Riva Mae S.
Cometa
306 Evening; Legal Research Synthesis (Persons and Family Relations Cases
Republic V Cagandaha
Jennifer Cagandahan was out to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH),
genetically a female, but secreted male
hormones, he felt like he was a male. SC
considered him as an “intersex individual”.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the
Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as
one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences,
much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male
tendency due to CAH. Where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the
detrmining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, having reached
the age of majority, with good reason thinks
of his or her sex. Likewise, the law cannot
penalize the person on not undergoing
medical treatment to reverse the male
tendency due to CAH.
Duncan v Glaxo
The prohibition against personal or marital
relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxo’s employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of the company.
Glaxo only aims to protect its interests
against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and
procedures. The Constitution recognizes the
right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such
a policy to protect its right to reasonable
returns on investments and to expansion and
growth Glaxo does not impose an absolute
prohibition against relationships between its
employees and those of competitor
companies. What the company merely seeks
to avoid is a conflict of interest between the
employee and the company that may arise out
of such relationships.
Silverio v. Republic
Rommel Silverio was a transsexual who was
engaged to be married so he sought to have his
name changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to
"Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female”.
Marriages A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage
and family relations. It is a part of a person’s
(Art 1 – 26) legal capacity and civil status.. But there is no
such special law in the Philippines governing
sex reassignment and its effects. SC ruled that
the sex determined by visually looking at the
genitals of a baby at the time of birth is
immutable and that there is no law legally
recognizing gender sex re-assignment.
Granting the petition would alter the family
Code
Union between a
man and a woman
Tuazon V CA
Husband-petitioner failed to show up in the hearing for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage, despite being
active in the initial proceedings. He argued that article
48 and 60 of the Family Code provides that. In cases for
annulment, the fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of
the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion
between the parties and to take care that their evidence
is not fabricated.
Ruling:The role of the fiscal in annulment is to
determine whether collusion exists between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed.
Petitioner’s vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion
existed between the parties. Non-intervention is not fatal
to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company v. NLRC
A woman employee was discharged after it was found out
she was married.
State Marriage as a special contract cannot be restricted
discriminatory policies of private individuals or
policy corporations. The danger of such policy against marriage
followed by petitioner PT and T is that it strikes at the very
essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable
social institution and ultimately, of the family as the
foundation of the nation. That it must be effectively
interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled
forms as discriminatory of the laws of the land is not only
in order but imperatively required”

Beso v Daguman
Petitioner charged Judge Juan J.
Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing
marriage outside of his jurisdiction and
of negligence in not retaining a copy
and not registering the marriage
contract with the office of the Local
Civil Registrar.
"It shall be the duty of the person
solemnizing the marriage to furnish
either of the contracting parties the
original of the marriage certificate
referred to in Article 6 and to send the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the
certificates not later than fifteen days
after the marriage, to the local civil
registrar of the place where the marriage
was solemnized.
Judge Daguman failed to do his duties
STAR PAPER CORPORATION V
State SIMBOL
policy A company policy provided that, in case two of
their employees decide to get married to each
other, one of them should resign from the
company. The SC held that the policy is illegal
as it failed to prove a legitimate business
concern in imposing the questioned policy
especially so when the asserted policy is
premised on the mere fear that employees
married to each other will be less efficient.
Thus, it was not shown how marriage between
employees in different departments can be
detrimental to the business of the company.
Republic of the Philippines v. Albios
Fringer, an American citizen, married Albios,
a Filipina. The former will exchange American
citizenship for 2, 000 dollars
Although the Court views with disdain the
respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for
Consent dishonest purposes, it cannot declare the
marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s
marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it
is not void ab initio and continues to be valid
and subsisting. Marriage is not lacking in
consent. There was real consent because it was
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice
of consent. Their consent was also conscious
and intelligent as they understood the nature
and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their
Authority of consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American
Solemnizing citizenship through marriage
Officer
 COSCA vs. PALAYPAYON
Complainants allege that
respondent judge solemnized
marriages even without the
requisite marriage license.
Respondent judge did not sign
their marriage contracts and did
not indicate the date of
solemnization.
Every employee should be an
example of integrity,
uprightness and honesty.
Integrity in a judicial office is
more than a virtue, it is a
necessity. The absence of any of
the essential or formal requisites
shall generally render the
marriage void ab initio and that,
while an irregularity in the
formal requisites shall not affect
the validity of the marriage, the
party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively
liable.
Sy v CA
Marriage
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private
respondent Fernando Sy contracted license
marriage. Filipina then filed for the
declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage citing psychological incapacity
in the trial court. On her petition to this
Court, she assailed for the first time that
there was no marriage license during
their marriage.
A marriage license is a formal
requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
marriage contract shows that the
marriage license, numbered 6237519,
was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet,
neither petitioner nor private respondent
ever resided in Carmona.
Geronimo v CA
Petitioner contends that the marriage between her
deceased sister and oppositor Antonio A. Esman was
null and void since there was no marriage license. In
fact, petitioner contends that a certification issued by
the Local Civil Registrar of Pateros shows that the
marriage license number was not stated in the marriage
contract; and that the marriage contract itself does not
show the number of the marriage license issued.
Moreover, marriage license number 5038770 which
was issued to the deceased and the oppositor by the
Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal was not really issued
to Pateros before the marriage was celebrated but to
Pasig in October 1959
At most, the evidence adduced by the petitioner could
only serve to prove the non-recording of the marriage
license number but certainly not the non-issuance of
the license itself.
ENGRACE NIÑAL vs . NORMA BAYADOG
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa
Bellones and born the petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting
in her death. Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without
any marriage license which they
executed an affidavit that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least
five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. After their
father's death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack
of a marriage license because it will
affect successional rights.
A valid marriage license is a requisite
of marriage under Article 53 of the
Civil Code. void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid.

Arañes v. Occiano
Arañes married Orobia in a ceremony
solemnized by Judge Occiano. When
Orobia died, Arañes was unable to inherit
her husband’s properties and his pension
from the Philippine Navy because they
were married outside the judge’s territorial
jurisdiction and without the requisite
marriage license. She charged the Judge
with Gross Ignorance of the Law for
causing her embarrassment and sufferings.
The marriage is void. Respondent judge
should also be faulted for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage
license. A marriage which preceded the
issuance of the marriage license is void,
and that the subsequent issuance of such
license cannot render valid or even add an
iota of validity to the marriage.
ORLANDO G. TONGOL VS.
FILIPINAS M. TONGOL
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent's
disagreement with her husband's handling of
the family's business and finances and her
propensity to start a fight can hardly be
considered as psychological incapacity. The
psychologist diagnosed respondent with
Inadequate Personality Disorder, with
hysterical coloring. As a child, Filipinas had
always felt rejected, especially by her mother;
that she never got rid of those feelings of
rejection even when she became an adult
and got married. Her fits of jealousy and
temper tantrums, every time she sees her
husband having a good interaction with their
employees, are ways of coping up with her
feelings of rejection. However, Dr. Villegas
failed to link respondent's personality
disorder to her conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her
obligations as wife and mother.
SEVILLA v CARDENAS
After 25 years of marriage, petitioner Jaime
Sevilla claimed that he was made to marry
his respondent wife (Carmelita Cardenas)
out through machinations, duress and
intimidation. Further, they never applied
for a marriage license, nor did they obtain
one from the civil registry.
Marriage remains valid due to the following
reasons:
 The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity
or failure to perform a duty.
 Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed,
in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married.
a. husband and wife and lived
together for several years producing two
offsprings
b. It took Jaime several years before
he filed the petition
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO VS.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO
Supreme Court ruled that, on the part of the
petitioner, sexual infidelity does not
constitute psychological incapacity. It
must be shown that respondent’s
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality. Moreover, petitioner
failed to prove that his wife’s lack of
respect for him, her jealousies and
obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts
and her controlling nature (especially
with respect to his salary), and her
inability to endear herself to his parents
are grave psychological maladies that
paralyze her from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. On the
contrary, Juanita’s behavior is traceable from
her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her
in-laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted
Psychological their son to enter the priesthood, her
husband’s philandering, which he admitted
Incapacity and her inability to conceive

OSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA VS.
BONA J. ALANO
The Supreme Court ruled that although
they are sufficiently convinced that
respondent-wife had been, on several
occasions with several other men, sexually
disloyal to her spouse her alleged
psychological incapacity did not satisfy
the jurisprudential requisite of "juridical
antecedence”. Her sexual infidelity and
abandonment, can only be convincingly
traced to the period of time after her
marriage to Jose and not to the inception
of the said marriage.
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE
VS. ROWENA ONG
GUTIERREZ YU-TE
Supreme Court ruled that the
afflictions of both parties are
indicative of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner is afflicted with
dependent personality disorder,
cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and
fidelity and rendering support. He
allows others to make most of his
important decisions, followed
everything dictated to him even if it’s
demeaning. He has no sense of
identity as a person with no clear
direction in life.
Respondent’s has antisocial
personality disorder makes her
unable to assume the essential
marital obligations. She disregards
the rights of others, mistreatment
and control of others without
GLENN VIÑAS VS. MARY GRACE
PAREL-VIÑAS
The Supreme Court ruled that the evidence
merely shows that respondent-wife is
outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to
perform household chores; she was
romantically-involved with another man and
had not been maintaining lines of
communication with petitioner. While Glenn,
a conservatist, and Mary Grace possess
incompatible personalities, the latter’s acts and
traits do not necessarily indicate psychological
incapacity. They lived with each other for
more or less seven years shows that living
together as spouses under one roof is not an
impossibility. Mary Grace’s departure from
their home indicates either a refusal or mere
difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply
with her obligation to live with her husband.
In addition, the assessment of Mary Grace’s
condition was unfounded as it was just based
on the statements of petitioner.
HERNANDEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS
AND MARIO C. HERNANDEZ
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of CA
stating that (1) petitioner failed to establish the fact
that at the time they were married, private
respondent was suffering from a psychological
defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities. (2) Respondent’s
alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is
suffering from a psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. Nor was her
description of husband being “borderline between a
responsible person and the happy-go-lucky”.
It must be shown that the acts are manifestations of
a disordered personality and not merely due to
private respondent’s youth and self-conscious feeling
of being handsome. The law confined the meaning
of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage, and petitioner
should therefore prove the same.
Marriage License
Abbas v. Abbas, GR. No. 183896, Jan 30, 2013
Petitioner went to the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, where their Marriage License was
issued, to get certification on whether or not there
was a marriage license. There, he was asked to show
a copy of their marriage contract wherein the
marriage license number could be found. It
appeared that the marriage license number
appearing in their marriage contract was the
number of another marriage license issued to
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual
marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on
the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of
her witnesses to prove the existence of said license.
While Syed was able to secure a certification that
there was no marriage license.
Kho vs. Kho
"Carlito Kho (Kho) and his family applied for the
correction of various details in their birth certificate.
Kho petitioned for (1) change the citizenship of his
mother from “Chinese” to “Filipino”; (2) delete
“John” from his name; and (3) delete the word
“married” opposite the date of marriage of his
parents. The last correction was ordered to be
effected likewise in the birth certificates of
respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy
Moira.
Kho‘s certificate requires an adversarial proceeding
"It can not request for change in the details of their
birth be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it
sought to change the citizenship of Carlito‘s
mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and
delete the “married” status of Carlito‘s parents in
his and his siblings‘ respective birth certificates, as
well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and
Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather,
the changes entail substantial and controversial
amendments. The change involving the nationality
of Carlito‘s mother as reflected in his birth
certificate is a grave and important matter that has
a bearing and effect on the citizenship and
nationality not only of the parents, but also of the
offspring.
Jo Ann Diaz-Salgado v. Luis G. Anson
Luis Anson (Luis) filed a complaint against Jo-Ann
Diaz-Salgado et. al. seeking the annulment of the
three Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased
Severina DeAsis.
As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were
incapacitated to marry each other at the time of
their cohabitation and considering that their
marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a
valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code,
in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are
the pertinent provisions of law governing their
property relations. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the property
shall still be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family household."'
Ronulo v. People of the Philippines
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled
to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta.
Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the
supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza,
refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning
that the couple failed to secure a marriage license.
The couple and their guests instead proceeded to
Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also
known as the Aglipayan Church, requesting
petitioner priest Ronulo to marry them. He obliged
despite them telling him they did not have a
certificate.
Court ruled that the petitioner conducted the
marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
essential and formal requirements of marriage set
by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of
the absence of these requirements negates his
defense of good faith.
Marriage License is not an Essential or a
Formal Requisite
Villanueva v. CA, 198 SCRA 472
Respondent Catalina I. Sanchez claimed to
have rights over the property of her deceased
husband, Roberto Sanchez, and is registered in the
name of the petitioners without her knowledge.
Petitioner questioned the personality of the private
respondent to file the complaint, contending that
the late Roberto Sanchez was never married but
had a common-law wife by whom he had two
children.
As for the contract of a marriage submitted by the
private respondent, this should also be rejected the
Torrens certificate issued to Roberto Sanchezover
the subject land on August 25, 1965, described his
civil status as "single
The court said that the best documentary evidence
of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. The
Court notes at the outset that Catalina Sanchez has
proved her status as the widow of Roberto Sanchez
with her submission of the marriage contract. A
Torrens certificate is the best evidence of
ownership of registered land, not of the civil status
of the owner. As the surviving spouse of Roberto
Sanchez, the private respondent could validly file
the complaint for the recovery of her late husband's
property, without prejudice to the succession rights
of his other heirs.
De Loria v. Felix, 104 Phil 1
Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix lived
together as wife and husband, they acquired
properties but had no children. Father Bautista,
upon learning that they have been living without
benefit of marriage, asked both parties to ratify
their union according to the rites of his Church. He
solemnized their marriage with Felix in Articulo
Mortis. The Priest filed no affidavit nor recorded
the marriage with local civil registry.
Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of
them. Bearing in mind that the "essential requisites
for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent" the latter being
manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in
the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they
take each other as husband and wife" - which in this
case actually occurred. The fact of marriage is one
thing; the proof by which it may be established is
quite another.
Pugeda v. Trias, 4 SCRA 849
Petitioner Fabian Pugeda and Maria Ferrer were
married in January 1916, a few years after the death
of Maria ‘s first husband. When Maria died,
petitioner claimed a part of the former ‘s estate.
However, defendants objected, claiming that the
marriage was void for there was no record of the
marriage contract in the civil registry. The judge
who solemnized the marriage testified that the
absence of such a document might have been
caused by the president ‘s forgetting to record the
same.
Court ruled that failure to send a copy of the
marriage certificate or contract nor its absence does
not invalidate said marriage since it does not appear
that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its
validity were not present.
Delgado Vda Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Damain,
January 27, 2006
The Court held, through the testimonies of the
witnesses, that marriage between Josefa and
Guillermo never occurred. Although it is presumed
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage, such testimonies shall prevail.
Since, no marriage had occurred between the two,
the estate must be settled in different proceedings.
Therefore, dela Rosa cannot be appointed as the
sole administrator of the estate of the deceased.
Distinctions between Absent and Defective
Requisites
Republic v. CA, 236 SCRA 257
The law provides that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first issued
by a local civil registrar. Being one of the formal
requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license
would render the marriage void ab initio. The
certification of "due search and inability to find"
issued by the civil registrar enjoys probative value,
he being the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any
circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section
29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of
"due search and inability to find" sufficiently
proved that his office did not issue marriage license
no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
Alcantara v. Alcantara, GR No. 167746, Aug 28,
2007, 531 SCRA 446
Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for
annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that they, without securing the
required marriage license, went to the Manila City
Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who
could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding
before a certain priest. They got married on the
same day. They went through another marriage
ceremony in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26
March 1983 still without securing a marriage license;
however, Rosita asserted the validity of their
marriage and maintained that there was a marriage
license issued as evidenced by a certification from
the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite.
Petitioner and respondents were not residents in
Carmona, Cavite.
Court ruled that the marraige is not void ab initio.
According to Article 3 of the Family Code, a valid
marriage license is a formal requisite of marriage,
and, according to Article 4, the absence of any othe
the essential or formal requisites renders the
marriage void ab initio.
Criminal Liability for those responsible for the
Irregularities in Formal Requisites
U.S. v. Dulay, 10 Phil 305
In the month of May 1904, Pascual Dulay, 23,
began courting Gregoria Pimentel,16. Their
relations became every day more intimate, on
account of the promises of marriage made by the
accused Dulay, and the girl was seduced. The
defendant accomplished his desire for the first time
on a certain night in the latter part of December,
1905. Dulay informed the girl's parents of his
intention to marry her, and following the advice of
the parents the marriage was postponed until the
time when the accused was to complete his studies.
However, in the month of June following, in view
of the fact that his fiancee was pregnant, the
defendant disregarded his promise of marriage, and
denied being the author of the girl’s pregnancy. The
latter positively asserted that she never had sexual
intercourse with any other man. He confessed that
he had maintained friendly relations with her, but
denied that he had ever had any sexual intercourse
with her, or that he was the father of the child born.
The facts are duly proven in this case, and
constitute the crime of estupro (seduction).
Pimentel was seduced by his repeated promises of
marriage, and she permitted him to lie with her on
various occasions in consequence of these acts the
girl became pregnant and gave birth to a child. A
promise of marriage given to a woman over 12 and
under 23 years of age, with the evil intent of
committing an unlawful act and voluntarily
abandoned without just cause, constitutes the
deceit referred to article 443 of that of the
Philippines, according to the doctrine established
by the supreme court of Spain.
People v. Rosal, 49 Phil 509
The widow is accused of having unlawfully
contracting a second marriage before the lapse of
301 days from the death of her first husband. The
widow claims that the law (article 476 of the Penal
Code) preventing her from doing so, is not
applicable for lack of subject-matter.
The fact that General Orders No. 68, in its second
section, does not make a marriage illegal and void
if contracted within the period prohibited by article
476 of the Penal Code, does not mean that this
article has been repealed, for the reason that the
sanction of the Penal Code does not declare such
marriage contracted by a widow void or voidable;
but that notwithstanding its validity, a widow who
thus contracts marriage is criminally liable as
committing an act in violation of the law.
Villasanta v. Peralta, 101 Phil 313
The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a
1954 successful bar candidate, from being admitted
to the bar. To have sex, the husband prepared of a
fake marriage contract which was a blank document.
She signed it and was brought back by the
respondent already signed by the Justice of the
Peace and the Civil Registrar of Tarlac, and by two
witnesses. Since then they lived as husband and
wife. They later had a church wedding. The priest
no longer required the production of a marriage
license because of the civil marriage contract shown
to him. She then discovered that the respondent
was previously married.
Court ruled that the act of respondent in
contracting the second marriage (even his act in
making love to another woman while his first wife
is still alive and their marriage still valid and existing)
is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
Thus lacking the good moral character required by
the Rules of Court, the respondent is hereby
declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
Religious Rites, No Form Required
Eugenio v. Velez, 185 SCRA 434
A girl ran away with a rich man. The girl’s family
members are claiming that she was forcibly taken
from her home by the rich man. The family
members then filed for a writ of habeas corpus.
Later, they were told that the girl already died. The
man filed a motion to dismiss the petition, claiming
the writ does not apply to the deceased. The man is
claiming his right to legal custody of the body as the
girl’s common law husband. He is legally married
to another woman, making him unable to marry the
girl.
Court held that the writ of habeas corpus as a
remedy became moot and academic due to the
death of the person. Philippine Law does not
recognize common law marriages. The provisions
of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the
contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a
"spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.
They were not lawfully-wedded; in fact, he was not
legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body was correctly awarded to
her surviving brothers and sisters.
Martinez v. Tan, 12 Phil 731
Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan executed an
expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in
Spanish and consists of a petition directed to the
justice of the peace, signed by both, in which they
state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a
contract of marriage and ask that the justice
solemnize the marriage. Marriage was solemnized
with two witnesses. The couple did not live
together and when Martinez went home to Ormoc,
she was convinced to file charges claiming that the
marriage was not valid since she signed the
document in her own home thinking that it was a
paper authorizing Tan to ask the consent of her
parents to the marriage.
They were married since there was an expression of
mutual consent and both of them appeared before
the justice of the peace. They both understood
Spanish thus they knew the contents of the
document they were signing.
Enriquez v. Enriquez, 8 Phil 565
The husband is claiming that he is legally married
to his common law wife. During the time of their
supposed marriage, they acquired real property.
Later, the wife died, making her heirs entitled to her
share in the conjugal property. RTC found that a
marriage ceremony was duly performed between
these persons in 1865, but held that the fact that
prior to 1861 they had lived together as husband
and wife, had been recognized as such, and had
children who were baptized as the legitimate
children of their lawful marriage was sufficient
evidence to raise the presumption that they were at
the time legally married.
There is no valid marriage between them could be
contracted by their mere agreement to live together.
In order to show that they were, it was necessary to
prove that a marriage ceremony in which an
ecclesiastical functionary intervened was duly
celebrated. No proof of any such marriage was
offered. As has been said, the fact that prior to 1865
they lived together as husband and wife and had
children is not evidence in this case to show that
they were married prior to that time. Nor is the fact
that in the certificates of baptism of these children
it is stated that they were the legitimate children of
the lawful marriage of their parents.
Lex Loci Celebrationis
Van Dorn v. Romillo, GR No. 68470, October 8,
1985, 139 SCRA 140
A foreigner and a Filipina obtained a divorce decree
was in the US. After obtaining the divorce, the
husband returned to the Philippines and filed an
action, in his capacity as the husband of the wife,
that he be allowed to administer the properties
which he claimed to be belonging to the conjugal
partnership. The wife said that he cannot anymore
file the action for he is no longer her husband
pursuant to the divorce decree obtained. The
husband argued that the divorce decree cannot be
recognized in the Philippines because the
Philippines does not recognize divorce, it being
against public policy. Hence, he remains to be her
husband.
Being a foreigner, the husband is governed by his
own national law and being a US citizen, divorce is
recognized and therefore, the divorce decree
obtained in the US validly binds the husband.
Insofar as Philippine law is concerned, he is no
longer the husband of the Filipina wife. The SC did
not rule on the validity of divorce insofar as the
Filipina wife was concerned but on the validity of
divorce on the part of the American husband
pursuant to the nationality theory.
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, et. al., GR No. 80116,
June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 663
Petitioner was married to private respondent. After
3 and a half years, private respondent filed for
divorce in a German court and was recognized.
Petitioner, on the other hand filed for legal
separation. On June 27, 1986, private respondent
filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal
of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda,
latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as
1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime
in 1983”.
Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private
respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit
Quita v. Dandan, GR No. 124862, Dec. 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both
Filipinos, were married in the Philippines but
eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. Arturo died. He left
no will. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also
referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro,
Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda,
all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as
surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the
petition and prayed for the appointment. Petitioner
moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the
decedent and the distribution of his estate"
It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in
Philippine jurisdiction. Private respondent's claim
to heirship was already resolved by the trial court.
She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947
while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo
was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void.
Roehr v. Rodriguez, et. .11,, GR No. 142820,
June 20, 2003
Petitioner Roehr, a German citizen, married
Respondent Rodriguez, a Filipina citizen and had
two children. On august 28, 1996, respondent filed
for declaration of nullity. Whether the decree of
divorce obtained from Hamburg-Blankenese
removes a judge’s jurisdiction on a pending nullity
case in the Philippines
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by
foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on
custody, care and support of the children, must still
be determined by our courts
Republic v. lyoy
 23 years after the Iyoy Spouses got married
the wife left for the U.S.; less than a year after her
depature, she filed for divorce papers. After
securing a divorce from respondent, sometime in
the year after she left, she married her American
husband and acquired American citizenship. She
argued that her marriage to her American husband
was legal because now being an American citizen,
her status shall be governed by the law of her
present nationality.
The Supreme Court said that the marriage between
the Iyoy Spouses remains valid and subsiting.
Principle: Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
invoked, because at the time the wife filed for
divorce with her husband, she was still a Filipino
citizen; pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws
even when she was already living abroad. Philippine
laws, do not allow and recognize divorce between
Filipino spouses. Thus, she could not have validly
obtained a divorce from respondent.
Whether or not the wife's filing of divorce
to her Filipino husbund abroad is valid, even if she
is still a Filipino citizen while abroad.
Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galena Marinay
Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese national, married Maria
Paz Galela Marinay in the Philippines. He then filed
for the divorce decree to be recognized in the
Philippines, and to remove the entry of Marinay’s
second marriage from the records.
Court held that Fujiki has the personality to file a
petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay.
Muslim Marriages, Others
Nollora, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 191425, Sept. 7, 2011
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr was married to Jesusa Pinat
Nollora. He contracted another marriage with
Rowena P. Geraldino. Nollora admitted to having
both marriages. He, however, claimed that he was
a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992,
even before he contracted his first marriage. As a
[M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry
four wives as allowed under the Muslim belief. It
was however shown that in his both marriage
certificates, he did not declare himself to be a
Muslim convert.
Regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot
claim exemption from liability for the crime of
bigamy. His failure to indicate that he is a Muslim
convert showed criminal intent. Art. 180 of P.D.
No. 1083 does not bar a prosecution for bigamy
when the first marriage was not conducted in
accordance with Muslim law.
People v. Erwin Ong, G.R. No. 202130, April 7,
2014
Erwin Ong wed May Joan Erasmo Ong (Erasmo)
in a civil ceremony. After four months, Ong left
their conjugal dwelling to live with his mistress. As
a result, Erasmo moved back to her parents' house
and eventually left for work in Dubai. Meanwhile,
Ong and his mistress converted to Islam in June
2002, then they got married in Muslim rites. Ong
was charged with bigamy. His defense was that he
could not be prosecuted for bigamy because he had
converted to Islam before contracting a subsequent
marriage.
Court held that Ong committed bigamy
the moment he contracted his subsequent marriage
without his first marriage being judicially declared
null and void.
Ratification of Marital Cohabitation
Rex M. Tupal v. Judge Remegio V. Rojo, A.M.
No MTJ-14-1842, FEBRUARY 24, 2014
Judge Rojo notarized without authority. On the
basis that you cannot notarized a marriage for 5
year cohabitation and solemnize it as well.
Court held that as a solemnizing officer, the judge's
only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is
to examine whether the parties have indeed lived
together for at least five years without legal
impediment to marry. The guidelines does not state
that the judge can notarize the parties' affidavit of
cohabitation. Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are
documents not connected with the judge's official
function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent
with the duty to examine the parties' requirements
for marriage."
Lack of Marriage License
Republic v. CA, 236 SCRA 257
Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were
married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge
Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City.
The marriage was celebrated without the
knowledge of Castro's parents. There was no
marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage. Angelina Castro went
to the local civil registrar and no records can be
found.
The court demands a certificate of due search and
inability to find sufficiently proved that his office
did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the
contracting parties. It is noteworthy to mention
that the ending of the appellate court that the
marriage between the contracting parties is null and
void for lack of a marriage license does not discount
the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license,
purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig,
may have been presented by Cardenas to the
solemnizing officer.
Bigamous or Polygamous Marriages
Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galena Marinay,
etc., G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona,
Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a
sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona,
and they never went to Carmona to apply for a
license with the local civil registrar of the said place.
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage
ceremony twice in a span of less than one year
utilizing the same marriage license. In fact, for the
second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they
presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the
marriage contract executed during the previous
wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall.
Psychological Incapacity
Salita v. Magtolis
They then got separated and applied for annulity of
marriage. Respondent claims that there was a
license. However, petitioner had a mistress with 3
children.
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was
amenable and a willing participant to all that took
place at that time.
R. Velasco v. N. Velasco
The spouses here have been childless for more than
10 years. They have subjected themselves to
medical examinations to know the cause of their
childlessness. The husband was found to be sterile
due to a low sperm count while the wife herself has
admitted to also being barren. Thus, they agreed to
adopt the child born out of wedlock of 19 year-old
Yvonne Tan.
The Supreme Court said that at the time of his
marriage, he was not psychologically prepared to
accept his incapacity, or that of his wife, to bring
children to the world, and psychologically incapable
of facing the reality of a childless marriage, although
this incapacity only manifested when, obsessed
with the desire of having a child, he had himself and
his wife medically examined.
Ching Ming Tsoi v. CA
Spouses were married for 10 months. Despite this,
the marriage was never consummated.
The Supreme Court said that one of the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy
the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity”
Republic v. CA & Molina
A year after getting married, the husband showed
signs of immaturity and irresponsibility, observed
from his tendency to spend time with his friends
and squandered money with them, his dependency
from his parents for financial aid and dishonesty in
matters involving finances. Her husband then
abandoned her and their child. The wife filed for
annulment on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
The Supreme Court said that difficulty if not
outright refusal or neglect in the performance of
some marital obligations and irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities don't
constitute psychological incapacity.
Marcos v. Marcos
Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson
Marcos were married twice and had five children.
After the downfall of President Marcos, the
respondent left the military service in 1987.
Consequently, due to the respondent’s failure to
engage in any gainful employment, they would
often quarrel and the respondent would hit and
beat the petitioner. As a result, in 1992 they were
already living separately.
The totality of the respondent’s acts does not lead
to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his
part. There is absolutely no showing that his
“defects” were already present at the inception of
the
Rumbaua v. Rumbaua
Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner) filed a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage
against the Edward Rumbaua (respondent) alleging
that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of
marriage as shown by the following circumstances:
the respondent reneged on his promise to live with
her under one roof after finding work; he failed to
extend financial support to her; he blamed her for
his mother’s death; he represented himself as single
in his transactions; and he pretended to be working
in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another
woman in Novaliches, Quezon City.
The court find the totality of the petitioner’s
evidence insufficient to prove that the respondent
is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties
expected of him as a husband.
Aspillaga v. Aspillaga
Rodolfo Aspillaga, petitioner, filed a petition for
annulment of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora. He
averred that Aurora failed to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Rodolfo claimed
their marriage was "tumultuous." He described
Aurora as domineering and frequently humiliated
him even in front of his friends, was a spendthrift
as she overspent the family budget and made
crucial family decisions without consulting him.
Rodolfo added that Aurora was tactless, suspicious,
given to nagging and jealousy.
In the instant case, while the psychological
examination failed to reveal that these personality
traits or psychological conditions were grave or
serious enough to bring about an incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. This
Court is convinced that indeed both parties were
both found to have psychological disorders,
nevertheless, there is nothing in the records
showing that these disorders are sufficient to
declare the marriage void due to psychological
incapacity.
Imprescriptibility of Action or Defense
Engrace Ninal, et. al. v. Norma Bayadog, G.R.
No. 133778, Mar 14, 2000
After their father’s death, his heirs from the first
marriage collaterally attacked the validity of his
second marriage on account of being void for want
of a valid marriage license. SC ruled that the action
for the annulment of marriage survives the death of
the parties. Heirs may collaterally attack the validity
of marriage if it is essential for the determination of
the decedent's legitime.
Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, G.R. No.
173614, Sept. 28, 2007
The heirs of Spouses Enrico filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage of their
deceased father, Eulogio and Trinidad.
Court ruled that as a general rule, only the
contracting parties may file for a petition for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage. The heirs'
course of action is only to collaterally attack the
validity of the 2nd marriage in a proceedings for the
disposition of the decedent's estate.
Nullity of Previous Marriage; Final Judgment,
Basis For Purposes of Remarriage
Wiegel v. Sempio - Diy, 143 SCRA 499; August
19, 1986
After Karl Heinz Wiegel filed for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia
Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia’s previously
existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion. Lilia,
the wife admitted that the existence of the prior was
null and void as she and first husband Eduardo
Maxion was forced to enter the said marital union.
SC ruled that there is no need to prove that
her first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against both parties because assuming this to be so,
the marriage will not be void but merely voidable.
Since no annulment has yet been made when she
married the 2nd time, she was still validly married to
her first husband. Her 2nd marriage is void
Terre v. Terre, 211 SCRA 7, July 2, 1992
Complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent
Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with
“grossly immoral conduct,” consisting of
contracting a second marriage and living with
another woman while his prior marriage with
complainant remained subsisting. No judicial
action having been initiated or any judicial
declaration obtained as to the nullity of marriage.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself
by claiming that he had believed in good faith that
his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre
was null and void ab initio and that no action for a
judicial declaration of nullity was necessary. The
court ruled the claim of “no action for a judicial
declaration of nullity was necessary” on the part of
respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense.
Domingo v. CA Sr Delia Auera, GR No. 104818,
Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA 572
Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a "Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property"
against petitioner Roberto Domingo after knowing
that husband had a previous marriage, is valid and
still existing. The court ruled that the nullification
of a marriage for the purpose of contracting
another cannot be accomplished merely on the
basis of the perception of both parties or of one
that their union is defective. Were this so, this
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a
mockery and would rest on a very shaky foundation.
Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., A.M, No. MTJ-92- 708,
March 29, 1995,243 SCRA 32
Respondent judge was sleeping with the wife of the
complainant so the latter filed Gross Immorality
and Appearance of Impropriety. The judge denied
having been married because their marriage was
celebrated twice without marriage license. On his
marriage to De Castro in a civil rite was executed
because he believed in good faith and for all legal
purposes, his first marriage was solemnized without
marriage license. He argues that Article 40 of the
Family Code is not applicable in his case because
his first marriage in 1965 was governed by the Civil
Code and his second marriage in 1991 was under
the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.
Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said
Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This
is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested
right that was impaired by the application of Article
40 to his case.
Valdes v. RTC, GR No. 122749 July 31 1996; 260
SCRA 221
The marriage of Antonio Valdez and Consuelo
Gomez was declared null and void on the ground
of psychological incapacity. The trial court directed
the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation
of their common properties as defined by Article
147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the
provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same
code.
The court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless
of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article
148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code
and not Article 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code.
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family
Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to
voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void
marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage
contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage
before the latter is judicially declared void.
People v. Vicente Cobar, CA - G.R. No. 19344,
Nov. 10, 1997
A marriage was solemnized a year after issuance of
marriage license. Respondent later contracted a
second marriage but his first had not been judicially
declared void ab initio
The Supreme found that they have used an expired
marriage license their marriage was deemed
solemnized without a license and as such it is void
from the beginning. SC said that Vicente is not
liable for bigamy, subsequent marriage to 2nd wife
is void because of the failure to comply for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the former marriage and
the registration of the judgement with the civil
registry. Even if marriage is void, the declaration is
needed before any party can marry again
Apiag v Contero, 268 SCRA 61
Defendant judge left the conjugal home without
any reason and left the wife to raise the children.
They later learned that the Judge had another family
and when the wife asked for support but she was
ignored by the Judge.
The respondent judge did not obtain judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage to Maria Apiag
prior to his second marriage. Even if a marriage
though void still needs a judicial declaration of such
fact before any party can marry again otherwise the
second marriage will also be void.
Bobis v. Bobis, GR No. 138509, July 31, 2000
Respondent Isagani Bobis contracted his
first marriage with Maria Javier, without the first
marriage annulled or nullified he again contracted
another marriage with petitioner Imelda Bobis and
allegedly a third marriage with certain Julia
Hernandez. An information of bigamy was filed
against Isagani based on Imelda's complaint.
Respondent Isagani then a civil action of judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage
on the ground that it was celebrated without a
marriage license. Petitioner moved to quash the
civil case pending the criminal case of bigamy
The court ruled that he was still legally married
when he contracted his second marriage with the
petitioner. The decision in the civil action would
not erase the fact that he contracted his second
marriage with the petitioner, thus the decision in
the civil case is not essential to the determination of
the criminal case of bigamy therefore it is not a
prejudicial question.
Mercado v. Tan, G.R. No 137110 August 1, 2000
Dr. Vicente Mercado was previously
married with Thelma Oliva in April 10, 1976 before
he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in June
27, 1991. Tan then filed a bigamy case against Dr.
Mercado and one month after, Dr Mercado filed
for an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Oliva. The RTC decision in 1993 declared
the marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and
void.
SC ruled that the filing of declaration of nullity
should be done before contracting another
marriage. Mercado was already married to Tan but
he did not file a declaration of nullity of marriage
with Oliva until Tan filed a case of Bigamy. The
crime had been consummated by then, to file a
petition to have his first marriage void after Tan
charged him with bigamy is not defense in a bigamy
case.
Ty v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127406, Nov.
27, 2000
Edgardo Reyes and Anna Villanueva were married
twice, in civil rites and in church, in 1977. Both
weddings were declared null and void ab initio for
lack of marriage license and consent of the parties.
Even before the decree nullifying the marriage was
issued, Reyes contracted another marriage. The
decree was only issued in August 1980. In January
1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his
marriage with petitioner be declared null and void.
SC ruled that decree of nullity is required. Both
marriages entered by Reyes were solemnized prior
to the Family Code. The old Civil Code did not
have any provision that states that there must be
such a declaration before remarriage can be done
hence 2nd marriage is valid. The provisions of the
Family Code (which took effect in 1987) cannot be
applied retroactively especially because they would
impair the vested rights of 2nd wife under the Civil
Code which was operational during her marriage
with Reyes.
Te v. CA, G.R. No. 126746, November 29, 2000
Petitioner contracted another marriage while still
married to Liliana. Hence, Liliana filed a bigamy
case against Te and administrative case for the
revocation of his and his mistress’ engineering
license. Te filed a petition for nullity of marriage.
RTC rendered a decision on the bigamy case even
the petition for annulment was pending.
SC ruled that the annulment case had no bearing on
Te’s guilt in the bigamy case. The ground cited by
Te for the annulment was for voidable marriage.
Hence, he was still validly married when he
committed bigamy.
Susan Nicdao Carino v. Susan Yee Carino, GR
No. 132529, Feb. 2, 2001
During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S.
Carino, he contracted two marriages. The second
wife admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took
place during the subsistence of, and without first
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the
marriage between husband’s first.
The court sustained that the 2nd marriage between
is null and void for the same has been solemnized
without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of the first. Under Article 40, if a party
who is previously married wishes to contract a
second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a
judicial decree declaring the first marriage void,
before he or she could contract said second
marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be
void.
Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6,
2004
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete got married in
1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and
filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which
was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago.
He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity on the ground that there was
no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged
with bigamy. He claimed that his marriage with
Barrete was void ab initio and contented he
contracted second marriage in good faith.
Court ruled that considering that the first marriage
was void ab initio makes Morigo acquitted in the
Bigamy case. Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void
ab initio considering that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed
a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need
to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage
when he contracted his second marriage with
Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is
acquitted in the case filed.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 150758,
February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 272
Petitioner has contracted 3 marriages. Petitioner
was charged with a case of bigamy to which he then
defended himself saying that her previous marriage
was not valid as there was no solemnization and
that the second marriage is also void on the
grounds of him being psychologically incapable of
exercising marriage obligations.
SC ruled that the court of appeals has ruled
correctly as Tenebro had not obtained all the
necessary requirements to nullify the previous
marriage. Without having complied with the
necessary requisites in order for him to be able to
acquire the ability of being married for the second
time, he has contracted the second marriage in
violation to the RPC and must be held liable for the
crime of bigamy.
People of the Philippines v. Edgardo V.
Odtuhan, G.R. No. 1911566, July 17, 2013
Respondent married Modina in 1980 and in 1993,
contracted marriage to Alagon. In 1994, he filed
for annulment of marriage his marriage with
Modina and was granted by RTC for lack of
marriage license. In 2003, before death of his wife,
he was charged for bigamy by a private complainant.
SC ruled that Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Lasanas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
159031, June 23, 2014
Petitioner was married to first wife without the
benefit of a marriage license or an affidavit of
cohabitation. He separated de facto with first wife
in 1992 and married again in 1993. In 1996, he filed
a complaint for annulment of marriage with first
wife and while pending, the first wife filed a case of
bigamy against him.
Court used Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
which indicates that the provision penalizes the
mere act of contracting a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, Oct. 8, 2014
Husband filed for the presumptive death of her
wife in order to remarry in 2008. He contends that
after his wife left to work as a domestic helper in
Hong Kong, he has never heard from her for 12
years. He claims to have exerted efforts to locate
her but even her relatives don't know of her
whereabouts. His petition was granted. On the
other hand, wife petitioned for an annulment of
judgment as the allegations of her husband were
false as she was never absent.
The issue is on the appropriate remedy that must
be filed by the wife in order to dismiss her
presumptive death as filed by her husband for the
purpose of not only terminating the subsequent
marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the
declaration of presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of
reappearance would not suffice. Wife's choice to
file an action for annulment of judgment will,
therefore, lie.
Social Security Commision v. Azote, G.R. No.
209741, April 15, 2015
Respondent filed her claim for death benefits with
the SSS as wife of a deceased-member. The SSS
records, however, show that an earlier submission
by the deceased provides for a different wife-
beneficiary and therefore, her claim was denied by
the Social Security Commission.
Court ruled that SSS is not intrinsically empowered
to determine the validity of marriages, it is required
by Section 4 (b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282 to examine
available statistical and economic data to ensure
that the benefits fall into the rightful beneficiaries."
Norberto A. Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No.
207406, January 13, 2016
Wife discovered that Husband was previously
married as evidenced by a marriage contract
registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice
subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy
against Norberto.
Court ruled that the Certification from the Office
of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the
marriage license is suspect. Assuming that it is true,
it does not categorically prove that there was no
marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not
dissolved through mere certifications by the civil
registrar. For more than seven (7) years before his
second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his
alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity.
Even when this case was pending, he did not
present any decision from any trial court nullifying
his first marriage.
Validity of Void Marriage Collaterally Attacked
De Castro v. De Castro, GR No. 160172, Feb. 13,
2008
Reinel and Annabelle applied for a marriage license
in September 1994. When the couple went back to
the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage
license had already expired. Thus, in order to push
through with the wedding despite of absence of
marriage license, they executed an affidavit stating
that they lived together for at least five years. But,
they did not live together as husband and wife.
Annabelle gave birth to a daughter, and filed a
complaint for support against petitioner alleging
that she is married to petitioner and that the latter
has a responsibility or obligation to financially
support her as his wife and their child.
Reinel denied that they are married and claimed that
the marriage is void ab initio because the affidavit
they jointly executed is a fake. The trial court ruled
that the marriage is not valid because it was
solemnized without a marriage license. However, it
declared petitioner as the natural father of the child,
and thus obliged to give her support.
Court ruled the marriage is void ab initio. The false
affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed
so they could push through with the marriage has
no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a
marriage license renders their marriage void ab
initio
Santiago v. People of the Philippines, GR. No.
200233, July 15, 2015
4 months after solemnization of marriage, Leonila
(petitioner) and Nicanor Santiago were served an
information for Bigamy for the prosecution
adduced that Nicanor was still married to Estela
when he entered into the 2nd marriage. She claimed
that she thought he was single. She soon averred
that their marriage was void due to lack of marriage
license, wherein she should not then be charged
with bigamy. Estela Galang, the first wife, testified
that she had met petitioner and introduced herself
as the legal wife.
Lower courts consistently found that petitioner
indeed knew of the first marriage as shown by the
totality of the following circumstances: (1) when
Nicanor was courting and visiting petitioner in the
house of her in-laws, they openly showed their
disapproval of him (2) it was incredible for a
learned person like petitioner to not know of his
true civil status (3) Estela, who was the more
credible witness, compared to petitioner who had
various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly
testified that she had already told petitioner on two
occasions that the former was the legal wife of
Nicanor. In People v. Archilla, knowledge of the
second wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing
prior marriage, constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of Bigamy, which
makes her responsible as an accomplice. She is not
co-accused.
Declaration of Presumptive Death/ Requisite
for Remarry
Republic v. Nolasco, GR No. 94053, March 17,
1993, 220 SCRA 20
Gregorio Nolasco was a seaman who married a
British citizen named Janet Parker, they established
residence in Antique but Janet left the country after
giving birth to her son. After 5 years, Gregorio filed
for a presumptive declaration of death of his absent
spouse before the RTC.
SC believes that respondent Nolasco failed to
conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a ""well-founded belief""
that she is dead.” Nolasco did not even ask for the
help of Liverpool police, talking only the “friends
of Janet”, who were not named. He did not conduct
a ‘reasonably diligent search’.
Principle: In order to establish well-founded belief
of the death of an absent spouse, a reasonably
diligent search must be conducted
Calisterio v. Calisterio, GR No. 13646 , April 6,
2000
Marietta Calisterio’s successional rights of her late
husband’s estate was assailed by her husband’s
sister Antonia Calisterio, who alleged that
Marietta’s marriage to her brother was null and void
because Marietta was previously married to James
Bounds- a man who had disappeared 11 years
before Marietta and Antonia’s brother Teodorico
got married.
SC ruled that since the code in effect during the
time this marriage (1958) was solemnized was the
civil code and not the Family code, a judicial
declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary, as long as the prescribed period of
absence is met (7 consecutive years).
Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, GR. No. 160258,
Jan 19, 2005
9 years after leaving husband due to being violent,
habitual-drinker, who could not get properly
employed because he opted to go out with his
friends more, Gloria filed for a declaration of
presumptive death of her husband.
Gloria Bermudez established sufficient factual basis
for the judicial declaration of his husband’s death,
and was given a final and executory judgement by
the RTC. The Supreme Court no longer ruled on
this issue, it was the substantive issue of the
declaration of the judgement as final and executory.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, et. al., GR No,
163604, May 6, 2005
Clemente P. Jomoc, an absentee spouse who left
his wife for nine years, is declared presumptively
dead by Ormoc City RTC upon the petition of his
wife Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc in her desire to
contract a valid subsequent marriage. The Republic,
through OSG, contends that under Article 41 of
the Family Code such declaration is not a special
proceeding requiring a record on appeal.
SC ruled that since the purpose was to contract a
valid subsequent marriage, the petition required a
summary proceeding following Art. 41 Par. 2,
whereby filing of a Notice of Appeal is sufficient in
seeking to appeal the RTC’s order.
Eduardo Manuel v. People, GR No. 165842,
November 29, 2005
Eduardo P. Manuel contracted second
marriage in good faith after 20 years of no
communication with his first wife, believing that his
first marriage was no longer valid. After finding out
from NSO of his subsistent first marriage he was
charged with bigamy by his second wife.
SC ruled that petitioner should have
adduced in evidence a decision of a competent
court declaring the presumptive death of his first
wife as required by Art. 349 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Art 41 of the Family Code. It is
one of the means to ensure the procurement of the
most positive evidence of the presumptive death of
the absentee spouse.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, et. al., GR No,
159614, Dec 8, 2009
Alan B. Alegro, not hearing from his wife
for 6 years, petitioned for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Rosalia (Lea) A.
Julaton for the purpose of contracting subsequent
marriage, which the RTC granted.
SC ruled that respondent did report and
seek the help of the local police authorities and the
NBI to locate his wife, but only as an afterthought.
In respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-
founded belief that his wife is already dead and that
he exerted the required amount of diligence in
searching for his missing wife, the RTC should
have denied the husband’s petition.
SSS v. Vda de Bailon, GR No. 165545, March 24,
2006
Clemente G. Bailon petitioned for the declaration
of presumptive death of his wife after more than 15
years of absence. Close to 10 years after the
declaration, Bailon contracted second marriage and
upon his death the second wife was able to claim
the death benefits. The first wife eventually
emerged and attested that she is the widow of
Bailon whom he left when she found out his
extramarital affair, and that she only knew recently
of the petition for her to be declared presumptively
dead.
Action for annulment became extinguished as soon
as one of the 3 persons involved had died as
provided in Art. 87 Par. 2. It cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding and only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after the
death of either. Upon the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good
ab initio. As no step was taken to nullify, in
accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s
marriage prior to former’s death, respondent is
rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of
Bailon.
Effects of Reappearance
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No, 187061, Oct. 8, 2014
Husband Ricardo filed judicial declaration of
presumptive death against his wife Celerina, who
sought work abroad and was not heard of, as he has
already remarried. Wife then filed for annulment of
judgment for husband's misrepresentation of her
whereabouts. Celerina refuted that it was the
husband who left the conjugal home to live with his
girlfriend, that she never left the country to work
abroad. CA said wife should have filed for
presumption of reappearance instead.
Court ruled that for the purpose of not only
terminating the subsequent marriage but also of
nullifying the effects of the declaration of
presumptive death, mere filing of an affivadit of
reappearance would not suffice. Case was
remanded to the CA.
Voidable Marriages/ Consent Obtained
through Fraud
Almelor v. Regional Trial Court, G.R. No.
179620, August 26, 2008
Wife Leonida filed petition for nullity of marriage
due to psychological incapacity (homosexuality)
against her husband Manuel. RTC nullified
marriage not based on Art. 36 but on Art. 45.
Manuel, thereafter, filed for annulment of
judgment with the CA. CA said the remedy sought
was wrong, it should have been an ordinary appeal.
SC rule that the stringent rules of procedures may
be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial
justice and in the Court's exercise of equity
jurisdiction. SC granted petition, reversed appealed
decision and dismissed petition in the trial court of
annul the marriage.
Consent Obtained by Force, Intimidation or
Undue Influence
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 505 SCRA, Oct.
27, 2006
Orlando Villanueva filed for nullity of marriage
forced upon him by Lilia, who at that time was
pregnant, and that he never cohabitated with her
nor got her pregnant. RTC ruled in favor of the
wife who stated that husband freely married her.
CA affirmed RTC's decision, making husband pay
exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs.
The Court is not convinced that appellant's
apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter
voluntarily to a contract of marriage as the
appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. It is
reasonable to know that the appellant knew the
rudiments of self-defense. Exemplary damages is
allowed only in addition to moral damages. Private
respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her
claim for moral damages, likewise she is not entitled
to exemplary damages.
Republic of the Philippines v. Albios, G.R. No.
198780, Oct. 16, 2013
Albios filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Fringer. She described her
marriage as one made in jest since the purpose of
their marriage was for personal gain, which is
foreign citizenship for Albios and $2,000 for
Fringer.
Court ruled that consent by both parties were
conscious and intelligent since they understood the
nature, and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent
was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage since there was clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so
as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship.
Physical Incapacity for Consummating the
Marriage
Alcazar v. Alacazar, G.R. No. 174451, Oct. 13,
2009
Petitioner filed for an annulment of marriage due
to the respondent’s physical incapacity of
consummating their marriage; respondent did not
live with petitioner in her home. Respondent then
left for Riyadh to work and never communicated
with petitioner
No evidence was presented to establish that
respondent was in any way physically incapable to
consummate his marriage with petitioner.
Petitioner even admitted that she and the
respondent had sexual intercourse after their
wedding and before respondent left for abroad
Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent
inability on the part of the spouses to perform the
complete act of sexual intercourse. No physical
incapacity, no ground for annulling petitioner’s
marriage to respondent
No Declaration of Default
Tuazon v. CA, GR No. 116607, April 10, 1996,
256 SCRA 160, .70 SCAD 132
Respondent filed a petition for annulment or
declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner
Petitioner failed to appear on the scheduled hearing
and on oral motion of private respondent, the court
declared petitioner to have waived his right to
present evidence and deemed the case submitted
for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
Trial court rendered judgement declaring the nullity
of private respondent’s marriage to petitioner and
awarding custody of the children to private
respondent.
Petitioner claims he was denied due process when,
after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings,
the trial court deemed him to have waived his right
to present evidence and rendered judgement on the
basis of the evidence of private respondent
Court said that relief will not be granted to a party
who seeks avoidance from the effects of the
judgement when the loss of the remedy at law was
due to his own negligence. Petitioner was not
declared in default by the trial court for failure to
answer since petitioner filed his answer to the
complaint and contested the cause of action alleged
by private respondent
Ma. Lourdes De Castro v. De Castro, Jr., G.R.
No. 172198, June 16, 2009
Husband filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of their marriage. For failure of wife to file her
answer to the petition. The case was set for hearing.
RTC annulled the marriage. Wife failed to present
any evidence. As ordered and on the motion of
petitioner’s counsel deemed to have waiver her
right to present any further evidence. Wife claimed
that her reasons for her absence during hearings
were justifiable
SC rule that the situation is not akin to default at all,
where, for failure of defendant to file his responsive
pleading and after evidence for the plaintiff has
been received ex parte, the court renders a
judgment by default on the basis of such evidence.
Effects of Annulment
Ledesma v. Intestate Estate of Cipriano
Pedrosa, 219 SCRA 806
Angelica Ledesma's marriage to Cipriano Pedrosa
was declared a nulled; properties acquired by
plaintiff and Angelica Ledesma at the time they
were living together as common-law husband and
wife is owned by them as co-owners. Pending
receipt by the court of the ordered inventory,
Cipriano Pedrosa died. A separate petition for the
probate of his last will and testament was filed. Due
to disagreement of the parties on the
characterization of the properties, the court in the
partition proceedings ordered (30 March 1990) the
submission of comments, objections and
manifestations on the project of partition
submitted by the parties.
The respondent presiding judge is directed to
determine which of the properties of the conjugal
partnership should be adjudicated to the husband
and the wife
Domingo v. CA & Delia Auera, GR No., 104818,
Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA 572
Petitioner and Teofilo were brother’s who inherited
a lot of lands that was divided to both of them.
When Teofilo died Petitioner filed for a petition to
annul the marriage of Teofilo and Felicidad for
there was no marriage license.
SC ruled that ONLY a spouse can initiate an action
to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized
during the effectivity of the Family Code, except
cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. SC set
aside the ruling of the RTC.
Ablaza vs. Republic
The petitioner filed for the nullity of the marriage
of his late brother Cresenciano and Leonila Honata
for he alleged that there was no marriage license.
Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to
marriages covered by the Family Code, which took
effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural
rule that is prospective in application, is confined
only to proceedings commenced after March 15,
2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano
and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949,
the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law
in effect at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
Bolos vs. Bolos
Petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition
for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36
of the Family. RTC granted the petition for
annulment
Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to
marriages covered by the Family Code, which took
effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural
rule that is prospective in application, is confined
only to proceedings commenced after March 15,
2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano
and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949,
the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law
in effect at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
Office of the administrator vs. Hon. Liberty O.
Castaneda
Honorable Liberty O. Castaneda and some of his
workmates are being charged by the Office of the
administrator for negligence of duty. Further
investigation of these cases revealed various
irregularities in the proceedings.
SC ruled that Hon. Judge Liberty O. Castaneda was
found guilty in his disregarding the provision. Judge
Castañeda allowed the petitions for nullity of
marriage or annulment to prosper despite the
impropriety of venue. The audit showed that most
of the parties in these petitions are not actual
residents of the places under the territorial
jurisdiction. A number of the addresses reflected on
the pleadings are incomplete or vague, some are
handwritten, typewritten or super-imposed on
blanks, or even left completely blank. Many of the
respondents raised the issue of improper venue,
which Judge Castañeda ignored. Because of this he
was dismissed from service without pension.