^yicca ’(9.1.d ); ’tan -r ' a - ‘

tena sambandhah’(9.1.9); ’atithau tatoradhanatvanyfohivah kar-^e'

syat) tasya oritioradhlnatvit’(9.1.10) of the MS., has state*

that the Karya is not the Kriya as it can never be the direct

cause of the dpsired r°sult nor can it£ be held to produce toe

result through the favour of the Deity to whom the yaga is

performed. In the sutra viz., ’karmanyarambhabhavya+vit kreivat

pratyarambham phalani syuh’(MS.11.1.4), it is stated by Sahara

that Kriya cannot be regarded as leading to the result throu *

the potency of the person.

In the Aourvadhikarana, the sutra wherein is ’codana

punarambhah’ (MS.2.1.5), it has finally been stated that 'Karya i

that which is denoted by the Injunctive sentence. It has been

also said there that either the Kriyi itself or some ootencv

inhering therein does not continue for a longer neriod to brio-

about the desired result. This Kirya is called Aourva (unse°n

potency) by virtue of its being not known by any other mpans of

knowledge (pramana). Salikanat'na explains Aourv3 in Ka-rik* — e-.

(25)of the VM^which we will find in course of our exposition 0 -

the second pariccheda of the VM. The Karya has been caller'

Apurva by Sahara by reason of its bein= something ne- to all

 411

other means of valid knowledge except the Injunctive sentence.

It may be pointed out here that the Prabhakaras held that

Karya or Niyoga or 4purva is the meaning of the vedic 'Lins’ and

this is because of their being concerned with the vedartha(vedic

299
import) and not with Dharma which is the concern of the

Bhattas.Kumarila'*^ rejects the view of the Prabhakaras as regards

4purva on the ground that such an 4purva is not known by anybody

as Oharma as no one can see it. That the Karya is something

brought by krti (effort) and krti (effort) is the ohyslcal

effort of the persons^has been stated and explained by Salikanatha

many times of the VM.

In the Bhavarthadhikarana which includes four sutras viz.,

’bhavarthah karmasabdlstevyah kriya oratiyetaisa hyartho

vi d h i y a t e ’(2.1.l); 'sa^vesam b h a v o ’rtha iti c e t ’ (2.1.2);

’yesamutpattau sve orayoge rupopalab/dhistami namahi, tasmatte-

bhya parakanksa bhiltatvlt sve p r a y o g e ’(2.1.3); ’yesam tutnatta-

varthe sve prayogo na vidyate, tanyakhyatani. tasmattebhyah

pratiyetas'ritatvat prayogasya’ (2.1.4) of the MS , it is stated

that the prayatna (exertion) is not possible independently ~f

some act denoted by the verbal root. Thus what the Injuctive

sentence denotes is the Niyoga (prompting) relating to that act.

299 _
dharmasabdasca vedarthamatraparah. 3.VL under 3R, p. 16.

300 ** A
sreyo hi purus,aoritissa dravyacunakarmabhih/
codanalaksanaissadhya tasmattesveva dharmata // SV, 2. 191.
 412

Sahara und°r MS. 2.1.1. says that Kriya is understood from t.h<=

words denoting Karma ie, the meaning of the Kriya is Karma.

For examole, yajeta etc. From this KriyS , one should know t at

sacrifice is to be performed and Kriya is the means of attaining

301
the desired result.

Moreover, in the sabdantaradhikarana the sutra wherein,

is ’sabdantare karmabhedah krtanubandhatvat' (2.2.1) of thc _S,

it is stated that Karma being the object of the oromot.ing

(Niyoga) is denoted by the verbal root. Thus the act being ■

object of the Kiyoga (oromoting) comes to be known as the Karma

(means) by which the Niyoga (orompting) is accomolished. This

has been stated in the Badaryadhikarana of the MS and is also

_ - _ _ 302
stated by Madhavacarya in his Nyayamalavistara.

- 303
Sahara under sutra 2.2.1 states that the Kriya

Dadas viz., yajati, juhoti etc. in the Injunctive sentences like

’somena y a j e t a ’, ’daksinani juh o t i ’ etc. denote the joint-

Derformance.

tata ucyate, bhavarthah karmasabdih, tebhyah kriya orativ^ta,

yajeta ityevamadibhyah'................... ohalasye kriya
karanam nisoattiriti. SB under MS 2.1.1.1'.

302
sarvadhatvarthasambandhah karotyartho’hi bhavana.
dhatvarthah karanam tasyam samanaoadavarnitah. NMV, 2.1.
_ ’ & 7 '-.
303 U
asti jyoti s.tomastatra srAyate, somena yajeta,
daksinani juhoti ...... yajati dadati juhotayaste, kirn
sam^hatya karyam kurvanti, uta viyutya *>....................
kirn tavat oraotam, samhatya iti.- SB. under MS. 2.2.1.
 Thus, Salikanatha has given a summary of some of the
£ -
A.dhikarans of the MS as conceived by the Prabhakaras.

kalantaravasthayinah karyasya niyojyanvayayogyatamaha -

’(The author) speaks of the compatibility of the

cl
performable which lasts for^long time in resoect of making

relation with the orompted person’-

K(24) taddhi kalantarasthinacchaktam svargadisiddhaye.

sambandho’oyupadyeta niyojyena’sya kamini.

’For , that (performable) which lasts for a lone time is,

indeed, capable of bringing about the heaven etc. Moreover, its

(i.e., of the performable) relation, too, with the promoted

person who is desirous (of getting something) is to be justi fled!

’In the K text viz., ’taddhi kalantarasthinacchaktam ...

........ 'etc. above, Salikanatha states how the Karya which

remains ever can have the relation with the Niyojya. Me re, oe

repeals what has been stated by him in K (23). But here in the

K text above, the author adds that the Karya is also capable of

bringing about the heaven etc. which is the desired object. T+

is stated that the Karya continues to exist till the produce l oo

of the heaven etc. from the yaga and acs such it is called
^ 304
Kalantarasthiyi. This is stated by Salikanatha in his Rjuvlmala.

yattu kalantarasthayi karyam tadeva tena sahanvayam

gantumarhatTti kriyatireki man^antaravedyameva.
3VL. under oR,o. 2o:3.
 414

In V text under K(23), Salikanatha contends that the Karya w M c n

is different from the Kriya and which continues to exist til

ope
the attainment of the svarga etc. is related to the Niyojya.

The word ’kamini’ in the K above, is the attribute of +he

Niyojya. We have already stated that in the beginning of the

sixth chapter of the Mimimsa-sutra , it has been shown that the

Niyojya is one who is desirous of acquiring for himself some

+ke_
desired result in^form of heaven etc. As we have already

discussed the present issue in our exoosition of the V text u n ^ r

K(23), so we refrain from explaining the same at length.

_ _ yj
nanu bhasyakarah - oratyartham prayatnamitya’
n a, na

kriyadibhinnam karyamiti yo manyate, tarn prtyaha -

*It may be argued, that the author of the Bhasya (i.e

cabara) speaks of (means) the meaning of the suffix (i.e.,l.lh

etc.) as the right effort and £he who maintains that the

performable is not different from the action, to him (the author)

replies’-

K(25) kriyadibhinnam yatkaryam vedyam manantarairna tat.

ato manantaraourvamaourvamiti giyate.

’That performable which is different from the action ate.

cannot be known by any other source of valid knowledg e . It i -,

therefore, called the unique result by reason of its beino not

known before by any other source of valid knowldptje.’

305
niyojyasambandhasamartham kalantarasthayi karyam,
iti. VM. under po, p. 440.
 4X5

’In ’kriyadibhinnam yatk a r y a m ................’etc. of

the K text above, Sllikanatha contends that the Klrya is other-

m* 4

wise also known as the Apurva. We have already stated that

Kirya because of its being not known by any other source of

knowledge such as pratyakstetc., is called Apurva. In K(23)?

we have found that the author states that the Karya is different

from the Kriya and as such the word ’kriyldibhinnam* in the K

above bears the same sense of the words viz., lariyito bhinnam’ as

stated in K (23) of the V M . It can, therefore, be said that the

present K text above, which is our concern, is partly a repeti­

tion of the K(23) of the VM. The present K text above, is

introduced by Silikanatha in order to discard the objection

raised by the Bhattas who want to contend that in view of the

Bhasyakara Sahara, Kirya is not different from the Kriya* and the

meanings of the suffixes *Lihs* etc. are krti or prayatna. We

have already explained that Karya or Apurva of the Prabhakara

school which identifies it with the meaning of the suffix ’Lins’

is different from that of the Bhattas who accept yiga as Dharma

and accept Apurva as the connecting link between the two viz.,

yaga and svarga. It has also been^ stated by us that in the

Apurvadhikarana of the Mimamsi-sutra, Sabara calls Karya as

Apurva by reason of its being something new to all other means

of knowledge. Salikinatha also gives the same name.^0^ Of course,

306
yattu kilintarasthiyi karyam tadeva tena niyojyena sahanvayam
gantumarhatiti kriyatireki manSntaravedyemeva lihadayah
klryamftbhidadhati. tacca manintarapurvatead-
apurvamityucyate. RVL under BR, p. 288.
 d 1,

he has given one more name to it viz., Niyoga. 7e have already

discussed Kriya, Karya or Apurva in context of our exoositio'" a

the corresoonding vrtti text of the V M .

Silikanatha did not write any vrtti on the K above

oerhaos, in order to avoid reoetiting v/hat has be°n stated in

preceding V text.

nanvevamapyapurvam vakyarthassyad, na niyogah niyogasea

vakyartha iti DrabhakaranamullaDa ityatra’ha -

’It may be argued that even this being such, the union-

result is the meaning of a sentence and not the promoting. An-'

that the prompting is the meaning of a sentence ic the inconn r -

utterance of the followers of Prabhakara. Here (in reoly) save

(the auth o r ) ’-

K(26) karyatvena niyojyanca svatmani orerayannasau/ niyoga

iti mimamsanisnatairabhidhiyate jj
’Promoting is called by the exoerts of the ''imamsa syct ’

(particularly the Prabhakaras) as the oerformable because of it

inducing the promoted oerson towards itself (i.e., the

oerformable) ’.

In ’karyatvena niyojyanca ........... ’ etc. of t :.<= K ^ n

the author rejects an objection that the Niyoga cannot bn the

vakyartha and he also asserts that accordin'.; to the view of r

Prabhakaras, the Niyoga is also another synonym of Kirya. p

have already mentioned that in the view o r the Prabhakaras,

Aourva, Karya and Niyoga are synonymous, hence ,Ni.yo. a is t, in

 417

vikyartha.

The K above is also quoted in the Nayanaprasadini commen­

tary of the Gitsukhl. but instead of the word ’Niyojyanca*, it is

307
used as ’Niyojyam yah*. Dr. Ganganath Jha says in his work

viz., The Prlbhakara School of Purvamlmamsi that Karya is called

Niyoga or prompting, by reason of the fact that it acts as an

incentive to the Niyojya (prompted person) and makes him put

forth an exertion towards the accomplishment of the action

denoted by the verbal root. What the sentence as a whole expresses

s
in- this Niyoga as related to the Niyojya expressed by one of the

words in the sentence. From this, it can easily be understood

that Niyoga is the import of the sentence.

It may be mentioned that Karya is two-fold. One is Kriya

and the other is Niyoga which is other than Kriya. The agency of

the first belongs to the Karta and that of the other belongs to

the Niyojya and both are secondary and such is the difference
308
between Kartrtva and Niyojyatva. Salikanatha mentions the

word ’Niyoga* in the K above stating that it is identified as the

Karya. As Salikanatha has already explained Karya several times

in the VM, he finds it unnecessary here to explain the same and

as such he did write no sentence in the form of vrtti under the

K above.

307 Vide, CS, p. 176.

308
dvividhaiin hi karyam kriySrupam tadariktam niyogarupam ca.
tatra prathamam prati gunabhutatvam kartrtvam.dvitiyam prati
gunabhBtatvam niyojyatvamiti gunabhave samane’pi yatprati
gunabhavastadvaisamyadidam vaisamyamityarthaft.
NRSunder CS, pp. 175-76.
 418

evamapi katham tasya vakyarthatvamityaha -

’Even in that case, how that (prompting) possesses the

state of being the sentence-meaning ? (in this context) says

(the author)’ -

K (27) klryasyaiva pradhinatvldvakyirthatvanca yujyatejf vakyam

tadeva hi pra’ha niyojya-visayanvitamjf

’The state of being the sentence meaning comes to be

proper in respect of the performable by virtue of its (of the

performable) being the principal element (in the sentence), for

the sentence soeaks of(denotes) only that which is related to

the promoted person*.

V(27a) uktam hyetat - yat pradhanataya pratioadyate,tadvHkyirthah

iti. kiryanca pradhanatayocyata iti, tasyaiva vlkyarthatvam.

’For, it has been stated - that which is determined as

being the principal is the sentence - meaning. And the perfor­

mable is stated as being the principal and as such only that

(i.e., the performable) has the state of being the sentence­

meaning’ .

In ’karyasyaiva pradhlnatvad ........... * etc. and

’uktam h y e t a t ....... ....’etc. of the K and V text resoectively

as stated above, Salikanatha asserts that it is the Karya and

the Karya alone that is the vakylrtha. It is stated in the K

and V text above that whatever is the pradhana is the vakyartha

and the Karya by virtue of its being the pradhana, comes to be

the vikyartha. That the Karya is the pradhana is stated by

«£fi
 419

£
Salikanatha in K (13) viz., ’krtisadhyam pradhlnam yat tat

klryamucyate* of the present section of the V5kyirthamitrka. In

several occasions in our exposition, we have stated that the

Prabhakaras, as the adherents of the Karyavakylrthavada or the

V
Niyogavakarthavada, accept the Karya or the Niyoga as the

Vakyartha.

The insertion of the emphatic particle ’eva’ after the

word ’Karya* in the K text above, implies that it is only the

Kirya and not anything that can be called as denoting the

♦

vlkyartha.

As we know Prabhakara Misr a ^ ^ in his Rjuvimala states

that the Niyoga is the important thing in every sentence and it

is also known as Kirya. All other words in the sentence are

understood to convey their meanings as related to the orincipal

element i.e., Karya. The connecting link in respect of each

padartha constitutes the vakyartha and each word has the power

to express its meaning and its relation with a Karya. The

Prabhakaras, as the Anvitabhidhanavldins, urge that the words

alone in a vakya are capable of conveying the vakyartha which is

nothing but the relation of each padlrtha with the Karya.

a* •

Kumarila, however, maintains that there is no difference

between the sentences of the Vedas and outside them in respect

of conveying their meanings. Moreover, there exists no

difference between the sentences intended to convey either

309
niyogas'abdena kriylvyatiriktamapurvam karyatayl Itmani
purusam niyunjanamucyate. BR, p. 238.
 4 g.O

injunctions for actions or simoly accomolished facts. In all

these sentences, the words denote only their meanings. Th^re

is, he says, no Niyoga or Karya expressed by the suffixes

’Lins’ etc. either in the vedic sentences or those outside th'5

vedic sentences.

In the K text above, the author also contends that

the vakya denotes that which is related to the "iyojya and it i

the Karya that is related to the Niyojya and as such Karya is

the vakyartha.

7 (27b) niyojyanvitabhidhanca orayikam, adhanadhyayanahga-

oradhanotoattiniyoganam niyojyasunyanamabhidhana-

bhyupagamit. vivaranakara hyldhlnav'sayamaoi

niyogantaramicchanti, kratuniyogaoratyabhijnanabhavat

asannidhane hi tanniyogaoratyabhijnanam nopapadyat®.

napi oarnatadivadavyabhicaritakratusambandhagni.nukh*n

pratyabhi jrfopapa ttih. pragadhanadahavaniyadisabdana-na

_ *

rthaparijnatkratusambandhanavagamat. juhvadinantv»-

krtivacanatvat prageva vidherniyogaorat 'abhijna^

sambhavah.

nanvagninamapi sadhyatvat, sadhyadvaya'h kathaoie-

kasminvakye’nviyate ucyate - niyoga eva’tripi

oradhanam sadhyam, anipsitakarmatatva^oninam.

A

anipsitakarmatve’oi yattadadhanajanyam phalanagxtfi*

-samavayi, tadyoginyshavaniyadisabdaprayogat,ahavani ya

dinanca kratupayogitvattatsidhyarthatayaiva purusa-

3 _ _
oravrttupaoatteranusthanalabhadalam niyojyanvi.ta-

bhidhanena - iti.
 421

tatha’dhyayanavidKavipyaciryakaranBvidhiprayuktyaiva’

nu^thanalawJinniyojyasunyabhidhanamiti sthitam.
x
pradhanotpattiniyoga aoyadhikaraniyogaksiotasvavi say =-

nust'nanenaiva labdhasiddhaye iti, na tatra

niyojyanvitabhidhananvesanam.

’And the denotation arises as related usually with the

promoted person, for, the denotation of the promptings havino

no prompted person, in respect of producing the leading of fire

(Adhana), study (Adhyayana), subsidiary and principal, is

admitted. The author of the '/ivarana (i.e., Prabhakara) again

desires (admits) objects of leading of fire,as the other

prompting, because of there being no recognition(Dratyabnijne)

of the prompting relating to (the sacrifice) kratu (without the

leading of fire) . For, without the close proximity ( of other

prompting), the recognition of the prompting relating to that

(i.e., kratu) does not occur. There will be no recognition by

means of fire related to the kratu which is not inconsistent as

in the case of the palasa (i.e., wood) branch. For, there can

be no knowledge of the meanings of the words like ’AhavanTya ’

(a kind of fire) etc. prior to (the knowledge of ) the leading

(of fire), because of there being no knowledge of the relati >n

of the kratu ("Ith that). 3ut because of the state of denoting

the configuration by the vessel (Juhu) etc, the recognition of

the promoting becomes possible prior to (the knowledge of )

injunction.

It may be argued, because of the fires alro being the

 422

object to be made out (i.e. to be accomolished), how two(thin s)

to be made out can be related to one sentence ? (It is) said -

promoting is, indeed, here orincioally to be made out. cor, m e

fires are the undesirable objects. In the case of the state o '

being undesirable object also, that fruit which is oroduced bv

the leading of fire is inherent in the fire because of the use ->f

the words ’Ahavaniya’ in respect of being related with that

(fruit) and as such Ahavaniya etc. because of their being useful

for the kratu, there is the inclination of a person for the

obtainment of that (i.e., kratu) and £as such because of attaini.no

the oerformance, there is no use of the denotation of the relate

with the oromoted person.

Likewise, because of the attainment of the performance

(of the study) by means of the use of the injunction of makino a

precentor in respect of the injunction of the study also, the

denotation widfh being related with the prompted oerson. The

promptings oroducing the principal (rite) also are made out (i.-.,

brought about) through their own performance known through th-

prompting regarding the right and as such the denotation of the

related by the prompted person should not be searched for.

In the V text viz., ’niyojyanvitabhidhana^ca prayikem....

.......’etc., Sllikanltha contends that the Anvitabhidhana :'rom

the Niyojya is usual. The word ’orayikam’ in the V text is used

for this reason. That the Niyojyanvitabhidhana is usual is

because of the fact that the denotation of the Miyo. as r°la ‘:- ;

to the production of Adhana (leading of fire), Adhyayana( stu '/'t

o
.Anga (subsidiary) and Pradhana (principal) sacrifices,is admit to

as occurring without the Niyojya. The author of the Vivarans

admits another Niyoga relating to the Adhana, because of not

recollecting the Niyoga with regard to kratu. It may b^ menti--

ned here that Prabhakara Misra because of his writing the

Vivarana is known as vivaranakira and the Vivarana is another

310
name of the commentary called La hvl. Kratu is a sacrifice
— O I I
relating to Agni and so by ’Agneya’^ one inS" understands kratu."'

It is also stated in the V text that there can be no recognition

of the Niyoga by means of the fire related to the kratu whic~ is

inconsistent as in the case of the oalasa branch. It is because

there can be no knowledge of the meanings of the words like

Ahavaniya etc. Drior to the knowledge of the Adhana, because o:

its relation with the kratu being not known.

3y the use of the word ’adi’ after AhavaniyaeH- in the _

text above, the other t- o types Agniviz., ’Garhapatyagni’ an •

’Oaksinagni’ are to be understood. It may be added that in ‘he

312
vedas three types of Agni are admitted. But in the case or

the Juhu (vessel) etc. because of its denoting the Akrti

(configuration), theierecognition of the Niyoga orior to the

knowledge of the Vidhi.

In the V text above, we find the mention of the word

’parnata’ which is to be taken as the parnatavidhi. It is alro

310
Vide, Aooendix, p.30 under PIS.
311
’ityagneyg kratuh* iti. SP, p. 2.
312
Ibid. o.3.
 424

a maxim indicates the invariable presence of something. '-'or

example, the Juhu or branch of oalasa tree which is used in ^l1

sacrifices. Sahara under MS. 3.6.1, deals with the oarr-~a

Vidhi and the maxim i.e., parnamayi-nyaya. It can be ad ed

here that the Juhu etc. is invariably related to the kratu.

Salikanatha in the first section of the Angapariyana- orak=rsna

of his Prakarana-oancika. deals with the issue of

314
Parnatavidhi .

In the V text again, the author rejects an objection

that because of the fires being the object to be brought about,

how the two can be related in a single Vakya. The *sadhyad'-~ya

referred to in theV text above, refers to Agni and N'iyoga. \s

the Prabhakaras accept Niyoga as the vakyartha, how can they

accent Agni as being the Sadhya which is also to be taken ae

the vakyartha ? In order to meet this objection, Salikanatha

asserts that Miyoga is the princioal object to be brought about

for, it is the most desirable object and the fire is the

undesirable object. In this way, Salikanatha contends that the

Niyojyinvitibhidhana is not consistent.

/ -

Moreover, in the V text above, Sllikanatha asserts -nat

there can be Anvitabhidhana even without the Niyojya. \s for

313
sarvarthamaprakaranat. MS.3.6.1.

314 ucyate - juhvadayo’vyabnicaritakratusambandha iti tate^hau

dhamukhena ....................... ............ ^ ...........
.............................. juhvadisu oarnatadisambandha*
PP, o. 461.
 & 25

instance, he refers to the Acaryakaranavidhi. It may be mentio­

ned here that Prabhakara maintains that the vedic injunction

’svadhyayo* dhyetavyah’ which literally means ’ones’ own brao.cn

of the veda should be studied’, do°s not exoress a comolete

injunctions; for, no soecific Adhikarin is mentioned here for

the injunction ire-intended. It does indicate whether the

oerson is Arthajnanakama, or svargakama or desirous of anything

else, Prabhakara observes that Adhyayana is to be done only oy

means of that ^idhi which is comolete with the Adhikarin ’who is

Acaryakama. He also maintains that students should learn thr

Vedas in order to comply with the Adhyapana Niyoga prescribed

for the Aciryas, and the comoliance with that Niyoga is alone

the sole object of Adhyayanavidhi. Thus, in the V t=xt above,

Sllikanatha asserts that the denotation of the Niyojya is

possible because of attaining the performance by means of

aoolying the injunction regarding the Acaryakarana in resoec+ oc

the Adhyayanavidhi viz., ’svadhyiyo’dhyetavyah’.

V(27c) ahgotpattiniyoga api viniyuktaprayajadiC-visayatvada-

dhikaraniyogahgatayaiva siddhyantlti, kirn tesu

niyojyanvitabhidhanena.

katham punah orayajadividhinam.viniyuktavisayatvam "

ucyate - sadhikaraniyogasannidhau orayajadivakyani

srutani na tavat svavisayam niyogantaramavajama-

-yitumisate, avaghatadivadanuvadakatva^ambhavat.

315 ~ * y* _ _
svadhyayadhyayanavidheradhikarasravanat, acaryakaranavisHii_
prayojyatvacca. BR.p.2.
 kintu svaruoamatrameva yogyasvapadarthavisistam-

yoast'nap'ayanti. tacca orayojanakinksitaya orayojani-

bhutena sadhikarena niyogena’nviyata iti,

adhikaravakyagata eva. lihsabdastadanvitam svarthamabr.id-

hatte. sa ci’nvayah prayajadiinamaidamarthyamatrena

grahakagrahanamucyate. karanopakarasi^ksaysya

ca’purvasya yatkaranopakaraoarikalpanam,tadauoadanikam-

iti.

’The oromDtings producing the subsidiaries also because

of having the prayaja etc. with aoolication as their object,

are brought about by way of their being tue subsidiaries to the

oroducing right and so, what is the use of the denotation of

the related by the prompted person?

How, again the injunctions prayaja etc. are the object':

for aoolication ^ (it is ) said - the injunctive sentences

regarding orayija etc. are heard in proximity with the oromn-

tings with the right and are not again capable of giving ris^

to the knowledge of other prompting relating to their own. for,

like the act of threshing etc., (these) have the restatement

(Anuvada). But these (i.e., sentences) present only their o^n

nature characterised by compatible meaning of their own. Ann

that (nature of the prayaja) is related with the promoting

along with the right being the necessity and because of the

necessity being expectant and as such the word lih etc. in •

‘•.he

sentence stating right, denote? the meaning as related with

that (promoting). And that relation is called the inclusion o f

3
the principal duty (i.e. Grahakgrahana) only by means of thn
 427

utility of the prayaja etc. And that which is the assumption

of the help of the means of the unique result character!srd

by expectancy towards the helo of the m°ans, is the function

of context. Ther^, that which is the assumption of th*5 stat^

of producing the helo of the means of them (i.e. of prayaja

etc.), is having the requirements (i.e..Aupadanika)’.

In the 7 text viz., ’angotoattiniyogi aoi .... ’etc.

above, Salikanatha presents someone’s; query that there is

other Niyoga in respect of the prayaja Vidhi etc. and th°n hr

meets the same. The ouery is - how the prayaja Vidhi etc.

the objects of being applied 7 The inclusion of the word ’adi’

in ’prayajadi* etc. in the V text refers to Anuyaja and

Ajyabhaga also. It may be said here that the ^idhis viz.,

prayaja etc. are Angavidhis. In reply to the query stated ir

the V text, Salikanatha states that the Vidhis viz.,pr-’yaj a

etc. are used in proximity with the Niyoga along with the

right and they do not give rise to the knowledge of other ivooa
relating to their own. It is because like the act of thresh! no

(Avaghata), the Vidhis have the state of being the Anuvadeka

(restatement). '7e have already explained Anuvada. Avaghata

(i.e., the act of threshing) is the example of the Niyamavi":h!

(i.e., the restricted injunction)

In the v text above, we find Salikanatha r^ferrino to

the issue of Crahakaarahana. Grahakagrahana is the consider!^;;

316
pak$e’praotasya orapako vidhirniyamavidhih. yathi
’brihinavahanti’tyadih. AS. o. 121.
 r *

428
of one as a Grahaka. To explain - the principal duty which is

denoted by the suffix Lin and which is imposed on a functio­

nary in the main sentence is what is called Grahaka because of

its including or considering all Mother meanings indicated by

that sentence and also by other sentences in the same chapter

as subordinated to and connected with itself. In this wa^,the

subsidiaries included by a grahaka are of two types. These

subsidiaries viz., prayaja etc. are prescribed in the same

chapter with the helo of separate sentences with separate

suffixes viz., Lins etc. The Lins in these sentences do not

indicate a different Niyoga from that of the principal

injunctive sentence, but they are taken to express the Grahaka

only. This is what is stated by Salikanatha in the V text .

317
above. This Grahakagrahana is stated at the beginning of

the seventh chapter of the Mimamsa-sutra. The theory of

— 313
Anvitabhidhana is also known as Grahakagrahana.

In the V text again, Salikanatha refers to the upSdana

of the Mimamsakas. According to the Mimimsakas, upadina is

*3 1 - m m
L adhikaripurvikanksayas'ca nirankus^aprasaratvat graySjadiyi-
ganam ca tadanvay^yogyatvat ....... idameva grahakagrahanam
. ......... ......prayijidlnam tatkaranatvayoglt te$am
grahakagrahanavagatamapurvaidamarthyam tatkaranooakarardvara
nirvahatlti. NK under NRM. p. 199.
O iQ —» — —
saptamadye tikakrta grahakagrahapamanvitabhidhanopapadanaya’
bhyupagatam*............ tadeva anvitabhidhanam,grahakagra-
hanamiti ca glyate. Introduction, p. 17 of the pp.
accepted as the seventh Pramina or the means of knowledge to

determine the subsidiaries. The subsidiaries called >nnioa-

ttya are not known as subsidiaries +o the princioal sacrific1*

by any other means other than Uoadina5because they are oeif r>i~r ■
319 320
in order to complete the princioal sacrifice. Uoadana ' is,

according to the Prabhakaras, nothing but the necessary

renuirement of an injunction.

V(27d) nasti tarhi Drayajadisu niyogantaram ? na nasti,

_ _. u
ksanikanam tesam sambhyakaranooakarakatvanuoaoattprni /o-

gantarasya’ vasyasrayaniyatvat. y o ’sau lin"dih

praganudyamanarthakataya sankitah, sa idanim

niyogantaramabhidhatte. ata eva ca ’vaghatidivadesam

ya jyadisaf' danameva ’ngav'akyagatanamadhikaraniyoganvit a •-

varthTibihidhanam na ’bhyupagamyate . tatha satyut-attlv'-'va ’

ngayagasvaruoasya ’nyatirascinasya niyogantaravl sav atv a t,

niyogintarvisayata na syat. utoattidasayam

tvananyatirascinataya’bhidhanidyuktam niyogantaravlsaya-

-tvam. kasmatounaranyatirascinasya niyogantaravisayatva-T.,

karyadvayasambandhavagamanuoapattih, nahyekam vastu

yugapatkaryadvayattsambandhi s'akyamavagantum. yacsa

sannipatinamaourvasesatvam grahakgrahanena bhavati .......

karanase$atvam tu nanyatah siddhamiti upadanameva tesam
tacchesataya viniyojakamasrayaniyamiti. NK. under ' ,o.20r>.

katham tarhi pasvekatvadinamahgatvam ? uktam hi

pas'oruoadanavlsayatvam ................................
viniyogakrtameva. BR. p. 3.
 tanniyogantaram orayajadisu, tat pascadabhidhiyamanama-

dhikiraniyogangatayaiva svas'abdena’bhidhiyate. anyatba

vi sayadvayaviniyogavirodhadityalamatiorasangena.

’Is there, then, no other prompting in respect of the

Praylja etc. 0 It is not,that there is no (other promoting in

respect of the Prayaja etc.), for, because of the non-obtainm-' n

of the state of being the helo of the combining means of th^s*

momentary (rites) viz., (-Prayaja etc.), other orompting is, o*

course, to be admitted. That the Lin etc. is aoorehpnded

because of their being the state of denoting the meaning

Dreviously restated, now that denotes the other oromoting, \nd

therefore, like the act of threshing etc., the denotation of

the related meaning of the prompting relating to right, is not

admitted in resoect of the words like ’yaji’ (i.e., tne verbal

root ’yaj’) found in the subsidiaries. Such being the case,

because of not being the object for other orompting in its

occurrence, the subsidiary rite as different from other, cannot

have the state of being the object for other orompting. But at

the time of oroduction, because of the denotation as not be in a

different from other, the subsidiary rites have the state of

being the object of other orompting. How, again, that which is

different from other, cannot be the object of other promotinc

It is because, the relation between the two osrformables

cannot be obtained, for, a single object can be known

simultaneously as related to two performables. And that whic-

 431

.is (admitted as) the other prompting in resoect of the Pr*yTja

etc., later on, being denoted as a subsidiary of the promoter,

relating to the right, is denoted by its own word. Otherwise,

there will oe the contradiction in resoect of the aoolication

between the two objects, and thus there is no need of much

elaboration.’

In the v text viz., ’nasti tarhi orayajadisu ...... V ':.

above, the author oresents a doubt that may arise and then

meets the same. The doubt is - is there no other Niyoga in

resoect of the Prayaja etc ^ Salikanatha asserts that in

respect of the Prayaja etc., another Niyoga is to bp admitteo.

It is bedause, says Salikanatha, all actions viz., Prayaja et:.

are momentary and so, without a separate Niyoga, there will

no obtainment of the utility of the means together. The suffixes

Lins etc. denotes the other Niyoga and as such lik^ theact of

threshing (Avagh^ta), there will be no denotation of the meaning

as related to the Niyoga relating to the Adhikira known from

the words viz., ’yajati’ (one oerforms) in the subsidiary

sentences. The act of threshing (i.e. Avaghata) can be had

the didhi vakyas like 'brihinavahanti ’ (one should thr°sh tf.<-

caddy-grains). ‘‘/e have already stated in our exoosition of

immediately preceding V text that it is a case of Niyamavidhi.

In the V text again, it is stated that the Niyoga in - v

Prayija etc. is denoted by its own meaning in th-- form of thr

Niyoga relating to the right (i.e. the Adhikara).

 432

In this way, Salikanatha asserts that Niyoga is to be

accepted in respect of the Praylja etc.

nanu niyogasya kimyamanaphalasadhanatvabhyupacamat,

ohalasyaiva pradhanyat, tasyaiva vakylrthatv°

yuktamityata aha -

’It nay be argued, as the prompting is admitted as the

means of (attaining) the desired object and the desired object

is the Drincipal element, its (i.e., of the result) being the

meaning of the sentence is proper. Hence, (it is) said -

K(28) itmasiddhyanukulasya niyojyasya prasicMhaye.

- a/
kurvatsvargadikamaoi pradhanam karyame^nah.

’In our view, the performable even bringing the heaven

etc. for the attainment of the promoted person as conducive or

the attainment of its own (i.e. for being the prompted person),

is, indeed, the principal (element).’

V(23) yattadaourvam klryam, tasya niyojyanvayam vina

karyatvlnuoapatteh, anusthanam vina tadasambhavat,kar+ri

ca vini tadanupapatteh, adhikarena ca vini karturabhavat,

niyojyatvarh vina tadayogat, akamasadhane ca kimino

niyoganavagamatjiti, atmasiddhyarthameva niyogah

kamyamanaohalasiddhihetutvamabalambate, s-'amivat. y atha’

tmana $va samvidadhanassvami garbhadasasyooakaroti,

tatha ni y o g o ’oi niyojyasyeti, na pradhanapracyutih.

’That which is the unseen potency (i.e. unique result)

 4T?

is the performable; for the performability does not occur • it:-

out having its relation with the promoted person; because.there

cam be no performability without performance and ther® can fee

no oerformance without an Agent,and without a right none can he

an Agent. There can be no right without a nrompted person an <

as without the attainment of the desire (kamana), the oerson

desiring, has no knowledge of the promoting, the promoting for

its own sake, like a master (svami), becomes the means for the

attainment of the desired object. As a master for his own

benefit, he lps the born slave (Garbhadasa),so also is the

promoting for the oromoted oerson and as such the importance o ,r

the promoting is not lost’.

In ’atmasiddhyanukulasya ........... ’etc. of the K

and ’yattadaourvam ........... ’etc. of the V text, Salikanatha

asserts that in the view of the Prabhakaras, the Niyoga or ti -

Karya is, indeed, the principal element and the most importan+

for the attainment of the Niyogya. iVe have, in several

occasions,stated that the Karya, Niyoga and Aourva are

synonymous and hence the Karya in the K above refers to \’i/o^.

Th^t Karya is the orincioal factor and by reason of its bein

so, it constitutes the meaning of the sentence, has been star" j

by the author in K(27) of the VM . By reason of th°ir admit* in-;

the Nivoqa as the Vakyartha (meaning of the sentence), the

Prabhakaras are calledd Niyogavakyarthavadins.

In the 7 text, we find some technical issues, like

Karya, Niyogya, Anusthana, Karta, Adhikara etc. which ar®

indispensable for one another. To explain - the Karya or

Niyoga cannot be a Karya in the true sense of the term or 't'voo*

without a Niyojya i.e., the oerson to be promoted to effort.

As wit. out effort there can be no Niyoga?so without an \crnt

ther® can be no effort nor the Agent can be a Niyojya unless

he is entitled to Adhikara (right) arising out of the ef'ort.

Moreover, it is only the Kami (oerson desiring the result)

issuing from the \dhikara (right) that is entitled to its

performance. Thus the result, indirectly in the \gent become

a necessary factor in resoect of the Niyoga. The relat'on

bet ween th" Niyoga and the Niyojya is comoared to th° relation

between a svami (master) and a gharbhadisa (born slave), 'ithou*

the servant, the master cannot be a master worth the name an-4

yet it is the master who is the more imoortant person of the two

Same is the case with the Niyoga also and because of its

helping the Niyojya, is the principal element.

The eomoarison between the master and the servant in wie

side and the Niyoga and the Niyojya on the other3 is also shown
■£ - 321
by Salikanatha in his Rjuvimala. A garbhadasa is a born lav

and it is found in the Katyayana-Srauta-sutra of Asvalayana.

Though a garbhadisa renders service to his master, yet he is not

the principal person. For, he is helped by the master for nis

livelihood and as such he is much benefited by the master. T h t

is why the master is the more imoortant of the two. Same is

321 Vide, BR, p. 2d3.

 435

the case also with the Niyoga and the Niyojya. Niyoga is exore-

ssed by the sentence as a whole; for,that which is the principal

element made known by the sentence constitutes the meaning of

the sentence and of all the factors made known by the sentence,

the Niyoga is the most important. Though the desired result ha'

all the condition of being ijfthe most important element, yet

is the Niyoga which is the principal. The desired result is

regarded as subordinate to the Niyoga. For, the desired result

comes to be one of the elements necessary for the making uo of

the full Niyoga.

In the V text above, we find the issues like Karts,

\dhikara etc. \ Karta is one who actually performs the act' n

indicated by the principal root in a Vidhi. One undertakes tn<=

action when one understands that one is meant to be the 4Hhik=r’

*

(rightful person) to discharge the action because of hi' bc in:

a functionary to the action imposed by the Vidhi. The Karta ,

Niyojya and 'idhikari are combined in one person who is stst<='; to

322
be the functionary in a Vidhi. ^dhikara is the prosperity of
323
the person in the action. Adhikara always accrues to him who

is stated to be a Niyojya.

324
The K above is found ouoted by litsukha in context

of his refuting the view of the Pribhakaras that the knowl©

322 -
tadanu karmanirvartakastu karteti tisro’vastha ekasyaiva
kramab-avinyah. NK under NRM, p.4.

adhik~r~ah ourusasyaiscaryam karmani. 3VL under B.i, o,14.

324
TS, o. 165.
 436

of the Karya inclines a person to an action. We find there the

use of the word 'svatma* inccstead of *itma* in the VM.

Vacaspati Misra, in his commentary called Nyivakanika

** ,
refutes Salikanatha*s view that Niyoga is the principal element
***

like a master. The maxim *garbhadasanyiya* cited by Salikanatha

has not been favoured by Vacaspati Mis'ra. H§ says that the

maxim *garbhadasa* is improper. Both the efforts are inherent

in the two sentient beings. The effort of the master ooerates

for the welfare of the servant. But his effort is connected

with his self-interest. On the other hand, the servant^also

Is
inclined to action for the service of his master and his

inclination to action is also connected with his own benefit. So,

it is not proper to say that the master is the more important of

the two and as such in the context also it cannot be said that
325
Niyoga is the principal factor. It can be mentioned here

that Vacaspati Misra and Mandana Misra refute# the Niyogavlda of

the Prabhikaras by reason of their supporting the views of

- / 326 ^ -
Kumarila. Mandana Misra refutes also Salikanatha's view that

yattu garbhadasavadityuktam.tadayuktam. dvau hi tatra

prayatnau cetanadvayasamavayinau. tatra sviminah prayatnal)
svarthamuddisya garbhadasopakiraya pravartate. garbhadlso’pi
ca_svayogaksemasamavahitasvantav?ttireva pravartate.
svamyarthe i.... .;•••• n? ca svamlva cetanantaramatra'sti,
yatkrtim Drati pradhanyam niyogasya bhavet.
- NKK under W , p. 67.

326 —
api ca na niyogamatram pravrttihetuh mithyi tarhi
niyogaj?fanam. na ca tadyuktam karanadvayabhavlt.
- W, d . 76.

«
Niyoga is the cause of pravrtti (inclination) of persons in

action. 'Ye have already stated that according to Wandana "i^ra.,

the IstasadhanafSjnana (the knowledge of the achievability of

the desired object) is the cause of the pravrtti (person’s

inclination to action) and constitutes the vakyartha (tn- me a-

ning of the sentence). But Salikanatha, in the K and V text

above, asserts that the Niyoga or the Klrya because of its he in,

the princioal element, constitutes the vakyartha and not any

other such as Istaeadhanata etc.

nanu niyogasya ohalasadhanatvat, tasya ca setikaita-

vyatakarananibandhanasiddhitvat, tadanusthanantaram

niyogaeiddheh phalasiddhissyat, anantaram niyoyo n-<

nisDadyate, tarhi kriyayamatitayam kutastat -

siddhirityatra’ha -

’It may be argued, prompting is the m°ans of attai.nin

the desired result and it is attained by the means in the form

of modus ooerandi and as the prompting is attained subseouent a-f-

to the performance, the desired object is attained. If at tic

end of the performance, the prompting is not attained, then -.'h<-n

the performance is over, how that (i.e., the promoting) will be

attained 0 Here (in this context) says (replies) the author’ -

K(29) visayanusthitau satyarh siddho na hi vid’

nih ohalam.

tadanimeva kurute sahakarivyapeksaya.

'For, an established injunction does not do (produc---)

 43o

the result when there is the performance of an object (i.e.,

an action), (but) it (oroduces the same) by means of thc h^lc

of the auxiliary (cause)'.

esa’tra dars*anasthitih - pradhanotpattiniyogah,

a'nqotoattiniyogasca yathayatham sannipattyooak^rakanga-

yuktasvavisayamatranusthan°naiva siddhyanti. tatra

yanyangaourvani, tani sambhuya pradhanoto3ttya-

-purvesuoakurvanti, tasmacca oaramaourvam nisoadyat^.

yanyapi ca’rigapurvani diksaniyldinam,

tes’amaoyaraduoakarakatidesikangabhajamekamutoattya-

-purvam, aoaramawapyihgapurvam oradhanavadv^dita^vya" -

iti. anaya dis*a’nyatrlpi sakalamuhaniyam.

ittham yadyapi karmanusthinanantarameva

niyogasiddhih, tathapi yat ohalasya’nantarabhavanam,

tat uoaoattya kalpyate - iti.

’Here is this logical position - the promptings

produced from the orincioal injunction and the oromptinns

produced from the subsidiary are attained by the oerormance

of their own actions connected with the subsidiaries that an-

comoonently helpful (Sannipattyopakaraka), Those which arc-

subsidiary unique re suits(Ahgapurva) having been united

together come to helo in producing the principal unique result

(PradhanaDurva) and from that (i.e., the orincioal unique-

result) is produced the final unique result (Paramaourva). \ni

those which are the subsidiary unique results of the sacrifice

like Diksaniya etc., have also one initial unique result. Anot':~-e

subsidiary unique result is to be understood like the principal

(unique result). In this manner, (the production of the unions

result) is to be considered in other cases also.

Thus although the prompting is attained subseou^nt to

the performance of the action, yet that non-attainment of +’

ne

result at subsequent period is assumed by a relation of cause ~n

ef fect. ’

In ’Visaylnusthitau satyam ............... ’etc. a no

’e s a ’tra darsanasthitih .................. ’etc. of the K and V

text resgectively as stated above, Salikanatha refers to th^t ••o-

fold division of the Niyoga or Aourva and states that ther<~ is

mutual reauirements between both the divisions. The t'-o

divisions of Niyoga are - Pradtianotoatti Niyoga and Angotnatti

Niyoga. The Pradhanotpatti Niyoga is one which is produced by

a Pradhina yaga (principal sacrifice) and the Angotnatti

Niyoga is that which is produced by an Ahga yaga (subsidiary

sacrifice). The Anga ylgas (auxiliary sacrifices), help the

Pradhina yagas (principal sacrifices). Anga yagas (auxiliary

sacrifices) are two-fold viz., Sannipatyopakaraka (comoonently

helpful) and AradUpakaraka (directly helpful). Sannina+yooakarak

auxiliaries are those that directly or indirectly constitute

the body of the Pradhana yaga and thereby contribute to the

utpatyaourva (initial unseen potency) springing from that

 44C

327
sacrifice. For, instance, materials such as rice, thresh­

ing, sorinkling etc, relating to them, deities like the fire

and acts like recitation from memory of yljyl (sacrificial

hymns) and anyvakya (preliminary hymns) relating to them.

Aradupakaraka auxiliaries are those that Jzfgenerate Vourva

(unseen potency) inhering in the soul. For instance, sacrifi

like the prayaja, Ajyabhaga and 4nuyija. These do not causc

any puricication either in the materials or in the deities, ui

produce Aourva (unseen ootency) in the soul. Henc~, th°y ar

** 32x3
called \radupakaraka auxilaries. . It has been stated in -.he

vrtti that the paramaourva (final unseen ootency) is oroduc" '

by the principal rite together with its prior and oosterior

auxiliaries and not by the princioal rite alone. If the

orincioal ritn alone oroduced the Paramaourva, the result of

the rite also would accrue from that and as such the auxil"ar'-
329
would be redundant. The Paramaourva is also otherwise known

3 2 *7 Tt i
tanyangani dvividhani sannipatyopakarakam- araduoakarakini
oeti. yanyangani saksat paramparaya va pradhanayagaeirTr am
nispadya taddjfra tadutpattyaourvoyogini tani
sahnioattyooakarakani.MP, po. 23-29

3 93
itmasamavetaourvaj anakanyaridupakarakini. yat’
na orayaj aj yib-
ganuyajadini. etani dravyagatam devatigatam va samskaram na
janayanti kintvitmagatamadrstam janayantityariduoakira-
kini - Ibid., po. 31-32.

329
tadeva ohaliourvam.tatkaranatvanca pracyodicyiriga '1 si?t.a?ya
oradhanasya bhavati, na pradhanamatrasya. oradhanamatraJe /
ohalaourvajanane ohalasyaoi tata eva siddheranganamanartha-
kyapatteh. Ibid, p. 3.
 441

as Phalapurva.
th -t ' , '
It may be said here that the sanipatya. auxiliaries form

a part of the Pradhanayiga which is the object of the principal

duty. The Lin in the sentence that prescribes the Sannipa-fya

Anga, repeats the principal duty which is again connected with

the meaning of the root as its own Visaya (object). But this

Visaya cannot be its Karana (chief cause), because the Pradhina

yaga is already known as the chief cause of the duty in the main

sentence. The same duty, therefore, includes the Sannipat'ya Anga

as a part of its Karana (chief cause), because without it the

Pradhana yaga is complete.

- _ _ 330
The Araduoakaraka auxiliaries again do not lend

support physically to the Pradhana yaga which is the object of the

principal duty. These auxiliaries are minor sacrifices complete

in themselves and lend support to the Pradhana yagas in forming

the principal duty. The Aradupakaraka auxiliaries may be of two

kinds viz., one that fulfils only an unseen purpose and the other

that fulfils as seen as well as an unseen purpose. As an example

of the second kind, we can take Pavovrata (the penance of living

on milk alone) observed by the sacrificer and his wife, during the

performance of the Jyotistoma yaga. As examples of the first kind3

we can take all the acts that are enjoined by the texts like

’samidho yajeta* etc., which do not mention any effects produced

by the act either in any substance or in the performing Agent

330 avantarapurvakaranopakirakatvamevaradupakarakatvam. TR,p 64.

 442

which would help the main act of sacrifice and it is only the

effects produced in the substance or in the Agent that could

, 331
be seen.

The Prabhikaras classify Sannipattyopakiraka into

four viz., (1) Utpatti, (2) Prapti, (3) Vikrti and

(4) Samskrti. The kneading of the dough which produces the

cake^is the example of the Utpatti Sannipattyopakarakajmilking

of a cow whereby the milk is obtained^is the case of Prapti tyoe

of Sannipattyepakaraka; the threshing of the corn which changes

its appearance is the example of the Vikrti Sannipattyopakiraka

and the sprinkling of water on the corn is the case of the

332
Saaskrti type of Sannipattyopakaraka.

These four types of Sannipattyopakaraka admitted by

the PrabKakaras may be compared to the four types of Guna Karma

333
admitted by the followers of Kumarila.

331 - -
araduoakarakam dvividham - adfstaprayojanam,_drstadr^tapra-
yojarfca. tatridr^taprayojanam *samidho yajati (S.’Bal2.6.1.1)
tyadi^. asya kar'akagatam kincit prayojanam na drsyate ,PP,p.46<3

332 _ _
tatra sannipattyopakarakam caturvidham, sadhyabhutotpatti-
pripti-vikrti-samskrti-bhedat. yathakramam samyavana-
dohana-vilapana-proksanadirupam. Ibid, p. 457

333 _
punarapi gunakarma caturvidham - utpattyaptivikrtisamskrti-
bhedat. yatha - -’agnlnadadhlta* iti ..................
............. adhanasya utpattisamskirakatvam. iptisamskaro
yatha - ’svadhyayo’dhyetavyatl’tTai. S.) iti ..............
vitortiryatha - 'brlhlnavahantit iti .......................
samskrtiryatha - *brlhln proksati*. MP, pp.45-46.
 443

SIlikanatha in the Angaparayanaprakarana of his PrakayanJ-

pancika shows their classification of Auxiliaries into four

heads - (a) Jati (universal), (b) Guna (quality),(c) Dravya

(substance) and (d) Bhavartha (action) . The Sannipattyopakiraka

and Aradupakaraka are the divisions of the Bhavlrthiatmaka type of

334
Anga. Prabhakaras classification of Auxiliaries appears to

be exhaustive and more logical than that of the Bhittas.

nanvevam sati phalahetuta*plirvasya bodhyetefcyatrlha -

’If such being the case, the state of being the means of

the desired object in respect of the unique result gets

hindered, to such a doubt (the author) states* -

K(30) sahakarivyapeksa ca kiranatvam na bldhate^ mi badhistheti

sarvatra tadanugrahakalpan^f

’The requirements of the auxiliary causes,' however, do not

hinder the state of being the (chief) cause and these do not

oopress the same and as such there takes place the assumption

of favour of that (i.e., the auxiliary cause)*.

V(30) tathetyarthah.

*atah purusakarasca daivanca phalasadhanam* ityiciryih,

daivam - apurvam. apeksaniyam sahakiri ca purusakara-

padavedyam.nanvevam bhavatu kamyesvapurvakaryabhidhinam

linadinam, nitya ^ naimittika ^nisedhadhikaresu katham 0

na hi tesu phalodayam prabhakara anumanyante. na hi r

334 "

iha caturvidhamahgajatam - jati-guna-dravya-bhavartha-

tmakam. tatra bhavarthatmakamapi dvividham - sannipattyo-
pakarakam, araduoakarakaffceti. PP, p. 457.
 444

ohalam phalataya’rtviyate , kintvadhikarivis"°sanatava

labdhe tu jivanadivadhikarivisesanena, kin ohalan-

-vesanena. na ca phalamantarena pravrttyasambhavah,

svasambandhikaryavagamnmatrSy8%^atv5toravrtt£h.

niraoeksaechabdat phalamantarena’oi svasamband'm'

vagamah,tavanmatrasya loke oravrttihetutvivagamat.

karyavagamotoadanayaiva phalamupayujyata ityutetam.

nanu yatha ^abdatkaryavagatih, tatha nisohalatvada-

numanena’ karyatapratitiraoiti, katham oravrttyuoanac+

na agamavirodhena’numanasya’tmalabhabhavit.etavineva

oramanavyanarah, yatoravrttiyogyarthooadarsanam. anvat

yadi kascitkalpite phale na pravartate, tada kin

kartavyam.

*Sam? is th? cas° (with the act of cooking etc.) and i

is the meaning. Hence, the scholars remark " so, the effort

the agent and the fate are means of (producing) the re?u11 ".

word ’daivam’ (fate) means 'Vpurva (unique result), A.nd by t

word ’Purusakara’ (i.e,, the effort of the agent), the r<=au’r

auxiliary cause is to be understood.

Let the suffixes viz., Lins etc. denote the performed!

the uniaue result in respect of the prospective acts (Kamya),

but how it is so in respect of regular (Nitya), occasional

(Naimittika) and the prohibitive (Hisedha) acts.9 For, th«

followers of the Prabhakara system do not admit the product’

of the desired result in resoect of them (i.e., in the regul-

rite etc.). It is because?a desired result is not related a<

 445

desired result but as qualification of the rightful person

(Adhikari). If at the beginning of life, the qualification of

the rightful person is attained, where lies the necessity of

searching for the desired object ? It cannot be said that the

inclination of a person to action does not take place without

having any result, because the inclination of a person takes

place as a result of his knowledge of an action. Even without

«

the result, one's knowledge of action may be acquired from the

injunction which is not required. For, in daily life, it is

observed that only from this,there may be the knowledge of the

cause of a person's inclination to action. It has been said

that the desired object is utilised only to produce the

knowledge of the action. ]>t may be argued, just as from the

words there arises the knowledge of the performable, so also

there arises the knowledge of that which is not the performable

by means of inference because of there being no desired object,

how can there'be the inclination (of a person)? It cannot be

said so. For, there is no self-attainment of an inference

with its contradiction to verbal testimony (Agama). This much

is the function of a source of valid knowledge that they express

the inclination of a person for the appropriate object.

Otherwise if someone is inclined to the assumed desired object,

then what is to be done ?

In 'Sahakarivyapeksa ca .................’etc. of the K

and in ’tathetyarthah.atah purusakarasca...... 'etc. of the

 446

V text above, Salikanitha refutes an objection that Apurva

cannot be the cause of producing the desired object. -In­

in the K above, it is stated that the necessity for the

auxiliary cause does not hinder the causality. Along with the

chief cause for the production of an effect,some auxiliary

causes are also required. For instance, in the expression,

’Devadattah odanam pacati’, Devadatta is the Agent for the act

of cooking and so, he is the cause i.e, the efficient cause.

But only by him the cooking cannot be completed. It requires

some other auxiliary causes. These are fuel, fire and the -tpot

etc. This is what is expressed by the words 'tathetyarthah*

in the V text above.

The second half of the K is found with a variant reading

in the first edition of the VM which is as follows -

*ma va bidhista sarvatra karye pakadike yathi*

Sllikanltha in supoort of his view,quotes the view of

some ancient teachers on smrti which mean that the Purusakira

(effort of the Agent) and daiva (fate) are the means of

attaining the desired result.

Notwithstanding sincere effort, we could not trace the

teachers referred to by the expressions ’Acaryas’ in the V

text above, similar sentences however, are met with in the

335 Vide, FN.2 under PP.444.

 336
Yaqyavalkya-smrti.

In the oresent context, th~ word ’daiva’ refers to \pur’^

and jkr the word ’Purusakara’ refers to sahakari karana

(auxiliary cause).

The word ’daiva’ also refers to the de°ds done in nrev^o-e

birth. It has also be°n said that without the effort of the

A.gent, haiva or fate can oroduce no result.

Moreover, in the V text above, the author refutes the

objection which states that let the suffixes ’Lins’ etc. d~no —

4ourvakirya in resoect of the Kamya (Prospective) acts and no'

in resoect of the Mitya, Naimittika and Nisedha acts, "“he

Prabhakaras do not hold that no result can accrue from these

acts. They say that the non-performance of the Mitya and

Naimittika rites inevitably leads to demerit5but their

337
performance produces no result. The Prabhakaras also d'clax

that by doing th^ Nisedha (prohibited) actions no bad result

are seen to follow. Salikanitha has discussed it in his

_ 333
Rjuvimala on the Brhati.

336
daive ourusakare ca karmasiddhirvyavast'nita.............
....... evam ourusakarena vina daivam na siddhyati’
FN.3 under ?P, p. 444.

nityanaimittikayorakarane oratyavaya eva krte phalam

nastiti kecit. MP, p. 48,
338
na hi nisedhena nanarthasyakarane pratyavayaoarihairthata
....... !............ tada caitadaoi siddhynt - orat^sid "ia

pratyavayayeti. na tvevamasti. RVL. on 3R, o.28.

 A4 3

The followers of Kumarila Bhatta, however, maintain that

the performance of Nitya and Naimittika rites oroduces result

339
viz., the destruction of demerit. Regarding this ">e find
_ 340
discussion on Kumarila s Brhattika♦

nanu phalodayanabhyupagame ca Dracyamargisambhavat

nityadisvaourvakaryabhidhanamaDramanakam syat,tatri’ha -

’It may be argued that in the event of non-admission of

the obtainment of the result, because of the aforesaid vedic

statement being imoossible, the denotation of the unioue result

which is ;he performable in resoect of the regular rites etc.,

will be without any ground’.

. _ _ _ _ _ t
K(31) evam kamadhikarathaparyalocanayothita.

vyutoattissarvavakyarthapratioattinibandhanam.

’Thus the knowledge resulting from the elaborate

discussion of the idea of the right for pleasure, forms tne basis

of the knowledge of the meanings of all the sentences’.

V(3l) uktamidamanyiyyarfca’nekirthatvam - iti. tena kamidhikar-

siddhe’ourvakaryabhidhayakatve, nityidisvaoi sa eva’rtoo

virodhabhavadasriyate. nityadhikaranugunyena tu

kriyakaryatvlbhidhanam kamyesvanuoaoannamiti, sarvatr^’

purvameva vakyirthah - iti.

339 nityanaimittikaireva kurvana duritaksayam (BK), IPM, o. 160

340
Ibid, p. 160.
 44Q

tatraitadeva tavadvaktavyam - na kevalam vede

lokavyavaharideva sabdarthavadharanam, kiritu

prapidharthapadasambandhadaoi oadarthantaranvaya-

yogyarthabhidhayakateti sthite, tadanuruoartha-

" bhidhayakafa nirniyata eva. etacca yavavarahadhi-

- karane (M.D.1.3.5) vyutpaditam. vyavaharata eva

I
sambandhavadharanadubhayatha’pi vyavaharadarsanat sam

vioratipattiriti purvah paksah.

oadantarasambandhadapi oadintararthadhyavasanam

bhavatyeva. tena vaidikavakyasesanvayarhatalocan^na

dirghasukadyarthatvameveti radhintah.

tatha trivrcchabde, yupa-havaniyadisu ca saktyavad;.=ra-

nat. loke’oi ca’yarh vyavaharo bahulamuoalabhyate.

tatha sati vaidikaniyojyanvayayegyataya lihadinama-

ourvakaryabhidhayakatvanirnayo na’nupaoannah.

ayancl’paro visesah - yallinadiyuktanarii vakyanam

karyarthatvam, tattavadvrddhavyavahariddva siddham,

kintu linadipratyayanam yadvacyam karyam,tacca’ourvsr-

upamityetavanmatrarh vaidikoadasambandhadavasiyate -

’ Vhat has been stated is without any logic and cont'^n?

many meanings. Hence, in the case of the unique result, tn*

Derformable as the denoter being established in the contexi or

Klmadhikara, that very meaning is admitted in resoect of the

regular rites etc. But by means of the utility of the r---ouLar

rite, the state of denoting the Derformable by the action is

 450

inconsistent in respect of the orasoective rites and as such

the unique result is the meaning of the sentence in all

re soects.

There (in that case), it should, however he stated -

not only in the Veda, the ascertaining of the meanings of thc

word? arises, indeed, from the popular usage, but also from

the relation of the words having popular meanings in the ev?r i

of there being the state of being the denoter of the meaning

compatible for relation with the meanings of other words, tn?

state of being the denoter of similar meaning is, indeed,

determined. And it is stated in the Y^vavarahadhikarana

(MD. 1.3.5)-. According to the prima facie view, there ar’

1s°-

the same controversy from the observation of the usage both

ways and from the ascertaining of the relation. Also from t:ir

relation of other word, there is, indeed, the acertaining of

the meanings of other words. Hence, the conclusion is that

means of considering the comoatibility in respect of t .e

relation of the Vedic supplementary statement (Vaidikavakyaf-s

the meaning of the word Yava (barley) is (to be taken in the

sense of ) dirghasuka (i.e. long-awned grain).

Same is the case with the word ’trivrt’ (b?caus^ of

the denotativ0 power being ascertained in resoect of the

yuoa (the sacrifical post) and Ahavaniya (i.e. a kind of -irp

etc. Hven in common osrlance, this usage is widely found

(used). Such being the case, it is not inconsistent to

 451

determine that the suffixes Lins etc. denote the unique result,

the performable by means of compatibility in respect of the

relation with the prompted person of the Veda.

And this is another distinctive feature - that which

is the meaning of the performable of the sentences constituted

by Lins etc., is,indeed, determined by the usage of the elders,

but which is denoted by the suffixes Lins etc., is the

performable and that is in the form of the unique result and

so this much is ascertained from the relation of the Vedic words?.

In 'evam kamadhikarartha .................*etc. and

’uktamidamanySyyanca .................. *etc. of the K and V

text respectively above, Salikanatha meets a query that the

admission of the Apurvakarya in respect of the rites like Nitya

etc. is without any ground.

Salikanatha states that Karya or Apurva is the principal

object and is the Vikyirtha or the meaning of the sentence. It

may be stated here that according to the Prabhakaras, Niyoga or

Apurva or Karya is the Dharma and it is the principal object

and subsidiary to nothing. In case of the Nitya and Naimittika

rites, only the attainment of the Vidhi is necessary and if

there is no attainment of the Vidhi, it comes to be harmful,

because it is the puruslrtha. Even in the case of the

Kamldhikaras, therefore, to attain the Vidhi is necessary. But

the attainment of the desired result ’svarga* etc., is not an

uc
observation to it. The result that accrues from the performance'
A
 45 /

of the duty consists in comoliance with the injunctions for

which one haopens to be a Niyojya and an 'idhikeri to p e r f o r m

341
the sacrifices. '"/e have already stated that accordina to

the system of Prabhakara, Karya is the Pradhana and const!tj s

the Vakyartha.

That the knowledge of the meaning of the word can be

had even from a ponular relation between the word and m^anin ’

and with a view to clearly exolaining it, Salikanatha ref r?

to the ourvaoaksa and the siddhanta as found in the

- - 342
Yavavarahadhikarana of the MS. 1.3.3, the sutra of which ir
-

"tesvadarsanadvirodhasya sama vioraoatioattih syat".

It has been stated in the Yavavarahadhikarana that

some tak- the word *yava’ to mean ’dirghasuka’ (lone-awned

grain) and others ’priyangu*. Thus some use thc word

’varaha’ in the sense of ’sukara’ (i.e. a boar) and others in

the sense of ’krsnas'akuni ’ (black hanh) . Thus, there are

nanu kamadhikare’nusthanabhj^ phalam na siddhyct.

Taccanistam. nityesu tu kirn syat. vidhisiddhirna syat.tv^a
kimanistam tadevanistam. tasyaiva puruslrthatvat. ata eva
kamad'nikare *oi vidhisiddhih orayojanam.ohalasiddhistu
nantarxyakT ...... .........................................
.......... tasmat karyameva oradhanam. tadeva vakvarths.o.
TR, o. 59.

342 In the vrtti text, the no. of the sutra of the sale
\ d h i k a r a n a is aiven as MS.1.3.5 which is found
incorrect.
 4 53

34 3
ootions due to th^ knowledge of the meaning of the word.

Ramarjujacarya, in his Tantrarahasya. discusses this

344
tODic in an easier way.

The Myaya-vaisesikas also take the above discussion

of the Miminisakas, One of the factor from which arises the

- _ with
knowledge of Sakti is Vakyasesa. In connection^the citatio

of the Vakyasesa, the Nyaya-vaisesikas take the above

instance of the Mimamsakas. In the expression,

’yavamay =s‘carurbhavati ’, (i.e., the porridge should ne of

yava), the word ’yava’ is used by the iryans to signify a

oarticular long-owned grain, while the Mlecchas use it in + n«

sense of oanic seed. 'Vith regard to this,there is a statement,

’when other herbs wither, these remain flourshing’. "In J!v

soring season, all grains lose their leaves, but yava with ire

owns remains flourshing". From this Vakyasesa, it may be

concluded that the denotative capacity of the word is with

regard to the grain with long owns (dirghasuka) and that its

yavamayas'caruh, varahi uo"anahau vaitase kate orajaoaty^n

s3ncinoti iti yavavarahavetasasabdan samamananti. tatra
keciddirghasukesu yavas'abdam prayunfjate, kecit oriyahcusu.
varahasabdam kecit sukare, kecit krsnasakunau...........
...................... tatrobhayathS oadarthavagamadvi-
kalpah. SB under MS 1.3.3.

na kevalam vrddhavyavaharajieva vyutoattih.-prasiddhaoade'--

amabhivyaharadapi lbke_drs'yate. vede’pi ’yavamayas'carur-
bhavati, varahi up’anahavuoamurTcate^ityatra yavavarahas'ah_
dayoh oriyangflu dirghasuke ve^ase sukare ca orayuj yamaca-
yorarthavadasamabhivyaharat dirghasuke sukare ca
s”aktiniyamo drstah. TR, p. 55.
 454

use to signify Kangu is1 due to a mistaken notion about its

345
denotative caoacity.
<1 -
Salikanatha in the V text above,places the views of

both the Purvaoaksa and the Siddhanta. According to the

Purvapaksa,since both the meanings are found to be signified

by the word, the acceptance of the one or the other is a

matter of option. And according to the siddhanta, that

meaning is to be regarded as more authoritative in which th<~

word is used by persons who take their stand on the scr^'otur'

because it is more reliable than the other. This is what ha<^

been stated by Sahara under MS . 1.3.8.

In regard to the word ’yava’, Sabara finds support f^r

its denoting the Barley-corn in the Vedic text which soeaks

of the ’yava-plant’ as flourshing while other olants •,'ithf=i

away - which description is aoolicable to Barley-corn ani no*

to the long-pepper.
•C —
In the V text above, Salikanatha shows the difference

between the Karya of the sentences formed with the suffixes

Lins etc. and the Karya which is denoted by the suffixes Lins

evam vakyasnsadaoi saktigrahah. vatha yavamayascarur-

bhavatltyatra yavapadasya dirghasuka-visese ar-yanam orayoga
kahgau tu mlecchanam. tatra hi ’yatrlnya ausadhayo mlayao+e
thaite modamanastisthanti’.• ta^tha -
"vasante s^arvasas^anamjSlarasatanam. ^
modamanas’ca tisthanti yavah kanisa-salinah". iti
v'akyasesad dirghasuke saktirnirniyate Under BP,o- .
433 - 3^1.
 45b

etc. It is stated that meaning of the Karya of the sentences

with the Lins etc. is ascertained from the Vrddhavyavah^ra,

while that being denoted by the suffixes Lins etc. is

ascertained from its (of the Karya) relation with the words
as
of the Vedic sentences and that Karya is known ^the V^urva.

ekadesimatamadhuna nirakartumupanyasyati -

’Now (the author) with a view to rejecting the view of

a certain section of the Mimimsakas, presents (introduces) the

following’-

K(32) vyavaharata eva’hurvyutpattimapare ounah.

karye manantarivedye kriyadivyatirekini.

’In the event of the oerformable being unknowable bv

any other source of knowledge and being different from the

action etc., the knowledge (of the oerformable), others aoain

contend, can be obtained from the usage of the oeoole’.

V(32) asya’yamarthah - kecidevamahuh - linadiyukta -

vakyasravane oravrttidars'anat, karyivagatinibandha-

natvat oravrtteh, karyamitrameva tesamarthah, na

kriya.

’The idea of this (is)- some others contend like th'iw -

because of seeing the inclination (of a person to som~ action)

subseouent to the hearing of the sentences formed with thr

Lins etc., because of there being the inclination due to it^

(of the inclination) being based on the knowledge of the

 4bo

performable, only the performable is the meaning of them(i.e.,

of the sentences) and not the action’?

In ’vyavaharata eva ............ * etc. and ’asyertha.g -

kecidevamahuh ...... ......... ’etc. of the K and V t°xt

respectively as stated above, S=>likanatha presents the view of

a section of Mimamsakas. According to these Mimamsakas,as toe

Karya cannot be known by other source of knowledge and ~s it

is different from the Kriya in the view of the Prabhakaras, so

the Karya can be known from the u s age of the sentences. To

explain - these Mimamsakas contend that a person is inclinec ta

by
certain action on hearing" a sentence which is formed A the

suffix Lin etc. and it is also stated that the Pravrtti of the

person is because of his knowledge of the Karya. Thus it can

be stated that the Klrya comes to be the import of the senteo:rs

with Lins etc. and not the Kriya and thereby the difference

between the Karya and the Kriya is asserted. That thp Karya

is the import of the Lins etc. is because of the fact that tne
v
Pravrtti of a word in the Kriya is not useful. As th« K
t* *

above is partially a repetition of the K (23) and K(25) as '--e

have discussed already, here we refrain from explaining the

same further,

nanvevam vedadeva vyutoattirasthita syaditvasnnkya’-

ha -

'It may be argued, the knowledge of the meaning r

obtained from the Veda (i.e., the '-edic sentence s ), aoor hr n in-
 457

this (the author) states* -

K(33) vyutpattirapi karye’rathe vyavaharanusirini.

kintu nirdharanamatram vedavakyavimarsajam.

’The knowledge also in the sense of the perf^ormable

follows the usage of the people. But the ascertainment of the

process results only from the examination of the Vedic

sentence *.

V(33) tasyam sabdasya pravrttyanuyogitvaditi,kriyaniskrsta-

karyabhidhlyita laukikavyavahlrade\0 nirniyate - iti.

’Because of the inclination of the word being not

useful in respect of that (action), the state of denoting the

performable evolving, out of the action is, indeed, determined

from the usage of common parlance’.

In ’vyutpattirapi karye’r t h e .... .............. ’etc.of

the K and in ’tasyam sabdasya .............. ’etc. of the V

text above, Silikanitha maintains that the Vedic Lins etc. have

the denotative power in respect of the Karya. It is stated in

the K above, that Karya takes place after the usage of the

people i.e., from the observation of the inclination of a

person to certain action, one can acquire the knowledge of the

Karya.

—
Salikanatha states that although the knowledge of the
in
denotative power of the words Lins etc. arises only respect of
 4ro

the DOpular actions (Laukika karya)? yet the Lins etc. y m^ar.1-

of th<= word ’svergakama’ etc. that refers to the Miyojya,

convey the Vedic performable other than the Kriya, for the

momentary sacrifices cannot bring about the result viz.,svar , 1

etc. at a subseouent period.

But this view of the Prabhikaras as stated by Saliksr.a; >

is refuted by Gitsukha. According to Gitsukha^, this view is

imorooer, because the bringing about of the heaven through

\ourva is a case of ^rthapitti and thus the view of the

Prabhikaras that %urva cannot be known by any other oramana

_ 34A
except the Sastraoraraana.

The K abov<= is found quoted by Pratyaksvaruoa Bhagavar, i

his Mayanaoresadini commentary in connection with the

refutation of the view of the Pribhakaras by Gitsukha.

tadidamayuktamiti pratijanite -

*3ut that (view) is (considered) improper and as such

(the author) resolves (asserts)’ -

K(34) sitetara iva tvesa oaksas'cittam na karsati.

candrataoamalanyayapravasamalinikrtah.

’This view does not attract the mind (i.e., is not

accented) like the dark fortnight blackened by the absence -->i

346
na ca karyamatre’evasitasangatika lihadayah s'abdah......
..... kriyatiriktameva karyamavagamayati, ........ .
iti yuktarn vaktum. ■¥- CS, o. 163.
347
Vide NSP under ibid.
 4bd

the brilliant moon-beams’.

kathamityaha - ’How is it h (the author) says’ -

K(35 & 36)

karye manant aravedye oarsvasthastanniband'nanam.

vyavaharam kathamkaram sabdatpragavabudhyatam.

vyavaharamavijnaya tannibandhanatadgatau.

pratioattih katham jney*ah sabdasaktih kathantaram.

’In what manner, you will make a child standing nearby

known the usage based on the oerformable prior to the word in

resoect of the oerformable (which is) not known by any other

source of knowledge ^

Without -t-he- knowing the usage, how the knowledge o~

the word based on that (usage) is to be known and e^en more

than that,in what manner, the denotative power of the word can

be assumed ?

V(34-36) idamatri’kutam-yadyapi karyamatrameva oravrttyu-

payogiti tavanmatrameva s*abdarthah, tatha’oi loke

kriyagatasyaiva pravarttakatvadarsanat,sakyate

kriyasritata pratyetum. yatha’krtimatrasya

sabdarthatve ’oi vyaktyas'ritati’pi na pratiksioyat-,

tatha kriyasritatvam pramanantarapramitam.na

pratikseoamarhati. tena kriyltiriktakaryabhidhayaka-

-tvamasiddham. yadi param tannibandhanavyavanara

eva syat, tada taddarsanattaddhetubhutaoratioattye-

nyathFnupapattyi’ numnnena sabdasya vacakatvadhya-

 450

-vasanam bhavet. na caitadasti, tasya sabdadanyatah

praganavagamattannibandhanavyavaharaoratioattih,

tadaoratioattau ca taddhetubhutapratipattyananumana-

-nna saktikalpanooapattih.

’This is the intention h er2. Although only the

oercormable is, indeed, conducive for*inclinat'on and as sucn

only that (performable) is the meaning of the word, yet in

common oarlance, because of observing the state of being the

inducer of only that being in action, its state of resortino

to the action can be uriderstood. Just as even in reso^ct o>

its being the meaning of a word only of the configuration, the

state of resorting to the individual is not hindered. Likewise

the state of resorting to the action known by other source o

valid knowledge, does not get hindrance. Hence, the state of

denoting the performable other than the action, is un°s4:abli^ '<<■■

If sometimes, usage is based on that (i.e. Kriya),(the u s a u }

not being there in the absence of the knowledge of that (Kirya

which is the cause of that (usage), from the observation of

that (usage), under that circumstances, there will be th*

ascertainment of the denotativeness of the word by means of

inference. And that is not so, because of not und rstandin.

that (usage) earlier from any source other than verbal

testimony, there is no knowledge of the usage ac bein', bas--‘

on that (word) and in the case of not knowing that (•■■ord)

because of not inferring the knowledge of that (word) 'hi if'

 461

is the basis of that (usage) there arises no assumption of

denotative power’.

In ’sitetara iva tvesa .............. * etc. of the K

text and in ’idamatra’kutam .................’etc. of the V

text above, Salikanatha refutes the view of a certain section

of the Mimamsakas who contend that one can understand the

Karya from only the oopular usage and only the Karya is the

meaning of the suffixes Lins etc. and not the Kriya. But

Salikanatha does not accent this view and with the help of a

simile, he refutes the same. In K(34) above, we find that

he compares this view to the black fortnight w M c h is very dark.

Just as the fortnight because of having no pleasant moon-beams

cannot attract the minds of the people, so also this view

because of lacking in satisfying points^cannot attract the minds

of the scholars, i.e.t this view is not acceptable. 'Vhy this

view is not acceptable, is stated by the author in K(35 & 36)

and is elaborated in the relevant V text. If it is admitted

that the Vidhi gives rise to the knowledge of the Kriya and not

that of the Karya, then how there will be the knowledge of the

Klrya? In the event of the Kirya being not known by any other

source of valid knowledge, a person will not know the usage

relating to the Karya prior to the word and without the

knowledge of the usage, one cannot have the knowledge of the

word relating to the usage. Thus in that case, one cannot

assume the denotative power of the words.

 462

Although only the Karya is conducive for the

Pravrtti of a person in an action and only the Karya is the

Sabdartha, yet we observe in common parlance that the knowledge

of the KriyI comes to be the cause of the Pravrtti. Thus it

can be assumed that the Pravrtti is resorted to the Kriya and

the Vakylrtha is what is the meaning of the suffixes Lins etc.

Just as only the meaning in the form of Akrti being admitted

as the meaning of the Sabda, the Akrti is understood as

pertaining to the Vyakti, and thus there is no obstruction in

respect of the knowledge of the Vyakti in the case of the

knowledge of the meaning of the word, so also is the caseewith

the Kriya. As a result, it cannot be established that the word

denotes the meaning in the form of the Kirya as different from

the KriyI. Thus in the V text above, Salikanltha contends that

the Kirya is not the basis of the usage, but it is the Kriya

which is the basis of the usage.

tatra’kutam vivrnoti -

’There (in that case), the author expounds the

intention* -

K(37) klryapratitimatranca pravrtteranumiyatlm.

kintu karya kriyaiveti lokadrsta’vasiyate.

’And let only the knowledge of the performable be

inferred from the inclination. But from the observation of the

popular usage, it is ascertained that the performable is,

 463

indeed, the action’.

V(37a) lok aoratitam kriyaruoatvanca na sakyate ’oahnotumi ti ,

karyamatrarthatve kriyaiva karyataya linidvartha

iti nisciyate, na punah pramanantaradapurvam - iti.

’And the state of being in the form of action

known from common parlance cannot be concealed and so it is

ascertained that the action in the sense of only the

oerformability, the meaning of the suffixes Lin etc. and not

again the unique result (i.e. unseen potency) from any other

source of valid k n owledge.’

In ’karyaoratitimatranca .................. !etc. mn

’lokaoratitam ............... ’etc. of the K and V text

resoectively above, Silikanatha maintains the view that from

the popular usage,the Kirya is ascertained the Kriya and

the knowledge of the Karya is inferred from the Pravrtti of -■

person in certain action. '.Ve hav^ already stated that in t!.-

view of the Prabhakaras, the Kirya is different from the

Kriya and it is stated by Silikanatha in K (23) and K (23)

which we have already exolained. In the text above, the

author states that the Kriyi is ascertained as the meanin- o f

the Lins etc. and is also ascertained in the form of the

Kirya in the meaning of only the Karya. Thus the meaning o'

the Lins etc. is not ascertained a s the Aourva by means of ar.v

other source of valid knowledge. We have earlier discussed

the issu° of the Kriya and the Karya and as such we refrain

from explaining them further.

Though the word ’Karya’ in the K text above is

apparently correct from the grammatical ooint of vie'", yet

from the ooint of the view of the purport, it is not correct.

The word will, therefore, be ’Klryam’.

The use of the emohatic oarticle ’eva’ after t he '-‘<oi ;

’Kriya’ in the K text above, asserts that it is the Kriya aloe"

that is ascertained as the Karya.

V(37b) anye punar '^"'vedarthabodhakaciryavacananibandhana-

-oravrttidarsanena’tindrive karye }-inadayo

vyutDadyanta ityahuh. yadyacaryavacanadapi kriyaiva

1> *
Waryatayl’ vagamyate, tada tasyassvayam duhkharuoa-.v

ourus"Srthantaranubandhanam vina oravrttyasambhavin-

-niyamena sukharthinah pravrttirna syat. na ca

sandhyooasanadau purusartho’sti,tasmat kriyatirikta-

-karyamacaryavacanebhyo’vagamyate - iti.

’Others agains soeak of (contend) that because :>•

observing the inclination based on the statements of the

precentors that convey the meanings of the vedic s°ntenc°s,t '.<■

Lins etc. are understood in resoect of the supras-"-nsibl<= act:o n .

If from the statement of the preceptor also, the action is,

indeed, understood in the form of performable, then because or

that (action) itself being in the form of pain, because of the

inclination being imoossible without the relation of another

human goal (purusartha) as a rule, there will be no incline*ion

of a oerson seeking happiness. And in the case of the ev^nino

rite (Sandhyooasana), there is no human goal. Hence, the

Derformable additional to the action is understood from the

statements of the p r eceptors’.

In the V text viz., ’anye ounarvedarthabodhaka ........

......... ’etc. as stated above, Salikanatha presents the vi°-"

of some other Mimamsakas who contend that the Pravrtti of a

oerson to some action is due to the statements of the preceptor

that convey the meanings of the Vedic sentences. These

Mimamsakas also contend that the suffixes Lins etc. are unders­

tood in respect of the suorasensible actions. If again it is

said that only the Kriya is understood as the Karya from the

statements of the preceptors and as the KriyI is in the form

of Dain and as there arises no Pravrtti without a purusartha.

there ’"ill be no Pravrtti of a oerson seeking haooiness in tne

actions b^ing of the nature of pain. And in the case of the

Mitya Karma (i.e,, the regular rite) such as Sandhyopasana o-c.

there is no Purusartha and as such there will be no Pravrtti n

such rites. It may be stated here that the Mimamsakas divide

Arthakarma (princinal rite) into !itya (regular), Naimittika

(occasional) and Kimya (optional). Sandhyooasana etc. are tne

 45’

Nitya Karma the oerformance of which produces no recult. camr

is the case with the Naimittika karma also. According to th<-

Prabhakaras, the non-oertormance of th-se two rites inevitv ly

leads to demerit.34d

In the V text above, it is thus stated that according

to those Mimamsakas, the Karya additional to the Kriyi is

understood from the statements of the precentors.

tin pratyaha- ’(The author) replies to them’ -

K(33) vedirthacaryavakyesu pravrttit£yl’pi drs'yate.

tatra’pyesaiva sambandhanarijnanavidha bhavet.

’That inclination which is also seen in resoect of

the sentences of the preceptor relating to the meaning of tn>

Veda (i.e., Vedic sentences), there also that snould b^,inde d

the process of the knowledge of the relation’.

V(38) aclryavakyasravanadaoi, sisyanam ya sandhyooasanidau

oravrttih, tatra’oi balassvavisayaniruoitam

kriyakaryatvivagamameva karanatvena oarikaloayet,

ohalam vina ca tadanupapatteh Dhalavagamamapi

sambhavayet. lokaj?yutpattyanu sarena vedarthanani

oratipadyamano nitya ^naimittika ^ nisedhadhikarecv=ni

nityanafmittika^yorakarane oratyavaya,krte tu ohalam

nastiti kecit. '"MP, o. 35.
 phalam kalpayet. sa eva balyadasayam vyutoannas-

-svayamacaryapadavimarudho vedartham oratitya,

sisyebhyah uoadisan kriyameva karyataya

pratioadayet, n a ’purvam karyam-iti.

’Frpm the hearing of the s°ntencec of the or^c^ptor

also, that which is the inclination of the discioles to the

evening rite etc., in that also a child assumes the knowledge

of the action as the oerformable determined from his caco a^

the cause and because of the non-obtainment of the oerforma!-1«>

without the result, (he), should also assume the knowledge of

the result. In accordance with the knowledge of the common

parlance, having ascertained the meaning of the Vedic s2nt-n;»

(he should) also assume the result even in respect of r^oul^r,

occasional and prohibited rites also. He having understood

(the meaning of the Vedic Sentences) during childhood and (no"1

being in the post of the oreceptor (and) having understood the

meaning of the Vedic sentence (and) having instructed the

discioles, should assert the action, indeed, as the oerformafcl

and not the unioue result, the oerformable’.

In ’vedarthiciryavakyesu ...................’et".

and ’icaryavakyas'ravanadapi .............. 'etc. of th<= K ar.ci

*+ -

V text respectively, a? stated above, Salikanatha discards +ne

view of a section of Mimamsakas according to whom the Karya

additional to the Kriyi is understood from the statements o' f

 468

Aclryas, that convey the meaning of the Vedic sentences. But

£
Salikanatha asserts that the Kriya as stated by the section
Trt •
of the Mimamsakas to be understood as the Karya is not the

Apurvakarya. It is stated in the V text above, that the

Pravrtti of the disciples to the sandhyopasani etc. that

takes place subsequent to the hearing of the sentences of the

Aciryas in that (Pravrtti), a child assumes the knowledge of

the Karya from the Kriya as the cause. He also thinks of the

knowledge of the result as without it, there can be no

attainment of the .Karya and thus he should assume the result

even in the case of the rites viz., Nitya, Naimittika,

Nisedha and Adhikara Karma and that, too, is after having

understood the meaning of the Vedic sentences in accordance w

with the knowledge of the popular sentences. That very

child having understood in childhood, later on securing the

post of a preceptor and coming to understand the Vedartha

(i.e., the meaning of the Vedic sentence^. Then the child

being the preceptor at a time establishes the Kriya as being

the Karya and not the Apurva as being the Karya. Earlier on

several occasions, we have stated that in the view of the

Prabhakaras, Apurva is the Karya and not the Kriya and as such

the Karya is to be understood as the ApUrva. But the Mima»sakas

who accept that the Karya additional to the Kriya is understood

from the statements of the Acaryas, cannot establish that their

Karya is to be understood in the formrApurva. Thus their view,

*
says Silikanltha, is not acceptable.
 upasamharati - ’(The author) concludes’ -

K(39) tasmallokanusarena vyutoattih karyamatrake.

tasys tvapurvaruoatvarn vedavakyanusaratah.

'Therefore, according to the oopular usage, the

knowledge (of the meaning of the Vedic sentences) arisen onl

in resoect of the nerformable. But, of that (i.e., the

oerformable) being in the state of the unicue result (is

understood) according to the Vedic sentences’.

In the K text viz., ’tasmallokanusarena ........

.... ’etc. as stated above, Salikanatha draws the conclusion

after rejecting the view of some >Mimamsakas who maintain + hai

from the statements of the Aciryas that convey the meanings u

the A' Sentences, the Karya is understood as different from t v

Kriya. But Salikanatha does not accent this view and he

rejects the same which we have discussed in the oreceding

K(33) and V text. According to Salikanatha, in common oarlanc-

we understand the meanings of the Vedic injunctive sentences

only in resoect o? the Karya and that this Karya is known

\ourva is understood from the Vedic sentences.

In the K text above, Salikanatha also asserts that

the Kirya is also otherwise known as the 'tourva. On several

occasions, we have mentioned that in the system of Prabhak^ra

Karya, \purva and Niyoga are synonymous. Surlier also in

K(25) , viz., ’kriyadibhinnam yatkaryam etc.’, we find

 470

Salikanatha ’s reference to Karya as \purva and as such in th*

present K text above also, he repeats the same. But in

present context, he states that in Vedic sentences, the Karya

349
is known as the Aourva. Haridasa Bhattacharya in his

commentary called Vibha ^yayakusumanjali, quotes the K t°xt

above which is also cited by Yogindrananda in his translation

- 350
of the Citsukhi. Because of the K above, partially b»ing th

reoetition of the K(25), Salikanatha does not write the Vrtti

on the K text under discussion.

evamaourvakaryabhidhayitve siddhe codayati -

’Thus the state of being the denoter of the uniaue

result in the form of oerformable having been establ;shed,

(the author) apprehends* -

K(40) nanu lokavirodhitvan oakse ’sminnapi drsyate.

sarvatnaiva yato loke kriya karyaiva gamyate.

’It may be argued, the state of being the contradi:

tory to the oooular usage is also seen in resoect of this vie

also; for, in common oarlance, the action by all means, is,

indeed, understood as the performable.

349 ,
Vide, vibha under NKM (ii). P 245.
350 Vide, CS, o. 155.
 471

In the K text viz., ’nanu lokavirodhitvam..... .

......... ’etc. as stated above, the author refers to a ouer/

that may arise that if the Karya is admitted in form of the

fltf>urva, then it will be contradictory to the oooular usage, in

K(39) it is stated by Salikanatha that the Karya is otherwise

known as the 4ourva. Therefore, in the K text above it is,

maintained in the form of objection that as in common

oarlance, the Kriya is understood as the Karya, so, the vie',-

that the Kirya is called the ^ourva will be contradictory t

the popular usage. It is because, in common parlance, there is

no difference between the Kriya and the Kirya. In other word-,

both these are understood in common oarlance a c one and the

same thing. 'Ve h=ve found earlier in K(37) that the Karya

is ascertained in oooular usage as the Kriya alone and in the

V text :nder the same, it is asserted by the author that

from the ooint of view of the popular usage, the Kriya in the

form of the Karya is the meaning pf the suffixes Lins etc.

Thus it may be mentioned here that the K text under examination

is nothing but the repetition in part of the K (37). Althou -i

both the Kriya and the Karya are taken to be one and the sam-

in common oarlance, yet in the view of the Prabhakaras,, the

Kirya is different from the Kriya and it is stated by the

author in K(23) and K(25) which we have discussed in the

oreceding pages of the present work.

The twice mention of the emohatic ©article ’eva’

after the ’sarvatha’ and the ’karyaiva’ in the K text above,

 47 2

asserts that in common parlance, both the Kriya and the Kirya

are same.

pariharati -

’(The author) discards (the objection)* -

K(41) bhavedevam virudhyete kirye’purve’pi laukikau.

pratipattiprayogau cet kriyakaryatvagocarau.

’Thus this may so happen (i.e. the contradictioh in

respect of common parlance) if the knowledge and usage of the

popular sentences (in common parlance) arising out of the

action and the performable contradict each other in respect of

the unique result, the performable (as being denoted by the

Lins)’.

V(4l) yadi kriyakiryatvagocarau lokikau

pratipatti^p prayogavapurvakaryabhidhayitvapaksahgikare

virudhyete, tato lokaviruddhatvam syidasmatpaksasya.

’If in respect of admitting the view that the

knowledge and the use of the popular sentences understood from

the action and the performable are contradictory (to each

other) in (respect of admitting) the state of denoting the

unique result, the performable, then in our (i.e., of the

author) view will be contradictory to the popular usage.*

In ’bhavedevam virudhyete ............. ...’etc. and

*yadi kriyikaryatvagocarau ..............’etc. of the K and 7

 473

text respectively above, Salikariatha meets the objection that

there will be contradiction to the oopular usage in the event

of admitting the Kirya as the 4purva. 4s we have already sta­

ted, in common parlance the Kriya is known as the Kirya. But,

according to the view of the Prabhakaras, the Karya is known

as the 4purva and in the case of admitting the Kirya a? the

Apurva, the objection says that it will be contradictory to the

<T
popular usage. But Salikanatha with a view to rejecting the

objection contends that the view( i.e,. the Lins etc. denote

the Apurva, the Karya) will be contradictory to the common

parlance provided the knowledge and the use of the popular

sentences that are understood from the action and the performa-

ble are contradictory to each other. But the knowledge and

the use of the word understood from the Karya in the firm of

Kriya cannot be common.

Thus Salikanatha meets the objection very intelligently

and asserts that Karya is the Apurva which is also taken to be

the Vikyartha.

na caitadastityaha - 'But this is not the case and

so, (the author says)' -

K(42 & 43) apurvam hi kriyasaddhyam sadhita sadhanam kriya.

tasmadapurvakaryatvam kriyakaryatvasarigatam.

pramanantaragaayam hi lokassabdairvivaksati.

kriyakaryatvam eva'tah prayogo laksananvitah.

’For, the unique result is that which is to be

 474

brought about by the action (and) the action having been

brought out comes to be the means (of bringing about the

unique result). Hence, the unique result, the oerformable is

consistantly the performable of the action.*

As in the common parlance, only what is understanda­

ble by some other source of valid knowledge is, intended to be

conveyed by means of words. Hence, the use (description) of

the performable in the form of action is, indeed, understood

by means of imolication.*

V (42 & 43) pratipattiprayegau hi n a ’vasyam srautavrttyanu-

sarinaveva, laksanayl’oi loke darsanat. tena

yadyapyuktena nylyena’purvameva fpryam Mnadinimabhi-

-dheyam, tatha'pi tasya kriyikiryatvivyabhicarat,

tatra laksanayi tayornanupattih. yattu srautapadarthe

karye loke lihldi na prayujyat iti. tat tasya'

purvatmanah pramanantarapratitatvat, Dratitavisayatvi-

-cca laukikaprayogasya. kriyasidhyantivapurvam,

sldhita ca sati kriya sadhanam bhavatityapurvena saha

kriyakaryatvam roityasambaddhamiti, sakyate,

tallaksayitum.

’For, the knowledge and the use do not

necessarily follow (i.e., take place by) the denotative function

(Srautavrtti). For, in common parlance, these two (i.e., the

knowledge and the use) are seen as being known even through
 475

implication. Therefore, if by the said princiole, the unique

result, the performable is denotable by the Lins etc., yet

because of its (i.e., of the unique result) being invariably

present as the performable of the action, there, these two

(i.e., the action and the performable) are, indeed obtained

through imolication. But that in common parlance, the Lins

etc. are not used in resoect of the performable in its denoted

sense is of that in the form of the unique result, for it

(the unique result) is not known by any other source of

knowledge and because of the popular use being the known object.

But that which is to be brought about by the action is the

unique result and the action having been accomplished comes to

be the means (of producing the unioue result) and as such the

action, the oerformable is oerttanently related with the unique

result and so, that (the action) cannot be known through

imolication.’

In ’apurvam hi kriyisadhyam...................’etc.

and ’pratipattiorayogau hi ........... ’etc., of the K and

V text respectively as stated above, Salikanatha asserts that

the view of the Prabhakaras who maintain that the 4purva is

called the Karya, is not contradictory to the popular usage.

Salikanatha contends that Apurva is brought about by the KriyI

which after being accomplished serves as the cause of producing

the Apurva. Thus it is proper to state that the Apurva which

is the Karya comes to be the Katya of the Kriya also. In the

K text above, Salikanatha also states that which is understood

 476

by some other means of valid knowledge is stated (i.e. used)

by the popular usage. But we have stated earlier that in

vie w of the Prabhakaras, Apurva is not known by any other

source of valid knowledge and as such the use of the Apurva as

the Karya of the Kriyas being not understood comes to be the

object of Laksana i.e., comes to be known through Laksana. It

is becaused of the fact that Pratipatti (knowledge) and

Prayoga (use) do not occur necessarily by means of Abhidha

(i.e., the primary denotation). We find that the Pratipatti

and Prayoga occur by means of Laksana also. Thus although the

Apurva is denoted by the Lins etc. as the Kirya , yet because

of the Apurva being invariably the Karya of the Kriya, it is

not inconsistent that both Kriya and Karya are obtained

through Laksani. It is also stated in the V text above that

Apurva is also that which is brought about by the Kriya which

again being performed becomes the means of bringing about the

Apurva and thus it is established that the Kriya as the Kirya

is oermanently related with the Aourva. As a result, a relation

is made between the Kriya and the Apurva and so because of

there being the relation, they are known through Laksana. In

our exposition of the concept of Laksana in the VM(1), we have

stated that there is Laksana by means of relation.

The comDOund word ’^rautavrtti’ in the V text above

means Abhidha vrtti (i.e., the primary d e n o t a t i o n ).Salikanatha

—
uses the word Srauta vrtti in the sense of Abhidha vrtti and
 477

Srauta artha in the sense of Mukhy artha. The K viz.,

’pramanantaragamyanl hi’ etc. above is found quoted in the
351
Nayanapresadini commentary.

yadyesa laksana, kimiti tarhi loko navagacchatityahe

’If this is the implication, how is that, the

people do not understand this (implication)?,so (the author)

says* -

K(44) laksananabhimlnastu mukhyarthanavadharanat.

ye tu mukhyarthakusalastesam laksanatvadhih.

’But the lack of ascertainment of the implication

arise? from the non-ascertainment of the primary meaning. But

those whose are expert (in respect of understanding the primary

meaning), they do have the knowledge of the implication’.

V(44) mukhyamarthamaviditva laksanikamapyartham

srautamiva manyante, mleccha iva yavavarahadyartham.

mukhyarthavivekinantu oariksakanam laksanikatvadhih -

iti.

’Without knowing the primary meaning (one) consid°r?

even the implied m°aning as the primary meaning, just as the

Mlecchas do (understand) the meaning of the word? yava anH

varaha. But the knowledge pertaining to the implication do'71'

351 Vide, 7S, p. 156.

 478

not occur to those who examine and can discriminate the primary

meaning*.

I n ’laksanabhimanastu .....................*etc. of the

• A

K and ’mukhya^rthamavlditva ...........’etc. of the V text above,

Salikanatha meets the query that if it is known by means of

Laksani that Apurva is the Klrya of the Kriyi, then why, in

common parlance, it is not known. Salikanltha contends that in

common parlance, the knowledge of the Apurvakarya cannot be

ascertained by means of Laksana because of there being no

knowledge of the primary meaning. But those who are expert in

respect of understanding the primary meaning, can understand the

Apurvakirya through Laksana. It can be stated here that in

order to understand Laksanika artha one must have the knowledge

of the Mukhyartha of a word. It is because of the fact that

one has to take resort to Laksani when there is the failure of

the primary meaning of a word.

In the V text above, the author clearly explains the idea.

It is said that just as the Mlecchas not knowing the primary

meanings of the words like yava and Varaha etc. acceot the

i m p l i e d meanings in the place of the primary meanings, so,also js

the c*se with the people in common parlance* Only w those

scholars can understand the Apurva by means of Laksana, who are

capable of discriminating the Mukhyartha and the Laksaniklrtha.

- 352
In the yavavarahidhikarana of the MS , Sahara discusses this

3 5 2 Vide, M S.l.3.8-10.
 479

issue which we have discussed earlier in our exposition. Thus

S'
Salikanatha asserts that Apurva as the Karya can be known

through Laksana.

upasamharati - ’Now (the author) concludes’ -

K(45) tasmanmanlutarivedyafn kiryamarthantaranvitam.

vedavakyam bravitlti samksepo’yamudahptah.

'Hence, thus this is stated in brief that the

Vedic sentence speaks of (conveys) that which is not knowable

by any other source of valid knowledge, which is the

performable and which is related to the other meaning’.

In the K text viz., ’tasmanmanintarSvedyam ....

*«•

............ ’etc. above, Salikanatha concludes his assertion

that the Klrya which is also known as the Apurva or Niyoga

cannot be known by any source of valid knowledge except the

Sabdapramana or Sastrapramana. It is also stated that the

author states that it is the Vedic sentence that conveys the

Apurva or Karya.

We have stated earlier that the Pribhakaras are

Apurvalaryavakyarthavadin s and as such their aim is to establish

A

the \ourva or the Klrya as the Vikyartha and so, Salikanatha

uses the word Klrya in the K above.

granthasya, kartusca samjnam,

prayojananca’ha -
*
|(The author) speaks of the name of the work and
 4 30

(the name) of the author and the ouroose (i.e., of writing tfw

work) as well’ -

K(46) vakyarthamatrkeyarh prabhakaragurormatanusarena.

anasuyubodhanartham s"alikanathena saroqratlv ta .

— S'

’This Vakyarthamatrka is connosed by Salikanatha in

accordance with the view of the teacher Prabhakara for the e-wy

understanding (of the unmallicious readers)’.

V(46) racita saccaritanamanugraham kartukamena.

vakylrtha^atrkaya vrttiriyam salikenaiva.

’This commentary of the Vakyarthamatrka is co^nos^d

by Salika (himself) desirous of making favour to the readers o f'

good conduct’.

In ’Vakyarthamatrkeyarh................ ....... ’etc.

and ’racita saccaritanamanugraham ........... ’ etc. of the K

and V text (which is also in the form of a Karika) respectively

as stated above, the author clearly mentions the name of the

work (i.e., the Vakyarthamatrka). his name (i.e., Salikanitha}

and the ouroose of writing the Vakyarthamitrkl and also h°

states the purpose of writing the Vrtti for the easy understanding

of the readers who are not mallicious.

In order to avert the confusion that may arise in <-w

minds of the readers in future as to who is the author of thr

s*

Vrtti, Salikanatha mentions his name as the author of the 'rtvi.

 481

Thlt SSlikanatha Is a follower of Prabhakara Misra or the

system of Prabhakar*, can be easily be understood' from

Salikanatha*s mention of the name of his teacher Prabhakara.

It may be added here that in the K above, the author

indicates, as is usually done in the beginning of a work, what

are called Anubandhas (Incentives or necessary elements of a

literary work). The Anubandhas are four in number viz.,

(1) Visaya (subject matter); (2) Prayojana (purpose);

(3) Sambandha (connection) and (4) Adhikari (person for whom

353
the work is written). Of course, it may be pointed out that

in the K above, the author states the Visaya (i.e., the

Vakyarthajnana or the knowledge of the sentence-meaning) and

the Prayojana (i.e, the easy understanding of the readers).

<L -

Again in the V above, Salikanatha refers to the Adhikari (i.e.,

the persons who are good in conduct). In both the K and V,

again, the author explains the Sambandha (i.e., the connection

of the work with the method of treatment adopted in the work

i.e., the method of the treatment of the Vakylrtha).

It is also to be noted here that generally the Anuban-

-dhas are indicated in the beginning of a work. The

jKatartham jnatasambandham srotum srota pravarttate/

sastradau tena vaktavyah sambandhah saprayojanah //
Also, - _
sambandhascadhikari- ca visayas'ca prayojanam /
vina’nubandham granthadau mahgalam naiva sasyate //.
 482

Sahitvadarpana of Visvanltha, the Dhvanyaloka of Anandavardhana

and Salikanatha’s Vakyirthamatrkl are the works of the same

kind wherein the authors themselves write both the texts and

the Vrttis thereon.

iti mahamahopadhyiyasrimacchalikanathamisrapranitayayam

savrttau vakylrthamatrkayam dvitiyah paricchedassamaptah.

'Thus ends the second chapter entitled the

Vakyirthamitrka along with the commentary composed by Mahamaho-

-padhyaya Sri Salikanatha Misra .

samipta ^ ncedam prakaranapancikayam savrttirvakyarthama-

-trkanamaikadasam prakaranam.

'Also ends the eleventh chapter entitled Vakyirthamatrki

along with the commentary, of the Prakaranapanciki*.

Thus with the K (46) and the V (46) as stated above,

Silikanatha brings the end to the Vakyarthamitrka a nd its Vrtti

as well.