Arc Flash in the

National Electrical Code

DO ARTICLES 240.87 AND 240.67
ACHIEVE THEIR INTENT AND GOALS?

©IstockPhoto.Com/idealistock

By Marcelo E. Valdes, Steve Hinton,
and Francisco Martinez
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/MIAS.2018.2868354
Date of publication: 5 November 2018
The National Electrical Code (NEC) has ­included  requirements
for arc-flash-related labeling for several code cycles [1]. Increasingly rigorous require-
ments for specific arc-flash-related protection attempt to reduce any arc-flash
hazards to which personnel may be exposed. They may be exposed to arc-flash
hazards during planned energized work or accidentally at any time. The risk-
control mechanisms added to the NEC in recent times include additional signage
requirements and two articles that intend to reduce arc-flash hazard by decreasing

1077-2618/19©2019IEEE j anuary /F e bruary 2019 œ IEEE Industry Applications Magazine 53

 clearing time for circuits rated 1,200 A
or greater whether protected by circuit
breakers or fuses. This article discusses A robust and reliable
these recent protection requirements
and their intent and potential practical solution will use
effects as well as how to ensure that
the protection this language seeks to
a lower threshold
provide is included in the electrical due to the potential
power distribution system.
variability of the
Overview of Clearing
Time Methods
arcing current.
Currently, National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) 70, the 2017
NEC [1], has two sections addressing
required minimum arc-energy reduction for low-voltage
fuses and circuit breakers rated 1,200 A and higher.
For fuses, Section 240.67 takes effect 1 January 2020.
Section 240.87 is in effect now for circuit breakers.
Both sections require documentation available to those
authorized to design, install, operate, or inspect the
installation as to the location of the circuit breaker or
fuse. Both sections offer methods to reduce clearing
time (for implied arc-flash reduction) and are shown in
Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1. NEC 240.87
For Circuit Breakers, One of the Following Means Shall Be
Provided:
1) ZSI
2) Differential relaying
3) ERMS with local status indicator
4) Energy-reducing active arc-flash mitigation system
5) An instantaneous trip setting that is less than the available
arcing current
6) An instantaneous override that is less than the available
arcing current
7) An approved equivalent means
Table 2. NEC 240.67
A Fuse Shall Have a Clearing Time of 0.07 s or Lower at the
Available Arcing Current, or One of the Following Shall Be
Provided:
1) Differential relaying
2) ERMS with local status indicator
3) Energy-reducing active arc-flash mitigation system
4) An approved equivalent means
54 IEEE Industry Applications Magazine œ j anuary/F ebruary 2019
These methods can be used to
reduce clearing time, but they are all
very different solutions. How does a
designer know if the specified meth-
od provides the desired reduction of
arc-flash incident energy (Ei)? The
methods described may be divided
into two categories:
1) those methods that expressly list
what is needed to ensure that the
protection threshold will sense the
expected available arcing current
2) those methods that imply such
needs but do not expressly state
them.
This is an important distinction because adding a mech-
anism to reduce clearing time does not ensure its effective-
ness unless the added protection operates when needed
(i.e., at the full range of expected arcing current in the pro-
tected circuit). To comply with the intent of the code, the
ability for the control measures to operate at the expected
available arcing current is the key operating parameter that
must be determined, regardless if it is stated in the NEC. To
implement one of the stated mechanisms without knowing
if it will work may comply with the letter of the code but
not with its intent. In addition, a robust and reliable solu-
tion will use a lower threshold due to the potential variabil-
ity of the arcing current.
How to Categorize and Evaluate Solutions
NFPA 70E-2015 [2] describes the hierarchy of risk-control
methods specified in American National Standards Insti-
tute (ANSI)/American Industrial Hygiene Association Z10
[3], Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems.
The hierarchy lists the following six risk-control measures:
1) elimination
2) substitution
3) engineered controls
4) awareness
5) administrative controls
6) personal protective equipment (PPE).
The first three methods do not require any specific
action, understanding, or comprehension on the part of
the personnel benefiting from the control measure as they
are automatic or by default. However, the second three
do require active personnel participation, comprehension,
skill, or training. That makes the second set of measures
fallible and subject to human error. Hence, any hazard
control measure in the upper half of the list is considered
more robust or better than those in the second half.
The first control measure, elimination, refers to any
measure that fully eliminates the hazard. The second,
substitution, refers to any measure that substitutes less
in lieu of a more hazardous situation. The third, engi-
neered controls, is any kind of automated system that,
when operational, provides an automatic reduction of the
hazard on a ­continuous basis without is important to have the correct value
any interaction from the regularly of fault current. It is best to have the
exposed personnel or anyone act- It is important to expected range of fault current avail-
ing on their behalf. It is important to able because it may vary during the
note that engineered controls tend note that engineered day due to different topologies used,
to require maintenance and possibly
adjustment to ensure they operate as
controls tend to either by the serving utility or the end
user. Higher fault current will cause
expected during the useful life of require maintenance higher incident energy for fixed clear-
the equipment. ing times proportional to available
The fourth category, awareness, and possibly fault current. Lower arcing current can
includes all methods to instruct,
advise, warn, or impart skills to oper-
adjustment to ensure result in protection operating more
slowly and higher incident energy due
ating personnel so they can reduce they operate as to the increased operating time of the
their risk. In this category are warn- protective device.
ing signs, job site meetings, training, expected during the The third parameter in arcing cur-
and so on. Administrative controls,
the fifth category, include steps or
useful life of the rent calculations is the equipment
bus/conductor gap. The arc current
actions personnel can do prior to equipment. must sustain itself across the gap. IEEE
exposure to a hazard to lower their 1584-2002 provides a table of typi-
risk. Turning a switch on or off, posi- cal gaps for various equipment types
tioning a lever, and ensuring the sta- (see Table 3).
tus of a device or apparatus prior to the task would fall Most arc-flash studies use a combination of these
under this category. The last category, PPE, entails a per- values. In equipment, however, different values could
son wearing PPE to minimize the negative effects of any be found, both larger and smaller, and this provides an
unintentional event that may occur during exposure. additional source of variation in arcing current calcula-
This article will refer to this hierarchy of risk-control tions. The 100–85% range defined in IEEE 1584-2002 for
methods to explain the measures in the NEC articles. arcing current only attempts to account for the variance in
the experimental data from the arc-flash research prior to
Arcing Current: How Low Is Low Enough? 2002. All other potential sources of variance are not con-
IEEE 1584-2002, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc Flash sidered in the current IEEE model.
Hazard Calculations [4], and IEEE 1584.1 provide formu- Sources of arcing current variance may include but are
las and methods for calculating arc-flash currents to deter- not limited to
mine arc-flash incident energy and arc-flash boundaries. ●● the chaotic nature of an electrical arcing fault

The formulas are used to calculate a value referred to as ●● variable system topology and varying short circuit current

100% arcing current and another at 85% of the first value. ●● incorrect assumptions regarding conductor impedances

The calculations are based on three factors used as vari- ●● conservative utility high-fault-current assumptions

ables within the equations: ●● conservative fault study methods by power systems

●● system voltage (nominal) engineers

●● available three-phase short circuit current ●● incorrect measurements of system conductors

●● equipment bus/conductor gap. ●● incorrect assumptions about regenerating sources

The first parameter, system voltage, is easily determined. ●● a variance in source voltage due to system loading

The second is often estimated at preliminary phases of a ●● incorrect assumptions about bus/conductor gap or

project design. And even in the later stages of a project, the arc environment (i.e., size of equipment enclosure or
short circuit current value may depend on several assump- compartment).
tions, switching or operating scenarios, and worst-case
tolerances. For the short circuit evaluation of equipment,
power system engineers performing short circuit calcula-
Table 3. A portion of IEEE 1584 Table 4, from p. 12
tions purposely drive any potential error toward higher val-
ues because that is conservative from an equipment-rating System Typical Gap Between
perspective. Ensuring properly rated equipment, per NEC Voltage (kV) Equipment Type Conductors (mm)
110.16, involves calculating maximum short circuit fault 0.208-1 Open air 10–40
current and evaluating it against the withstand and inter-
rupting ratings of the electrical distribution and protection Switchgear 32
equipment. Conservatism from the equipment ratings MCC and panels 25
perspective is not necessarily appropriate from an arc-
Cable 13
flash calculation perspective. For arc-flash calculations, it

j anuary /F e bruary 2019 œ IEEE Industry Applications Magazine 55

 These sources of variance and oth-
ers can yield arcing current that is
slightly higher or lower than expect- The more sensitive
ed. Slightly higher current can yield
proportionately higher arc-flash inci- protection is, the
dent energy, but slightly lower arcing
current can yield significantly high-
more robust it may
er incident energy if the protection be considered.
reacts more slowly because it does
not sense the arcing fault as expected.
The more sensitive protection is, the
more robust it may be considered, which means it is more
likely to operate for the actual arc fault current. IEEE
1584.1 [4] instructs that, to calculate arc flash, consider-
ation should be made for overly conservative source fault
current and whether motors are turned on or off. It impor-
tant to note that IEEE 1584 is undergoing revision, and the
revised version will include additional sources of variance
both in arcing current and incident energy. When the new
model becomes available, the reader is encouraged to con-
sider it within the context of this article.
Figures 1 and 2 show the IEEE 1584-2002 calculated
85% arcing current as a percentage of short circuit cur-
rent for various gap assumptions. Table 2 in IEEE 1584
lists typical bus gaps for different equipment classes.
For low-voltage switchgear, the commonly used value
is 32 mm. For switchboard and motor control centers
(MCCs), the typical value suggested is 25 mm, and most
engineers performing studies use this value in switch-
boards and MCCs. Most moderately sized commercial
and industrial power systems tend to operate with
available short circuit currents between 30 and 50 kA.
A conservative assumption (i.e., biasing toward a low
arcing current value) for arcing current could be approx-
imately 40% for 480-V systems and 20% for 208-V sys-
tems. However, it is best to have a study done for short
circuit, protective device coordina-
tion, and arc-flash so the values for
arcing current can be used to deter-
mine protective device settings.
Arcing Current Where?
The last question regarding arcing
current is where is the arc? For a
main circuit breaker, the arcing cur-
rent may be the bus protected by the
main circuit breaker. In most cases,
the entire bus is considered to have the same arc-flash
incident energy value. However, for a feeder in a switch-
board, the arcing current could be at the circuit break-
er’s load-side terminals (location 3 in Figure 3) or at the
far end of the feeder conductor (location 4 in Figure 3).
That downstream arcing current (location 4) is probably
much lower due to the conductor impedance. It is also
possible that the load-side equipment is more likely to
be serviced while energized than the overcurrent protec-
tion’s secondary terminals (location 3) if it is distribution
equipment feeding multiple loads. Hence, the protection
should consider the lower-arcing current at the far end
of the conductors.
Another concern is the arc-flash current at the line
side of main devices (location 1 in Figure 3). When the
main device is fed from a source such as a substation
transformer within the owner’s system, there are ­several
­measures that can be taken to provide protection for
the line side of the main device [5]. But when the main
device is fed from a utility-owned transformer, options
are limited. Generally, it is best to isolate the main device
to minimize 1) exposure when energized work is being
performed on the load side of the main device and 2) the
possibility of an arcing fault on the load side (location 2
in Figure 3) propagating to the line side.

70% 50%
13 mm, 85%
60% 25 mm, 85%
40% 32 mm, 85%
40 mm, 85%
Ia as % Ibf

Ia as % Ibf

50%
30%
40%
13 mm, 85%
25 mm, 85% 20%
30%
32 mm, 85%
40 mm, 85%
20% 10%
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105

5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105

Ibf (kA) Ibf (kA)

FIGURE 1. A plot of 85% arcing current (I a) as the percentage of FIGURE 2. A plot of 85% arcing current (I a) as the percentage of
available bolted fault current (I bf) for a 480-V system, per the IEEE available bolted fault current (I bf) for a 208-V system, per the IEEE
1584-2002 model. 1584-2002 model.

56 IEEE Industry Applications Magazine œ j anuary/F ebruary 2019

Solution Types
The hazard controls listed in the NEC articles are either
engineered or administrative controls per the hierarchy
identified in NFPA 70E [2] and ANSI Z10 [3]. The energy-
reducing maintenance switch is an administrative control.
The other measures are engineered controls.
Engineered Controls
Instantaneous Overcurrent Function and
Override Function Below Estimated Arcing Current
In North America, circuit breakers are listed under two
industry standards:
●● Underwriters Laboratory (UL) 489, Molded-Case Circuit
Breakers, Molded-Case Switches, and Circuit-Breaker
Enclosures [6]
●● UL 1066, Standard for Low-Voltage AC and DC Power
enabling the feature allows circuit breakers at the sec-
ond and higher tier to operate faster than if they did not
implement ZSI. However, the lowest-tier devices will not
operate any faster. Regardless if ZSI is implemented, it is
required that the protection thresholds be set sufficiently
sensitive enough to detect the expected arcing current for
the entire protection zone.
ZSI is a way to improve clearing time without sacri-
ficing system selectivity. Manufacturers may implement
ZSI in different ways so the actual capabilities may vary,
but the basic principles are consistent. Figure 4 shows
a simple ZSI scheme. The basic premise is that lower-
and upper-tier devices detect the same fault current; the
lower-tier device (fault location 2 in Figure 4) simultane-
ously initiates its protection logic, sending a signal to the
upper-tier device indicating that it is in the process of

Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures [7]

The molded-case class may also be divided into tra-
ditional molded-case circuit breakers (MCCBs; see IEEE
3004.5 [8, p. 2]) and insulated-case circuit breakers
Source
(ICCBs; see IEEE 3004.5 [8, p. 2]). MCCBs always have
instantaneous protection. For some larger MCCBs, manu-
facturers may state instantaneous protection may be
turned off, but an instantaneous override will always be 1 Switchboard
present at a relative low multiple of the frame size, typi-
2,000 A
cally not higher than 15 times the frame size. Low-voltage
2
power circuit breakers (LVPCBs; see IEEE 3004.5 [8, p.
2]) may have a high range of adjustability in their instan- 1,200 A 1,200 A
taneous function, maybe more than 15 times the sensor 3
rating. Most LVPCBs will allow the adjustable instanta-
neous protection to be turned off. However, many will
have a fixed override that cannot be turned off. Some will 4
not have an override; hence, when the user-adjustable Load
instantaneous function is turned off, no instantaneous
protection is present. ICCBs share MCCB and LVPCB
characteristics but always implement an adjustable instan-
taneous protection or override or both.
FIGURE 3. Possible arcing fault locations relative to overcurrent
Regardless of the type of circuit breaker, it is pos- protection in equipment.
sible that the instantaneous function could be set above
the available arcing current, resulting in higher clearing
times, especially in smaller, weaker, or lower voltage
systems and when circuit breakers are larger. In terms
of device selectivity expectations for the system, if LVP- Switchboard
2,000 A Main
CBs are used within multiple coordination tiers, then it
is more likely that there will be a desire to set instanta- Restraint
Fault 1 Signal
neous protection to a high (insensitive) level or to disable
Current
it. This will be especially true if the designer is not tak-
ing advantage of modern instantaneous selective coor-
1,200-A Feeder
dination methods recently introduced by manufacturers
1,200-A Feeder
into the UL and National Electrical Manufacturers Asso-
ciation markets [9]–[11]. 2

Zone-Selective Interlocking
Zone-selective interlocking (ZSI) is commonly avail- FIGURE 4. A simple three-circuit breaker ZSI scheme with two 1,200-A
able from all circuit breaker manufacturers. In all cases, feeders providing a restrain signal to a single 2,000-A main.

j anuary /F e bruary 2019 œ IEEE Industry Applications Magazine 57

 asserting a trip and protecting. The
upper-tier device receives the signal
(also known as a restraint signal) and A responsible party
shifts its timing from unrestrained (in-
zone protection) to restrained (backup must establish what
protection). Depending on the device,
the restrained protection may be
the expected arcing
adjustable by the user, whereas the current is and ensure
unrestrained protection is automatic,
or both may be user adjustable. When the protection is
the fault location is in position 1 in
Figure 4, the 2,000-A main should
adjusted correctly.
operate its protection at the faster
unrestrained timing point since no
restraint signal was received. The ZSI
scheme improves the protection provided by the main
with the assistance of the ZSI function in the 1,200-A feed-
ers. However, the ­protection provided by the 1,200-A feed-
ers is not improved, even though the devices are part of
a ZSI scheme. The 1,200-A feeders may meet the letter of
the code text but not its intent.
Modern ZSI offers significant enhancements for pro-
tection [12]. ZSI implementations in advanced trip unit
systems may provide various ways to test the ZSI system,
which has traditionally been a concern when installing
such systems. When installing a ZSI system, it is impor-
tant to verify that it is wired correctly and signals are
getting to the correct devices. Generally, if the wiring
is damaged upstream, devices will revert to the unre-
strained timing and, hence, protect well, but selectivity may
be compromised.
Bus Differential Protection
Bus differential protection works on the simple concept
known as Kirchhoff’s current law. Simply stated, for this
application, it means that all of the measured currents into
a bus must balance the measured currents leaving it. Any
imbalance in current, above the programmed threshold,
must be a fault. In a differential protection scheme, the dif-
ferential relay is connected to current sensors that measure
all of the power coming in, sources, and power going out
to loads. A fault below a feeder, such as fault 2 fed by the
1,200-A feeder shown in Figure 4, has power measured
going into the main bus and going through the feeder. The
differential relay will not sense that current as a fault. A fault
in location 1 on the bus in Figure 4 will cause power to flow
into the bus and be measured at the main circuit. However,
neither feeder is carrying the power out of the bus, and the
differential relay will sense the bus fault and signal the main
circuit breaker to open. Like the ZSI scheme described pre-
viously, a differential scheme that includes the three circuits
shown in Figure 4 will provide additional protection for the
main bus but not for the feeder circuits. To determine the
exact zone of protection provided, the equipment draw-
ings must be examined, with the exact location of current
transformers and circuit breakers noted. Again, the letter
58 IEEE Industry Applications Magazine œ j anuary/F ebruary 2019
of 240.87 may be satisfied, but the
intent is not. Like any other protec-
tion, the threshold for operation must
be below the available arcing current
fault expected within the target zone
of protection. Use of shunt trips and
lockout relays can add to the total clear-
ing time, negatively impacting the arc-
flash reduction.
Administrative Controls
Within the hierarchy of hazard con-
trol measures, administrative controls
are second to last (with last being
least effective). The reason for this is
that they are very dependent on the behavior of the per-
son implementing the control. For example, a person
●● could forget to implement it
●● might not be sufficiently trained to know how to
operate it
●● might not be sufficiently trained to know the need to
operate it
●● might not know that his or her work task could have
been incorrectly planned with the administrative con-
trol accidentally omitted
●● could operate the incorrect control
●● could operate it at the wrong time
●● might not know the control could be inoperative.
The possibility of human error will lower the value of
an administrative control, relative to fully automated solu-
tions, regardless of how effective the control is in mitigat-
ing the hazard. See ANSI Z10 [3] for further discussion.
Energy-Reducing Maintenance Switching
with Local Status Indicator
Sensitive to What?
Energy-reducing maintenance switches are offered by cir-
cuit breaker manufacturers and even by at least one manu-
facturer of fused UL 977 listed power switches [13]. In the
code-defined requirements for this function, there are no
performance requirements, just that they must be provid-
ed. Protection can only work as intended if it is set sensi-
tive to the available arcing current magnitude. The benefit
of these switches is that they generally have a broad range
of adjustability and should be able to be adjusted to be
sensitive enough to achieve acceptable arc-flash reduc-
tion. However, a responsible party must establish what
the expected arcing current is and ensure the protection is
adjusted correctly. Once commissioned, maintenance per-
sonnel should only need to enable and disable the func-
tion as prescribed in the planned task procedures.
Indication and Control Local to What?
Maintenance switches should be used with indicator lights.
The code states that a local indicator must be provided,
but the text is not specific as to what should be local. Does
it need to be local to the overcurrent protection device
(OCPD) being affected or to the remote equipment being
protected? Good engineering practice would dictate that it
should exist where the protected equipment is. However,
the switchboard manufacturer, if not given specific direc-
tions to the contrary, will often include it near the OCPD
being controlled by the switch. Most importantly, the per-
son who is relying on that protection should be aware of
its status and what circuit or equipment is being protected.
To facility operators, it may be important to know if the
protection is accidentally left on when not needed.
The maintenance control switch should have test pro-
cedures for confirming that the circuit breaker or relay
being controlled has received the signal and processed it
correctly. These should be followed up on initial start-up
and at regular intervals afterward. This could be referred
to as positive feedback of status. The switch should be
lockable so it can be properly locked in the on state by
maintenance personnel.
This function can temporarily compromise coordina-
tion, until it is disabled. Users are often concerned about
forgetting to turn this off after a task, and an obvious
indication of the status is often designed into the system.
Indications, such as tower lights evident through the elec-
trical room, sound alarms, and even e-mails to supervi-
sory personnel, have been used to ensure a maintenance
switch is not left on indefinitely. Similar measures should
be used to ensure that a maintenance switch is used
when needed. The manufacturer should be consulted for
device implementation information because wiring and
space requirements may vary.
What About the Arc-Flash Label?
Another consideration when relying on an energy-reduc-
ing maintenance switch to provide lower levels of arc-
flash incident energy is whether that lower level should
be reflected on the NFPA 70E defined arc-flash label
[2, Sec. 130.5(D), p. 28] installed on the equipment. There
are many opinions about this subject. One argument is
that arc-flash labels should not be ambiguous or complex
and should be conservative in case the reader is not fully
aware of proper procedures or inadequately trained.
Administrative Procedures Require Qualified Personnel
and Task Planning
The better protection afforded by the energy-reducing
maintenance switch can be reflected in the data provided
by the arc-flash study and form part of the risk assess-
ment [2, Sec. 130.5, p. 25] required to plan an energized
work task [2, Sec. 130.2(A), p. 24]. The other argument
is that the maintenance function is embedded in the
equipment and always available to be used, so the better
protection can be reflected in the arc-flash label, or a sec-
ond label, that clearly indicates the incident energy with
the switch turned on or off. However, this may not be
the case for equipment fed by multiple sources involving
multiple energy-reducing maintenance switches, unless
they are coordinated in some manner. A concern may also
be the improper use of an energy-reducing maintenance
switch by unqualified personnel not aware of the system’s
limitations. Some of the limitations are the following.
●● Neither a circuit breaker nor its load is made safe using
the switch. The protection provided by the circuit
breaker may be improved, but that does not mean the
circuit breaker or the load circuit is electrically safe.
●● The arc-flash hazard at the line side of the circuit
breaker is not affected by an energy-reduction main-
tenance setting (ERMS) on that circuit breaker. Protec-
tion for the line side depends on an upstream device
that may not be affected by the switch mounted in the
proximity of the circuit breaker.
●● A bus, or equipment, may have multiple sources, and,
unless the switch controls all of them, they may need
to be addressed simultaneously to make sure the haz-
ard from each source is minimized.
●● When the switch is local to the circuit breaker but the
actual equipment to be worked on is remote, there are
opportunities for mistakes (e.g., setting the switch on
the wrong OCPD or having the switch operated by
other personnel if it’s not properly locked out in the
enabled position).
●● The switch may be used properly, but, if the setting is
not sensitive enough, arc-flash protection may not
be improved.
●● Setting the normal instantaneous protection temporari-
ly lower, and thereby using it as an ERMS, may provide
the expected energy-reducing function. However, this
method does not provide the annunciation function
that is described in the code, and, therefore, it is tech-
nically not an acceptable method.
Approved Equivalent Means Solution
and Energy-Reducing Active Arc-Flash Mitigation System
The code does not clearly explain what an approved
equivalent means or what an active energy-reducing
arc-flash mitigation system is. However, there are sev-
eral possibilities should the authority having jurisdiction
(AHJ) choose to accept them. Components of such sys-
tems may include
●● for sensing: light-sensing relays as event detectors and
controllers or overcurrent relays to sense arcing current
●● for interruption: low-voltage circuit breakers, medium-
voltage circuit breakers, low-voltage fuses, medium-
voltage fuses, crowbars to divert energy and collapse
system voltage, or combinations of these.
Arc-flash relays are usually able to directly sense the
light from an arc-flash event near the sensor location
[14]. These devices are fast and considered to be very
good at sensing an arcing fault event. However, they have
some drawbacks. They can unexpectedly operate from
the light emanating from a circuit breaker ­interrupting
j anuary /F e bruary 2019 œ IEEE Industry Applications Magazine 59
 a remote fault [15]. Furthermore,
they can sense within an equipment
enclosure very well but do not sense Both arcing gap and
a fault at the far end of a conductor
feeding remote equipment. In some driving voltage are
cases, it may be possible to prevent
a nuisance operation due to an inter-
important factors
rupting circuit breaker within the affecting arcing
enclosure using ZSI restraint from
the trip unit controlling the circuit current.
breaker [12, C, p. 1643] or via other
interlocking methods.
Overcurrent relays, ANSI 50/51
devices, may be able to provide additional protection and
control over and above that provided by circuit breaker
trip units in some situations. One example is sensing
faults on the conductors between the secondary of a sub-
station transformer and the first secondary low-voltage
devices. Details of these implementations are beyond the
scope of this article, and some references on secondary
substation protection are provided in [5].
Low-voltage circuit breakers and power switches can
be controlled from various sensing devices. When using a
combination of interrupting devices and external controls,
it is important to understand the full operation time of
sensing, signaling, and switching devices. In many cases,
although the relay sensing may be very fast, the combina-
tion of the various delays provides for slower protection
than the integral instantaneous protection provided by
the circuit breaker. In most cases, external relays should
only be used in special applications that warrant the com-
plexity and cost.
Medium-voltage circuit breakers may be especially
suitable to protect conductors and equipment fed from
a transformer prior to the first low-voltage device. Such
circuit breakers may be controlled in many ways. See the
references on secondary substation protection provided in
[5] and [12].
Low- and medium-voltage fuses could, potentially, be
accelerated by use of a crowbar to divert energy, collapse
voltage, and force the highest available fault current to
flow through the fuses to ensure they operate in their
current-limiting range. If the current is high enough, it
will flow for under half a cycle, and arc-flash protection
can be very quick with minimal consequences. Crowbars
are shunt devices that divert current and collapse system
voltage by causing a minimum impedance fault some-
where in the system. As arc-flash protection, they should
work very well if the arc fault is detected. However, the
bolted fault current may not be desirable and have seri-
ous consequences to the distribution system. If such a
mitigation system is considered, the manufacturer should
be consulted to fully understand the implications of the
application, how the sensing will operate, and how the
energy diversion device will operate. At the time of this
writing, most crowbar devices seem to be one-time-use
60 IEEE Industry Applications Magazine œ j anuary/F ebruary 2019
devices, which has implications on
the ability to test them. Because an
arc-flash mitigation system is a safety
mechanism, the ability to fully con-
firm operation for maintenance pur-
poses is also important.
240.67 Fusible Switches,
Improving Protection
In 2017, the NEC added Section
240.67, which describes requirements
similar to those found in 240.87 for
switches with 1,200-A or higher fuses.
The requirements, as defined, are not necessary to be
enforced until 2020. The existence of the requirements
indicates that the code-making panel perceives a poten-
tial hazard and consequential risk to personnel that
merit consideration. The 2020 enforcement date seems
to be an attempt to delay a solution having limited com-
mercial availability.
The section allows fuse protection to be evaluated
with the arcing current to investigate if the fuse will
protect sufficiently quickly without additional protective
measures being applied in the system. The requirement
is for fuses to clear in 70 ms or fewer at the estimated arc-
ing current. The authors believe this requirement may be
insufficient for various reasons.
●● It forces the AHJ to evaluate complex time–current-
curves. Not all AHJ have the skills to evaluate time–
current curves.
●● The time–current curves provided will be for a specific
brand and model of fuse. When a fuse melts, it could
be replaced by one with different characteristics. A
conservative course of action would be to use enve-
lope or test fuses, like fuse-to-circuit breaker series
rating tests do, so not just one manufacturer’s fuses
are considered.
●● The 70-ms clearing time exceeds three cycles, and
even a three-cycle clearing time is not the best a fuse
can do. Fuses in this size range are current limiting
and provide best performance when operating in
their current-limiting range. Fuses operating in their
current-limiting range may provide the best arc-flash
incident energy mitigation possible for any overcur-
rent device.
●● Fuse curves are drawn as single-phase devices. When
a fuse melts in one phase, the fault current in a three-
phase balanced fault changes to a single-phase fault at
87% of the original fault current, increasing the possi-
bility of the second or third fuse melting more slowly.
The fuse curves an AHJ would review are incapable of
revealing slower melting times.
IEEE 1584-2002 (Sect. 5.6, p. 13) includes formulas for
fuses based on testing done by the research group for one
brand of fuses. The tests were performed primarily at 600 V.
The test data were used to derive several fuse formulas
that could be used in lieu of time– fuse performance in 240.67, which
current curves to evaluate arc-flash allows for no additional measures to
incident energy performance. The An arc-flash study be taken to reduce clearing time for a
formulas provide for an energy calcu- fused switch. As can be seen in Figure 6,
lation based on available bolted fault is the best way to the slower 0.07 s does allow a bit more
current regardless of arcing gap and
driving voltage. Both arcing gap and
determine if the energy, although it is lower than 8 cal
up to an available 70- kA short cir-
driving voltage are important factors fuse will provide the cuit current.
affecting arcing current. Based on the IEEE 1584-2002 fuse
Furthermore, the experiments to desired protection at arc-flash incident energy formulas,
determine fuse performance also put
a thin wire (trigger wire) in series
the available arcing an attempt was made to transpose
those formulas for 480-V applications
with the fuse, which is a weak con- current expected. (see Table 4). Fuses above 1,200
ductor. The trigger wire serves as a A probably need additional means
primitive fuse. When high current is to reduce incident energy below the
passed through, both heat up and commonly desired level of 8 cal/cm2.
eventually melt. The trigger wire should melt first, caus- Likewise, at 208 V, 1,200-A fuses would benefit from the
ing an arc-flash event, which is interrupted by the fuses. additional protection described in 240.67. An arc-flash study
The current causing the wire to heat also causes the is the best way to determine if the fuse will provide the
fuse to heat before an arcing event occurs. This could desired protection at the available arcing current expected.
be interpreted as biasing the tested fuse to operate more
quickly, but no clear data are available to identify if this
is consequential.
An additional concern is that most of the test data are 14 0.025 s 0.05 s
at 600 V. This means the arcing current is a relatively high 12 0.07 s 1.2 Cal/Cm2
percentage of available short circuit fault current relative 4 Cal/Cm2 8 Cal/Cm2
to the percent at 480 or 208 V. The IEEE fuse formulas do 10
Cal/cm2

not provide any guidance on how to correct the formulas 8

when applied at lower driving voltages. Figure 5 shows 6
the identified fuses, 1,200 A and greater, and the pro-
spective fault current at which the fuse seems to reduce 4
energy to about 8 cal per the formulas provided in IEEE 2
1584-2002. 0
Figure 6 shows incident energy per the IEEE 1584- 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2002 model for 480-/277- V, 32-mm gap at 18-in work- Ibf (kA)
ing distance at three clearing times: 0.025 s, typical for
a larger slow MCCB; 0.05 s, typical for a large ICCB FIGURE 6. A graph of incident energy per IEEE 1584-2002 at an
or LVPCB; and 0.07 s, the value specified as sufficient 18-in working distance for a 32-mm arcing gap. The arc-in-a-box
formulas for three different clearing times are shown for 480/277 V,
32 mm, and 18 in.

IEEE 1584-2002 Fuse Equations

32
Table 4. An approximate prospective current
Incident Energy cal/cm2

24 value where the IEEE 1584-2002 fuse formulas

predict 8-cal/cm2 incident energy at 600 V,
16 transposed for 480 and 208 V
8 Fuse Class kA for kA for kA for
and Range 8 cal 600 V 8 cal 480 V 8 cal 208 V
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 L, 1,601–2,000 96 120 240
Available Bolted Fault Current (kA)
L, 1,201–1,600 41 51 103
L-1601-2000 L-1201-1600 L-801-1200
L, 801–1,200 25 31 63
Determined Transposed Transposed
FIGURE 5. A fault current where the fuse limits the incident energy from graph by 5/4 ratio by 5/2 ratio
to 8 cal at 600 V, transposed to 480 and 208 V.

j anuary /F e bruary 2019 œ IEEE Industry Applications Magazine 61

 Fuses can provide optimum protection if they are
operating within their current-limiting range. The current-
limiting threshold is defined in the applicable standard
for those fuses. The ratios and thresholds are shown
in Tables 5 and 6. Fuses will provide the best possible
arc-flash protection after one fuse melts, if the expected
arcing current is larger than the value shown in the
current-limiting threshold table, which provides a conser-
vative interpretation of available data. Most products will
perform better than standard allowed maximum thresh-
olds. However, different fuse manufacturers and different
types of fuses may be installed over time, meaning the
conservative course of action is to base design decisions
on the worst practical scenario over the life of the equip-
ment. This also adds some ­flexibility to account for other
issues that may impact fuse melting times.
Arc-Flash and Electrical Safety Improvements
That Do Not Address Implied Code Intent
Within the industry, many design decisions can be made
that have a positive impact on electrical safety and arc-
flash-hazard mitigation. Designers, following Prevention
Through Design principles, should consider many of
these decisions and implement them as much as possible
in system designs. Among these considerations may be
●● high-resistance grounding, widely believed to reduce
the probability of an accidental arcing fault [16]
Table 5. The current-limiting ratio values,
UL fuse standard
Fuse Class Ratio
Class RK5 65
Class RK1 30
Class J 30
Class CC 30
Class L 30 (601–1,200 A)
Class L 35 (1,201–2,000 A)
Class L 40 (2,001–4,000 A)
●● arc-resistant equipment, which provides benefits for per-
sonnel working or standing near fully closed equipment;
however, it does not reduce the hazard when someone
is working on live equipment with doors open or covers
removed [17]
●● remote human–machine interface, diagnostics, dis-
play, and so forth, a good solution that is very easy to
implement in modern equipment and provides many
benefits; however, it does not address live work hazard
control implied by the code
●● remote circuit breaker operation, a very good risk miti-
gation method but does not address live work hazard
concerns as the code attempts to do.
Suggested Improvements in the Code
Circuit Application
Current code sections make no allowances for the applica-
tion of the circuit being addressed. Is the circuit a service
entrance main, a feeder on an important distribution bus,
or a branch device feeding a single load or machine? Is it
an additional device being used as a local disconnect pro-
viding mostly a disconnect function rather than a critical
protective function?
The extra protection mandated by code requirements
seems to address the hazard during energized work (an
energy-reducing maintenance switch is only used during
planned exposure). But a local disconnect, such as a safety
switch, used in a circuit fed from a remote, similarly sized
circuit breaker and feeding a dedicated load is not exempt-
ed from the code requirements. The extra protection is not
needed twice in the same circuit.
System Voltage Considerations
Additional protection requirements are necessary at
1,200 A, regardless of system voltage. As stated previously,
key factors in good protection are 1) having it operate for
the available arcing current and 2) the arcing current as
a percentage of the bolted fault current will vary greatly
with system voltage. If 1,200 A is the proper limit for addi-
tional protection at 480 V, then the proper limit for 600-V
installations may be 1,600 A, and for 208-V installations, it
may be 600 A.

Is the Overcurrent Protection Being Improved or Not?

Table 6. The current-limiting threshold values, The code is not sufficiently specific when discussing
UL fuse standard additional protection functions, such as bus differential
or ZSI. Those enhancements only provide a benefit if
Class L Fuse Size (A) Current-Limiting Threshold (A)
they operate the overcurrent device(s) for a fault in the
1,200 36,000 zone of protection and only if the protection is as fast
1,600 56,000 as possible at expected arcing current levels. In other
words, the threshold for operation of the device must
2,000 70,000 meet the same criteria as those control methods having
3,000 120,000 a threshold identified. It is not sufficient for a device
to be installed; it must play an active protection role to
4,000 160,000
provide benefit.

62 IEEE Industry Applications Magazine œ j anuary/F ebruary 2019

Arcing Current Location
An additional concern, not addressed by the code when it
states protection will operate at the available arcing cur-
rent expected, is that there is no definition of where the
arcing current is to be determined—at the terminals of
the overcurrent device or at the far end of the protected
conductors? The far end of the conductors may be the
equipment that may be worked on while energized. It
would be reasonable to expect this is where the improved
protection is desired, but that detail is not identified in the
code text, and it should be.
Protection with Fuses
It is well understood that the faster the protection is at the
arcing current level, the better it is. Fuse performance should
be taken from the standards defining the fuse class, and for
arcing current higher than those thresholds, additional protec-
tion is not needed. For arcing current lower than the thresh-
olds, additional protection is needed. Evaluations using 0.07 s
can provide higher E i levels than the code intended, espe-
cially when fuses can perform much better. This eliminates
AHJs from having to confirm overly complex compliance for
fuse-protected circuits, and instead, a specific numerical target
for arcing current versus fuse size should be provided.
Unprotected Conductors
Some systems may have conductors not adequately pro-
tected in the case of an arc-flash event, particularly line-side
conductors for service entrance equipment or other large
equipment where the power comes from a generator or
transformer. Between the power source and the first over-
current device, there may be no protection, or the protec-
tion operates at a different voltage and is not adequate for
conductors. A recommended practice within the industry
is to isolate such conductors so personnel working down-
stream of the local OCPD are not exposed to them. It is
also recommended that the space with the unprotected
energized conductors be isolated such that the effluent
from an arc-flash event localized downstream of the local
OCPD cannot cause a flashover and arc-flash event at the
primary side of the OCPD.
Conclusions
To ensure that the NEC is properly enforced, local AHJs
must be able to reasonably verify the requirements. Ensur-
ing that arc-flash reduction goals are achieved requires
expert knowledge in the application of these methods
described in the code. Implementing a method without
understanding if or how it works can create a false sense
of security. It is important that electrical inspectors examine
coordination study documentation, particularly because
the art of circuit breaker selectivity requires more than just
confirming that device time–current curves do not overlap.
Without a high-quality short circuit coordination study and
arc-flash-hazard analysis performed by a competent engi-
neer, it is difficult to confirm that arc-flash incident energy
mitigation has been suitably implemented. A more practical
course of action may be requiring a competent engineering
professional to provide a report indicating what methods
have been applied to the installation to ensure the devices
provide a reasonable limited level of incident energy. This
could be given either as a calories-per-square-centimeter
target or indicating that all devices above a certain size are
operating as quickly as they can at or below the expected
minimum arcing current level calculated.
One last note: it is important to remember that equip-
ment-based solutions will be sufficient only if mainte-
nance is properly performed and all appropriate safe
work practices are followed.
Author Information
Marcelo E. Valdes (marcelo.e.valdes@ieee.org) is with
ABB, Cary, North Carolina. Valdes is a Fellow of the IEEE.
Steve Hinton is with Schneider Electric, Lexington, Ken-
tucky. Francisco Martinez is with ABB, Tampa, Florida.
This article first appeared as “Arc Flash in the National Elec-
trical Code: Articles 240.87, 240.67; Intent and Reality, Does
the Code Achieve Its Goals? Do You Achieve Its Goals?” at
the 2017 IAS Annual Meeting. This article was reviewed
by the IAS Codes and Standards Committee.
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