Abakada v.

Purisima Digest

FACTS:

The Attrition Act of 2005 (RA 9335) was enacted to encourage BIR and BOC employees to exceed their
revenue targets by creating a system of rewards and sanctions. It includes all employees who served for
at least 6 months.

In order for its implementation there will be Reward Incentives Fund, which will be sourced from the
excess of revenue targets of BIR and BOC for the year. And a Revenue Performance Board which will be
composed of the secretary of the DOF, DBM, NEDA and the commissioners of BIR and BOC.

The board is tasked with duties such as

1. Prescribing the rules and guidelines for its allocation and distribution of the fund
2. Setting the criteria and procedures for removing officials who fall short of the target
3. Prescribing a system for performance evaluation
4. Etc.

The Board together with the CSC were then tasked to promulgate the IRR for the Attrition Act to be
approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. (7 senate members and 7 HOR reps) Once the
IRR have been approved, the committee ceases to exist.

Petitioners assail the creation of the committee for it violates separation of powers. While legislative
power is deemed finished upon the approval of the law, by creating the committee it allows the
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

ISSUE:

1. The RA makes the employees bounty hunters and will do their best only in consideration of the
incentive, NO

- This claim is without legal basis and purely speculative

- Public service is its own reward but public officers may also be rewarded for exemplary
performance

2. The RA violates equal protection clause because the rewards system is only for the BIR and BOC,
NO

- Equal protection clause is applied to persons similarly situated

- The equal protection clause allows for classification
- The BIR and BOC are both tasked with the duty of collecting taxes hence there is a
substantial distinction

3. The RA unduly delegates power to fix target revenues to the president, NO

- 2 tests for undue delegation: complete in itself, sufficient standards test

 - The RA provides guidelines for the president in fixing the revenue targets

4. WON the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is unconstitutional? YES

- Congressional oversight in general involves post-enactment activities taken by the congress

to monitor the administrative agencies and determine whether the laws are being properly
administered
- Congress oversight may be divided in 3 categories:
o Scrutiny
 Requests reports from the other branches
 Power to ask heads of departments to appear and be heard by the houses
on any matter pertaining to its departments
o Investigation
 Investigating and monitoring in to the implementations
o Supervision
 Involves the veto power of the congress to require the President or an
agency to submit their proposed regulations to the Congress who may
approve or disapprove of such before it is allowed to take effect

- In the case of Macalintal, the court struck down the RA creating the Joint Congressional
Committee which was tasked with implementing the law BUT ALSO amending and
approving the IRR promulgated by COMELEC.
- The court held that this was an infringement on the independence of COMELEC
- While congressional oversight allows for a system of checks and balances, the congress is
limited to post-enactment measures of only Scrutiny and Investigation. The congress may
not encroach on the power of the Executive and Judicial branch.
- By allowing for legislative veto, it is an intrusion on the executive and judicial power
- Only the president may exercise veto powers
- By allowing for Congress to approve or disapprove the IRR based on WON they conformed
with RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself.