Lopez vs.

Orosa

103 phil. 98

Doctrine: a building is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is
adhered to belong to the same owner.

Facts: Eriquez Lopez is doing a business under the trade name of Lopez- Castello Sawmill. In 1946, Vicente Orosa, Jr.
invited Lpoez to make an investment in theatre business named Plaza theatre, Inc. Lopez refused to join the business
but he agreed to supply the lumber necessary for the construction of the theatre. Pursuant to the agreement, Lopez
delivered the lumber for the construction. The total cost of the materials was 62, 255.85 but only 20, 848.50 was paid,
thus leaving a balance of 41, 771. 35

The Plaza theatre was erected to a land owned by Orosa. Later Lopez made demands to Orosa for the payment of the
remaining unpaid obligation. The latter promised to obtain a bank load by mortgagimg the properties of the Plaza
theatre, out of which the balance will be satisfied, which however, were previously mortgaged to Luzon Surety but
under a different law so such encumbrance did not appear in the 2nd mortgage.

However, Orosa still failed to pay Lopez. Thus, the latter filed a complaint against the former to pay him the remaining
balance.

Orosa argued that the land on which the movie house was constructed was not charged with a lien to secure the
payment of the aforementioned unpaid obligation.

Issue: WON lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of a building attaches to said structure alone and
does not extend to the land on which the building is adhered to

Held: Yes. A while it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is
obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may
constitute real properties could mean only one thing — that a building is by itself an immovable property.

a building is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to
belong to the same owner.

Associated Insurance vs. Iya

G.R. Nos. L-10837-38 May 30, 1958

Facts: Spouses Valino purchased on credit rice from NARIC, which was subscribed by the Associated Insurance and
Surety Co., Inc., and a guaranty, the spouses executed a chattel mortgaged on the house in favor of the surety company.
However ate the time of the chattel mortgage, the land which the house is erected was still registered in the name of
Philippine Realty Corporation.

Later they secured title to the land. To secure payment of the purchase price, the spouses executed a real mortgage
over the lot and the house in favor of Isabel Iya.

Spouses Valino failed to satisfy their obligation with NARIC thus the surety company was compelled to pay the bond. In
turn, the surety company demanded reimbursement from the spouses Valino, and as the latter likewise failed to do so,
the company foreclosed the chattel mortgage over the house.

Sometime in July, 1953, the surety company learned of the existence of the real estate mortgage over the lot. The surety
company acquired the said property from a public auction but filed an auction to exclude the house from the real estate
mortgage in favor of Iya.
It alleged that the building, that the lot on which the house was constructed did not belong to the spouses at the time
the chattel mortgage was executed, the house might be considered only as a personal property and that the
encumbrance thereof thus the foreclosure proceeding were proper and legal.

Isebel Iya filed a case to collect on the Valino’s debt or foreclosure on the real estate mortgage over the house and lot.

Issue: WON the house can be subject of chattel mortgage property

Held: No.

A building certainly cannot be divested of its character of a realty by the fact that the land on which it is constructed
belongs to another. To hold it the other way, the possibility is not remote that it would result in confusion, for to cloak
the building with an uncertain status made dependent on the ownership of the land, would create a situation where a
permanent fixture changes its nature or character as the ownership of the land changes hands.

In the case at bar, as personal properties could only be the subject of a chattel mortgage (Section 1, Act 3952) and as
obviously the structure in question is not one, the execution of the chattel mortgage covering said building is clearly
invalid and a nullity.

Makati Leasing vs. Wearever

G.R. No. L-58469 May 16, 1983

Facts: Makati Leasing discounted and assigned receivables with Wearever Textile Mills, which the latter, to secure the
receivables, executed Chattel Mortgage over certain raw materials inventory as well as machinery Arto Aero Dryer
Stentering Range.

Since Wearever defaulted in payment, Makati Leasing file petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the property.

The RTC ordered for the enforcement of the writ of seizure and order to break open the premises Wearever.

The CA set aside the orders of RTC, ruling that the machinery in suit cannot be subject of replevin, much less of a chattel
mortgage, because it is a real property under the NCC, he same being attached to the ground by means of bolts and the
only way to remove it from respondent's plant would be to drill out or destroy the concrete floor.

Issue: WON the machineries are real property

Held: No. The machineries are personal property.

It was held in the case of Tulad v. Vicencio, that a house made of strong materials was a movable for the purposes of
executing a chattel mortgage thereon.

there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by
destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped
from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.

Bd. of Assessment vs. Meralco

G.R. No. L-15334 January 31, 1964

Facts: City Assessor of QC declared the steel towers for real property tax under Tax Declarations. After denying the
Meralco’s petition to cancel these declarations, an appeal was taken with the CTA which held that the steel towers
come under the exception of “poles” under the franchise given to MERALCO; the steel towers are personal
properties; and the City Treasurer is liable for the refund of the amount paid.
Issue: WON the steel towers of MERLCO constitute real property for the purposes of real property ta

Held: No. the steel towers s are personal property exempt from tax. The towers are poles. Par. 1 of aArt. 415 does not
apply in this case since the towers are not building adhered to the soil. they are removable and merely attached to a
square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to
place. They can not be included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and
they can be separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to which they are
attached. Each of these steel towers or supports consists of steel bars or metal strips, joined together by means of bolts,
which can be disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and reassembled by screwing the same. These steel towers or
supports do not also fall under paragraph 5, for they are not machineries, receptacles, instruments or implements, and
even if they were, they are not intended for industry or works on the land. Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or
works in the land in which the steel supports or towers are constructed.

Meralco Securities vs. Bd. of Assessment Appeals

G.R. No. L-46245 May 31, 1982

Facts: Meralco Securities installed from Batangas to Manila a pipeline system onsisting of cylindrical steel pipes joined
together and buried not less than one meter below the surface along the shoulder of the public highway.

In order to repair, replace, remove or transfer segments of the pipeline, the pipes have to be cold-cut by means of a
rotary hard-metal pipe-cutter after digging or excavating them out of the ground where they are buried. The Secretary
of Public Works and Communications approved the removal of the pipes.

. The provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real property and issued Tax Declaration. The Central Board of
Assessment Appeals that the pipeline is subject to realty tax.

Issue: WON the pipelines are real properties

Held: Yes. The pipelines are considered real property taxes. It is attached to the land in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without dismantling the steel pipes which were welded to form the pipeline.

Pipeline means a line of pipe connected to pumps, valves and control devices for conveying liquids, gases or finely
divided solids. It is a line of pipe running upon or in the earth, carrying with it the right to the use of the soil in which it is
placed.

Meralco vs. Bd. of Assessment Appeals

G.R. No. L-47943 May 31, 1982

Facts: Meralco stalled two oil storage tanks in Batangas which is owned by Caltex. The tax was assessed on such tanks.
But according to Meralco, the tank is not attached to its foundation. The steel sides of the tank are directly
supported underneath by a circular wall made of concrete to prevent the tank from sliding.

Central Board of Assessment Appeals, on the basis of an assessment made by the provincial assessor, required Meralco
to pay realty taxes on the two tanks.

Meralco contends that the said oil storage tanks do not fall within any of the kinds of real property enumerated in article
415 of the Civil Code and, therefore, they cannot be categorized as realty by nature, by incorporation, by destination nor
by analogy. Stress is laid on the fact that the tanks are not attached to the land and that they were placed on leased
land, not on the land owned by Meralco.

Issue: WON the oil tanks are real property thus Meralco is required Meralco to pay realty taxes on the two tanks.
Held: Yes.

The two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the
land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been
installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its
operations. Thus, Oil storage tanks were held to be taxable realty.

Caltex vs. Bd. of Assessment

G.R. No. L-50466 May 31, 1982

Facts: Caltex installed machinery and equipments on its gas station which were located on leased land. The said
machines and equipment are loaned by Caltex to gas station operators under an appropriate lease agreement or receipt.
The lessor of the land, where the gas station is located, does not become the owner of the machines and equipment
installed therein. Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of the lease. The city assessor of Pasay City
characterized the said items of gas station equipment and machinery as taxable realty.

Caltex filed this certiorari petition wherein it prayed for the setting aside of the Board's decision and for a declaration
that t he said machines and equipment are personal property not subject to realty tax.

Issue: WON the pieces of gas station equipment and machinery already enumerated are subject to realty tax.

Held: Yes. The equipment and machinery are subject to realty tax. We hold that the said equipment and machinery, as
appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which
fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and which
have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and
machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.

The question is whether the gas station equipment and machinery permanently affixed by Caltex to its gas station and
pavement (which are indubitably taxable realty) should be subject to the realty tax. This question is different from the
issue raised in the Davao Saw Mill case.

Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though for some purposes they might be considered
personalty (84 C.J.S. 181-2, Notes 40 and 41). "It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for
purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property" (Standard Oil Co. of New York
vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, 633).

Benguet Corp. vs. Central Bd. of Assessment Appeals

G.R. No. 106041 January 29, 1993

Facts: The realty tax assessment involved in this case amounts to Php 11, 319,304.00. It has been imposed on the
petitioner's tailings dam and the land thereunder over its protest. Benguet Corporation operated a mine in Zambales,
connected to a tailings dam.

The controversy arose in 1985 when The Provincial Assessor of Zambales classified the dam as a taxable improvement,
requiring corporation pay taxes of P 11, 319, 304 pesos. The assessment was appealed to the Board of Assessments
Appeals of the Province of Zambales. The appeal was dismissed.
Benguet seasonably elevated the matter to the CBAA which reversed the dismissal of the appeal but, on the merits,
agreed that "The tailings dam and the lands submerged thereunder were subject to realty tax.

Issue: Whether the tailings dam is subject to realty tax because it is an improvement upon the land.

Held: Yes. The Real Property Tax Code does not carry a definition of "real property" and simply says that the realty tax is
imposed on "real property, such as lands, buildings, machinery and other improvements affixed or attached to real
property." In the absence of such a definition, the court applied Article 415 of the Civil Code, the pertinent portions: Par
(1) and (3).

A structure constitutes an improvement so as to partake of the status of realty would depend upon the degree of
permanence intended in its construction and use. The expression "permanent" as applied to an improvement does not
imply that the improvement must be used perpetually but only until the purpose to which the principal realty is devoted
has been accomplished. It is sufficient that the improvement is intended to remain as long as the land to which it is
annexed is still used for the said purpose.

The court is convinced that the subject dam falls within the definition of an "improvement" because it is permanent in
character and it enhances the value and utility of petitioner's mine. Moreover, the immovable nature of the dam defines
its character as real property under Article 415 of the Civil Code and thus makes it taxable under Section 38 of the Real
Property Tax Code.

Tumalad vs. Vicencio

G.R. No. L-30173 September 30, 1971

Facts:

Alberta Vicencio and Emiliano Simeon received a loan of P4, 800 from Gavino and Generosa Tumalad. To guaranty said
loan, Vicencio executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Tumalad over their house of strong materials which stood on a
land which was rented from the Madrigal & Company, Inc. When Vicencio defaulted in paying, the house was
extrajudicially foreclosed, pursuant to their contract. It was sold to Tumalad and they instituted a Civil case in the
Municipal Court of Manila to have Vicencio vacate the house and pay rent.

The MTC decided in favor of Tumalad ordering Vicencio to vacate the house and pay rent until they have completely
vacated the house. Vicencio is questioning the legality of the chattel mortgage on the ground that 1) the signature on it
was obtained thru fraud and 2) the mortgage is a house of strong materials which is an immovable therefore can only be
the subject of a REM. On appeal, the CFI found in favor of Tumalad, and since the Vicencio failed to deposit the rent
ordered, it issued a writ of execution, however the house was already demolished pursuant to an order of the court in
an ejectment suit against Vicencio for non-payment of rentals. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the chattel mortgage is void since its subject is an immovable

HELD:

NO.
Although a building is by itself an immovable property, parties to a contract may treat as personal property that which
by nature would be real property and it would be valid and good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned.
By principle of estoppel, the owner declaring his house to be a chattel may no longer subsequently claim otherwise.

When Vicencio executed the Chattel Mortgage, it specifically provides that the mortgagor cedes, sells and transfers by
way of Chattel mortgage. They intended to treat it as chattel therefore are now estopped from claiming otherwise. Also
the house stood on rented land which was held in previous jurisprudence to be personalty since it was placed on the
land by one who had only temporary right over the property thus it does not become immobilized by attachment.

[Vicencio though was not made to pay rent since the action was instituted during the period of redemption therefore
Vicencio still had a right to remain in possession of the property].

Property of State

Bugal- B’laan Tribal Assn. vs. Ramos

G.R. No. 127882 January 27, 2004

Facts: The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that participation
in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their
enjoyment by non-Filipinos.

RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30,
1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized
under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and
North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23,
which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.

Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared
unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop
Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.

In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to
Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian
company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated
assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.

EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical
or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate
recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise
contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides
for the protection of Australian investments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit
the Philippine mineral resources.

2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract that permits fully foreign
owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
HELD:

First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to
exploit the Philippine natural resources.

Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State.

Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant
licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By
such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer
allowed under the 1987 Constitution.

Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a
particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over
the country‘s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of
extraction.

The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms of assistance in the 1973
Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial assistance. The management and the
operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the
evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in
the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly
against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service
contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987
Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial
ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.

The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just
like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of
the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to
these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.

The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-
40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization
of Philippine natural resources.

When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or
compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts
are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.

Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or
financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils.

Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract

The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a
service contract.

Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize
and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same
agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the
Mining Operations.

These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over
natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are
abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it
aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

Property of the State

Bugal- B’laan Tribal Assn. vs. Ramos

G.R. No. 127882 December 1, 2004

Facts:

Chavez vs. public Estate Authority

G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002

President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was tasked with the development,
improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then president also transferred to PEA the
foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal

Road and Reclamation Project.

Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then, years later, PEA entered into a JVA
with AMARI for the development of the Freedom Islands. These two entered into a joint venture in the absence
of any public bidding.

Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda denouncing the JVA as the grandmother of all
scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI were
lands of the public domain; the certificates of title over the

Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an investigatory committee on
the legality of the JVA.

Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the conveyance or sale of
the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the
parties.

ISSUE:

W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate
the Constitution.
HELD:

The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, which holds
that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.

The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all natural resources are owned by the State
and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated.

The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750 hectare reclamation
project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the area are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Further, it
is provided that AMARI will reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the areas of land and it will shoulder the other
reclamation costs to be incurred.

The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain, waters and other
natural resources and consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be
alienable unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas
by the PEA doesn’t convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. There must be a law or presidential

proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable if the law has reserved them
for some public or quasi-public use.

Usero vs. CA

G.R. NO. 155055 : January 26, 2005

Facts: Usero and Samela are owners of adjacent lots while spouses Polinar owns a lot behin those of Usero and Samela.
Situated between the lots of the parties is a low-level strip of land, with a stagnant body of water filled with floating
water lilies. Polinars suffer considerable damage every time the water rises, which prompted them to erect a concrete
wall on the bank of the low-level strip of land about three meters from their house and rip-rapped the soil on that
portion of the strip of land.

Both Usero and Samela claimed ownership to the said land and requested Apolinar stop their construction but the
spouses paid no heed, believing the strip to be part of a creek. Later Polinars Polinars offered to pay for the land being
claimed by petitioners Samela and Usero. However, the parties failed to settle their differences.

Useroa and Samela filed a case against spouses Polinar. The RTC said that the strip of the land formed part of the creek,
which is considered as public domain

Issue: WON the strip of land, allegedly encroached upon by the spouses Polinar, is the private property of petitioners or
part of the creek and therefore part of the public domain.

Held: Yes. The strip is part of the creek thus it is part of public domain.

That the subject strip of land is a creek is evidenced by: (1) a barangay certification that a creek exists in the disputed
strip of land; (2) a certification from the Second Manila Engineering District, NCR-DPWH, that the western portion of
Pilar Village where the subject strip of land is located is bounded by a tributary of Talon Creek and (3) photographs
showing the abundance of water lilies in the subject strip of land.

RT. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

The phrase "others of similar character" includes a creek which is a recess or an arm of a river. It is property belonging to
the public domain which is not susceptible to private ownership.9 Being public water, a creek cannot be registered
under the Torrens System in the name of any individual.

Private Property

Manotok vs. Heirs of Barque

Facts: Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de
Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands. (It is a Friar Land.)

o The subject parcel “Lot No. 823” is part of the Piedad Estate and is located in QC.

· On 23 December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the Philippine Government pursuant to the Friar Lands Act.
The certificate of title in the name of the government was OCT No. 614. The Estate was placed under the administration
of the Director of Lands.

· Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began after a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall
on June 11, 1988 which destroyed records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds.

· In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 372302 covering Lot
No. 823 with an area of 342,945 square meters à GRANTED à TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) was issued in 1991.

· In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No.
210177 in the name of Homer Barque also covering Lot 823. In support of their petition, the Barques submitted copies
of the alleged owner’s duplicate of the TCT, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan Fls 3168-D covering the
property.

o MANOTOKs opposed alleging that TCT No. 210177 was spurious.

· Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to land belonging to Lot No. 823, TCT No. 210177
actually involves 2 parcels with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) pertains
only to a 1 parcel of land, with a similar area of 342,945 square meters.

· 1997 – Barques’ petition was DENIED. à Lot. No. 823 already registered in the name of the Manotoks. -->
Barques MR was denied à They appealed to the LRA à LRA Reversed.

o LRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was fraudulent. Hence, it ordered the Barque title to be
reconstituted. BUT cancellation must 1st be sought in a court of competent jurisdiction of the 1991 Manotok TCT.

· The LRA denied the Manotoks’ MR and the Barques’ prayer for immediate reconstitution. Both the Manotoks and
the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the CA.

§ In the CA, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought the dismissal of the cases claiming ownership of
the subject property.

· 2002 and 2003 à 2 separate divisions of the CA both directed the RD of QC to cancel the Reconstituted Manotok
Title and to reconstitute the Barques’ “valid, genuine and existing” TCT No. 210177.
o Hence, the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which were ordered consolidated on August 2, 2004.

· December 12, 2005, SC First Division à affirmed both decisions of the CA. à Manotoks filed MR à Denied in April
2006 Resolution.

o Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second MR with their MR attached. à Denied in June
2006 Resolution. Eventually entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment on May 2, 2006. In the
meantime, the Barques filed multiple motions with the First Division for execution of the judgment, while the Manotoks
filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the SC En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral arguments).
à Case was referred to the En Banc in July 2006.

· On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to intervene, to which was
attached their petition in intervention. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Manahan, was issued
Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot No. 823 and attached the findings of the NBI that the documents of the Manotoks
were not as old as they were purported to be. Consequently, the Director of the Legal Division of the LMB
recommended to the Director of the LMB the reconstituted Manotok Title should be reverted to the state.

o Oral arguments were held on July 24, 2007.

· 2008 - En Banc set aside the December 2005 1st division decision and entry of judgment recalled and the CA’s
Amended Decisions in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700 were reversed and set aside. The En Banc remanded the case to
the CA.

o The CA was directed to receive evidence of and focus on the issue of WON the Manotoks can trace their claim of title
to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. PURPOSE: to decide
WON the title of the Maotoks should be annulled.

· CA’s findings à None of the parties were able to prove a valid alienation of Lot 823 from the government in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1120 otherwise known as the “Friar Lands Act”. Notably lacking in the deed of
conveyance of the Manotoks is the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce as required by Section 18 of
the said law. Upon close scrutiny, the factual allegations and voluminous documentary exhibits relating to the purchase
of Lot 823 by the predecessors-in-interest of the claimants revealed badges of fraud and irregularity.

BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:

Manotoks à Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in 1919. They have since occupied the land, built
their houses and buildings on it. The subject land is now known as Manotok Compound.

Barques à Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from Emiliano Setosta who had a TCT in his name.

Manahans à The lot originally belonged to his parents but was subsequently bought by his wife. They had a caretaker on
the property but she was ousted by armed men in 1950s so they just declared the property for taxation to protect their
rights.

Issue: WON the Manotoks have valid claim over the land

Held: No.

Sale Certificate No. 1054 was not signed by the Director of Lands nor approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
The Certificates of Assignment of Sale contained only the signature of the Director of Lands. The Manotoks belatedly
secured from the National Archives a certified copy of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 dated December 7, 1932, which
likewise lacks the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it was signed only by the Director of
Lands.
Act No. 1120 SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act
shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

· It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the sale of friar lands shall be valid only if
approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce).

Laurel vs. Garcia

G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990

Facts: FACTS: The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations Contract No.
300 dated June 27, 1958. A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino to make the property the subject of
a lease agreement with a Japanese firm. On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-
Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.
Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion, and not of private
ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code. The respondents rely upon the rule of lex situs which is used in
determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Roppongi property can be alienated by the Philippine Government.

HELD: No. There can be no doubt that the property is of public dominion. The property is classified under Art 420 of the
Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service. The fact that it has not been used for
actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Such conversion happens inly if
property is withdrawn from public use, through an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for
public service and to make it patrimonial property. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct
legal premises.

The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through reparation agreements. They
were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property was specifically designated under the
agreement to house the Philippine embassy.

It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. The
respondents have failed to do so.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its
ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and payment, in application to the satisfaction of collective
needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as the juridical person but the citizens; it is
intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.

Tantoco vs. Municipal Council

G.R. No. L-24950 March 25, 192

Facts: The Widow of Tan Toco sued the council of Iloilo for the amount og 42, 966.40, for purchasing two strips of land,
which the municipality of IloIlo has appropriated for widening of Calle Basa and Calle Aldiguer. Tantoco secured a writ of
execution on the Municipality’s properties because of lack of funds. However the provincial fiscal of IloIlo filed a motion
to dissolve the said attachment and be declared null and void as being illegal and violative of the rights of the
municipality. The counsel of Tan Toco objected the fiscal’s motion but the court declared the said attachments levied
upon the property of the municipality null and void, thereby dissolving the said attachment. From this, Tan Toco
appealed by bill of exceptions.

Issue: ether or not the property levied upon can be subject of execution.
Held: No.

article 343 of the Civil Code divides the property of provinces and towns (municipalities) into property for public use and
patrimonial property. According to article 344 of the same Code, provincial roads and foot-path, squares, streets,
fountains and public waters, drives and public improvements of general benefit built at the expense of the said towns or
provinces, are property for public use.

All other property possessed by the said towns and provinces is patrimonial and shall be subject to the provisions of the
Civil Code except as provided by special laws.

The property for public use of the State is not within the commerce of man and, consequently, is inalienable and not
subject to prescription. Likewise, property for public of the municipality is not within the commerce of man so long as it
is used by the public and, consequently, said property is also inalienable.

Property for public use is not within the commerce of man if used by the public, thus not subject to execution. The rule
also applies to funds in the hands of a public officer. Taxes due to a municipality cannot also be seized under execution
But a property used by municipality for quasi-private purposes (such as stocks) maybe subject to execution. Therefore,
properties levied upon cannot be the subject of execution because they are public properties or properties held by the
municipality in trust for the benefit of their inhabitants and used for public purpose.

Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga

G.R. No. L-24440 March 28, 1968

Facts: The Municipality of Zamboanga was converted into a chartered city. Sec. 50 ofCA 39 provided that the City of
Zamboanga would acquire property owned by the province at a price to be determined by the Auditor General. There
were 50 properties to be transferred, consisting of schools, a hospital, the provincial, capitol, and a leprosarium, among
others.

Later, the province was divided into Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. RA 3039 was enacted amending Sec.
50 of CA 39. It states: “All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located
within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga.”

The Province contends that the law is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the transfer of its patrimonial property
without compensation therefor.

ISSUES:

Are the properties mentioned, properties for public use or patrimonial property?

Should the city pay for said properties?

HELD:

If we follow the Civil Code classification, only the high school playgrounds are for public use since it is the only one that
is available to the general public, and all the rest are patrimonial property since they are not devoted to public use but
to public service. But if we follow the law on Municipal Corporations, as long as the purpose is for a public service, the
property should be considered for PUBLIC USE.

If the Civil Code classification is used, since almost all the properties involved are patrimonial, the law would be
unconstitutional since the province would be deprived of its own property without just compensation. If the law on
Municipal Corporations would be followed, the properties would be of public dominion, and therefore NO
COMPENSATION would be required. It is the law on Municipal Corporations that should be followed. Firstly, while the
Civil Code may classify them as patrimonial, they should not be regarded as ordinary private property. They should fall
under the control of the State, otherwise certain governmental activities would be impaired. Secondly, Art. 424, 2nd
paragraph itself says "without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."

Salas vs. Jarencio

G.R. No. L-29788. August 30, 1972

Facts: City of Manila – owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as Lot 1, Block 557 of Cadastral Survey of City of
Manila, containing an area of 9689.80 sqm. On various dates in 1927, City of Manila sold portions of the parcel of land.
When the last sale was effected August 1924, Transfer Certificate of Title 22547 covering the residue of the land 7490.10
sam was issued in the name of City of Manila.

On September 1960, Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution requesting the President to consider the
feasibility of declaring the land under Transfer Certificate of Title 25545-25547 as patrimonial property of Manila for the
purpose of selling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. The resolution was then transmitted to the Congress. The
bill was then passed by Congress and approved by President, and became Republic Act 4118, converting the land from
communal property to disposable and alienable land of State.

To implement RA 4118, Land Authority requested City of Manila to deliver the City’s TCT 22547 in order to
obtain title thereto in the name of Land Authority. The request was granted with the knowledge and consent of City
mayor, cancelling TCT 22547 and issuing TCT 80876 in the name of Land Authority.

City of Manila, for some reasons, brought an action to restrain, prohibit, and enjoin Land Authority and Register of
Deeds from implementing RA 4118, and praying for the declaration of RA 4118 as unconstitutional.

Trial court declared RA 4118 to be unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that it deprived City of its property
without due process of law and payment of just compensation.

Land Authority and Register of Deeds argued that the land is a communal land, or a portion of public domain owned by
State; that the land has not been used by City of Manila for any public purpose; that it was originally a communal land
not because it was needed in connection with its organisation as a municipality but rather for the common use of its
inhabitants; that the City mayor merely enjoys the usufruct over said land and its exercise of acts of ownership by selling
parts thereof did not necessarily convert the land into a patrimonial property of City of Manila nor divert the State of its
paramount title.

Issue:

Whether the aforementioned land is a private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila.

Held:

The land is public property.

As a general rule, regardless of the source or classification of the land in the possession of municipality, excepting those
which it acquired in its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held for the State for the benefit
of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. The legal situation is the same if the State
itself holds the property and puts it to a different use.
When it comes to property of municipality which it did not acquire in its private or corporate capacity with its own funds
(the land was originally given to City by Spain), the legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to an
agency of the National Government to be disposed of according to its discretion. Here it did so in obedience to the
constitutional mandate of promoting social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of the people.

The property was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. The land
was part of the territory of City of Manila granted by sovereign in its creation. Furthermore, City expressly recognised
the paramount title of the State over its land when it requested the President to consider the feasibility of declaring the
lot as patrimonial property for selling.

There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land belongs to the State and was simply granted in
usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes. But since the City did not actually use said land for any recognized
public purpose and allowed it to remain idle and unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by squatters, no
presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of the City of Manila may be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is
its own private or patrimonial property.

Cebu vs. Bercilles

G.R. No. L40474 August 29, 1975

Facts: