IX. MUNICIPAL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
Larrazabal satisfied the voter registration
A. Elective Officials
Qualifications
ABELLA v COMELEC
Facts:
● Petitioner Benjamin Abella (Abella) of the Liberal Party ran for
Leyte Governor in 1988 against Emeterio V. Larrazabal (Mr.
Larrazabal) of Lakas ng Bansa-PDP-Laban.
● After being disqualified for lacking the residency requirement,
Mr. Larrazabal was substituted by his wife, private respondent
Adelina Larrazabal (Mrs. Larrazabal) the day immediately
preceding the election.
● Silvestre de la Cruz (de la Cruz) sought to disqualify her for
falsifying entries in her COC regarding her residence. In the
interim, Mrs. Larrazabal won the election, while Abella placed
second.
○ COMELEC could not act on the complaint; most
members not yet confirmed.
○ SC issued a TRO; remanded the case to COMELEC
decision on the merits.
● Abella intervened in the disqualification case and filed a criminal
complaint against Mrs. Larrazabal for falsification and
misrepresentation of residence in her COC.
○ COMELEC Division dismissed the disqualification case
and referred the criminal complaint to its Law
Department. MR denied.
○ SC required the COMELEC to decide on the criminal
complaint on its own, not through its Law Deparment.
○ COMELEC 2nd Division disqualified Larrazabal
○ COMELEC en banc affirmed, but also disallowed
Abella’s proclamation as governor.
● Both parties appealed.
Issue + Ruling:
1. W/N Mrs. Larrazabal satisfied the residence requirement?—NO,
because animus revertendi does not apply to Mrs. Larrazabal’s
case given that she did not leave her domicile of origin for
economic advantage.
2. W/N Mrs.
requirement?—NO, as the transfer of her registration from
Ormoc City to Kananga was tainted with irregularities.
3. W/N the prohibition against an ICC’s registered voters to elect
provincial officials carries with it a prohibition against the same
registered voters to themselves be elected as provincial
officials?—YES, the independence enjoyed by an ICC from the
province carries with it includes the prohibition against election
of provincial officials by their registered voters.
4. W/N Abella may succeed Mrs. Larrazabal as governor upon the
latter’s disqualification?—NO, he was not the choice of the
sovereign people.
Ratio:
On the residency requirement
● Mrs. Larrazabal’s argument:
○ COMELEC erroneously disqualified her as only the
criminal complaint was remanded.
○ She remained a resident of Kananga despite her
subsequent physical transfer to Ormoc City as she had
animus revertendi manifested through frequent returns
thereat.
● De la Cruz and Abella’s argument:
○ Mrs. Larrazabal is in fact not a resident of Kananga, but
of Ormoc City which is an ICC exempt from voting for
provincial officials.
● While the SC only remanded the criminal complaint for
misrepresentation in a COC, Mrs. Larrazabal’s disqualification
should be implied if she is found to lack the residency
requirement.
● Residence requirement should be understood as legal
residence or domicile, not any place where a party may have
properties and visit from time to time.
● The following circumstances dispute the Mrs. Larrazabal’s
contentions:
○ Their relatives attested that the spouses only
transferred to Kananga the year prior to the elections
so that Mr. Larrazabal can run and Mrs. Larrazabal can
vote for his husband.
○ While they leased a house and lot in Kananga, their
lease contract with option to purchase itself states that
the spouses are residents of Ormoc City.
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 ○ Mr. Larrazabal’s residence certificate was issued in
Ormoc City.
■ Applying the principle that husband and wife
live together in one residence embodied in
Arts. 681 and 692 of the Family Code, it is
correct to infer that Mrs. Larrazabal was
likewise a resident of Ormoc City.
● In Faypon v. Quirino, it was held that the determination of one’s
legal residence or domicile depends upon intent.
○ A person may temporarily leave his/her domicile to
pursue a calling, profession, or business.
○ However, animus revertendi is still manifested through
activities such as returning to his/her native town every
election to cast their ballot.
● This is not applicable to Mrs. Larrazabal, as she did not leave
her domicile to look for greener pastures, but to establish her
residence in Ormoc City with her husband.
○ Animus revertendi is not inferred from her occasional
visits to Kananga, as it is normal for Filipinos to visit
their friends and relatives in their hometowns despite
their transfer of residence.
On the voter registration requirement
● Mrs. Larrazabal’s argument:
○ She is a registered voter in Kananga as she had
already cancelled her registration in Ormoc City on
Nov. 25, 1987 and transferred her voter’s registration in
Kananga on the same day. She also voted in Kananga
in the 1988 elections.
● However, the SC found several irregularities attending Mrs.
Larrazabal’s transfer of registration and clearly disputing the
same, including conflicting minutes by the Board of Election
Inspectors on whether it had acted on such transfer at all, the
fact that the serial numbers of the spouses’ voter’s affidavits
were so far removed from other voters who registered for the
same precinct on the same day, and the fact that the Larrazabal
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FC, Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together x x x
2 provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. x x x
FC, Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. x x x The court may
exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there
are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. x x x
spouses were only certified as voters in Precinct No. 17 of
Kananga 2 weeks after elections.
On the prohibition against being elected as provincial officials
● Mrs. Larrazabal’s argument:
○ Citing Sec. 4, Art. X,3 she argues that the
independence of ICCs from the province referred to in
Sec. 12, Art. X4 merely refers to administrative
supervision, not the prohibition from electing provincial
officials. Hence, even if she were a registered voter in
Ormoc City, and ICC, she is not subject to the
prohibition.
○ In the alternative, prohibition against voting for
provincial officials does not carry with it prohibition
against running as provincial officials.
● However, Sec. 12, Art. X is explicit that ICCs enjoy the same
independence as HUCs, which includes the prohibition against
election of provincial officials by their registered voters. This is
affirmed by Ormoc City’s charter which likewise explicitly
prohibits its registered voters from electing provincial officials.
● Furthermore, applying the rule that relative words refer to the
nearest antecedent to the language of Ormoc City’s charter, the
conjunctive “and” bisects the phrase “shall not be qualified and
entitled” to form two prohibitions relative to the demonstrative
phrase “in the election of the provincial governor”.
On who will succeed Mrs. Larrazabal upon disqualification
● Abella’s argument:
○ Sec. 6 of R.A. 66465 applies. As Mrs. Larrazabal was
disqualified making her a noncandidate, it was in fact
him who garnered the highest number of votes.
● As of the time the local elections commenced on Feb. 1, 1988,
Mrs. Larrazabal was still considered a bona fide candidate and
3
1987 Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 4. The President x x x shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities x x x
shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions.
4
1987 Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined
by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
5
R.A. 6646, Sec. 6. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
2
 voters cast their votes for her in the sincere belief that she was
qualified. Abella thus validly lost the election to her.
● Citing Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, the SC reasoned that votes cast
in the sincere belief that the candidate was qualified should not
be treated as tray, void, or meaningless. It was also said that it
would be extremely repugnant to suffrage if a candidate be
declared a winner when the majority of voters have positively
declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
FRIVALDO v COMELEC
Facts:
● Petitioner Juan Frivaldo was the incumbent governor-elect of
Sorsogon in 1988
● The League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, filed with
COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo’s election
and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen, having been naturalized as an American citizen in 1983
● In his answer, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the
US but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had
sought American citizenship as a means of survival against
persecution by Marcos
○ He added that he returned to the PH following the
EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy
● Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing but COMELEC set the
case for hearing on the merits
○ Frivaldo’s MR was denied
● Frivaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to the SC to
ask that the orders be set aside on the ground that they had
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
○ Pending resolution, SC issued a TRO
● SolGen supported the position that Frivaldo was not a citizen of
the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his
naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was
disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did
not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could
not amend the Constitution, the LGC, and the Omnibus Election
Code.
● In Frivaldo’s Reply, he insisted that he was a citizen of the
Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen
was not "impressed with voluntariness”
○ He cited the Nottenbohm case, wherein a German’s
naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized
because he only obtained it for convenience
● Additionally, Frivaldo argued that his active participation in the
1987 congressional elections had divested him of American
citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus restoring
his Philippine citizenship.
● SC decided to resolve the issue directly to avoid delay
○ While COMELEC has primary jurisdiction as the sole
judge of contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members, SC took cognizance of the
petition because COMELEC already made a decision
on his citizenship through the SolGen, which can be
subject to review.
Issue + Ruling:
Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the
time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of
Sorsogon? NO, not a PH citizen. SC declared that he was
DISQUALIFIED from the position as governor.
Ratio:
● SC enumerated the Filipino Citizenship requirements in law:
○ Art.XI, Sec. 9 of the Constitution --that all public officials
and employees owe the State and the Constitution
"allegiance at all times"
○ Section 42 of the LGC --that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the
Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency
where he is running.
○ Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code --that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines.
● Frivaldo claimed in his COC that he was a “natural born” citizen,
omitting any loss of status
○ However, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a
US citizen following certification from a US district
court, as duly authenticated by the Philippine Vice
Consul
● Frivaldo did not deny this evidence, and even admitted it in his
answer. He argued that he was only forced to do so to avoid
persecution
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 ● SC saw no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of
the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship.
● Even if that was the case, it can’t be argued that as a
consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American
citizenship. The suggestion that his naturalization was not the
result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally
unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
● There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly
situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk
than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to
have been coerced — to abandon their cherished status as
Filipinos.
● Further, the Nottenbohm case does not apply because it dealt
with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as
decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at
bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming
Frivaldo as its national.
○ Moreover, in Nottenbohm they were invoking his
nationality. In this case, they’re rejecting Frivaldo’s
nationality
● If he really wanted to disavow his US citizenship and reacquire
his Filipino citizenship, he should have done so through a direct
act of congress, repatriation or naturalization
○ He contends that just by filing his COC he can recover
his citizenship, but Filipino citizenship previously
disowned is not cheaply recovered
● This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as
provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive
allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by
the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of
the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to
the citizens of this country.
Separate Opinions:
Gutierrez,Jr., J.
● Agreed that when the higher interests of the State are involved,
the public good should supersede any procedural infinities
which may affect a petition filed with the Commission on
Elections.
● Failed to see how the Court could allow a person who by his
own admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the
office of Governor of any province.
LABO v COMELEC
Facts:
● Petitioner Ramon L. Labo, Jr. (Labo) initially sought to restrain
COMELEC from looking into the question of his citizenship as a
qualification as mayor of Baguio City based merely on
procedural grounds.
○ He was asserting that the filing fees for the quo
warranto proceedings against him were paid out of
time.
○ However, the SC held in this case that the payment of
the filing fees were on time, since it initially considered
a pre-proclamation controversy for which no docket fee
was collected. Only later was it considered a quo
warranto petition. The delay in paying the filing fee is
thus not imputable to private respondent Luis R.
Lardizabal’s (Lardizabal) fault or neglect.
● After disposing of the procedural aspect of the case, the SC
proceeded to dispose of the substantive issue of Labo’s
citizenship even if it was not raised in order to settle the
controversy in a single proceeding.
● There were two prior administrative rulings on his citizenship:
○ First by the COMELEC who found Labo to be a citizen,
even though confirmation from the Australian Embassy
was wanting.
○ Second by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID), which found him to be an alien,
based on the uncontested account of Australia’s
Consul, Graham West, who alleged that:
■ Labo was granted Australian citizenship by
naturalization on July 28, 1976 based on
relaxed requirements by virtue of his marriage
to an Australian Citizen.
■ Labo took an oath of allegiance to Australia
and renounced any other allegiance as part of
the process.
■ His marriage was later voided for being
bigamous, although Labo remained an
Australian citizen.
■ Labo now stands to lose citizenship through
the following ways, none of which have been
realized yet:
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 ● Court action by virtue of
misrepresenting material information
in his application for Australian
citizenship;
● A declaration of Renunciation of
Australian citizenship; or
● Acquisition of another nationality.
● His Australian citizenship was likewise manifested by Labo
himself through:
○ Reentering the Philippines using an Australian passport
and registering under an Alien Certificate of
Registration, later changed to an Immigrant Certificate
of Residence.
○ His categorical declaration of Australian citizenship in
several sworn statements.
○ His avoidance of barangay court jurisdiction by
asserting alienage.
Issue + Ruling:
1. W/N Labo satisfied the citizenship requirement for local public
office under BP 337?—NO, as he never reacquired citizenship
through any of the recognized modes.
2. W/N Lardizabal can replace Labo as mayor given that he
garnered the 2nd highest number of votes?—NO, given that the
majority positively declared in their ballots that they do not
choose him.
Ratio:
On Labo’s citizenship
● COMELEC erred in dismissing the aforementioned
manifestations of Labo’s Australian citizenship through own acts
as “mere mistakes”
○ Labo is not an unlettered person who was not aware of
the consequences of his acts, moreso as he was
assisted by counsel.
● The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of
citizenship.
○ Even if it did, it was not seasonably pleaded.
○ The requisite identity of parties for the application of res
judicata was likewise not present.
● Labo likewise did not become a dual national by virtue of his
naturalization in Australia.
○ C.A. 63 provides the mode by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost, which are all present in Labo’s
case:
■ Naturalization in a foreign country
■ Express renunciation of citizenship
■ Taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign
country
○ In any case, the Constitution itself considers dual
allegiance inimical to national interest and mandates for
it to be dealt with by law.
● Even assuming that his Australian citizenship was annulled after
his marriage to an Australian citizen was voided, it does not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship.
○ C.A. 63 as amended by P.D. 725 provides that
citizenship may only be reacquired:
■ By direct act of Congress;
■ By naturalization; or
■ By repatriation.
○ None of these methods were exercised.
● Conclusively, Labo is not now, nor was he on the day of the
local elections, a citizen of the Philippines.
○ Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that
can be easily recovered after renunciation. It may only
be restored after the returning renegade makes a
formal act of re-dedication, and reaffirm total and
exclusive loyalty to the Philippines.
○ Labo is disqualified as a mayoralty candidate for want
of Philippine citizenship as required by Sec. 42 of BP
337.
● The will of the electorate cannot substitute for requirements of
both BP 337 and the Constitution.
○ In any case, he only won by a narrow lead of 2,100
votes.
○ The qualifications are continuing requirements. As
such, if they are lost during incumbency, title to the
office is deemed forfeited.
On Labo’s replacement as mayor
● SC reinstated the Geronimo v. Ramos as proper precedent,
which reiterates the doctrine first announce in 1912 in Topacio
v. Paredes that it would be extremely repugnant to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes
5
 is proclaimed winner, even though the majority has positively
declared that they do not choose him.
○ It is fundamental in all republican governments that no
one can be declared elected unless he receives a
majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in an
election.
○ Disqualification of the winner does not automatically
entitle the candidate with the 2nd highest number of
votes to be proclaimed.
○ If the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as
stray, void, or meaningless.
Separate Concurring Opinion, Gutierrez, Jr., J.
● Limits his concurrence only to cases of citizenship and
disloyalty, but not to any of the many other grounds for
disqualification cited in his concurring opinion in Frivaldo.
LABO, JR. v COMELEC
Facts:
● Second time the court has to rule on the citizenship of Ramon
Labo
● Labo launched his candidacy as mayor of Baguio by filing his
COC in 1992
● Roberto Ortega filed his COC for the same position, then filed a
disqualification proceeding against Labo before the COMELEC
Labo’s Position
● Contention of Labo is that he is a FIlipino citizen and that he can
prove the same
● Labo, in citing the case of Vance v Terrazas, argued that the act
of expropriation must be proven by a preponderance of
evidence, which was not satisfied by COMELEC or the
Commission on Immigration
● He also faulted COMELEC for denying him of the opportunity to
present a full dress presentation of his case
○ BUT records disclose that summons were issued and
he just ignored them
Issue + Ruling:
● W/N Labo has shown that he has reacquired his Filipino
citizenship? --NO. He has failed to submit a scintilla of proof to
shore his claims. Petition denied.
Ratio:
● Labo relied on the case of Vance to support his position, but this
issue had already been passed upon in his MR
● At any rate, Labo did not submit any evidence to prove that he
had reacquired his Filipino citizenship
○ Hence, SC found no grave abuse of discretion as a
result of COMELEC cancelling his COC
● Labo also argued that sec. 72 of the omnibus election code
“operates as a special repatriation proceeding” and that it allows
proclamation as a winning candidate since the resolution
disqualifying him was not yet final
○ SC ruled that the argument was quixotic and untenable
● First, sec. 72 was already repealed by Sec.6 of RA 6646
○ This means that COMELEC can suspend Labo’s
proclamation, his reception of the winning number of
votes notwithstanding, especially since Labo failed to
present any evidence to support his claim of
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship
● Second, Labo tried to raise a new argument not litigated before
COMELEC. He argued that he re-acquired his citizenship by
citing his application for re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship
filed before the OSG pursuant to PD 725 and Letter of
instruction 270
○ Special committee on naturalization had not acted on
the application
○ Even Labo admitted this
○ In the absence of approval or official action,a mere
application cannot amount to automatic re-acquisition
of one’s Filipino citizenship.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Gutierrez, J.
● Since Mayor Labo never validly acquired Australian citizenship,
he never lost his Philippine citizenship. His oath of allegiance to
Australia was null and void because he was not qualified to be
an Australian citizen.
○ A null and void act cannot have the positive and
serious effect of stripping a Filipino of his natural-born
citizenship.
● Labo's taking an oath as citizen of a foreign country was based
on his marriage to a citizen of that country.
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 ○ Labo's marriage was bigamous and void because his
Australian wife had an existing valid marriage when she
tied the knot with him.
○ Not being married to her, Labo could not become an
Australian.
○ Not being qualified to become an Australian citizen, his
oath of allegiance to that country was meaningless act.
It should not deprive him of his Philippine citizenship.
● In deciding cases involving citizenship, the presumptions should
be in favor of its retention and against its loss.
FRIVALDO v COMELEC
Facts:
● Private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo (Frivaldo) filed his COC as
governor of Sorsogon for the May 8, 1995 elections.
○ This was his 3rd time to run against Raul R. Lee (Lee)
(1st was in 1988, 2nd was in 1992). In both times, he
was overwhelmingly elected governor despite twice
being judicially declared non-Filipino and thus
disqualified.
● Petitioner Lee sought Frivaldo’s disqualification and the
cancellation of his COC as he was not a citizen.
○ COMELEC 2nd Division disqualified Frivaldo
● Pending appeal, Frivaldo won the elections by a margin of
20,000 votes. Lee placed second.
● Lee then filed a supplemental petition praying for his
proclamation as governor of Sorsogon.
○ COMELEC en banc directed the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to proclaim Lee as the
winning gubernatorial candidate.
● Frivaldo filed a petition before the COMELEC praying for the
annulment of Lee’s proclamation and for his own proclamation.
○ Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance on June 30, 1995,
2:00 PM, through his granted petition for repatriation
under P.D. 725, curing any legal impediment to his
proclamation.
○ COMELEC 1st Division granted Frivaldo’s petition.
○ COMELEC en banc denied Lee’s MR.
● Frivaldo and Lee separately filed their respective petitions
before the SC.
○ Lee sought Frivaldo’s disqualification and, in the
interim, the issuance of a TRO.
■ SC granted the TRO.
○ Frivaldo assailed the abovementioned resolutions on
the basis that they were not rendered within the period
allowed by law (i.e., not later than 15 days before the
election) as mandated by Sec. 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Issue + Ruling:
1. W/N Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid and legal, and thus
seasonably cured his lack of citizenship as required by the
LGC?—YES, Frivaldo’s repatriation is deemed to be retroactive
to the date of his application therefor, curing any
disqualifications he may have had for elective office.
2. W/N the lack of citizenship is a continuing disqualification?—
NO, the issue of citizenship must be decided every time it is
material.
3. W/N the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, is
valid and legal?—NO, because prior to Lee’s proclamation,
Frivaldo was no longer disqualified from assuming office.
Ratio:
On the legality of Frivaldo’s repatriation
● The LGC of 1991 in Sec. 39 requires that elective local officials
must be a citizen of the Philippines, among others.
● Three ways to reacquire citizenship under Philippine law:
○ By direct act of Congress;
○ By naturalization; or
○ By repatriation.
● Frivaldo initially tried to reacquire citizenship through an act of
Congress. However, the bill did not materialize due to the
maneuvers of his political rivals.
● Naturalization was likewise rejected by the Court in a previous
case due to jurisdictional, substantial, and procedural defects.
● It was only through repatriation under P.D. No. 725 that he was
able to acquire the requisite citizenship under the LGC.
● Contrary to Lee’s position, the Pres. Aquino’s memorandum
dated March 27, 1987 directing the Special Committee on
Naturalization to cease and desist from all proceedings was not
a repeal of P.D. No. 725 as it was not a law.
● Lee is likewise incorrect that the repatriation proceedings were
tainted with irregularities, i.e., that Frivaldo’s repatriation was
hastily approved in just one day.
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 ○ Frivaldo applied for repatriation on Aug. 17, 1994.
○ However, the Special Committee was only reactivated
on June 8, 1995 the following year.
○ While he filled up and re-submitted his form on June
29, 1995 and thereafter took his oath the following day
on June 30, 1995, it could not be said that the approval
was done with indecent haste, as the processing of his
application in fact took almost a year.
○ In any case, repatriation proceedings are supposed to
be faster, as in this case a former natural-born citizen is
merely seeking reacquisition of citizenship. In contrast,
naturalization contemplates an alien’s first-time entry
into Philippine political life.
○ 10 other applications were likewise approved with his,
disputing allegations of partiality.
● Under Sec. 39 of the LGC, the law merely imposes that an
elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines without
imposing any particular date or time when the candidate must
possess citizenship.
○ In contrast, the residency requirement mandates
possession of at least one year immediately preceding
the day of election. The age requirement likewise
expressly requires a minimum age on election day.
● The purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that no
alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall
govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
○ An official begins to govern or to discharge his
functions only upon his proclamation and on the day
the law mandates his term of office to begin. Literally
speaking, this is the beginning of the governance
sought to be insulated from an alien.
○ In this case, as Frivaldo re-assumed citizenship on the
very same day his term of office as governor began,
there was no longer any legal impediment barring his
proclamation, holding of office, and discharge of
functions and responsibilities as of said date. Otherwise
stated, he satisfactorily and timely met the citizenship
requirement of the LGC.
■ Interpreting Sec. 39 of the LGC liberally, this
construction gives spirit, life, and meaning to
our law on qualifications consistent with its
purpose.
■ Interpreting Sec. 39 of the LGC literally, this
provision speaks of “qualifications” of “elective
officials” and NOT of candidates. Thus, it is
only required when the “elective official” begins
to govern, not at the date of election or any
time prior.
● Moreover, it cannot be implied from the voter’s registration
requirement (which, in itself, requires citizenship on the day of
voter’s registration) that the law requires citizenship at an earlier
date.
○ Had the law intended the citizenship qualification to be
possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, it would not
have made citizenship a separate qualification, as it
results in a redundancy which the law abhors.
○ Thus, the point of the voter’s registration requirement is
NOT for the voter to be a citizen prior to the date of
election, but for the voter to actually be registered in the
area he seeks to govern and not elsewhere.
● Additionally, the remedy of Quo Warranto under Sec. 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code—the only provision authorizing a
remedy against an ineligible incumbent who fails to meet the
qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the LGC—can only
be availed of with 10 days from proclamation. It is thus only at
such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance
of by the Commission.
○ In this case, Frivaldo was already and indubitably a
citizen at the time he was supposed to be proclaimed.
Thus, he was no longer ineligible.
● Most importantly, Frivaldo’s repatriation RETROACTED to the
date of the filing of his application therefor on Aug. 17, 1994.
○ Under the general rule, laws do not have a retroactive
effect, UNLESS they be CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in
nature, or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
■ Curative statutes are those which undertake to
cure errors and irregularities, thereby
validating judicial or administrative
proceedings of public officers, or private deeds
and contracts which otherwise would not
produce their intended consequences by
reason of some statutory disability or failure to
8
 comply with some technical requirement.
These are normally retroactive.
■ Remedial laws are statutes relating to
remedies or modes of procedure, which do not
create new or take away vested rights, but
only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of such rights. These are not
ordinarily retroactive.
○ In this case, P.D. 725 creates new rights for:
■ Filipino women who lost citizenship by
marriage to aliens, who otherwise could not
avail of repatriation until after the death of their
husband or termination of their marital status,
to reacquire Filipino citizenship; and
■ Natural-born Filipinos who had lost Philippine
citizenship to reacquire Filipino citizenship,
without having to undergo naturalization.
○ The retroactivity applies not only to the law itself but
also to the repatriation granted, which must be deemed
to retroact to the date of a person’s application therefor.
○ Retroactivity to the date of filing would also prevent
prejudice to the applicants.
■ Should the Special Committee delay in acting
on the application, as has happened in
Frivaldo’s case, former Filipinos who may be
stateless such as Frivaldo who had already
renounced American Citizenship may be
prejudiced for causes outside their control
should the benefit of repatriation not be given
retroactive effect.
○ The retroactivity of Frivaldo’s repatriation likewise cures
his application for voter’s registration.
○ Giving his repatriation retroactive effect likewise did not
give him dual citizenship status which would disqualify
him from running for government office.
■ Frivaldo attests that he had long renounced his
American citizenship prior to his application for
repatriation. Thus, he was in fact stateless in
the interim.
On citizenship as a continuing disqualification
● The SC’s prior pronouncements in past cases disqualifying
Frivaldo in prior elections do not govern his future status with
finality.
○ A person may subsequently require or lose citizenship
under any mode recognized by law.
○ Thus, a prior judgment on a person’s citizenship is not
considered res judicata, as the issue of citizenship of a
person must be threshed out again and again should
the occasion demand that such a determination is
material.
On Lee’s proclamation as governor
● The SC agrees that Lee’s proclamation was invalid.
● This case has circumstances similar to those in Labo v.
COMELEC.
○ At the time of election, the COMELEC has yet to decide
with finality on Frivaldo’s disqualification case. As such,
he was not notoriously known to the voters as an
ineligible candidate, nor did they think that they were
wasting their ballots in voting for him.
○ As such, the sovereign will must be respected, and as
in the case of Labo, Lee was obviously not the choice
of the people—a defeated candidate that cannot be
proclaimed winner.
● In any case, Frivaldo was already qualified prior to Lee’s
proclamation as governor. As such, Frivaldo should have been
proclaimed, not Lee.
Refutation of Justice Davide’s Dissent
● The SC states that even though Pres. Aquino’s memorandum
dated Mar. 27, 1987 would be construed as a suspension of
P.D. 725 and not a repeal, it would have no bearing on the
disposition of the issue as the memorandum is still not a statute
which can amend or abrogate existing law.
● Furthermore, the retroactivity of Frivaldo’s repatriation only
cured his candidacy in the 1995 elections and did not affect his
status in the 1988 and 1992 elections. As such, the decision of
the majority does not run counter to previous decision of the SC
rendering Frivaldo disqualified for want of the citizenship
requirement.
● Nor does the retroactivity of Frivaldo’s repatriation in the present
case dilute the SC’s decision in the previous case.
9
 ○ In the earlier casee, repatriation as a mode of acquiring
citizenship was not directly involved
● The finding of the SC that Frivaldo was stateless for a certain
period was not intended to be a substitute for a declaration by
the US as actually having renounced citizenship.
○ The holding was merely intended to affirm a finding of
fact by the COMELEC given that Lee was not able to
show that the same was arbitrary and whimsical.
● The majority likewise disagrees with Justice Davide that the
citizenship qualification was required of elective (i.e.,
candidates) and not elected officials.
○ However, Sec. 39, par. (a) speaks of “elective local
official” while pars. (b) to (f) refer to “candidates”. Had
Congress intended them to refer to the same persons,
it would have said so and not made a distinction.
○ Likewise, had Congress intended for the citizenship
requirement to have been possessed on the day of
election or prior thereto, it should have said so, the
same way it did for pars. (b) to (f).
● The majority likewise does not disagree that the law on
repatriation specifically states that it is only after taking the oath
that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired citizenship.
Rather, they are saying that it must likewise be deemed
retroactive to the date of application therefor.
MERCADO v MANZANO
Facts:
● Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were candidates for
vice-mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections
● Manzano won with 108, 853 votes, but his proclamation was
suspended in view of a pending disqualification case filed by
Ernesto Mamaril
○ Manzano has dual US-Filipino citizenship
○ Mamaril claimed to be a US citizen, not a Filipino
● COMELEC granted Mamaril’s petition and cancelled Manzano’s
COC
● Manzano admitted that he is a registered foreigner under the
bureau of Immigration and that he is Filipino because he was
born of Filipino parents. He was born in San Francisco and is
considered an American under US law, but he did not lose his
Filipino citizenship
● COMELEC, pursuant to an omnibus resolution, tabulated the
votes for vice mayor but suspended the proclamation of the
winner
○ But the motion was not resolved. COMELEC en banc
reversed the decision of the second division and
declared Manzano qualified to run
○ He was deemed qualified because at the time he
attained the age of majority, he registered for the
1992,1995, and 1998 elections, which effectively
renounced his American citizenship under US law.
Issue + Ruling:
● W/N Manzano’s dual citizenship disqualifies him from the
position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy? --NO, he
is not disqualified. Dual citizenship and Dual allegiance are
different. By filing his COC, he elected to be a Filipino citizen.
Ratio:
Mercado’s Personality to bring the suit
● Manzano argued that Mercado has no personality to bring the
suit because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty
post who cannot be proclaimed even if the private respondent is
ultimately disqualified
○ The flaw in this argument is that it assumes that, at the
time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings
before the COMELEC, there had already been a
proclamation of the results of the election for the vice
mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which
petitioner came out only second to private respondent.
○ However, there had been no proclamation at that time.
Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in
ousting private respondent from the race at the time he
sought to intervene.
● Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less
because he filed a motion for intervention after private
respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest
number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That
petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent
is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646
○ The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve
petitioners motion for intervention was tantamount to a
10
 denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the
instant petition for certiorari.
Dual Citizenship as a ground for disqualification
● Manzano’s disqualification is sought under sec.40(d) of the
LGC, which disqualified a person with dual citizenship from
running for any elective position
● To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance
○ Dual allegiance refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition.
○ Dual allegiance is inimical to public interest and shall
be dealt with by law
● SC looked at the deliberations of the constitutional commission,
particularly at Blas Ople’s discussion of dual citizenship
○ It was noted that during the deliberations, a significant
number of commissioners expressed concern about
dual citizenship in the sense that it implied double
allegiance
● In including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but
with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization.
● Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in the LGC and in R.A. No.
7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
● Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification.
○ Unlike those with dual allegiance who must be subject
to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering
that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.
○ Joaquin G. Bernas pointed out: Dual citizenship is just
a reality imposed on us because we have no control of
the laws on citizenship of other countries. We
recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or
not she is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control
● By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same
time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are
also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of
its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship.
Petitioner’s election of PH Citizenship
● The record shows that private respondent was born in San
Francisco of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the
doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he
was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States.
However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in
Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private
respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under
American law, so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
○ Mercado challenges this ruling. He argues that merely
taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient
evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the
alleged renunciation was made when private
respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective
as it should have been made when he reached the age
of majority.
● In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private
respondent renounced his American citizenship, the COMELEC
must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
the United States, which provided that a person who is a
national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization,
shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a
foreign state
○ US courts later struck this down as unconstitutional
● However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his
present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship
and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private
respondents certificate of candidacy included statements such
as “ I am a Filipino citizen natural born” and “I am not a
permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country”.
11
 ● The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
● Therefore, there is no merit in Mercado’s contention that the
oath of allegiance contained in Manzano’s COC is insufficient to
constitute renunciation of his American citizenship.
○ Equally without merit is petitioners contention that, to
be effective, such renunciation should have been made
upon private respondent reaching the age of majority
since no law requires the election of Philippine
citizenship to be made upon majority age.
● Finally, much is made of the fact that Manzano admitted that he
is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and that he holds an American passport which he
used in his last travel to the US
○ There is no merit in this.
○ Until the filing of his COC, he had dual citizenship. The
acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the
assertion of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship
○ Aznar v Comelec : To recapitulate, by declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another
country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws
of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen.
COQUILLA v COMELEC
Facts:
● Petitioner Teodulo Coquilla (Coquilla) was born to Filipino
parents in Eastern Samar on Feb. 17, 1938, and continued
residing there until 1965.
● Thereafter, Coquilla joined the US Navy, was subsequently
naturalized as a US citizen, and remained there even after his
retirement in 1985.
● On Oct. 15, 1998, Coquilla came to the Philippines to take out a
residence certificate, albeit still making frequent trips to the US
until Aug. 5, 2000.
● His application for repatriation under R.A. 8171 was approved
on Nov. 7, 2000. He took his oath as citizen of the Philippines 3
days later.
● Later that same month on Nov. 21, 2000, Coquilla registered as
a voter in Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar, which was approved
on Jan. 12, 2001. He then filed his COC on Feb. 27, 2001
stating that he had been a resident of Oras for 2 years.
● Respondent Neil M. Alvarez (Alvarez), incumbent mayor of
Oras, challenged the same on the ground of material
misrepresentation regarding residency, as Coquilla had in fact
only resided in Oras for only about 6 months since he took his
oath on Nov. 10, 2000. In the interim, Coquilla won the elections
and was declared Mayor of Oras.
○ On July 19, 2001, after the elections, COMELEC 2nd
Division cancelled Coquilla’s COC, ruling that his
frequent trips to the Philippines before repatriation do
not qualify as residence required by the Sec. 39(a) of
the LGC. Residency only commenced after Nov. 10,
2000, when he took his oath.
○ COMELEC en banc denied his MR.
Issue: + Ruling:
1. W/N Coqullia had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at
least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001?—
NO, as Coquilla only waived his status as a non-resident upon
taking his oath of allegiance on Nov. 10, 2000.
2. W/N COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of
Coquilla’s COC?—YES, given that Coquilla committed a
misrepresentation of a material fact in his COC.
Ratio:
● The “residence” required by the LGC must be understood not as
“dwelling” or “habitation”, but rather as “domicile” or “legal
residence”, i.e., the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
12
 where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain (animus manendi).
● There are two kinds of domicile:
○ Domicile of origin - acquired at birth and subsists until
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile
○ Domicile of choice
● In this case, Coquilla lost his domicile of origin in Oras by
becoming a US citizen after enlisting in the US Navy in 1965.
Until Nov. 10, 2000, petitioner was an alien allowed only to stay
in the Philippines as a visitor or resident alien.
○ In fact, residence in the US is required for naturalization
by Title 8, Sec. 1427(a) of the United States Code.
● In Caasi v. CA, immigration to the US through a “greencard”
constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
○ In this case, Coquilla abandoned domicile not simply
through “greencard” but through naturalization as an
actual citizen.
● Coquilla cannot argue that he was merely compelled to adopt
US citizenship by reason of his service in the US armed forces.
He sought repatriation through, R.A. 8171. Thus, R.A. 2630
does not apply. In any case, naturalization abroad still bars
reacquisition of legal residence in the Philippines.
○ R.A. 2630 applies to repatriation of those who lost their
citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed
Forces of the United States.
○ R.A. 8171 provides for repatriation of natural-born
Filipinos who lost citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity.
● Coquilla likewise did not reestablish residence in the country in
1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections
by securing a CTC and announcing to his townmates his
intention to repatriate and run for mayor.
○ The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be
waived separately or simultaneously:
■ Separately, when he/she obtains an immigrant
visa under §13 of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, waiving his/her status as non-
resident.
■ Simultaneously, when he/she is naturalized
under C.A. 473, or reacquires citizenship by
repatriation or an act of Congress, waiving
his/her status as both alien and non-resident
○ In this case, Coquilla’s prior entries into the Philippines
were only through his status as a visa-free balikbayan
under §3(c) of R.A. 6768. Thus, waiver of his status as
non-resident was only effected on Nov. 10, 2000, upon
taking his oath as citizen.
● The cases of Frivaldo v. COMELEC and Bengson III v. House
of Representatives do not apply.
○ In Frivaldo, what was held was that the citizenship
requirement was complied with when the petitioner took
his oath of repatriation on the same day that his term
as governor of Sorsogon began, as citizenship may be
possessed even on the day the candidate assumes
office. This cannot apply to the residency requirement,
which must be possessed for at least one year
immediately preceding the day of election.
○ In Bengson, the ruling was that, upon repatriation, a
Filipino is deemed to have recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen.
● Neither can residency be assumed from his registration as a
voter in January 2001, a precondition to which is residency for
at least one year.
○ In Nuval v. Guray, registration as a voter does not bar
disputing a candidate’s lack of residency in a
subsequent case.
● Likewise, the liberal interpretation of election laws shall not
obtain. As held in Aquino v. COMELEC, not even the will of a
majority or plurality of voters would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself.
On the cancellation of the COC
● Under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, a false statement
regarding a material representation contained in a COC as
required under Sec. 74 is grounds for cancelling the same.
○ In previous cases, the SC has held that a
misrepresentation regarding qualifications for an office
for which a person filed a COC is justification for
cancellation of COC.
○ As Coquilla misrepresented his residency, his COC
was validly cancelled.
13
 LIMBONA v COMELEC
Facts
● Norlainie Mitmug Limbona , Mohammad G. Limbona , and
respondent Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan were mayoralty
candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte.
● Malik filed petitions to disqualify Mohammad and Norlainie for
failure to comply with the residency requirement
● Norlanie later filed a withdrawal of certificate of candidacy and a
motion to dismiss the petition for disqualification
○ Motion was granted by the COMELEC en banc
● Meanwhile, the first division of COMELEC granted Malik’s
petition and disqualified Mohammad
○ Decision became final and executory
● Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy as
substitute candidate for Mohammad which was given due
course by Comelec
● As a result, Malik filed a second petition for disqualification
● After the elections, Norlainie emerged as the winning candidate
and accordingly took her oath and assumed office.
● However, the Second Division of Comelec disqualified Norlainie
on three grounds: lack of the one-year residency requirement;
not being a registered voter of the municipality; and, nullity of
her certificate of candidacy for having been filed at a place other
than the Office of the Election Officer.
○ The second division reasoned that Norlainie’s domicile
of origin was in Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is her
place of birth. When she got married, she became a
resident of Marawi City, specifically, in Barangay
Rapasun where her husband served as Barangay
Chairman until November 2006. This is her domicile by
operation of law pursuant to the Family Code
● The COMELEC en banc denied Norlainie’s MR, so she filed the
petition at bar alleging that COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in proceeding to resolve the petition despite the
approval of petitioner’s withdrawal of certificate of candidacy
○ Court issued a TRO to enjoin COMELEC from
disqualifying Norlainie
Issue + Ruling
● W/N Norlainie Limbona is disqualified from her position for
failure to comply with the residency requirement?
Ratio
As to COMELEC hearing the case on its merits
● The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not
necessarily render the certificate void ab initio. Once filed, the
permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even if the
certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn.
● Thus, when petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy , such act
produced legal effects, and the withdrawal of the same, despite
the approval of the COMELEC, did not bar or render nugatory
the legal proceedings it had set in motion. As such, the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
ruled on the merits of the petition despite the withdrawal of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.
● The fact that petitioner’s certificate of candidacy as a substitute
candidate was given due course by the Comelec did not bar the
Comelec from deciding on her qualifications to run as municipal
mayor.
As to the residency requirement
● Nolrlainie’s claim that she has been physically present and
actually residing in Pantar for almost 20 months prior to the
elections,is self-serving and unsubstantiated
● COMELEC correctly observed that self-serving affidavits cannot
persuade the court that she has abandoned her domicile of
origin. She alleged that she had been staying, sleeping, and
doing business in Lower Kalanganan for 20 months but there is
no independent and competent evidence to prove this
● Norlainie’s domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which
is also her place of birth. Her domicile by operation of law (by
virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. The COMELEC
found that Mohammad, petitioner’s husband, effected the
change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only
on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the husband
and wife live together in one legal residence, then it follows that
petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November
11, 2006.
● Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement,
petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Pantar,
Lanao del Norte. However, petitioner’s disqualification would not
result in Malik’s proclamation who came in second during the
special election (lol).
14
 ○ Considering Norlainie’s disqualification, the Vice-mayor
elect will succeed her.
Disqualifications
CAASI v COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
● This involves two consolidated OEC Sec. 68 disqualification
cases against Merito Miguel (Miguel), as mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan for allegedly being a green card holder.
○ 3 petitions for disqualification field by Cascante and
Celeste and DISMISSED by COMELEC 1st Division
prior to the 1988 local elections.
○ Petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi (Caasi),
Miguel’s rival,and DISMISSED by the CA after the
1988 local elections.
● Miguel admitted being a green card holder but denied being a
resident of the US.
○ Green card was only for convenience due to frequent
trips for medical exams and family visits.
○ Remained a permanent resident of Bolinao,
Pangasinan.
■ Voted in all previous elections, including the
plebiscite for the ratification of the 1987
constitution.
● COMELEC’s basis for dismissal of disqualification cases:
○ Possession of a green card does not establish
abandonment of Philippine residence. Respondent
sufficiently indicated animus manendi in Bolinao
evidenced by voting in local elections. As such, he
meets the both citizenship and residency requirements
imposed by LGC Sec. 42.
○ Dissent by Comm. Badoy, Jr.: Miguel failed to dispose
of burden of proof to show he waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant to be qualified to run
for office.
● CA’s basis for dismissal of quo warranto cases:
○ COMELEC denial of disqualification cases rendered
the quo warranto case moot, as RTC decisions on quo
warranto cases are appealable to the COMELEC under
the OEC.
Issue + Ruling:
1. W/N a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent
resident of the US?—YES, they constitute conclusive proof of
permanent residency in another country despite a person’s
occasional visits to the Philippines.
2. W/N Miguel waived his status as permanent resident/immigrant
to the US prior to the 1988 local elections?—NO, filing of COC
is not sufficient waiver of permanent residency/immigrant status.
Ratio:
● SC noted rumors that several elective and appointive public
officials under Pres. Aquino’s administration were green card
holders of foreign countries to emphasize importance of
deciding the case.
● SC cited 1987 Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 186 and OEC Sec. 687
as basis for disqualifying permanent residents of or an
immigrant to a foreign country from running for any elective
office.
○ The Constitution prohibits the acquisition of an
immigrant status of another country during his tenure.
○ On the other hand, the OEC determined that
permanent residency or immigrant status in another
country shall be grounds for disqualification from public
office.
■ Exception: When the person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of
such foreign country.
● In the case of Miguel, he indicated in his “Application for
Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration” that the length of his
intended stay is permanent.
6
1987 Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 18. Public officer and employees owe the State
and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who
seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
7
OEC Sec. 68. Disqualifications. x x x Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective
office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.
15
 ● Miguel’s green card further states on its face and in clear, bold
letters that he identifies as a resident alien. On the back, it
states his intention to reside permanently in the US.
● SC thus concluded that Miguel’s acts constituted abandonment
of his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
○ He went to the US intending to live there permanently,
not merely to visit his children or his doctor;
○ He applied for an immigrant’s visa, not a visotor’s or
tourist’s visa; and
○ The US issued him the requisite green card or authority
to reside there permanently.
● In relation to this, SC defined immigration as “entering into a
country with the intention of residing in it” and immigrant as “a
person who removes into a country for the purpose of
permanent residence.”
● As a resident alien, Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance
to the US in return to the protection given to him during the
period of his residence therein.
● Application for immigrant status/permanent residency in the US
and possession of a green card attesting to such status are
CONCLUSIVE PROOF of permanent residency in the US
despite occasional visits to the Philippines.
On waiver of permanent residency/immigrant status prior to the 1988
local elections
● Relating the rules to Miguel’s case, 1987 Constitution, Art. XI,
Sec. 18 is NOT applicable, as he acquired immigrant status in
the US before election to public office and NOT during his
tenure.
● However, the disqualification provided under OEC Sec. 68 is
clearly applicable. Thus, by way of exception, he can only be
qualified to run for elective office should he have waived his
status as a permanent resident/immigrant of a foreign country.
○ SC found that filing of COC for elective office is not
sufficient waiver of such status as the records of the
case are bereft of any proof of such waiver.
○ Waiver of green card must be manifested by some act
or acts independent of and done prior to filing his COC.
● What the OEC prohibits is the possession of dual loyalties and
allegiance.
○ This is because resident aliens of a foreign country are
incapable of entire devotion to the interest and welfare
of their homeland, for with one eye on their public
duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties
under foreign laws to preserve their status as
permanent residents thereof.
○ In this case, Miguel cannot be given the best of both
worlds.
RODRIGUEZ v COMELEC
Facts:
● Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O.
Marquez, Jr. were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of
Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections.
○ Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected
governor.
● Marquez challenged Rodriguez’s win
○ He alleged that Rodriguez left for the US because
there was a pending case against him before the Los
Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance
claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of
personal property.
○ Marquez argued that Rodriguez was therefore a
"fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his
disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the
LGC so argued Marquez.
● COMELEC dismissed the petition filed by Marquez and likewise
denied his MR
● Marquez thus filed a petition for certiorari with the SC
○ The crux of his petition was W/N Rodriguez was a
fugitive from justice as contemplated by the LGC
● In the case of “Marquez v COMELEC” the court ruled that being
a fugitive from justice does not only contemplate fleeing from
conviction, but also fleeing from prosecution
○ BUT the court did not rule on whether or not the
Rodriguez was a fugitive from justice, SC just
remanded the case back to COMELEC, with the
instruction to proceed therewith with dispatch
conformably with the Marquez decision
● Rodriguez thus sought a reconsideration thereof
○ MR denied
● In the May 8, 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed
their rivalry for the same position of governor.
16
● This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via
petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based
principally on the same allegation he is "fugitive from justice."
○ This petition for disqualification was filed by Marquez
when Rodriguez' petition for certiorari was still then
pending before the Court.
● COMELEC promulgated a consolidated resolution wherein they
ruled that Rodriguez was a fugitive from justice. This finding
was based on:
○ An authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest from the
LA court
○ An authenticated copy of the felony complaint
● This was presented after Rodriguez walked out of the hearing
(#drama), hence the court ruled that Rodriguez waived his right
to dispute this evidence
● At any rate, Rodriguez emerged the winning candidate in the
elections
● Marquez filed an urgent motions to suspend Rodrigues’
proclamation which the COMELEC granted
○ But the provincial board of canvassers nonetheless
proclaimed Rodriguez as the winner
● Marquez filed an "Omnibus Motion To Annul The Proclamation
Of Rodriguez To Proclaim Marquez And To Cite The Provincial
Board of Canvassers in Contempt" before the COMELEC
○ Motion was granted
● Marquez then filed an "Urgent Motion For Temporary
Restraining Order Or Preliminary Injunction" which sought to
restrain and enjoin Rodriguez "from exercising the powers,
functions and prerogatives of Governor of Quezon
○ Motion was granted and the SC issued a TRO
○ Motion to lift that was filed by Rodriguez was denied
● SC then ordered COMELEC to issue and evaluate the evidence
presented by Marquez purporting to prove that Rodriguez was a
fugitive from justice
○ COMELEC complied, and submitted a report wherein
they declared that Rodriguez was NOT a fugitive from
justice
○ SC then quoted certain portions of the report:
■ “ It can be gleaned that the objective facts
sufficient to constitute flight from justice are:
(a) a person committed a 'crime' or has been
charged for the commission thereof; and (b)
thereafter, leaves the jurisdiction of the court
where said crime was committed or his usual
place of abode.”
■ “It is not necessary that the party should have
left the state or the judicial district where the
crime is alleged to have been committed, after
an indictment found, or for the purpose of
avoiding an anticipated prosecution, but that,
having committed a crime within a state or
district, he has left and is found in another
jurisdiction
● The poll body expressed what it describes as its "persistent
discomfort" on whether it read and applied correctly the
MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice".
Issue
● W/N Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice”? NO. Intent to evade
on the part of a candidate must be established by proof that
there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has
already been filed, at the time of flight.
Ratio
Note: Definition of “fugitive from justice” follows the Marquez decision,
which defined a fugitive as including “not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution.”
● The definition indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling
factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction.
○ There can only be an intent to evade prosecution or
punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing
subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a
promulgated judgment of conviction.
● Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no
dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June
25, 1985, preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los
Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on
even date of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by
almost 5 months.
● It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about
such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the
US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much
less conviction to speak of yet at such time.
17
● What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez
deliberately running away from with his departure from the US?
The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the
MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be found in
the circumstances of Rodriguez.
● SC then quoted portions from COMELEC’s findings:
○ "Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of
the charges to be filed against him at the time he left
the United States, it becomes immaterial under such
construction to determine the exact time when he was
made aware thereof. While the law, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, does not countenance flight from
justice in the instance that a person flees the
jurisdiction of another state after charges against him or
a warrant for his arrest was issued or even in view of
the imminent filing and issuance of the same,
petitioner's plight is altogether a different
situation.When, in good faith, a person leaves the
territory of a state not his own, homeward bound, and
learns subsequently of charges filed against him while
in the relative peace and service of his own country, the
fact that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction
of the former state does not qualify him outright as a
fugitive from justice.
● Besides, to re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment
instability in jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the
MARQUEZ Decision.
● To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for
the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to run for
any elective local position under Section 40(e) of the Local
Government Code, should be understood according to the
definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit:
○ "A 'fugitive from justice' includes not only those who
flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise
those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution." (Italics ours.)"
● Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be
established by proof that there has already been a conviction or
at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight.
Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition,
Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial
post.
Vitug, J. Dissenting Opinion
● While it may generally be said that the possible outcome or truth
of an indictment need not necessarily be an issue in
ascertaining whether or not one is a fugitive from justice, when,
however, the accusation is lodged with and an arrest is ordered
by a foreign court or agency we might also assure ourselves as
a matter of principle that, in the process of sanctioning in effect
an act of a foreign government, we do not thereby abandon our
own basic sense of equity and fair play. There cannot thus be
any serious doubt that, when assailed or in doubt, the courts are
free to look into, and receive evidence on, the legitimacy and
regularity of the proceedings in that foreign jurisdiction.
DELA TORRE v. COMELEC
Francisco, J. / July 5, 1996
Facts:
● Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre (Dela Torre) seeks the
nullification of the two decisions of the COMELEC disqualifying
him from running for mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the 1995 local
elections on the grounds of a sentence by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude under LGC Sec. 40(a).
○ Disqualification case (decision rendered PRIOR to
election), where COMELEC asserts that the nature of
the offense under the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 of
which dela Torre was convicted with finality involves
moral turpitude.
○ Denial of MR on disqualification case (decision
rendered AFTER elections) where the SC dismissed
Dela Torre’s argument that LGC Sec. 40(a)
disqualification is inapplicable due to grant of probation
which suspended execution of judgment of conviction
and all its other legal consequences
Issue + Ruling:
1. W/N the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude?—YES, as
actual or supposed knowledge that the object was derived from
a crime displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of
one’s rightful property as the robbery or theft itself, which are
crimes involving moral turpitude.
18
 2. W/N grant of probation affects Sec. 40(a)’s applicability?—NO,
as the only effect of probation is the suspension of the
execution of sentence.
Ratio:
On moral turpitude in crime of fencing
● SC has consistently adopted Black’s Law Dictionary of “moral
turpitude”:
○ An act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society
in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule
of right and duty between man and woman or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
● General rule: Crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while
crimes mala prohibita do not.
○ Rationale: Since moral turpitude implies something
immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is
punishable by law or not, it must not be merely mala
prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral.
(Zari v. Flores)
○ Criticism: Not a clear-cut solution. Some crimes mala in
se do not involve moral turpitude, while other crimes
involve moral turpitude despite being mala prohibita.
● Further rules of analysis given criticism to the general rule:
○ Assessment of factual circumstances surrounding the
violation of the statute
○ Analysis of the elements of the crime
● In this case, no assessment of the factual circumstances is
needed as Dela Torre does not assail his conviction and in fact
has admitted all elements of the crim.
● The following elements can be inferred from the definition of
fencing in P.D. 1612, Sec. 2:
○ Robbery or theft was committed;
○ Accused is neither principal/accomplice to
robbery/theft, but buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells,
or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, derived from the robbery/theft;
○ Accused knows or should have known that it was
derived from the robbery/theft; and
○ Intent to gain for himself/another on part of accused.
● In this case, such actual knowledge displays the same degree
of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which
animated the robbery or theft, which are also crimes of moral
turpitude.
○ Both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s
deliberately reneged “private duties” they owe their
“fellow men” or “society” in a manner “contrary to
accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice,
honesty, or good morals.
● Even absent actual knowledge, if accused should have known
or is charged with reasonable prudence and intelligence in
ascertaining the source of the object, accused shall nonetheless
be liable.
○ Usual warning signs: unordinary time and place of sale,
fact that seller is not regularly engaged in business of
selling goods
○ Thus, mere possession of goods subject of robbery or
thievery constitute prima facie evidence of fencing.
● Conclusively, Dela Torre had been convicted by final judgment
of a crime involving moral turpitude, and was validly disqualified
by COMELEC from running for mayor.
On grant of probation
● Legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the
sentence. Thus disqualification under LGC Sec. 40(a) subsists
and remains notwithstanding grant of probation.
○ Judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto
attains finality when accused applies for probation,
although not executory pending resolution of such
application.
MAGNO v COMELEC
Facts:
● Carlos Montes filed a case for disqualification against Nestor
Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija
during the 2001 elections on the ground that Magno was
previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of
direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the RPC
● Magno was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 3
months and 11 days of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year 8
months and 21 days of prision correccional as maximum, for
each of the four counts of direct bribery.
19
 ○ He applied for probation and was discharged upon
order of the RTC of Gapan
● COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification citing sec.12
of the Omnibus election code8
○ The provision also lifts the disqualification to run for an
elective office of a person convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude after 5 years from the service
of sentence. However, Magno would only complete this
on March 5, 2003
● Magno filed an MR but the same was denied by COMELEC
● Magno brought his case to the SC and argued that direct
bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
○ Likewise, he cited Section 40 of the LGC, which he
claims is the law applicable to the case at bar, not the
Omnibus Election Code
■ Petitioner insists that he had already served
his sentence when he was discharged from
probation. Such being the case, the two-year
disqualification period imposed by Section 40
Code expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, he was
qualified to run in the 2001 elections.
● Meanwhile, Sonia Lorenzo was proclaimed by the COMELEC
as the duly elected mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija
● SolGen filed his manifestation and agreed with Magno that
COMELEC should have applied Section 40 of the Local
Government Code.
Issue + Ruling
● W/N Magno was disqualified to run for mayor in the 2001
elections. --NO. Although his crime of direct bribery involved
moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified
from running in the 2001 elections.
8
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced
to a penalty of more than eighteen (18) months, or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon, or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had
been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of
sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
○ Whether the crime of direct bribery involves moral
turpitude --YES. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime
involving moral turpitude
○ Whether it is the Omnibus Election Code or the LGC
that should apply in this situation. --LGC. It’s the later
and more specialized law.The reduction of the
disqualification period from five to two years is the
manifest intent.
Ratio
On the Issue of Moral Turpitude
● SC adopted the Black’s law definition:
○ Moral Turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between
man and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
● Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It
frequently depends on the circumstances surrounding the
violation of the law.
● By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the
elements of the crime of direct bribery, which includes:
○ That such offer or promise be accepted or gift or
present be received by the public officer with a view to
committing some crime, or in consideration of the
execution of an act which does not constitute a crime
but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing
something which it is his official duty to do;
● Moral turpitude can be inferred from this element.
○ The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise
or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains
from performing an official duty in exchange for some
favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the
offender to renege on the duties which he owes his
fellowmen and society in general.
○ Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his
office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on
him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the
accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and
good morals.
20
 ● In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral
turpitude.
On whether the LGC or Omnibus election code applies
● There appears to be a glaring incompatibility between the five-
year disqualification period provided in Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code and the two-year disqualification period
in Section 40 of the Local Government Code.
● It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code was
approved in 1985 while the LGC took effect in 1992.
○ It is basic in statutory construction that in case of
irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later
enactment must prevail, being the more recent
expression of legislative will (Legis posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant.)
○ In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to
have knowledge of the older law and intended to
change it.
○ Furthermore, pursuant to the LGC’s repealing clause,
Section 40 of the LGC is deemed to have repealed
Section 12 of BP 881.
● David v COMELEC: SC declared that RA 7160 is a codified set
of laws that specifically applies to local government units.
Section 40 thereof specially and definitively provides for
disqualifications of candidates for elective local positions. It is
applicable to them only.
○ Section 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it governs the
disqualifications of candidates for local positions,
assumes the nature of a special law which ought to
prevail.
● The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period
of candidates for local positions from five to two years is
evident. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law.The reduction of
the disqualification period from five to two years is the manifest
intent.
● Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral
turpitude, petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified from
running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code must yield to Article 40 of the LGC
LINGATING v COMELEC
Facts:
● Petitioner Miguel M. Lingating (Lingating) sought the
disqualification of respondent Cesar B. Sulong (Sulong) as
mayoralty candidate of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur in the
2001 local elections. Lingating alleges that, applying LGC Sec.
40(b), Sulong must be disqualified for previously having been
administratively removed from office.
○ Sulong had been mayor for 3 prior consecutive terms
beginning 1988.
○ During his 1st term, Lingating alleges that Sulong had
been convicted with finality by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of several charges, including dishonesty,
falsification of public documents, malversation of public
funds, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
○ Consequently, Sulong was allegedly removed from
office and succeeded by Vice Mayor Vicente Imbing.
● Sulong denied the allegations, saying the case remained open
pending comment by Lingating on his MR therein.
● COMELEC was unable to render judgment before the elections.
Thus, Sulong won and was proclaimed mayor, while Lingating
came in second.
● COMELEC thereafter disqualified Sulong almost 3 months after
the elections, saying he was found guilty with finality of violating
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by the SP of
Zamboanga del Sur, and thus disqualified pursuant to LGC Sec.
40(b).
○ Sulong appealed, alleging that Provincial Secretary
Wilfredo Cimafranca certified that the decision in the
administrative case was not yet final and executory due
to intervening circumstances (1992 local elections).
○ Lingating countered contending that Gov. Ariosa
ordered enforcement of the decision. Hence, his MR
had not been given due course by the sanggunian.
Likewise, he even filed a usurpation case against
Imbing, belying his own claim that he had not been
succeeded by Imbing. Lingating likewise filed a motion
for execution of Sulong’s disqualification, praying for his
proclamation as mayor.
● COMELEC 1st Division: denied Lingating’s motion; candidate
with 2nd highest votes cannot succeed a disqualified candidate.
21
 ● COMELEC en banc: reversed; Sulong found guilty with finality,
but subsequent re-elections amount to condonation of
Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s verdict (Aguinaldo v. COMELEC);
in any case, Lingating may not succeed.
Facts:
Issue + Ruling:
W/N Sulong is disqualified under LGC Sec. 40(b)?—NO, as the filing of
an MR stayed the finality of the decision in the administrative case.
Ratio:
● Lingating’s argument:
○ Citing Aguinaldo v. COMELEC is erroneous. Instead
Reyes v. COMELEC should be applied, where it was
held that an elective local executive officer removed
prior to expiration of his term is disqualified under LGC
Sec. 40(b).
● Differentiation of Aguinaldo and Reyes cases by the SC:
○ In the Aguinaldo case, it was stated that if the public
official is not removed prior to expiration of his term, he
cannot be removed if he is subsequently elected.
Moreover, at the time of this case, there was no
applicable provision similar to LGC Sec. 40(b) yet.
○ In the Reyes case, the public official was removed prior
to expiration of his term. Thus, he was validly
disqualified pursuant to LGC Sec. 40(b) which was
already in effect then.
● However, Reyes cannot be applied in the instant case, as the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan decision had not yet become final
due to Lingating’s failure to comment on Sulong’s MR.
○ Although the LGC is silent on the filing of an MR, such
does not amount to prohibition of the same.
○ Similarly, it was previously held that while Rule 139-B
§12(c) is silent on the filing of an MR regarding
disbarment proceedings before the IBP, such is not
prohibited and must in fact be encouraged as a matter
of exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to
resorting to an appeal.
● Conclusively, Sulong had not yet been convicted and removed
from office with finality.
○ Neither does succession by Vice Mayor Imbing prove
the same, as this was done pursuant to LGC Sec. 68
which allows for execution pending appeal.
● As Sulong is not disqualified, it is unnecessary to pass upon
Lingating’s prayer to be proclaimed mayor.
FLORES v DRILON
● The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise
known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of
Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is
challenged
● Petition was filed to prevent useless and unnecessary
expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and other
operational expenses attached to the office
● Paragraph (d) reads —
○ (d) Chairman administrator — The President shall
appoint a professional manager as administrator of the
Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined
by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the
Board and who shall serve as the chief executive
officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That
for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of
this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be
appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer
of the Subic Authority
● Petitioners claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility
at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the
Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the
Philippines
● Petitioners allege that the provision is unconstitutional for
violating the following:
○ (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which
states that "no elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public officer or position during his tenure," because the
City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and
the subject posts are public offices;
○ (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides
that "the President shall . . . . appoint all other officers
of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may
22
 be authorized by law to appoint" since it was Congress
through the questioned proviso and not the President
who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts;
○ and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election
Code, which says that the following shall be guilty of an
election offense: (g) Appointment of new employees,
creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary
increases. — During the period of forty-five days before
a regular election and thirty days before a special
election
Issue+Ruling:
● Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which
states, "Provided, however, That for the first year of its
operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City
of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the
constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of
elective officials to other government posts? --
Ratio:
● Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution expresses the policy
against the concentration of several public positions in one
person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time
with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public
services.
○ It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job.
Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an
executive departmentshould be allowed to attend to his
duties and responsibilities without the distraction of
other governmental duties or employment. He should
be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and
energy among too many positions of responsibility,
which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency
● In this case, the provision directs the President to appoint an
elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer of SBMA).
● Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks
to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude
that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution.
○ Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official
may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the
body politic is of no moment
● It is argued that Sec. 94 of the LGC permits the appointment of
a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his office.But, the contention is
fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the
constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no
legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land.
○ Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC
is not the issue here nor is that section sought to be
declared unconstitutional, we need not rule on its
validity.
● In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed
to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the
two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art.
● IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph
authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official
when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position,
the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not
providing any exception to the rule against appointment or
designation of an elective official to the government post, except
as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself
● It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to
the position of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted
circumstance
○ This argument is apparently based on a wrong
premise. Congress did not contemplate making the
subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically
attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City
without need of appointment. The phrase "shall be
appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make
the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to
the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the
legislative intent to make the subject positions ex
officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the
word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have
been used
● While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the
qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of
SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is
23
 manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify.
Accordingly, while the conferment of the appointing power on
the President is a perfectly valid legislative act, the proviso
limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his
prerogative.
● Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent
elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed
to other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his
elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the
Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective
official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment
or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his
disqualification or lack of eligibility.
● As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible
for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto
pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution
cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo
City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and
void; he may be considered a de facto officer "one whose acts,
though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of
policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the
interest of the public and third persons.”
GARVIDA v SALES
Facts:
● Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida (Garvida) applied for registration
as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Brgy.
San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte prior to the 1996 SK
Elections.
○ Her application was denied for exceeding the age limit
for membership in Sec.3(b) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2824. She was 21 years and 10 months old at the
time.
● Garvida thereafter filed a Petition for Inclusion as Registered
Kabataang Member and Voter.
○ MCTC: Garvida is QUALIFIED
○ RTC: presiding judge INHIBITED due to close
association with Garvida
● In the interim, Garvida filed her COC for SK Chairman of Brgy.
San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
○ Election Officer Rios: DENIED due to age
○ COMELEC Regional Director Asperin: prior order SET
ASIDE; Garvida is ALLOWED to run
● Private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr. (rival candidate for
SK Chairman), without knowledge of COMELEC officials,
sought the cancellation/denial of Garvida’s COC for material
misrepresentation of her age
○ COMELEC en banc: ordered SUSPENSION of
Garvida’s proclamation in case she wins due to
material misrepresentation in her COC; her BC states
that she was born on June 11, 1974, thus she will
exceed 21 years on election day on May 6, 1996.
● On election day, Garvida won by 2 votes, but her proclamation
was suspended.
○ A month later, she was still proclaimed without
prejudice to further action by COMELEC or other
interested parties.
○ Another month later, she won as and was proclaimed
Auditor of the Pambayang Pederasyon of SK Bangui.
Issue + Ruling:
1. W/N COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction to deny/cancel her
COC?—NO, it is the COMELEC sitting in division which has
jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course to or cancel a
COC.
2. W/N the cancellation of her COC on the ground that she has
exceeded the age requirement to run as an SK official was
proper?—YES, the age requirement for elective SK officials
clearly states that they cannot be more than 21 years of age on
election day.
Ratio:
On COMELEC en banc’s jurisdiction
● LGC Sec. 531(a) provides that the conduct of SK elections is
under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed
by the OEC.
● OEC, Art. IX, Sec. 78 in relation to COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, Rule 23 provide that a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a COC for an elective office may be filed with the
COMELEC’s Law department for false material representation
in a COC. Hearing and reception of evidence shall be done by
24
 COMELEC’s designated official, while the decision shall be
done by COMELEC itself.
○ According to COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Sec. 3,
the jurisdiction for such a petition lies with the
COMELEC sitting in Division, NOT en banc.
○ COMELEC en banc can only entertain division
decisions due to the following:
■ Required number of votes to reach a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling is not met
■ MR of Division decisions
● In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the
case to any of its Divisions and hence acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion.
On disqualification due to age requirement
● Legal history of the age requirement:
○ P.D. 684: Age requirement of Kabataang Barangay
was at least 15 years but less than 18 years
○ BP 337: Maximum age was increased; at least 15
years but less than 21 years
○ LGC 1991: Retained BP 337’s age requirement but
changed the name to Katipunan ng Kabataan; at least
15 years but less than 21 years
● In this case, Garvida possesses all qualifications as member
and voter of the Katipunan, and as candidate for SK, EXCEPT
regarding age.
● Garvida’s argument:
○ Sec. 3(b) of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultravires,
and beyond the scope of LGC Secs. 424 and 428 as
the LGC itself does not provide that the voter must be
EXACTLY 21 years on election day. Thus, as long as
she is NOT 22 years old, she remains 21 years old on
election day for the purposes of the age requirement.
● SC noted that LGC made a distinction in the age requirements
between maximum age of a member of the Katipunan, and
maximum age of an elective SK official, by adding the phrase
“on the day of his election” in the latter.
○ The phrase is an additional qualification which must be
interpreted to mean that while a Katipunan member
MAY exceed 21 years old on election day/day of
registration, an elective SK official CANNOT exceed 21
years old on election day.
○ Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio (Of things dissimilar, the
rule is dissimilar). Courts may distinguish when facts
and circumstances how that legislature intended a
distinction or qualification.
■ In this case, a distinction was apparently
intended as the LGC imposes more
qualifications on an elective SK official
● As such, COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 Sec.3(b) is ultra vires
for imposing the additional qualification “on the day of the
election” which is not found in its counterpart (LGC, Sec. 424).
● The requirement that elective SK officials must not exceed 21
years on election day however stands by clear provision of law.
○ LGC speaks of years, not months nor days. When the
law speaks of years, it is understood that yeaers are of
365 days each.
○ Thus, the phrase “not more than 21 years of age”
means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It
means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years
and one or some days of a fraction of a year because
that would be more than 21 365-day cycles.
■ Conclusively, contrary to Garvida’s argument,
“not more than 21 years old” is not equivalent
to “less than 22 years old”.
■ If intent of the Code’s framers was to include
citizens less than 22 years old, they should
have expressly stated so.
■ The only exception is found in LGC Sec. 423,
for an SK official who passes the age of 21
during his term, who is thus allowed to serve
the remainder of his term.
● In this case, Garvida patently exceeded the age limit for SK
officials. She was born on June 11, 1974. Thus, she was:
○ 21 years and 9 months on the day of her voter
registration (March 16, 1996)
○ 21 years, 11 months, and 5 days old on election day
(May 6, 1996)
○ 21 years, 11 months, and 20 days (merely 10 days shy
of turning 22) when she assumed office (June 1, 1996)
25
 ● The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification
is founded on public policy. If found lacking, he can be declared
ineligible.
○ Fact of election will not make the age requirement
merely directory, nor will it validate his election.
● Despite Garvida’s ineligibility, Sales has no right to be deemed
elected.
● LGC Sec. 435 regarding succession by the SK member who
obtained the next highest number of votes likewise does not
apply.
○ Question of age qualification is a question of eligibility.
■ Being “eligible” means being “legally qualified;
capable of being legally chosen”.
■ Being “ineligible” refers to lack of constitutional
and/or statutory qualifications for holding
public office.
○ However, ineligibility is not one of the grounds for
succession provided under LGC Sec. 435.
● As such, SC directed the incumbent SK members to choose
amongst themselves who will fill the vacancy in order to avoid a
hiatus in the office of the SK Chairman.
RISOS-VIDAL v COMELEC
Facts
● The Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the
crime of plunder
● However, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President
Estrada.
● Estrada “received and accepted” the pardon by affixing his
signature beside his handwritten notation thereon.
● Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
President. During that time, his candidacy earned three
oppositions in the COMELEC
● After the conduct of the May 2010 synchronized elections,
however, Estrada only managed to garner the second highest
number of votes.
● Of the three petitioners , only Pormento sought recourse to this
Court and filed a petition for certiorari
○ Denied because of mootness
● Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a
Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post,
that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
● Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for
Disqualification against former President Estrada before the
COMELEC.
○ Risos-Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that
Estrada is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because
of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan
○ She also relied on sec. 40 of the LGC:
■ Disqualifications. - The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local
position:(a) Those sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment,
within two (2) years after serving sentence;
● COMELEC dismissed the petition
○ COMELEC held that Risos-Vidal failed to present
cogent proof sufficient to reverse the standing
pronouncement of this Commission declaring
categorically that [former President Estrada’s] right to
seek public office has been effectively restored by the
pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M.
Arroyo.
● Risos-Vidal elevated the case to the SC
● While this case was pending before the Court the elections
were conducted as scheduled and Estrada was voted into office
with 349,770 votes cast in his favor.
○ The next day, the local board of canvassers proclaimed
him as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.
Risos-Vidal’s arguments
● Pardon granted to former President Estrada was conditional as
evidenced by the latter’s express acceptance thereof.
○ The “acceptance,” she claims, is an indication of the
conditional nature of the pardon, with the condition
being embodied in the third Whereas Clause of the
pardon,“WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office.”
26
 ● Risos-Vidal clarifies that the fundamental basis upon which
former President Estrada must be disqualified from running for
and holding public elective office is actually the proscription
found in Section 40 of the LGC
○ She argues that the crime of plunder is both an offense
punishable by imprisonment of one year or more and
involving moral turpitude; such that former President
Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public
elective office
● Even with the pardon granted to former President Estrada,
however, Risos-Vidal insists that the same did not operate to
make available to former President Estrada the exception
provided under Section 12 of the OEC, the pardon being merely
conditional and not absolute or plenary.
● She avers that in view of the foregoing provisions of law, it is not
enough that a pardon makes a general statement that such
pardon carries with it the restoration of civil and political rights.
By virtue of Articles 36 and 41, a pardon restoring civil and
political rights without categorically making mention what
specific civil and political rights are restored “shall not work to
restore the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage
OSG’s stand
● OSG maintained that “the issue of whether or not the pardon
extended to Estrada restored his right to run for public office
had already been passed upon by COMELEC way back in
2010.
● There is no cogent reason for it to reverse its standing
pronouncement and declare Estrada disqualified to run and be
voted as mayor of the City of Manila in the absence of any new
argument that would warrant its reversal.
Erap’s Arguments
● Factual findings of COMELEC, the Constitutional body
mandated to administer and enforce all laws relative to the
conduct of the elections, relative to the absoluteness of the
pardon, the effects thereof, and the eligibility of former President
Estrada to seek public elective office are binding and conclusive
on the SC
● He was granted an absolute pardon and thereby restored to his
full civil and political rights, including the right to seek public
elective office such as the mayoral position in the City of Manila
Issue + Ruling
● Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling
that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted
for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by
former President Arroyo? --No GAD. Petition lacks merit.
Ratio
● Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that
fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of
this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified
Pardoning Power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action
● Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides
that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to
grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency
● the only instances in which the President may not extend
pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that
have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases
involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in
which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the
COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of
Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the
pardoning power of the President.
● In the cases of Cristobal v Labrador, Pelobello v Palatino, and
Monsanto v Factoran, the court unequivocally declared that
“subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the
pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative
action.”
● This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the
President’s power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically
through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an
overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution
when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception
from the pardoning power of the President
Proper Interpretation of Arts. 36 & 41 of the RPC
● SC cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal’s interpretation that the said
Articles contain specific textual commands which must be
27
 strictly followed in order to free the beneficiary of presidential
grace from the disqualifications specifically prescribed by them.
● A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law, as
proposed by Risos-Vidal, is unwarranted, especially so if it will
defeat or unduly restrict the power of the President to grant
executive clemency.
● It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation (Verba Legis)
● The Dissent of Leonen agreed with Risos-Vidal that there was
no express remission and/or restoration of the rights of suffrage
and/or to hold public office in the pardon granted to former
President Estrada, as required by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
● Ponente disagreed with the overbroad statement that Congress
may dictate as to how the President may exercise his/her power
of executive clemency. The form or manner by which the
President, or Congress for that matter, should exercise their
respective Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be
interfered with unless it is so provided in the Constitution.
○ This is the essence of the principle of separation of
powers
● For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code
should be construed in a way that will give full effect to the
executive clemency granted by the President
○ The said codal provisions must be construed to
harmonize the power of Congress to define crimes and
prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the power
of the President to grant executive clemency.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the
LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.
● Risos-Vidal argued that former President Estrada’s conviction
for plunder disqualifies him from running for the elective local
position of Mayor of the City of Manila under Section 40(a) of
the LGC.
○ However, the subsequent absolute pardon granted to
former President Estrada effectively restored his right
to seek public elective office
● While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a)
of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC
provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon
or amnesty.
● The applicability of Section 12 of the OEC to candidates running
for local elective positions is not unprecedented. In Jalosjos, Jr.
v. Commission on Elections, the Court acknowledged the
aforementioned provision as one of the legal remedies that may
be availed of to disqualify a candidate in a local election filed
any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy,
but not later than the date of proclamation.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the
pardon conditional.
● This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly
impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use
of the term “civil and political rights” as being restored.
● Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part
of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that
explains the reasons for the enactment
○ Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because,
strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute.
● Absent any contrary evidence, Arroyo’s silence on Estrada’s
decision to run for President in the May 2010 elections against,
among others, the candidate of the political party of former
President Arroyo, after the latter’s receipt and acceptance of the
pardon speaks volume of her intention to restore him to his
rights to suffrage and to hold public office.
○ Where the scope and import of the executive clemency
extended by the President is in issue, the Court must
turn to the only evidence available to it, and that is the
pardon itself.
● Leonen is of the view that the pardon in question is not absolute
nor plenary in scope despite the statement that former
President Estrada is “hereby restored to his civil and political
rights,” that is, the foregoing statement restored to former
President Estrada all his civil and political rights except the
rights denied to him by the unremitted penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification made up of, among others, the rights of
suffrage and to hold public office.
28
 ○ However, the statement “He is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights,” to the mind of the Court, is
crystal clear – the pardon granted to former President
Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was not only
unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope, complete
and plenary in character, as the term “political rights”
adverted to has a settled meaning in law and
jurisprudence.
COMELEC did not commit GAD
● In light of the foregoing, contrary to the assertions of Risos-
Vidal, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Resolutions.
● a petition for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is
confined only to instances of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process,
because the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in
matters falling within its domain
● The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately
demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a “whimsical,
arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an
evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law” or
were so “patent and gross” as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion
Election Cases Involving Local Elective Officials
GALIDO v COMELEC
Facts:
● Petitioner Perfecto V. Galido (Galido) and private respondent
Saturnino R. Galeon (Galeon) were opponents in the 1988
mayoralty race of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol.
○ Galido was elected and proclaimed mayor.
● After the elections, Galeon filed an election protest.
○ RTC: Petition DENIED; Galido’s proclamation UPHELD
as he won by 11 votes
○ COMELEC 1st Division: Decision REVERSED; Galeon
is duly-elected Mayor as he won by 5 votes
○ COMELEC en banc: Reversal AFFIRMED; invalidated
15 ballots from the same precinct in favor of Galido for
being marked ballots due to recurring “C” letter after
Galido’s name
○ SC: Petition DISMISSED for procedural grounds; MR
DENIED with finality.
● Galido still filed another petition for certiorari and injunction with
prayer for TRO containing the same allegations.
○ Galeon’s argument: Petition must be dismissed as:
■ Decisions of COMELEC on election contests
involving elective municipal offices are final,
executory, and non-appealable citing par. 2,
Sec. 2(2), Art. IX(C), 1987 Constitution;
■ Petition involves questions of fact which were
already settled conclusively by the COMELEC;
and
■ An identical petition was already dismissed by
the SC with finality.
○ Galido’s counter-argument:
■ Decisions of each Commission is appealable
to the SC by certiorari, citing Sec. 7, Art. IX(A),
1987 Constitution;
■ Petition involves purely questions of law,
specifically, interpretation of Sec. 211(10) of
BP 8119; and
■ Prior petition was not decided on the merits;
merely dismissed procedurally.
○ SC: TRO GRANTED.
Issue + Ruling:
W/N Galeon was correctly proclaimed mayor of Garcia-Hernandez,
Bohol?—YES, COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
Ratio:
● Under. 1987 Constitution, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2), par. 1,
COMELEC has:
9
BP 881, Sec. 211(10). The erroneous initial of the first name which accompanies the
correct surname of a candidate, the erroneous initial of the surname accompanying
the correct first name of the candidate, or the erroneous middle initial of the candidate
shall not annul the vote in favor of the latter.
29
 ○ Exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating
to elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials; and
○ Appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by TC of general jurisdiction
or involving elective barangay officials decided by TC of
limited jurisdiction.
● However, while COMELEC decisions in contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory, and
not appealable, this does not preclude recourse to the SC by
special civil action of certiorari.
○ ConComm deliberations reveal intent to allow recourse
through certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus under Rule
65, ROC.
○ Purpose of writ of certiorari is to keep inferior
court/tribunal within bounds of its jurisdiction and
prevent it from committing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
● In this case, COMELEC did not commit such grave abuse of
discretion.
○ COMELEC has inherent power to decide an election
contest based on physical evidence, equity, law, and
justice, and apply established jurisprudence in support
of its findings and conclusions. Furthermore, extent to
which such precedents apply rests on its discretion.
○ Furthermore, petition for prohibition which seeks to
suspend all action/prevent further performance of an
act is rendered moot by assumption of Galeon of office
of the mayor.
RIVERA v COMELEC
Facts:
● Juan Garcia Rivera and private respondent Juan Mitre Garcia II
were candidates for the position of Mayor of Guinobatan, Albay
● Garcia filed an election protest with the RTC Legazpi City
○ the trial court rendered its verdict finding Garcia to have
obtained 6,376 votes as against Rivera's 6,222.
● Rivera appealed to the COMELEC. Through its First Division,
the COMELEC sustained the RTC decision
● MR was heard by COMELEC en banc
○ COMELEC denied the motion and re-affirmed the
decision of its First Division declaring Garcia as the
duly elected Mayor of Guinobatan, Albay but with a
winning margin of one hundred 123 votes over Rivera.
● Garcia commenced to discharge the duties and functions of
Mayor by virtue of a writ of execution
○ He continued as mayor until he was served notice of a
TRO by the SC, issued upon Rivera's motion.
● Rivera filed a petition to annul the COMELEC decision
● He also prayed for the issuance of an order restraining the
implementation of the said judgment, arguing that the same had
not yet become final and executory as of the time this petition
was filed.
○ Basis: Article IX-C, Section 2, Par. (2) of the 1987
Constitution, in relation to Part VII, Rule 39, Section 1
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
He also contends that since the COMELEC decision of 6
September 1990 has not yet become final and executory, the
COMELEC has no authority to issue the assailed order and writ
of execution.
● Garcia argued that the Constitution declares the decisions of
the COMELEC on election contests involving elective municipal
and barangay officials to be final, executory and not appealable
(Article IX-C, Sec. 2, par. (2))
Issue + Ruling
● W/N the COMELEC decision is appealabe by way of certiorari?
YES.
Ratio
● The environmental facts of this petition are similar to those in
the Galido case
○ Issue in Galido: whether the decisions of the
COMELEC in election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay officials, being final and
executory and not appealable, preclude the filing of a
special civil action of certiorari
○ SC ruled that the fact that decisions, final orders or
rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices are
final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude
30
 a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action
of certiorari.
● SC also cited Flores v COMELEC
○ Obviously, the provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of
the Constitution that "decisions, final orders, or rulings
of the Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable" applies only to
questions of fact and not of law. That provision was not
intended to divest the Supreme Court of its authority to
resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial
power conferred upon it by the Constitution.
● The main thrust of the present petition for certiorari is that
COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion when
it affirmed the decision of its First Division, annulling the
proclamation of the petitioner as the duly elected Mayor and
when it did not exclude from the total votes of Garcia at least
ten (10) votes which were allegedly misappreciated in Garcia's
favor
● SC found that the said decision was not arrived at capriciously
or whimsically by respondent COMELEC. A painstaking re-
evaluation of the questioned 67 ballots was made by the
COMELEC en banc. In fact, fourteen (14) ballots originally
adjudicated in Garcia's favor were overruled by the Commission
en banc, thus reducing the number of votes in his favor to 894
votes out of the 2,445 contested ballots
Narvasa, J. Dissenting
● The Constitutional Commission opted, to repeat, to prescribe
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, rather than
the usual procedures of appeal just mentioned, as the process
for the review of the decisions, orders or rulings of the
COMELEC. It also decreed that certiorari action, as a review
procedure, may be instituted only in the Supreme Court.
○ Generally, then, any order, ruling or judgment of the
COMELEC may be thus appealed, or sought to be
reviewed through the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
under Rule 65.
● Aggrieved party should have attempted to persuade the SC that
COMELEC had indeed acted without jurisdiction, in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, these being, as
already pointed out, the only issues that may properly be raised.
● It bears stressing that the final, executory and unappealable
character of the COMELEC's rulings, orders or decisions in
election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices, is pronounced not by statute or presidential issuance,
but by the Constitution itself
Term of Office; The Three-Term Limit Rule
BORJA v COMELEC
Facts:
● While private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was
serving as vice-mayor of Pateros beginning 1988, he became
mayor by operation of law upon the death of incumbent Cesar
Borja (Borja, Sr.) and served as such until 1992.
○ He was thereafter elected for two more terms as mayor
and served as such until 1998.
● Capco then filed his COC for the same position for the 1998
local elections.
● However, his political rival, petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr.
(Borja, Jr.), sought Capco’s disqualification for having already
served three consecutive terms and therefore ineligible for
another term.
○ COMELEC 2nd Division: Petition GRANTED. Capco is
disqualified for reelection.
○ COMELEC en banc: Decision REVERSED. Capco is
eligible for reelection.
■ Term as contemplated in law refers to terms
for which the public officer was elected, not
when he merely succeeded the incumbent and
thereafter served for the remainder of the
unexpired term.
● Capco subsequently won the elections by more than twice the
number of Borja’s votes and was proclaimed mayor.
● Borja, Jr. appealed to the SC.
○ Borja Jr.’s arguments:
■ Term for which Capco succeeded Borja, Sr.
should have been counted as a term, thereby
disqualifying him by virtue of the three-term
limit within the contemplation of Art. X, Sec. 8
31
 of the 1987 Constitution10 and Sec. 43(b) of
the LGC.11
■ Purpose of prohibition is prevention of
monopolization of political power, so having
been mayor only through succession is
irrelevant.
Issue + Ruling:
W/N a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of
law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a
term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit?—NO, as he
was not elected for his first term.
Ratio:
● The constitutional provision seeks not only to prevent political
dynasties, but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the
people.
○ As such, it is erroneous to consider only stay in office
regardless of whether it was by election or succession
by operation of law.
By historical analysis
● History of the constitutional provision reveals that members of
the ConComm equally considered both policies.
○ Comm. Garcia’s proposal: Absolutely no further
reelection after serving three consecutive terms for
local and legislative officials.—REJECTED
■ Comm. Abubakar opposed, as it amounts to
an arrogation unto themselves of people’s right
to decide.
10
1987 Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
11
LGC, Sec. 43. Term of Office.— x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which the elective official concerned was elected x x x
■ Comm. Aquino likewise called on colleagues
to allow people to rely on their own strength to
prevent overreach of power.
■ Comm. Bacani stressed that the Filipino
people are politically mature and should be
allowed freedom to choose politicians who
aspire to serve longer.
○ Comm. Monsod’s proposal: Only bar such officials from
running for the same position after three consecutive
terms.—APPROVED
■ Comm. Ople supported this saying temporary
disqualification, as opposed to perpetual
disqualification should be sufficient to promote
the end intended, which is to prevent the
development of a proprietary interest and
accumulation of powers and perquisites by
politicians in their positions so as to permit
them to stay on indefinitely or establish
political dynasties.
● Evidently, the commissioners considered both (1) service of
term, from concern of accumulation of power due to prolonged
stay in office; and (2) election, derived from concern that right of
people to choose should be preserved.
● It is likewise patent that the commissioners discussed this under
the assumption of officials serving for being elected.
○ In an exchange between Comm. Davide and Comm.
Gascon regarding term limits for congressmen, Comm.
Davide repeatedly mentioned election in reference to
the limit.
● Thus, to sustain Borja, Jr.’s view would amount to disallowing
the electorate to choose those whom they please to govern
them.
By textual analysis
● The first sentence of the constitutional prohibition speaks of “the
term of office of elective local officials” and bars “such official[s]”
from serving for more than 3 consecutive terms.
● The second sentence states that “voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected”.
32
 ● From the foregoing, it is apparent that the limit was imposed on
elective local officials, not officials who succeed.
● With regard to the term limits for congressmen, Comm. Bernas
stated that, “if one is elected Representative to serve the
unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how
short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing
the number of successive terms allowed.”
○ This is based on Comm. Davide’s opinion that the term
served after special election due to a vacancy shall
count towards the term limits for senators and
congressmen.
● Differentiation of succession between vice-mayor and member
of the House of someone who dies, resigns, becomes
incapacitated, or is removed from office:
○ Vice-mayor succeeds by operation of law.
○ Representative is elected to fill the vacancy.
● Thus, it is only right for the term to be counted towards the
three-term limit in the case of the latter, as what is limited is the
right to be elected.
● The fact that the service of the Vice-President who succeeds
the President and serves as such for more than 4 years is
counted as a term for purposes of the term limit is of no
moment, as such qualification is completely absent in the case
of the mayor and vice-mayor. Thus, what is really contemplated
in the mayor’s case is really only an elective term.
○ Other reasons for difference:
■ A Vice-President’s sole purpose is to succeed
the President, and is only appointed to the
cabinet through the good graces of the latter.
Thus, in running for Vice-President, he also
seeks the Presidency.
■ A vice-mayor has distinct powers and
functions: presiding officer of sanggunian,
appointive power of employees of local
assembly, etc. and succession to mayorship is
merely one of them. As such, in running for
vice-mayor, he cannot be said to also b e
seeking mayorship
LONZANIDA v COMELEC
Facts
● Assailed resolutions declared Romeo Lonzanida disqualified to
run for Mayor in the municipality of San Antonio, Zambales in
the May 1998 elections and that all votes cast in his favor shall
not be counted and if he has been proclaimed winner the said
proclamation is declared null and void.
● Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive
terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the
1995 elections.
● In the 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office
and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995
was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who
filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales, which
declared a failure of elections.
● Both parties appealed to the COMELEC.
○ COMELEC resolved the election protest filed by Alvez
and after a revision and re-appreciation of the
contested ballots declared Alvez the duly elected
mayorby plurality of votes cast in his favor totaling
1,720 votes as against 1,488 votes for Lonzanida.
● COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to
vacate the post, which he obeyed, and Alvez assumed office for
the remainder of the term.
● In the 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. His opponent Eufemio Muli
timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for
mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that
he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.
● Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. The First Division of the
COMELEC issued the questioned resolution granting the
petition for disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida had
served three consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and he is therefore disqualified to run for the same
post for the fourth time. The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas
assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995,
although he was later unseated before the expiration of the
term, should be counted as service for one full term in
computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the
LGC.
■ The finding of the COMELEC First Division
was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc.
33
 ● Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC
resolutions finding him disqualified to run for mayor of San
Antonio Zambales in the 1998 elections. He maintains that he
was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that
his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of
a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local
government officials, because he was not the duly elected
mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections as evidenced
by the COMELEC decision
● The SolGen filed comment to the petition for the respondent
COMELEC praying for the dismissal of the petition. The
Solicitor-General stressed that section 8, Art. X of the
Constitution and section 43 (b), of the Local Government Code
which bar a local government official from serving more than
three consecutive terms in the same position speaks of service
of a term and so the rule should be examined in this light. The
public respondent contends that petitioner Lonzanida
discharged the rights and duties of mayor from 1995 to 1998
which should be counted as service of one full term, albeit he
was later unseated, because he served as mayor for the greater
part of the te
Issue + Ruling
● W/N Lonzanidas assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio
Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as
service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-
term limit for elective local government officials? NO. he was not
the duly elected mayor and he did not hold office for the full
term.
Ratio
● Records of the Constitutional Commission show that the three-
term limit which is now embodied in section 8, Art. X of the
Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any
elective local government official from running for the same
position after serving three consecutive terms. The said
disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the
accumulation of massive political power by an elective local
government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his
tenure in office.
○ The mayor was compared by some delegates to the
President of the Republic as he is a powerful chief
executive of his political territory and is most likely to
form a political dynasty.
● As finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local
government official should be barred from running for the same
post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one
term, he may again run for the same office
● Two ideas emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of
the Constitutional Commission.
○ The first is the notion of service of term, derived from
the concern about the accumulation of power as a
result of a prolonged stay in office.
○ The second is the idea of election, derived from the
concern that the right of the people to choose those
whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
● Not only historical examination but textual analysis as well
supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art X, section 8
contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive
terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the
term of office of elective local officials and bars such officials
from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second
sentence, in explaining when an elective official may be
deemed to have served his full term of office, states that
voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected
● SC held that two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur:
○ That the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post
and
○ That he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent.
● First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly
elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by
reason of involuntary relinquishment of office
● It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a
proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the
34
 proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a
presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final
outcome of the election protest.
● Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not
duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as
presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by
the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost
in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
● Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the
May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his
post before the expiration of the term.
● The respondents contention that the petitioner should be
deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998
because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal
basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the
application of the disqualification, that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
● The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any
attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s
choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is
evident.
● Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of
the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service.
● The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by
the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
ADORMEO v COMELEC
Facts:
● Petitioner Raymundo M. Adormeo (Adormeo) and private
respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) were the only
candidates for mayor of Lucena in 2001.
○ Talaga’s prior terms:
■ 1st full term from 1992-1995
■ 2nd full term from 1995-1998
■ 3rd term: lost in actual elections to Tagarao,
but won the recall elections in 2000, then
served remainder of unexpired term
● Adormeo then sought the cancellation of Talaga’s COC alleging
that he had already served 3 consecutive terms, violating Sec.
8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution.
○ Talaga’s counter-argument: He was only elected for 2
consecutive terms. He cited Lonzanida v. Comelec
which required both election and full service of term to
animate the constitutional prohibition.
○ COMELEC 1st Division: Petition GRANTED; Talaga is
DISQUALIFIED; COC CANCELLED
● Talaga filed an MR adding that Tagarao’s prior tenure was not a
continuation of his, and that he was only elected through special
(recall) elections.
○ Adormeo’s opposition: Serving an unexpired term is still
considered a full term.
○ COMELEC en banc: Decision REVERSED; Talaga is
QUALIFIED
■ He was not elected three times as he lost in
the general elections.
■ He was installed only through recall elections,
and such does not count as a term of office.
■ He did not fully serve three consecutive terms;
earlier loss was an interruption of service.
● In the interim, Talaga won the 2001 elections and was
proclaimed mayor of Lucena City.
● Adormeo appealed to the SC, arguing that Talaga’s election
violated Sec. 8, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution and Sec. 43(b) of
the LGC.
○ Talaga merely rehashed the same arguments.
○ COMELEC cited Talaga’s defeat in the 1998 elections
as an interruption of a full term.
Issue + Ruling:
W/N Talaga is disqualified to run for mayor of Lucena City?—NO, as his
loss in the 1998 general elections constituted interruption of service.
Ratio:
● SC cited the case of Borja, where they held that what is sought
to be limited by the term limits are (1) the right to be elected,
35
 and (2) the right to serve in the same elective position. Both
election to the same position thrice consecutively and service of
full term thrice consecutively must concur to animate the
prohibition.
● SC likewise cited the case of Lonzanida, which reiterated the
aforesaid requisites.
● Applying the requisites to the instant case he was neither
elected nor has he served as mayor of Lucena for 3 consecutive
terms.
● Allowing Talaga another term does not violate Art. X, Sec. 8 of
the 1987 Constitution
○ Fr. Bernas’s comment that service of remainder of
unexpired term constitutes a full term is only applicable
to members of Congress, not local elective officials.
○ Likewise, there is no recall election for members of
Congress, unlike in local government.
● Furthermore, respondent’s victory in recall election is not
“voluntary renunciation”.
○ In Lonanida, the SC the prohibition against term
interruption through voluntary renunciation is meant to
bar attempts to circumvent the three-term limit, also to
respect people’s choice and grant elected official full
service of term.
○ While voluntary renunciation does not cancel the
renounced term, involuntary severance from office is
considered an interruption of the term.
SOCRATES v COMELEC
Facts:
● Consolidated petitions for certiorari seeking the reversal of the
resolutions issued by COMELEC in relation to the recall election
for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
● 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay
officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly
○ The PRA was convened to initiate the recallof Victorino
Dennis M. Socrates who assumed office as Puerto
Princesas mayor on June 30, 2001. The members of
the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn,
president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as
interim chair of the PRA.
● The PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 which declared its loss
of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA
requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for
mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.
● Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition to nullify the
petition
○ COMELEC dismissed petition
● Edward M. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor
in the recall election.
● Ma. Flores F. Adovo and Merly E. Gilo filed a petition before the
COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 02-492, to disqualify
Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his
certificate of candidacy.
○ COMELEC denied petition and declared Hagedorn
qualified
● Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc
resolution which gave due course to the Recall Resolution and
scheduled the recall election
● Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution.
● Socrates cites the following circumstances as legal infirmities
attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the
Recall Resolution: (1) not all members of the PRA were notified
of the meeting to adopt the resolution; (2) the proof of service of
notice was palpably and legally deficient; (3) the members of
the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate
from their respective constituents; (4) the adoption of the
resolution was exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5)
the PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated
his and the public’s constitutional right to information
Issue + Ruling:
● Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
giving due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduling the
recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa? NO.
● Whether Hagedorn is qualified to run as mayor?
Ratio:
Validity of the recall resolution
36
 ● Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the
absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective
service of notice to other PRA members.
● However, COMELEC found that :
○ On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the
proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the
convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant
to Section 70 of the Local Government Code.
○ Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places
particularly at the Barangay Hall.
○ Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA
were also sent to the following: [a list of 25 names of
provincial elective officials, print and broadcast media
practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional
and national officials, and DILG officials].
● This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on
matters within the competence and expertise of the COMELEC,
unless the findings are patently erroneous
○ In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to
hold that the COMELECs findings of fact are patently
erroneous.
● Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to
adopt the Recall Resolution because a majority of PRA
members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the
barangay elections
○ This argument deserves scant consideration
considering that when the PRA members adopted the
Recall Resolution their terms of office had not yet
expired. They were all de jure sangguniang barangay
members with no legal disqualification to participate in
the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local
Government Code.
On the qualification of Hagedorn
● The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and is reiterated in
Section 43 (b) of the LGC
● ese constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The
first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for
more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only
consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit
rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office
for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service.
The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for
any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents
the service before and after the interruption from being joined
together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
● After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot
seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term. Any
subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer
covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent
election like a recall election is no longer an immediate
reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service.
● When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit
of elective local officials, the question asked was whether there
would be no further election after three terms, or whether there
would be no immediate reelection after three terms.
● Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate
reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms.
The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent
reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall
election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term
is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after
the third term.
● Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking
immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election
involving the same term of office.What the Constitution prohibits
is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the Constitutional
Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred
to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate
reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent
election.
● Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992,
1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive
terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and
the Local Government Code, Hagedorn could no longer run for
mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the Local
37
 Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the
maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive
term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the
2001 elections.[16] Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto
Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be
mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the
recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018
votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
● From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24,
2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the
same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period
is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service
as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but
because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorns three consecutive
terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorns new recall term from
September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless
continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor.
One cannot stitch together Hagedorns previous three-terms with
his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive
term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption
occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which
broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorns
service as mayor.
● Thus, in the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall
election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection
after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001.
The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn
from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn
did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
MENDOZA v COMELEC
Facts:
● Leonardo B. Roman (Roman) was Governor of Bataan for the
following periods:
○ 1986-1988: appointed OIC Governor by Pres. Aquino,
served full term
○ 1988-1992: elected, served full term
○ 1994-1995: elected during recall elections in 1993,
assumed office in 1994, served for remainder of
unexpired term
○ 1995-1998: elected, served full term
○ 1998-2001: elected, served full term
● Roman then filed his COC for the same post for the 2001
regular elections. He later won and was proclaimed governor of
Bataan for the 4th time.
● Melanio L. Mendoza (Mendoza) and Mario E. Ibarra (Ibarra)
thereafter filed with the COMELEC en banc a petition for quo
warranto alleging that he is disqualified/ineligible for a 4th term
as this would violate the three-term limit imposed by Sec. 8, Art.
X of the 1987 Constitution.
○ COMELEC en banc: Petition DISMISSED
■ Roman did not exceed the three-term limit as
he did not serve the full term of his 2nd
elective term, having only succeeded the
incumbent through a recall.
■ Reckoning point is Roman’s term from 1995-
1998, being his first regular term after the
interruption.
■ As such, the instant term is only his 3rd term.
● Petitioners appealed to the SC via the instant petition.
○ Roman’s arguments: He did not serve the full term from
1992-1995, as he only served for the unexpired portion
of former Gov. Enrique Garcia’s term.
○ OSG arguments: Petition should be dismissed as a
recall election is not a regular election. As such, that
term is not counted.
Issue + Ruling:
W/N Roman’s incumbency as governor after winning the recall elections
count towards the three-term limit prescribed by the Constitution?—NO.
Ratio:
● After due deliberation, the SC voted 8-7 to dismiss the petition.
The justices rendered separate opinions as follows:
Separate Opinion, Vitug, J.
● For the three-consecutive term limit to apply, the following must
concur:
○ Election for three consecutive terms to the same local
government position; and
○ Service of three consecutive full terms, albeit a
voluntary renunciation does not interrupt continuity of
service for the full term for which he is elected.
38
 ● In the ConComm deliberations, the commissioners referred to a
full 9 years of service continuous and uninterrupted except only
when an incumbent voluntarily gives up office.
○ The exchanges in the drafting reveal that there were
two opposing propositions for term limits:
■ An absolute prohibition to run for any office
after serving 9 cumulative years in office; and
■ A prohibition only from immediately running
again for office after serving 9 consecutive
years in office.
○ The latter proposal was approved.
● The winner of a recall election merely serves the balance of the
term of the incumbent he dislodges. As such, it is not a full
three-year term.
○ However, should the incumbent win the recall election,
his term shall not be considered interrupted.
○ Citing Lonzanida, involuntary severance amounts to
interruption of continuity of service.
■ If an incumbent involuntarily severed from
service is not considered to have served a full
term, neither should the newly elected recall
winner who merely assumes the balance of
the term be considered to have served a full
term.
● Should the petitioners’ interpretation of the law be adopted, this
would effectively limit the right of suffrage of the electorate.
○ As Roman overwhelmingly won as governor, the will of
the people must be carried out, not defeated.
○ As such, any doubts as to the candidate’s eligibility
must be resolved to carry out the paramount will of the
electorate.
● Therefore, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Separate Opinion, Mendoza, J.
● Two elements must concur for the application of Art. X, Sec. 8
of the 1987 Constitution:
○ Election in regular elections for 3 consecutive terms;
and
○ Service for the full 3-year terms for which the local
official was elected.
● Citing the cases of Borja, Arcos, and Adormeo, the SC did not
count the term during which succession/recall elections took
place.
○ However, these precedents were recently overruled in
the case of Socrates, which included terms served after
recall elections in counting the terms regarding the
limit.
● I concur in the result but dissent in so far as the majority holding
that there was an interruption/break in the continuity of his
service. What made him eligible for another term was that his
recall term was less than three years.
● In contrast to special elections to fill a vacancy in Congress, the
person elected wins a term within the contemplation of the
prohibition even if it is less than 3/6 years.
○ This is because there is always a vacancy and not
automatic succession in such cases.
● While Borja’s interpretation may result in tenure longer than 9
years, it is of no moment as the Constitution does not prohibit
service for more than 9 years if interrupted by means other than
voluntary renunciation.
● Furthermore, the ruling in Socrates was mere obiter dictum. The
main issue therein was W/N a recall election that took place
after the 4th consecutive election had taken place was to be
deemed an “immediate reelection” to a fourth term. It did not
include the question of W/N a recall term should be considered
one term.
● Considering recall terms as one term would also disqualify
many public officials and effectively disenfranchise people who
voted for them in the earnest belief that they could validly be
voted for.
● Finally, in an election contest, the scales of justice should be
tilted in favor of the people’s overwhelming choice. Therefore, I
vote to DISMISS the petition.
Separate Opinion, Panganiban, J.
● The petitioners are trying to equate a recall term with a full term,
saying that not ruling so would allow local officials to hold office
for more than 3 consecutive terms.
○ However, mode of assumption of office, whether by
recall or succession is of no moment. The instant case
is not substantially different from the case of Borja.
While Borja therein assumed office through succession,
39
 he was nonetheless effectively allowed to serve for
more than 11 consecutive years.
● Therefore, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Separate Opinion, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
● For the three-term limit imposed in both Sec. 8, Art. X, 1987
Constitution and Sec. 43(b), LGC to apply, the following must
concur:
○ Election to a public office; and
○ Service of three consecutive terms for the same
position.
● In this case, the two requisites are present.
● The constitutional and statutory prohibition make no distinction
as to the nature of the election, whether regular, special, or
recall. As the law does not distinguish, the provisions do not
confine the three-term rule to regular elections only, and may
include recall elections.
● Citing Claudio v. Commission, the SC ruled that “election”
includes recall “by means of which voters decide whether they
should retain their local official or elect his replacement.
● During the ConComm deliberations, then Comm. Davide
likewise stated that a term served pursuant to a special election
whereby the officer only serves the unexpired portion
constitutes a term within the contemplation of the limit.
○ While the statement was made referring to members of
Congress, the principle equally applies to local officials.
● The objectives of the term limit are to:
○ Forestall the accumulation of massive political power
by an elective local official who intends to perpetuate
himself in office;
○ Broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates
who will run for office; and
○ Infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying
officials from running for the same office after serving 9
consecutive years.
● In this case, to rule out recall elections would be to defeat the
very purpose of the prohibition, as Roman has been governor
since 1986.
● Also cited is the case of Socrates, decided just the month prior,
where the SC held that a term served pursuant to a recall
election is counted as a term in reference to the limit.
● Term vs. tenure
○ Term means the time during which the officer may
claim to hold the office as a matter of right.
○ Tenure means the period during which the incumbent
actually holds office. This may be shorter than term.
● In this case, while Roman’s tenure was shorter, he was
nonetheless elected for a specific term which must count
towards the limit.
● Borja is likewise cited regarding Comm. Bernas’ affirmation in
relation to Art. VI, Sec. 7 that service for the unexpired term of
another is still considered as one term. This is based on Comm.
Davide’s comment affirming the same construction in relation to
members of Congress.
○ In the instant case, service of former Gov. Garcia’s
tenure from 1994-1995 must be counted, and his term
from 1998-2001 must be counted as his 3rd and last
allowable consecutive term.
● The case of Lonzanida v. COMELEC does not apply, as
Lonzanida therein was removed involuntarily.
● The will of Roman’s constituency cannot prevail over the will of
the people who ratified the Constitution.
● Therefore, I vote to GRANT the petition.
Separate Opinion, Carpio, J.
● First, the framers of the Constitution intended a recall term (i.e.,
the unexpired term of a recalled official) to be considered as
one term for counting term limits.
○ Comm. Davide stated during the deliberations that
even service of merely the unexpired portion of the
term still counts as one term.
○ While the statement was with reference to the special
election of senators and representatives, this must
apply in equal force to local officials to avoid the
absurdity of having officials who have served for more
than 9 consecutive years in the same position.
● Second, he framers of the Constitution further intended that
local officials should not be elected to serve continuously for
more than 9 years in the same position.
○ In the exchanges between Comm. de Castro and
Comm. Garcia, it was repeatedly mentioned that they
intended the three-term/nine-year limit on local officials
to allow for new ideas and new approaches.
40
 ○ Given the absolute limit of 9 years, Roman must
therefore be barred from serving another term, as he
will have then exceeded the limit.
○ When intention of the framers is clear, definite, and
unequivocal as in this case, the intention becomes
controlling as it expresses the true spirit of the
Constitution.
● Third, the 1987 Constitution does not require either
elective/appointive public officials to serve his full term in order
to be disqualified from re-election/reappointment.
○ In the case of the Vice-President, he/she shall be
disallowed to run for President should he/she have
succeeded the President and serve as such for over 4
years.
○ In the case of members of the CSC and COMELEC,
they are disqualified from reappointment even if they
only served the unexpired term of a member who
vacated the position.
● Fourth, this also not a case where the official succeeded merely
by operation of law as in the case of Borja, where the unexpired
term did not count towards the three-term limit.
○ This is likewise unlike the case of Adormeo, where the
term of the incumbent/recalled official broke the
continuity of the public officer therein.
● Fifth, holding the recall term to be a stray term would only
encourage political opponents to agitate for recall elections, as
they would have everything to gain and nothing to lose.
● Sixth, the overwhelming vote of the people of Bataan which
installed Roman in office in 2001 cannot overcome the vote of
the people of the entire Philippines in ratifying the Constitution
which includes the three-term limit therein.
● Therefore, I vote to GRANT the petition.
Separate Opinion, Azcuna, J.
● General rule: As a fundamental tenet of democracy, the people
should be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern
them.
○ Exception: The three-term limit provided in the 1987
Constitution.
● The rule of strict construction applies to the exception. As such,
the term limit applies only if the official served three consecutive
terms in full. Thus, service less than a full term through either
succession or recall, does not count towards the three-term
limit.
● Citing Socrates v. COMELEC, the prohibition limits both (1)
immediate re-election, and (2) serving more than three
consecutive terms.
○ However, such 4th term is NOT required to be a full
term to violate the prohibition, as any such term is
already in EXCESS of three consecutive terms even if
not served completely.
● In the present case, Roman’s election as governor in the recall
elections should NOT be counted as one full term.
○ Service of less than a full term, EXCEPT ONLY in case
of voluntary renunciation, should not be counted to
determine the existence of the disqualification.
● Therefore, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Tenure of Office
OSMENA v COMELEC
Facts:
● Petition calls for a determination of the validity and
constitutionality of Republic Act 7056, "An Act Providing for the
National and Local Elections in 1992, Pave the Way for
Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995, and
Authorizing Appropriations Therefor,")
● The suit was instituted by Governor Emilio M. Osmeña
(Province of Cebu) et.al. to prevent the implementation of said
Republic Act 7056 and the consequent expenditure of public
funds and to compel the Comelec to immediately and with all
deliberate speed set up the machinery and make the necessary
preparation for the holding of synchronized national and local
elections
○ The petitioners' claim they have actual and material
legal interest in the subject matter of this case not only
because, as public officials, they have taken an oath to
support and defend the Constitution but also because,
as taxpayers, they have an interest in seeing to it that
public funds are properly disbursed
● Solicitor General prayed for the denial of the petition arguing
that the question raised by petitioners is political in nature and
therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
41
 ○ On the merits, the Solicitor General contends that
Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative
power by Congress and that the regular amending
process prescribed by the Constitution does not apply
to its transitory provisions.
Issue + Ruling:
1. W/N the SC has jurisdiction over the issue? --YES. Case
concerns the wisdom of the RA
2. W/N RA 7056 is constitutional? --NO. The RA is violative of a
number of constitutional provisions.
Ratio:
On the issue of jurisdiction
● What is before the SC is not a discretionary act of Congress or
the Executive that may not be reviewed by us because it is
political in nature.
○ issue presented in the case at bar, is justiciable rather
than political
● What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of Republic
Act 7056.
○ EVEN IF the SC were to assume that the issue
presented before it was political in nature, it would still
not be precluded from resolving the issue under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it that now covers
in proper cases even political questions
On the Constitutionality of RA 7056
● At the core of this controversy is Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5
(Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution
○ Sec. 2. The Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials first elected
under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June
30, 1992. Of the Senators elected in the election in
1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of
votes shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve
for three years.
○ Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President
and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986
election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
○ The first regular elections for President and Vice-
President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992
● The terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-
President have been synchronized to end on the same hour,
date and year — noon of June 30, 1992.
○ Also evident from the wording of the above-mentioned
Sections that the term of synchronization is used
synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously
since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office
Tenure on the same day or occasion
● It has to be stressed that the term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, is fixed by the Constitution at
three years (Sec. 8, Art. X).
● The incumbent local officials were elected in January 1988.
Therefore, their term would have expired on February 2, 1991.
But their term was adjusted to expire at noon of June 30, 1992.
The reason for the said adjustment, as well as those of the
Senators, members of the House of Representatives, President
and Vice-President, is the same — to synchronize the national
and local elections.
● With the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hold
synchronized (simultaneous) national and local elections in the
second Monday of May, 1992, the inevitable conclusion would
be that Republic Act 7056 is clearly violative of the Constitution
because it provides for the holding of a desynchronized
election.
○ Stated differently, Republic Act 7056 particularly
Sections 1 and 2 thereof contravenes Article XVIII,
Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
● But this is not all. There are other provisions of the Constitution
violated by RA 7056.
○ Section 2, Article XVIII which provides that the local
official first elected under the Constitution shall serve
until noon of June 30, 1992.
■ But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these
incumbent local officials shall hold over
beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until
their successors shall have been duly elected
and qualified.
42
 ○ Section 9, Article IX which state that the filing of the
Certificate of Candidacy and the ensuing campaign
period must be embraced or circumscribed within that
election period of ninety days, except when in special
cases, the Comelec (not Congress) alters the period.
■ But RA 7056 provides for a different campaign
period
● All these — the postponement of the holding of a synchronized
national and local election from 1992 to 1995; the hold-over
provision for incumbent local officials; the reduction of the term
of office of local officials to be elected on the second Monday of
November 1992 and the change in the campaign periods, are
violative of the 1987 Constitution
KIDA v SENATE
Facts:
● Legislative history covering ARMM regional elections:
○ RA 6734 (Organic Act of ARMM) was enacted on Aug.
1, 1989 and scheduled regular elections for regional
officials not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days
after ratification.
○ RA 9054 (Amendment of Organic Act of ARMM) reset
the regular elections of ARMM regular officials to 2nd
Monday of Sept. 2001.
○ RA 9140 set the plebiscite for approval of RA 9054 to
not later than Aug. 15, 2001 and reset the first regular
elections under RA 9054 to Nov. 26, 2001.
○ RA 9333 reset ARMM regional elections to 2nd
Monday of Aug. 2005 and on same date every 3 years
thereafter (BUT not ratified).
● Thus, following RA 9140, regional ARMM elections should have
been held on Nov. 26, 2001, BUT RA 10153 was enacted,
resetting it to May 2013.
○ RA 10153 (“An Act Providing for the Synchronization of
the Elections in the ARMM with the National and Local
Elections and for Other Purposes”) reset the ARMM
elections from Aug. 8, 2011 to the second Monday of
May 2013 and every 3 years thereafter.
○ President was granted power to appoint interim OICs
for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor, and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly.
● Several petitions assailing the constitutionality of RA 10153
were filed before and after its enactment on the following
grounds:
○ RA 9140, 9333, and 10153’s failure to comply with
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements under
Secs. 1 and 3, Art. XVIII or RA 9094;
○ RA 10153’s failure to comply with three-reading
requirement of Sec. 26(2), Art VI of the 1987
Constitution;
○ Violation of the right to suffrage of the people of ARMM;
○ Failure to adhere to “elective and representative”
character of executive and legislative departments of
ARMM;
○ Invalidity of grant of appointive power to the President;
and
○ Unconstitutionality of such appointive power given that
it gives the President control over the ARMM.
Issue + Ruling:
● W/N the grant of power to appoint OICs is unconstitutional?12—
YES, as the President is authorized by law to make the
appointment pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. 16 of the 1987
Constitution, and such appointment does not undermine the
required representative and elective character of the offices.
Ratio:
● The Court first discussed basic underlying principles:
○ Extent of powers of Congress to legislate;
○ Constitutional mandate for synchronization of elections;
and
○ Concept of autonomy as recognized and established
under the 1987 Constitution.
I. Extent of powers of Congress to legislate
● It is broad, general, and comprehensive.
● Legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all
matters of general concern or common interest, except as
limited by the Constitution.
12
This digest will only discuss this issue as it is what is most relevant to the heading
under which it is assigned in the syllabus. For the other issues irrelevant to the topic
for class discussion, kindly refer to the full text.
43
 ● Express limitations include the Bill of Rights, while implied
limitations are found “in the evident purpose which was in view
and the circumstances and historical events which led to the
enactment of the particular provision as part of organic law.”
● With respect to autonomy, there are limitations imposed in the
prescribed basic structure of government, i.e., requirement that
executive and legislative offices are elective and representative;
proscription against encroachment by the national government
of legislative powers granted under Sec. 20, Art. X, 1987
Constitution; and retention of the National Government of all
powers and functions not granted by the Constitution or by law
to the autonomous regions.
● Secs. 15 to 21, Art. X, 1987 Constitution therefore serve as
standards for legislation by Congress on the autonomous
regions’ affairs.
● Self-rule or self-government must be balanced with national
sovereignty and territorial integrity. An imperium et imperio is
rejected.
II and III. Constitutional mandate for synchronization and autonomy
● Relevant to synchronization, both autonomy and
synchronization are constitutional mandates:
○ Synchronization operates on and affects the whole
country; while
○ Regional autonomy carries a narrower regional effect.
● The problem then with synchronization under RA 10153 was
providing ARMM with governance in the intervening period
while respecting regional autonomy. Appointive powers were
created in:
○ Creation of LGUs, such as the case in Quezon del Sur
and Dinagat; and
○ Transitions from sub-province to province.
● Verily, what Congress had to provide in this case were interim
measures.
Applying this to the options…
Option 2: Special Elections—UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Option 1: Holdover Option—UNCONSTITUTIONAL
13
1987 Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 8. The term of office of elective officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.”
● Holdover for those elected for ARMM term 2008-2011 violates
Sec. 8, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution.13
○ ARMM officials, being local officials, are bound by the
three-year term prescribe therein.
○ Citing Osmeña v. COMELEC, Congress has no
legislative authority to extend the term beyond the
three-year period even though successors fail to qualify
within the time. American Jurisprudence has provided
that legislature cannot, by postponing election, extend
the term of the incumbent beyond the period as limited
by the constitution.
○ Aside from jurisprudence, the primacy of the
Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates
that legislature cannot deviate from its express
mandate, except only as the Constitution itself allows.
● Holdover likewise cannot be construed as a new term for which
Congress may appoint the occupant.
○ This is unconstitutional because Congress cannot do
indirectly what it cannot do directly.
○ This is furthermore an encroachment of the appointive
power of the President.
● The cases of Sambarani v. COMELEC, Adap v. COMELEC,
and Montesclaros v. COMELEC where SC ruled that holdover is
allowed do not apply to the instant case.
○ The facts differ, where these cases dealt with elective
barangay/SK officials without constitutionally mandated
terms, while the instant controversy deals with regional
ARMM elective officials with constitutionally mandated
terms.
● Even assuming holdover is constitutionally and statutorily
permissible, the rule of holdover can only apply when no
express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it
cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
○ In this case, Congress in enacting RA 10153 explicitly
removed the holdover provision from RA 9054.
44
 ● Petitioner Romulo Macalintal wishes to compel the COMELEC
to immediately conduct special elections.
● However, the power to fix the date of elections is essentially
legislative in nature, as evident in Sec. 8, Art. VI,14 Sec. 4(3),
Art. VII,15 and Sec. 3. Art. X16 of the 1987 Constitution, and thus,
no elections may be held on any other date for the officials
mentioned therein except when so provided by Congress or a
delegated body/officer.
○ In this case, Congress under RA 10153 already
decided to set May 13, 2011 for synchronized
elections. As such, it neither the executive nor the
judiciary can intervene.
○ Furthermore, COMELEC’s power is limited to enforcing
and administering election laws and regulations, and
has no power to call for special elections unless
pursuant to specific statutory grant.
■ Power of COMELEC to postpone elections
under Secs 5 and 6, BP 881 is limited to the
specific terms and circumstances provided for
in the law.
● Sec. 5 addresses instances were
elections have already been
scheduled but have to be postponed
due to (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c)
loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, (d) force
majeure, and (e) other unforeseen or
unexpected analogous cases of such
a nature that the holding of a free,
orderly, and honest election should
become impossible.
● Sec. 6 addresses failures of election
where elections were scheduled but
14
1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the
regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives
shall be held on the second Monday of May.
15
1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 4(3). xxx Unless otherwise provided by law,
the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May.
16
1987 Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local
government code which shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials.
do not take place due to (a) force
majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism,
(d) fraud, or (e) other analogous
cases the election in any polling place
has not been held on the date fixed,
or had been suspended.
■ Clearly, neither provision applies, as RA 10173
suspended ARMM elections by law pursuant
to the constitutional mandate of
synchronization.
● Even assuming option 2 is legally permissible, SC in any case
cannot limit the terms of those specially elected only until the
officials elected through the synchronized elections can assume
office.
○ Even Congress is denied the same power to fix the
term of office of ARMM regional elective officials, and
may only exercise the same in the case of barangay
officials.
○ Conclusively, neither Congress nor the SC is
authorized to fix the terms of elective local officials in
the ARMM for less or more than the constitutionally
mandated three years in contravention of Sec. 8, Art. X
and the ruling in Osmeña.
● Furthermore, neither the SC nor Congress can limit the tenure17
of those specially elected instead of acting on their term.18
○ As with the fixing of the elective term, there is likewise
no legal basis for the Congress nor the SC to exercise
this power.
Option 3: Presidential Appointive Power for Interim OICs—
CONSTITUTIONAL
● The power to appoint is executive in nature and any limitations
thereon must be strictly construed. Thus, they have to be clearly
stated in order to be recognized.
● Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution19 classifies four groups
of officers that the President can appoint:
17
“Tenure” represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office.
18
“Term” means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right
and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.
19
1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
45
 ○ Heads of the executive departments; ambassadors;
other public ministers and consults; officers of the AFP,
from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution;
○ All other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
○ Those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and
○ Officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
● In this case, the President’s power to appoint interim OICs falls
under the third group and thus facially rests on clear
constitutional basis.
● The appointive power granted likewise does not contravene the
constitutional requirement that ARMM executive and legislative
officials be elective and representative of the constituent
political units.
○ This contention only becomes real if RA 10153 were
mistakenly read as a law changing the elective and
representative character of ARMM positions.
○ However, RA 10153 does not amend the ARMM
organic law. It was not even subject to the
supermajority and plebiscite requirements. It is merely
an interim measure granting Presidential appointive
power of OICs for regional offices, different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated
term.
● The elective and representative governance requirement will
only be violated if the power were granted under other situations
or where the appointive power would extend beyond the
adjustment period amounting to a systematic withdrawal of the
people’s right to choose its leaders.
○ In this case, the period is fixed, and the terms of
governance will not be systematically affected.
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
● Given the temporary disruption synchronization will cause, it is
but necessary that these interim measures be adopted, as was
previously done in the creation of LGUs, and the adjustment of
sub-provinces to the status of provinces.
○ It is thus akin to police power, in that reasonableness
must be taken in light of the given circumstances.
● While the grant of appointive power may supplant the “elective
aspect” RA 10153 addresses concerns by providing for
concrete terms, the manner and procedure, and the
qualifications for such appointments.
Other constitutional concerns
● The SC clarified that RA 10153 does not grant the President the
power to cancel elections anywhere and to subsequently
appoint replacement OICs.
○ What RA 10153 ordered was not an across-the-board
cancellation of elections, but merely a cancellation for a
very specific and limited purpose of synchronizing
elections.
○ As such, the SC’s support for this legislation cannot be
transferred or applied to any other cause for the
cancellation of elections.
● The SC likewise underscored the importance of addressing the
vacuum during the 21-month intervening period before the
rescheduled synchronized elections given that the other two
remedies are unconstitutional.
○ Critical and adverse developments may transpire in the
country’s Muslim areas in this span of time in the way
they transpired in the past.
● The SC likewise noted that granting the President the power to
appoint OICs is not new and has been done before in the case
of Menzon v. Petilla to avoid disruptions and delyas in the
delivery of basic services.
Vacancies and Succession
LABO v COMELEC
Supra
MENZON v PETILLA
Facts:
46
● MR of SC resolution which initially denied the petition for
certiorari and mandamus filed by then Acting Vice-Governor of
Leyte, Aurelio D. Menzon.
○ SC stated that Mr. Menzon cannot successfully assert
the right to be recognized as Acting Vice-Governor and,
therefore, his designation was invalid
● By virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in
the province of Leyte, the Secretary of Local Government Luis
Santos designated the Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E. Petilla as
Acting Governor of Leyte.
● petitioner Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designated by Secretary
Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of
Leyte.
○ He took his oath of office before Senator Alberto
Romulo
● the Provincial Administrator, Tente U. Quintero inquired from
the Undersecretary of the Department of Local Government,
Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., as to the legality of the appointment of
the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.
○ USEC replied that since B.P. 337 has no provision
relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-
Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the
appointment of the petitioner as the temporary Vice-
Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor
who is temporarily performing the functions of the
Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of
both offices.
● the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. 505
where it held invalid the appointment of the petitioner as acting
Vice-Governor of Leyte
● Petitioner sought clarification from Undersecretary Jacinto T.
Rubillar, Jr.
○ Rubillar clarified that :”the designation extended by the
Secretary of Local Government in favor of one of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members of Leyte to
temporarily discharge the powers and duties of the
vice-governor during the pendency of the electoral
controversy in the Office of the Governor, does not
contradict the stand we have on the matter. The fact
that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan member was
temporarily designated to perform the functions of the
vice-governor could not be considered that the
Sangguniang member succeeds to the office of the
latter, for it is basic that designation is merely an
imposition of additional duties to be performed by the
designee in addition to the official functions attached to
his office. Furthermore, the necessity of designating an
official to temporarily perform the functions of a
particular public office, would depend on the discretion
of the appointing authority and the prevailing
circumstances in a given area and by taking into
consideration the best interest of public service.”
● The Regional Director of the Department of Local Government,
Resurreccion Salvatierra, wrote a letter addressed to the Acting-
Governor of Leyte, Leopoldo E. Petilla, requesting the latter that
Resolution No. 505 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be
modified accordingly
● Despite these several letters of request, the Acting Governor
and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, refused to correct
Resolution No. 505 and correspondingly to pay the petitioner
the emoluments attached to the Office of Vice-Governor.
● Petitioner filed before the SCa petition for certiorari and
mandamus.
○ However, the issue on the governorship of Leyte was
settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the
Governor of the province of Leyte.
○ SC dismissed the petition
● respondent, by virtue of the resolution requested Governor
Larrazabal to direct the petitioner to pay back to the province of
Leyte all the emoluments and compensation which he received
while acting as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.
Issue + Ruling:
1. Whether or not there was a vacancy? --YES, there was a
vacancy.
2. Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government has the
authority to make temporary appointments? --YES, the power
is granted by statute.
Ratio:
On the Vacancy
47
 ● The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter: there is no
vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified
incumbent.
○ A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no
person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at
present the duties of the office
● It can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was
left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo
Petilla was appointed Acting Governor.
○ In the eyes of the law, the office to which he was
elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to
exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.
● The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a full-
time occupant to discharge them. More so when the vacancy is
for an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's automatic
assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in the
vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. The fact that the
Secretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint the
petitioner shows the need to fill up the position during the period
it was vacant
On the power of the Sec. of LocGov to make temporary appointments
● The LGC is silent on the mode of succession in the event of a
temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor.
○ However, the silence of the law must not be understood
to convey that a remedy in law is wanting
● The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed a
necessity for the appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. For
about two years after the governatorial elections, there had
been no de jure permanent Governor
● In order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum
created by the vacancy, the President, acting through her alter
ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the
situation.
● SC declared valid the temporary appointment extended to the
petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor.
● It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is
empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public
offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws
deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions.
However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we
see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the
two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case
● The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord
with the intent behind the Local Government Code. There is no
question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52 of the
Local Government Code shows clearly the intent to provide for
continuity in the performance of the duties of the Vice-Governor.
● By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the
mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies may
likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in the
same office. In this case, there was a need to fill the vacancy.
The petitioner is himself the member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The
Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the
temporary appointment.
DOCENA v SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN NG SAMAR
Facts:
● Luis Capito (Capito) was elected and served as member of
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar (SPES).
○ Upon Capito’s death in 1990, Secretary of Local
Government. Luis Santos (Santos) appointed petitioner
Agustin B. Docena (Docena) to succeed him. He
assumed office on Nov. 26, 1990.
○ However, merely one day after, Santos appointed
private respondent Socrates B. Alar (Alar) to the
position already occupied by Docena.
● On Dec. 18, 1990, the SPES passed Resolution No. 75
recognizing Alar as legitimate successor.
● However, a day after, Santos reversed the SES in a letter
addressed to Alar recalling his appointment. This was affirmed
by Head Executive Assistant Arturo V. Agundo (Agundo) on
Jan. 4, 1991.
● In response, the SPES passed Resolution No. 1 on Jan. 8,
1991 reiterating its recognition of Alar and declaring his recall to
be without basis in fact and in law.
● Provincial Prosecutor Dario S. Labrador (Labrador) rendered an
opinion stating that Alar’s recall was void ab initio as his right to
the office had become vested.
● On Feb. 20, 1991, Santos again issued a recall order, now
directed against Docena.
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 ● Aggrieved, Docena filed a petition for mandamus to compel his
admission as lawfully appointed member of the SPES. He
argues that he has a preferential right as he placed 9th in the
elections next to Capito, while Alar did not even run for office.
○ Respondents’ argument: Alar’s appointment super-
○ seded Docena’s appointment; subsequent recall was
void ab initio for lack of previous hearing (self-
contradictory according to the SC as they do not apply
the same argument to Docena’s recall); quo warranto
was the proper remedy, not mandamus.
○ SC: Issued a TRO.
● SPES can likewise be compelled by mandamus to perform a
ministerial duty which in this case is the recognition and
admission of Docena.
○ SPES does not exercise discretion with regard to
appointments made to the body, nor does it have a
right to review or reject such appointment. Instead, they
must leave it to the courts to decide.
● However, Docena is not entitled to damages given the parties
acted in good faith, although erroneously. He is, however,
entitled to salaries and benefits related to his office from time of
his assumption until his admission.

Issue + Ruling:
W/N Docena may lawfully hold office as member of the SPES?—YES,
as he already acquired security of tenure upon assumption of office, and
thus can only be removed for recognized causes and through
designated procedure in the LGC.

Ratio:
● Pursuant to Sec. 50 of the LGC, the appointee to succeed in
case of a permanent vacancy in any sanggunian except that of
the barangay must come from the political party of the member
who caused the vacancy.
○ In this case, both Docena and Capito ran for provincial
board in 1988 under the banner of Lakas ng Bansa,
and later transferred to Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino under Speaker Mitra.
● Contrary to the respondents’ argument that Alar’s appointment
superseded Docena’s, Docena’s appointment had in fact
already become complete and enforceable prior to Alar’s, as he
had already assumed office as certified by the Provincial
Secretary.
● Furthermore, Docena’s appointment was already permanent.
He had already acquired security of tenure, and could only be
removed therefrom for causes and according to the procedure
prescribed by the LGC. Recall by the Secretary of Local
Government is not one of them.
● There is likewise no merit in the prosecutor’s argument that Alar
acquired a vested right in the office.

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