11.08.

2012

Lidasan v. Comelec Digest

Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.:

Facts:
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967
elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the
same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of
Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of
the two provinces.

2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon inthe Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and
parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in theProvince of Cotabato and not of Lanao
del Sur.

3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the
statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province — Cotabato is
unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title

YES. RA 4790 is null and void

1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from
conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in
a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single
subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the
title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative,
given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations
the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read
from its introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated.

2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should
serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action
thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set
forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of
 the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

4. The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" — projects the
impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao
del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the
title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in
one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of
Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in
Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not apprise the
people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del
Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.
 21 SCRA 496 – Political Law – Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan however
discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant
to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant
to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of
Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred
that the law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in
its territory several barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province –
Cotabato – to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may
be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill”?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so
difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law;
it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added
to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces
were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out
later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh
against the constitutionality of RA 4790.
Bara Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections,21 SCRA 542

Facts: RA 4790, entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” took effect on

June 18, 1966. It sought to create the new municipality of Dianaton within barrios in Lanao del Sur, but also included

barrios located in Cotabato. Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato requested

for certiorari and prohibition and declare RA 4790 as unconstitutional because its Title is misleading and invoked the

provision of the Constitution that the title of a bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the

public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

Issue: Whether the title of RA 4790 "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur" satisfied

the provision of the Constitution that the title of an act must be sufficient to notify the public and others concerned of its

substance.

Decision: RA4970, “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” is deemed

unconstitutional. The very title projected the impression that Lanao del Sur is the only province affected by the act. This

statute apprised neither Congress nor the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of

Cotabato that part of Cotabato’s territory is being taken to add to the adjacent Lanao del Sur.

Dissenting opinion: Fernando, J.

The said provision of the Constitution must be construed liberally as this has been the general disposition in all courts, as

opposed to the strict interpretation of the Supreme Court. Thus, the title of RA 4790 is sufficient to inform the public of its

substance, namely, the creation of the Municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur.
 24 SCRA 172 – Political Law – Title Must Express One Subject
In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One
Hundred Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One) was
passed. This law amended the charter of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation). Section 3 of RA
3043 provides that:
a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall not exceed an annual profit of 12%;
b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their customers;
c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply
of energy.
Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company (PPDC) assailed the said
provision.They averred that Section 3 is a rider because first, it was not included in the title of the
amending law nor was it included in the amended law. Second, the main purpose of RA 3043 was to
increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al believed that Section 3 was not germane
to RA 3043.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of RA 3043 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and
the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to
lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action
thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
FACTS:Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. 121”.In
Section 3 of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in any franchisecontract for the supply of electric
power constituting 50% of the electric power andenergy of that franchisee, to realize a net profit of not
more than 12%annually of itsinvestments plus 2-month operating expenses; and NPC is allowed to
renew all existing franchisecontracts so that the provisions of the act could be given effect.

ISSUE:W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title “An Act to Further AmendCommonwealth Act No.
121” does not embrace, thus making it a rider because it is violative of theconstitutional provision
requiring that “a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embracemore than one subject, which
shall be expressed in its title.”

HELD:Section 3 is constitutional. Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. It is sufficient thatthe title
makes reference to the legislation to be amended (in this caseCommonwealth Act 121).Constitutional
provision is satisfied if title iscomprehensive enough to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect withoutexpressing each and every ends and means necessary for its accomplishment.
Titledoesn’t need to be a complete index of the contents of the act.
Alalayan vs NAPOCOR (same c above)
Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company assails the power vested
in NAPOCOR that “in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder,” receivingat
least 50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchiseholder
“shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plustwo-month
operating expenses.” Also it could “renew all existing contracts with franchise holdersfor the supply of
electric power and energy,”. This is all in pursuant to RA 3043 and theamendments it offered to RA
2641. Alalayan and PPDC are contractors with NAPOCOR. They arere-suppliers of power produced by
NAPOCOR. They aver that the provision of the said RA is arider in only meant to increase the capital
stock of NAPOCOR.

ISSUE:Whether or not RA 3043 is constitutional.

HELD:
No bill “which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed
in [its] title . . .” This provision is similar to those found in many American StateConstitutions. It is aimed
against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills as log-rolling legislationas well as surreptitious or unconsidered
enactments. Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people
should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus
precludes the insertion of ridersin legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the
bill. Alalayanasserts that the provision objected to is such a rider.To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above
constitutional provision as to cripple or impede proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and not
unduly technical,it must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include thegeneral
object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and meansnecessary for its accomplishment.
Thus, mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is notrequired to make the title of the act a complete index of its
contents. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. More specifically, if
the lawamends a section or part of a statute, it suffices if reference be made to the legislation to beamended, there being no
need to state the precise nature of the amendment. “Of course, theConstitution does not require Congress to employ in the
title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. Itsuffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform
thelegislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope andconsequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the bodyof the bill, study and discuss the same, take
appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surpriseor fraud upon the legislators.
Sumulong v. Commission on Elections Case No. 149G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1941)

FACTS:On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted

the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority electioninspector in t
he first congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Front Party
of Petitioner, the minority inspector in the second congressional district of
the said province. Eleven days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority
inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos.

ISSUE:W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:Where the minimum number of votes required by law was polled by a mere coalition or allianceof
minority parties, the right to minority representation in the board of electioninspectors to which such
coalition is entitled, cannot be claimed by any of the
component parties which have thereafter separated. Respondent shall have the discretion to choosethe
minority inspector
SUMULONG vs. COMELEC Case Digest
SUMULONG vs. COMELEC
73 P.R. 288, 1942

Facts: Under the authority of Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, Comelec adopted a resolution
providing for the appointment of election inspectors to be proposed by the political parties and persons
named therein. Petitioner, Juan Sumulong, President of the political party Pagkakaisa ng Bayan,
claims the exclusive right to propose the appointment of such inspectors. He contends that the
resolution of the Comelec, by giving the so-called rebel candidate or free-zone faction of the
Nationalista Party the right to propose one election inspector for each of the precincts in each of the
53 legislative districts, contravenes Section 5 of the Commonwealth Act No. 657. He argues that under
that section the Nationalista Party has the right to propose one, and only one inspector for each
precinct, and that the resolution has the effect of giving that party two inspectors in each and every
precinct within those legislative districts. Petitioner maintains that the discretion given by Section 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 657 to the Comelec in the Choice of election inspectors is not absolute, but
limited by the provision of the Act that the majority party shall have the right to propose only one
inspector.

Issue: Whether or not the Comelec, in giving the so-called rebel candidates and free-zone factions of
the Nationalista Party the right to propose election inspectors, has acted within the limits of the
discretion granted to it by law.

Held: The present case is not an appropriate case for review by the Supreme Court. The Comelec is
a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government.
It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created – free, orderly, and honest elections.
The Supreme Court may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal /
constitute grave abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. The Comelec because of its fact-
finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience
in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex
political questions. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission, as ordained in the
Constitution requires that the power of the Supreme Court to review the acts of that body should, as a
general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases.
People vs. Purisima (Statutory Construction)
Facts:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve
one basic question of law.

The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and CFI of Samar

Several informations were filed before the abovementioned courts charging the accused of Illegal
Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of Presidential Decree #9. The counsel of the defense
filed motions to quash the said informations after which the respondent-courts passed their own
orders quashing the said informations on common ground that the informations did not allege
facts constituting ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential element of the
crime, which is, that the carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed, pointed, or blunt
weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with, or related to to subversion,
insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.

The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081which seeks to
maintain law and order in the country as well as the prevention and suppression of all forms of
lawless violence. The non-inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be distinguished
from other legislation related to the illegal possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in
particular, reasoned that the information must allege that the purpose of possession of the
weapon was intended for the purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized
lawlessness, public disorder. The petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not necessary
in this regard because the prohibited act is basically a malum prohibitum or is an action or
conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The City Fiscal also added in cases of statutory
offenses, the intent is immaterial and that the commission of the act is voluntary is enough.
Issue:
Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense
of “Illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9?

Held:
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it
must state the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him
the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of such decree is to
penalize the acts which are related to Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness, rebellion,
subversive acts, and the like. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it implies the intent
and spirit of the decree. The preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts or events
which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.

The petition is DISMISSED.

Case Digest, People vs. Purisima, No. L-47757-61, January 28, 1980
FACTS: Informations were filed to 26 individuals from Manila andSamar, individually and separately,
before the Courts of First
Instanceof Manila and Samar for illegal possession of deadly weapon orviolation of Presidential Decree
No. 9 pursuant to Proclamation No.1081 dated Sept 21 and 23, 1973. On the motion to quash by
theaccused, the three respondent judges: Judge Purisima and JudgeMacaren, both of CFI of Manila; and
Judge Polo of CFI of Samar,issued in the respective cases filed before them an order to quash ordismiss
the informations on a common ground – Lack of
essentialelements to constitute an offense penalized by PD No. 9. Therespondent judges stated that to c
onstitute the said offense, twoelements must be present; (1) possession of any bladed, blunt
orpointed weapon outside of residence as stated in par 3; (2) andintended to use it to commit or abet su
bversion, rebellion, etc asstated in the preamble of the said PD. The People, as petitioners, thruthe
Solicitor General, contended that the prohibited acts need not
berelated to subversive activities and the intent of the accused areirrelevant since its is a statutory
offense and punishing the possessionof such deadly weapon is not only to eradicate subversive acts but
alsocriminality in general. The petitioners also argued that the preamble isnot an essential part of an act
and cannot prevail over the text of thelaw itself.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ arguments as to the intentionand scope of PD No. 9 (3) correct?

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3)is to penalize the acts which are
those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081 and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to
suppressthose who commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts andthe like. The preamble of
PD No. 9 also clearly concurs to that, thoughthe preamble is not a part of the statute, it is the key to
determinewhat is the intent and spirit of the decree and determine what acts fallwithin the purview of a
penal statute.
Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997
Facts:
The petitions assail the constitutionality of various provisions of RA
8180 entitiled the “Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.”
Under the deregulated environment, any person or entity may import orpurchase
any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign ordomestic source,
lease or own and operate refineries and other downstreamoil facilities and market
such crude oil or use the same for his ownrequirement, subject only to monitoring
by the Department of Energy.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy

(2) Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the law

(3) Whether or not Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 violates the one title one
subjectrequirement of the Constitution

(4) Whether or not Sec. 15 of RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibitionon

undue delegation of power

(5) Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition

againstmonopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition

Held:

As to the first issue, judicial power includes not only the duty of thecourts to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable,
but also the duty to determine whether or notthere has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.The
courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority todetermine
whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limitimposed by the
fundamental law. Where a statute violates the Constitution,it is not only the right
but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act asunconstitutional and void.

The effort of respondents to question the legal standing of petitioners also

failed. The Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner’s locus
standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendentalsignificance to
the people. In the case, petitioners pose issues which aresignificant to
the people and which deserve the Court’s forthright resolution.

It is also contended that Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 on tariff differential violatesthe

provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only onesubject which
should be expressed in its title. The Court did not concur withthis contention. The
title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all(sorry incomplete digest)
 “Equal Protection” – Oil Deregulation Law
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been
finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these
innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA
8180. This law allows that “any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and
petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other
downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement,” subject
only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He
claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported
refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff
differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective
investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source
refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on
refined crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the
Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free
competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players
in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron,
Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore
works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts
and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New
players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of
their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with
them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing
on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce
prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract
new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new
players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry
is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the “new players”
insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the established oil companies by
requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.
 Tatad v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997

DECISION
(En Banc)

PUNO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners assailed §5(b) and §15 of R.A. No. 8180, the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation
Act of 1996.

§5(b) of the law provided that “tariff duty shall be imposed . . . on imported crude oil at the rate
of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) . .
.” On the other hand, §15 provided that “[t]he DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement
the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable,
the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar
is stable . . .”

Petitioners argued that §5(b) on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.

They also contended that the phrases “as far as practicable,” “decline of crude oil prices in the
world market” and “stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar” are ambivalent, unclear and
inconcrete since they do not provide determinate or determinable standards that can guide the
President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil industry.

Petitioners also assailed the President’s E.O. No. 392, which proclaimed the full deregulation
of the downstream oil industry in February 1997. They argued that the Executive misapplied R.A. No.
8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in the implementation of full
deregulation.

Finally, they asserted that the law violated §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting
monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition

II. THE ISSUES

1. Did §5(b) violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution?
2. Did §15 violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power?
3. Was E.O. No. 392 arbitrary and unreasonable?
4. Did R.A. No. 8180 violate §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in
restraint of trade and unfair competition?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED the petition. It DECLARED R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional and E.O.
No. 372 void.]

1. NO, §5(b) DID NOT violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution.
 As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule. [T]he
title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a
single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject. [S]ection 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A.
No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway
prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported
petroleum.

2. NO, §15 DID NOT violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of
power.

Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute
laws does not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and
bounds of these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA, thus:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate
the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority
to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be
noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of
March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is
mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law
is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President
is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the
standard to guide the judgment of the President --- he is to time it as far as practicable when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words “as far as practicable,” “declining” and “stable” should have
been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn
submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled
and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines “practicable” as meaning
possible to practice or perform, “decline” as meaning to take a downward direction, and “stable” as
meaning firmly established. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of
executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the
validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.

3. YES, E.O. No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable.

A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors
to be considered by the Department of Energy and the Office of the President,viz.: (1) the time when
the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time when
the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the
depletion of the OPSF as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full
deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that some of our legislators wanted
to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. We
therefore hold that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No.
8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of
this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive department considered anyway
the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the exchange rate of the
peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive department
rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by
subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede
to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of
separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the
delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the
Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price
of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text
of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive department to the
depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It
could have been accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this
uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A.
No. 8180.

4. YES, R.A. No. 8180 violated §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting
monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

[I]t cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players
in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron,
Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore
works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts
and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New
players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of
their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with
them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing
on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce
prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract
new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new
players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry
is an idle dream.

The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex
against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory
requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again
will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The construction
cost of storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players. Their net effect
is to further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and enhance the control of
the market by the three (3) existing oil companies.

Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as “. . . selling or offering
to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers
to the detriment of competitors.” Respondents contend that this provision works against Petron, Shell
and Caltex and protects new entrants. The ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation.
Its validity is interlocked with the barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of new players. The
inquiry should be to determine whether predatory pricing on the part of the dominant oil companies is
encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players. Text-
writer Hovenkamp gives the authoritative answer and we quote:
 xxx xxx xxx
The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly
profits in the future. The monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new
entrants as soon as the successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory pricing will be profitable
only if the market contains significant barriers to new entry.

As aforediscussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant
barriers which discourage new players to enter the market. Considering these significant barriers
established by R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with the comparable clout of PETRON, SHELL
and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to engage in predatory pricing and succeed is a
chilling reality. Petitioners’ charge that this provision on predatory pricing is anti-competitive is not
without reason.

[R.A. No. 8180 contained a separability clause, but the High Tribunal held that the offending
provisions of the law so permeated its essence that it had to be struck down entirely. The provisions
on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing were among the principal props of R.A. No. 8180.
Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions.]
FACTS:
The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the
transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and the (b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No.
372).

Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the
Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the
Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude
oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the
US dollar is considered stable.

Issue:
w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is unconstitutional.
sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power, and
(b) w/n the Executive misapplied RA No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as
factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in Feb. 1997.

HELD/RULING:
(a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. RA No. 8180
provided that the full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997 regardless of the occurrence of
any event. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.

Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President—he is to time it as far as
practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the world market are declining and when
the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

Webster defines “practicable” as meaning possible to practice or perform, “decline” as meaning to

take a downward direction, and “stable” as meaning firmly established.

(b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the
Executive before ordering full deregulation. The Executive department failed to follow faithfully the
standards set by RA No. 8180 when it co0nsidered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF
fund. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set
in RA No. 8180 for it has no powers to make laws.
Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union vs Vega
In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of thePhilippine
Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB employeesunion herein
petitioner filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits.On January 2, 1992, RA 7169
(An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was signed into law byPres. Corazon Aquino and which was
published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor
tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.In May
1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite thelate mandate
for rehabilitation and reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued with theliquidation proceedings of
the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March10, 1992 or 15 days after its
publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days followingcompletion of
their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation inthe Philippines, the
legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause“unless otherwise
provided”. Citing Tanada vs Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of effectivityand not to the
requirement of publication, which cannot in any event be omitted. The reason is thatsuch omission
would affect due process in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the lawsthat are supposed
to govern it.
 360 scra 32
Publication of Laws
In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the Philippine
Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB employees union herein
petitioner filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits.
On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was signed into law by Pres.
Corazon Aquino and which was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for
reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.
In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late
mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued with the liquidation
proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15
days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.
HELD: The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless
otherwise provided”. Citing Tanada vs Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication, which cannot in any event be omitted. The reason is that such omission
would affect due process in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed
to govern it.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS JUDGE
VEGA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:12 AM
G.R. No. 105364, 28 June 2001 [Effectivity and Application of Laws]

FACTS:

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of Philippine
Veterans Bank. It was published in the Official Gazette in February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed
with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening the bank.

In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late
mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the
bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its
publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.

RULING:

Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take effect upon its approval. Aquino signed it into law on
January 2, 1992. Thereafter, said law became effective on said date. Its subsequent publication was not
necessary for its effectivity. RA 7169 is of internal nature and not have general application thus it took
effect on the date provided for and hence was rightfully invoked by the petitioners. The Supreme Court
upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the
authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless otherwise provided”.