CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 46 Original Cases
1. Guy vs CA 535 Scra 584 Pracuelles
FACTS: Gilbert, petitioner, is the son of Francisco and
Simny Guy. Respondents, Geraldine, Gladys and Grace
are his sisters. The family feud involves the ownership
and control of 20,160 shares of stock of Northern Islands
Co., Inc. (Northern Islands).Northern Islands is a family-
owned corporation. In November 1986, they
incorporated Lincoln Continental as a holding company
of the 50% shares of stock of Northern Islands in trust
for their daughters, respondents. In December 1986,
upon instruction of spouses Guy, Atty. Andres
Gatmaitan, president of Lincoln Continental, indorsed in
blank Stock Certificate No. 132 (covering 8,400 shares)
and Stock Certificate No. 133 (covering 11,760 shares)
and delivered them to Simny. In 1984, spouses Guy
found that their son Gilbert has been disposing of the
assets of their corporations without authority. In order
to protect the assets of Northern Islands, the20,160
shares covered by the two Stock Certificates were then
registered in the names of respondent sisters, thus
enabling them to assume an active role in the
management of Northern Islands. Thereafter, Simny was
elected President; Grace as Vice-President for Finance
;Geraldine as Corporate Treasurer; and Gladys as
Corporate Secretary. Gilbert retained his position as
Executive Vice President. This development started the
warfare between Gilbert and his sisters. Lincoln
Continental filed a Complaint for Annulment of the
Transfer of Shares of Stock against respondents. The
complaint basically alleges that Lincoln Continental
owns20,160 shares of stock of Northern Islands; and that
respondents, in order to oust Gilbert from the
management of Northern Islands, falsely transferred the
said shares of stock in respondent sisters’ names. The
trial court held that the complaint was baseless and an
unwarranted suit among family members. That based on
the evidence, Gilbert was only entrusted to hold the
disputed shares of stock in his name for the benefit of
the other family members; and that it was only when
Gilbert started to dispose of the assets of the family’s
corporations without their knowledge that respondent
sisters caused the registration of the shares in their
respective names.
On November 8, 2005, Ignacio and Ignacio Law Offices
and Smart net filed with this Court their petitions
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. NOS. 170185 and
170186, respectively.
On February 27, 2006, Lincoln Continental filed with this
Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 85937, docketed as G.R. No. 171066.
On March 20, 2006, we ordered the consolidation
of G.R. No. 171066 with G.R. NOS. 165849, 170185, and
170186.
RTC: The trial court held that Civil Case No. 04-109444 is
a baseless and an unwarranted suit among family
members; that based on the evidence, Gilbert was only
entrusted to hold the disputed shares of stock in his
name for the benefit of the other family members; and
that it was only when Gilbert started to dispose of the
assets of the family's corporations without their
knowledge that respondent sisters caused the
registration of the shares in their respective names.
CA: Court of Appeals (Special Second Division) affirmed
the Decision in Civil Case No. 04-109444 of the RTC
(Branch 25) dismissing Lincoln Continental's complaint
and Gilbert's complaint-in-intervention, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeals are dismissed and the assailed
decision AFFIRMED with modifications that plaintiff and
plaintiff-intervenor are ordered to pay each of the
defendants-appellees Simny Guy, Geraldine Guy, Grace
Guy-Cheu and Gladys Yao moral damages
of P500,000.00, exemplary damages of P100,000.00 and
attorney's fees of P500,000.00.
ISSUE: In G.R. NOS. 170185 and 170186, the pivotal
issue is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that petitioners Ignacio and Ignacio
Law Offices and Smartnet are also covered by its
Resolution granting the writ of preliminary injunction in
favor of respondents.
HELD: Ignacio and Ignacio Law Offices and Smartnet,
petitioners, claim that the Court of Appeals never
acquired jurisdiction over their respective persons as
they were not served with summons, either by the MeTC
or by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 87104. Thus,
they submit that the Court of Appeals committed grave
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abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it included them in the coverage of its
injunctive writ.
Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by the law to a
court or tribunal to entertain, hear, and determine
certain controversies. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law.
Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended,
provides:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto,
and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction.
Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, governs all cases originally filed with the
Court of Appeals. The following provisions of the Rule
state:
SEC. 2. To what actions applicable. - This Rule shall apply
to original actions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto.
Except as otherwise provided, the actions for annulment
of judgment shall be governed by Rule 47, for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus by Rule 65, and for quo
warranto by Rule 66.
xxx
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how
acquired. - The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent by the service on him of its
order or resolution indicating its initial action on the
petition or by his voluntary submission to such
jurisdiction.
SEC. 5. Action by the court. - The court may dismiss the
petition outright with specific reasons for such dismissal
or require the respondent to file a comment on the
same within ten (10) days from notice. Only pleadings
required by the court shall be allowed. All other
pleadings and papers may be filed only with leave of
court.
It is thus clear that in cases covered by Rule 46, the
Court of Appeals acquires jurisdiction over the persons
of the respondents by the service upon them of its order
or resolution indicating its initial action on the petitions
or by their voluntary submission to such
jurisdiction.14 The reason for this is that, aside from the
fact that no summons or other coercive process is
served on respondents, their response to the petitions
will depend on the initial action of the court thereon.
Under Section 5, the court may dismiss the petitions
outright, hence, no reaction is expected from
respondents and under the policy adopted by Rule 46,
they are not deemed to have been brought within the
court's jurisdiction until after service on them of the
dismissal order or resolution.
Records show that on April 27, 2005, petitioners in these
two forcible entry cases, were served copies of the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division)
dated April 26, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87104. The
Resolution states:
Private respondents SMARTNET PHILIPPINES,
INC., IGNACIO & IGNACIO LAW OFFICE,
SUNFIRE TRADING, INC., ZOLT CORPORATION,
CELLPRIME DISTRIBUTION CORPO., GOODGOLD
REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORP., are hereby
DIRECTED to file CONSOLIDATED COMMENT on
the original Petition for Certiorari, the First
Supplemental Petition for Certiorari, and the
Second Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (not
a Motion to Dismiss) within ten (10) days from
receipt of a copy of the original, first and second
Petitions for Certiorari.
Pursuant to Rule 46, the Court of Appeals validly
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Ignacio and
Ignacio Law Offices and Smartnet upon being served
with the above Resolution.
But neither of the parties bothered to file the required
comment. Their allegation that they have been deprived
of due process is definitely without merit. We have
consistently held that when a party was afforded an
opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed
to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due
process for by such failure, he is deemed to have waived
or forfeited his right to be heard without violating the
constitutional guarantee.
On the question of whether the Court of Appeals could
amend its Resolution directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction so as to include petitioners,
suffice to state that having acquired jurisdiction over
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
their persons, the appellate court could do so pursuant
to Section 5 (g), Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court,
However, the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur denied the
thus:
motion to withdraw the indictments on the ground
SEC. 5. Inherent powers of courts. - Every court
that there was probable cause for the filing of the
shall have power:
Informations. Petitioners moved to reconsider the
xxx
denial, but this motion was similarly denied.
(g) To amend and control its process and orders
so as to make them conformable to law and
justice.
Petitioners then elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari. |
In Villanueva v. CFI of Oriental Mindoro19 and Eternal
Gardens Memorial Parks Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, we held that under this Rule, a court has inherent
power to amend its judgment so as to make it II. CA
conformable to the law applicable, provided that said
judgment has not yet acquired finality, as in these cases.
The appellate court dismissed the petition. The
Court of Appeals found that the copies of the
2. Religioso Molina vs CA GR No 1314156 assailed orders of the trial court were purportedly
certified, but there was no showing whatsoever of
TEDDY MOLINA, JULIET PASCUAL, ISAGANI the authority of the person who certified the same.
YAMBOT, and LETTY JIMENEZ-MAGSANOC, Moreover, the seal of the trial court could not be
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and identified on the copies of said orders. Furthermore,
RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT, respondents. the petition was not accompanied by all the
pleadings and documents pertinent thereto.

I.FACTS
III. Petitioners then moved for reconsideration,
but this was likewise denied.

Private respondent Raymundo Armovit filed a

complaint for libel against petitioners, alleging that
they caused to be published reports that maliciously IV. PETITION FOR REVIEW TO SC
accused him of harboring and/or concealing a
convicted murderer.
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the
In a resolution dated October 31, 1996, the
resolutions dated September 30, 1999 1 and May 2,
Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Sur found probable
2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
cause and recommended the filing of an Information
54397. Both resolutions dismissed herein
for libel against petitioners. Accordingly, on
petitioners' special civil action for certiorari due to
November 28, 1996, two Informations for libel were
their failure to: (a) include certified true copies of the
filed with the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur.
orders dated July 9, 1997 and June 29, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch
21, and other pleadings referred to in the petition;
On December 12, 1996, petitioners sought a review and (b) implead the RTC judge as a nominal party.
of the resolution dated October 31, 1996 by the
Office of the Regional State Prosecutor. The latter
reversed the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor
Petitioners contend, firstly, that they should not be
and directed the latter to withdraw the Informations
faulted for such technical defects as the failure to
filed.
indicate the authority of the certifying officer or the
inscrutable imprint of the trial court's seal because
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
they did not have a hand in the preparation of the
documents. After all, they only relied in good faith
on the authority and diligence of the court personnel
who prepared and authenticated the subject
documents, considering that said personnel are
presumed to know the procedural and technical
requirements and because of the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.
According to petitioners, it was too harsh and
arbitrary for the Court of Appeals to fault them for
the oversight committed by the trial court personnel.
Second, petitioners aver that their failure to attach
the pleadings and documents relevant to the petition
is immaterial as the Supreme Court, in a long line of
cases, has given due course to similarly faulty
petitions in the interests of equity and justice and
merely directed that the lacking pleadings and
documents be attached.
Lastly, petitioners claim that they did not err if they
only mentioned in the caption of the petition the trial
court and not the trial court judge. After all, it is clear
from the enumeration of parties against whom or
against which a petition for certiorari may be filed,
namely, any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in Rule 65,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court that they need not
implead the officer or the trial court judge who
committed the grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to want or excess of jurisdiction.
V. ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals commit a
reversible error of law in dismissing the petition?
VI. SC RULING
The Court find that it did.
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled
that the CA erred in stressing too much on
petitioners' failure to comply with technicalities. The
Court cannot attribute to petitioners the perceived
defects on the attached copies of the trial court's
orders because petitioners did not have control over
their preparations. The Court likewise ruled that the
alleged failure to attach all pleadings and
documents is not a sufficient ground to dismiss the
petition. In appropriate cases, the courts may
liberally construe procedural rules in order to meet
and advance the cause of substantial justice.
Lastly, it is not required under Rule 65, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court that the trial judge himself be
impleaded in a petition for certiorari. The inclusion of
the tribunal, which issued the decision, as nominal
party, was substantially complied with. When
petitioners mentioned RTC, Branch 21 of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, they also referred necessarily to the
judge who issued the assailed resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 54397, dated September 30, 1999 and May
2, 2000 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Court of Appeals is hereby directed to reinstate the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioners in CA-G.R.
SP No. 54397, with dispatch.
3. NYK International Knitwear Corp. PH v NLRC , G.R.
No. 146267, February 17, 2003 ACOSTA
I. Established Facts
Virginia Publico was a sewer in NYK International
Knitwear Corp. PH (NYK).
On May 7, 1997, she allegedly requested to be allowed
home due to influenza but was not allowed. The
following day, she was still sick so she did not go to
work.
On May 9, 1997, she was refused entry to the NYK
premises and was eventually told, by Stephen Ng, owner
of NYK, that she was fired.
She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter against NYK and its manager, Cathy Ng.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
Stephen Ng alleged that Publico’s husband prevented
her from working so they were forced to fire her.
II. LA and NLRC Ruling
The LA ruled in favour of Publico. The NLRC affirmed it.
III. Petition for Certiorari with CA
NYK alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction to public respondent NLRC for
affirming the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
The CA dismissed the petition because there was non-
compliance with Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure as the petition was merely
accompanied by a certified xerox copy of the assailed
NLRC decision, instead of a certified true copy thereof
as required by the Rules of Court. Furthermore,
petitioners failed to attach the other pleadings and
documents pertinent and material to their petition, such
as the parties’ position papers, their evidence and the
motion for reconsideration in contravention of the said
rule.
IV. Petition for Review on Certiorari with SC
NYK alleges that the original NLRC decision was printed
on onionskin was not legible, the NLRC itself
photocopied the resolution and certified it afterwards. In
addition, as proof of their request for a certified true
copy, they attached receipts of their request from the
NLRC.
V. ISSUE: W.O.N NYK substantially complied with
the Rules in submitting a photocopy of the
original NLRC decision
VI. Ruling
No.
Section 1 of Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
requires that the petition shall be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment or order subject
thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto. [and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided
in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.]
Administrative Circular No. 3-96, provides that a certified
true copy is:
“The "certified true copy" thereof shall be such other
copy furnished to a party at his instance or in his behalf,
duly authenticated by the authorized officers or
representatives of the issuing entity as hereinbefore
specified.
“The certified true copy must further comply with all the
regulations therefor of the issuing entity and it is the
authenticated original of such certified true copy, and
not a mere xerox copy thereof, which shall be utilized
as an annex to the petition or other initiatory
pleading.”
“Failure to do so shall result in the rejection of such
annexes and the dismissal of the case. Subsequent
compliance shall not warrant any reconsideration unless
the court is fully satisfied that the non-compliance was
not in any way attributable to the party, despite due
diligence on his part, and that there are highly justifiable
and compelling reasons for the court to make such other
disposition as it may deem just and equitable.”
Therefore, the CA was correct in dismissing the case.
Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus
1. VICTORINO E. DAY v. THE RTC of Zamboanga,
Presided by Hon. Judge Eisma, and GO CHU
GR No. 79119 November 22, 1990 CABEL
Doctrine: Sec. 22 of B.P. 129 provides that decisions of
inferior courts may be elevated to the Regional Trial
Court only by ordinary appeal, that is, by filing a Notice
of Appeal with the inferior court. The said proviso does
not admit of any other mode of elevating decisions of
inferior courts to the Regional Trial Court presumably to
carry out the purpose of B.P. 129 which is to simplify
judicial procedure to effect a speedy administration of
justice
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
Questions of fact cannot be raised in an original action
for certiorari. Only established or admitted facts can be
considered.
I. Established Facts
Petitioner Victorino Day is the registered owner of a
parcel of land situated at Tomas Claudio St., Zamboanga
City. Private respondent Go Chu is the owner of a
building constructed on the said lot occupying an area of
101 square meters.
Petitioner asked private respondent to peacefully
vacate and remove the portion of the the latter’s
building standing on the former’s lot. The latter refused.
Petitioner instituted a formal complaint against
respondent with the Office of the Barangay Chairman,
Zone I, Zamboanga City. As no amicable settlement
could be reached in the case, the Barangay Chairman
issued a certification that conciliation of the dispute at
the barangay level had failed.
The dispute continued for a number of years. On
1984, petitioner agreed to accept P1,000.00 from private
respondent as rental for the use of his lot from 1979 to
December 1984. Because Day received the money, Go
Chu claimed the existence of a lease contract between
them. However, Go Chu failed to prove the existence of
such.
II. MTC
On 1985, Day made another demand to remove the
building. Because of private respondent’s adamant and
continued refusal to vacate the disputed lot, petitioner
filed an action for unlawful detainer with application for
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. But Day did
not use the former Barangay Certification in
commencing the said suit against Go Chu.
The trial court ruled in favor of Day
No motion for reconsideration was filed by Go Chu.
III. Petition for Certiorari (RTC)
Go Chu filed an original action for certiorari with
respondent court against Judge Cabato and petitioner
Victorino Day. Pending hearing of the application for
preliminary injunction, respondent court issued a
temporary restraining order in the case.
At the hearing of the application for preliminary
injunction, the parties waived further oral arguments
and submitted the case based on their pleadings and
documents.
Respondent court issued an order resolving all the
matters and issues in the petition in favor of herein
petitioner Day, that the petition on its main is "lacking in
merit except that there are still certain matters which
the respondent court would like to resolve after hearing
thereon." (Rollo, p. 3). The application for preliminary
injunction was likewise denied and the hearing of the
main petition was set on June 24, 1986. At the said
hearing, respondent court gave the parties opportunity
to adduce additional arguments on the merits of the
case. They, however, submitted the case for decision
without further arguments, relying therefore on the
pleadings and documents on record.
However, respondent court issued another order
granting the petition for certiorari and setting aside the
decision of Judge Cabato of the Municipal Trial Court. In
connection therewith, the parties were directed to
submit their dispute before the Lupong Tagapayapa
pursuant to the requirements of PD 1508. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied on June 25, 1987.
IV. Petition for Review the decision of RTC of
Zamboanga City
Issues:
1. May respondent court modify or reverse its own
order after the lapse of 15 days from its issuance
2. Does BP 129 allow the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer
case to apply for a writ of preliminary injunction
3. Is the prior conciliation proceedings pursuant to P.D.
1508 applicable to petitioner’s suit in the MTC
4. May respondent court entrain the petition for review
on certiorari when the proper remedy is ordinary appeal
5. In a petition for certiorari, may respondent court
entertain procedural questions or questions of facts or
substance already decided by the lower court
6. May respondent court grant a writ of certiorari on the
grounds other than those specified under Section 1, Rule
65 of ROC
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
V. Supreme Court
1. Petitioner’s contentions
Petitioner maintains that the respondent court
has no jurisdiction to reverse its own order after
the lapse of 15 days from its issuance because it
was a final order, all issues in the main petition
having been resolved therein.
According to petitioner, since the respondent
court resolved no new or other matter in its
subsequent order, the first order should be
considered as already a final one insofar as the
issues resolved therein are concerned.
Private respondent’s contentions
Chu argues that the first order was merely an
interlocutory order that did not finally dispose
of the action and that the dispositive portion
thereof dealt only with the preliminary
injunction incident; that the denial of the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
and the setting of further hearing on the main
petition was the highlight of the said order and
that since the order was interlocutory in nature,
nothing precluded respondent judge from
further hearing the case after the issuance of
the May 27, 1986 order and deciding it on its
merits on July 8, 1986.
No. "The test to ascertain whether an order is
interlocutory or final is: does it leave something to be
done in the court with respect to the merits of the case?
If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final." In
the instant case, it is evident that the respondent court
resolved no new or other matter in the order of July 8,
1986. Such being the case, it necessarily follows that the
order of May 27, 1986 should be deemed as a final order
in so far as the issues resolved therein are concerned. An
order which decides an issue or issues in a complaint is
final and appealable, although the other issue or issues
have not been resolved, if the latter issues are distinct
and separate from the others. Thus, the respondent
court was without jurisdiction to modify or reverse the
earlier order after the expiration of fifteen (15) days
from and after receipt thereof by the parties,
considering that there was no motion for
reconsideration filed by then private respondent Go Chu.
2. Yes. With the advent of B.P. 129, Art. 539 of the New
Civil Code, Sec. 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, and Sec.
3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court have been substantially
modified. B.P. 129 provides: "provided the main action is
within its jurisdiction, an inferior court can appoint a
receiver and it has jurisdiction to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction in either forcible entry or unlawful
detainer cases." "Under the present law, an inferior
court has jurisdiction to grant provisional remedies in
proper cases. These proper cases would be:
1. Preliminary attachment under Rule 57,
provided the principal action is within its
jurisdiction such as an action for recovery of
personal property valued at not more than
P20,000.00; an action for recovery of a sum
of money not exceeding P20,000.00; an
action of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer
2. Preliminary injunction under Rule 58 in both
forcible entry and unlawful detainer also in
cases mentioned in the preceding
paragraph
3. Yes
Sec. 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of
complaint. — No complaint, petition, action or
proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon as provided in Sec. 2
hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any
other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confrontation of the parties
before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and
no conciliation or settlement has been reached
as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the
Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or
Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has
been repudiated. However, the parties may go
directly to court in the following cases:
1)where the accused is under detention;
(2) where a person has otherwise been
deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas
corpus proceedings;
(3) actions coupled with provisional remedies
such as preliminary injunction, attachment
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
delivery of personal property and support
pendente lite;
(4) where the action may otherwise be barred
by the Statute of Limitations
Prior conciliation proceedings were inapplicable
to the petitioner’s suit, the action being for ejectment
with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. The case of petitioner being an exception to
the requirement of prior conciliation by P.D. 1508, it was
not necessary for petitioner to first secure the necessary
certification to file action from the proper barangay
court. Even assuming that petitioner’s complaint for
ejectment in the Municipal Trial Court did not fall within
the exceptions enumerated in Sec. 6 of P.D. 1508, the
lower court in its decision ruled that the April 1982
certification to file action issued by the proper Barangay
Court was sufficient compliance
4. Private respondent is of the firm belief that the action
he filed before the respondent RTC was both an original
action for certiorari and a petition for certiorari as a
mode of appeal.
We disagree. Applying Sec. 22 of B.P. 129,
decisions of inferior courts may be elevated to the
Regional Trial Court only by ordinary appeal, that is, by
filing a Notice of Appeal with the inferior court. The
said proviso does not admit of any other mode of
elevating decisions of inferior courts to the Regional
Trial Court presumably to carry out the purpose of B.P.
129 which is to simplify judicial procedure to effect a
speedy administration of justice
5. No. The barangay certificate of 1982 was admitted
and found to be sufficient by the MTC, after considering
the circumstances surrounding its issuance. This is a
procedural question or a question of fact which cannot
be raised or corrected in a certiorari case, but should be
assigned as error and reviewed in the appeal properly
taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on
the merits of the case. It should be remembered that
except for the lower court’s admission in evidence of
the Barangay Certification and the said court’s
appreciations of the said Certification as sufficient
compliance, the respondent court’s order (RTC), which
is herein sought to be nullified, resolved all the matters
raised by private respondent in his petition, against the
latter. Admissibility of evidence is a matter that is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Such
being the case, no potent reason existed to justify
respondent court’s substitution of the lower court’s
judgment with its own judgment.
Further, in an original action for certiorari, questions of
fact cannot be raised much less passed upon by the
respondent court. Thus, it has been ruled that:
Questions of fact cannot be raised in an original
action for certiorari. Only established or
admitted facts can be considered.
It is therefore clear that respondent court erred in
reversing the lower court’s findings regarding the
sufficiency of the Barangay Certificate of 1982. It was an
error for the respondent court to rule upon a question of
fact or procedural question already decided by the lower
court.
6. No. In an original action for certiorari under Sec. 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the grounds for the
issuance of the Writ of Certiorari are as follows, to wit:
a) Lack of jurisdiction
b) Grave abuse of discretion
c) When the court acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
In the ejectment suit filed by petitioner against
private respondent, the lower court undoubtedly
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and over
the person of then defendant (now private respondent)
by the filing of the complaint and service of summons
upon then defendant (now private respondent) and the
filing by the latter of his answer.
Assuming that the lower court committed a
mistake on the merits of the case, it was in the exercise
of such jurisdiction. The error, if at all, is at most one of
judgment and not of jurisdiction, which cannot be the
object of a petition for certiorari. The proper remedy in
such case was appeal. Errors in the application of the law
and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court
after it has acquired jurisdiction over a case, are
correctible only by appeal
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
Neither can it be said that the lower court
committed a grave abuse of discretion or exceeded its
jurisdiction when it appreciated the barangay
certification as sufficient compliance with P.D. 1508. In
the petition for certiorari filed by private respondent
before the respondent court, he did not allege that the
lower court’s decision was outside or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or was issued in grave abuse of discretion.
Private respondent merely alleged that the lower court
"erroneously" appreciated facts and evidence, issued
interlocutory orders, and appreciated the issues. He also
challenged the soundness of the decision. These do not
constitute excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. It must be remembered that there is "excess
of jurisdiction" where the court has jurisdiction but has
transcended the same or acted without any statutory
authority. There is "grave abuse of discretion" where
there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction or where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reasons of passion or personal hostility, and
it is so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. We
find no such grave abuse of discretion committed by the
lower court in appreciating the barangay certification to
be sufficient compliance with P.D. 1508. In fact, the
respondent court categorically ruled that there was no
grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the lower court when it held that:
The foregoing recital and discussions of each
particular questioned act of the respondent
judge would plainly show that no grave abuse of
discretion has been committed by him. If any,
they could have been assigned as errors in an
ordinary appeal, which to the mind of the Court
should have been the remedy resorted to by the
herein petitioner.
2. Romy’s Freight Service vs Castro GR. NO. 141637
Culajara
I. ESTABLISHED FACTS
This case originated from a complaint for illegal
dismissal filed jointly by private respondents Jesus C.
Castro and Dominador Veloria against petitioner Romys
Freight Service, represented by Roman G. Cruz, its
owner/sole proprietor, with the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in Baguio City.
Private respondent Castro was hired by petitioner
as a mechanic in April 1975. He was promoted to
supervisor in 1986. On December 31, 1994, he suffered a
stroke. On his doctors advice, he took a leave of absence
from work. Pending recovery, he extended his leave
several times. While on leave, however, petitioner
Roman G. Cruz sent him several letters first urging him
to return to work. The succeeding ones assumed the
nature of show cause letters requiring him to explain
why he should not be disciplined for his prolonged
absence. Cruz also filed complaints for estafa and
qualified theft against him. Because of these, Castro was
constrained to file a case for illegal dismissal against
petitioner on the ground that Cruzs acts constituted
constructive dismissal.
On the other hand, private respondent Veloria was
hired by petitioner in 1977 as a carpenter. After several
years, he was promoted to mechanic and, in 1993, as
senior mechanic. Sometime in the last week of February
1995, he figured in an accident. The overheated water
coming from the radiator of a car he was repairing
spurted onto his face, burning it. He was forced to
absent himself from work to undergo recuperation.
During his absence, he received several letters from
Cruz. One letter required him to explain the loss of
several tools, another ordered him to pay his loan and
still another required him to explain his absences. He
was later charged for qualified theft of the missing tools.
Because of petitioners acts against him, Veloria joined
Castro in filing a case for illegal constructive dismissal
against petitioner.
II. LABOR ARBITER
On September 15, 1997, executive labor arbiter
Jesselito Latoja ruled that petitioner was guilty of illegal
dismissal and ordered it to pay private respondents the
total amount of P352,944.90, representing 13th month
pay, backwages, separation pay, premium pay for work
rendered on rest days and holidays, and attorneys fees.
Private respondents moved for the clarification of the
decision, specifically on the award of backwages in their
favor. While the decision discussed their entitlement to
backwages, it was not included in the computation of
the judgment award in the dispositive portion of the
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decision. The labor arbiter, in his October 1, 1997 order,
recognized his inadvertence and granted the motion. He
amended the decision and increased the award to
P985,529.20 to include backwages.
III. NLRC
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which, in its
October 29, 1998 decision, reversed and set aside the
labor arbiters ruling. It found private respondents guilty
of abandonment of work and dismissed their complaint
for illegal dismissal against petitioner.
IV. COURT OF APPEALS
Aggrieved, private respondents filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
Court of Appeals (CA). They ascribed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the NLRC for not finding that they were
constructively dismissed by petitioner.
On September 9, 1999, the appellate court granted
the petition. It ruled that, since the findings of the labor
arbiter were supported by substantial evidence, it
should be respected by appellate tribunals. Petitioner
failed to overcome the burden of proving the existence
of just cause for dismissing private respondents, hence,
it was guilty of illegal dismissal. The CA rejected
petitioners contention that private respondents
abandoned their work. It held that their failure to report
for work was for justifiable reasons and that they had no
intention to sever their employment. As a consequence,
the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the NLRC
and reinstated the September 15, 1997 decision of the
labor arbiter as modified by the latter’s October 1, 1997
order.
V. ISSUE - Whether or not the petition for certiorari was
correctly granted even without the filing of a motion for
reconsideration
VI. RULING
As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is
needed before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 can
be resorted to. However, there are well recognized
exceptions to this rule. Private respondents petition for
certiorari before the CA was covered by the exceptions.
These exceptions are:
(a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
Court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or
of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action
is perishable;
(d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless;
(e) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable;
(g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process;
(h) Where the proceedings were ex parte or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved.
The issue raised in the certiorari proceeding before
the appellate court, i.e., whether private respondents
were constructively dismissed without just cause, was
also the very same issue raised before the NLRC and
resolved by it. Moreover, the employer-employee
relationship between petitioner and private respondents
was impressed with public interest. Thus, it was proper
for the appellate court to take cognizance of the case
even if no motion for reconsideration had been filed by
private respondents with the NLRC.
3. MS. EMILY YU FAJARDO, SPOUSES SALVADOR and
ENGRACIA GIANAN, RENE and BEVERLY RODELAS,
SPOUSES JULIAN and TERESITA CUIZON, MS. TERESITA
RIVERA and RICARDO VILLANUEVA vs. HON. ODILON I.
BAUTISTA, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Calamba, Laguna,
SPOUSES ISABELO and PURITA JAREÑO, RUBEN
HABACON, and CESAR S. REYES, in his capacity as the
Register of Deeds, Calamba, Laguna
G.R. Nos. 102193-97 May 10, 1994 CRUZ
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DOCTRINE: Although the special civil action
of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is
available, it may be granted where it is shown that the
appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will
not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of
the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate
and ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a
substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, where
such loss is occasioned by the petitioner's own neglect or
error in the choice of remedies
I. ESTABLISHED FACTS
Private respondents Isabelo Jareño and Purita Jareño
(hereinafter JAREÑOS) are the owners and developers of
a subdivision known as the Calamba Central Compound.
On various dates, they as SELLERS, and the petitioners as
BUYERS signed separate contracts, each designated as a
CONTRACT TO SELL, under which, for the considerations
therein stated, they bound themselves to sell to the
petitioners the lots subject thereof, and after the latter
shall have paid the purchase price and interest, to
execute in favor of the petitioners the corresponding
deeds of transfer of title, free from any lien or
encumbrance except those expressly provided for in the
Contract to Sell.
On the other hand, private respondent Fernando Realty
and Development Corporation (hereinafter FERNANDO)
as SELLER, and petitioner Emily Yu Fajardo as BUYER
signed a CONTRACT TO SELL under which for the
considerations therein stated, FERNANDO agreed to sell
to Fajardo a Lot, also located at the Calamba Central
Compound Subdivision, and upon full payment of the
agreed price and interest thereon, to execute a deed of
absolute sale in favor of Fajardo.
It appears, however, that the JAREÑOS sold the
aforesaid lots subject of the different contracts to sell to
private respondent Ruben Habacon (hereinafter
HABACON) under separate documents denominated as
"Kasulatan ng Bilihan." HABACON caused the
cancellation of the certificates of title covering the said
lots and the issuance of new ones in his name.
II. COMPLAINT
Petitioners filed separate complaints with the court a
quo for annulment of the sales in favor of HABACON and
of the new certificates of title issued to him, for
reinstatement of the certificates of title cancelled by
those issued to HABACON, and for accounting and
damages.
III. MOTION TO DISMISS – FILED BY HABACON
- on the ground that the plaintiffs (petitioners herein)
have no legal capacity to sue because they were not
parties to the "BILIHAN."
The trial court, through the respondent Judge, directed
the plaintiffs to show cause why their complaints should
not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to P.D.
No. 957 (Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'
Protective Decree), as amended by P.D. No. 1344, and
the doctrine laid down by this Court in Solid Homes, Inc.
vs. Payawal.
In their compliance with the show cause order, the
petitioners maintained that it is the trial court, and not
the HLRB, which has jurisdiction over the complaint.
They contend that Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal is
inapplicable because in their cases: (1) the title of the
developers, the JAREÑOS, had already passed to a third
person, HABACON; (2) their action is for the annulment
of the title of a third person; (3) HABACON is not a
developer; and (4) Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129 vests
upon the Regional Trial Court the jurisdiction to hear and
decide all civil actions which involve title to or
possession of any real property or any interest therein,
except actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry.
IV. TRIAL COURT DISMISSED THE AFORESADI CIVIL
CASES FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
V. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (DENIED)
Trial Court ruled that while HABACON may not be the
developer, the JAREÑOS are, and by selling the same lots
to HABACON after they were previously sold to different
parties, the JAREÑOS may have committed an "unsound
business practice." Moreover, it ruled that Section 19(2)
of B.P. Blg. 129, being a general law, should yield to P.D.
No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1344, which is a special
law.
VI. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOE CERTIORARI
The petitioners filed the instant special civil action
for certiorari to annul the Orders of the trial court on the
ground that the judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing
their complaints and that they have no other plain,
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speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The petitioners maintain that the trial court has
jurisdiction over their complaints.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial Court gravely abused
its discretion in dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, the
complaints filed by the petitioners.
HELD:
Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong,
is a final order, and hence a proper subject of appeal,
not certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative
or successive. Accordingly, although the special civil
action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary
appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown
that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient,
and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious
effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is
inadequate and
ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a sell a subdivision lot in Antipolo Reality Corp. vs. National
substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, where
such loss is occasioned by the petitioner's own neglect
or error in the choice of remedies.
The petitioners admit that they received a copy of the
trial court's order dismissing their complaints on 4
October 1991. The instant petition was filed on 24
October 1991 or beyond the 15-day period to appeal
from the order. The petitioners have not even
attempted to explain why they were unable to appeal
from the challenged order within the reglementary
period. This civil action then was resorted to as a
substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, and
since none of the exceptions to the rigid rule barring
substitution of remedies was alleged to exist in this
petition, or even indicated by the pleadings, this petition
must be dismissed.
Even if we were to accept this petition in the broader
interest of justice, it must still fail for the trial court
correctly ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter in Civil Cases Nos. 1683-91-C, 1684-91-C, 1685-
91-C, 1686- 91-C, and 1688-91-C. Jurisdiction thereon
was originally vested in the National Housing Authority
(NHA) under P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1344.
Under E.O. No. 648 of 7 February 1981, this jurisdiction
was transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission (HSRC) which, pursuant to E.O. No. 90 of 17
December 1986, was renamed as the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board.
We agree with the trial court that the complaints do
involve unsound real estate business practices on the
part of the owners and developers of the subdivision
who entered into Contracts to Sell with the petitioners.
By virtue of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344 and our decision
in Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, the NHA, now HLRB,
has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
matter. In addition to involving unsound real estate
business practices, the complaints also involve specific
performance of the contractual and statutory obligations
of the owners or developers of the subdivision. The
claims for annulment of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan" in
favor of HABACON and the certificates of title issued to
him and for damages are merely incidental.
We had earlier upheld the jurisdiction of the NHA to
determine the rights of the parties under a contract to
Housing Authority and struck down the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court over a case
instituted by a lot buyer for delivery of title against the
subdivision owner in Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal. We
also sustained the jurisdiction of the HLRB over
complaints for (a) the refund of reservation fees for the
purchase of a subdivision lot, (b) specific performance
filed by a lot buyer against the seller of a subdivision
lot, (c) annulment of the mortgage constituted by the
project owner without the buyer's consent, the
mortgage foreclosure sale, and the condominium
certificate of title issued to the highest bidder at the said
foreclosure sale, and (d) collection of the balance of the
unpaid purchase price of a subdivision lot filed by the
developer of a subdivision against the lot buyer.
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